PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS WITH
RESPECT TO RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked act of
aggression by the Empire of Japan. The treacherous attack was planned
and launched while Japanese ambassadors, instructed with characteristic
duplicity, were carrying of the pretense negotiations with the
Government of the United States with a view to an amicable settlement of
differences in the Pacific.
2. The ultimate responsibility for the attack and its results rests on
Japan, an attack that was well planned and skillfully executed.
contributing to the effectiveness of the attack was a powerful striking
force, much more powerful than it had been thought the Japanese were
able to employ in a single tactical venture at such distance and under
such circumstances.
3. The diplomatic policies and actions of the United States provided no
justifiable provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on this Nation.
The Secretary of State fully informed both the War and Navy Departments
of diplomatic developments and, in a timely and forceful manner, clearly
pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United
States and Japan had passed beyond the age of diplomacy and were in the
hands of the military.
4. The committee has found no evidence to support the charges, made
before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of Navy tricked, provoked,
incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this Nation in order
that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from the
Congress. On the contrary, all evidence conclusively points to the fact
that they discharged their responsibilities with distinction, ability,
and foresight and in keeping with the highest traditions of our
fundamental foreign policy.
5. The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials
made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and
endangering our security, to avert war with Japan.
6. The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase
in personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy institute
measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a
state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at
hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the
Japanese.
7. Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in Washington and
Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack; they
realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a
possibility; and they were adequately informed of the imminence of war.
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8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed
(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings
received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the
principle of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to
alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii particularly
in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during
the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with
the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint
security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence
(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of
their equipment.
(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy
establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.
(f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command,
which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of
the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information
available to them.
9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and
not derelictions of duty.
10. The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to discharge its
direct responsibility to advise the commanding general he had not
properly alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter, pursuant to
instructions, had reported action taken in a message that was not
satisfactorily responsive to the original directive.
11. The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy
Departments failed:
(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted
messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and
November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to
raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a
particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should
have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their
assistance, along with other information available to them, in making
their estimate of the situation.
(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the "one o'clock"
intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese
military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December
7. If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a
dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information,
as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.
12. Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-four
hour watch, the Committee believes that under all of the evidence the
War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and
7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the evidence in the Committee's record, the following
recommendations are respectfully submitted:
That immediate action be taken to insure that unity of command is
imposed at all military and naval outposts.
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253
That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence
agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which
experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a
unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who
possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that
they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order
that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of
their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating
material received. The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for
such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions.
Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace
as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded
the important role which it deserves.
That effective steps be taken to insure that statutory or other
restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces
inimical to the Nation's security and to the handicap of our own
intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the Congress should give
serious study to, among other things, the Communications Act of 1934; to
suspension in proper instances of the statute of limitations during war
(it was impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to
the "Magic" without giving the secret to the enemy); to legislation
designed to prevent unauthorized sketching, photographing, and mapping
of military and naval reservations in peacetime; and to legislation
fully protecting the security of classified matter.
That the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer
in the Hawaiian Department, as developed by the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate or the House
of Representatives.
That the military and naval branches of our Government give serious
consideration to the 25 supervisory, administrative, and organizational
principles hereafter set forth.
SUPERVISORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN OUR
MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS REVEALED BY THE PEARL HARBOR
INVESTIGATION
The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor proceedings
by one enigmatical and paramount question: *Why, with one of the finest
intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge
that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of
attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7 Why was
it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur*? The answer to this question
and the causative considerations regarded as having any reasonably
proximate bearing on the disaster have been set forth in the body of
this report. Fundamentally, these considerations reflect supervisory,
administrative, and organizational deficiencies which existed in our
Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor. In
the course of the Committee's investigation still other deficiencies,
not regarded as having a direct bearing on the disaster have presented
themselves. Otherwise stated, all of these
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deficiencies reduce themselves to principles which are set forth, not
for their novelty or profundity but for the reason that, by their very
self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they were ignored.
It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealed by our
investigation may very probably have already been corrected as a result
of the experiences of the war. We desire, however, to submit these
principles, which are grounded in the evidence adduced by the Committee,
for the consideration of our Army and Navy establishments in the earnest
hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our
national defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December
7, 1941. We do this after careful and long consideration of the evidence
developed through one of the most important investigations in the
history of the Congress.
1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority
and clear-cut allocation of responsibility
Reviewing the testimony of the Director of War Plans and the Director of
Naval Intelligence, the conclusion is inescapable that the proper
demarcation of responsibility between these two divisions of the Navy
Department did not exist. War Plans appears to have insisted that since
it had the duty of issuing operational orders it must arrogate the
prerogative of evaluating intelligence; Naval Intelligence, on the other
hand, seems to have regarded the matter of evaluation as properly its
function. It is clear that this intradepartmental misunderstanding and
near conflict was not resolved before December 7 and beyond question it
prejudiced the effectiveness of Naval Intelligence.
In Hawaii, there as such a marked failure to allocate responsibility in
the case of the Fourteenth Naval District that Admiral Bloch testified
he did not know whom the commander in chief would hold responsible in
the event of shortcomings with respect to the condition and readiness of
aircraft. [1] The position of Admiral Bellinger was a wholly anomalous
one. He appears to have been responsible to everyone and to no one. The
pyramiding of superstructures of organization cannot be conducive to
efficiency and endangers the very function of our military and naval
services.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the
alerting of subordinates
The testimony of many crucial witnesses in the Pearl Harbor
investigation contains an identical note: "I thought he was alerted"; "I
took for granted he would understand"; "I thought he would be doing
that." It is the same story each responsible official seeking to justify
his position by reliance upon the fallacious premise that he was
entitled to rely upon the assumption that a certain task was being
performed or to take for granted that subordinates would be properly
vigilant. This tragic theme was particularly marked in Hawaii.
The foregoing was well illustrated in Admiral Kimmel's failure to
appreciate the significance of dispatches between December 3 and 6,
advising him that Japanese embassies and consulates, including the
[1] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 1522.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
255
Embassy in Washington, were destroying their codes. Navy Department
officials have almost unanimously testified that instructions to burn
codes mean "war in any man's language" and that in supplying Admiral
Kimmel this information they were entitled to believe he could attach
the proper significance to this intelligence. Yet the commander in chief
of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not interpret these
dispatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate war on the United
States. That the Navy Department was entitled to rely upon the feeling
that Admiral Kimmel, as a responsible intelligent commander, should have
known what the burning of codes meant appears reasonable; but this is
beside the point in determining standards for the future. The simple
fact is that the dispatches were not properly interpreted. Had the Navy
Department not taken for granted that Kimmel would be alerted by them
but instead have given him the benefit of its interpretation, there
could now be no argument as to what the state of alertness should have
been based on such dispatches. With Pearl Harbor as a sad experience,
crucial intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders
accompanied by the best estimate of its significance.
3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should
always be resolved in favor of supplying the information
Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the "one o clock" intelligence to
the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as adequately
alerted and he did not want to confuse them. As has been seen, he was
properly entitled to believe that naval establishments were adequately
alert, but the fact is that one Hawaii was not in a state of readiness.
This one exception is proof of the principle that any question as to
whether information should be supplied the field should always be
resolved in favor of transmitting it.
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty
of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised
Perhaps the most signal shortcoming of administration, both at
Washington and in Hawaii, was the failure to follow up orders and
instructions to insure that they were carried out. The record of all
Pearl Harbor proceedings is replete with evidence of this fundamental
deficiency in administration. A few illustrations should clearly
demonstrate this fact.
In the dispatch of November 27, 1941, which was to be considered "war
warning," Admiral Kimmel was instructed to "execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL-46." Very little was done pursuant to this order with a view to a
*defensive* deployment; the Navy Department did nothing to determine
what had been done in execution of the order. Yet virtually every
responsible Navy Department official has testified as to what he
"assumed" Kimmel would do upon receipt of this dispatch. While it
appears to have been the policy to leave the implementation of orders to
the local commander, as a matter of future practice it would seem a
safer policy to recognize as implicit in the delegation of authority or
the issuance of orders the responsibility of inspecting and supervising
to determine that the delegated authority is properly administered and
the orders carried out.
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The story of Admiral Kimmel's administration of the Pacific Fleet and
supervision of the Fourteenth Naval District as well as General Short's
administration of the Hawaiian Department in the critical days before
December 7 is the epitome of worthy plans and purposes which were never
implemented. The job of an administrator is only half completed upon the
issuance of an order; it is discharged when he determines the order has
been executed.
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest
supervision
In the November 27 warning sent General Short he was ordered "to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary"
and to "report measures taken." The commanding general reported: "Re
your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy."
This message from General Short was not clearly responsive to the order.
Yet during the 9 days before Pearl Harbor not one responsible officer in
the War Plans Division of the War Department pointed out to the
commanding general his failure to alert the Hawaiian Department
consistent with instructions As a matter of fact, it does not
affirmatively appear that anyone upon receipt of General Short's reply
"burdened" himself sufficiently to call for message No. 472 in order to
determine to what the report was responsive.
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through
repetition
It has been suggested, in explaining why additional warnings were not
sent to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, that it was desired to avoid
crying "wolf" too often lest the department commanders become impervious
to the significance of messages designed to alert them. The McCollum
message, for example, was not dispatched for the reason that overseas
garrisons were regarded as fully alerted. Admiral Noyes is alleged to
have referred to the proposed dispatch as an insult to the intelligence
of the commander in chief inasmuch as he felt Admiral Kimmel had
received adequate information Although the exact provisions of the
McCollum dispatch are unknown, it would seem to have been a safer
practice to have sent this additional warning to intensify and insure
alertness over a period of time through repetition, particularly under
the critical circumstances prevailing between November 27 and December
7, 1941.
No consideration appears to have been given to the thought that since
nothing occurred for 9 days after the warnings of November 27 there
would be a lessening of vigilance by reason of the simple fact that
*nothing did occur for several days* following such warnings. Of course,
this observation has little or no application to the Hawaiian situation;
for had Japan struck on November 28, the next day after the warnings,
the same lack of readiness would substantially have prevailed as existed
on the morning of December 7. There could have been no lessening of
alertness there for the reason that the Hawaiian commands were at no
time properly alert.
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257
7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and
decisive action are of the essence
Beyond serious question Army and Navy officials both in Hawaii and in
Washington were beset by a lassitude born of 20 years of peace. Admiral
Kimmel admitted he was affected by the "peace psychology" just like
"everybody else." As expressed by Admiral McMorris, "We were a bit too
complacent there." The manner in which capable officers were affected is
to a degree understandable, but the Army and the Navy are the watchdogs
of the Nation's security and they must be on the alert at all times, no
matter how many the years of peace.
As indicated in the body of this report, there was a failure in the War
and Navy Departments during the night of December 6-7 to be properly on
the qui vive consistent with the knowledge that the Japanese reply to
our Government's note of November 26 was being received. The failure of
subordinate officials to contact the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval
Operations on the evening of December 6 concerning the first 13 parts of
the 14-part memorandum is indicative of the "business as usual"
attitude. Some prominent military and naval officials were entertaining
and, along with other officers, apparently failed to read into the 13
parts the importance of and necessity of greater alertness.
Of a similar tenor is the remark of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the
"lost" Japanese carriers "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding
Diamond Head * * *?" Or the observation attributed to General Short with
respect to the transcript of the "Mori" conversation that it looked
quite in order and was nothing to be excited about.
The people are entitled to expect greater vigilance and alertness from
their Army and Navy whether in war or in peace.
8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of
stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of
responsibility in competent officials
On occasion witnesses have echoed the sentiment that the Pearl Harbor
debacle was made possible, not by the egregious errors or poor judgment
of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the
imperfection and deficiencies of the system whereby Army and Navy
intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence,
however, can be extended this conclusion inasmuch as no amount of
coordination and no system could be effected to compensate for lack of
alertness and imagination. Nevertheless, there is substantial basis,
from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to
conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault
and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through
continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those
charged with handling intelligence. *And the assignment of an officer
having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should
not impede his progress nor affect his promotions*.
The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to have
been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Departments. It
seems to have been regarded as just another tour of duty,
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as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such
work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct
impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to
relegate intelligence to a role of secondary importance.
As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically
portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments (1)
for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the back ground,
capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining them in the
work over an extended period of time in order that they may become
steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ
this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data received; and (3) for the
centralization of responsibility for handling intelligence to avoid all
of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so
abundantly apparent.
9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal; there
should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of
instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt
Despite the fact that the record of testimony in the Pearl Harbor
proceedings is filled with various interpretations as to what War and
Navy Department dispatches meant, in not one instance does it appear
that a subordinate requested a clarification. General Short was ordered
to undertake reconnaissance, yet he apparently ignored the order
assuming that the man who prepared it did not know of his special
agreement-with the Navy in Hawaii whereby the latter was to conduct
distant reconnaissance. He chose to implement an order which manifestly
he did not understand, without the presumption that the man who prepared
it did not know what he was doing, rather than request clarifying
instructions. On November 27 Admiral Kimmel received a message beginning
with the words: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Every
naval officer who has testified on the subject has stated that never
before in his naval experience had he ever seen a dispatch containing
the words "war warning"; Admiral Kimmel testified that never before in
his some 40 years as a naval officer had he seen these words employed in
an official dispatch. In the same message there was another term,
"defensive deployment," which the commander in chief manifestly did not
clearly understand. In spite of his apparent uncertainty as to the
meaning of the message, Admiral Kimmel, it can be presumed, chose to
endeavor to implement it without seeking advice from the Navy
Department.
While there is an understandable disposition of a subordinate to avoid
consulting his superior for advice except where absolutely necessary in
order that he may demonstrate his self-reliance, the persistent failure
without exception of Army and Navy officers, as revealed by the
investigation, to seek amplifying and clarifying instructions from their
superiors is strongly suggestive of just one thing: That the military
and naval services failed to instill in their personnel the wholesome
disposition to consult freely with their superiors for the mutual good
and success of both superior and subordinate. One witness, upon being
asked why an explanation was not requested replied, in effect: "Well, I
have found the asking is usually the other way"; that is, the superior
asking the subordinate Such a situation is not desirable, and the
services should not be prejudiced by walls of "brass."
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10. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part
of supervisory and intelligence officials
As reflected by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, there was
failure to employ the necessary imagination with respect to the
intelligence which was at hand.
Washington, like Hawaii, possessed unusually significant and vital
intelligence. Had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the
significance of intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to
particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have
concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.
The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate the highest
imagination with respect to the intelligence which was available in
Hawaii and in Washington is traceable, at least in part, to the failure
accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it
deserves.
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and
appropriateness
The evidence before the Committee reflects an unusual number of
instances where military officers in high positions of responsibility
interpreted orders, intelligence, and other information and arrived
opposite conclusions at a time when it was imperative for them to
estimate the situation and to arrive at identical conclusions.
Admiral Kimmel was ordered to execute an *appropriate defensive
deployment*. Everyone in Washington in testifying before the committee
seems reasonably certain as to just what this meant; Admiral Kimmel did
not feel that it required his doing anything greatly beyond what he had
already done, even though he knew that Washington knew what he had
previously done. In using the words "this dispatch is to be considered a
war warning" everyone in Washington felt the commander in chief would be
sharply, incisively, and emphatically warned of war; Admiral Kimmel said
he had construed the messages he had received previously as war
warnings. Everyone in Washington felt that upon advising Hawaii the
Japanese were destroying their codes it would be understood as meaning
"war in any man's language"; Admiral Kimmel said that he did not
consider this intelligence of any vital importance when he received it.
The War Department warned General Short that hostilities were possible
at any moment, meaning armed hostilities; General Short felt that
sabotage was one form of hostilities and instituted an alert against
sabotage only. Washington ordered the commanding general undertake
reconnaissance; the latter took for granted that the war Department had
made a mistake and proceeded in effect to ignore the order on the basis
of this assumption. General Short was instructed to report the measures
taken by him pursuant to departmental orders. He replied that his
department was alerted against sabotage and that he had effected liaison
with the Navy; the Director of War Plans saw the reply and took for
granted the commanding general was replying to a different warning
concerning subversive activities, at the same time suggesting that some
of his subordinates may have interpreted the reply to mean that, in
effecting liaison with260
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the Navy, General Short had necessarily carried out the order to conduct
reconnaissance.
General Short said he thought the order given Admiral Kimmel to execute
a defensive deployment necessarily required distant reconnaissance; the
commander in chief did not so interpret the order Admiral Kimmel saw the
warning General Short received and took for granted the Army would be on
a full alert designed to protect the fleet base.
As has been seen, an objective consideration of the warnings received by
the Hawaiian commanders indicates they were adequate. But on the basis
of the disaster, in the future *adequacy* cannot be regarded as
sufficient. Dispatches must be unmistakably clear, forth right, and
devoid of any conceivable ambiguity.
The committee feels that the practice, indulged by the Navy, of sending
to several commanders an identical dispatch for action, even though the
addressees may be located in decidedly different situations is
distinctly dangerous. In the preparation of messages to outposts the
dispatch to a particular officer should be applicable to his peculiar
situation. What may well be characterized as the "lazy" practice of
preparing a single dispatch should be replaced by a more industrious and
effective system whereby a separate "individualized" dispatch is sent to
each commander whose particular situation varies greatly from that of
another commander or there may be reason for him because of distance or
other factors to believe so.
It is believed that brevity of messages was carried to the point of
being a fetish rather than a virtue. Dispatches must be characterized by
sufficient amplitude to be meaningful not only to the sender but beyond
reasonable doubt, to the addressee as well.
12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received
and every effort should be made to inquire that the paraphrased material
reflects the true meaning and significance of the original
To preserve the security of their own codes the War and Navy Departments
followed the natural and proper practice of paraphrasing messages
received. From a review of several messages as paraphrased the committee
is of the opinion that the utmost caution and care should be employed in
preserving the original meaning of material. One classic example will
serve to illustrate this point.
In replying to the War Department's directive of November 27, 1941,
General Short said:
"Re your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with
Navy."
As paraphrased upon receipt at the War Department, this message read:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy re your 472."
It is to be recalled that the Army and Navy had entered into a special
agreement at Hawaii whereby the Navy assumed responsibility for long-
range reconnaissance. Therefore, having ordered General Short to
undertake reconnaissance, a reasonable construction of his message as
paraphrased would be that the commanding general, through liaison with
the Navy, had made the necessary arrangements for reconnaissance as
instructed in the War Department's warning of November 27. The message
which Short actually
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261
sent however, cannot so easily be afforded this construction. The
seriousness of this matter lies in the fact that failure to conduct
long-range reconnaissance at Hawaii was the prime factor responsible for
the Army and Navy having been caught flat-footed. Conceivably, had the
message as paraphrased not been misleading, the War Department might
well have followed up on General Short's message, pointing out that he
had failed to take the necessary action to alert his command.
13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of
unusual situations
Reviewing the Pearl Harbor evidence there are, in both the War and Navy
establishments, several illustrations of inflexible procedures that
could not be or at least were not subjected to sufficient alteration to
satisfy the exigencies of the situation. Everything seems perforce to
have followed a grooved pattern regardless of the demands for
distinctive action. The idea of proceeding "through channels" was
carried to an extreme.
Among the best illustrations of this fact was the failure of Admiral
Kimmel to advise Admiral Newton that the "war warning" had been
received. Admiral Newton was departing from Pearl Harbor with some of
the most vital units of the Pacific Fleet, yet because the table of
organization indicated Admiral Brown to be Newton's superior, the
commander in chief did not take it upon himself to insure that Newton
was fully informed as to the critical situation between the United
States and Japan, and relied upon the usual procedure whereby Brown
would keep Newton advised of developments.
14. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of
officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of
prejudicing the work of the organization.
The Magic intelligence was preeminently important and the necessity for
keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasized. However, so closely
held and top secret was this intelligence that it appears the fact the
Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance than
the *information* obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this
rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and
enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most
pertinent information concerning Japan.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was charged with
combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the
United States. On February 15, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Washington a
detailed outline as to the type of espionage information desired from
this country. [2] The FBI was never informed of this vitals information
necessary to the success of its work, despite the fact that the closest
liaison was supposed to exist among the FBI, Naval Intelligence, and
Military Intelligence.
Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, who was in charge of the intelligence branch of G-
2, has testified that he at no time was permitted to avail himself of
the Magic. And this despite the fact that to effectively perform
[2] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 117, 118.
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his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his
subordinates, Colonel Bratton, was "loaned" to General Miles to
distribute magic materials to authorized recipients.
While, as previously indicated, it is appreciated that promiscuous
distribution of highly confidential material is dangerous, it
nevertheless should be made available to all those whose responsibility
cannot adequately and intelligently be discharged without knowledge of
such confidential data. It would seem that through sufficient paraphrase
of the original material the source of the information could have been
adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed in
ranking officials of various departments and bureaus of the Government
as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and clerks
required for the interception and processing of the Magic.
15. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident
Virtually every witness has testified he was surprised at the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. This was essentially the result of the fact that
just about everybody was blinded or rendered myopic by what seemed to be
the self-evident purpose of Japan to attack toward the south Thailand,
Malaysia, the Kra Peninsula, and perhaps the Philippines and Guam. Japan
had massed ships and amphibious forces, had deployed them to the south,
and had conducted reconnaissance in that direction. So completely did
everything point to the south that it appears everyone was blinded to
significant, albeit some what disguised, handwriting on the wall
suggesting an attack on us elsewhere.
The advice of the Army lieutenant to the radar operators to "forget it"
when they informed him of the approach of a large number of planes
appears to have been based on the self-evident assumption that the
planes were Army or Navy craft on patrol or the expected B-17's due to
arrive from the west coast.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of
significant information
Before the committee Admiral Turner testified that he regarded an attack
on Pearl Harbor as a 50-50 possibility. Assuming this to be correct,
there can be little doubt, considering the position he held as Director
of War Plans in the Navy Department, that he could have given the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusion
had he been disposed to do so. As a matter of fact Admiral Turner had
the principal hand in preparing the November 27 "war warning.
As has been seen, the orders contained in the war warning necessarily
carried the implication of an attack from without; however, the dispatch
did not reflect the likelihood of an attack upon the fleet with the
degree of likelihood manifested by Admiral Turner in indicating to the
committee his estimate of the situation. Admiral Turner's position would
be indefensible were his estimate based on any information or
intelligence he may have possessed. It appears, on the other hand, that
his conclusion was predicated on a rather long-standing impression in
the Navy that an attack on our Pacific Fleet by Japan could be expected
at one time or another. It is regarded as
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
263
unfortunate, however, that Admiral Turner did not see fit to give to he
Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions outlined, with benefit of
retrospection, in such detail before the committee.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his
organization should forfeit his responsibility
It would seem that War and Navy Department officials both in Washington
and Hawaii were so obsessed by an executive complex hat they could not
besmirch their dignities by "stooping" to determine what was going on,
or more especially what was not going on, in their organizations.
Examples should illustrate this observation.
Admirals Stark and Turner both have testified they "thought" the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was receiving the Magic
intelligence. Yet in a period of over 6 months, with relations between
the United States and Japan mounting in tenseness and approaching a
crisis, neither of these ranking officers determined for a fact whether
the fleet was receiving this information.
In the case of Hawaii, the evidence indicates failures on the part of
the commanding general and the commander in chief to actually determine
what was going on in their organizations. Additionally, in a command by
mutual cooperation it was as important that Admiral Kimmel know what
General Short was doing, and vice versa, as that he know what the fleet
itself was doing. But, as has been heretofore pointed out, neither of
these officers really verified whether his assumptions concerning what
the other was doing were correct.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any
eventuality
The record tends to indicate that appraisal of likely enemy movements
was divided into *probabilities* and *possibilities*. Everyone has
admitted that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was regarded as at east
a possibility. It was felt, however, that a Japanese movement toward the
south was a probability. The over-all result was to look for the
probable move and to take little or no effective precautions to guard
against the contingency of the possible action.
While it appears satisfactorily established that it is the basic
responsibility of an outpost commander to prepare for the worst
contingency, it is believed that this premise has been applied more in
theory than in practice. The military and naval branches of the
government must be continuously impressed by, and imbue their personnel
with, the realization that failure can be avoided over an extended
period of time only by preparation for any eventuality, at east when
hostilities are expected.
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official
instruction
On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet a dispatch concerning the resignation of
the Japanese Cabinet, pointing out, among other things, that "since the
U. S. And Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan
264
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
may attack these two powers." But on October 17, referring to this
dispatch, Admiral Stark, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, said: "Things
have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our
dispatches you know about all that we do. *Personally I do not believe
the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely
stated the 'possibility'; in fact, I tempered the message handed to me
considerably*.
It appears to have been a generally accepted practice in the Navy for
the Chief of Naval Operations to supplement official dispatches by
correspondence of a quasi-personal nature. [3] Despite this fact, it is
regarded as an extremely dangerous practice for the Chief of Naval
Operations to express an opinion on a personal basis to an outpost
commander which has the inevitable effect of tempering the import of an
official dispatch. Were it not for the fact that Admiral Stark supplied
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet highly pertinent and
significant information after his letter of October 17 and before
December 7, the manner in which he emasculated the October 16 dispatch
would be inexcusable. However, as has been seen in this report, some of
the most vital intelligence and orders relating to Japan were supplied
Hawaii during November and December of 1941.
20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization
This principle is the result of the general impression obtained by the
committee concerning the relationship between the Army and the Navy as
well as concerning certain intra-organizational situations which
existed. The relationship, understanding, and coordination between the
War Plans Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence were wholly
unsatisfactory. The War Plans Division, particularly, appears to have
had an overzealous disposition to preserve and enhance its prerogatives.
The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity of
command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental prerogatives
and unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army
and Navy. The same comment is applicable to the near dispute between
Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to which of them should command Wake
and Midway when the marines were replaced by soldiers. It is proper to
suggest that, had both the commanding officers in Hawaii been less
concerned between November 27 and December 7 about preserving their
individual prerogatives with respect to Wake and Midway and more
concerned about working together to defend the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
in the light of the warnings they had received, the defensive situation
confronting the Japanese on the morning of December 7 might well have
been entirely different.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of
liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper
functioning of two or more agencies
One of the more "human" aspects of the testimony of both Admiral Kimmel
and General Short is the manner in which each sought to bring out their
personal friendship for the purpose of demonstrating
[3] Admiral Stark said: "I might point out, in passing, that there was
nothing unusual in this so-called 'personal' correspondence between the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief it was a long-
established custom when I took office." Committee record, p. 5594.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
265
the close relationship that existed between them. They played golf
together; they dined together but they did not get together on official
business in such manner as to insure that each possessed the same
knowledge of the situation as the other and to effect coordination and
integration of their efforts.
22. No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform
a fundamental task
Both the commanding officers in Hawaii have offered as explanation and
excuse for failure to perform various supervisory and administrative
responsibilities in their commands the fact that they had countless and
manifold duties in their respective positions as commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet and commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.
Additionally, Admiral Kimmel has referred to the extraordinarily
competent staff which he had in Hawaii. The most fundamental
responsibility that both commanders had under the circumstances,
however, was to make certain beyond any reasonable doubt that there was
an integrated and coordinated employment of defensive facilities
consistent with the principle of command by mutual cooperation. No
excuse or explanation can justify or temper the failure to discharge
this responsibility which superseded and surpassed all others.
23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately
informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors
informed
In Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, and
Captain McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that Division,
were not adequately and currently informed as to the nature of the
dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating from the War Plans
Division. Subordinate officials in both the War and Navy Departments
failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of getting to both
General Marshall and Admiral Stark the first 13 parts of the Japanese
14-part memorandum immediately on the evening of December 6. Colonel
French did not inform the Chief of Staff that he had been unable to
raise the Army radio in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. In Hawaii,
Admiral Kimmel failed to insure that Admiral Bellinger, who was
responsible for Navy patrol planes, knew of the war warning of November
27. Admiral Newton, as previously pointed out, was permitted to leave
Pearl Harbor with a task force completely oblivious of any of the
warning messages. General Short, construing the caution to disseminate
the information in the warning of November 27 to "minimum essential
officers" in a too-narrow manner, failed to inform the essential and
necessary officers of his command of the acute situation in order that
the proper alertness might pervade the Hawaiian Department.
2. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed
to locate failures and to assess responsibility
The committee has been very much concerned about the fact that there was
no way in which it could be determined definitely that any individual
saw a particular message among the Magic materials. It
266
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
does not appear that any record system was established for initialing
the messages or otherwise fixing responsibility. The system existing
left subordinate officers charged with the duty of disseminating the
Magic at the complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any
question as to whether a particular message had been delivered to or
seen by them.
25. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of
responsibility and authority
Witnesses have testified rather fully as to what their responsibilities
were, both in Washington and at Hawaii. However, it does not appear that
any of them, except the highest ranking officers, possessed any real
authority to act in order decisively to discharge their
responsibilities. It cannot be presumed that it will be possible to meet
the exigencies of an emergency if the officer charged with the duty of
acting at the time the emergency arises does not possess the necessary
authority to follow through on the situation. There should be a close
correlation between responsibility and authority; to vest a man with
responsibility with no corresponding authority is an unfair,
ineffective, and unsatisfactory arrangement.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Chairman.
JERE COOPER, Vice Chairman.
WALTER F. GEORGE.
SCOTT W. LUCAS.
J. BAYARD CLARK.
JOHN W. MURPHY.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART.
FRANK B. KEEFE (with additional views).
(Senators Brewster and Ferguson are filing minority views.)
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE
INTRODUCTION
The committee report is divided into five parts. Part I deals with the
diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack. Part II describes the
actual attack and its aftermath. Part III discusses responsibilities in
Hawaii. Part IV discusses responsibilities in Washington, and Part V
includes certain recommendations of the committee. Scattered throughout
the entire five sections of the committee report are conclusions with
respect to individuals in charge of carrying out our diplomatic,
military, and naval obligations prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I
find myself in agreement with most of these conclusions and
recommendations. The voluminous facts contained in the committee report
have been accurately assembled from the enormous record compiled by the
committee. Any criticism which I may have toward the marshaling of facts
in the committee report is directed to the manner in which such facts
have been used to sustain the various arguments and conclusions indulged
in in the committee report.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
266-A
It correctly states that both Washington and Hawaii were surprised at
the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It is apparently agreed that both
Washington and Hawaii expected the initial attack to come in the Asiatic
area. What was done in Washington as well as what was done in Hawaii was
admittedly done in the light of the universal military belief that
Hawaii was not in danger from an initial attack by Japan. If this belief
was unjustified, as I believe it was, then the mistake lies on the
Washington doorstep just as much as it does upon that of Hawaii.
Throughout the long and arduous sessions of the committee in the
preparation of the committee report, I continuously insisted that
whatever "yardstick" was agreed upon as a basis for determining
responsibilities in Hawaii should be applied to the high command at
Washington. This indicates in a general way my fundamental objection to
the committee report. I feel that facts have been martialed [sic],
perhaps unintentionally, with the idea of conferring blame upon Hawaii
and minimizing the blame that should properly be assessed at Washington.
A careful reading of the committee report would indicate that the
analysis of orders and dispatches is so made as to permit criticism of
our commands in Hawaii while at the same time proposing a construction
which would minimize the possibility of criticism of those in charge at
Washington.
I think it is true that none of the military chiefs at Washington or
Hawaii thought the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. I conclude hat
they all thought it would come first in the Far East. Obviously this was
a fatal mistake, and I agree that the mistake was without proper
justification and that neither Hawaii nor Washington should be excused
from criticism for having made it. I think that the facts in this record
clearly demonstrate that Hawaii was always the No. 1 point of danger and
that both Washington and Hawaii should have known it at all times and
acted accordingly. Consequently I agree hat the high command in Hawaii
was subject to criticism for concluding that Hawaii was not in danger.
However, I must insist that the same criticism with the same force and
scope should apply to the high command in Washington. It is in this
respect that I think the tenor of the committee report may be subject to
some criticism.
I fully agree with the doctrine relating to the placing of
responsibility in military officers in the field and their resulting
duty under such responsibilities. I agree that they must properly
sustain this burden in line with the high and peculiar abilities which
originally gave them their assignments.
In the execution of their vitally important duties, however, the
officers at the front in the field are fairly entitled to all aids and
help lad all information which can reasonably be sent to them from the
all-powerful high staff command in Washington. If both commands are in
error, both should be blamed for what each should have done and what
each failed to do respectively. The committee report, I feel, does not
with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities
at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot
suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as
soft a light as possible on the Washington scene.
In order to clearly appraise the contentions herein expressed, I feel
compelled to restate some of the basic military aspects of the Pearl
Harbor disaster as shown by the evidence.
266-B PEARL HARBOR
ATTACK
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
During the year 1941 the United States Pacific Fleet was based in Pearl
Harbor in the Hawaiian island of Oahu. It had proceeded to the Hawaiian
area for Fleet exercises in the spring of 1940. Its scheduled return to
its regular bases on the west coast was delayed from time to time. From
these delays there gradually emerged evidence of the President's
decision to retain the Fleet in the Hawaiian area, to deter Japan from
aggression in the Far East. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral
J. O. Richardson, protested this decision with a vigor which caused him
to be relieved of command He believed that the readiness of men and
ships of the Fleet for war operations would impress Japan rather than
its presence in Hawaii, where facilities to render it ready for war were
greatly inferior to those available on the west coast. Richardson was
succeeded in command by Admiral H. E. Kimmel in February 1941. The
appointment of Kimmel was made on his record as a capable officer. There
was no political or other favoritism involved. At this time the decision
to base the Fleet in Hawaii was an established fact. Pearl Harbor was
the only anchorage in the Hawaiian area offering any security. It was
then, however, an extremely deficient Fleet base. Its exposed position
rendered concealment of Fleet movements practically impossible in an
area filled with Japanese agents. The Army's equipment for antiaircraft
defense was meager. The local Army-Navy defense forces did not have
sufficient long-range patrol planes to perform effective distant
reconnaissance, even if the patrol planes of the fleet were made
available to augment the handful of Army reconnaissance planes.
Under these circumstances, the position of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
area was inherently untenable and dangerous. The Fleet would sacrifice
its preparations for war, and its potential mobility in war, if it
concentrated its resources on the defense of its base. Moreover, with
only four tankers suitable for fueling ships at sea, ships of the Fleet
had to come into Pearl Harbor for refueling, to say nothing of
maintenance and repair, and the necessary rest and relaxation of crews.
Once the ships were in Pearl Harbor, with its single channel, they were
a target for any successfully launched air attack from carrier-borne
planes. The severity of the attack might be mitigated, but damage to the
ships found in port was inevitable. To prevent a hostile carrier from
successfully launching planes required that it be first discovered and
attacked. Discovery, other than by lucky accident. Required air
reconnaissance of the perimeter of a circle of 800-mile radius from
Oahu. The Fleet did not at any time have patrol planes sufficient in
number to carry out such reconnaissance. The Japanese task force which
raided Oahu on December 7, 1941, was composed of six carriers. The
Pacific Fleet had on that date three carriers, one of which was on the
Pacific coast for repair, leaving only two immediately available in the
area of a prospective sea engagement. An engagement at sea would have
found the preponderant strength with Japan.
Although the Fleet was placed by the President in the Hawaiian area in
1940 as an implement of diplomacy and as a deterrent to Japan, its
strength was appreciably reduced in April and May of 1941. At that time,
one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers and eighteen
destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and trans
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
266-C
ferred to the Atlantic. The President directed the Chief of Naval
Operations to consult the British Chiefs of Staff on the proposal to
effect this transfer. They gave their opinion "that the consequential
reduction in the strength of the United States Pacific Fleet would not
unduly encourage Japan" (exhibit 158, letter from Admiral Danckwerts to
Admiral Turner, April 28, 1941). The transfer to the Atlantic was then
carried out. The Commander in Chief of the United States pacific Fleet
was not asked for his opinion. The Chief of Naval Operations wrote him
about the proposed transfer stating "I am telling you, not arguing with
you" (exhibit 106, letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, dated
April 19, 1941).
The primary mission assigned the Pacific Fleet under existing Navy War
Plans was the making of raids on the Marshalls. These were to divert
Japanese strength from the so-called Malay barrier. No existing War Plan
of the United States in 1941 contemplated that the Pacific Fleet would
go to the rescue of the Philippines or resist Japanese naval forces
attacking the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet was so inferior to the
Japanese Navy in every category of fighting ship that such a mission was
considered too suicidal to attempt. The American public in 1941 was
deluded about the fighting strength of our Fleet in the Pacific, by
irresponsible utterances from men in authority. Japan was under no such
misconception. Her consular agents in the Hawaiian islands needed only
their eyesight, and possibly binoculars to appraise correctly the
strength of the Fleet.
An inferior Fleet, under enemy surveillance in an exposed naval base
without resources to protect it could only avert disaster by. Receiving
the best possible evidence of the intentions of its potential enemy. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1941 recognized that information was
essential to his making appropriate dispositions to meet any crisis. He
formally requested the Chief of Naval Operations that he "be immediately
informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest
secure means available"(exhibit 106, Official Letter CINCPAC to CNO,
dated May 26, 1941).
The best evidence of Japanese intentions in the year 1941, available to
the United States Government, were messages exchanged; between the
Government of Japan and her diplomatic consular agents abroad. These
were intercepted by the Army and Navy. These were decoded and translated
in Washington. The President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy,
the Chief of Staff, and Chief o Naval Operations regularly received
these intercepted messages.
The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages
in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely that Japan
would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his
so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's
notes the President stated: "that we were likely to be attacked perhaps
(as soon as) next Monday" (Stimson Statement, page 47). There was
abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan intended to
attack the United States, Japan had fixed a deadline date of November
25, extended to November 29, for reaching a diplomatic agreement with
the United States. There were at least six Japanese messages emphasizing
this deadline. If the deadline date passed without agreement, the
Japanese government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are
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