INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Imperial Command to form a new Cabinet was given on October 17 (Japan time) to General Hideki Tojo, who not only became Premier but  also took the portfolios of the War and Home Ministries.  In addition to  having been War Minister in the preceding Cabinet of Premier Konoye,  General Tojo was an Army officer on the active list. The same day,  Premier Konoye's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor  Dooman at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and through him conveyed to  Ambassador Grew from the Premier

"a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to  the fall of the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister  to ensure the appointment of a successor who would continue the  conversations with the United States.  The circumstances were  extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in future be regarded  as one of the really big moments in Japanese history (ex. 30, p. 458)."

Mr. Ushiba also delivered to Ambassador Grew a letter from Prince Konoye in which he stated that he felt certain

"that the Cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have  been carrying on up till today (ex. 30, p. 457)."

The following week, a "reliable Japanese informant" gave Ambassador Grew  the following account of the events leading up the resignation of the  Konoye Cabinet:

"The informant called on me at his own request this evening. He told me  that just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the  leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces  had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to  pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with  the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended  this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the  latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the  Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the  armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand  necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a  position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of  Prince Konoye, and the appointment of General Tojo who, while remaining  in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to  conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 697)."

On October 16 (Washington time), in a conversation with Lord Halifax,  the British Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador Nomura said:

"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences  between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach  agreement with the United States by not insisting on the third point  mentioned above (the right to station troops in China), and on the other  hand those who thought that not to insist on this point would involve  too great a loss of face.

"But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The  Emperor was in favor of peace, and even if a general were made Prime  Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor's wishes would be  disregarded.

"The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United  States press today was of no importance, and might be disregarded.

"Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United  States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid  for it (ex. 158)."

Two days later, on October 18 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura  cabled his congratulations to the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo,  at the same time expressing his fear that he would not "be able to  accomplish much in the future" and asking the new Foreign Minister's  approval of his returning to Japan "in the near 

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future so that I may personally report the situation here" (ex. 1, p. 79). He expressed similar views in a message (ex. 1, p. 80) to the  Japanese Navy Minister on October 20 (Washington time), and in a message  to the new Foreign Minister 2 days later in which he said:

"I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. * * * Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the  bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical  existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee  from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way  that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return  to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured  your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my  rudeness (ex. 1, p. 81)."

On October 23 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador  Nomura that the outcome of the negotiations would "have a great bearing  upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue,"  and expressed the hope that the Ambassador would see fit "to sacrifice  all of (his) personal wishes and remain at (his) post" (ex. 1, p. 82).  On November 4 (Japan time), the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura to "compose yourself and make up your mind to do your best."  Finally, on November 5 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura cabled the  Foreign Minister that after careful consideration "I have decided to  continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be" (ex.  1, p. 100).

THE TOJO CABINET FORMULATES ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 5, 1941)

As the result of the Cabinet crisis in Japan, the State Department in Washington considered the dispatch of a personal message from President  Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito urging Japan to join with the United  States to preserve peace in the Pacific area, but stating that if Japan  should start new military operations the United States "would have to  seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to  prevent any extension" of the war (ex. 20). Such a message was not sent,  however, pending clarification of the situation in Japan and the  policies of the new Japanese Government (ex. 20; tr. 4494-4501).

Commencing October 17 (Japan time) the Tojo Cabinet engaged in  preparations for a formal determination of the policies it would follow,  and such a determination was made at an Imperial Conference on November  5 (Japan time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador  Nomura received only general instructions from the Japanese Foreign  Office concerning the course he should follow in further talks with the  Americans. He was, however, advised on October 21 (Japan time) that

"the new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere  desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our  country has said practically l she can say in the way of expressing of  opinions and setting forth our stands. *We feel that we have now reached  a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to  urge the United States to reconsider her views.*

"We urge therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or  Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our  country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this  matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal  United States counter proposal to our proposal of 27 September (ex. 1,  p. 81)."

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These instructions were concurred in by the Japanese War and Navy Ministers (ex. 1, p. 84).

In accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions, Minister  Wakasugi called on Under Secretary Welles on October 24 (Washington  time). The Minister told the Under Secretary that the new Japanese  Government desired to follow the policy of the preceding Government and  to continue the conversations without delay, adding that in his belief  the new Government

"had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense  public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that  the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 693)."

He then asked whether the United States had as yet any counterproposals  to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on  September 27. In reply, Mr. Welles made it clear that the United States  would be glad to continue the conversations, but suggested that recent  belligerent public statements by high Japanese officials and the tone of  the Japanese press were not helpful to the atmosphere in which the  conversations would take place. When Minister Wakasugi pointed to a  recent speech by Secretary of the Navy Knox in which Mr. Knox had said  that a Japanese-American war was inevitable and that the United States  Navy was on a "24- our basis," Mr. Welles said that this simply showed  the effect on the Navy of the statements being made in Japan. In reply  to the Minister's inquiry regarding the possibility of counterproposals  being submitted by the United States, Mr. Welles said that the United  States position was fully set forth in its draft proposals of June 21  and the statement delivered to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, and that  for this reason he did not think any counterproposals by the United  States were called for. The conversation concluded with a discussion of  the possibility of taking up the three major points of disagreement in  the following order: (1) Economic nondiscrimination, (2) Japan's status  under the Tri-Partite Pact, and (3) the China question (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 692-697). A full report on this conversation was immediately sent to  Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 1, pp. 82-84).

Four days later Minister Wakasugi cabled his own lengthy appraisal of  the general attitude of the United States (ex. 1, pp. 86-87). The basic  United States policy, he said, was the crushing of the so-called  Hitlerism, which he defined as "the establishment of a new order through  the force of arms." Because the United States "presumed" that Japan  intended to develop the French Indo-China and Thailand area "under the principle of our military's coprosperity sphere, in a monopolistic  manner, and through the force of arms," as contrasted with America's  principle of economic nondiscrimination, there had arisen "a clash of  ideologies." He said that there was every indication that the United  States Government was "anxious to adjust the relationship between the  two nations," but that he doubted that it would make any concessions  from its proposals of June 21 and October 2. He expressed the opinion  that the United States had completed its preparations "in the event of  the worst," and that "a course of economic pressure plus watchful  waiting" had been decided on. He felt, however, that all was not  hopeless and that by "good-naturedly" continuing the talks there would  be opened up "ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use  of world developments." He concluded his report by saying:

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"However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local  differences by insisting upon our freedom of action (sic), we must have  our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated,  but that our national relations will be severed.

"The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the  talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly  formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet  establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay  our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that  would be to our best interest (ex. 1, p. 87)."

On October 30 (Japan time) in Tokyo the new Foreign Minister received  the diplomatic corps individually, and during the course of his talk  with Ambassador Grew he expressed his desire that the Japanese-American  conversations be continued and be successfully brought to a conclusion  without delay, and he asked Ambassador Grew's cooperation to that end  (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 699-700). Ambassador Grew noted that, compared  with Admiral Toyoda who had preceded him, the new Foreign Minister was  "grim, unsmiling, and ultra- reserved" (ex. 30, p. 465). The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that he had told Ambassador Grew that  Japanese- merican relations got worse unfortunate results would ensue, a  statement substantially similar to the statement he had made to Sir  Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, on October 26 (Japan time) (ex.  1, p. 91).

The great activity in Tokyo during the period immediately after the  formation of the Tojo Cabinet, and the attitude with which that Cabinet  approached the continuance of the Japanese-American conversations, is  illustrated by Foreign Minister Togo's message No. 725 of November 4  (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura:

"1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the  edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever  adjusting them.  In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy,  *the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some  days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are  at length able to bring forth a counterproposal for the resumption of  Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the  Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 and 727).*  This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the   conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

"2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no  longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain  pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States  of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to  gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, *but this is our  last effort. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal of ours is,  indeed, the last.* I want you to know that. *If through it we do not  reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be  ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the  brink of chaos.* I0 mean that the success or failure of the pending  discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of  Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this  die.*

"When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt  that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some  understanding we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and  yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick  and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with.  Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of  the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things,  our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes,  too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this  to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who  think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell  you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our  long-suffering. Nay, when it come to a question of our existence and our  honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost.  If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this  position of ours,

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there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. *This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time use are making our  last possible bargain,* and I hope that we can thus settle all our  troubles with the United States peaceably.

"3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward *to what may come at the end at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations* the  Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much  better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be  for the whole world situation.

"4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is  your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your  being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you  please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind  to continue to do your best?  I hope you will. Now just as soon as the  conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to  go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to  tell them *how determined we are* and try to get them to foster a speedy  understanding.

"5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there,  so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in  Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American  officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these  things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me  know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting  anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, *I want you to  follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to  know there will be no room for personal interpretation (ex. 1, pp. 92- 93).*"

The day the Foreign Minister sent the long message quoted above, he  cabled Ambassador Nomura the substance of two Japanese counterproposals  to be used in the conversations, if they should be approved at the  Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time). The first proposal was  designated "Proposal A," and was described as "*our revised ultimatum*";  its provisions were referred to as "*our demands*" (ex. 1, pp. 94-95).  The second proposal, designated "Proposal B," was to be used in case of  "remarkable" differences between the Japanese and American views, "since  the situation does not permit of delays." It was advanced, the Foreign  Minister said, with the idea of making "*a last effort to prevent  something happening*" (ex. 1, p. 96-97).

At the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time), the  counterproposals developed in the conferences and discussions which had  gone before were taken up and approved in the form previously sent to  Ambassador Nomura. Foreign Minister Togo immediately cabled the  Ambassador that he should resume the conversations, and instructed him  to submit "Proposal A" first.  The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador  that if it should become apparent that an agreement based upon "Proposal  A" could not be reached, "we intend to submit *our absolutely final  proposal*, Proposal B." He continued:

"4. As stated in my previous message, *this is the Imperial Government's  final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very  critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted*. * * *

"5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time  limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a  friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept  our proposal (ex. 1, p. 99)."

The intercepted messages show that the Japanese Government intended to  insist not only on a written agreement signed by the United States but  also to require the United States to "make Great Britain and the  Netherlands sign those terms in which they are concerned" (ex. 1, pp.  98-99). Although the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura to  avoid giving the Americans the impression that "there is a time limit,"  he made it clear to the Ambassador (No. 736) that such a dead line had  been fixed:

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"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that  arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th  of this month.* I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the  circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this  thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations  *from falling into chaotic condition.* Do so with great determination  and with unstinted effort, I beg of you (ex. 1, p. 100)."

The record before the Committee does not show whether or not the  decision to submit the foregoing counterproposals was the only decision  made at the Imperial Conference on November 5. It is now known, however,  that on that date the Navy promulgated its "Combined Fleet Top Secret  Operation Order No. 1" to all Japanese Fleet and task force commanders  (tr. 482). The record does not show whether the issuance of this order  was made known to the Japanese Foreign Office.

Order No. 1, itself, was brief:

"COMBINED FLEET ORDER

"Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT  BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the  Separate Volume (ex. 8)."

The separate volume, which was attached to Order No. 1, prescribed the  operations to be conducted (a) in case war with the United States, Great  Britain, and the Netherlands "begins during the China Operations," and  (b) in case war with Russia "begins during the War with the United  States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China" (ex. 8). It stated:  "The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great  Britain and the Netherlands," and provided that, in such event, "In the  east the American Fleet will be destroyed" (ex. 8).

Order No. 1 had been in course of preparation since the latter part of  August. From September 2-13 (Japan time) a war plans conference had been  held continuously at the Naval War College in Tokyo. It was during this  same period, on September 6 (Japan time), that an Imperial Conference decided:

"If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having  our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will  immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America  (England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

On September 13 (Japan time) an outline containing the essential points  of Order No. 1 had been completed at the Naval War College, but the  Order itself was not promulgated until immediately after the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) (ex. 8).

AMBASSADOR GREW WARNS THAT WAR WITH JAPAN MAY COME "WITH DRAMATIC AND  DANGEROUS SUDDENNESS"

(November 3, 1941)

During the period which immediately preceded the Imperial Conference on  November 5 (Japan time), Ambassador Grew was endeavoring to determine  what the policies of the Tojo Government would be. Among the sources of  his information was "a reliable Japanese informant" who called on the  Ambassador on October 25 (Japan time) and again on November 3 (Japan  time). On both occasions the information imparted by the informant fell  short of disclosing to Ambassador Grew the actual decisions affecting  the United States which were

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being made by the Tojo Cabinet, as described above, but was sufficient  to convince the Ambassador that the situation u-as approaching a crisis.  He recorded that on November 3 he was told that the new Japanese  Government "had reached a definite decision as to how far it was  prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an  adjustment of relations with the United States," and that "this  information had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor  on the afternoon of November 2" (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 701).  In his testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Grew said, referring  to the period immediately following the fall of the Konoye Cabinet:

"I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite  sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going  to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an  agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers  crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent  the telegram of November 3 (tr. 1908)."

In the telegram of November 3 (Japan time) to which Mr. Grew referred,  he warned Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that

"Japan's resort to measures which might (make) war with the United  States inevitable may come *with dramatic and dangerous suddenness* (ex. 15)."

The telegram summarized his opinions on the general situation in Japan.  In it he noted that the strong policy which he had recommended in his  telegram of September 12, 1940 (ex. 26), called the "green light"  telegram because it gave the go-ahead signal for economic sanctions  against Japan, together with the impact upon Japan of political  developments abroad had brought the Japanese Government "to seek  conciliation with the United States." If those efforts should fail, he  foresaw a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan back once more to its  former position "or still further back," leading

"to what I have called an "all out, do or die" attempt to render Japan  impervious to foreign economic embargoes, even risking national hara  kiri rather than cede to foreign pressure. * * * such a contingency is  not only possible but probable (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew went on to express his opinion that the view that the  progressive imposition of drastic economic measures, while attended with  some risk of war, would probably avert war, was

"a dangerously, uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States (ex. 15)."

Conceding that in discussing the "grave and momentous" subject of  whether American needs, policies, and objectives justified war with  Japan if diplomacy should fail, he was "out of touch with the  Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon," and that his purpose  was only to "ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan  through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush  headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States," he warned  that

"it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations  for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace  should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on  the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber  rattling (for) the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's  high pressure diplomacy. *Japan's resort to measures which might (make)  war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and  dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).*

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The State Department file copy of Ambassador Grew's telegram of November  3 (Japan time) bears the following handwritten note:

"Paraphrase of this telegram in full given to Commander Watts, ONI, by telephone on November 8, 1941 (ex. 15)."

On November 17 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew cabled Secretary Hull and  Under Secretary Welles as follows, referring specifically to the last sentence of his November 3 warning:

"In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval  actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict,  7 am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would  exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative  and surprise.* It is important, however, that our Government not (repeat  not) place upon us, including the military and naval attaches, major  responsibility for giving prior warning."

[Discontinuous text]

"We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations  which might be forthcoming against such areas and we are taking every  precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and  naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen  with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that  our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible  the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew testified that he had no knowledge or indication  whatever of the assembling of the Japanese naval striking force for the  attack on Pearl Harbor, or that at the war games conducted by Admiral  Yamamoto at the Naval War College in Tokyo between September 2 and 13  (Japan time) the final plans were being formulated for the attack (tr.  1481). He further testified that although he knew that a meeting of the  Japanese Cabinet took place on December 1, he "did not (know) and could  not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on Pearl  Harbor (tr. 1615), and that, with the single exception of the  information upon which his message of January 27, 1941 (Japan time) (ex.  15) was based, he had no information of any character prior to the  attack on Pearl Harbor which indicated the possibility of such an attack  by the Japanese (tr. 1477).

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK APPEALS TO GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED  STATES FOR AID

(October 28-November 4, 1941)

During the latter part of October, the Japanese began extensive troop  concentrations at Haiphong on the coast of northern French Indochina,  and steady streams of Japanese military supplies and materials were  reported arriving at Hainan (off the northern coast of French Indochina)  and at Formosa. As a result of these and other Japanese military  movements, which were interpreted in Chungking as foreshadowing an early  invasion of Yunnan Province for the purpose of taking the city of  Kunming and severing the Burma Road, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made  strenuous efforts to obtain British and American air support for his  ground forces in that area.

On October 28 at his first meeting in Chungking with General Magruder, the head of the recently arrived United States military mission to  China, the Generalissimo asked General Magruder to

[1] Ambassador Grew's message of January 27 1941 (Japan time) follows  "My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from  many sources including a Japanese sour e that the Japanese military  forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States to attempt  a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military  facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact  that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the  information" (ex 15) Paraphrased copies were promptly sent by the State  Department to Military Intelligence Division (Army) and Office of Naval  Intelligence (Navy) (ex. 15).

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inform Washington at once of the threatening situation, and urged that  President Roosevelt "intercede with London to make available the  Singapore air forces to support his defense." He pled with General  Magruder that the President "be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on  Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an  attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests." He  insisted that if the Japanese should take Kunming and thus sever the  Burma Road, Chinese resistance would end and a Japanese attack on the  Malay Peninsula would inevitably follow. He believed his land forces  could resist the anticipated attack only with air support, which he did  not have and which only the British air forces at Singapore could  furnish in time. General Magruder immediately radioed the  Generalissimo's plea to Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, after  discussing the interview with Ambassador Gauss (ex. 47).

In Washington, on the morning of October 30 (Washington time), Mr. T. V.  Soong handed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, a message from  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which repeated the substance of what the  Generalissimo had said to General Magruder.  Chiang's message urged the  United States "to use strong pressure on Britain to send Singapore Air  Force to cooperate with Colonel Chennault in order to save democratic  position in Far East" and stressed the critical nature of the situation (ex. 16-A). Secretary Morgenthau sent the Generalissimo's message to  President Roosevelt on the same day, without written comment and the  President forwarded it to Secretary Hull with this handwritten note:

"C. H. Can we do anything along these lines? How about telling Japan a  move to close Burma Road would be inimical? F. D. R. (Ex. 16-A)."

n November 1 (Washington time), Secretary Hull called a conference at  the State Department which was attended by, among others, the Secretary,  Under Secretary Welles, and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for that  Department, and by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans  Division, for the War Department and Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, Director  of the Central Division, for the Navy Department.  The conference was  called for the purpose of discussing what action should be taken in  response to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's plea. Secretary Hull  expressed the opinion that "there was no use to issue any additional  warnings to Japan if we can't back them up," and the Secretary therefore  desired to know whether "the military authorities would be prepared to  support further warnings by the State Department." A second meeting in  the same connection was held at the State Department the following day  (ex. 16)."

General Gerow submitted a report on these meetings to General Marshall  on November 3 (Washington time) in which he pointed out that the  Military Intelligence Division's (G-2's) latest estimate did not support  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's conclusions as to the imminence of a  Japanese move toward Kunming, though agreeing that the fall of Kunming  would seriously affect Chinese resistance to Japan. After reviewing the  strength of the United States forces in the Philippines and concluding  that the dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison there  would leave the island of Luzon open to serious risk of capture, General  Gerow's report summarized certain "strong" opinions of the War Plans Division, which were stated as follows:

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"a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound; viz.:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan (which were          then enumerated).

[Discontinuous text]

"d. *Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action

"e. * * * *Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint, at the earliest, about the middle of December  1941,* when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat  to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to  delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March  1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected  strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.  (ex. 16)."

The weekly meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board scheduled for November 5  (Washington time) was held on the afternoon of November 3 (Washington  time). The question of aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received  more attention than any other item on the agenda (ex. 16). Admiral Royal  E. Ingersoll presented the situation as the Navy saw it and General  Marshall gave the Army's viewpoint.  Admiral Schuirmann reported on the  two meetings at the State Department and read a memorandum (tr. 5520- 5523) prepared by Dr. Hornbeck in which the latter stated his personal  opinion in favor of a firm representation to Japan, even though war  might result.  Among other things, General Marshall said that it was his  information that "the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide  upon the national policy by November 5," apparently referring to the  intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo regarding the  Imperial Conference to be held in Tokyo on that date. He expressed the view that

"Until powerful United States Forces had been built up in the Far East,  it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. *It  appeared that the basis of U. S. Policy should be to make certain minor  concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These  concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar  trade restrictions (ex. 16).*"

Following these discussions the Joint Board decided that

"War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a  memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's  proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take  the following lines:

"Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

"Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

"Oppose the movement and employment of U.S. Military forces in support of Chiang Kai-shek.

"Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

"Suggest agreement with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

"Point out the effect and cost a U.S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

"Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific  (ex. 16)."

That evening, November 3 (Washington time), the State Department  received a telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking to the effect  that while it was not yet certain that Japan would undertake an invasion  of Yunnan from Indochina, it was believed certain that in any case large Japanese air forces would operate against the

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Burma Road and any volunteer air forces in China, and that accordingly, if Anglo-American air units were sent into Yunnan, they should be in  sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air  concentrations. "Half or token measures " the Ambassador advised, "would  prove dangerous" (ex. 47).

The next morning, November 4 (Washington time), the State Department  received from the Chinese Embassy a personal message to President  Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (ex. 47). This message  quoted a lengthy message which the Generalissimo had sent directly to  Prime Minister Churchill, in which the Generalissimo expressed  substantially the same views as those he had communicated to General  Magruder, and urged that the British air force in Malaya, "with American  cooperation," be sent to his assistance to resist the anticipated  assault on Yunnan and Kunming. The Generalissimo then urged the United  States "to draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an  active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation," saying that

"unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of  winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately  and in her own time (ex. 47)."

Neither the Generalissimo's message addressed to the Prime Minister nor  his message addressed to the President made any further reference to the  proposal that a warning to Japan be issued by Britain or the United  States. On the 4th Secretary Hull held separate conferences at the State  Department with Secretary Knox, and with General Marshall and Admiral  Ingersoll (tr. 1171, 1173).

The next day, November 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt received  the following message from Prime Minister Churchill:

"I have received Chiang Kai-shek's attached appeal addressed to us both for air assistance. You know how we are placed for air strength at Singapore. Nonetheless, I should be prepared to send pilots and even some planes if they could arrive in time.

"What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable character. The Japanese have as yet taken no final decision, and the  Emperor appears to be exercising restraint. When we talked about this at Argentia you spoke of gaining time, and this policy has been brilliantly  successful so far. But our joint embargo is steadily forcing the  Japanese to decisions for peace or war.

"It now looks as if they would go into Yunnan cutting the Burma Road  with disastrous consequence for Chiang Kai-shek. The collapse of his  resistance would not only be a world tragedy in itself, but it would  leave the Japanese with large forces to attack north or south.

"The Chinese have appealed to us, as I believe they have to you, to warn  the Japanese against an attack on Yunnan. I hope you might remind them  that such an attack, aimed at China from a region in which we have never  recognized that the Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be  in open disregard of the clearly indicated attitude of the United States  Government. We should, of course, be ready to make a similar  communication.

"No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so  much tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our  utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I think myself, that  Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me  know what you think (ex. 158)."

President Roosevelt did not reply to Prime Minister Churchill until 2  days later. In the meantime, General Marshall and Admiral Stark  submitted to him, under date of November 5 (Washington time), a joint  memorandum (ex. 16) pursuant to the action of the Joint Board referred  to above. In their joint memorandum

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General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the various  communications from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which have been  mentioned above, and to Secretary Hull's request for advice "as to the  attitude which this Government should take" toward a Japanese offensive  against Kunming and the Burma Road, and stated that the question they had considered was

"whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive  military operations with U. S. Forces against Japan, to prevent her from  severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well disguised, would lead to war."

In answering this question, General Marshall and Admiral Stark then advised the President:

"At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior  to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic  offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would  have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels  from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An  unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous  merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now  considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of  naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose  the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

"The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct  defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the  defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The  Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air,  and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous  undertaking. By about the middle of December 1941, United States air and  submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat  to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces  in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February  or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a  point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in   operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time,  additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have  arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area  against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

"Until such a time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang Kai-shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United  States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective  of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and  Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In  any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against  Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the  Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) *War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while  building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan  attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United  States is of very great importance.* Military action against Japan  should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

"(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British    Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

"(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100  East or south of 10  North; or into Portuguese Timor, New    Caledonia, or Loyalty Islands.

"(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should  be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and  weakening Japan's economic position.

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"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand, except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia,  would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government

"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields,  should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the  United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention  against Japan in China be disapproved.

"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated  to the maximum practicable extent.

"*That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan (ex. 16).*

Secretary Hull testified that he

"was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the  Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be  sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American  foreign policy considerations were involved that material to China  should be accelerated as much as feasible and that aid to the American  Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally *I concurred completely  in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been  striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every  possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan.  That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President  and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.* (tr. 1130)."

On November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent the following  reply, prepared in the State Department, to Prime Minister Churchill's message of the 5th:

"We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China.

"We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to  strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar  efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's  hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal  warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an  opposite effect.

"This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention,  study, and effort.

"I shall probably not, repeat not, make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your  close official circle that I have said above (ex. 16-B)."

The record shows that on November 8, Secretary Hull conferred at the State Department with General Miles, head of the Military Intelligence  Division (G-2), General Staff (tr. 1173), and on November 10 with  Secretary Knox (tr. 1171). On the latter date he sent to President  Roosevelt a draft of a proposed reply to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.  The next day the President dictated the following brief note to his  aide, General Watson, which was attached to the Secretary's draft and read:

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"I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to  me when he comes (ex. 16)."

Written on the same sheet of paper, below the typewritten note to General Watson and apparently after the conference with Dr. Hu Shih, the  Chinese Ambassador, appears the following, in the President's  handwriting:

"C. H.  O. K. to send. F. D. R. (EX. 16)."

The draft was then returned to the State Department, where the message  in final form was handed to Dr. Hu Shih late in the afternoon of  November 14 (Washington time) for transmittal to Generalissimo Chiang  Kai-shek. In it President Roosevelt described briefly the intensive  consideration that had been given to the Generalissimo's appeal, and continued:

"Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world  situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that  the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is  along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease  materials and facilitating the building up of the American Volunteer air  force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present,  as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We  are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the  Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are  calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In-addition, our  program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly  expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with  great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving  expedition of increasing expedition of increasing amounts of material  for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems  which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in  the most practicable ways possible.

"I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the  foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering,  adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to  strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward  safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be  developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and  naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being  steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they  do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from  Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole  situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive  preparations in their territories to the south.

"This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government  of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of  aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view  upon Japan on every appropriate occasion (ex. 16)"

In accordance with the joint recommendation that had been made by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark, no warning was delivered to Japan as  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had urged.

It is clear that the movement of additional Japanese troops into northern French Indochina had a twofold purpose. On the one hand he  troops were an immediate threat to China by their proximity to Yunnan  Province, the Burma Road, and Kunming on the north and northwest.  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid recognized the immediacy  of that threat. On the other hand, the additional Japanese forces  increased the potential threat to the British Malay States and  Singapore, and to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The  price the Japanese Government hoped to exact from the United States and  Great Britain for the removal of this latter threat had been determined  at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time). The subsequent  fall of the Konoye

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Cabinet and accession of General Tojo in October had only increased  Japan's determination to use this potential threat to blackmail the  United States, if possible, into (1) ceasing all aid to China, (2) accepting a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to that  of Japan, and (3) furnishing all possible material aid to Japan.  Furthermore, since the Japanese Army at no time evidenced a willingness  to withdraw its troops from China, or to agree not to use northern  French Indo-China as a base for operations against China it would seem  clear that the Japanese strategy was not only to blackmail the United  States into granting those ".minimum demands" but also, having  accomplished that, to turn on China from northern French Indochina and  thus to expedite the liquidation of the "China Incident" and the  establishment of a Japanese " just peace" in the Far East.

JAPAN DELIVERS ITS NEXT-TO-LAST PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES

(November 10, 1941)

After the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) the Japanese-American conversations were "on the last lap" as far as the Japanese  Government was concerned (ex. 1, p. 101). Immediately after that  conference the final Japanese diplomatic, naval, and military maneuvers  began. The instructions Foreign Minister Togo sent to Ambassador Nomura  to resume the talks and to present proposal "A" to the United States  Government had their counterparts in operational orders issued to the  Japanese Navy and, without doubt, to the Japanese Army as well. Those  orders contemplated naval, air; and troop dispositions which were  commenced immediately. Many of those dispositions were detected and  observed by the United States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, but  the major Japanese naval movement was successfully kept secret by the  Japanese until the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7,  1941.

It is imperative to an accurate appraisal of this closing period of the  Japanese-American conversations to keep in mind those Japanese military  and naval dispositions. Reports of the military movements toward the  south and alarms about Japanese naval movements (except the one toward  Pearl Harbor) reached Washington and the State Department during  November as the Japanese Ambassadors were presenting their final  proposals, and again, as in July, discredited the intentions of the  Japanese Government. Commencing in the middle of November the American  consuls at Hanoi and Saigon in north and south French Indochina reported  extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina  (tr. 1138). About November 21 (Washington time) the State Department  received word that the Dutch had information that a Japanese naval force  had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese mandated  islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies (ex. 21; tr. 1138).

It is now known that at the same time a powerful Japanese naval striking  force, its formation and purpose successfully kept secret, was  assembling in a northern Japanese harbor for the attack on the United  States Pacific Fleet, under orders issued on or about November 14 (Japan  time). On November 21 (Japan time) the commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet was directed to order his forces

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to advance to the area in which they were to wait in readiness and to  station them in such positions that

"in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of  hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation  promptly (tr. 43S7)."

On November 25 (Japan time) the commander in chief issued an order which  directed the naval striking force to "advance into Hawaiian waters and  upon the very opening of hostilities * * * attack the main force of the  United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow" (tr. 437). The  order provided, however, that

"Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach  an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all  the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and  return to their bases (tr. 437)."

The striking force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in northern Japan at 9 a.  m. November 26 (Japan time), or about 7 p. m. on November 25 (Washington  time) (tr. 450).

In the meantime, it had been decided in Tokyo to send Saburu Kurusu,  former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to Washington to assist  Ambassador Nomura. On the evening of November 4 (Japan time) Mr. Kurusu  told Ambassador Grew that the mission had been broached to him "only  yesterday afternoon" (ex. 3O, p. 471), although it appears from the  comments made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on October  10 (Japan time) that the matter had been under consideration for some  time. Arrangements were made by the State Department for the Pan- American Clipper to be held in Hong Kong for 2 days to permit Mr. Kurusu  to travel on that plane, and he left Tokyo early on November 5 (Japan  time). Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 4  (Japan time) of this development, saying that Ambassador Kurusu was  being sent to assist Ambassador Nomura and to be his "right- and man" in  view of "the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your  request on instructions from me" (ex. 1, p. 97). Two days later the  Foreign Minister cabled that the reason for Ambassador Kurusu's dispatch "so quickly" was "to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations  soon to follow." The officials of the Japanese Army and Navy, the  Foreign Minister said, were "pleased with the special dispatch of the  Ambassador" (ex. 1, p. 101).

In Washington, as soon as he received Foreign Minister Togo's  instructions to resume the conversations, Ambassador Nomura arranged a  meeting with Secretary Hull. At that meeting, which took place on the  morning of November 7 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura informed the  Secretary that he had now received instructions from the new Japanese  Government, and that he wished to resume the conversations. He then said  that the new Japanese Cabinet had deliberated on the various questions  at issue between the two Governments

"with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make,  having due regard for the situation in the Far East and the attitude of  public opinion in Japan (vol. II, p. 707)."

He said that of the three principal questions on which there were  divergent views, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile  the views of the two Governments on two, namely, nondiscrimination in  international trade and Japan's obligations under the Tripartite

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Pact. He realized that the difficulties of reaching an agreement on the  third, the China question, were greater. So saying, he handed to  Secretary Hull a document (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 709-710) containing  formulae relating to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and to  nondiscrimination in international trade. This document was, he said, to  be taken in conjunction with the United States proposals of June 21 and  October 2 and the Japanese proposal delivered to the Secretary on  September 27. It embodied the substance of the provisions of proposal  "A" regarding those two points, but was silent regarding the question of  Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull expressed  the hope that some concrete statement concerning the latter point could  be worked out that would be of help, but Ambassador Nomura said it did  not seem to him any further statement was necessary than had already  been made, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which  "manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific." During the  conversation Secretary Hull again mentioned that before entering into  any formal negotiations he intended to discuss the matter with the  Chinese, the British, and the Dutch (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 708).  Ambassador Nomura requested a meeting with President Roosevelt, which  was subsequently arranged for November 10 (Washington time).

The afternoon of November 7 (Washington time), Secretary Hull attended a  Cabinet meeting at the White House. The situation in the Far East  appears to have been uppermost in the minds of those present; especially  the President, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson. Secretary Stimson  had had a conference with the President the day before, November 6  (Washington time), and had recorded in his daily notes that he and the  President had talked

"about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the  messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he  thought he might say. *He was trying to think of something which would  save us further time.*  He suggested he might propose a truce in which  there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the  Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that  meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw  two great objections to that; first, that it tied up our hands just at a  time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our  reinforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would  feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him  that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington  conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because  the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese  know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into  such an arrangement (tr. 14414-14415)."

The morning of the next day, November 7 (Washington time), Admiral John  R. Beardall, President Roosevelt's naval aide, at the President's  direction, requested the appropriate officers in the Navy Department to  arrange for the delivery to the President of complete translations of  the intercepted Japanese messages, rather than memoranda briefly  summarizing the messages as had been delivered theretofore under the  existing agreement between the Army and the Navy in that connection.  Such arrangements were made and, commencing November 12 (Washington  time), complete translations were delivered each day to Admiral Beardall for delivery to President Roosevelt. According to reported statements  made by Admiral Beardall at the time, the President told him that he  (the President) "was in fact either seeing or being told about the  material through Hull" (tr. 14525-14526).

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According to Secretary Stimson's notes of the Cabinet meeting on  November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt took-

"what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on  the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case  we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a  very interesting talk the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had  since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then  myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in  feeling the country would support us.  He said that this time the vote  is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of  the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a  following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be  done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the  Cabinet had known and they did not know except in the case of Hull and  the President what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready  we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)."

Secretary Hull testified that at this Cabinet meeting after President  Roosevelt turned to him and asked whether he had anything in mind

"thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the  international situation. I went over fully developments in the  conversations with Japan and *emphasized that in my opinion relations  were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a  military attack anywhere by Japan at any time*. When I finished, the  President went around the Cabinet. *All concurred in my estimate of the  dangers.* It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country  would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

"accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on  November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted  with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic,  but we were " likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side  of the world on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less  than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

"On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated  that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the  same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations  bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking  high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening  more and more with each passing day "to engulf our own shores." He  warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;  that "at any moment war may be forced upon us" (tr. 1131-1132)."

Statements which were made by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Grew  in Tokyo 3 days later, on November 10 (Japan time), show the attitude  with which the Japanese Foreign Office was approaching the conversations  during this period immediately following the Imperial Conference on  November 5. After informing the Ambassador that new proposals had been  sent to Ambassador Nomura for presentation to the United States  Government, the Foreign Minister urged the necessity of a speedy  settlement, saying that national sentiment would "not tolerate further  protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion" and that the position  was "daily becoming more pressing." He said that the new proposals  represented the "maximum possible concessions by Japan," and handed to  the Ambassador the texts of the two documents submitted to Secretary  Hull on November 7. During the Foreign Minister's comments on these  documents, he expressed the desire that the British Government should  conclude an agreement with Japan simultaneously with the United States,  in view of Great Britain's interests in the Pacific. The Foreign  Minister told Ambassador Grew that he felt that the United States did not adequately appreciate the realities of the situation in the Far  East. Referring to the steadily increasing population of Japan, he stated it

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was necessary to assure the raw materials necessary for the existence of  that population and that unless the United States realized this fact as  among the realities of the situation, a successful conclusion to the  conversations would be difficult. Ambassador Grew told the Minister that  his statements penetrated to the heart of the whole problem, since one  of the fundamental purposes of the conversations was to open a way for  Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a full flow of  trade and commerce and market for her industries, but by peaceful means  as opposed to the use of force. In reply to this the Minister said, as  reported by Ambassador Grew, that

"He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he  thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and  economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by  the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many  important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is  capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the  direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take  into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the  possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic  pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures  of self-defense (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 714)."

The Minister saw no inconsistency between insisting that Japan would not  give up the fruits of 4 years of hostilities in China and at the same  time accepting the principle of refraining from aggression and the use  of force (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 710-714; ex. 1, pp. 109-111).

Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt took place at the  White House on the morning of November 10 (Washington time), with  Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi present. At this meeting the  Ambassador read from a prepared document an explanation of the proposals  he had been instructed by his Government to present (i. e., proposal "A"), the substance of which (except as regards the Tripartite Pact) he  had already communicated to Secretary Hull on November 7. Regarding the  first question, the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in  international trade, he said that his Government had now decided to  accept its application in all Pacific areas, including China, upon the  understanding that the principle would be applied uniformly to the rest  of the world as well. As to the second question, the attitude of the two  Governments toward the European war, he stated that his Government was  not prepared to go further in black and white than the language  contained in its proposal of September 27, which was:

"Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in  the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor  jointly for the early restoration of world peace.

"With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration  of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by  considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United  States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide  entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite  Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, and would likewise determine  what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in  accordance with the said interpretation (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 638)."

He added that if the United States was in a position to give assurance that it had no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the  term "protection and self-defense," his Government would be prepared to  reciprocate. Concerning the third question, the stationing and  withdrawal of troops from China and French Indochina, Ambassador Nomura  submitted the following formula:

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"With regard to the Japanese forces which have been dispatched to China  in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of  North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao  (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required  duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and  China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as  general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal  will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China  and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of  peace and order.

"The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial  sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present  stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled  or an equitable peace is established in East Asia (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  716)."

The Ambassador said that this formula clearly indicated that the  stationing of Japanese troops in China was not of a permanent nature,  and that however desirable the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China might be, it was "impracticable under the  present circumstances." In a written statement, which he then read,  Ambassador Nomura said that as viewed from the Japanese side it seemed  that the United States had remained adamant in its position and had  shown little sign of reciprocation to "concessions" by the Japanese with  the result that "in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has  arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government." He  continued:

"People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic  blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern  warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the  supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from  home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only  way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and  satisfactory understanding with the United States without any  unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties,  the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the  conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for  the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. *My Government  therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort* for  that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of  your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 717)."

In reply, President Roosevelt read a brief statement which concluded:

"We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable  results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall  continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we  understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that  the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue  peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification  should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 718)."

The President referred to the improvement of American relations with the  South American countries under the "good neighbor policy" as compared to  the policy of force that had been employed by the United States in some  cases. Then, according to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo the same day

"Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them  impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this  expression should be translated as "method of living" (ex. 1, p. 116)."

Ambassador Nomura reported that it was not clear to him what the phrase "modus vivendi" really meant, and that he intended to ascertain whether the President was referring to, possibly, "a provisional agreement" (ex.  1, p. 116).

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