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		INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR 
      ATTACK REPORT 
      OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
      OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
      PURSUANT TO 
      S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress A concurrent resolution to 
      investigate the attack on Pearl 
      Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and 
      circumstances relating thereto. II III JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
		HARBOR ATTACK ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, ChairmanJERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
 WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
 SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
 OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
 HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
 J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
 JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
 BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
 FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
 COUNSEL(Through January 14, 1946)
 WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
 GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
 JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
 JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
 (After January 14, 1946)SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
 SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
 JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
 EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
 LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
 IV LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESWashington, D.C., July 16, 1946
 Hon. Kenneth McKellar,President pro tempore of the Senate.
 Hon. Sam Rayburn,
 Speaker of the House of Representatives.
 Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent 
      Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, 
      the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl 
      Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete 
      investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances 
      leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon 
      Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned
      and respectfully submits herewith its report.
 Sincerely yours,
 ALBEN W. BARKLEY,Chairman.
 JERE COOPER,Vice Chairman.
 V                           
       CONTENTS
 Foreword ...........................................................  
      xi
 
      Introductory statement ............................................ xiii 
      Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack ..........    
      1Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................    
      1
 Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ..    
      4
 Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggression ......................................................  10
 Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................  
      13
 Japanese proposal of May 12 ......................................  
      14
 Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ...................  
      15
 Temporary cessation of negotiations ..............................  
      16
 Freezing of assets ...............................................  
      18
 Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye 
      ...................................  19
 Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 .........................  
      26
 Advent of the Tojo Cabinet .......................................  
      28
 Arrival of Saburo Kurusu .........................................  
      30
 Negotiations versus deadlines ....................................  
      32
 Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi ..........  
      32
 United States memorandum of November 26 ..........................  
      38
 Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy November 28 to December 7 
      .....................................................  42
 Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington ....................  
      43
 Conclusions ......................................................  
      47
 
      
      Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath .....................  
      53Formulation of the plan and date for execution ...................  
      53
 Nature of the plan ...............................................  
      54
 Departure for the attack .........................................  
      56
 Execution of the attack ..........................................  
      57
 Air phase 
      .....................................................  57
 Submarine phase 
      ...............................................  62
 Withdrawal of the striking force .................................  
      63
 Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result of the attack 
      ..................................................  64
 Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result of the attack 
      ..................................................  65
 Japanese losses ..................................................  
      65
 Summary comparison of losses .....................................  
      65
 State of readiness to meet the attack ............................  
      66
 Attack a surprise 
      ..............................................  66
 Personnel 
      ......................................................  66
 Antiaircraft 
      ...................................................  67
 Aircraft 
      .......................................................  68
 Action taken following the attack ................................  
      68
 Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............  
      69
 Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............  
      70
 Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and Hawaiian defensive forces 
      ......................................  70
 
      Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  
      75Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  
      75
 Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack 
      ...........  75
 General Short's awareness of danger from air attack 
      ............  79
 Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier 
      .............  81
 Concept of the war in the Pacific 
      ..............................  87
 Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air attack 
      .......................................................  88
 Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the imminence of war 
      ..............................................  89
 Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the imminence of war 
      .............................................. 100
 Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders from Washington 
      ............................................... 103
 Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval 
      Operations ....... 103
 Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval 
      Operations ...... 104
 The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 
      ................... 104
 Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
 On where the attack might come 
      .............................. 107
 Other dispatches received on November 27 
      .................... 108
 "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral 
      Kimmel ....... 109
 The "War warning" and training 
      .............................. 110
 The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to 
      institute distant reconnaissance 
      .................................... 110
 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
 Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the warning dispatch of November 27 
      ............................... 119
 No warning of attack on Hawaii 
      .............................. 120
 Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage 
      .................... 121
 "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoidance of war" 
      ........................................ 123
 Commanding general's reliance on the Navy 
      .................... 125
 Interference with training 
      ................................... 125
 The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
 The Short reply ................................................. 128
 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dispatch 
      ...................................................... 129
 The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
 General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by Japanese consulate 
      ......................................... 131
 The "Lost" Japanese carriers Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
 The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
 Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
 Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
 Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
 Channels of intelligence 
      ..................................... 142
 The "Manila message" 
      ......................................... 142
 The Honolulu press 
      ........................................... 142
 The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
 Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
 Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
 
      
      Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
 Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
 Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
 "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
 Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
 Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
 The "Magic" 
      .................................................. 179
 Policy with respect to dissemination of magic 
      ................ 180
 "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
 Nature of consular espionage 
      ................................. 181
 Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports 
      ........ 189
 The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
 "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
 The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
 Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28, 1941 
      ............................................. 195
 Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of November 27 
      ................................................... 198
 Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
 The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
 Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
 The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
 Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
 The "Pilot message" 
      ........................................... 210
 The fourteen part memorandum 
      .................................. 211
 First thirteen parts 
      ........................................ 211
 Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts 
      proper .... 212
 Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" 
      messages apart from messages proper 
      ................................ 219
 The fourteenth part 
      ....................................... 221
 "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
 Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch 
      ...... 224
 Choice of facilities 
      ......................................... 225
 Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages 
      ................................................... 226
 Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
 Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses 
      ..................... 228
 Considerations responsible for delays in translations 
      ......... 230
 Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in Washington which was not supplied Hawaii 
      ...................... 232
 Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
 Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
 Duties in Hawaii 
      ............................................. 237
 Duties in Washington 
      ......................................... 238
 Unity of command ................................................ 240
 General observations ............................................ 245
 The "Wyman Matter" 
      ........................................... 245
 The Philippine Attack 
      ........................................ 246
 Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack 
      ........... 246
 
      
      Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251
 Recommendations ................................................. 252
 Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation 
      .......................................... 253
 Operational and intelligence work requires 
      centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of 
      responsibility ...... 254
 Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything 
      for granted in the alerting of 
      subordinates ................... 254
 Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given 
      information should always be resolved in favor of 
      supplying the information 
      ............................................... 255
 The delegation of authority or the issuance of 
      order's entails the duty of inspection to 
      determine that the official mandate is properly 
      exercised .................... 255
 The implementation of official orders must be 
      followed with closest supervision 
      ....................................... 256
 The maintenance of alertness to responsibility 
      must be insured through repetition 
      ................................ 256
 Complacency and procrastination are out of place 
      where sudden and decisive action are of the 
      essence ............. 257
 The coordination and proper evaluation of 
      intelligence in times of stress must be insured by 
      continuity of service and centralization of responsibility 
      in competent officials 
      ................................................. 257
 The unapproachable or superior attitude of 
      officials is fatal: There should never be any 
      hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in 
      seeking advice on  matters that are in doubt 
      ................................. 258
 There is no substitute for imagination and 
      resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and 
      intelligence officials ..... 259
 Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness 
      ....................... 259
 There is great danger in careless paraphrase of 
      information received and every effort should be 
      made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the 
      true meaning of the original 
      .................................................. 260
 Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet 
      the exigencies of unusual situations 
      .......................... 261
 Restriction of highly confidential information to 
      a minimum number of officials, while often 
      necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing 
      the work of the organization 
      .............................................. 261
 There is great danger of being blinded by the 
      self-evident .. 262
 Officials should at all times give subordinates 
      the benefit of significant information 
      ................................ 262
 An official who neglects to familiarize himself 
      in detail with his organization should forfeit 
      his responsibility ... 263
 Failure can be avoided in the long run only by 
      preparation for any eventuality 
      ....................................... 263
 Officials, on a personal basis, should never 
      countermand an official instruction 
      ...................................... 263
 Personal or official jealousy will wreck any 
      organization ... 264
 Personal friendship, without more, should never 
      be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused 
      therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper 
      functioning of two or more agencies 
      .................................................. 264
 No considerations should be permitted as excuse 
      for failure to perform a fundamental task 
      ............................. 265
 Superiors must at all times keep their 
      subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, 
      subordinates should keep their superiors informed 
      ............................. 285
 The administrative organization of any 
      establishment must be designed to locate failures and to 
      assess responsibility .. 265
 In a well-balanced organization there is close 
      correlation of responsibility and authority 
      .............................. 266
 Committee members signing the report ............................ 266
 Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266
 
      Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor 
      Attack .......................................................... 269The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269
 The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269
 The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269
 The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270
 The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270
 The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270
 The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271
 
      Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275Organization and personnel of War Department 
      .................. 275
 Army Air Forces 
      ............................................. 275
 Organization and personnel of Navy Department 
      ................. 276
 Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department 
      ............. 276
 Hawaiian Air Force 
      .......................................... 277
 Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet 
      ........................................ 277
 Organization and personnel of Fourteenth 
      Naval District .... 278
 List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 
      .................... 278
 List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify before the Joint Committee and their 
      assignments as of December 7, 1941 
      ......................................... 279
 
      Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285 
      Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291Introductory statement 
      ........................................ 291
 Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the Atlantic Conference 
      ..................................... 293
 The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) 
      .................. 300
 President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression 
      and at the same time offers to resume the 
      Japanese-American conversations (August 17, 1941) 
      ............................. 302
 Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27, 1941) 
      ........................................... 305
 Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) 
      .... 306
 Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
 President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September 3, 1941) 
      ........................................... 310
 Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
 Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 
      314
 Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) 
      ........................................... 316
 The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals (October 2, 1941) 
      ............................................. 319
 Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the  Tripartite Pact (October 1941) 
      ................................ 325
 The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941) 
      ......................................................... 326
 The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (November 5, 1941) 
      ............................................ 331
 Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) 
      ........ 335
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) 
      ........... 337
 Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November 10, 1941) 
      ........................................... 344
 The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 18-19, 1941) 
      ........................................ 355
 Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States and demands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) 
      ........................................... 360
 The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
 The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-American conversations and at the same time moves additional
 Japanese troops into southern Indochina  (November 27- December 7, 1941) 
      ................................ 387
 The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) 
      ......................... 405
 Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States (November 29, 1941) 
      ............................. 409
 President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) 
      .... 411
 President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 
      415
 The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by the Chinese (December 5, 1941) 
      ................................ 421
 The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
 
      Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469
 Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471
 Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 
      .............................................. 471
 Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 
      .............................................. 475
 
      Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army installations ................................................... 489Geographical considerations 
      ................................... 489
 Navy and Army installations 
      ................................... 490
 Navy 
      ........................................................ 490
 Army 
      ........................................................ 491
 Illustrations 
      ................................................. 499
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