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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

220            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore,
with a report of the views of the Imperial (Government on this American
proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured*. This is inevitable.

In the foregoing dispatch the Japanese Government stated it would send a
reply to Nomura and Kurusu within 2 or 3 days. This presupposes the
presence and *availability* in Washington of these ambassadors to
receive the reply. Clearly, therefore, war between Japan and the United
States was not to eventuate *until* the reply had been received in
Washington, otherwise the Japanese ambassadors would not be available
for the purpose of receiving such reply. By the same token war would not
eventuate until the ambassadors had an opportunity to *deliver* the
reply, otherwise little or no purpose would be served in sending it
whatever.

Knowledge of this fact should have intensified alertness in the War and
Navy Departments to such a point that from the moment the 14-part reply
started coming in, all hands should have been on the qui vive and
additionally an adequate number of responsible officers should have been
actually at their stations with full authority to act in any emergency
throughout the night of December 6-7. This statement is of course
subject to the observation that Japan had indicated in the pilot message
that the full reply would not be received until the following day,
Sunday, December 7, and even that was not certain; that instructions
would be sent in a separate dispatch with respect to the time of
presentation and "the situation is extremely delicate, and when you
receive it (the reply) I want you to please *keep it secret for the time
being*." Further, it is clear from the evidence that the receipt of the
pilot message and portions of the first 13 parts of the 14-part
memorandum served as basis for special measures taken by the War and
Navy Departments to insure prompt handling, decoding, and distribution
of this magic material on the evening of December 6. The naval officers
who received the first 13 parts on the evening of December 6 appear to
have regarded them as requiring no action during the evening. Within the
Army the first 13 parts were seen by the Chief of the Military
Intelligence Division, who in view of the fact that the fourteenth part
had not been received and the further fact that this message appeared to
him to be of interest primarily to the State Department, decided that it
required no further distribution within the Army that evening but should
be delivered to the State Department. [297a] But the fact that the
message was being received removed the last *known* barrier to Japan's
taking military action. [298]

In consequence, it is not believed the War and Navy establishments in
Washington were sufficiently alerted on the evening of December 6

[297] As has been indicated, the evidence is in dispute as to whether
the first 13 parts were in reality delivered to a watch officer at the
State Department on the evening of December 6. See Note 280a, supra.
[298] However, it should be noted that Ambassador Nomura in a dispatch
to Tokyo of November 26, 1941, stated: "The United States is using the
excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent
countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are
continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our
expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations,
deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger
that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast
upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have
considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French
Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a
rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent
operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as
counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing
insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing
as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret;
consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of
course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations
be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to
the American Embassy in Tokyo or by declaration for internal and
external* consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to
make representations here at the same time." Committee exhibit No. 1, p.
183.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             221

with a view to receiving the Japanese reply. As events turned out,
however, there was nothing contained in the first 13-parts to have
served as basis for additional warnings to outposts already regarded
adequately alerted. The information contained in the first 13-parts of
the 14-part message did not add to the sum total of information already
supplied the commanders in Hawaii who had been warned of war and advised
"hostile action possible at any moment." It did not point to Hawaii. It
did not provide the essential *where* or, with any degree of
definitiveness, the *when* of the attack. There is no intelligence
contained in the first 13-parts which this Committee can conclude could
reasonably be expected to have changed the decisions already made in
Hawaii.

*The Fourteenth Part*

At 2:38 a. m., December 7, there was filed in Tokyo and intercepted by a
Navy monitoring station between 3:05 and 3:10 a. m. the fourteenth and
final part of Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26.
[299] This message as subsequently decoded by the Navy read as follows:
[300]

"(Part 14 of 14)

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
East Asia, and especially to reserve Anglo-American rights and interests
by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed
clearly during the course of the present: negotiations. Thus, the
earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific rough
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations.*"

The fourteenth part was available in the Navy Department for
distribution at some time between 7:30 and 8:00 a. m. [301] Captain
Kramer made delivery within the Navy Department shortly after a. m. The
delivery to the White House and to Secretary Knox, who was at the State
Department for a 10 a. m. meeting with Secretaries Hull and Stimson, was
made shortly before 10 a. m. Distribution of the fourteenth part within
the War Department was begun at 9 a. m. with subsequent delivery to the
State Department.

It is to be noted there is no statement that Japan intended to declare
war on the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations
were to be broken merely that the current negotiations cannot produce an
agreement. The fourteenth part is much less severe than the strongly
worded first 13 parts would have indicated. Admiral Beardall testified
as follows with respect to delivery of the fourteenth part o the
President: [302]

"As I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10:00 o'clock on
Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best
of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that came
in the night before, which delivered to him.

[299] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[300] Id., No. 1, p. 245. As forwarding instructions to the radio
station handling the fourteenth part there appeared at the beginning the
plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT".
[301] Committee record, pp. 10461-10463.
[302] Id,, at pp. 14010, 14011.

222            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Asked if there was any discussion or conversation with the President
when he made the delivery, Admiral Beardall testified: [303]

"No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying
though, which marks this in my mind, that *it looked as though the Japs
are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations*."

Admiral Beardall further testified that at the time of delivering the
fourteenth part to the President there was nothing in the manner of the
President which would indicate he was expecting an attack within a
period of hours; that there "was no alarm, or no mention of this,
mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that
he was expecting an attack." [304]

As to the question whether termination of negotiations would indicate
certain war it is significant to note that the Japanese Ambassadors
themselves stated in a message to Tokyo dated November 26, 1941: [305]

"We suppose that *the rupture of the present negotiations does not
necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States*, but after we
break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is
to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack
them and a clash with them would be inevitable * * *."

From a review of the fourteenth part it is clear that nothing is added
to what was already known with respect to Japan's reaction to Secretary
Hull's note. To be sure it is observed that the "hope * * * to preserve
and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the
American Government has finally been lost" and "in view of the attitude
of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible
to reach an agreement through further negotiations." But these facts had
already been known for several days and the only paramount
considerations at this time were *when* and *where* Japan would strike.
A thorough consideration of the fourteen-part message, when viewed in
the light of all other intelligence already available in Washington,
reflects no added information, particularly of a military character,
which would serve further to alert outpost commanders who had already
been supplied a "war warning" and informed that "hostile action possible
at any moment." [305] This conclusion is partially modified to the
extent that actual delivery of the fourteen part message to the American
Government might be construed as removing the last diplomatic obstacle,
in the minds of the Japanese, to launching an attack.

"ONE O'CLOCK" AND FINAL CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES

Two messages intercepted on the morning of December 7 have received
paramount consideration the celebrated "one o'clock" message specifying
the time for delivery of the Japanese 14-part memorandum to the
Government of the United States and the message setting forth final
instructions to the Japanese Embassy concerning

[303] Id.
[304] Committee record, p. 14047.
[305] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.
[306] General Marshall stated: "* * * the particular part which affected
me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts. It was the one o'clock,
which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I read
through everything before I came to that." committee record, p. 13805.

Referring to the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Admiral Turner said: "I
did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be
an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because
I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately
between the United states and Japan, and this was merely confirmatory.
The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture Of the situation
had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27,
and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the
destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for
our people to destroy codes in exposed positions." Committee record, p.
5099.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             223

the destruction of codes and secret papers. The latter was as follows:
[307]

"After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, [308] #908, [309]
and #909, [310] please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and
all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents."

This message was intercepted shortly after the one o'clock message but
from the evidence it appears that both these intercepts were distributed
at approximately the same time. The "one o'clock" message read as
follows: [311]

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at
1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."

This dispatch was filed by the Japanese at 4.18 a. m. December 7 and
intercepted by a Navy monitoring station at 4:37 a. m. [312] It was
decrypted and available in the Navy Department at approximately 7 a. m.
thereupon being sent to the Army for translation inasmuch as there was
no translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. Translated
copies of the "one o'clock" message appear to have been returned to the
Navy at approximately 9 a. m. Captain Kramer testified [313] that upon
his return to the Navy Department at 10:20 a. m. he found the "one
o'clock" message and thereafter, between 10:30 and 10:35 a. m.,
delivered it to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where a
meeting was in progress. Delivery was then made within approximately 10
minutes to an aide to Secretary Hull at the State Department and
thereafter within roughly another 10 minutes, to a Presidential aide at
the White House. In the course of delivery to the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to Secretary Hull's aide mention was made of the
fact that 1 p. m. Washington time, was about dawn at Honolulu and about
the middle of the night in the Far East. *No mention was made that the
time indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor*. [314]

Delivery of the "one o'clock" message within the War Department was made
at some time between 9 and 10 a. m. General Marshall after being advised
at his quarters that an important message had been received, arrived at
his office at some time between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m. where he saw for
the first time the 14-part memorandum, General Gerow, General Miles, and
Colonel Bratton, among others, being present. After completion of his
reading of the memorandum General Marshall came to the "one o'clock"
message and appears to have attached immediate significance to it. He
testified that he and the officers present in his office were certain
the hour fixed in the "one o'clock" message had "some definite
significance;" that "something was going to happen at 1 o'clock;" that
"when they specified a day,

[307] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 249.
[308] The dispatch set forth, infra, concerning delivery at 1 p. m.,
December 7, of the 14-part memorandum.
[309] No. 908, dated December 7, read: "All concerned regret very much
that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters
have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two
Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer
my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well
as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." Committee exhibit
No. 1., p. 248.
[310] No. 909, dated December 7, read: "(From Bureau Chief Yamamoto to
Commerical Attache Iguchi and his staff as well as to Secretary Yuki) I,
together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily
thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many
months in behalf of our country despite all difficulities in coping with
the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good
health."  Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[311] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[312] Id., No. 41.
[313] Committee record, pp. 10470-10479.
[314] See testimony of Captain Kramer before the committee; also Captain
McCollum, committee record, p. 9275.

224            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

that of course had significance, but not comparable to an hour;" and,
again, that it was "a new item of information of a peculiar character."
[315] At 11:30 or 11:40 a. m. General Marshall telephoned Admiral Stark
[316] and, upon learning the latter had read the message, proposed that
a warning be sent immediately to all theaters concerned. It should be
noted that the exact time of Admiral Stark's arrival at the Navy
Department is not definitely established although it is known that he
was there by 10:30 a. m. on the morning of December 7, at the very
latest. [317] Admiral Stark hesitated because he regarded the theater
commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them
further. [318] General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft
of a warning message to the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command,
the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command, as follows: [319]

"The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, today,
what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy
their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may
have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly."

He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the foregoing message immediately
to the message center to be dispatched by radio but as Colonel Bratton
was leaving the room, Admiral Stark called to request that there be
placed on the dispatch the "usual expression to inform the naval
officer". The following was therefore added in handwriting, by General
Marshall, "Inform naval authorities of this communication" [320]

EVENTS ATTENDING TRANSMITTAL OF THE DECEMBER 7 DISPATCH

By 11:50 a. m. the handwritten warning had been delivered by Colonel
Bratton to Colonel French, [321] in charge of the message center. When
Colonel Bratton returned, General Marshall inquired as to how much time
would be required to encipher and dispatch the message. Not
understanding the explanation, he instructed both Colonels Bratton and
Bundy to obtain a clearer picture from the message center. These two
officers upon returning advised that the message would be in the hands
of the recipients within thirty minutes. Still not being satisfied,
General Marshall is indicated to have sent the

[315] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Report, pp. 7, 8; committee
record, p. 13806.
[316] See committee exhibit No. 58.
[317] See committee record, p. 5813. The testimony of some witnesses
indicates Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department as early as 9 a.
m.
[318] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 7, 8. Admiral
Stark said: "During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had
information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present
his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at
1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its
presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann)
when General Marshall called me on the phone to ask if I knew of it. I
told him I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the
information concerning the time of presentation on to the various
commanders in the Pacific. *My first answer to him was that we had sent
them so much already that I hesitated to send more*. I hung up the
phone, and not more than a minute or two later I called him back,
stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese
Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and that I would go along with
him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his
communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our
communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He
replied that he felt they could get it through very quickly. I then
asked him to include in the dispatch instructions to his people to
inform their naval opposites" Committee record, p. 5676.
[319] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 21.
[320] Id.
[321] Col Edward F. French.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            225

Two officers back again and their report upon returning was regarded as
satisfactory; that is, he felt assured from what he was told that the
warning would be received by the pertinent commanders before 1:00 p. m.
[322]

After receiving the message Colonel French personally took charge of its
dispatch. Learning that the War Department radio had been out of contact
with Honolulu since approximately 10:20 a. m. he hereupon immediately
decided that the most expeditious manner of getting the message to
Hawaii was by commercial facilities; that is, Western Union to San
Francisco, thence by commercial radio to Honolulu. The message was filed
at the Army signal center at 12:01 a. m. (6:31 a. m., Hawaii); teletype
transmission to Western Union completed at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m.,
Hawaii); received by RCA Honolulu 1:03 p. m. (7:33 a. m., Hawaii);
received by signal office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at approximately 5:15
p. m. (11:45 a. m., Hawaii) after the attack. It appears that the
teletype arrangement between RCA in Honolulu and Fort Shafter was not
operating at the particular hour the message was received with the
result that it was dispatched by a messenger on a bicycle who was
diverted from completing delivery by the first bombing.

CHOICE OF FACILITIES

Colonel French testified that important messages to be transmitted
immediately had previously been sent by commercial means when there was
interference on the Army circuit between Honolulu and the War
Department; that on the morning of December 7 Honolulu appeared to be in
touch with San Francisco; that he had a teletype connection from his
office to the Western Union office in Washington and knew Western Union
had a tube connecting with RCA across the street in San Francisco; that
RCA had 40 kilowatts of power whereas his set had 10 kilowatts; and that
he concluded the fastest means of transmission would be via Western
Union and RCA. He stated that he acted within his authority in deciding
to send the message by commercial means and did not tell General
Marshall how the message was going. [323]

Colonel French stated further that he had not considered using the
telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center; that
it was unsuitable for a classified message, and that, in any event "if
they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals
themselves, Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned." [324]

According to General Marshall, the telephone was not considered as a
means of transmission, or that it may have been considered but would not
have been used, he was quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first;
that if he had thought he could put a telephone call through, he would
have called General MacArthur first, and then would have called

[322] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 8-10,14. There is some
testimony indicating only two trip were made by Colonel Bratton to the
message center.
[323] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 188, 195; Roberts Commission
Record, pp. 1843, 1844, 1846.
[324] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 189-205.

226              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the Panama Canal. He observed that it was important to send the message
in code because it was not known what "one o'clock meant" and that it
might have meant only a termination of diplomatic relations or some
action in southeast Asia. General Marshall pointed out that there was no
secrecy in the telephone and that he was trying to gain time and yet had
to be careful not to "precipitate the whole business" or do anything
which could be construed as an act of war; that it was important not to
disclose to the Japanese our reading of their codes. [325]

With respect to the matter of using Navy radio facilities, Colonel
French stated that the Navy used more power than did the Army and
occasionally the Army asked the Navy to communicate messages but that in
practice they did not use the Navy for expediting traffic to Honolulu.
He considered the possible use of Navy transmission of the warning
message but decided against it since it would have required time to
determine whether the Navy was also having trouble getting through to
Hawaii and the message would have had to be delivered from the Navy at
Pearl Harbor to Fort Shafter. [326]

General Marshall had no knowledge on the morning of December 7 that the
Army radio could not establish contact with Hawaii nor that the Navy had
a more powerful radio to Honolulu. [327] It is to be noted that the
message got through to addressees other than Hawaii prior to the attack.

After the event it is easy to find other means of communication which
General Marshall might have employed. This will always be the case. It
is clear from the record, however, that he selected a secure means
dictated by the contents of the message and was assured after two or
three requests for verification that the message would get through in
adequate time. It did not reach Hawaii because of a failure in
communications concerning which he could not have known and concerning
which he was not advised. It was the failure of communications and not
the selection of an improper channel that occasioned the delay.

While it is not regarded as contributing to the disaster, for reasons
hereinafter to appear, it is considered extremely regrettable that
Colonel French did not advise the Chief of Staff upon his inability to
employ the Army's radio, the anticipated means of communication,
particularly when he realized the great importance of the message and
the-personal concern of the Chief of Staff for its expeditious
transmittal.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "ONE O'CLOCK" AND CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES

No one knew or presumed to know definitely just what the time "one
o'clock" meant. [328] Indeed, the warning sent by the Chief of

[325] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Record, pp. 10-14. See also
Roberts Commission record, p. 1803.
[326] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 203, 204. Roberts Commission
record, p. 1844.
[327] Roberts Commission record, p. 1801.
[328] Admiral Stark observed: "My first reaction was that we had sent so
much out that and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what
it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just
as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion
whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not
to send too much, it might create the story of 'wolf'." Committee
Record, page 5815. In this regard it is to be noted that Admiral Smith,
Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel said that he thought there had been too
much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only
during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral
Richardson. See Hart Inquiry Record, page 64.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             227

Staff stated "*just what significance the hour set may have we do not
know*." Despite this fact the Hawaiian commanders have asserted or
implied that if they had received this information at the earliest
possible moment on the morning of December 7, they would have
anticipated a surprise air attack upon Pearl Harbor and have instituted
appropriate defensive measures accordingly. [329] It is to be noted,
however, that one of the asserted justifications by Admiral Kimmel and
General Short for their not having taken the necessary defensive
measures prior to December 7 was the fact that the warnings they had
received, while indicating that war was imminent, pointed to southeast
Asia and not to Hawaii as the likely point of attack.

There was nothing in the fact that the Japanese ambassadors were to
present their Government's reply to the American note of November 26 at
1 p. m., December 7, pointing any more to an attack on Hawaii than to
any other point to which General Marshall directed is dispatch: Panama,
the west coast, the Philippines. The intelligence contained in the "one
o'clock" intercept indicated no more than the distinct possibility that
*some* Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m.

What Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have done upon receiving
this intelligence or the Marshall dispatch before the attack necessarily
speculative.

Testifying before the Roberts Commission concerning that portion of the
December 7 warning pointing out that instructions had been issued for
the Japanese Embassy to destroy its code machine immediately, General
Short was asked whether his dispositions would have been changed if the
message had reached him, say three hours before he attack. He replied:
[330]

"General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either to
at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone
against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.
"The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would
have stirred you up?
"General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the
other matter was the fact that they had ordered the code machines
destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going
into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that
the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That
would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more
significant than just the ultimatum."

It is to be noted that when appearing before the Roberts Commission,
General Short insisted he had no knowledge concerning the destruction by
Japanese diplomatic representatives of codes and confidential papers,
prior to December 7. As has been seen, the evidence before this
committee reflects that he received substantially this information on
December 6.

Admiral Kimmel has likewise suggested that the fact the Japanese
Washington Embassy had been ordered to destroy its code machine would
have been of greater significance to him than information received on
December 3 that the Embassy, among others, had been ordered to destroy
"most of its codes." [331] With respect to the latter

[329] General Short said: "This message (the one o'clock message)
definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington
time." Committee Record, page 7992.
[330] Roberts Commission record, pp. 1619, 1620.
[331] Committee record, pp. 7476, 7477.

228            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

intelligence Admiral Kimmel has testified: [332] "I didn't consider that
of any vital importance when I received it * * *" Significantly,
however, on December 6 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District
advised the Navy Department: "believe local consul has destroyed all but
one system * * *" [333]

It is concluded that the information contained in the Japanese intercept
of December 7 instructing the Washington Embassy to destroy its
remaining code machine, added little if any information to that already
possessed by Admiral Kimmel concerning Japanese destruction of codes and
confidential matter; and that if the intelligence supplied him in this
regard on December 3 did not serve to warn of the immediate imminence of
war the information concerning the destruction of the Japanese code
machine on the morning of December 7 would not have effectively modified
the situation. In the case of General Short, as elsewhere pointed out,
it appears that while Admiral Kimmel did not supply him with the
intelligence he had received concerning the destruction of codes, the
Commanding General none-the-less received information of an equivalent
character.

We believe, however, that the "one o'clock" intercept should have been
recognized as indicating the distinct possibility that some Japanese
military action would occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7 Washington
time. If properly appreciated, this intercept should have suggested a
dispatch to *all* Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information,
as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.

SIGNIFICANT MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER THE ATTACK

INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING HAWAIIAN DEFENSES

One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the handling of
Magic is the fact that several very significant messages were not
translated until after the attack. After December 7, 13 messages [334]
between Tokyo and Honolulu from November 24 to December 6 were
translated, several of these differing markedly from any of the messages
between these points translated prior to December 7. Three of the 13
messages were from Tokyo, two of which related to instructions and
interest concerning fleet locations and movements [335] with the third,
however, containing for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo concern-

[332] Id., at P. 7477.
[333] The extreme importance of codes being destroyed in the consulates
was expressed by Admiral Ingersoll in his testimony:

"I considered that the information which we received regarding the
destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of
the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval
Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one
being the dispatch stating that, 'this is a war warning' in effect and
that all hope of negotiations had broken off . .  .

"The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes
is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily
have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up
their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture
diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The
consuls stay on.

"Now in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their
diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told
their consuls in Manila, in Hongkong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn
their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations,
*it  meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleet as soon
as we got it* * * *" Committee record, pp. 11286, 11287.
[334] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 16-29.
[335] Id., at pp. 18, 26.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            229

ing the defenses of the fleet in port. The latter message dated December
2 (translated December 30) read: [336]

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships,
airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to
the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case
whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or
if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me
whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets."

The messages translated after December 7 from Honolulu to Tokyo so
reflect for the first time that information relating to the defenses at
Pearl Harbor was being collected and supplied to Japan. In a message of
November 24, Tokyo was advised that on the preceding night five mine
layers had conducted mine-laying operations outside the harbor. [337] A
November 28 message reported, "there are eight 'B-17' planes at Midway
and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?)";
that "12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops
in Honolulu during December or January"; and that "there has usually
been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl
Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." [338]

Of extreme significance are two messages of December 6 (both translated
December 8) one of which reads as follows: [339]

"Re the last part of your #123. [340]

"1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are
considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and
Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been
made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring
equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore,
there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons
is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage
balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they
have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land
runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford,
and Ewa, there are limits in the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. *I
imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places*."

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details
are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."

The other message of December 6 from Honolulu to Tokyo reported, among
other things, "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted
by the fleet air arm." [341]

Also of particular interest is a message from Honolulu on December 3
[342] establishing a "number code" to indicate whether warships of a
given category were preparing to sortie or had departed. A system

[336] Id., at p. 21. This message was transmitted from Hawaii and was
translated by the Army in Washington, the translation bearing the
notation, "This message was received on December 23."
[337] Translated December 16, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No.
2, p 17.
[338] Translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2,
p. 19.
[339] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 27, 28. Army translation. *The record
indicates that this information was taken from matrial published in
newspapers*.
[340] See committee exhibit No 2, p. 21.
[341] Id., p. 29. Army translation.

230            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

of houselights, newspaper want ads and bonfires, in addition to the use
of a sail boat, was designed to indicate the code numbers. While I this
system of communication did not relate to the defenses of Hawaii it was
clearly in anticipation that the normal channels for transmitting
information regarding the movements of the feet might be cut off and
that a visual means of communication, probably to submarines offshore,
was desired. It is also to be noted that no provision was made in the
code for transmitting information concerning the departure of ships
after December 6.

This message was decrypted and translated in rough form on December 6 by
a civilian translator in the Navy Department, it having been received
from a radio intercept station of the Army at Fort Hunt, Va. While
Captain Kramer testified he had no positive recollection of having seen
the translation prior to the attack, the evidence tends to indicate that
the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6
but that on account of the pressure of work on other important
diplomatic messages, including the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14-
part memorandum, no action was taken on the translation until December
8. [343] It is to be noted that this intercept of December 3 was in a
code system referred to as "PA-K2" whereas the important Japanese 14-
part reply which started coming in on the afternoon of December 6 was in
the so-called Purple code system. The Purple was afforded first priority
which, it appears, explains Captain Kramer's not giving undivided
attention to the PA-K2 dispatch of December 3 together with the fact
that this message was badly garbled and the civilian translator who
handled it, while proficient in Japanese, had not as yet had adequate
experience concerning the handling of the intercepted dispatches. [344]

CONSIDERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN TRANSLATIONS

Of the 13 messages between Tokyo and Honolulu intercepted before
December 7 but not translated until after the attack, 5 were transmitted
on or after December 4. The evidence shows that because of technical
difficulties a delay of 3 days in transmitting, decoding, and
translating such messages was not unusual or unreasonable. [345]

[343] Id., pp. 22-24.
[345] See Hewitt Inquiry Record, pp. 588, 589; also pp. 511-515.

*Captain Safford stated that on the week end of December 6, 1941, his
unit handled three times the normal traffic on a busy day *. Navy Court
of Inquiry record, p. 756.
[346] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, pp. 9283,
9284. The December 3 dispatch from the Honolulu consul was obtained by
the district intelligence officer of the Navy in Hawaii and was turned
over on December 5, 1941, to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption
and translation, Being in the more simple PA-K2 system the unit in
Hawaii while capable of breaking the message down did not decrypt and
translate it until after the attack.
[345] In discussing the matter of delays in securing the translations of
the Magic, General Miles stated:

"* * * it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in
Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also
very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of
the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the
same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.

"In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the
few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.

"Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by
which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to
Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in
Washington by air mail.

"So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very
rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington but also the actual
intercepting of the message in the field and the transmission of those
messages to Washington."  Committee record, pp. 2111, 2112.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            231

The same difficulty partially explains the delays ranging from 5 to 9
days in decoding and translating six of the eight messages transmitted
prior to December 4.

Of the remaining two messages, one dated November 24 was not translated
until 20 days after it had been received in Washington. The key in which
this message was transmitted was not recovered until about December 16.
The other is the message from Tokyo, dated December 2, requesting
information as to observation balloons and antimine nets at Pearl
Harbor. A transmission of this message was intercepted by a Navy station
on the west coast on December 2 and was received by the Navy on December
6 by air mail. This version of the intercept text, however, was badly
garbled and the actual decoding and translating was based on a copy
obtained from the Honolulu office of a radio corporation after the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

The two messages transmitted from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6,
reporting the absence of barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and air
reconnaissance, were intercepted by an Army station on the west coast at
7:22 p. m. on December 6 and 12:42 a. m. on December 6, respectively
(Washington time), but were not processed as rapidly as were the
diplomatic messages transmitted from Tokyo to Washington on the same
night. On the basis of experience as to the contents of messages over
particular circuits and in particular codes, the very highest priority
was given to messages between Tokyo and Washington transmitted in the
most secure Japanese code, the so-called Purple, and the "pilot message"
of December 6 had alerted the services to what was coming on the Tokyo-
Washington circuit.

The messages from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 were transmitted in
the PA-K2 code system, a relatively insecure Japanese code and one past
experience had shown was not ordinarily used for messages which Tokyo
considered of the highest importance. The actual content of any message
could not of course be known until it had been decoded and translated,
and before the attack there was no reason to suspect that the two
messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 would prove of
unusual interest. It is to be noted, however, that the low-grade PA-K2
system was virtually the only code available to the Honolulu consul
after he had destroyed his major codes pursuant to instructions from
Tokyo on December 2. [346]

Despite the unfortunate fact that these messages were not processed
prior to December 7, no basis exists for criticizing the system which
was set up for decrypting and translating the intercepted Japanese
messages and for determining the priorities in the processing of the
various classes of messages. The evidence shows that throughout the
period of tense relations between the United States and Japan in 1941,
the important diplomatic messages were intercepted, transmitted to
Washington, decoded and translated, and disseminated with utmost speed.
Not infrequently they were in the hands of the authorized recipients of
Magic in our Government as soon as they were in the

[346] See exhibit No. 1, pp. 215, 216.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            232

hands of the Japanese addressees. Many of the civilian and military
personnel engaged in handling the Magic worked long hours far in excess
of those prescribed with no additional compensation nor special
recognition. *The success achieved in reading the Japanese diplomatic
codes merits the highest commendation and all witnesses familiar with
Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed
enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and
saved many thousands of lives*. [347]

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON WHICH  WAS NOT SUPPLIED HAWAII

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have complained that they were
wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through the
Magic which would have altered completely their estimate of the
situation and would have resulted, if it had been supplied them, in a
proper alert and appropriate dispositions consistent with an adequate
defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. In a prepared statement, read
before the committee, Admiral Kimmel said: [348]

"The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the
receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of
December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a
certain course of action four years ago had he known facts which were
then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the
subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible,
and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then
influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

"Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on
November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected
the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I
would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the West
Coast. I would have gone to sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it
in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the
disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet an attack in the
Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the Fleet fueled, however,
would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time
of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet."

In the last analysis, however, there are only four messages or groups of
messages which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contend pointed to Pearl
Harbor as a likely place of attack; i. e., the harbor berthing plan and
related dispatches, [349] the deadline messages, [350] the dispatches
which indicated the fraudulent nature of Japanese negotiations after
November 28, [350a] and the dispatch specifying 1 p. m., December 7, as
the time for delivery of the Japanese memorandum to the Secretary of
State. [350b]

Referring to the berthing plan (and related dispatches) Admiral Kimmel
said, [350c] "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to

[347] See note 113, supra.
[348] See committee record, pp. 6805, 6806.
[349] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
[350a] See section "Dispatches Indicating Fraudulent Nature of
Negotiations after November 28, 1941," supra.
[350b] See section "Significance of the 'One o'clock' and Code
Destruction Messages," supra.
[350c] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            233

an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Additionally, he has
indicated that the dispatches concerning the deadlines and fraudulent
negotiations [350d] pointed to Pearl Harbor.

During the course of committee examination General Short was asked
whether, "outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into five
divisions," there was any information among the Magic intelligence which
pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other
place. He replied: [350e]

"That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery
of the message was at 1 p. m. Washington time, which would be shortly
after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication."

At another point, referring to the "harbor berthing plan" and the so-
called "one o'clock" message, General Short said, [350f] "I think those
two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor"
and that the other intercepted messages related to the "more tense
situation as it developed."

As heretofore pointed out, we are unable to conclude that the berthing
plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl
Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in
view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [350g] We are of the
opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should
have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to
their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the
Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and
supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding
general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with
other information and intelligence available to them, in making their
estimate of the situation.

We believe that the deadline messages and the messages indicating
fraudulent Japanese diplomacy after November 28 in themselves no more
indicated Hawaii as a likely point of attack than any other point in the
Pacific. The equivalent of this intelligence was supplied Admiral Kimmel
in the dispatch of November 27 beginning, "This dispatch is to be
considered a war warning" and advising, "negotiations with Japan looking
toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." It was
supplied General Short in the November 27 warning, stating, "Japanese
future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

The "one o'clock intercept", as previously indicated, was an unusual
piece of intelligence suggesting the distinct possibility that some

[350d] See committee record, pp. 6791-6793.
[350e] Committee record, pp. 8126, 8127. At another point, when asked if
his thought was that the Magic messages that were not sent Hawaii would
have been more important than the messages he did receive, General Short
said: "There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was
the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the
ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m. which could have been sent to me
4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack.
These two messages would have meant something to me." Committee record,
p. 8201.
[360f] Id., at pp. 8126-8128.
[350g] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.

234            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m. but it
did not reasonably point to Pearl Harbor any more than to any other
place in the Pacific. This intelligence indicated the need for
particular alertness at 1 p. m. to meet the dangers contemplated on the
basis of estimates already made as to where a Japanese attack might
come.

The burden of the statements of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short to
the committee is that Washington withheld vital information from them.
In fact, Admiral Kimmel has charged that the Navy Department's handling
of Magic constituted an affirmative misrepresentation. On the basis of
the evidence before the committee, this charge is without foundation in
fact.

Both Hawaiian commanders all but ignore the fact that they are properly
chargeable with possessing far more vital intelligence indicating an
attack on Hawaii than was in the hands of anyone in the War or Navy
Departments. They had, among other things, correspondence with
Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the
warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio
intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the
report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in
close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese
raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7.
General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance.
Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Army would alert its aircraft warning
service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. From these assumptions
and the estimate and action taken on the basis of information available
to them, it is problematical as to what steps would have been taken by
the Hawaiian commanders had they received all of the intelligence which
they contend was withheld from them.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON

The evidence reflects that virtually everyone in Washington was
surprised Japan struck Pearl Harbor at the time she did. Among the
reasons for this conclusion was the apparent Japanese purpose to move
toward the south the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula; and the
feeling that Hawaii was a near-impregnable fortress that Japan would not
incur the dangers of attacking. The latter consideration necessarily
contemplated that Hawaii was alert and that the enemy would be met with
the full weight of Army and Navy power provided for defense. It is
apparent, however, that an attack on the fleet by Japan at some time was
regarded as a distinct possibility. The warning messages sent the
Hawaiian commanders contained orders requiring defensive measures
against this possibility. Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans in the
Navy Department, is the only officer in Washington in the higher
echelons who indicated a strong belief that Hawaii would be attacked he
testified that he

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              235

regarded such an attack as a "50-50 chance." [351] Asked if he had
gained this impression around December 1 as a result of the Japanese;
ship-location reports, [352] he testified: [353]

"No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy
Department expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department,
expressed by everybody else, that there was a strong possibility that
there would be an attack, a raid, that is, against Hawaii. That was
merely following along the line the Navy officers and Army officers had
been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no change."

When asked why, around November 27, if the Navy felt in this way about
the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor some further
message was not sent suggesting this possibility, Admiral Turner stated:
[354]

"That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November
27 fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of
the 5th of December, after convassing [sic] the situation with officers
in my Division, I went to Admiral Ingersoll's office and we talked for
an hour as to what more the Navy Department could do to warn the forces
in the field, the fleets, what ought to be done, should we send any more
dispatches, or what. We came, both, to the conclusion that everything
had been done covering the entire situation that ought to be done and we
then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question
with him for 15 minutes, and *it was the unanimous decision that the
orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive
deployment were were sufficient*.

"*What was he going to take a defensive deployment against Just one
thing. That the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there."

The foregoing thoughts expressed by Admiral Turner characterized the
feelings of all the ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments:
*that the Hawaiian commanders had been adequately alerted to all
contingencies*. Admiral Stark stated, "We considered we had fully
alerted them (referring to the 'war warning' of November 27) with the
directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves * * * We
felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if

[351] It is to be noted that the record clearly indicates that Admiral
Turner's estimate of a possible attack on Hawaii was not based on any
intelligence which he possessed indicating such an attack but rather on
his personal appraisal of possible Japanese action.

In this connection Captain McCollum said: "I was not surprised at the
Japanese attack, sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that
attack, sir. * * * I do not mean by that statement to imply that I had
any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I
wish to state categorically that there was no bit of intelligence that I
had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicated at the Japanese
would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had * * * for many years felt that in
the event an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan
that the Japanese would make a very finite attempt to strike the fleet
at or near the commencement time of those hostilities." Committee
record, pp. 9259, 9260.

The following committee examination reflects the feeling of Captain
McCollum with respect to a possible Japanese attack on our fleet:
Question: "And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike
with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?"
Captain McCollum: "That is correct."
Question: "The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet."
Captain McCollum: "They not only would do that, but that there was
historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us.
Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia
in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in
1914 was started in that way. * * * Attacking their fleet and timing a
declaration of war on presentation of the final notes." Committee
record, pp. 9275, 9276.
[352] Radio Intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers.
[353] Committee record, p. 5200.
[354] Id., at p 5201.

236            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

war broke, in all theaters." [355] General Marshall said, "In our
opinion the commanders had been alerted." [356] As expressed by Mr.
Stimson: [357]

"We assumed that when he (General Short) had been warned that hostile
action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat
that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was
of course that General Short did receive, not only from Washington but
from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis."

Captain McCollum, who had suggested (not knowing the "war warning" had
been sent) an additional warning dispatch, stated in referring to the
dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on November 27: [358]

"It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a
message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message
containing the information "This is a war warning," indicated clearly
that the Department expected a war to break out there at any moment from
then on.

"* * * I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is
addressed must assume that war is going to break out over his forces and
take the steps necessary to cover it."

The consummate confidence that field commanders were adequately alert on
the basis of dispatches sent them is manifested by the reluctance of
Admiral Stark to dispatch a message based on the "one o'clock
intercept." As stated by General Marshall: "I asked him if he had read
the final message referring to one o'clock. He stated that he had, and I
proposed an immediate message to all theaters concerned. *Admiral Stark
hesitated, because he said (he) had alerted them all and he was afraid
of confusing them further*." [359]

As indicated, the record reflects the judgment of responsible officers
in both the War and Navy Departments that they had fully and I
adequately alerted our military outposts before December 7. [360] We
believe that Admiral Kimmel and General Short received sufficient
information to justify the expectation that they would be fully alert to
the implications of their military responsibilities in Hawaii. In this
connection it is to be noted that all other outpost commanders,
receiving the warning messages of November 27 in substantially the same
form as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short, took full and ample
measures to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the fact that
war was imminent. Hawaii was the *only* outpost that failed to institute
a proper alert.

[355] Id., at pp. 13733, 13747.
[356] Id., at pp. 13792, 13793.
[357] see Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record p. 14398.
[358] Committee record, pp. 9194, 9195, 9281, 9282. McCollum said: "I
had been given to understand that they (the Fleet) had been thoroughly
alerted * * * and on their toes." Committee record, p. 9156.
[359] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pages 7, 8.
[360] General Miles said: "G-2 was charged with the dissemination of
information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's
November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the
initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The
information emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis.

"But these things were known in Hawaii. *That Fortress, like a sentinel
on post had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for
being. Anything else was considered to be redundant*." Committee record,
p. 2216.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            237

NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITIES

In seeking to make an assessment of responsibilities for the Pearl
Harbor disaster, apart from that which is forever Japan's, it is
imperative that the duties and obligations existing in Hawaii be placed
in the proper perspective with respect to those attaching to Washington.
She responsibility of the commander in the field with his well-defined
scope of activity is manifestly to be distinguished from that of the
officer in Washington who is charged with directing the over-all
operations of the military on a global basis.

DUTIES IN HAWAII

It has been a cardinal principle of military theory to select capable
commanders for our outposts, give them broad directives, [361] and leave
to their discretion and good judgment the implementation of the
Departmental mandate consonant with their more intimate and detailed
familiarity with the peculiar problems existing in their particular
commands. [362] Admiral Kimmel and General Short were selected because
of their impeccable records for two of the most important field commands
of the Navy and Army Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department these two officers were
primarily and fundamentally responsible they were the men to whom
Washington and the Nation were properly entitled to look for the defense
of the Hawaiian Coastal frontier.

With respect to Hawaii and the fleet, theirs were the obligations to
plan for war, to train for war, and to be alerted for war when it came.
The first two of these obligations they discharged in an exemplary
[manner but in the case of the third, alertness for war, they failed.
[363] All of the intelligence, thought, and energies of the field
commander are to be devoted to his command. He is to apply all
information and intelligence received to his particular situation. He is
not privileged to think or contemplate that he will not be attacked. On
the contrary, he is to assume and to expect that his particular post
will be attacked. He cannot wholly assume that others will inform him

[361] It is to be recalled, as heretofore pointed out, that Admiral
Kimmel said: "* * * the Department itself is not too well informed as to
the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current
outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by *broad policy and
objective rather than by categorical instructions*." Letter from Admiral
Kimmel to Admiral Stark, dated May 26, 1941. See committee exhibit No.
106.
[361] Referring to the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier, Admiral Turner said: "After reading these splendid plans that
had been sent in by the Commander in Chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval
District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business.
They knew what to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the
rest of us here, because they were the ones that were on the firing
line." Committee record, p. 5211. See also testimony of General Gerow,
committee record, p. 2719.
[362] In striking contrast with the failure to effect adequate readiness
in Hawaii is the manner in which the Russians prepared to meet in June
and July of 1941 the possibility of a Japanese thrust against the Soviet
Union. An intercepted dispatch from Vladivostok to Tokyo on July 3,
1941, stated: "Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval
authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval
preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet *any eventuality*.
However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force
for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. *Evidently the
preparations are intended* for defense against Japan." Committee exhibit
No. 2, p. 125. See also committee record pp. 7509-7512.

238            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

when and where the foe will strike. He is "like a sentinel on duty in
the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. It
is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the
possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of
his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make
the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons
with which he has been supplied." [364]

The commanders in Hawaii were clearly and unmistakably warned of war
with Japan. They were given orders and possessed information that the
entire Pacific area was fraught with danger. They failed to carry out
these orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate responsibilities.
They failed to defend the fortress they commanded-their citadel was
taken by surprise. Aside from any responsibilities that may appear to
rest in Washington, the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure
to engage the Japanese on the morning of December 7 with every weapon at
their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy
commands in Hawaii whose duty it was to meet the enemy against which
they had been warned.

DUTIES IN Washington

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the
Navy had the over-all responsibility for supervision of our military and
naval operations and establishments everywhere, including Hawaii. Theirs
was the obligation of determining that all of the equipment available
was supplied the field commander which would assist him in discharging
his responsibilities. [365] In supplying equipment it was their duty to
consider the demands for material from many quarters in the light of the
commitments and interests of the United States to estimate where the
most dangerous and likely point of enemy attack might be and then to
effect dispositions which in their best judgment most nearly satisfied
the exigencies of the hour. They discharged this duty to the best of
their ability.

They had the duty of alerting our outposts in view of the critical
situation in our relations with Japan in the days before December 7 and
of informing them of probable enemy action. [366] In the dispatch of
November 27, sent Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet, there was outlined what at the time was
regarded and appeared to be the major strategic effort of the enemy. The
Japanese major effort did follow the course outlined in the dispatch.
Pearl Harbor was not known to be a point of Japanese attack but it was
known that such an attack was a possibility and both responsible
commanders in Hawaii were accordingly ordered to take action
contemplated to meet this possibility.

[364] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14406.
[365] See committee record, pp. 2764-2771; 5594, 5595. Also see
committee exhibit No. 42.
[366] Admiral Turner said "My function was to give the major strategic
over all picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that."
Committee record, p. 5074.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           239

The officers in the intelligence and war plans divisions of the War and
Navy Departments handling matters in the Pacific had a *particular*
responsibility with respect to the magic intelligence just as the
Hawaiian commanders had a particular responsibility for the defense f
the fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. It was the duty of these
officers to evaluate and disseminate the magic in the form of estimates,
as originally obtained, or otherwise. This responsibility they failed to
discharge with that his degree of skill and imagination which this
intelligence warranted. [367]

In the case of the War Plans Division of the War Department, once it had
warned General Short of hostilities, issued order in contemplation of
this contingency, and directed him to *report measures taken*, it
thereby assumed responsibility for reviewing the report of action and
advising the commanding general in the event the measures taken by him
were not in accordance with those desired.

While the report submitted by General Short was ambiguous and
disarmingly terse, it was the duty of the War Plans Division through the
exercise of proper supervision to require a reply reflecting with
clarity that there had been satisfactory compliance with the
departmental orders. [368]

Hawaii was but one of many points of concert to General Marshall, the
Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated
by the Chief of Staff, "the only place we had any assurance about was
Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we
had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of
correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one
point." [369] Theirs was the obligation of mapping the strategy of
global war, of advising and counseling the President and others on
military and naval matters, of following and encouraging the progress of
preparation for defense in the event of war, of outlining and justifying
to the Congress the manifold needs of the Army and Navy, of over-all
responsibility for many military and naval outposts and interests, of
disposing and allocating the scanty

[367] As expressed by Mr. Stimson: "A keener and more imaginative
appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy
Departments of the significance of some of the information might have
led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not
think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these
respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind,
however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of
hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation
and information with which the officers were required to deal at the
time of the event." See statement of the Secretary of War with respect
to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
[368] In this connection, however, the marked distinction between the
character of the responsibility resting on the War Plans Division and
that reposing in General Short was expressed by Mr. Stimson:

"It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941 the
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many
theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely be
threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities
then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of
the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to
an attack in that direction, and they were exercising particular care
with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an
entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as
General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and
vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he
has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed be
distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which
he is not responsible." See statement of the Secretary of War with
respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Committee exhibit
No. 157.
[369] Committee record, p. 13793.