INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress

A concurrent resolution to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto.

II

III

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin

COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel

IV

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1946

Hon. Kenneth McKellar,
President pro tempore of the Senate.
Hon. Sam Rayburn,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session,  the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl  Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete  investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances  leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon  Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned and respectfully submits herewith its report.

Sincerely yours,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman.

JERE COOPER,
Vice Chairman.

V                          

CONTENTS

Foreword ...........................................................  xi

Introductory statement ............................................ xiii

Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack ..........    1
  Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................    1
  Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ..    4
  Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggression ......................................................  10
  Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................  13
  Japanese proposal of May 12 ......................................  14
  Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ...................  15
  Temporary cessation of negotiations ..............................  16
  Freezing of assets ...............................................  18
  Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ...................................  19
  Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 .........................  26
  Advent of the Tojo Cabinet .......................................  28
  Arrival of Saburo Kurusu .........................................  30
  Negotiations versus deadlines ....................................  32
  Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi ..........  32
  United States memorandum of November 26 ..........................  38
  Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy November 28 to December 7 .....................................................  42
  Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington ....................  43
  Conclusions ......................................................  47

Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath .....................  53
  Formulation of the plan and date for execution ...................  53
  Nature of the plan ...............................................  54
  Departure for the attack .........................................  56
  Execution of the attack ..........................................  57
     Air phase .....................................................  57
     Submarine phase ...............................................  62
  Withdrawal of the striking force .................................  63
  Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result of the attack ..................................................  64
  Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result of the attack ..................................................  65
  Japanese losses ..................................................  65
  Summary comparison of losses .....................................  65
  State of readiness to meet the attack ............................  66
    Attack a surprise ..............................................  66
    Personnel ......................................................  66
    Antiaircraft ...................................................  67
    Aircraft .......................................................  68
  Action taken following the attack ................................  68
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............  69
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............  70
  Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and Hawaiian defensive forces ......................................  70

Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  75
  Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  75
    Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ...........  75
    General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............  79
    Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier .............  81
    Concept of the war in the Pacific ..............................  87
    Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air attack .......................................................  88
  Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the imminence of war ..............................................  89
  Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 100
  Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders from Washington ............................................... 103
      Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
      Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
      The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
  Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
      On where the attack might come .............................. 107
      Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
      "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
      The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
      The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
  Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
      No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
      Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
     "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
     Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
     Interference with training ................................... 125
  The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
  The Short reply ................................................. 128
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dispatch ...................................................... 129
  The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
  General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
  The "Lost" Japanese carriers Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
  The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
  Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
  Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
  Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
     Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
     The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
     The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
  The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
  Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
  Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153

Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159
  Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
  Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
  Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
  "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
  Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
  Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
     The "Magic" .................................................. 179
     Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180
  "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
     Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181
     Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189
  The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
  "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
  The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
  Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195
  Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of November 27 ................................................... 198
  Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
  The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
  Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
  The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
  Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
    The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210
    The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211
      First thirteen parts ........................................ 211
      Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212
      Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages apart from messages proper ................................ 219
        The fourteenth part ....................................... 221
  "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
     Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224
     Choice of facilities ......................................... 225
     Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages ................................................... 226
  Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
    Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228
    Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230
  Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232
  Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
  Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
     Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237
     Duties in Washington ......................................... 238
  Unity of command ................................................ 240
  General observations ............................................ 245
     The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245
     The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246
     Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246

Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251
  Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251
  Recommendations ................................................. 252
  Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation .......................................... 253
      Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254
      Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254
      Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information ............................................... 255
      The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255
      The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision ....................................... 256
      The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition ................................ 256
      Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257
      The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials ................................................. 257
      The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on  matters that are in doubt ................................. 258
      There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259
      Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259
      There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the original .................................................. 260
      Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261
      Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization .............................................. 261
      There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262
      Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information ................................ 262
An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263
      Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality ....................................... 263
      Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction ...................................... 263
      Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264
      Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies .................................................. 264
      No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265
      Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed ............................. 285
      The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265
      In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority .............................. 266
  Committee members signing the report ............................ 266
  Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266

Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack .......................................................... 269
  The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269
  The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269
  The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269
  The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270
  The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270
  The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270
  The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271

Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275
    Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275
      Army Air Forces ............................................. 275
    Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276
    Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276
      Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277
    Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277
       Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278
    List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278
    List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279

Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285

Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
    Introductory statement ........................................ 291
    Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
    The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
    President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
    Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
  Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
 Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
  President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
  Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
  Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
  Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
  The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
  Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the  Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
  The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941) ......................................................... 326
  The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
  Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
  Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
  The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
  Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States and demands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
  The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
  The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-American conversations and at the same time moves additional  Japanese troops into southern Indochina  (November 27- December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
  The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
  Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
  President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
  President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
  The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
  The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424

Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469
  Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469
  Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471
  Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471
  Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475

Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army installations ................................................... 489
    Geographical considerations ................................... 489
    Navy and Army installations ................................... 490
      Navy ........................................................ 490
      Army ........................................................ 491
    Illustrations ................................................. 499

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