| 20              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 (2) For "suspension of its (the United States') military measures in the
 southwest Pacific area";
 
 (3) For the exercise of good offices by the United States for the
 initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China;
 
 (4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement
 between Japan and China;
 
 (5) For recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in
 Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops.
 
 Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that Japan
 would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its good
 offices between China and Japan, to discontinue aid to China. The
 Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the proposal of the
 President to which it was allegedly responsive. It asked either
 expressly or by implication that the United States remove the
 restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its defensive
 preparations in the Philippines; discontinue furnishing military
 equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their
 far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and
 acquiesce in Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military
 position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in
 Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals
 which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary
 to the principles to which this Government was committed. The Japanese
 Government in return offered not to station Japanese troops in regions
 of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain
 its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period.
 There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the
 United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security
 of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area.
 
 On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan's Ambassador that the Japanese
 proposal was not responsive to the President's proposal of July 24.
 Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it might be possible for
 President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with a view to discussing
 means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments.
 [61] This suggestion was made pursuant to a dispatch from Tokyo to
 Ambassador Nomura which related in pertinent part: [62]
 
 "We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the
 situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing
 each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay
 their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to
 determine a way out of the present situation.
 
 "In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of
 just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to
 this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and
 converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.
 
 "Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we
 sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific."
 
 The sincerity of Japan's desire for peace and the appraisal of any hopes
 for a satisfactory settlement from such n meeting necessarily had to be
 viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an intercepted
 dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura: [63]
 
 [61] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p, 344.
 [62] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12
 [63] Id., at p. 10.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      21
 
 "Thus, *all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a
 determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the
 Tripartite Pact*. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of
 an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of
 those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no
 time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action."
 
 On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally observed
 to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the strained relations
 between the United States and Japan from further deterioration would be
 through a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime
 Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal was urged upon our
 Ambassador for the reason that premature announcement of the meeting
 would result in the project being "torpedoed" by certain elements in
 Japan. The Japanese Government's concern for preserving the secrecy of
 the proposed meeting between the President and Premier Konoye is fully
 evinced in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September
 3, 1941: [64]
 
 "Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made
 known to the public, *that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial
 talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the
 Tripartite Pact banner*.
 
 "In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald-
 Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier
 and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you
 can well imagine.
 
 "The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does
 it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said
 conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a
 secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are
 aware that such a policy is not limited to just this ease.
 
 "Because of the circumstances being what they are we would like to make
 all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with
 all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as
 soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any
 early date would meet with our approval.)
 
 "Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us
 the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue
 a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that
 this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please
 advise the United States of this plan."
 
 The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting between
 the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret for the
 reason that premature disclosure would result in frustration of the move
 by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubt that there
 existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts designed to achieve
 an improvement in relations with the United States. [65] Further,
 secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the additional
 purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her Axis
 partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be undertaken
 which would in any way compromise Japan's commitments under the
 Tripartite Pact.
 
 [*There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comprehensive review
 of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and
 related matters, during the critical period from the Atlantic Conference
 through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facts made public by this
 committee, to which reference is hereby made.*]
 
 In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that
 President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the
 
 [64] Id., at p. 25.
 [65] See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173.
 
 22              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been
 discussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the President
 and Prime Minister Churchill that more time was needed by both the
 United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against Japanese
 attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps should be taken
 to warn Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr.
 Churchill were in agreement that this Government should be prepared to
 continue its conversations with the Government of Japan and thereby
 leave open to her a reasonable and just alternative to the aggressive
 course which she had mapped out for herself.
 
 Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the
 President on August 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one
 pointing out that the principles and policies under discussion in
 conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force
 or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further
 steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of
 force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States
 would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring
 the security of the United States. [66] In the second document reference
 was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese
 Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion of
 August 8 that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Minister meet with a
 view to discussing means for adjustment of relations between the United
 States and Japan. Reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention
 not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country
 except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic
 principles to which the United States had long been committed and of its
 intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting
 aggression.
 
 It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese
 Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage
 the working out of a progressive program involving the application to
 the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial
 opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries
 to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a
 program would contemplate cooperation by all nations of the Pacific
 toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and
 economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and
 toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of
 living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed
 that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the
 program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan
 satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with a far
 greater measure of certainty than could any other program. The statement
 was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend
 its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark
 upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program
 and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government
 of the United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal
 exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and would be
 glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to
 
 [66] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 656.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         23
 
 exchange news. It was also stated that, before renewal of the
 conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the
 two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would
 furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present
 attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of
 force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the
 Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations."
 
 On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a message from
 Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of the Governments of
 the United States and Japan to discuss all important problems in the
 Pacific. This message was accompanied by a statement of the Japanese
 Government in which assurances were given, with several qualifications,
 of Japan's peaceful intentions and her desire to seek a program for the
 Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States
 had long been committed. The qualifications were voiced in the following
 terms: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from
 Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is
 established in east Asia"; Japan would take no military action against
 the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the
 Soviet Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo
 or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty"; the
 Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation"
 military force against any neighboring nation. [67]
 
 On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the
 following "oral statement." [68]
 
 "Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government
 communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the
 President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a
 meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of
 the Government of the United States to discuss important problems
 between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in
 an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of
 the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of
 the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly
 as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting
 and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important
 questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In
 further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States
 in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as
 follows:
 
 "On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory
 conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the
 Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental
 principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which
 all relations between nations should properly rest. These four
 fundamental principles are as follows:
 
 "1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each
 and all nations.
 
 "2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs
 of other countries.
 
 "3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of
 commercial opportunity.
 
 "4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status
 quo may be altered by peaceful means.
 
 "In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to
 make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States
 Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these
 principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be
 assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and
 ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United
 States and other countries, and that only upon
 
 [67] Id., at pp. 346, 347.
 [68] Id., at pp. 589-59l.
 
 24              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would
 be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.
 
 "The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the
 statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the
 Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28
 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and
 assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area
 consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United
 States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the
 informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United
 States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has
 given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political
 expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or
 preferences by force.
 
 "The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating
 in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the
 Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United
 States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be
 taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of
 Japan and of the United States might mate to collaborate toward a
 peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the
 conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of
 State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked
 "Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of
 the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled
 further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there
 were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were
 divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained
 unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The
 Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a
 conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear
 agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any
 satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an
 indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with
 regard to the fundamental questions under reference.
 
 "It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on
 policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country
 and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will
 surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not
 enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the
 principles in which the American people in fact all nations that prefer
 peaceful methods to methods of force believe.
 
 "The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of
 the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth."
 
 The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister was
 handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows: [69]
 
 "I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27,
 which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.
 
 "I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in
 regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of
 the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.
 
 "I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish
 to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the
 swiftly moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as
 rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a
 meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring
 about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.
 
 "In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made
 to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long
 been committed, and it was declared that the Japanese Government
 "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in
 the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true
 peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout
 the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and
 sought by Japan itself."
 
 "I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these
 principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this
 matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of
 developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing
 upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular
 moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence
 in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if
 
 [69] Id., at pp. 591, 592.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          
      25
 
 widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to
 successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am
 sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I
 feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view,
 that it would seem highly desirable that *we take precaution, toward
 ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring
 to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and
 essential questions on which we seek agreement*. The questions which I
 have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical
 application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance
 of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement
 accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this
 suggestion."
 
 The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the Japanese
 Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of fundamental and
 essential questions was deliberate and well considered. Secretary Hull
 testified fully concerning the considerations attending the decision:
 [70]
 
 "A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe [70a] would have been
 a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our
 Government involved several important considerations.
 
 "We knew that *Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous*. We
 asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the
 civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of
 expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the
 civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took
 aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past
 and contemporary record was replete with instances of military
 aggression and expansion by force. *Since 1931 and especially since 1937
 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national
 policy*.
 
 "Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance
 was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently
 unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce
 Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan
 would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through
 self-defense in the European war. *They held on to the threat against
 the United States implicit in the alliance*.
 
 "Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the
 conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a *practice of offering
 general formulas* and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had
 consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This
 suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized
 formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down
 the general assurances.
 
 "A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would
 have had important psychological results.
 
 "It would have had a *critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese*.
 
 "If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the
 Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to
 utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which
 Japan might choose to place upon them.
 
 "*If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese
 military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the
 United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.*
 
 "The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps
 toward reversion to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the
 President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of
 Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of
 establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.
 
 "It was clear to us that *unless the meeting produced concrete and
 clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted
 the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this
 country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.*
 
 "The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be
 overlooked.
 
 "He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China
 and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its
 principal cities and industrial regions.
 
 "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S.
 Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.
 
 [70] Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of
 events and circumstances attending the proposed meeting between
 President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D.
 
 [70a] It is to be noted that except in those instances where the name
 appears in direct quotations, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is
 spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe.
 
 26              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious
 outrages in Nanking in 1937.
 
 "He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon
 which the Japanese Government, even throughout the 1941 conversations,
 stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those
 principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese
 troops in North China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a
 permanent stranglehold on China.
 
 "He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in
 1940 with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying
 the stranglehold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
 
 "Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minster when Japan signed the
 Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.
 
 "As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a
 period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their
 course of conquest, *we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with
 Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all,
 unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move
 in a peaceful direction*. I was opposed to the first Munich and still
 more opposed to a second Munich.
 
 "Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the
 realities in the situation.
 
 "Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel
 thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in
 view of the factors mentioned the President could go to such a meeting
 only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some
 assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe
 nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. [71]"
 
 JAPANESE PROPOSALS OF 
      SEPTEMBER 6 AND 27
 
 On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the following
 proposal: {72]
 
 "The Government of Japan undertakes:
 
 "(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters
 which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United
 States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;
 
 "(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French
 Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,
 without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any
 regions lying south of Japan;
 
 "(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the
 European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-
 defense, and, in ease the United States should participate in the
 European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by
 Japan shall be independently decided;
 
 "(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of
 general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the
 realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from
 China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between
 Japan and China;
 
 "(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not
 be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;
 
 [71] The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea
 of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister
 whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned desirability.
 After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye
 observed: "Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently.
 Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day (August 4,
 1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover,
 anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came
 in writing, as follows:
 
 " 'If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of
 the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire,
 which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened.
 At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be
 created. For these reasons the meeting is not considered a suitable
 move. The attempt to surmount the present artificial situation by the
 Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere
 respect and admiration. *If, therefore it is the Prime Minister's
 intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support
 the basic principles embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan
 and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United
 States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even
 after this final effort is made the army is not necessarily in
 disagreement.*
 
 " 'However (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making
 preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with
 someone other than the President such as Secretary Hull or one in a
 lesser capacity; (2) *you shall not resign your post as a result of the
 meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be
 prepared to assume leadership in the war againat America.'*
 
 "The War Minister was of the opinion that 'failure of this meeting is
 the greater likelihood.' " See committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31.
 [72] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 608, 609.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      27
 
 "(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be
 carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of
 nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will
 cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of
 natural resources in the said area which it needs;
 
 "(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of
 normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in
 connection with the above mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue
 immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control
 regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of
 reciprocity.
 
 "The Government of the United States undertakes:
 
 " "(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment
 expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain
 from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour
 by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;
 
 " "(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment
 expressed in point (f) referred to above;
 
 " "(e) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the
 Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
 
 " "(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement]
 reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above
 by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with
 regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the
 passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." "
 
 Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the foregoing
 Japanese proposal: [73]
 
 "On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of
 proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given
 in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the
 September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula
 with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a
 qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable
 reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No
 commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan
 would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to
 respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from
 interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops
 indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of
 nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula
 contained in the draft that "the economic activities of the United
 States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued* on an
 equitable basis" [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the
 conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were
 henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan.
 [74]"
 
 From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held between
 Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On September 27, Ambassador
 Nomura presented a complete redraft of the Japanese proposals of
 September 6, following the form of the American proposals of June 21. On
 October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the proposals made by the Japanese
 Ambassador during September, handing the Ambassador an "oral statement"
 reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining
 our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese
 proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the
 principles to which this country was committed. He said: [75]
 
 "Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the
 outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to
 Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese
 troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the
 Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting
 between the President and the Japanese Prime
 
 [73] Committee record, pp. 1118,1119.
 [74] The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial
 conference was held at which were determined the basic principles of the
 Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the
 understanding that in case there was no way found for attainment of
 Japanese demands by early in October of 1941 the Empire should at once
 determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United
 States Great Britain and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173.
 [75] Committee record, pp. 1124-1126.
 
 28              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a
 meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles
 so as to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated
 in conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime
 Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active
 interest of the President and that it was the President's earnest hope
 that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that
 such a meeting could be held.
 
 "During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces
 in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and
 speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian
 populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of
 extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of
 Japanese leaders. For example, Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the
 naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on
 October 16 as having declared in a public speech:
 
 " "America, feeling her insecurity * * * , is carrying out naval
 expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry
 out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.
 
 " "*The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all
 necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for
 action, when needed.*
 
 " "In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now
 approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends
 upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our
 Navy should set about on its primary mission." "
 
 It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull's
 position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of
 September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo: [76]
 
 "Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be
 passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the
 matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President
 to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be
 settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever
 conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past
 eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies
 once, and that they are as "two in one." "
 
 ADVENT OF THE TOJO CABINET
 
 The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on the
 following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo. On October
 17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted manifesting a
 disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the negotiations: [77]
 
 "The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I
 wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts
 you have made.
 
 "The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is
 true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the
 matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However,
 regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the
 United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.
 There shall be no changes in this respect.
 
 "Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single
 purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.'
 
 The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the
 arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist
 Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary Hull as
 follows. [78]
 
 "On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by
 Maj. Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto:
 
 " "Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American
 question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and
 establishment of a common coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains
 unaltered.
 
 [76] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27.
 [76a] For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see
 Appendix D.
 [77] Id., at p. 76.
 [78] Committee record, pp. 1127-34.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      29
 
 " "For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to
 reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means.
 There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may
 end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people
 must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation."
 
 "Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of
 aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions.
 
 "On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American
 Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations
 be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to
 make progress, the United States should face certain realities and
 facts," and here thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese
 armed forces.
 
 "The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it
 desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to
 defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on
 for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of
 State to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement with the
 Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to
 prevent a break-down in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the
 way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese
 of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would
 also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad
 faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we
 could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the
 same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles.
 
 "In the last part of October and early November messages came to this
 Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese
 attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the
 United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a
 similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United
 States issue a warning to Japan.
 
 "At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4
 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial
 situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this,
 even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could
 not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost
 consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our
 hard-pressed Chinese friends.
 
 "I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese
 appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
 Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an
 estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this
 estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
 recommended:
 
 " "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention
 against Japan in China be disapproved.
 
 " "That material aid to China be accelerated constant with the needs of
 Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
 
 " "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
 to the maximum practicable extent.
 
 " "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
 
 "I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the
 Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be
 sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American
 foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China
 should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American
 Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely
 in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been
 striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and to explore
 every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United
 States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the
 President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.
 
 "On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
 in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the
 memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
 Operations. The Generalissimo was told that from our information it did
 not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately
 imminent. It was indicated that American air units could not be sent and
 that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined
 ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
 Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist
 China.
 30              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 "On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the
 President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask
 some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me
 and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for
 about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over
 fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that
 in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on
 the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I
 finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my
 estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the
 critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that
 the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a
 development.
 
 "Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on
 November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted
 with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic,
 but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of
 the world on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than
 the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense
 
 "On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated
 that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced
 more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the
 same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations
 bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking
 high both in the East and in the West" he said and were threatening,
 more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He
 warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;
 that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."
 
 "Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo
 Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the
 conversations.
 
 "On November 7, the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing
 draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces
 in Indochina, and the principle of nondiscrimination. That proposal
 contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from
 the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government
 
 "In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in
 Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks
 which might make inevitable war with the United States
 
 "In the first half of November there were several indeterminate
 conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On
 November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible
 joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I
 pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement
 we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that
 Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a
 general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of
 what her leaders professed to desire.
 
 "On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador
 Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be
 brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the
 pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their
 outstanding proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese
 Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that
 it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums.
 
 "On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the
 Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the
 President."
 
 ARRIVAL OF SABURO KURUSU
 
 Mr. Kurusu in his initial conversation with President Roosevelt and
 Secretary Hull indicated that Prime Minister Tojo desired a peaceful
 adjustment of differences. At the same time it was clear that Kurusu had
 nothing new to suggest concerning Japan's participation in the
 Tripartite Pact or the presence of her troops in China. The President
 reiterated the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two
 countries and to effect a peaceful settlement of divergent positions in
 the Pacific. The Secretary of State, setting forth his comments at the
 conference, stated: [79]
 
 [79] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 740, 741.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      31
 
 "Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the
 Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in
 discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth,
 which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a
 peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to
 her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself
 to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would
 not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries
 interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against
 Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact
 and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of
 invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand
 airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited
 invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that
 danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this
 country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that
 danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too
 late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know
 whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country
 feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten,
 twenty-five, or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when
 Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that
 she has no opinion on the subject I said that I cannot get this view
 over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we
 are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her
 present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political
 difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties
 in connection with this country's relations with Japan."
 
 In a further conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on
 November 18, Secretary Hull's observations were related in the following
 terms: [80]
 
 "The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and
 Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether
 any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an
 alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said
 that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of
 congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits
 some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut
 agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would
 be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He
 pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the
 establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that
 this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to
 offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that
 frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of
 reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but
 rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand
 and take the consequences."
 
 During the discussion Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu suggested the
 possibility of a modus vivendi or a temporary arrangement to tide over
 the abnormal situation. [81] They offered as a possibility return to the
 status prevailing prior to July 26, 1941, when Japanese assets in the
 United States were frozen following Japan's entry into southern French
 Indochina. To this suggestion, Secretary Hull replied: [82]
 
 "I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the
 strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we
 would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina
 would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I
 said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in
 removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely
 started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I
 said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on
 this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my
 talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited
 arrangement."
 
 [80] Id., at p. 363.
 [81] See committee record, p. 1135.
 [82] Id.
 
 32              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 NEGOTIATIONS VERSUS DEADLINES
 
 In a conversation with the Secretary of State on November 19, the
 Japanese emissaries made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the
 Tripartite Alliance and regarded herself as bound to carry out its
 obligations. Through all of the discussions it was evident that Japan
 was pressing for an early decision. In a series of "deadlines" (now
 known to have been keyed to the contemplated departure of the task force
 that struck Pearl Harbor) contained in intercepted messages from Tokyo
 to Washington the urgency of the negotiations was explained:
 
 November 5, 1941, circular No. 736. [83]
 
 "Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all
 arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th
 of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
 circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this
 thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations
 from falling into chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and
 with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
 
 "This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."
 
 November 11, 1941, circular No. 762. [84]
 
 "Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be
 indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the
 exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that
 the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under
 present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is
 essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session
 of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following
 day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear
 picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You
 can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that
 time is indeed becoming short.
 
 I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view
 "of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking
 to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do
 everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. Attitude in
 the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your
 power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.*
 
 "We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not
 they will accept our final proposal A."
 
 November 22, 1941, circular NO. 812. [85]
 
 "To both you Ambassadors.
 
 "It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
 No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard.
 Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and
 try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your
 ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
 the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
 conversations with the Americans, *if the signing can be completed by
 the 29th* (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent
 notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
 Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished,
 we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the
 dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are
 automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful
 consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the
 present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."
 
 JAPANESE 
      ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND THE MODUS VIVENDI
 
 During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the Japanese
 Ambassador presented a proposal which was in fact an ultimatum, reading
 as follows: [86]
 
 [83] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
 [84] Id., at p. 116.
 [85] Id., at p. 165.
 [86] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, pp. 366, 367.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      33
 
 "1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
 make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
 Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
 China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
 
 "2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now
 stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace
 between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in
 the Pacific area.
 
 "In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to
 remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
 China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of
 the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final
 agreement.
 
 "3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a
 view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which
 the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
 
 "4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to
 restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
 freezing of the assets.
 
 "The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required
 quantity of oil.
 
 "5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such
 measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
 restoration of general peace between Japan and China."
 
 In his testimony Secretary Hull observed with respect to the foregoing
 proposal: [87]
 
 "On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a
 proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high
 officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied
 to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final
 Japanese proposition *an ultimatum*.
 
 "The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to
 Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing
 measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and
 for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese
 Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed
 forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no
 limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina
 and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either
 the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of
 an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations
 against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia
 and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions
 which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive
 activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of
 Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal
 contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to
 revert to peaceful courses."
 
 There can now be no question that Japan intended her proposal of
 November 20 as an ultimatum. It was their final proposal [88] and a
 deadline of November 25, subsequently changed to November 29, had been
 set for its acceptance. It was a proposal which the Government of Japan
 knew we could not accept. It was the final gesture of the Tojo Cabinet
 before launching the vast campaign of aggression which the military
 overlords of Japan had long before decided upon.
 
 The critical situation culminating in consideration of a modus vivendi
 was revealed by Secretary Hull: [89]
 
 "On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had
 information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest
 point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands
 Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new
 landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had
 information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese
 Government had decided that the negotiations must
 
 [87] Committee record pp. 1136-1138.
 [88] In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 19
 the Japanese Government stated in referring to the ultimatum presented
 to the United States on the following day: "If the United States consent
 to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to he broken off;
 therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best
 efforts." Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 155.
 [89] Committee record pp. 1138-1141.
 
 34              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew
 from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not
 intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with
 Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government
 had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that
 the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final
 proposal."
 
 "*The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed
 movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental
 principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world*. By
 midsummer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were
 determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had
 made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It
 was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we
 might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were
 armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever
 they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental
 principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being at
 least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made
 without fighting.
 
 "*There was never any question of this country forcing Japan to fight.
 The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its
 principles.*
 
 "To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly
 unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in
 Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with
 Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the
 United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant
 abject surrender of our position under intimidation.
 
 "*The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our
 Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a
 peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as
 the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need
 of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling
 for a showdown*.
 
 "There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in
 their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.
 
 "The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically
 vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.
 
 "Three possible choices presented themselves.
 
 "Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese war lords could
 then have told their people that the American Government not only would
 make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.
 
 "Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In
 that event the Japanese war lords would be afforded a pretext, although
 wholly false, for military attack.
 
 "Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.
 
 "The last course was the one chosen."
 
 Full consideration was given by officials of our Government to a
 counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including the
 thought of a possible modus vivendi. It was recognized that such an
 arrangement would demonstrate the desire of the United States for peace
 and at the same time afford a possible opportunity for the Army and Navy
 to continue its preparations. From November 22 to 26 the President,
 State Department, and the highest military authorities discussed a modus
 vivendi, a first draft being completed on November 22. Revised drafts
 were prepared on November 24 and 25. The final draft of November 25,
 which is being set forth in its entirety in view of the testimony that
 has been adduced concerning it, was as follows: [90]
 
 "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
 Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
 informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
 settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
 based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing
 among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability
 of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
 principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
 countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial
 opportunity and
 
 [90] See Committee Exhibit No. 18.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK        35
 
 treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation
 and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of
 controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
 peaceful methods and processes.
 
 "It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
 reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
 peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently, the
 Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
 of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
 peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
 creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
 conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in
 effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the
 Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus
 vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary
 steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal
 intercourse between Japan and the United States.
 
 "On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary
 of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken
 respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the
 United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
 accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain
 features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the
 fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
 consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
 committed.
 
 "The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute
 to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to
 afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the
 Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of
 peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the
 Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the
 Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus
 vivendi, as follows:
 
 "MODUS VIVENDI
 
 "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,
 both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their
 national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
 throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
 therein.
 
 "2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they
 have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force
 into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern
 or the northern Pacific area.
 
 "3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces
 now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those
 forces; to reduce the total of its force in French Indochina to the
 number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land,
 or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
 
 "The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the
 position of the Government of the United States with regard to the
 presence of foreign troops in that area.
 
 "4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify
 the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
 extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the
 United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their
 peoples:
 
 "(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the
 sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the
 purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at
 Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese
 obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds
 in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood
 that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in
 transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption
 of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.
 
 "(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
 
 "(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided
 for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two
 Governments may agree.
 
 "(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such
 limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of
 commodities in short supply in the United States.
 
 "(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in
 value per month.
 
 36               
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 "(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations
 the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in
 short supply in the United States.
 
 "(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of
 petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a
 monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum
 to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined
 after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is
 understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the
 operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting,
 heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
 
 "(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and
 additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as
 it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering
 the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the
 Pacific area.
 
 "The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application
 of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary
 to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as
 provided for in paragraph 4 above.
 
 "6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach
 the Australian, British, and Dutch Governments with a view to those
 Governments taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4
 above.
 
 "7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,
 the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in
 reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the
 Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions
 and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and
 exemplify the fundamental principles of peace law, order, and justice,
 which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between
 the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and
 which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
 
 "8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months
 with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance
 of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful
 settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the
 modus vivendi for a further period."
 
 The tentative modus vivendi was submitted for consideration to the
 Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. The
 ultimate decision to abandon it was made for reasons best set forth in
 Secretary Hull's testimony: [91]
 
 "On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the
 considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus
 vivendi aspect.
 
 "As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of
 November 24 and of November 25, contained two things: (1) The possible
 modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested
 example of how those principles could be applied that which has since
 been commonly described as the 10-point proposal.
 
 "I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese
 military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were
 demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended
 later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme,
 last-word proposal of November 20.
 
 "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other
 high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal
 was remote.
 
 "So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese,
 it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton,
 oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared
 with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.
 
 "It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American
 opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the
 supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese
 Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments
 were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable
 or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that
 the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major
 blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear
 that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did
 not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it,
 especially the serious
 
 [91] Committee Record, pp. 1146-1147.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          
      37
 
 risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of
 disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the
 modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.
 
 "The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were
 being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the
 other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing
 Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to
 restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered
 all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and
 mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to
 Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It
 still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's
 decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually
 extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic
 effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be
 worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort
 should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful
 settlement.
 
 "In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I
 recommended to the President and he approved my calling in the Japanese
 representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while
 withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon
 of that day."
 
 The very serious reaction of the Chinese to the suggested modus vivendi
 is clearly set forth in a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from an
 American adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking: [92]
 
 "After discussion with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's
 conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently
 advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have
 never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or
 unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in
 China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in
 China would dismay the Chinese. Any "modus vivendi" now arrived at with
 Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to
 the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British
 prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the
 resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against
 occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or
 increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at
 this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's
 fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the
 Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if
 the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of
 Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory."
 
 There is no possibility whatever that the modus vivendi would have been
 accepted by the Japanese. In an intercepted dispatch of November 19 [93]
 the Japanese Ambassadors suggested to Tokyo that there were three
 courses open to the Empire: (1) maintain the status quo, (2) break the
 "present deadlock" by an advance under force of arms, or (3) devise some
 means for bringing about a mutual nonaggression arrangement. In favoring
 the third alternative it was stated:
 
 "* * * as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by 4
 years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident,
 is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long-drawn-out
 warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a
 temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the
 prelude to greater achievement to come later * * *."
 
 Replying to the foregoing suggestion, Tokyo advised on November 20 [94]
 that "under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested
 by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for
 
 [92] Communication from Owen Lattimore in Chungking to Lauchlin Currie,
 Presidential Assistant handling Chinese matters, in Washington. See
 Committee exhibit No. 18.
 [93] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 158.
 [94] Id., at p. 160.
 
 38              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 saving the present situation. We see no prospects for breaking the
 deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines
 of the latter part of our No. 798. [95] Please understand this. The
 Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion."
 
 It is significant to note that when Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility
 of a modus vivendi to Secretary Hull on November 18, the Japanese
 ambassadors very obviously had not consulted their Tokyo superiors. When
 they did on November 19, Tokyo replied the following day rejecting the
 idea completely, as indicated above.
 
 Writing in his diary for November 25, 1941, Secretary Stimson, in
 referring to the tentative draft of a modus vivendi, clearly indicated
 an appreciation of the fact that it would not be acceptable to the
 Japanese: [96]
 
 "At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull
 showed us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay
 before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our
 interests, I thought as I read it, but l don't think there is any chance
 of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for
 the propositions which they were to do, namely, to at once evacuate and
 at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no
 aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give
 them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian
 population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil."
 
 Had our Government submitted the tentative modus vivendi, it is clear
 that Japan would have rejected it, and Chinese morale and resistance
 would very probably have been seriously impaired if not destroyed.
 
 UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM 
      OF NOVEMBER 26
 
 The modus vivendi was designed to accompany a statement of principles
 with a suggested example of how the principles could be applied. With
 the decision not to propose a modus vivendi, the Secretary of State on
 November 26 presented to the Japanese Ambassador its accompanying
 material which was as follows: [97]
 
 "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
 Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
 informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
 settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
 based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among
 nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of
 territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
 principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
 the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity
 and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international
 cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement
 of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
 peaceful methods and processes.
 
 "It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
 reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
 peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the
 Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
 of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
 peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
 creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
 conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in
 effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the
 Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador
 communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary
 measures to be taken respec-
 
 [95] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155.
 [96] See committee record, pp. 14417, 14418.
 [97] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 766-770.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         39
 
 tively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United
 States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
 accomplish the purposes above indicated.
 
 "The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to
 contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in
 the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of
 discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a
 broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals
 which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain
 some features which, in the opinion of this Government conflict with the
 fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
 consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
 committed. The Government of the United States believes that the
 adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the
 ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in
 the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve
 our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the
 fundamental principles already mentioned.
 
 "With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for
 the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but
 simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical
 exemplification of *a program which this Government envisages as
 something to be worked out during our further conversations.*
 
 "The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap
 between our draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September
 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a
 comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing
 with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we
 have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for
 worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress
 toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be
 expedited.
 
 "OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
 JAPAN
 
 "SECTION I DRAFT MUTUAL DECLARATION OF POLICY
 
 "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both
 being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national
 policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the
 Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that
 they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using
 military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,
 accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and
 give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon
 which their relations with each other and with all other governments are
 based:
 
 " "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
 sovereignty of each and all nations.
 
 " "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
 other countries.
 
 " "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
 opportunity and treatment.
 
 " "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and
 conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies
 and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and
 processes."
 
 "The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have
 agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing
 recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will
 actively support and practically apply the following principles in their
 economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
 
 " "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial
 relations.
 
 " " (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and
 abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade
 restrictions.
 
 " "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw-
 material supplies
 
 " "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming
 countries and populations as regards the operation of international
 commodity agreements.
 
 " "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and
 arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential
 enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may
 permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of
 all countries."
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