INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the  exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that  the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under  present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is  essential that settlement be realized by about that time.* The session  of Parliament opens on the 15th * * *. The government must have a clear  picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You  can see, therefore, *that the situation is nearing a climax and that  time is indeed becoming short.*

"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in  view of the above-mentioned situation, will you redouble them? When  talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to  them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S.  attitude in the minimum of time.  At the same time do everything in your  power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not  they will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117)."

Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that Secretary  Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the following day,  Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Secretary was  scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p.  118).

On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by Foreign  Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p; 91), the  British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, called on the Foreign  Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign Office and urged the  desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agreement with the United  States, saying that when the point of actual negotiations was reached  the British Government would be ready to join in seeking an agreement  (ex. 1, pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secretary Hull was informed of the  instructions to the British Ambassador in Tokyo during a conversation  with Lord Halifax on November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 158). During the  conversation between Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the  Foreign Minister went to great lengths to convince the British  Ambassador how critical the situation was, saying that in the view of  the Japanese Government the negotiations had reached the final phase,  that the Imperial Government had made its " maximum concessions," and  that if the United States refused to accept those terms and sign the  agreement "within a week to ten days," it would be "useless" to continue  the negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would  permit "no further delays in reaching a decision." He emphasized this  latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura,  saving that it was "absolutely impossible that there be any further  delays," that while there were indications that the United States  Government was "still under the impression that the negotiations are in  the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions," as far as Tokyo was concerned, "this is the final phase," and  expressed the "fervent" hope that Ambassador Nomura would do-

"everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring  about an agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119)."

At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on November  12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his new Government had  asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a

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settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people  were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impending. He  expressed the hope that "within a week or ten days" some agreement could  be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the matters submitted on  November 10 were being worked on as rapidly as possible, and that as  soon as a good basis had been reached in the exploratory conversations  the United States could then approach the Chinese Government and sound  out their attitude. He had previously handed to the Ambassador a  document setting forth his general ideas relating to mutual conciliation between Japan and China. In response to a question from Minister  Wakasugi, who was also present, Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and  China might be "brought together" by the United States, but did not say  in so many words that the United States would mediate between them. The  conversation ended with Secretary Hull expressing the hope that he might  have something by way of comment on the Japanese proposals on November  14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). According to Ambassador Nomura's  report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the British and the  Dutch were being informed generally of the nature of the conversations,  and that if a basis for negotiations should be worked out, it was  possible that they might sign with the United States, although the  Secretary "could not guarantee this" (ex. 1, p. 120). Ambassador Nomura  told the Foreign Minister he was not "satisfied with their attitude  toward taking up negotiations," and he sent Minister Wakasugi to see one  of Mr. Hull's advisors the following day to press for an early decision.  During that conversation, Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was  becoming impatient "and almost desperate," and that he hoped for a  clear-cut answer the next day as to whether the United States would  accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through  November 10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States'  proposal of June 21 was its final proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729- 731; ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need  for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on November 12  (Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had reached  their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible  concessions, and that "a very critical and dangerous state of affairs  will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully  concluding the negotiations" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).

Secretary Hull testified that:

"during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they  were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies * * *  the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power,  about the 16th, I think, of October * * * and the Konoye Government  fell.

"While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the  conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of  duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward  more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous  demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not  go on without something serious happening.

[Discontinuous text]

The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that  during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by  persuasion and threats and other methods to yield its basic principles,  so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course  of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-1179) .

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On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador Nomura had  scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15 (Washington  time) at which proposal "A" would be further discussed Foreign Minister  Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be used in presenting  proposal "B", and told the Ambassador he would be notified when to  present that "absolutely final proposal" to the United States Government  (ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This message was translated and available in  Washington on November 14 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 126). The same  day Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister a long report (No.  1090) in which, although he realized he would be "harshly criticized,"  he cautioned against precipitate action:

"I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

"I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations,  and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite  patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must  tell you the following:

"1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American  Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part  either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their  command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are  contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of  preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward;  they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather  than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It  is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich  conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be  such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been  passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate  peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in  evidence.

"3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China,  and insofar as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace  in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of  China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to  the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the  United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

"4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese  Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are  regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any  case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers  are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and  closer with the Axis.

"5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence  and our lives it naturally follows that we will have to fight England  and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will  participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central  America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those  of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for  their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a  neutrality partial thereto.

"6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory  or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do  not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out  till the end will be the victor.

"7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and  deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and  as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength  to the Pacific.

"Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German  and Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength  into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that  should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there  would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there  has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now  many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal  questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the  Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be  carried out through the Pacific area.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 353

"8. *Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation  in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition  must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding  that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am  going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be  harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan  permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be  the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).*"

The Foreign Minister's reply came back promptly and unequivocally:

"For your Honor's own information.

1." I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my  gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our  Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight  harder than you ever did before.

"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so  and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only  to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you  please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait  and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am  awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the  question.* I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in  my #736, and there *will be no change.* Please try to understand that.  You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States  to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a  solution *on the basis of our proposals*, and do your best to bring  about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137- ).*

The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on  Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement, in  writing, regarding the formula proposed by the Japanese Government on  November 10 (Washington time) for dealing with the question of  nondiscrimination in international trade. After noting that in its  proposal, the Japanese Government recognized

"the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial  relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China,  *on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied  uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well* (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  734),"

the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached by  the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the Japanese  Government did not intend to ask the United States Government to accept  responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside its  sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with  the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the  consent and cooperation of all other governments. The statement then reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent gears to reduce  tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by Japan would be a  "long forward step" toward the objective set forth in the Japanese  proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was then questioned, and  it was suggested that the proviso might well be omitted. The statement  was accompanied by a draft of a proposed joint United States-Japanese  declaration on economic policy, which Secretary Hull told Minister  Wakasugi constituted the United States reply to the Japanese proposal on  the question of nondiscrimination in international trade (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 731-737).

Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded the  conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal negotiations.  In reply to this, Secretary Hull said that until the conversations had  reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese, and the  Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the conversations  were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the United States proposal  of June 21 made it clear that the settlement under discussion related to  the entire Pacific area, the proposal the

Page 354 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 narrowed the  application of the proposals regarding economic nondiscrimination and  peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he then requested that  the new Japanese Government give assurances on that point. He said that  it would be difficult for him to go to the British and the Dutch and say  that Japan was willing to enter upon a peaceful program but at the same  time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany. The  Secretary said that if the United States made an agreement with Japan  while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call  upon Japan to go to war with us, this would cause "so much turmoil in  the country that he might be lynched." He asked the Ambassador whether  the United States Government could assume that if the Japanese  Government entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would  become a "dead letter." When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this was an  answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan's relations  under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United States would  be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the question he had  just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government, though there was no  material difference between the policies of the new Government and the  previous Government. Secretary Hull said that the new Japanese  Government seemed to be taking the attitude that the United States  Government must reply "at once" to their points, and that he did not  think that his Government

"should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese  Government under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing  peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been  violating law and order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734)."

He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new  Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the  question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the  proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting, and  also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution  could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The  Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any delay  and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a wholly  satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed that there should be a  further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received instructions from  his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1, p. 132).

In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that he  had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be "very disappointed"  over these replies. He continued:    -1

"Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did  clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They  harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion  (ex. 1, p. 137)."

There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that time  Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval striking  force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 355

THE TOJO CABINET REFUSES TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTION LESS FAVORABLE TO  JAPAN THAN ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 18-19, 1941)

Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Washington time) (tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washington time), with  Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hull prior to their meeting  with President Roosevelt. After he had been  introduced, Ambassador  Kurusu said, among other things, that he was fully assured of Premier  Tojo's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States, and  that Premier Tojo was optimistic regarding the possibility of settling  the differences in respect to nondiscrimination in international trade  and Japan's attitude toward the European war, but felt that there were  greater difficulties in the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from  China. Before the meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura  handed Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese  Government was submitting in response to the questions that had been  raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan's peaceful  intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the two  Governments (ex. 29, vol. It, pp. 738-739).

At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was formally  received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was largely devoted to  a discussion of the relation of Japan and the United States to the war  in Europe and to the China problem. Concerning the latter the President  said that at a suitable stage the United States would, so to speak,  "introduce" Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with  the remaining adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been  determined. Secretary Hull explained at length that America's military  preparations were for defense before it was too late, that the United  States was on the defense in the present Pacific situation and that  Japan was the aggressor. The conference ended with the understanding  that both Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 740-743).

At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either side to  solve the three major points of difference between the two countries,  and there is no evidence before the Committee of any contact between  representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon of November 17  (Washington time). However, as Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo the  next day (No. 1135), that evening the two Japanese Ambassadors "went to  call on a certain Cabinet member." "This," they cabled the Foreign  Minister, "is what he told us":

"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and  the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no  ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the  great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle  approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do  something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her  peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with  oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade  relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so  long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the  Americans (ex. 1, p. 154)."

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There are indications in the record before the Committee that this meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening before their meeting with Secretary Hull was more than a coincidence. Under Secretary Welles testified before the Committee in another connection that he had been told by Secretary Hull "and other individuals" that Mr. Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was "negotiating" with the Japanese and that he thought Mr. Walker "had conversations both with Admiral Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well" (tr. 1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors with the "certain Cabinet member," Postmaster General Walker talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary Hull at 9:22 o'clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington time) before Secretary Hull's conference at 10:30 o'clock with the two Ambassadors (ex. 179).

The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member that some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, "such as  evacuating French Indochina," would open the way for the United States  to relax its freezing orders was substantially the proposal made by the two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30 the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was placed on the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had pointed out that the American public would never understand an agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore and the Philippine Islands to counter Japan's sending troops to French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked, if the tension could be relaxed, an atmosphere could be created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could; he said that what was needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. Secretary Hull asked to what extent a relaxation of freezing would enable ,Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that

"what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get  control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence."

Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a solution some small beginning toward the realization of "our high ideals" and continued by suggesting:

"*the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the  date in July when following the Japanese move into southern French  Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect.* [1] The  Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo  on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn  from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. *The  Secretary said

[1] While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing  order was into *southern* French Indochina, Japanese troops had moved  into northern French Indochina in 1940.

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that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long  way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan  was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes  of conquest.* The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of  fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first  step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the  Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered  by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750)."

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19 (Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that they had reported to their Government the conversation of the preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.

"The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the  possibilities. *The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the  suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed  before the Japanese moved into south Indochina in the latter part of  July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing  measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if  something could be done on his suggestion, it could serve to relieve  that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations.*  The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would  go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.  The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in  Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a  peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some  time.

"The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now  appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the  Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing  measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in  mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further  efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so  far diverged. The Ambassador agreed (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751)."

In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate telegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two Ambassadors attached to it. The sending of four telegrams may also have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Foreign Minister the English text of proposal "B", which was far more drastic than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as Japan's "absolutely final proposal." Furthermore, they had been told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message (No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:

"In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think  there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in  harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that *as a stopgap for  the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a  "time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock,  ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for  assurance regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.*

"*In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested  the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July*, but in view of the  progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent  to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory  aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in  vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China * * * Please  have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit"  and * * * as we desire to press for a

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 358

speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at  once (ex. 1, pp. 151-152)."

In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador Nomura  outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu had in mind:

"In our conversations of today, *as a practical means of alleviating the  ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful  situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing  before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the  evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French  Indo-China.

"Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan had clearly  demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain,  the Netherlands and other interested powers."

"In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the  American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in  China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal  situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the  Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the  Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather,  exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans  insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to  other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to  bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions.  In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of  successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B"  immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if  we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". *Therefore, looking at  it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to  presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a  practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of  goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in  Proposal "B", and then to try to proceed with the solution of other  questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced  that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.*

[Discontinuous text]

"The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not  interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises  in effect. *It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to  withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and  materials are made available to us.*"

"Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133  (ex. 1, pp. 152-3)."

The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Ambassadors was  summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in Tokyo. On November 19  (Japan time), in a message in which he referred to the Ambassadors'  messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above, Foreign Minister Togo emphasized  that in the negotiations consent could be given only "within the scope  of the instructions of this office." He told Ambassador Nomura that

"the internal situation in our country is such *that it would be  difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo- China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act  will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that  would come up to the B proposal.* With the situation as urgent as it is  now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the  amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your  message, then to push on for an understanding.

"*The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but  made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting  the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result  in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore,  having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 800  and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government,  and no further concessions can be made.*

*If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will  have to be broken off*; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth  your very best efforts (ex. 1, p. 155).

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Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in Tokyo his  astonishment at the Japanese Government's unwillingness to consider  seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had made. His message  (No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington time) follows in full:

"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the  Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation  and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and  the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality.  There are now three ways which the Empire might take

"(1) Maintain the status quo.

"(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.

"(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.

"No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war  preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a  state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In  other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.

"No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the  present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our  objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. *My #1134 of  yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by  the government is beyond my power of comprehension*, but as I view it,  the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China  incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an  opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a  large scale. *I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary  "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude  to greater achievements to come later.*

"I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary  to my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158)."

In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign Minister  to "convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister" (ex. 1, p. 158).

In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 20 (Japan time) that:

"under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by  you, as we have stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the  present situation.*"

"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock *except for you to push  negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our  #798.* Please understand this.  *The Premier also is absolutely in  accord with this opinion* (ex. 1, p. 160)."

Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the  message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time) which  rejected Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for a "provisional arrangement"  and instructed him to present proposal "B," the Japanese Government's  "absolutely final proposal."

Foreign Minister Togo's message of November 20 (Japan time), which thus  finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by Ambassadors  Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the Foreign Minister had  received the Ambassadors' four telegrams of November 18 (Washington  time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134 quoted in part above, but also  after the Foreign Minister had received Ambassador Nomura's message No.  1135 of the same date, reporting on the meeting of the two Ambassadors  with the member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening of  November 17 (Washington time). Consequently, the record before the  committee shows that the Japanese Government, including Premier Tojo,  refused to consider the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors  Nomura and

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Kurusu with knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss  it with the British and the Dutch thus indicating, in the light of his  prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations had been  suggested by the two Ambassadors but with the further knowledge that  practically the same suggestion had been made to Ambassadors Nomura and  Kurusu by a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet.

The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the stage  that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by the fact  that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Office sent out a  circular message to its officials abroad, including those in Washington,  prescribing "the order and method of destroying the code machines in the  event of an emergency" (ex. 1, p. 137). Four days later the Foreign  Office sent out circular messages establishing the so-called "winds  code," to be used in case of an emergency and the cutting off of  international communications. The receipt of a message implementing this  code was to be the signal to "destroy all code papers, etc." (Ex. 1, pp.  154-155). Those two messages were sent from Tokyo before Japan's  "absolutely final proposal" was presented to Secretary Hull, and appear  to have been the first Japanese messages intercepted which dealt with  the destruction of codes, code machines, et cetera.

JAPAN DELIVERS ITS ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND  DEMANDS AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS

(November 20, 1941)

On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassadors Nomura  and Kurusu called at the State Department. Ambassador Kurusu told  Secretary Hull that they had referred to their Government the suggestion  Ambassador Nomura had made at the meeting 2 days before for a return to  the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into southern  French Indochina in July. He said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had  anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in  moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the  Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal "on that  basis." He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification  of the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29 vol. II, p. 753)

The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to Secretary  Hull was the second formula, proposal "B," approved at the Imperial  Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a "last effort to  prevent something happening." In his messages to Ambassador Nomura,  Foreign Minister Togo had described it as "an ultimatum" (ex. 1, p. 99),  as "our absolutely final proposal" (ex. 1, p. 99), and as "our last  possible bargain" (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally drawn up and approved,  proposal "B" had consisted of four provisions, each of which was  contained in the Japanese proposal of November 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97,99; ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). "If necessary," those four provisions were to  be supplemented by others dealing with the three points previously at  issue in the conversations i. e., the evacuation of troops from China  and French Indochina, the Tripartite Pact, and nondiscrimination in  international trade. In the English text of proposal "B" cabled to  Ambassador Nomura on November 

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14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were  added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the  Foreign Minister's instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November 19  (Japan time) to present proposal "B" had also directed him to delete the  provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international trade and the  Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to evacuation of troops in addition to the four provisions approved on November 5 (Japan  time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula concerning the evacuation  of troops which Ambassador Nomura had presented to Secretary Hull on  November 7 (Washington time) had covered the evacuation of Japanese  troops from both China and French Indochina, the provision contained in  the Japanese proposal of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese  troops from French Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the  suggestion made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18,  the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of their  troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina "upon  the conclusion of the present arrangement." [1]

As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu, the  Japanese proposal follows in full:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to  make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern  Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo- China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now  stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration (If peace  between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in  the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to  remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo- China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of  the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final  agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a  view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which  the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to  restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the  freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required  quantity of oil.  "5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such  measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the  restoration of general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 755-756).

When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him Secretary  Hull said that he would examine and study it sympathetically. Secretary  Hull referred to the fact that the United States was supplying aid to  both Great Britain and China, and indicated that until Japan made it  perfectly clear that her policy was one of peace it would be impossible  to cease aiding China. However Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection  with paragraph 5 of the proposal that it "might be interpreted to mean  that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that  negotiations were started."  (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)

In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized the  Japanese note of November 20 in these words:

[1] Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese  "to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was  meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern  Indochina within a day or two and furthermore they placed no limit on  the number of troops they might continue to send there." (Tr. ;4261.)

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"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to  Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing  measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China and  for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese  government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed  forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no  limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into  Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until  after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the  establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there  were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into  southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there  were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh  Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to  the north of Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The  proposal contained no Provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and  to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38)."

It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was in fact, a  restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan's "minimum demands"  determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 (Japan  time). As applied to the United States, the three major Japanese  "demands" decided upon at that Imperial Conference were, that the United  States would not "intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the China Incident", i. e., would cease all aid to China; that the United  States would "take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to  the defense of the Empire"; and that the United States would " cooperate  with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials" (ex. 179,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador  Nomura which was translated and available in Washington on November 24  (Washington time), Foreign Minister Togo said:

"our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of  Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American  petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p.  172)."

Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that their  proposal was

"an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years  exploration of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181)."

He continued

"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly  unthinkable.  It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in  Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with  Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the  United States abandon its principles and policies.  It would have meant  abject surrender of our position under intimidation (tr. 1140)."

Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high officials  of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted Japanese messages  already mentioned that the note the Japanese delivered on Thanksgiving  Day, November 20, was their "absolutely final proposal," they also knew  from the same source that the Japanese Government had fixed November 25  (Japan time) as the dead line by which the written agreement of the  United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to its demands were to  be obtained. On November 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted  message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was translated  and available in Washington:

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my  #736 (November 25). You should know this, however, I know you are  working hard. Stick"

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"to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to  bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your  ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by  the 26th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your  conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes  can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and  the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have  decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the dead line  absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going  to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work  harder than you ever have before (ex. 1, p. 165)."

Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary Hull  testified,

"critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired  to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution  and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this  country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need for time to  prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a show- down.

"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically  vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140)."

Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their  advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery in  Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the Imperial  Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the commander in  chief of the Japanese combined fleet to direct the Japanese naval  striking force, already assembling in a harbor in northern Japan, to  "advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness" for the  attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).

THE UNITED STATES REPLIES

(November 26, 1941)

The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in  the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time), 6 days after the  delivery of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those 6 days were a  period of intense activity, involving not only the highest officials in  the United States Government but also the highest officials of the  British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.

From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassadors that  when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory stage he  would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch, and Chinese Governments. On November 18 (Washington time), after the Japanese  Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior to the freezing  orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would consult the British  and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  750). Immediately after that conference, Secretary Hull requested the  British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, to call on him. Secretary Hull's  memorandum of his conversation with the Minister is as follows:

"I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking  Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the  purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that  the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful  settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon  at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two  opposing policies of conquest by force on the one hand and a

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policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the  three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in  former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of  Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of  commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made  no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite  Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a  brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would  enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of  peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea  of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and  maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be  so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes  on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps  in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating  its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few  months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a  general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually  developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more  satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the  more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite  commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with  respect to these two points."

"I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese  that if their Government cared to present something on this point. I  would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of  consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should  be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the  Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they  would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said  to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful  policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far  in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might  need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168)."

The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called separately  on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the substance of  his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).

Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United States'  reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important to recall  briefly the evidence before the Committee of the consideration given  earlier in November to-

"the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese  to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a  breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a  subsequent general agreement (Hull, tr. 1128)."

At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 (Washington time) which  followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to determine whether  "the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings"  by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,  General Marshall had expressed the view that

"the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions  which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be  a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex.  16)."

The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments would  prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would, among other  things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as urged by the  Generalissimo advocate State Department action to put off hostilities  with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an agreement be made  with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months. However, the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark  actually submitted to President Roosevelt on November 5 contained only  the first of the Joint Board's

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recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the second  or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned above (ex. 16).

The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to President  Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson

"had an hour's talk alone with the President with regard to the Far  Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was  coming from Japan.  The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain more  time (tr. 14386-14387)."

In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:

"The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to  think of something which would give us further time.* He suggested that  he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament  for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their  arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr.;  14414)."

At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President had heard  Secretary Hull's estimate of the situation in the Far East and had  polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On November 10,  during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the President had made reference  to a "*modus vivendi*," and after this meeting, in his report to Tokyo,  Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to find out whether the President  referred to "possibly, a provisional agreement" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  718; ex. 1, p. 11G).  Again, in his report to Tokyo of the meeting with  President Roosevelt on November 17, Ambassador Nomura had commented  that, in connection with a remark by the President that the United  States desired to preserve peace in the Pacific,

"I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p. 139)."

It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Ambassadors  had called on a member of the President's Cabinet and had been told that  the President "was very desirous of an understanding between Japan and  the United States," and if Japan would do something real to show her  peaceful intent, "such as evacuating French Indo-China," the way would  be open "for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to  the re-establishment of normal trade relations" (ex. 1, p. 154).

Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated, penciled  memorandum in President Roosevelt's handwriting:

"6 months

"1. U. S. To resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.

"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or  any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

"3 Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into  European war.

"4 U. S. to *introduce* Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to  take no part in their conversations.

"Later on Pacific agreements. (Ex. 18). [Italics in original.]"

Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from the  files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears the  following typewritten note: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President  to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after  November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that the memorandum  suggests only that Japan should not be permitted to send "more troops to  Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas by November 18 the Japanese  Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-

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tary Hull the withdrawal of Japanese troops from at least southern  French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may have  been written by the President before the latter date.

Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been giving  intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement,  knowing that

"The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to  keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to  prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We  considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or  keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the  integrity of American principles (Hull, tr. 1128)."

Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States' reply  to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 11 (Washington time),  the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had submitted to  Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve as a

"transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not  only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to,  but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement  of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and  provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from  Japan (ex. 18)."

This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained  a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic  relations which followed closelythe lines of the counterproposals made  to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations during  which there would be an armistice between those countries and the United  States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies of a military  character to China and Japan would not increase or supply its military  forces in China and French Indochina. Upon the conclusion of a peace  settlement between Japan and China the United States was to negotiate  with both China and Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations  (ex. 18).

On November 18 (Washington time), Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau  sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft of a proposed  comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United States (ex. 168).  This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division of the State  Department the same day and copies of the revised draft entitled  "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and  Japan," were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral Stark for  their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set forth in  summary form various steps "proposed" to be taken by the United States  and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The evidence before the  Committee shows that on the same day, November 19, Secretary Hull had  two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann, through whom the State Department  maintained liaison with the Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a  conference attended by Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by  General Gerow for the War Department (General Marshall was out of town)  was held at the State Department on the morning of November 21  (Washington time) at which the "Outline" was discussed. At that  conference Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow  to

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submit their comments on the "Outline" from the military and navaI standpoint (ex. 18).

This they did the afternoon of the same day, November 21  (Washington.time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he believed  General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed concerning  the "Outline" and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis of a hasty  study War Plans Division saw "no objection to its use as a basis for  discussion." He said that 

"the adoption of its provisions would attain *one of our present major  objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan.* Even a temporary peaee in  the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the  Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material  assistanee to the British both of which are highly important.

"The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to  all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. *War Plans  Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the suceess of  our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan*  (ex. 18)."

General Gerow suggested the deletion from the "Outline" of a provision  which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria  except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided Russia  withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except for an  equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision would probably  be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the War Department be given  an opportunity to consider the military aspects of any major changes  that might be made in the proposal (ex. 18).

In his memorandum, Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the "Outline"  which would place limitations on American naval forces in Pacific  waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward causing  Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require Japan to sell to  the United States a specified tonnage of merchant vessels. He agreed  with General Gerow that the provision concerning the withdrawal of  Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted. He made several  suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions, and ended his  memorandum with the comment that while the provisions of the "Outline"  might be assumed to abrogate the Tripartite Pact on the part of Japan, it would be helpful if that could be specifically stated (ex. 18).

The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was completed in  the State Department the first draft of a counterproposal in reply to  the Japanese note of November 20. This draft counterproposal was in two  sections. The first section contained a proposed *modus vivendi*. As an  alternative to the Japanese proposals of November 20, and was prefaced  by a brief statement of the circumstances leading to its preparation.  Revised drafts of this section were prepared on November 24 and 25. From  November 22 to November 26 the *modus vivendi* project was discussed and  given intensive consideration within the State Department, by President  Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy, including  Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The  *modus vivendi* was also discussed with the British, Australian,  Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principally through their diplomatic  representatives in Washington. Such revisions as were made in the  original draft of this section are discussed

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in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth in  full below.

The second section of the November 22 draft consisted of two parts. The  first part contained the statement of principles and mutual pledges with  respect to economic relations which had been prepared by the State  Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11.  The second part was  based primarily upon the "Outline" sent by the State Department to the  War and Navy Departments on November 19, modified, however, in  accordance with the suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Gerow  in their memoranda of November 21 to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The  changes made in this section in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and  November 25 were few in number and, as so modified, this section became  the reply to the Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by  Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington  time).  Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the *modus vivendi*  section also saw the section which became the United States reply of  November 26 (tr. 14363).

The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the *modus vivendi* section was as follows:

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the  Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months  informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a  settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area  based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing  among nations. These principles include theprinciple of inviolability  of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the  principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other  countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial  opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon  international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and  pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international  conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in  reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a  peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the  Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous  of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and  peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward  creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the  conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be  in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in  the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such  *modus vivendi* include as one of its provisions some initial and  temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and  normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.

"*On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary  of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken  respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the  United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to  accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain  features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the  fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under  consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is  committed.*

"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute  to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to  afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the  Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad- auge program of  peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the  Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the  Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary *modus  vivendi*, as follows:

"MODUS VIVENDI

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,  both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their  national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace  throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs  therein.

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"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they  have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force  into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern  or the northern Pacific area.

"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed  forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace  those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to  the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval,  land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the  position of the Government of the United States with regard to the  presence of foreign troops in that area.

"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify  the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the  extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the  United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their  peoples:

"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the  sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the  purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at  Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese  obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds  in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk.  It is  understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of  which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the  adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United  States.

"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree

(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon          a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs          will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two  governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of    outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

"5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the  extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the  United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach  the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those   Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph  four above.

"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,  the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in  reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the  Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions  and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and  exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice,  which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between  the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and  which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

"8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three  months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the  instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a  peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an  extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period (Ex. 18.)"

Comparison of this final draft of the *modus vivendi* section and the  prior drafts of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs

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