Site Map INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK |
Page 370 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above were contained in each draft and remained the same in substance throughout, with but few changes in text. In paragraph 3, the final draft added the proviso contained in the second sentence and omitted specific mention of a limitation of 25,000 upon the total number of Japanese troops to remain in French Indochina, retaining from the prior drafts, however, the limitation expressed in terms of "the number there on July 26,1941." Paragraph 4 was the same in both the final draft and the draft of November 24, but differed from the corresponding provision in the November 22 draft, which had been as follows: "The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national defense (ex. 18)." During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive, the State Department was the focal point of great activity. After the preparation of the November 22 draft of the *modus vivendi* and in accordance with his conversations with the British Minister on November 18 and the Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19, on Saturday, November 22 (Washington time), Secretary Hull arranged a meeting at the State Department with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr. Richard G. Casey, the Australian Minister. His report of that meeting follows in full: "The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here. "I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a *modus vivendi*, I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed *modus vivendi* which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions (ex. 18)." Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with those who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately reported to their respective Governments, for comment, the terms of the Japanese note of November 20 to the United States and of the November 22 draft of the proposed *modus vivendi* (ex. 18)." Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 371 talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned above, and "that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that their intentions were peaceful. "The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian consumption. "The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen are talking about a peaceful course whereas in the American press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she desired, that the Japanese Government knows that. "The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and other persons in this country (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 757-758)." Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult by leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied- "that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China altogether. "The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo- China, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should get out of Indo-China. "Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should be made by the Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760)." After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina. Ambassador Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese proposal of November 20. In reply, the Secretary said "that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761)." Ambassador Nomura "disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard for an answer * * * and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to wait until Monday" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Ambassador Nomura sent two reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1, pp. 167-169,170-171), in one of which he observed: Page 372 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the same (ex. 1, p. 171)." The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull again until Wednesday afternoon, November 26 (Washington time), when the Secretary gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-770) . There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or conferences outside the State Department regarding the *modus vivendi* the next day, Sunday, November 23 (Washington time). However, Monday, November 24 (Washington time), like the preceding Saturday, was a day of great activity. A new draft of the entire counterproposal was completed in the Department over the weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the afternoon Secretary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral Schuirmann (tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. M., Secretary Hull had a conference at the State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at which the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). During this conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that 25,000 Japanese troops in French Indo-China, the maximum permitted under the current draft of the *modus vivendi*, would not be a menace (ex. 18). Following his conference with General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the State Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called on Secretary Hull at his request, and to each of them he handed copies of the latest draft of the *modus vivendi*. The Secretary's memorandum of that meeting records that they spent an hour reading the draft and taking notes to send back to their Governments. The memorandum continues: "The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000 Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that 25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur any day after this week unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement. "The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having additional time in which to make further preparations, et ectera, et ectera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 373 lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his Government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion (ex. 18)." Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill. The proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20, saying that the Japanese Ambassador had "represented" that the conclusion of such a "modus vivendi" might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that "the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal." The message pointed out that the Japanese proposal "would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indo-China " It went on to say that the United States Government proposed to inform the Japanese Government that in its opinion the Japanese proposals contained features "not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement" to which each Government had declared that it was committed, and then summarized the terms of the *modus vivendi* which was being considered by the United States Government as an alternative proposal. The message advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in Washington had been informed and was informing the British Foreign Minister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to Secretary Hull with the notation "O. K., see addition. F. D. R." (Ex. 18). The "addition" referred to by the President was the following sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the end of the message: "This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon (ex. 18)." The message, with the sentence added by the President, was sent to the Prime Minister at 11 p. m. That evening, November 24 (Washington time), through Ambassador Winant in London (ex. 18). The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft counterproposal was once more revised in the State Department. This was the final revision of the section containing the *modus vivendi*. At 9:30 a. M. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secretary Hull at the State Department for their "usual Tuesday morning meeting" (tr. 14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes: "Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do; namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation (tr. 14,417-14,418)." It is clear that Secretary Stimson's description of the *modus vivendi* as "so drastic" refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions to be made by the United States under it. Page 374 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK At noon that day the so-called "War Council" composed of President Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered on the Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the President "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next .Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. [1] It was a difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing should be rested the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that (tr. 14,418-14,419)." In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting (tr. 1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a letter written by the Secretary to the Roberts Commission a little over a month after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that at the meeting of the War Council on November 25, as well as the meeting on November 28, he had "emphasized the critical nature" of the relations between the United States and Japan, the Secretary continued: "I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174)." General Marshall testified that he had "a very distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, 'These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared" (tr. 3079). Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November 25, added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he described the comments of the President and the Secretary of State: "I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack (ex. 100)." After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to the State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department. Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes: [1] With reference to this sentence in Secretary Stimson's notes, General Marshall testified: "* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing of a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement" (tr. 13801). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 375 "When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships 30, 40, or 50 ships-and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the menace from G-2 (tr. 14419)." Secretary Hull's record of telephone calls shows a call on that day from Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of outside telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows such a call at 4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545. The latter record also shows that Postmaster General Walker telephoned Secretary Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The first call was at 12:27 p. M., while the meeting at the White House was in progress, and was not completed. The other calls, which were completed, were at 3:30,4:05, and 5:30 p. m. In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions of the Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the proposed *modus vivendi*. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister informed Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of November 24 (Washington time) that his Government would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. The next day the Minister formally transmitted to Secretary Hull his Government's comments on the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus vivendi* (tr. 4471-4474). The comments of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, were contained in a memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the same day by Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador (ex. 18). That memorandum expressed the willingness of the British Foreign Office to leave to Secretary Hull the decision whether to reject the Japanese proposals or make a counterproposal. It took the position that the Japanese proposals should be regarded " as the opening movement in a process of bargaining," and suggested that if a counterproposal should be made, "our demands should be pitched high and our price low." On this basis it was suggested "for the consideration of the United States Government" that any counterproposal "should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval, military and air forces with their equipment and for the *suspension of further military* advances in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar nature from Japan if we required them. "Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned (ex. 18). (Italics in original.)" Prime Minister Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt's message of November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said: "Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign" Page 376 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves (ex. 23)." The views of the Chinese Government had already been made known to the United States Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister, to whom on November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had cabled the substance of the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus vivendi*, sent the following message to the Chinese Ambassador on November 24: "After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. * * * We are * * * firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China. Please inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18)." On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's American advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's administrative assistants: "After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18)." The same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V. Soong in Washington the following message, which the latter promptly delivered to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox: "I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately. "Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 377 "We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China, is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the break-down of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in future will record this episode (ex. 18)." The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to him a copy of the Chinese Foreign Minister's telegram quoted above. According to Secretary Hull's memorandum of the conversation, the Ambassador endeavored to explain Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to the *modus vivendi* on the ground that the Generalissimo was not thoroughly acquainted with the over-all international aspects of the Japanese situation, and viewed it only from his own situation in Chungking (ex. 18). The Secretary's memorandum continued: "I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far, and the Japanese are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others. "I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singapore the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward. "The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit (ex. 18)." The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary Hull is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shih called on Dr. Stanley E. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary. After expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the United States "would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no course of 'appeasement' ", the Chinese Ambassador repeated what Page 378 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second and third points of the *modus vivendi*, evidencing the concern of his Government that point 2 would leave Japan free to continue operations against China and that point 3 would not sufficiently limit the number of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese threat to the Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the *modusvivendi* would be made more restrictive (ex. 18). In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to Secretary Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November 26 (Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160) in which the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that a return to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough and that it would be necessary to have a solution that would "come up to the B proposal," had indicated that the Japanese Government would accept nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on November 24 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura: "Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 7. (*Note*. Clauses 6 and 7 were not included in the Japanese proposal of November 20.) Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172)." Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura that "our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the 'B' proposal in toto" with the two exceptions already noted (ex. 1, p. 176). The same day the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that as soon as he reached a settlement on the basis of the November 20 note "it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 (*Note*: clauses 3 and 4 of the November 20 note) of that proposal. Of these goods the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, * * * prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines: "4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177)." On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had called on Secretary Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed to sign as a clarification of Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. The proposed letter asserted that the Pact did not in any way infringe the sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that Japan was free to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese Government would not become involved in war "at the behest of any foreign power"; and that it would " accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of its national life against active injustice" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 757). The record of the conversations shows that the substance of all of these assertions had been made by the Japanese many times before. Secretary Hull asked the Ambassador whether he had anything more to offer on the whole subject of a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756). Secretary Hull described this incident in his testimony: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 379 "The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that, and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, 'No.' "So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr. 1181)." Secretary Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of his talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time), during which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maximum concession Japan could make "in any event", and that Japan would be willing to have President Roosevelt act as "introducer" between Japan and China "with the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan," I. E., cease all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 762-763). On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson talked with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. M. And again at 9:50 a. m., according to the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr. Stimson summarized the conversations in his notes: "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I had called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose (tr. 14,420)." On his return to the State Department from the War Council meeting the preceding day, Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary Stimson that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50 ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson had also telephoned President Roosevelt about this, and had sent copies of the intelligence report to him. A few minutes after his telephone conversations with Secretary Hull on the morning of November 26, Secretary Stimson telephoned the President to inquire whether he had received the report on the Japanese expedition. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the President "fairly blew up jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China) they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-china, I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr. 14,420- 14,421)." The record before the Committee contains the following "Memorandum for the President," dated November 26 (Washington time) and signed by Secretary Stimson: 380 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK JAPANESE CONVOY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDO-CHINA "About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement. "Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000 but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships leave been seen south of Formosa. "The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government. "I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field (ex. 98)." At 6:54 p. M. That day the following priority message was dispatched from the Navy Department: "From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines "Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my approval the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces on the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US Forces. However, I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862)." The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m. that day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned n Stark (tr. 1166, 5546), that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m. after attempting to telephone General Marshall (who was out of town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546), and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull conferred at the White House with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147). The Secretary was preceded at the White House by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong (ex. 179). Secretary Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended to President Roosevelt and that the President approved the Secretary's calling in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had been under consideration at the State Department, while withholding the modus vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was, Secretary Hull testified, "thoroughly familiar" with both sections of the counterproposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time) from Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 381 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT "With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government, namely: "(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic, peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject. "(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations. "In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal. "/S/ CORDELL HULL (ex. 18)." In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommendation to the President: "I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme last-word proposal of November 20. "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote. "So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding. "It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible. "The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement (tr. 114S1147). " Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with President Roosevelt, at 5 p. M. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors 382 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply to the Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the counterproposal which had been under consideration since November 22, together with an explanatory statement. The explanatory statement was the first section of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71) modified by the deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes made necessary thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought in the exploratory conversations, and stated that it was believed that some progress had been made with respect to the general principles involved. Note was taken of the recent statements of the Japanese Ambassadors that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to that successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversations looking toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area were continuing. It was stated that the United States Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of the discussions to this end. The statement continued: "The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. "With this object in view *the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.* "The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941. and the Japanese draft of September 25, by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. *This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 767)." The outline of a proposed basis for agreement which Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full: "Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment. "WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941. "OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOB AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN "SECTION I "*Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy* "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based: "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 383 "(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment." "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. "The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples: "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. "(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions. "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies. "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements. "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries. "SECTION II "Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British Empire China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and The United States. "2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. "3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indochina. "4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking. "5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in international settlement's and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. "7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan. "8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. 384 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. "10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167; ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 768-770)." Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-stance of the United States' reply. (Tr. 4513-4522; ex. 75.) The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the first draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (Washington time), all the officials of the United States Government who were consulted by Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi necessarily saw and considered the successive drafts of the foregoing so-called "Ten Point" note, since from the outset the provisions which, as revised, became the "Ten Point" note had constituted the second section of the counterproposal and had been attached to the first section containing the modus vivendi. The record also shows that the provisions of the "Ten Point" note probably received more attention from the high officers of the Army and Navy than did the terms of the modus vivendi, since the part containing the so-called "Ten Points" was based primarily upon the State Department's revision of the Morgenthau suggestions of November 18. It will be recalled that that revision was sent to the Army and Navy for comment on November 19, and was the subject of the conference at the State Department on November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral Stark, who thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to Secretary Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been pointed out, the first section of the "Ten Point" note was based almost entirely upon the statement of principles contained in the draft proposal submitted by the State Department's Far Eastern Division to Secretary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently discussed with the Japanese during the six months since the conversations began in the spring of 1941. Returning to Secretary Hull's meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them by the Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the United States reply to their proposal. "The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation-to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country. *He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, to which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding.* He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his *of settling the immigration question* but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764). Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions of the American note, saying among other things that he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4), and that if this represented the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible. He said that when they reported the United States' answer to their Government "it would be PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 385 likely to throw up its hands". He suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he felt the reply could be interpreted "as tantamount to meaning the end." He asked whether the United States was interested in a modus vivendi. Secretary Hull replied that he had explored that and that he had done his best in the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-766). In reply to Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the document should be discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo "The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved. "The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765)." At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura asked whether the two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary Hull replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see them at any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to have the counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, one of the Secretary's principal advisors on Far Eastern affairs, the next day "to discuss further details" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766). Secretary Hull testified: "The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the situation in the Far East as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the in- ormal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations. * * * * * "Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer. We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152)." *Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of November 26 (Washington time)*, the two Japanese Ambassadors had sent a joint telegram to Foreign Minister Togo in which they recognized, *even before Secretary Hull delivered the " Ten Point" note to them,* 386 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that the negotiations were for all practical purposes at an end. They told the Foreign Minister: "As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, *if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete* (ex. 1, p. 180)." They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more time. The Ambassadors suggested, with "grave misgivings," that they be permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt wire Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that "for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-operate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific * * * and that you in return reply with a cordial message." The Ambassadors asked that their request be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1. p. 189). While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting with Secretary Hull at the State Department, and at their direction, the counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the trans-Pacific telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the meeting was in progress and that "the future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversation" (ex. 1, p. 179). In making this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code established earlier that day in a message from the Foreign Minister which said "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long" (ex. 1, p. 178). There is no evidence before the Committee of the use of a trans- Pacific telephone code in connection with the negotiations prior to the establishment of this code by the Japanese Foreign Office before the American note was delivered on November 26 (Washington time). Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy, Ambassador Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the trans- Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American Division, Kumaicho Yamamoto: "I have made all efforts, *but they will not yield*. I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. [1] The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179)." He continued "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome (ex. 1, p. 180)." To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied: "Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p. 180)." That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled three reports to the Foreign Minister of the Ambassadors' meeting with Secretary Hull. The first was a brief resume of the "Ten Point" note, accompanied by this comment: "In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have [1] The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said "Our failure and humiliation are complete". PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 387 been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so (ex. 1, p. 182)." The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp. 183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed great concern lest some "independent action" taken by Japan *while the negotiations were continuing* should place upon Japan the responsibility "for the rupture of the negotiations." He pointed out that "up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention!" Recognizing that "such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret," the Ambassador recommended: "consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.* I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183)." (November 27-December 7, 1941) The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little hope or expectation in Washington on November 27, either among those in the United States Government who were familiar with the Japanese-American conversations or on the part of the two Japanese Ambassadors, that the Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue the conversations. Nevertheless, as requested by Ambassador Kurusu the day before, a meeting with President Roosevelt was arranged for 2:30 p. m. on November 27 (Washington time) at the White House. That morning, before the White House conference, Secretary Hull held a "special and lengthy" press conference at which he reviewed the Far Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-American conversations in much greater detail than had been true of the statement made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following his conference with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154- 161). That statement had said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had been handed for their consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks, and that it was unnecessary to repeat what had been said so often in the past that it rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions (ex. 167). At Secretary Hull's press conference on the morning of November 27, he emphasized that from the beginning he had kept in mind that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan to conquer by force half of the earth with half its population; that this movement had started in earnest in 1937, and carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play. The Secretary said that from the beginning, as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy, the United States had sought to keep 388 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, but that it was no easy under- taking. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he had had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to determine whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area might not be possible. He said that while the conversations during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for the past 10 days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory there might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, including the United States. He said that during the conversations it had been necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in Japan but also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he cited the fact: "that we had known for some days * * * that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China. * * * There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks some-where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr. 1156-1157)." He said that if the Japanese established themselves in Indochina in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have a base not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea area. The Secretary said that the United States Government had exhausted all its efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese; and that those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. On November 26, he continued, because he had found there was so much confusion and so many collateral manners brought in, while at the same time high Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim their old doctrine of force he had thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective by restating the fundamental principles to which the United States was committed and at the same time show how those principles could be applied to a number of specific conditions which would logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the entire Pacific area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on November 26, Secretary Hull replied that he did not know, but that the Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it could be assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept the principles to which he had referred and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said there was always a possibility but that he would not say how much probability there might be. Secretary Hull's press conference took place at about 10 o'clock that morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o'clock, the Secretary talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the negotiations; he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167, 5547). Secretary Stimson's notes for that day (November 27) describe his two conversations with Secretary Hull: "A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob- PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 389 ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives. The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his finale has been with the Japanese whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position. "General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs. "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was (tr. 14,421- 14,423)." Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson's observation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired "to seek for more time." It will be recalled that on November 5, in connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded that "war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance (ex. 16)." As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus vivendi proposal was the desire of the military and naval authorities "for more time." However, at the War Council meeting on November 25 attended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary Hull stated that there was "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan" (ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an Army-Navy Joint Board meeting, General Marshall and Admiral Stark directed the preparation of a memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding what steps should be taken if the negotiations with Japan should end without agreement. The meeting on November 27 described by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day was also described in a memorandum for General Marshall prepared the same day by General Gerow: "2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark |