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Site Map INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK |
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK PBY-5's were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an absence of spare parts. He pointed out that 12 of the patrol planes indicated as available for fight had returned from Midway on December 5 after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since October 17, and were in relatively poor material condition because of the extended operations. [54] While radar equipment was available on three of the battleships and on one seaplane tender, it was not being manned inasmuch as the height of the land surrounding Pearl Harbor rendered ships' radar ineffective. [55] DEFENSIVE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF THE ARMY IN HAWAII As of December 6, 1941, General Short had a total of 42,959 officers and men under his command. The principal elements of the Hawaiian Department were 2 infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air Force. [66] The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command had a total of 213 antiaircraft guns. [57] Eighty-six were 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile); 20, 37-millimeter; and 107 caliber .50. The Army on December 7, prior to the attack, had a total of 227 planes [58] located principally at Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows Fields. They consisted of 12 heavy bombers; 36 medium bombers (obsolescent); 14 light bombers (2 obsolescent); 152 pursuit planes (53 obsolescent); and 13 observation planes. [59] Eighty-seven of these planes for one reason or another were not available for flight, including 6 of the heavy bombers and 58 of the pursuit planes. Ninety-four pursuit planes (including 30 of the obsolescent craft) were available for flight. In addition, the Army had six mobile radar units which were available and in operating condition. [60] COMPARISON OF STRENGTH AND LOSSES: JAPANESE ATTACKING FORCE AND HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE FORCES The Japanese attacking force brought to bear 360 planes incident to the attack; whereas the Army and Navy together had a total of 402 planes of all types, not taking into account those not available of flight on the morning of December 7. The operating strength of the opposing forces by comparison follows: [54] Id. [55] The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar on December 7 were the battleships Pennsylvania, California, and West Virginia and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment these ships was not manned since the height of the land around Pearl Harbor would have made it ineffective. The equipment of the Curtiss was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results. There were no naval radar stations on shore in Hawaii. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 82. [56] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 64; also committee exhibit No. 5. [57] The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command included: 4 16-inch guns, 2 14-in guns (obsolescent), 4 12-inch guns (2 obsolescent), 4 3-inch seacoast guns, 36 155-millimeter guns, 86 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile), 20 37-millimeter antiaircraft guns, and 107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns. Committee exhibit No. 5. [58] The statement of General Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7, reflected the status of planes as follows: Pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69; reconnaissance planes in commission, 6; reconnaissance planes out of commission, 7; bombers in commission, 39; bombers out of commission, 33. [59] See committee exhibit No. 5. [60] Three additional radar units calling for permanent installation were not as yet in operating condition. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 71 Japanese attacking force Fighters ................................................... 81 [61] Dive bombers ............................................... 135 Horizontal bombers ......................................... 104 Torpedo planes ............................................. 40 Defending forces Available for Not available flight for flight Fighters .......................... (30 obsolescent) 108 59 Army bombers ...................... (21 obsolescent) 35 27 Navy patrol bombers ................................ 61 8 Navy scout bombers ................................. 36 1 Army observation planes ............................ 11 2 Miscellaneous Navy planes .......................... 45 1 (Planes from carrier Enterprise which joined the defense) 8 Army-Navy antiaircraft ............................. 993 guns A comparison of losses or severe damage in summary form is as follows: Japanese attacking force Defending force [62] Personnel (less than) ............... 100 ............... 3,435 Planes ............................. 29 ............... 188 Ships ............................... 0 ............... 18* Submarines (midget) ................. 5 ............... 0 Facilities. (Extensive damage to Army and Navy installations on Oahu.) *8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels. The extreme disproportion of Army and Navy losses to equipment and facilities at hand is traceable to the complete surprise of the commanders in Hawaii when the Japanese struck on the morning of December 7. The Japanese employed, it is true, a powerful attacking force, much more powerful than they had been thought capable of utilizing in a single tactical venture. They executed the attack with a skill, daring, and military know-how of which we thought them incapable. However, as reflected by the comparison of relative strength, the Hawaiian commanders had formidable defensive forces which, if properly coordinated and brought into play should have been capable of inflicting severe damage on the Japanese raiders and repelling the attack to a degree. How great the losses that might have been inflicted on the attacking force and the extent to which the attack might have been repulsed will forever remain a matter of conjecture. The real power of the defenses of Hawaii was not brought into the fight. [62a] There can be no question that some damage would have been inflicted irrespective of the state of alertness that might have prevailed; for as a military proposition it is agreed that some attacking planes will invariably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack. This is largely true no matter how fully equipped and how alert a garrison may be. [63] But this fact does not draw forth the con- [61] It is reported that of the Japanese fighter planes, 39 were kept around the carriers as interceptors in case the American planes get in the air and made an attack. Committee Exhibit No. 8D. (Enclosure 1, p. 2) [62] It is interesting to note that Admiral Bloch testified that had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-docks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and ships of the fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that *the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air*. See Hart Inquiry Record, p. 94. [62a] It is interesting to note that the Japanese had estimated the air strength in Hawaii at roughly twice the actual strength and had expected to lose one-third of the striking force, including two of the aircraft carriers. See discussion "The Role of Espionage in the Attack", Part III, infra. [63] It appears agreed as a military proposition that carrier-borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to repel successfully a carrier attack. See, for example, testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 686; also Admiral Stark, Id., pp. 1023, 1024. As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. Once launched, attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or antiaircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage." See Navy Court of Inquiry Report, committee exhibits Nos. 157 and 181. 72 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK clusion that the attacker cannot and must not be made to pay and pay heavily. The disaster of Pearl Harbor lies in the failure of the Army and Navy to make their fight with the equipment at hand-it was not that they had no equipment, for they did, but that they did not utilize what they had. This failure is attributable to the complete surprise with which the attack came. It is proper, therefore, to inquire at this point to determine whether the Hawaiian commanders should thus have been surprised and, more particularly, whether they were justified in employing their defensive facilities in a manner least calculated to meet the Japanese on the morning of December 7. (The responsibilities relating to the disaster affecting both Hawaii and Washington will be found treated in Parts III and IV, respectively, infra.) |