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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

180            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

rely upon either the Army or Navy in Hawaii being able to decode the
diplomatic messages which were decoded in Washington. However both
Admirals Stark and Turner testified that they were under the impression
that Japanese diplomatic messages were being decode by the Navy in
Hawaii. [115] No justification for this impression existed in fact apart
from the failure of these officers to inform themselves adequately
concerning Navy establishments. [116] Under arrangements existing during
1941 between the Army and the Navy in Washington the decoding and
translating of Magic was divided between the Army Signal Intelligence
Service under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer and a unit in
the Navy, known as OP-20-G, under the control of the Director of Naval
Communications. The responsibility for decoding and translating messages
was allocated between the two services on the basis of the dates of the
messages with each service ordinarily handling all messages originated
on alternate days, the Army being responsible for even dates and the
Navy, for odd dates This procedure was flexible in that it was departed
from in order to expedite the handling of material as the occasion
demanded or in the case of any unusual situation that might prevail in
one or the other of the services.

POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF MAGIC

The Magic intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and the
policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a
desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes were
being broken. [117] Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted
messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the
Secretary of Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the War
Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State
Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the
President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the
Army was responsible for distribution of Magic within the War Department
and to the State Department; the Navy, for distribution within the Navy
Department and to the White House. Any disclosure of the fact that the
Japanese messages were being decoded or any disclosure of information
obtainable only from that source would inevitably have resulted in
Japan's changing her codes with attendant loss completely of the vital
Magic. This fact was responsible for the translated material being
closely held among a

[115] See committee record, p. 5095.
[116] Admiral Stark testified:  "I inquired on two or three occasions as
to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up
and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was
told that he could. *However, I want to make it plain that that did not
influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent*. I felt it my
responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that
they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which
(would) be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I
might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that
affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have."
Committee record, p. 5793
[117] During the course of his testimony, General Miles was asked:  "Who
made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as
they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?"

He replied:  "That followed from the general policy laid down by the
Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of
these messages or our ability to decode them should be confirmed to the
least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside
of Washington. * * *

"The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode
Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us,
both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our
waging of that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the
distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing
in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret."
Committee record, pp. 2092, 2093.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            181

few key individuals, in addition necessarily to those who processed the
messages.

The policy generally prevailed in the days before Pearl Harbor that the
Magic materials were not ordinarily to be disseminated to field
commanders. [118] This policy was prescribed for the reason that (1) the
Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed Magic intelligence and
learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes: [119] (2) the volume
of intercepted traffic was so great that its transmission, particularly
during the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have
overtaxed communication facilities; and (3) responsibility for
evaluation of this material which was largely diplomatic in nature was
properly in Washington, where the Magic could be considered along with
other pertinent diplomatic information obtained from the State
Department and other sources. There was no inflexible rule, however,
which precluded sending to theater commanders in proper instances,
either in its original form as paraphrased or in the form of estimates,
conclusions, or orders based wholly or in part upon Magic. Important
information derived therefrom was from time to time sent to the Hawaiian
commanders by the Navy Department in paraphrased form or in the form of
estimates. [120] The War Department, on the other and, did not send the
Magic to the field, for the reason that the Army code was not believed
to be as secure as that of the Navy. [121]

For purposes of the investigation Magic fell generally into two
categories: first, messages relating to diplomatic matters of the
Japanese Government; [122] and second, messages relating to espionage
activities by Japanese diplomatic representatives, particularly with
respect to American military installations and establishments. [123]

The decision not to endeavor to supply field commanders all of the Magic
intelligence as such was a reasonable one under the circumstances.
However, it is incumbent to determine whether responsible commanding
officers were otherwise supplied the equivalent of intelligence obtained
from the Magic materials.

"SHIPS IN HARBOR" REPORTS

NATURE OF CONSULAR ESPIONAGE

In addition to the Magic materials relating strictly to diplomatic
negotiations, a great many messages between Japan and her diplomatic
establishments were intercepted reflecting espionage activities by the
consular staffs. [124] These intercepts related in the main to
instructions sent by Tokyo and replies pursuant thereto concerning the
movement and location of American ships and the nature of military and
defensive installations.

[118] For a discussion concerning this matter, see letter dated April
22, 1941, from Capt. Arthur N. McCollum in Washington to Capt. Edwin T.
Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. Committee record, pp. 12917-
12923.
[119] This factor applied principally to the Army. See testimony of
General Miles. Note 121, infra.
[120] See committee exhibit No. 37, pp. 4-12, 40, 41.
[121] In testifying concerning the matter of distributing Magic to field
commanders General Miles was asked; "Do I understand from your answer
that these messages intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii
by the Army?"

He replied:  "They were not. In some cases the substance of some
messages were sent to Hawaii, and all most always in naval code, I think
always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more
secure than the Army code." Committee record, pp. 2091, 2092.
[122] Committee exhibit No. 1.
[123] Id., No. 2.
[124] Id.

182            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Hawaiian commanders have strongly insisted that messages to and from
the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu clearly indicated Japan's intention
to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. They contend they were wrongfully
deprived of this information, basing this contention to a great extent
on an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo of September 24, 1941 [125]
issuing the following instructions to its Honolulu Consulate: [126]

"Strictly secret.

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible: 

"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)

"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there
are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.) [127]"

The foregoing message, No. 83, has been gratuitously characterized
throughout the proceedings as the "bomb plot message", the "harbor
berthing plan", and by similar terms. Three other intercepted messages
relate in a pertinent manner to the September 24 dispatch and to Tokyo's
interest in the fleet at Pearl Harbor: 

(1) In a message from Tokyo to the Honolulu Consul, dated November 15,
1941 (translated December 3, 1941) it was stated: [128]

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to
maintain secrecy."

(2) An intercept from Tokyo dated November 20, 1941 (translated December
4) read: [129]

"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet bases in the neighborhood
of the Hawaiian military reservation."

(3) An intercept of November 29 (translated December 5) stated: [130]

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in
future will you also report even when there are no movements?"

Referring to the indicated messages, Admiral Kimmel testified: [131]

"In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to
whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the
dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and
obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their
interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might
suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of
September 24, 1941, and those which followed there was a significant and
ominous change in the character of the information

[125] Translated October 9.
[126] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 12.
[127] Some of the subsequent reports from the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu were made pursuant to the instructions contained in the
September 24 dispatch from Tokyo. See committee exhibit No. 2 pp. 13 and
14.
[128] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 13.
[129] Id., at p. 15.
Captain Kramer testified with respect to the blank, a garble, in this
message between the words "fleet" and "bases" that he believed the
original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would
read: "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases."
Committee record, pp. 1162-1163
[130] Committee exhibit No. 2, 15 p.
[131] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            l83

which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then
directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable
suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general
whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of
particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what
ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately
preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by
Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of
Pearl Harbor. *These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an
attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor*. The information sought
and obtained with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable
usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and
executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost
completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl
Harbor."

In the same connection General Short testified: [132]

"While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know
about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our
naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese
were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor,
which might indicate more than just keeping track, *because such details
would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in
Hawaii*. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington new of this
Japanese espionage. *This message, analyzed critically, is really a
bombing plan for Pearl Harbor*."

In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September 4 and
related dispatches, it is to be borne in mind that the Japanese were
insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the location
and movements of American vessels everywhere and not merely at Pearl
Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the committee, however, in
which *Tokyo* manifested an interest concerning the disposition of ships
*within* a harbor, as in the case of the "berthing plan," as
distinguished from the desire to know whether a vessel was at a
particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instructions to her Honolulu
consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo vas manifesting an
unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed
location thereof in Pearl Harbor.

The evidence reflects, however, that no one in Washington attached he
significance to the "berthing plan" which it is now possible to read
into it. To determine whether failure to appreciate the plan represents
a lack of imagination and a dereliction of duty, we consider now the
contentions of the officers who saw this intelligence before December 7,
1941, and the circumstances under which it was received in Washington.

At the time the "berthing plan" was translated, the practice was being
followed by Captain Kramer of preparing a gist of intercepted messages
to expedite consideration of them by recipients. [133] Asterisks were
employed along with the gist to provide an indication of the
significance of messages one asterisk meant "interesting messages"; two
asterisks, "especially important or urgent messages." [134] The gist
relating to the berthing plan read: [135] "Tokyo directs special reports
In ships with(in) Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the
purpose of showing exact location" and was indicated by one asterisk

[132] Id., at p. 7989
[133] The practice of preparing gists is indicated to have been
discontinued during the month of November 1941, for the reason that the
President insisted on seeing the original messages "because he was
afraid when they tried to condense them, someone would change the
meaning." See testimony of Captain Safford, Hewitt Inquiry Record, p.
408, also Clarke Inquiry Exhibit No. 23.
[134] Committee record pp. 11206, 11207.
[135] Id., at pp. 11207, 11208.

184            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

as being an "interesting message". In explaining his estimate of the
message, Captain Kramer testified: l36

"* * * Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do
not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going
over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was
interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than
other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese
diplomatic service.

"I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise
wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and *I believe it
was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on
the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.*

"That view is substantiated by many factors.

"One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing
their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly
preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in
existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds
for quarterly allotments, and so forth to cover telegraphic expenses.
Those expenses were usually paid and furnished in part when so requested
by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain, probably, the
handling of this particular message, sir."

Upon being asked what evaluation he placed on the harbor berthing plan
and related intercepts, Admiral Wilkinson testified: [137]

"The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out
that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of
information, whether by photography or by written report or otherwise.

"We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three
Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of
Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we
had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and
locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions
for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in
Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that
were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be
responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there
were agencies finding that information there.

"My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and
these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general
information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that
certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did
not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target
significance which now appears."

And again: [138]

"* * * the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or
elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would
be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what her state
of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they
wanted to know everything they could not only about the movement of the
ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not
a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those
that were present where they were located with reference to state of
repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor
might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor
in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at
doublebanked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take
some time to go out."

Admiral Wilkinson thought he had mentioned to one or more officers that
the Japanese seemed curious as to the lay-port in Pearl Harbor and
testified "at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their
nicety of intelligence." [139]

On the other hand, Admiral Stark, who stated he had no recollection of
having seen the berthing plan and accompanying messages prior to the
attack, testified: [140]

[136] Id., at p. 1160.
[137] Id., at pp. 4620, 4621.
[138] Id., at pp. 4622, 4623.
[139] Id., at p. 4624.
[140] Id., at pp. 5788, 5789.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            185

"These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships
in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly
different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say,
"So many ships" or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is
different in that it calls for the location of ship in the harbor in her
particular berth.

"I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the
Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There
might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two
places were ships were reported like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth
or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of
a character which is different.

"In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can
read into now, as indicating the possibility or at least the ground work
for a Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have
in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I
have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that
significance at the time."

Asked if he felt significance should have been attached to the plan at
the time it was received, Admiral Stark said: [141]

"It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only
say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were
likewise vitality interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do
not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass
of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost
insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put
down as just another example of their great attention to detail.

"If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might
have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have
read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is
unusual. I wonder why they want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed
it or I might not. I simply did not know. We read it now in the light of
what has happened."

Captain McCollum, [142] who was not in Washington at the time the harbor
berthing plan was intercepted or translated, suggested certain reasons
why the plan would not have been interpreted as a "bombing plot." [143]
He observed that beginning in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not
satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded by the consular agents
and in consequence undertook to set up an observation net of its own,
particularly on the west coast of the United States, but that it was his
feeling the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the
consulate at Honolulu. Therefore. As he testified: [144]

"As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving,
through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval
Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was
needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the
west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a
Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.

"Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have
felt it was just another move to get explicit information, to cut down
the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which
the Jap Navy did not like."

Captain McCollum further pointed out that the matter of how ships were
anchored and where they were anchored was designed to indicate the
facility with which the fleet was prepared to *sortie*, considering that
the anchorage at Pearl Harbor is "chopped up" into a number of more or
less independent locks. He testified: [145]

"To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are
requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the
same device such as breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple
device could be used. With

[141 Id., at pp. 5790, 6791.
[142] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence.
[143] Captain McCollum left Washington on September 24 and did not
return until October 11. Committee record, p. 9195.
[144] Committee record, pp. 9140, 9141.
[145] Id., at pp. 9178, 9179.

186            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

this area discovered, a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice
to give the essential information as to the location of the fleet and
also an indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that
that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis as to why they wished
information, apparently, in this detail."

In summary, Captain McCollum stated he would not now necessarily regard
the harbor berthing plan as a "bombing plan" unless "I had known Pearl
Harbor had been bombed." [140]

It appears clear that there were many other messages between Tokyo and
her consulates, received in Washington, indicating a likely Japanese
purpose to attack at points other than at Hawaii. [147]

These messages indicate a definite interest in the state of defenses at
many points. A dispatch from Tokyo on October 16 to its Seattle consul
instructed "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes report it
at once." [148] In the same message the Consulate was instructed to
report on the movement and basing of warships at least once every 10
days, "As long as there is no great change," but a report was to be
submitted "Should more than 10 vessels of any type arrive or depart from
port at one time." A June 23, 1941 dispatch from Tokyo to Mexico
instructed: [149] "Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama
Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official
trip to Panama * * *. Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have
Sato, the naval attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns."
While no instructions from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to
August 2, 1941, the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information
concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location
and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of
artillery patrols, radar detectors and their range, map procurement and
other matters which would obviously be of interest only if an attack on
the Panama Canal were contemplated. [150] While some of these messages
were translated after December 7, they have a distinct bearing on
whether, before the event, the harbor berthing plan was reasonably
designed to be a harbinger of the December 7 attack. [151]

With respect to other messages concerning defenses, Tokyo on August 1
requested Manila to obtain information "regarding the camouflage and
distinguishing marks of the American naval and military aeroplanes in
Manila". [152] On October 4 Tokyo instructed Manila "to make a
reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and
southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress,
strength, etc." [153] Tokyo instructed Manila on November 5, pursuant to
a request of the "Naval General Staff", to obtain information with
respect to each port of call concerning "(1) conditions at airports on
land", "(2) types of planes at each, and number of planes", "(3)
warships; also machinery belonging to land forces", and "(4) state or
progress being made on all equipment and establishments." [154] On
November 15 Tokyo requested Manila to "make investigations again" as to
the number of large bombers in

[146] Id., at p. 9141.
[147] See committee exhibit No. 2.
[148] Id., at p. 111.
[149] Id., at p. 122.
[150] Id., at pp. 31-52
[151] General Marshall stated he was always in fear of a surprise attack
on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama
Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii. Navy Court of inquiry
record, p. 863.
[152] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 54.
[153] Id., at p. 72.
[154] Id., at p. 82,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            187

the Philippines. [155] Some 50 messages between Manila and Tokyo during
the period August 1 to December 1, 1941, contained detailed information
concerning airfields, air strength and activity, strength and activity
of land forces, location of antiaircraft guns, and other items of
defense. [156]

Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20 that a warship under repair at
Bremerton, Wash. Had "the upper part of the bridge and left side of the
bow spotted here and there with red paint". [157] A message of September
6 from Tokyo to Singapore and Batavia requested detailed information
concerning various types of fishing vessels should Japan "require the
use of these fishing vessels". [158] On October 22 a message from Tokyo
to Singapore reflected a specific request, on behalf of the vice chief
of the Japanese General Staff, for information concerning the air forces
stationed in the Federated Malay States. [159] Another dispatch from
Tokyo to Batavia on the same day stated that the Assistant Chief of
Staff desired an inspection and report "on the air force in the Dutch
Indies" in regard to training, information, and aerial combat methods;
organization, types, number, and location of planes; and types and
number of planes being sent from England and the United States. [160]

The exhibits are replete with evidence of the interest of Tokyo not only
in the state of defenses but in ships as well, at many different points.
For example, an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to San Francisco of
November 29 read: [161] "Make full report beginning December 1 on the
following:  Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed
(or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it
started), date of departure, etc., in detail of all foreign commercial
and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea."
Nor was the Honolulu consul the only one reporting the exact location of
ships in harbor. Manila advised Tokyo on November 12 that on the morning
of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port "She
is tied up at dock No. 7 * * *." [162] And again on November 22, Manila
advised Tokyo, among other things, that a camouflaged British cruiser
entered port In the "morning of the 21st and anchored at pier No. 7 * *
*." [163] Other examples of such reports will be hereinafter set forth.

Even today, of course, we do not know as a matter of fact that the
"berthing plan" was a bomb plot. On the basis of testimony before he
committee, the desire to know or the supplying of information with
respect to the location of vessels *within* a harbor is not of itself
conclusive that its only purpose was in contemplation of an attack
inasmuch as such information also has the value of indicating what ships
are under repair and the readiness of vessels for sortie. [164] For
example, Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20, "Saratoga class aircraft
carrier, 1 ship (*tied up alongside the pier*)" at Bremerton. [165] San
Francisco advised Tokyo on October 2, "One Oklahoma class battle-

[155] Id., at p. 91.
[156] Id., at pp. 54-98.
[157] Id., at p. 109.
[158] Id., at p. 101.
[159] Id.. at p. 102.
[160] Id.. at p. 102.
[161] Id.. at p. 115.
[162] Id.. at p. 87.
[163] Id.. at p. 94.
[164] See Committee record, pp. 4622, 4623, 9178, and 9179.
[165] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 109.

188              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ship has arrived in port and is *moored in front of the Bethlehem
shipbuilding yard*. [166] It may be argued that if obtaining information
concerning the location of ships within a harbor should be construed as
definitely indicating a purpose to attack the ships at harbor then these
messages would logically appear to indicate a purpose to attack at
Bremerton and at San Francisco.

In seeking to determine whether the harbor berthing plan was in reality
a "bomb plot" it is noted that in making his report of December 5 [167]
and his last report of December 6 [168] to Tokyo concerning vessels at
Pearl Harbor, the Honolulu consul did not employ the system established
in the plan for indicating the location of ships within the harbor. In
the report of December 5, he said:

" * * * the following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:  8
battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers * * *."

In the last report, the consul said:

"On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port
were (garble) and one submarine tender. The following ships were
observed at anchor on the 6th: 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3
submarine tenders, 17 destroyers and in addition there were 4 light
cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane
carriers have all left) * * *."

Failure to use the plan for indicating the location of ships within the
harbor at the only time when it could have materially assisted the
attacking force in locating ships as targets for bombing, that is on
December 5 and 6 immediately before the attack, raises a serious
question as to whether the berthing plan was in reality a bomb plot at
all.

Japanese interviewed since VJ-day have asserted that intelligence
obtained from the consulates was regarded as of little importance. They
did not include the intelligence under discussion in listing the
information which the Task Force employed in planning and executing the
attack on December 7. [168a]

The record reflects that no one in Washington interpreted the harbor
berthing plan of September 24 and related dispatches as indicative of an
attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor or was in any way conscious of the
significance of the messages which it is now possible to read into them.
There was in consequence no conscious or deliberate withholding of this
intelligence from the Hawaiian commanders. General Marshall, and
Admirals Stark, Turner, and Ingersoll testified they had no recollection
of having seen these dispatches. [169]

The peculiar division of Pearl Harbor into many lochs, the insatiable
desire of Japan for meticulous information concerning vessels of other
governments everywhere, the manner in which the berthing plan lent
itself to convenience of communications, the fact that Tokyo was
repeatedly instructing its consulates to cut down on traffic, the
feeling in Washington that Tokyo had no naval observer in Honolulu and
in consequence more detailed instructions to its consulate there were
required, Japan's natural interest in full information concerning our
Pacific Fleet base, the many intercepted dispatches indicating a likely

[166] Id., at p. 110.
[167] Id., at p. 26.
[168] Id., at p. 29.
[168a] See Part II, this report concerning Japanese plans for the
attack; also section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack", Part III,
this report.
[169] Committee record, pp. 2912, 5788, 5108, and 11311. Admiral Stark
said:  "We have been over this bomb plot thing from start to finish, all
of us in the front office, and I still not only have no recollection of
having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not see it."
Committee record, p. 13969.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            189

Japanese attack at points other than at Pearl Harbor all of these
considerations necessarily entered into the appraisal of the berthing
an. It may be contended that under such circumstances it would be
manifestly unfair to criticize an officer with many other
responsibilities [170] for failure to interpret properly a message,
considered before the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan,
which we single out after the event for minute analysis and conclude may
have been designed to assist the Japanese in the bombing of Pearl
Harbor. [171]

Similarly, it may be argued that the absence of apparent interest by
Japan in the defenses at Hawaii when compared with the avid interest
manifested in the defense facilities in the Philippines, Panama,
Singapore, Batavia, and on the west coast is indicative, in the days
before December 7, of the fact that Hawaii was a much less likely point
of attack than these other places; and that in this light, Tokyo's
detailed interest in our ship locations and movements was subject to the
reasonable construction that Japan desired to be warned in advance any
contemplated action by our fleet and was not seeking information with a
view to an attack upon it or, otherwise stated, that she desired
information with a view to the fleet's availability for distant
operations rather than its susceptibility as a target. [172] Further,
that Pearl Harbor was the base of the Pacific Fleet, the only
substantial deterrent to complete freedom of action by the Japanese Navy
in Pacific waters and that in consequence thereof an unusual interest by
Japan in the location of our fleet units would appear quite
understandable. It may be proper to insist that since Pearl Harbor was
the fleet base, Japan could be reasonably sure that substantial fleet
units would be located there at virtually all times; [173] and that,
with this in mind, failure to manifest an interest in the defenses of
Hawaii when compared with such an interest shown at other points has a
distinct bearing on whether the information exchanged between Tokyo and
Honolulu concerning ship locations and movements could have pointed in
any way to likelihood of an attack at Pearl Harbor. In this connection,
the evidence does reflect that none of the intercepted messages
translated before the attack, between Tokyo and Honolulu for over a year
prior to December 7, contain any reference to the defenses of the Army
or Navy in Hawaii as distinguished from locations of fleet units.

From these considerations it may be contended that a careful comparison
and evaluation of messages relating to espionage activities by Japan's
diplomatic establishments would not have reasonably indicated in the
days before December 7 any greater likelihood of an attack on Pearl
Harbor than was warned against in the dispatches sent the Hawaiian
commanders on November 27. [174]

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO SHIPS IN HARBOR REPORTS

Despite the foregoing observations, we think there are certain
circumstances which distinguish the request for detailed information on

[170] See committee record, pp. 2131-2138.
[171] General Miles observed: "* * * this message taken alone would have
been of great military significance but it was not taken alone unless
you look at it by hindsight, which focuses all light on the event which
did happen. It was one of a great number of messages being sent by the
Japanese to various parts of the world in their attempt to follow the
movements of our naval vessels, a matter which we knew perfectly well
they were doing, and which we ourselves were doing in regard to the
Japanese." Committee record, p. 2100.
[172] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 407
[173] This appears to be the premise assumed by the Japanese in planning
and launching the attack. See Part II, this report.
[174] Committee exhibits Nos. 32 and 37, pp. 9 and 36, respectively.

190            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor from similar or other requests
for information concerning other points. War with Japan was admittedly
probable for months before it actually occurred. Many of our highest
military and naval authorities considered it all but inevitable. As the
imminence of war increased so increased the importance of our Pacific
Fleet, the home base of which was Pearl Harbor, for in the broad picture
of the Pacific, the fleet was our strong arm of defense. Safety and
fitness of the Pacific Fleet was of prime importance, and any
communication or information bearing thereon should have been given
prompt and full consideration by competent authority. We realize the
exceedingly great demands upon the intelligence divisions of the War and
Navy Departments occasioned by reason of the great flood of intelligence
coming in from all parts of the world in the days before Pearl Harbor.
Nor do we overlook the Japanese policy of acquiring detailed information
of every kind from many points. It may be fair to attribute to this and
other considerations the failure to see anything of unusual significance
in the request of September 24 for detailed information as to the
berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor; but it is difficult to escape the
feeling that, when the message of November 15 was translated on December
3 referring to the critical relations between Japan and the United
States and requesting that the "ships in harbor report" be made
irregularly but at least twice a week and directing that extra care be
taken to maintain secrecy, it should have raised in someone's mind the
thought that this intelligence was highly important because it dealt
with that which was most vital to our safety in the Pacific the Pacific
Fleet. The message of November 20, translated December 4, directing a
comprehensive investigation of "the fleet (garble) bases" in the
neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation should not have
lessened such interest. [175]

It cannot be forgotten that a surprise attack by air on Pearl Harbor had
been listed and understood, both in Washington and Hawaii, as the
greatest danger to that base. We must assume that military men realized
that in order to execute successfully such an attack the Japanese would
necessarily need detailed information as to dispositions at the point of
attack. It would seem to be a natural consequence that if Japan
undertook an attack on Pearl Harbor she would seek to acquire such
detailed information and in point of time as nearly as possible to the
hour of such attempt.

We are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches
pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to
conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in view of the evidence
indicating it was not such. [176] We are of the opinion, however, that
the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful
consideration and created a serious question as to their significance.
Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base
this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of
the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other
information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate
of the situation.

[175] It may be argued that the fact that a "war warning" had been sent
the Fleet on November 27 along with the code destruction intelligence
before these latter messages were translated had a bearing on or
possibly conditioned the failure to attach significance to them.
[176] Admiral Kimmel said: "These Japanese instructions and reports
pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Committee
record, pp. 6779, 6780.

General Short said: "* * * such details would be useful only for
sabotage, or for air or submarine attack on Hawaii." Committee record,
p. 7989.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              191

THE "WINDS CODE" [177]

On November 19, 1941, Tokyo set up a code designed to be employed in
daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts or general
intelligence broadcasts in the event ordinary commercial channels of
communication were no longer available. Two circular [178] dispatches
Nos. 2353 and 2354 were translated by the Navy Department: [179]

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington 9 November 1941
Circular #2353
" "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations),
and the cutting off of international communications, the following
warnings will be added n the middle of the daily Japanese language
short-wave news broadcast.

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.
[1]
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITA NO KAZE KUMORI. [2]
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. [3]

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard
destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret
arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

[1] East wind rain.
[2] North wind cloudy.
[3] West wind clear.

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"19 November 1941
"Circular #2354

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the
following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence
broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, "HIGASHI"
"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA"
"(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.),
"NISHI".

"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and
end.

"Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

These intercepts were confirmed by a dispatch from the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Office of Naval Operations dated
November 28, 1941; [180] a message directed to the State Department from
its diplomatic representative in Batavia dated December 4, 1941; [181]
and a dispatch from the Army's military representative in Batavia,
reading as follows: [182]

"Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts
as weather report at end. East wind rain, United States. North wind
cloudy, Russia. West wind clear, England with attack on Thailand, Malay
and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass
directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in
general text."

The foregoing message was sent "deferred" by naval communications for
General Miles of the War Department and was not decoded until the
morning of December 5, 1941.

Both the War and Navy Departments extended themselves in an effort to
monitor for a message in execution of the winds code. Exten-

[177] A detailed record study of the winds code will be found set forth
as Appendix E to this report.
[178] The circular dispatches were designed for Japanese diplomatic
establishments generally.
[179] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155.
[180] Id,, No. 142.
[181] Id.
[182] Id.

192            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

sive evidence has been taken concerning the matter, the preponderate
weight of which indicates that no genuine execute message was
intercepted by or received in the War and Navy Departments prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Investigation conducted in Japan strongly
indicates no execute message was dispatched before the attack and the
British and Dutch, who were also monitoring for an execute message, have
advised that no such message was intercepted. [183] A reasonable
construction of the code is that it was designed for use in the event
ordinary commercial channels of communication were no longer available
to Japan, a contemplation which did not materialize prior to Pearl
Harbor. The fact that a message "West wind clear," applying to England,
was broadcast after the attack tends to confirm this conclusion. [184]
Inasmuch as the question of the winds code has been one of the few
disputed factual issues in the Pearl Harbor case, there has been set
forth in Appendix E to this report a detailed study of the matter.

*Based on the evidence it is concluded that no genuine "winds" message
in execution of the code and applying to the United States was received
by the War or Navy Departments prior to the attack on December 7, 1941*.
It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially
thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not
to be execute messages.

Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message
applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, we believe
that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known
concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of
Japan.

"HIDDEN WORD" CODE

In addition to the winds code the Japanese in a dispatch on November 27
established another emergency system of communications that has been
familiarly referred to as the "hidden word" code. [185] The dispatch
establishing this code, which was sent as a circular to all diplomatic
establishments, stated: "With international relations becoming more
strained, the following system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden
word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect" and further
"in order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP
will be added at the end as an indicator." Thereafter, a number of code
words, apparently arbitrarily chosen, were set forth with the meaning of
each word placed opposite thereto. Among the code words were: HATTORI
meaning "Relations between Japan and * * * (blank) are not in accordance
with expectation"; KOYANAGI meaning "England"; and MINAMI meaning "U. S.
A."

On the morning of December 7 a circular telegram from Tokyo was
intercepted reading: [186]

"URGENT 92494 *KOYANAGI* RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI *HATTORI  MINAMI* KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASS  STOP TOGO.

[183] Id.
[184] Id.
[185] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 186-188. The original code was
supplemented by a dispatch of December 2 from from Tokyo to Singapore
which was translated after the attack.  Committee exhibit No. 1, pp.
216-219.
[186] Committee exhibit No. 142-B.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            193

The translation as made by the Navy of the foregoing hidden-word message
was distributed in Washington to authorized recipients of, Magic at 11
a. m. on December 7 in the following form: [187]

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with
expectation."

This was not the complete message, which should have been translated:
"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in
accordance with expectation: England, United States." [188] The reason
for the message having been distributed on the morning December 7 with
the words *United States* omitted is explained by the fact that Captain
Kramer in his haste occasioned by the necessity delivering other
messages, including the "one o'clock message" overlooked the code word
relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only
that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with
expectation." He indicated that later discovered the error and
telephoned at "a quarter of one or 1 o'clock" the correction to his
superior and an officer of Military Intelligence. [189]

It is clear that the hidden-word message as literally translated [190]
contained no information of any import not already greatly overshadowed,
as will hereinafter appear, by other intelligence available on the
morning of December 7 even had the words *United States* been included
at the time of distribution.

THE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"

The following message, No. 736, from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in
Washington, relating to the then current Japanese United States
negotiations, was intercepted on November 5, 1941: [191]

"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th
of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations
from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination
and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."

On November 11, 1941 another message from Tokyo to Washington, o. 762,
was intercepted, referring to the deadline set in the message November
5: [192]

"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be
indications at the United States is still not fully aware of the
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that
the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under
present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore is
essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session
of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following
day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear
picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You
can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing climax, and that time
is indeed becoming short.

"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in
view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When
talking to the Secretary State and others, drive the points home to
them. Do everything in your power

[188] The Army translation of the message supplied in March 1944 read as
follows "Relations between Japan and _______ are approaching a crisis
(on the verge of danger): England, United States." Committee exhibit No.
142-B.
[189] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 133-136.
[190] Id, at pp. 579-581.
[191] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
[192] Id., at pp. 116, 117.

194            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of
time. *At the same time do everything in your power to have them give
their speedy approval to our final proposal*.

"We would appreciate being advised of your opinion on whether or not
they will accept our final proposal A."

The deadline was again referred to in a dispatch of November 15 from
Tokyo to Washington, stating: [193]

"It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no
particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under
the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.

"Whatever the case may be, *the fact remains that the date set forth in
my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one*. Please, therefore, make
the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of
the agreement by that date."

Referring to a dispatch from its Washington Ambassador, the following
message from Tokyo was intercepted on November 16: [194]

"I have read your #1090, [195] and you may be sure that you have all my
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our
Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight
harder than you ever did before.

"What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so
and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only
to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. [196] Will
you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to
wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am
awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the
question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in
my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You
see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to
sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a
solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about
an immediate solution."

Responding to requests of its Ambassadors, [197] in an intercepted
message of November 22, 1941, Tokyo extended the deadline date from
November 25 to November 29 in the following terms: [198]

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
#736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick
to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to
bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans; *if the signing can be completed by
the 29th*, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent
notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished,
*we have decided to wait until that date*. This time we mean it, that
the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are
automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful
consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This for the
present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

As a follow-up to the foregoing message, Tokyo on November 24, 1941,
advised its Ambassadors that the time limit set in the message of
November 22 was in Tokyo time. [199]

It is clear from the foregoing messages that "things are automatically
going to happen" after November 29, Tokyo time. It is equally clear from
information now available that the happening was to be the contemplated
departure of the Japanese task force to attack

[193] Id., at p. 130.
[194] Id., at pp. 137, 138.
[195] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 127-129.
[196] Id., at pp. 92-94.
[197] Id., at p, 159.
[198] Id., at p. 165.
[199] Id., at p. 173.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            195

Pearl Harbor. But the question is not what the deadline messages are en
now to mean but what they reasonably conveyed to officials in Washington
in the days before December 7.

Tokyo had indicated the extreme importance of time as the dead line
approached: [200] "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of
a few days." But does this importance and the fact of the deadline
indicate an attack at Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, an attack on the
United States elsewhere? It must be recalled that on August 17,
following the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt advised the
Government of Japan that if she took any further steps in pursuance of a
program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring
countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to
take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the
United States. [201] It is not unreasonable to conclude that, failing to
secure a satisfaction of her demands by November 29, Japan had
determined to launch a program of aggression which she felt would
involve her in war against the United States. The extensive employment
of her forces to the south after November 29, it would reasonably
appear, was regarded as the action to be taken upon expiration of the
deadline date. Washington had expressed this estimate to Admiral Kimmel
on November 27: [202]

"The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

One of the factors considered in dispatching the "war warning" to
Admiral Kimmel on November 27 was that of alerting the Fleet before the
cut-off date of November 29. [203] We believe that the dispatch of
November 27 to Admiral Kimmel beginning, "This dispatch is to be
considered a war warning" and the dispatch to General Short of the same
date advising that "hostile action possible at any moment" was the
equivalent of and in fact was of greater significance than the so-called
"deadline messages" merely informing that things would automatically
happen after November 29.

Based on what is now known concerning the plan of the Japanese attack,
it is believed that in contemplation of the future intelligence such as
the deadline messages could well be supplied field commanders as an item
of information for their assistance along with dispatches designed to
alert and to supply them with an estimate of the situation.

DISPATCHES INDICATING FRAUDULENT NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER NOVEMBER  28, 1941

The following message (No. 844) from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in
Washington, intercepted on November 28, 1941, indicated that
negotiations thereafter were to be a sham and fraud: [204]

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts, but in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.
*Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on
this American proposal which I will send

[201] See Part I, supra "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor
Attack".
[202] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[203] See testimony of Admiral Turner. It also appears that the November
24 warning to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was sent with
a view to the deadline date of November 25.
[204] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

196            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression
that the negotiations are broken off*. Merely say to them that you are
awaiting instructions and that, although the pinions of your Government
are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial
Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices
for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always
demonstrated long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the
other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible
for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this
pass, I contacted the man you told me about in your #1180 and he said
that under the present circumstances that you suggest is entirely
unsuitable. From now on do the best you can".

In the light of hindsight, an intercepted dispatch of November 29
(translated November 30) portrayed the extent of Japanese guile in
perpetrating the fraud: [205]

"Re my #844.

"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following
lines: The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and
judicial position and has formulated its policies after full
consideration of the claims of both sides.

"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be
made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which
ignore actual conditions n East Asia and would greatly injure the
prestige of the Imperial Government.

"With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem,
what as become of the basic objectives that the U S. Government has made
the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points
we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United
States government.

"(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not
lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)"

It is to be noted in passing that the foregoing dispatch, without
benefit of retrospection, conceivably suggested at the time of its
interception, the possibility that Japan was putting out a "feeler" with
a view to our withdrawing from the position assumed in Secretary Hull's
note of November 26.

In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to its Washington Ambassador on
December 1 it was observed that the deadline date of November 9 had come
and gone with the situation continuing to be increasingly critical,
however, "to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious
we have been advising the press and others that though here are some
wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations
are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)" [206]

During a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Yamamoto in Tokyo
and Kurusu on November 27 (translated November 28) instructions were
issued to Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off." [207]

The following significant trans-Pacific conversation was had between
Kurusu and Yamamoto on November 30: [208]

"KURUSU. It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a
short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that.
There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to
see him about the short one (i. e., telegram. The longer one is probably
Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)
"YAMAMOTO. Yes. I see.
"KURUSU. The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.
"Y. Is there any special significance to this?
"K. The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is
having strong repercussions here.

[205] Id., at p. 199.
[206] Id., at p. 208.
[207] Id., at pp. 188-191.
[208] Id., at pp. 206-207.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            197

"Y. Is that so.
"K. Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried
large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because
of it. There doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the
newspapers are giving.
"(Pause.)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and
others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there
must watch out about these ill-advised statements Please tell Mr. Tani.
"Y. We are being careful.
"K. We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the
correspondents and the worst features enlarged up. Please caution the
Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister
that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but
instead we get this. (i. e. Premier's speech.)
"(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)
"K. What about the internal situation? (In Japan.)
"Y. No particular _____ (one or two words faded out)
"K. Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?
"Y. Yes.
"K. *You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you
want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and
the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches*! Do
you understand? Please all use more discretion.
"Y. When will you see them. The 2nd?
"K. Let's see this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten.
That will be Monday morning here.
"(Pause.)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of
happenings in the South. You understand don't you?
"Y. Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?
"K. I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00
this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime.
"Y. Well then Goodbye."

Admiral Kimmel in testifying before the joint committee said: [209]

"The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after
November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect;
that the plan was such importance that it involved the fate of the
empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that
negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent
suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

"What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out
negations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Anyone
reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.

"Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into
effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo-
China * * * "No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the
naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that
movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would
provide a desirable semblance of normalcy" (Testimony of Admiral Inglis,
Committee Transcript, page 453.) The troop movements to southern Indo-
China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the two
governments of Japan and the United States.

*             *                  *               *               *

"Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese government from this formal
representation of the United States that our government was aware of the
movement in do-China. The United States expressed its concern about
potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies,
Malaya, or Thailand. There was therefore, very little reason for Japan
to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these
objectives.

"Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted
to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to
divert the suspicion the United States, it must have been apparent to a
careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline
date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, which was to
consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to
this government, and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment
in its initial phases."

[209] Committee record, pp. 6791-6793.

198            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The observations of Admiral Kimmel are well taken, however, they are
colored by knowledge of subsequent events. He has stated that on or
after November 29 "A Japanese *plan* of action automatically went into
effect" whereas the Japanese had stated that after that date "things are
automatically going to happen." He comments that "negotiations were
continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature
of the plan" whereas it is only after the event that this ruse could be
apparent. He refers to the "concealed Japanese plans" and observes that
Japan's open move to the South could not be the "automatic move." This
premise presupposes that the "automatic move" was to be concealed, a
fact which was not and could not be known until after the attack.

Admiral Kimmel makes reference to the intensification of Japanese
activity to the south about November 29 [210] but fails to consider that
this activity was subject to the reasonable construction that the
"automatic move" was the move to the South and the desire to "stretch
out" negotiations was a natural step in seeking to prevent a thwarting
of Japanese plans in that direction before she was fully poised for
attack. That the Japanese movement to the South effectively diverted
attention from other points and effectively disguised the strike against
Pearl Harbor is indisputable. But this is known only after the attack.

With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to attach to the fraudulent
character of Japanese negotiations after November 28 the greatest
significance to see that it clothed a Japanese action fraught with
typical treachery. But it is clear from the evidence that the salient
questions in the minds of responsible officials in Washington in the few
days before Pearl Harbor was not *Would the Japanese attack*?  but
*when* and *where* would she attack? The fact that an attack would come
was the considered judgment of our military. The Tokyo dispatch of
November 28 did not supply the highly essential information which was
desired. Neither the intercepted dispatches from Tokyo indicating the
fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28 nor the deadline
messages supplied the *when* or *where* of the attack. We do not believe
that this intelligence, if taken together, would have predicted Pearl
Harbor as a likely place of attack.

To have advised Admiral Kimmel and General Short on November 28 that
negotiations thereafter were a Japanese fraud could not have suggested
itself strongly to officials in Washington who had only the day before
told these commanders: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in
the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected
within the next few days"; and "Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment."

STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ARMY DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27

It is to be recalled that the "war warning" dispatch of November 27 from
the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel related, with respect to
the status of our diplomatic relations with the Japanese, "Negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of condi-

[210] Id.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            199

tions in the Pacific *have ceased* * * *." The message from the War
Department to General Short, on the other hand, stated "Negations with
Japan appear to be terminated to *all practical purposes with only the
*barest possibilities* that the Japanese might come back and offer to
continue."

The statement has been made that the estimate of the diplomatic
situation given General Short was not accurate and left the impression
ere was still a possibility of the negotiations continuing whereas we
were in reality at "sword's point" with Japan. [211]

The message stated negotiations appeared to be terminated to *all
practical purposes* with *only the barest possibilities* that the
Japanese might offer to continue. To be sure Secretary Hull had advised
the Secretary of War on the morning of November 27 that he had "broken
the whole matter off" had abandoned the idea of a modus vivendi and that
he had washed his hands of it and "it is now in the hands of you and
Knox, the Army and Navy." [212] But this was precisely the duty of the
Secretary of State *to advise the Army and Navy when the probabilities
were that negotiations had passed beyond the diplomatic age and were in
the hands of the military*. Secretary Hull was indicating that he had
given up the idea of a temporary diplomatic truce with Japan and was
expressing his personal and official feeling that the Japanese
Government would not respond to our Government's note of November 26 in
such manner as to permit further negotiations. Mr. Hull did not *know*
that Japan would not possibly reply with a counter proposal nor did
anyone in our Government in Washington at the time the November 27
dispatch was prepared.

In recounting the circumstances attending the November 27 dispatch to
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (as well as to Panama,
the Western Defense Command, and the Philippines) Secretary Stimson
stated that he telephoned the President on the morning of November 27
suggesting that a final alert be sent pointing out that commanders be on
the qui vive for any attack and explaining the exact situation. He
stated the President approved his idea. As related by Mr. Stimson: [213]
"Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate
in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the
military staff. [214] As the President himself, however, had now
actually directed the sending the the message, and as I wanted the
message clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas
as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to
participate in the forming of this message myself. In order that it
should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the
telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the
negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sentence of the
messages."

[211] See committee exhibit No. 167. The comment of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board was: "This statement on Japanese information is inadequate.
It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning
the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War
Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare
possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the
implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American
relations, i. e., that war might not come. The War Department was
convinced that war would come."
[212] See Part I, supra, section "Diplomatic and Military Liaison in
Washington."
[213] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14395.
[214] General Marshall who ordinarily would have prepared such a
dispatch was in North Carolina on November 27 incident to troop
maneuvers. It appears that prior to his departure from Washington he had
discussed generally with General Gerow the matter of sending a warning
message to our outpost commanders. The message was finally prepared by
Secretary Stimson in collaboration with General Gerow, among others. See
statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14394, 14395.