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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
40               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"SECTION II-STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND  BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose
to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British
Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and
the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an
agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to
respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event
that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking
such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the
threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the
Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential
treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would
use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of
treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and
police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
not support militarily, politically, economically any government or
regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of
China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights and interests in and with regard to international
settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of
1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British
and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights in international settlements and in concessions and
under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and
Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation
treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including
an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the
unite States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the
dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,
half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has
concluded with any third power or powers shall he interpreted by it in
such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this
agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the
Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other
governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic
political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."

The foregoing reply was clearly not an ultimatum from the standpoint of
the Government of the United States. On the contrary it was an admirable
statement of every honorable principle for which the United States has
stood for many years in the Orient. Ambassador Grew characterized the
November 26 note of Secretary Hull as follows: [98]             

"NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

"Our Government has handed to the Japanese a 10-point draft proposal for
adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge
objective, and statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically
everything that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply
stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such a program she would be
offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce,
financial cooperation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders,
and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she
wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East
Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East
Asia

[98] Grew, Ten Years in Japan (1944), pp. 482, 483.  Committee exhibit
No. 30.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         41

Co-Prosperity Sphere)-which most of her extremists do want-and if she
pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all
of the A B C D powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to
the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she
can obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she
allegedly started fighting strategic, economic, financial, and social
security."

Referring to the November 26 note Secretary Stimson said: [99]

"I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the
fundamental principles on which we had stood for so long and which *I
felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor
and prestige in the world*. I submit, however, that no impartial reading
of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an
ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize
upon it and give that designation for their own purposes."

As suggested by Mr. Stimson, Japan did choose to regard it as an
ultimatum consistent with her purposes. Her note of November 20, it is
apparent, was the final diplomatic move and failing to secure the
concessions demanded the November 26 reply of the United States was
seized upon by the war lords of Japan in subsequent propaganda as their
excuse for the attack on Pearl Harbor which they had planned for many
weeks. It is to be noted in this connection that the Japanese task force
was enroute for its attack on Pearl Harbor before the American note of
November 26 was delivered to the Government of Japan. At the time of
receiving the note from Secretary Hull, Kurusu stated the Japanese
Government would be likely "to throw up its hands" when it received the
proposal; that he felt the response which had thus been given to the
Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to
meaning the end of the conversations. [100] A dispatch from Ambassador
Grew to the State Department on December 5 reflected the strong reaction
in Japan. [101]

Secretary Hull said: 102

"It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan
had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give false
meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an
"ultimatum." This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic
of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people
and gain their support for militaristic depredations and
aggrandizement."

In press conferences on November 26 and 27, Secretary Hull outlined the
status of American-Japanese relations. [103]

The decision to stand by basic American principles was the only
honorable position under the circumstances. [104] To have acceded to the
Japanese ultimatum of November 20 would have been indefensible. Firmness
was the only language Japan understood. As Ambassador Grew had stated in
his celebrated "green light" dispatch of September 12, 1940, to the
State Department: [105]

"Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers (including
Japan) from attaining their objectives * * *.

"If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until
and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan
will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the
present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand * * *.

"In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come
when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States
may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-
American relations progressively precarious."

[99] See committee reeord, p. 14393
[100] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 375.
[101] Committee Record, p. 1821-24.
[102] Committee Record, p, 1153.
[103] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1153 et
seq.
[104] Id., p. 1155.
[105] Committee exhibit No. 26.

42              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

That firmness, the only language the Japanese understood, failed to
dissuade them cannot redound to our regret but only to the ignominy of
the Empire of Japan.

FRAUDULENT NATURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY NOVEMBER 28 TO DECEMBER 7

An intercepted dispatch NO. 844 from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy on
November 28 left little doubt of the fraudulent character of the
negotiations thereafter and is a classic example of Japanese deceit and
duplicity: [106]

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken
off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that,
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man
you told me to in your #1180 [107] and he said that under the present
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do
the best you can."

The following dispatch, while the attack force was en route to Pearl
Harbor, was sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 1: [108]

"The date (November 29) set in my message #812 [109] has come and gone,
and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to
prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been
advising the press and others that though there are some wide
differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are
continuing. (The above is for only your information) * * *"

After November 26 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu conferred with the
President and Secretary Hull on several occasions but with nothing new
being developed looking to a peaceful settlement.

On the morning of December 6 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was
intercepted advising that the Japanese reply to the American note of
November 26 was being transmitted:

"I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it
tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate,
and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time
being."

This dispatch indicated that subsequent instructions would be
forthcoming concerning the time for presenting the reply to the
Government of the United States. By approximately 7 p. m. on the evening
of December 6 the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese memorandum had
been intercepted, decoded, and made ready for distribution to authorized
recipients by our military. These 13 parts were a long recapitulation of
the negotiations with the purposes of Japan colored with pious hue and
those of the United States perverted into a base and ulterior scheme
"for the extension of the war." The thirteenth part concluded on the
note that 

"therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that
it cannot accept the proposal (American proposal of November 26) as a
basis of negotiations."

[106] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
[107] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.
[108] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 208.
[109] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 165, setting the date November 29
as the deadline for effecting an understanding.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             43

The fourteenth part was intercepted early on the morning of December 7
and was available for distribution at approximately 8 a. m. It stated
that- [110]

"obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and
interests by keeping Japan and China at war."

With the observation that this intention had been revealed during the
course of the negotiations and the "earnest hope of the Japanese
Government * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost",
the Japanese memorandum closed with the statement:

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations."

Nowhere in the memorandum was there any indication or intimation of an
intention to attack the United States nor, indeed, that formal
diplomatic relations were to be broken merely that it was impossible to
reach an agreement through the then current negotiations. Coincident
with the receipt of the full reply, instructions were issued to Japan's
representatives for its delivery to the American Government at an hour
keyed to the time set for the assault on Pearl Harbor. On the previous
evening, President Roosevelt had dispatched an earnest appeal to the
Emperor of Japan for the preservation of peace in the Pacific. [111] The
infamous character of the Japanese reply was voiced by Secretary Hull to
the Japanese ambassadors who were making delivery 1 hour after [112] the
first bombs had fallen on Pearl Harbor: [113]

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese
ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of
untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty
years of public service I have never seen a document that was more
crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions infamous falsehoods and
distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that
any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY LIAISON IN WASHINGTON

With a view to effecting the fullest liaison between the diplomatic and
military arms of the Government, there was created in the light of the
approaching emergency a body familiarly referred to as the War Council.
This Council consisted of the President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Army Chief of Staff, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and, on occasion, the Chief of the Army Air
Forces. [114] It met at the call of the President, and during the fall
of 1941 it was in frequent session. Secretary Hull said:

[110] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245.
[111] See Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 784-786. Several hours after
the Pearl Harbor attack had begun Ambassador Grew was informed by the
Japanese Foreign Minister that the Japanese 14-part memorandum replying
to the American note of November 26 was to be regarded as the Emperor's
reply to the President's appeal. See Peace and War, p. 148.
[112] The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the Japanese
note to the American Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on Sunday December 7.
They made the appointment pursuant to the instruction; however, they
later postponed for 1 hour their previous appointment, stating the delay
was due to the need of more time to decode the message they were to
deliver.
[113] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 787.
[114] For a rather full discussion of liaison between the various
departments, see testimony of Secretary Stimson, Army Pearl Harbor Board
Record, p. 4041 et seq.

44             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of
State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval
Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and
views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts
and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a
particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings." [116]

In addition to the War Council, another liaison body, consisting of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, was
created during 1940, with a view to holding weekly meetings, which were
scheduled for 9:30 each Tuesday morning. Secretary Stimson said: [116]

"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were
very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and * * * just before
Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting
on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took
place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy, and myself were in
constant contact."

And again: [117]

"During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr.
Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the
President."

During 1941 Rear Adm. R. E. Schuirmann was the Director of the Central
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and had as one of his
duties liaison with the State Department. He made the following
observations concerning State Department liaison: [118]

"A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up
while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was
mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally
questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of
May 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the
discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would take notes of the
meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required
action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the
meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these
liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the
record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee,
Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy
Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton
of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by
telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and
discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central
Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the
possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State
Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings
and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department
officials."

Admiral R. W. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the liaison with the State-
Department as follows: [119]

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the
Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. *He consulted them
frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making
any particular diplomatic move*. In the Office of Naval Operations, the
Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the
State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems
with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State
Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles,
usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of
the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War

[115] Committee record, p. 1144.
[116] Roberts record, pp. 4051-4053, 4078-4079.
[117] Committee record, p. 14386.
[118] Hart record. p. 405.
[119] Id., at p. 257.             

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             45

Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of
Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans
Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The
matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western
Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the
Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent
missions to those countries and at the meetings with the Under Secretary
it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally,
possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference
with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these
meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to
time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Wavy
Departments to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were
other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy
Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time
to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the
State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State
and the Chief of Naval Operations. *I would say that relations between
the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and
were characterized by good feeling.*"

At a regular Cabinet meeting on November 7 the President inquired of
Secretary Hull as to whether he had anything in mind. In replying
Secretary Hull testified: [120]

"I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the
international situation. I went over fully developments in the
conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations
were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a
military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished the
President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the
dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical
situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country
would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. [121]"

Secretary Stimson stated: [122]

"On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far
Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed
as that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on
the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. [123]"

At a meeting of the war council on November 25 Secretary Hull pointed
out that the leaders of Japan were determined and desperate, and, in his
opinion, the Japanese military was already poised for attack; that they
might attack at ally time and at any place. He emphasized the probable
element of surprise in Japanese plans, that "virtually the last stage
had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was
in the hands of the Army and Navy." [124]

At the same meeting of the council the President warned that we here
likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, or "the
Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." [125]

On the morning of November 26, Secretary Hull advised Secretary Stimson
that he had about decided not to make the proposition of the 3-month
truce, the modus vivendi, that he had discussed with Secretaries Knox
and Stimson on November 25 "the Chinese, for

[120] Committee record, p. 1131.
[121] In an address delivered on November 11, 1941, Secretary Knox
warned that the Nation was confronted not only by the necessity for
extreme measures or self-defense in the Atlantic but was "likewise faced
with grim possibilities on the other side of the world on the far side
of the Pacific." See committee record at pp. 1131, 1132.
[122] Committee record, pp. 14387, 14388.
[123] In an address on November 11, Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror
had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the
Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all
nations bordering on the Pacific. He said at the waves of world conquest
were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" and were
threatening "to engulf our own shores"; that the United States was in
far greater peril than in 1317 and at any "at any moment war may be
forced upon us." See committee record, p. 1132.
[124] Id., at p. 1144 See also statement of Mr. Stimson, committee
record, p. 14390.
[125] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.

46             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal,
particularly the effect on the morale of their own people." [126]
Secretary Stimson said: [127]

"Early that morning (November 27) I had called up Mr. Hull to find out
what is final word had been with the Japanese-whether he had handed them
the proposal for three months' truce, or whether he had told them he had
no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole
matter off. His words were: "*I have washed my hands of it, and it is
now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy.*" I then called
up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it
was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up
with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards
that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation
of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat
of any kind."

With reference to his remarks before the War Council on November 28,
Secretary Hull stated: [128]

" * * * I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the
Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of
an agreement being achieved with Japan. *I emphasized that in my opinion
the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of
conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was
in the hands of the Army and the Navy*. With due deference I expressed
my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an
assumption that the Japanese might make *the element of surprise a
central point in their strategy* and also might attack at various points
simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of
coordination."

Addressing a public rally in Japan on November 30, Premier Tojo stated:
[129]

"The fact that Chiang-Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain,
America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young
men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of
Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East
Asia by putting [pitting?] the East Asiatic peoples against each other
and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of
Britain and the United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice
from East Asia with a vengeance."

Following a conference with military leaders concerning the Japanese
Premier's address, Secretary Hull called the President at Warm Springs,
Ga., urging him to advance the date set for his return to Washington.
The President accordingly returned to Washington on December 1. [130]

In testifying before the Navy inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart, Admiral
Schuirmann stated in reply to a query as to whether the State
Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to
the Navy Department was in accord with the statements contained "on page
138 of the book *Peace and War*": [131]

"I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary
expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the
probability of attack at various points. However, the particular
meetings which he mentioned, I do not know if I was present. I cannot
make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement.
However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor Secretary Hull
phoned me saying in effect, "*I know you Navy fellows are always ahead
of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything
more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog
and bite anyone.*" I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I
reported the conversation to Admiral Stark."

[126] Committee record, pp. 14391,14392.
[127] Id., at pp. 14392, 14393.
[128] Committee record, pp. 1160, 1161.
[129] See committee record, p. 1162
[130] Id., at p. 1163.
[131] Hart record, p. 412,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             47

Referring to a meeting at the State Department on the morning of
December 7, Mr. Stimson said: [132]

"On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten-
thirty and we talked the whole matter over. *Hull is very certain that
the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the
blow will strike*. We three stayed together in conference until
lunchtime, going over the plans for what should be said and done."

Considering all of the observations made by Secretary Hull to Army and
Navy Officials in the days before December 7, 1941, it is difficult to
imagine how he could have more clearly and forcefully depicted the
manner in which relations between the United States and Japan had passed
beyond the realm of diplomacy and become a matter of cold military
reality. [133] This thought was expressed by General Marshall when he
testified to a distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying: "*These
fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared.*" [133a]

That there was the fullest exchange of information between the
diplomatic and military arms of the Government is further indicated by
the manner in which intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages
were distributed. These messages, familiarly referred to as "Magic" and
discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, contained detailed
instructions and proposals from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy and the
comments concerning and contents of American proposals as forwarded to
Tokyo by its ambassadors. This materials not only indicated what Japan
and her ambassadors were saying but literally what they were *thinking*.
This material was available to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the
Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War
Plans in both the Army and Navy, and the heads of the intelligence
branches of both the services, among others.

CONCLUSIONS

Beginning in 1931 Japan embarked on a career of conquest no less
ambitious nor avowed than that of the Nazis. Despite American protests
she overran and subjugated Manchuria. In 1937, bulwarked b her Anti-
Comintern Pact with Germany of the preceding year, she invaded China. In
1940 she seized upon the struggle for survival of the western powers
against Hitler's war machine to conclude an ironclad alliance with
Germany and Italy aimed directly at the United States. Thereupon she set
about to drive the "barbarians" from the Orient and to engulf the Far
East in her Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which was to be her
bastion for world conquest. As early as January of 1941 the dominating
military clique prepared for war on the United States and conceived the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

Hailing the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, as a divine
wind" securing her northern flank, Japan within a period of 2O days
adopted a crucial policy followed by an all-out mobilization for war
Almost immediately thereafter she invaded Southern French Indochina for
the purpose "when the international situation is suitable, to launch
therefrom a rapid attack." She boldly declared in an intercepted
dispatch of July 14, 1941:

[132] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 4081. See also committee
record, p, 14428.
[133] For a record of Mr. Hull's conferences, consultations, and
telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with
representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December
7, 1941, and arrangements for contacts between the Departments of State,
War, and navy in 1940 and 1941, see committee record, pp. 1166-1176. 
See also committee record, p. 1180.
[132a] Committee record, p. 3079.

48             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the
sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of
Singapore the Navy will play the principal part."

The invasion of southern Indochina resulted in the freezing of asset and
virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On November 20, 1941, the Empire of Japan delivered all ultimatum to the
Government of the United States. It required that the United States
supply Japan as much oil as she might require; that we discontinue aid
to China, withdrawing moral and material support from the recognized
Chinese Government. It contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon
aggression and to resort to peaceful methods. The ultimatum contained no
tenable basis for an agreement, a fact well known to and contemplated by
the Tojo Cabinet.

During all of the negotiations, Japan qualified and restricted every
intimation of her peaceful purposes. With each succeeding proposal it
became abundantly apparent that she did not intend to compromise in any
measure the bellicose utterances and plans of conquest of her military
masters. She uniformly declared her purpose to fulfill her obligations
under the Tripartite Pact-aimed directly at the United States. She
refused to relinquish the preferential commercial position in the Orient
which she had arrogated to herself. She demanded a victor's peace in
China and would give no effective recognition to the principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Her clear
purpose was to maintain a military and economic overlordship of China.

The story of our negotiations with the Empire of Japan during the year
1941 epitomizes the traditional purpose of the United States to seek
peace where compatible with national honor. Conversations were carried
forward with the representatives of that nation in the hope of bringing
to an end the frightful aggression that had brought sorrow, death, and
degradation to the Orient for almost a decade. At the same time it was
realistically recognized that the negotiations afforded precious time to
improve our own capacity for self-defense, the appalling need for which
was becoming daily more apparent as the Axis dreams of world conquest
pushed relentlessly toward realization.

That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unquestioned. But
for many years the Government of that nation had be divided into two
schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to think in terms of
international good will with the other dominated by the militarism of
the war lords who had always ultimately resolved Japanese policy. [134]
It was this monstrous condition which, from the time of Japan's
emergence as a power in world affairs, resulted in her military acts
invariably belying her diplomatic promises. The United States therefore
in looking to any final settlement had properly before it the
substantial question of whether those in Japan who might wish peace
possessed the capacity and power to enter a binding and effective
agreement reasonably designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East.
It was for this reason that our Government insisted Japan offer some
tangible proof of her honest purpose to abandon a policy of aggression.
No such proof or disposition to provide it was at any time forthcoming.

[134] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p, 1120.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

49

In considering the negotiations in their entirety the conclusion is
inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and that her program
of aggression was immutable. When the Konoye Cabinet could not secure an
agreement giving Japan an unrestrained hand in he Orient it was replaced
by a Cabinet headed by General Tojo. Tojo made one gesture in the form
of an ultimatum to realize Japan's ambitions without fighting for them.
When he realized such a price or peace was too high even for the United
States, his Government launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor
while instructing her ambassadors in characteristic duplicity to
maintain the pretense of continuing negotiations. [135]

It is concluded that the diplomatic actions of the United States
provided no provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on Pearl
Harbor. It is further concluded that the Secretary of State fully
informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic developments
and that he in a timely and forceful manner clearly pointed out to these
Departments that relations between the United States and Japan had
passed beyond the stage of diplomacy and were the hands of the military.

[135] The Japanese force to strike Pearl Harbor actually left Hitokappu
Bay for the attack at 7 p.m., November 25, Washington time, before the
United states note in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 was
delivered to Japan's ambassadors on November 26.