20
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) For "suspension of its (the United States') military measures in the
southwest Pacific area";
(3) For the exercise of good offices by the United States for the
initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China;
(4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement
between Japan and China;
(5) For recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in
Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops.
Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that Japan
would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its good
offices between China and Japan, to discontinue aid to China. The
Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the proposal of the
President to which it was allegedly responsive. It asked either
expressly or by implication that the United States remove the
restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its defensive
preparations in the Philippines; discontinue furnishing military
equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their
far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and
acquiesce in Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military
position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in
Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals
which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary
to the principles to which this Government was committed. The Japanese
Government in return offered not to station Japanese troops in regions
of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain
its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period.
There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the
United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security
of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area.
On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan's Ambassador that the Japanese
proposal was not responsive to the President's proposal of July 24.
Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it might be possible for
President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with a view to discussing
means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments.
[61] This suggestion was made pursuant to a dispatch from Tokyo to
Ambassador Nomura which related in pertinent part: [62]
"We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the
situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing
each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay
their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to
determine a way out of the present situation.
"In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of
just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to
this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and
converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.
"Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we
sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific."
The sincerity of Japan's desire for peace and the appraisal of any hopes
for a satisfactory settlement from such n meeting necessarily had to be
viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an intercepted
dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura: [63]
[61] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p, 344.
[62] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12
[63] Id., at p. 10.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21
"Thus, *all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a
determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the
Tripartite Pact*. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of
an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of
those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no
time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action."
On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally observed
to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the strained relations
between the United States and Japan from further deterioration would be
through a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime
Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal was urged upon our
Ambassador for the reason that premature announcement of the meeting
would result in the project being "torpedoed" by certain elements in
Japan. The Japanese Government's concern for preserving the secrecy of
the proposed meeting between the President and Premier Konoye is fully
evinced in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September
3, 1941: [64]
"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made
known to the public, *that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial
talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the
Tripartite Pact banner*.
"In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald-
Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier
and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you
can well imagine.
"The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does
it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said
conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a
secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are
aware that such a policy is not limited to just this ease.
"Because of the circumstances being what they are we would like to make
all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with
all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as
soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any
early date would meet with our approval.)
"Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us
the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue
a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that
this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please
advise the United States of this plan."
The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting between
the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret for the
reason that premature disclosure would result in frustration of the move
by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubt that there
existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts designed to achieve
an improvement in relations with the United States. [65] Further,
secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the additional
purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her Axis
partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be undertaken
which would in any way compromise Japan's commitments under the
Tripartite Pact.
[*There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comprehensive review
of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and
related matters, during the critical period from the Atlantic Conference
through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facts made public by this
committee, to which reference is hereby made.*]
In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that
President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the
[64] Id., at p. 25.
[65] See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173.
22
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been
discussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the President
and Prime Minister Churchill that more time was needed by both the
United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against Japanese
attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps should be taken
to warn Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr.
Churchill were in agreement that this Government should be prepared to
continue its conversations with the Government of Japan and thereby
leave open to her a reasonable and just alternative to the aggressive
course which she had mapped out for herself.
Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the
President on August 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one
pointing out that the principles and policies under discussion in
conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force
or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further
steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of
force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States
would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring
the security of the United States. [66] In the second document reference
was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese
Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion of
August 8 that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Minister meet with a
view to discussing means for adjustment of relations between the United
States and Japan. Reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention
not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country
except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic
principles to which the United States had long been committed and of its
intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting
aggression.
It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese
Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage
the working out of a progressive program involving the application to
the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries
to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a
program would contemplate cooperation by all nations of the Pacific
toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and
economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and
toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of
living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed
that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the
program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan
satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with a far
greater measure of certainty than could any other program. The statement
was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend
its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark
upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program
and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government
of the United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal
exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and would be
glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to
[66] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 656.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 23
exchange news. It was also stated that, before renewal of the
conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the
two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would
furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present
attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of
force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the
Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations."
On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a message from
Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of the Governments of
the United States and Japan to discuss all important problems in the
Pacific. This message was accompanied by a statement of the Japanese
Government in which assurances were given, with several qualifications,
of Japan's peaceful intentions and her desire to seek a program for the
Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States
had long been committed. The qualifications were voiced in the following
terms: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from
Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is
established in east Asia"; Japan would take no military action against
the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the
Soviet Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo
or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty"; the
Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation"
military force against any neighboring nation. [67]
On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the
following "oral statement." [68]
"Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government
communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the
President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a
meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of
the Government of the United States to discuss important problems
between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in
an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of
the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of
the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly
as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting
and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important
questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In
further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States
in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as
follows:
"On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory
conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the
Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental
principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which
all relations between nations should properly rest. These four
fundamental principles are as follows:
"1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each
and all nations.
"2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs
of other countries.
"3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of
commercial opportunity.
"4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status
quo may be altered by peaceful means.
"In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to
make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States
Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these
principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be
assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and
ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United
States and other countries, and that only upon
[67] Id., at pp. 346, 347.
[68] Id., at pp. 589-59l.
24
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would
be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.
"The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the
statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the
Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28
there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and
assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area
consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United
States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the
informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United
States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has
given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political
expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or
preferences by force.
"The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating
in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the
Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United
States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be
taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of
Japan and of the United States might mate to collaborate toward a
peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the
conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of
State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked
"Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of
the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled
further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there
were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were
divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained
unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The
Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a
conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear
agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any
satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an
indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with
regard to the fundamental questions under reference.
"It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on
policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country
and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will
surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not
enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the
principles in which the American people in fact all nations that prefer
peaceful methods to methods of force believe.
"The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of
the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth."
The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister was
handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows: [69]
"I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27,
which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.
"I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in
regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of
the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.
"I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish
to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the
swiftly moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as
rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a
meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring
about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.
"In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made
to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long
been committed, and it was declared that the Japanese Government
"considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in
the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true
peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout
the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and
sought by Japan itself."
"I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these
principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this
matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of
developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing
upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular
moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence
in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if
[69] Id., at pp. 591, 592.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25
widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to
successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am
sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I
feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view,
that it would seem highly desirable that *we take precaution, toward
ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring
to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and
essential questions on which we seek agreement*. The questions which I
have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical
application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance
of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement
accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this
suggestion."
The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the Japanese
Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of fundamental and
essential questions was deliberate and well considered. Secretary Hull
testified fully concerning the considerations attending the decision:
[70]
"A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe [70a] would have been
a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our
Government involved several important considerations.
"We knew that *Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous*. We
asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the
civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of
expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the
civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took
aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past
and contemporary record was replete with instances of military
aggression and expansion by force. *Since 1931 and especially since 1937
the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national
policy*.
"Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance
was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently
unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce
Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan
would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through
self-defense in the European war. *They held on to the threat against
the United States implicit in the alliance*.
"Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the
conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a *practice of offering
general formulas* and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had
consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This
suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized
formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down
the general assurances.
"A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would
have had important psychological results.
"It would have had a *critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese*.
"If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the
Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to
utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which
Japan might choose to place upon them.
"*If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese
military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the
United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.*
"The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps
toward reversion to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the
President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of
Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of
establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.
"It was clear to us that *unless the meeting produced concrete and
clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted
the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this
country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.*
"The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be
overlooked.
"He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China
and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its
principal cities and industrial regions.
"He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S.
Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.
[70] Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of
events and circumstances attending the proposed meeting between
President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D.
[70a] It is to be noted that except in those instances where the name
appears in direct quotations, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is
spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe.
26
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious
outrages in Nanking in 1937.
"He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon
which the Japanese Government, even throughout the 1941 conversations,
stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those
principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese
troops in North China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a
permanent stranglehold on China.
"He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in
1940 with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying
the stranglehold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
"Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minster when Japan signed the
Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.
"As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a
period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their
course of conquest, *we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with
Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all,
unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move
in a peaceful direction*. I was opposed to the first Munich and still
more opposed to a second Munich.
"Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the
realities in the situation.
"Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel
thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in
view of the factors mentioned the President could go to such a meeting
only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some
assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe
nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. [71]"
JAPANESE PROPOSALS OF
SEPTEMBER 6 AND 27
On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the following
proposal: {72]
"The Government of Japan undertakes:
"(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters
which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United
States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;
"(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French
Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,
without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any
regions lying south of Japan;
"(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the
European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-
defense, and, in ease the United States should participate in the
European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by
Japan shall be independently decided;
"(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of
general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the
realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from
China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between
Japan and China;
"(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not
be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;
[71] The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea
of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister
whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned desirability.
After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye
observed: "Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently.
Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day (August 4,
1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover,
anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came
in writing, as follows:
" 'If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of
the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire,
which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened.
At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be
created. For these reasons the meeting is not considered a suitable
move. The attempt to surmount the present artificial situation by the
Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere
respect and admiration. *If, therefore it is the Prime Minister's
intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support
the basic principles embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan
and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United
States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even
after this final effort is made the army is not necessarily in
disagreement.*
" 'However (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making
preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with
someone other than the President such as Secretary Hull or one in a
lesser capacity; (2) *you shall not resign your post as a result of the
meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be
prepared to assume leadership in the war againat America.'*
"The War Minister was of the opinion that 'failure of this meeting is
the greater likelihood.' " See committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31.
[72] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 608, 609.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27
"(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be
carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will
cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of
natural resources in the said area which it needs;
"(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of
normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in
connection with the above mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue
immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control
regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of
reciprocity.
"The Government of the United States undertakes:
" "(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment
expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain
from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour
by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;
" "(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment
expressed in point (f) referred to above;
" "(e) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the
Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
" "(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement]
reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above
by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with
regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the
passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." "
Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the foregoing
Japanese proposal: [73]
"On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of
proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given
in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the
September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula
with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a
qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable
reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No
commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan
would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to
respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from
interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops
indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula
contained in the draft that "the economic activities of the United
States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued* on an
equitable basis" [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the
conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were
henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan.
[74]"
From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held between
Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On September 27, Ambassador
Nomura presented a complete redraft of the Japanese proposals of
September 6, following the form of the American proposals of June 21. On
October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the proposals made by the Japanese
Ambassador during September, handing the Ambassador an "oral statement"
reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining
our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese
proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the
principles to which this country was committed. He said: [75]
"Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the
outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to
Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese
troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the
Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting
between the President and the Japanese Prime
[73] Committee record, pp. 1118,1119.
[74] The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial
conference was held at which were determined the basic principles of the
Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the
understanding that in case there was no way found for attainment of
Japanese demands by early in October of 1941 the Empire should at once
determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United
States Great Britain and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173.
[75] Committee record, pp. 1124-1126.
28
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a
meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles
so as to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated
in conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime
Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active
interest of the President and that it was the President's earnest hope
that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that
such a meeting could be held.
"During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces
in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and
speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian
populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of
extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of
Japanese leaders. For example, Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the
naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on
October 16 as having declared in a public speech:
" "America, feeling her insecurity * * * , is carrying out naval
expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry
out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.
" "*The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all
necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for
action, when needed.*
" "In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now
approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends
upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our
Navy should set about on its primary mission." "
It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull's
position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of
September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo: [76]
"Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be
passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the
matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President
to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be
settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever
conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past
eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies
once, and that they are as "two in one." "
ADVENT OF THE TOJO CABINET
The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on the
following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo. On October
17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted manifesting a
disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the negotiations: [77]
"The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I
wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts
you have made.
"The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is
true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the
matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However,
regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the
United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.
There shall be no changes in this respect.
"Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single
purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.'
The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the
arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist
Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary Hull as
follows. [78]
"On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by
Maj. Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto:
" "Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American
question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and
establishment of a common coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains
unaltered.
[76] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27.
[76a] For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see
Appendix D.
[77] Id., at p. 76.
[78] Committee record, pp. 1127-34.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29
" "For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to
reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means.
There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may
end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people
must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation."
"Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of
aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions.
"On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American
Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations
be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to
make progress, the United States should face certain realities and
facts," and here thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese
armed forces.
"The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it
desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to
defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on
for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of
State to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement with the
Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to
prevent a break-down in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the
way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese
of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would
also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad
faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we
could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the
same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles.
"In the last part of October and early November messages came to this
Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese
attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the
United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a
similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United
States issue a warning to Japan.
"At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4
years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial
situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this,
even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could
not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost
consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our
hard-pressed Chinese friends.
"I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese
appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an
estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this
estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
recommended:
" "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention
against Japan in China be disapproved.
" "That material aid to China be accelerated constant with the needs of
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
" "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.
" "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
"I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be
sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American
foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China
should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American
Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely
in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been
striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and to explore
every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United
States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the
President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.
"On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the
memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations. The Generalissimo was told that from our information it did
not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately
imminent. It was indicated that American air units could not be sent and
that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined
ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist
China.
30
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the
President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask
some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me
and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for
about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over
fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that
in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on
the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I
finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my
estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the
critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that
the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a
development.
"Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on
November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted
with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic,
but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of
the world on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than
the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense
"On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated
that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced
more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the
same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations
bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking
high both in the East and in the West" he said and were threatening,
more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He
warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;
that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."
"Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo
Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the
conversations.
"On November 7, the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing
draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces
in Indochina, and the principle of nondiscrimination. That proposal
contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from
the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government
"In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in
Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks
which might make inevitable war with the United States
"In the first half of November there were several indeterminate
conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On
November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible
joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I
pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement
we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that
Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a
general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of
what her leaders professed to desire.
"On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador
Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be
brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the
pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their
outstanding proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese
Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that
it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums.
"On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the
Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the
President."
ARRIVAL OF SABURO KURUSU
Mr. Kurusu in his initial conversation with President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull indicated that Prime Minister Tojo desired a peaceful
adjustment of differences. At the same time it was clear that Kurusu had
nothing new to suggest concerning Japan's participation in the
Tripartite Pact or the presence of her troops in China. The President
reiterated the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two
countries and to effect a peaceful settlement of divergent positions in
the Pacific. The Secretary of State, setting forth his comments at the
conference, stated: [79]
[79] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 740, 741.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
31
"Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the
Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in
discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth,
which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a
peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to
her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself
to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would
not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries
interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against
Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact
and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of
invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand
airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited
invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that
danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this
country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that
danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too
late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know
whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country
feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten,
twenty-five, or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when
Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that
she has no opinion on the subject I said that I cannot get this view
over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we
are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her
present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political
difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties
in connection with this country's relations with Japan."
In a further conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on
November 18, Secretary Hull's observations were related in the following
terms: [80]
"The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and
Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether
any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an
alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said
that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of
congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits
some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut
agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would
be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He
pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the
establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that
this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to
offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that
frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of
reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but
rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand
and take the consequences."
During the discussion Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu suggested the
possibility of a modus vivendi or a temporary arrangement to tide over
the abnormal situation. [81] They offered as a possibility return to the
status prevailing prior to July 26, 1941, when Japanese assets in the
United States were frozen following Japan's entry into southern French
Indochina. To this suggestion, Secretary Hull replied: [82]
"I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the
strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we
would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina
would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I
said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in
removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely
started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I
said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on
this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my
talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited
arrangement."
[80] Id., at p. 363.
[81] See committee record, p. 1135.
[82] Id.
32
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NEGOTIATIONS VERSUS DEADLINES
In a conversation with the Secretary of State on November 19, the
Japanese emissaries made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the
Tripartite Alliance and regarded herself as bound to carry out its
obligations. Through all of the discussions it was evident that Japan
was pressing for an early decision. In a series of "deadlines" (now
known to have been keyed to the contemplated departure of the task force
that struck Pearl Harbor) contained in intercepted messages from Tokyo
to Washington the urgency of the negotiations was explained:
November 5, 1941, circular No. 736. [83]
"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th
of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations
from falling into chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and
with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."
November 11, 1941, circular No. 762. [84]
"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be
indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that
the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under
present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is
essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session
of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following
day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear
picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You
can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that
time is indeed becoming short.
I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view
"of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking
to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do
everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. Attitude in
the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your
power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.*
"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not
they will accept our final proposal A."
November 22, 1941, circular NO. 812. [85]
"To both you Ambassadors.
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard.
Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and
try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans, *if the signing can be completed by
the 29th* (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent
notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished,
we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the
dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are
automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful
consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the
present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."
JAPANESE
ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND THE MODUS VIVENDI
During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the Japanese
Ambassador presented a proposal which was in fact an ultimatum, reading
as follows: [86]
[83] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
[84] Id., at p. 116.
[85] Id., at p. 165.
[86] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, pp. 366, 367.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
33
"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in
the Pacific area.
"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of
the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final
agreement.
"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a
view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
freezing of the assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required
quantity of oil.
"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China."
In his testimony Secretary Hull observed with respect to the foregoing
proposal: [87]
"On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a
proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high
officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied
to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final
Japanese proposition *an ultimatum*.
"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to
Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing
measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and
for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese
Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed
forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no
limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina
and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either
the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of
an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations
against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia
and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions
which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive
activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of
Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal
contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to
revert to peaceful courses."
There can now be no question that Japan intended her proposal of
November 20 as an ultimatum. It was their final proposal [88] and a
deadline of November 25, subsequently changed to November 29, had been
set for its acceptance. It was a proposal which the Government of Japan
knew we could not accept. It was the final gesture of the Tojo Cabinet
before launching the vast campaign of aggression which the military
overlords of Japan had long before decided upon.
The critical situation culminating in consideration of a modus vivendi
was revealed by Secretary Hull: [89]
"On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had
information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest
point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands
Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new
landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had
information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese
Government had decided that the negotiations must
[87] Committee record pp. 1136-1138.
[88] In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 19
the Japanese Government stated in referring to the ultimatum presented
to the United States on the following day: "If the United States consent
to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to he broken off;
therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best
efforts." Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 155.
[89] Committee record pp. 1138-1141.
34
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew
from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not
intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with
Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government
had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that
the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final
proposal."
"*The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed
movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental
principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world*. By
midsummer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were
determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had
made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It
was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we
might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were
armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever
they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental
principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being at
least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made
without fighting.
"*There was never any question of this country forcing Japan to fight.
The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its
principles.*
"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly
unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in
Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with
Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the
United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant
abject surrender of our position under intimidation.
"*The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our
Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a
peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as
the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need
of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling
for a showdown*.
"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in
their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.
"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically
vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.
"Three possible choices presented themselves.
"Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese war lords could
then have told their people that the American Government not only would
make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.
"Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In
that event the Japanese war lords would be afforded a pretext, although
wholly false, for military attack.
"Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.
"The last course was the one chosen."
Full consideration was given by officials of our Government to a
counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including the
thought of a possible modus vivendi. It was recognized that such an
arrangement would demonstrate the desire of the United States for peace
and at the same time afford a possible opportunity for the Army and Navy
to continue its preparations. From November 22 to 26 the President,
State Department, and the highest military authorities discussed a modus
vivendi, a first draft being completed on November 22. Revised drafts
were prepared on November 24 and 25. The final draft of November 25,
which is being set forth in its entirety in view of the testimony that
has been adduced concerning it, was as follows: [90]
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing
among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability
of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and
[90] See Committee Exhibit No. 18.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 35
treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation
and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of
controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently, the
Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in
effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the
Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus
vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary
steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal
intercourse between Japan and the United States.
"On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary
of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken
respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the
United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain
features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the
fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
committed.
"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute
to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to
afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the
Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of
peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the
Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the
Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus
vivendi, as follows:
"MODUS VIVENDI
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their
national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
therein.
"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they
have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force
into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern
or the northern Pacific area.
"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces
now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those
forces; to reduce the total of its force in French Indochina to the
number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land,
or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the
position of the Government of the United States with regard to the
presence of foreign troops in that area.
"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify
the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the
United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their
peoples:
"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the
sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the
purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at
Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese
obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds
in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood
that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in
transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption
of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.
"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
"(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided
for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two
Governments may agree.
"(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such
limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of
commodities in short supply in the United States.
"(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in
value per month.
36
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations
the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in
short supply in the United States.
"(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of
petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a
monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum
to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined
after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is
understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the
operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting,
heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
"(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and
additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as
it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering
the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the
Pacific area.
"The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application
of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary
to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as
provided for in paragraph 4 above.
"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach
the Australian, British, and Dutch Governments with a view to those
Governments taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4
above.
"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,
the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in
reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the
Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions
and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and
exemplify the fundamental principles of peace law, order, and justice,
which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and
which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
"8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months
with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance
of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful
settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the
modus vivendi for a further period."
The tentative modus vivendi was submitted for consideration to the
Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. The
ultimate decision to abandon it was made for reasons best set forth in
Secretary Hull's testimony: [91]
"On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the
considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus
vivendi aspect.
"As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of
November 24 and of November 25, contained two things: (1) The possible
modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested
example of how those principles could be applied that which has since
been commonly described as the 10-point proposal.
"I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese
military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were
demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended
later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme,
last-word proposal of November 20.
"It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other
high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal
was remote.
"So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese,
it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton,
oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared
with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.
"It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American
opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the
supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese
Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments
were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable
or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that
the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major
blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear
that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did
not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it,
especially the serious
[91] Committee Record, pp. 1146-1147.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
37
risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of
disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the
modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.
"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were
being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the
other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing
Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to
restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered
all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and
mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to
Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It
still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's
decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually
extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic
effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be
worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort
should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful
settlement.
"In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I
recommended to the President and he approved my calling in the Japanese
representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while
withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon
of that day."
The very serious reaction of the Chinese to the suggested modus vivendi
is clearly set forth in a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from an
American adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking: [92]
"After discussion with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's
conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently
advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have
never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or
unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in
China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in
China would dismay the Chinese. Any "modus vivendi" now arrived at with
Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to
the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British
prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the
resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against
occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or
increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at
this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's
fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the
Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if
the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of
Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory."
There is no possibility whatever that the modus vivendi would have been
accepted by the Japanese. In an intercepted dispatch of November 19 [93]
the Japanese Ambassadors suggested to Tokyo that there were three
courses open to the Empire: (1) maintain the status quo, (2) break the
"present deadlock" by an advance under force of arms, or (3) devise some
means for bringing about a mutual nonaggression arrangement. In favoring
the third alternative it was stated:
"* * * as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by 4
years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident,
is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long-drawn-out
warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a
temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the
prelude to greater achievement to come later * * *."
Replying to the foregoing suggestion, Tokyo advised on November 20 [94]
that "under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested
by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for
[92] Communication from Owen Lattimore in Chungking to Lauchlin Currie,
Presidential Assistant handling Chinese matters, in Washington. See
Committee exhibit No. 18.
[93] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 158.
[94] Id., at p. 160.
38
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
saving the present situation. We see no prospects for breaking the
deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines
of the latter part of our No. 798. [95] Please understand this. The
Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion."
It is significant to note that when Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility
of a modus vivendi to Secretary Hull on November 18, the Japanese
ambassadors very obviously had not consulted their Tokyo superiors. When
they did on November 19, Tokyo replied the following day rejecting the
idea completely, as indicated above.
Writing in his diary for November 25, 1941, Secretary Stimson, in
referring to the tentative draft of a modus vivendi, clearly indicated
an appreciation of the fact that it would not be acceptable to the
Japanese: [96]
"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull
showed us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay
before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our
interests, I thought as I read it, but l don't think there is any chance
of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for
the propositions which they were to do, namely, to at once evacuate and
at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no
aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give
them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian
population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil."
Had our Government submitted the tentative modus vivendi, it is clear
that Japan would have rejected it, and Chinese morale and resistance
would very probably have been seriously impaired if not destroyed.
UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM
OF NOVEMBER 26
The modus vivendi was designed to accompany a statement of principles
with a suggested example of how the principles could be applied. With
the decision not to propose a modus vivendi, the Secretary of State on
November 26 presented to the Japanese Ambassador its accompanying
material which was as follows: [97]
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among
nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of
territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity
and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international
cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement
of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the
Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in
effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the
Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador
communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary
measures to be taken respec-
[95] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155.
[96] See committee record, pp. 14417, 14418.
[97] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 766-770.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 39
tively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United
States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
accomplish the purposes above indicated.
"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to
contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in
the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of
discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a
broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals
which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain
some features which, in the opinion of this Government conflict with the
fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
committed. The Government of the United States believes that the
adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the
ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in
the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve
our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the
fundamental principles already mentioned.
"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for
the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but
simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical
exemplification of *a program which this Government envisages as
something to be worked out during our further conversations.*
"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap
between our draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September
25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a
comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing
with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we
have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for
worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress
toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be
expedited.
"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN
"SECTION I DRAFT MUTUAL DECLARATION OF POLICY
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both
being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national
policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the
Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that
they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using
military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,
accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and
give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon
which their relations with each other and with all other governments are
based:
" "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of each and all nations.
" "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries.
" "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment.
" "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and
conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies
and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and
processes."
"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have
agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing
recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will
actively support and practically apply the following principles in their
economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
" "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial
relations.
" " (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and
abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade
restrictions.
" "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw-
material supplies
" "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming
countries and populations as regards the operation of international
commodity agreements.
" "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and
arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential
enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may
permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of
all countries."
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