INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

60             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"executed with some difficulty, as the attacking planes strafed the crew
as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island
safely Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah. With
cutting tools obtained from the Raleigh a volunteer crew succeeded in
cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman, second class, who had
been entrapped in the void space underneath the dynamo room.

"An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge
is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and
Raleigh were placed, were designated carrier berths and that a carrier
was frequently moored in nearby F-9.

"The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing
just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another
torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.

"It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in
these 4 attacks was 21.

"In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types
of bombs were employed light, medium, and incendiary.

"During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-
inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil
fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with
antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adjacent berth was
endangered seriously by the oil fire.

"The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two
heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California, she had to be
abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer,
the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Tennessee, where he
organized a party of West Virginia survivors to help extinguish the fire
in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the
Tennessee and Ford Island.

"The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at
30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the
various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and
accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.

"Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not
occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in 4 groups were
active during phase I.

"Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All
outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the
battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the
Oklahoma, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the
Pennsylvania, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first
phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking condition; the California was
down by the stern; the Arizona was a flaming ruin; the other battleships
were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.

"Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise,
defensive action on the part of the feet was prompt. All ships
immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns
likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of
less than 5 minutes, practically all battleship and antiaircraft
batteries were firing. The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft
batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers,
although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7
minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.

"During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within
the harbor proper. The destroyer Helm, which had gotten under way just
prior to the attack, was just outside the harbor entrance when, at 8:17
a. m., a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the
entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately
submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8:19 a. m., when the submarine again
surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.

"Phase II: 8:25-8:40 a. m. Lull in Attacks

"This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air
activity continued, although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by
dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15
dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard,
the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, and
various light cruisers and destroyers.

"Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull,
these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under
that heading.

"At 8:32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard
and capsized.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK                61

"During phase II there was still relatively little ship movement within
the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at
7:51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact the
Ward in defensive in sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy
submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the Curtiss and
Tangier, the Monaghan proceeded a high speed and at about 8:43 rammed
the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight.
The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.

"The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower.
This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The
Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At
the same time that the Monaghan got under way, the destroyer Henley
slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan
down the channel.

"Phase III: 8:40-9:15 a m. Horizontal Bomber Attacks

"The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by the appearance
over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which
crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting
serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch
shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame.
According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude
horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor
area.

"During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was hit by a
heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated,
causing a ire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.

"The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship
moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the California
with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with
tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result
of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung
and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.

"Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had
participated n earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase
III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and
cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.

"Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing,
approximately 8 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.

"It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable
damage to the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also
to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.

"During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1
bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck
level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.

"During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these
bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit
squarely by the Curtiss' gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship,
spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of
the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

"Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m.
The Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the
South channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship
was trying to each open water they sent dive bomber after dive bomber
down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she
had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although
her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight
effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to, make a turn
in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.

"Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten
under way at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about
9:40 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.

"Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began
to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 dock. The
Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9, but shortly
thereafter she capsized.

"At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward
Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the
way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.

62               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"Phase IV: 9:15-9:45 Dive Bomber Attacks

"During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing
attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all
probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous
attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal
bomber attacks described in phase III.

"Phase V: 9:45 Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid

"By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading Navy aerial searches,
both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force
retired to its home waters without being contacted by any American
units."

An outline review of the Japanese attack on Army planes and
installations is as follows: [21]

"Hickam Field

"(Army planes at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up
aprons three or four abreast with approximately 10 feet between wing
tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose
of another.)

"First attack (lasting about 10 minutes): At about 7:55 a. m. nine dive
bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and three additional
planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes
later nine additional bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the
southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven more dive bombers attacked the
hangar line from the east.

"Second attack (lasting between 10 and 15 minutes): At about 8:25 a. m.
between six and nine planes attacked the No. 1 Aqua System, [21a] the
technical buildings, and the consolidated barracks. During and
immediately after this bombing attack, Army planes on the parking apron
were attacked with gunfire. About 8:26 a. m. a formation of five or six
planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, possibly
believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area.

"Third attack (lasting about 8 minutes): At 9 a. m. from six to nine
planes attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the
hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed. At about
the same time from seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated
barracks, the parade ground and the post exchange.

"Wheeler Field

"(Army planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of
the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing
tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.)

"First attack (lasting approximately 15 minutes): At 8:02 a. m. 25
planes dive-bombed the hangar lines, machine-gun fire was also employed
during the attack.

"Second attack (lasting less than 5 minutes): At 9 a. m. seven planes
machine-gunned Army planes being taxied to the airdrome.

"Bellows Field

"(The P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals; the
reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater
intervals )

"First attack: At 8:30 a single Japanese fighter machine-gunned the tent
area.

"Second attack (lasting about 15 minutes): At about 9 a. m. nine
fighters machine-gunned the Army planes."

Haleiwa Field was not attacked and after 9:45 a. m. there were no
further attacks on Army installations. The evidence indicates that a
maximum of 105 planes participated in the attacks on the airfields, it
being noted that some of the planes included in this number may have
taken part in more than one attack.

SUBMARINE PHASE

Prior to completion of the surprise attack the advance Japanese
expeditionary force of submarines was under the command of the striking
force commander, Admiral Nagumo. The precise move-

[21] See testimony of Col. Bernard Thielen, Committee Record, pages 104-
111.
[22] A hydrostatic pass for the fuel-pumping system. See committee
record, p. 105.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               63

ments of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed
that most of these units departed from Japanese home waters in late
November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area by way of Kwajalein. A few
of the submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, proceeded directly to
Hawaii. The functions assigned to the submarines in operations order No.
1 were: [22]

(a) Until X-day minus 3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter
important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe
and report on any strong American forces discovered.

(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force
in advance of the movement of that force to insure an undetected
approach.

(c) Until X-day minus 5, the remaining submarines were to surround
Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered
without being observed.

(d) On X-day the submarines in the area were to "observe and attack the
American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel
leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves
out to fight, he will be pursued and attacked."

With orders not to attack until the task force strike was verified, the
force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions on the evening of
December 6 in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor,
five midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet
submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive against
American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the
Pacific Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air raid.
Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines
penetrated into the harbor, discharging its torpedoes harmlessly. None
of the five midget submarines rejoined the Japanese force. [23]

The I-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian area
after the attack and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its
aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain he
status of the American Fleet and installations. In the event of virtual
destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the operation plan
provided that one submarine division or less would be placed between
Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic. At least one submarine
(the I-7) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or bout December 13.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE STRIKING FORCE

Upon completion of the launchings of aircraft at 7:15 a. m., December 7,
the fleet units of the Japanese striking force withdrew at high speed to
the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. And 1:30
p.m., whereupon the force proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure,
arriving on December 23. En route two carriers, two cruisers, and two
destroyers were detached on December 5 to serve as reinforcements for
the Wake Island operation. The

[22] See committee exhibit No. 8.
[23] All midget submarine personnel were prepared for death and none
expected to return alive. Committee exhibit No. 8.

64             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

original plans called for the retiring force to strike at Midway if
possible but this strike was not made, probably because of the
presence of a United States task force south of Midway. [24]

DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF  THE ATTACK

Of the vessels at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, [25]
the following were either sunk or damaged: [26]

Type            Name                        Extent of damage
Battleships     Arizona                     Sunk.
                California                    Do.
                West Virginia                 Do.
                Oklahoma                    Capsized.
                Nevada                      Heavily damaged.
                Maryland                    Damaged.
                Pennsylvania                  Do.
                Tennessee                     Do.
Light Cruisers  Helena                      Heavily damaged.
                Honolulu                    Damaged.
                Raleigh                     Heavily damaged.
Destroyers      Shaw                          Do.
                Cassin                      Heavily damaged (burned).
                Downes                        Do.
Repair Ship     Vestal                      Badly damaged.
Minelayer       Oglala                      Sunk.
Seaplane Tender Curtiss                     Damaged.
Miscellaneous
 Auxiliaries    Utah                        Capsized.
 
The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of
which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven
hundred and forty-nine wounded survived.  None were missing. [26a]

A total of 92 naval planes (including 5 scout planes from the carrier
Enterprise) were lost and an additional 31 planes damaged. [27] At the
Ford Island Naval Air Station one hangar was badly damaged by fire and
another suffered minor damage. A complete hangar, in which planes were
stored, was destroyed at Kaneohe Naval Air Station along with the planes
therein and the seaplane parking area was damaged. At the marine base at
Ewa a considerable amount of damage was suffered by material
installations, machinery tentage, and buildings. Damage at the base to
aircraft was extremely heavy inasmuch as the primary objective was
aircraft on the ground, the attacks being made on individual aircraft by
enemy planes using explosive and incendiary bullets from extremely low
altitudes. [28]

[24] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be separated from the
wide-scale operations of which it was a part. On the evening of December
7, Japanese forces struck Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine Islands, Wake
and, on the morning of December 8, Midway.
[25] The vessels in Pearl Harbor included 8 battleships: 2 heavy
cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 29 destroyers; 5 submarines; 1 gunboat; 8
destroyer minelayers; 1 minelayer; 4 destroyer minesweepers; 6
minesweepers, and 24 auxiliaries. Committee exhibit No. 6.
[26] Units of the Pacific Fleet not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the
attack included: (1) Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, consisting of
one aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, three heavy cruisers, and nine
destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu en route to Pearl Harbor
after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island. (2)
Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton, consisting of one aircraft carrier,
the Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was about 460
miles southeast of Midway en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a
squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. (3) Task Force 3 under Admiral
Wilson Brown, consisting of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer
minesweepers, had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a
new type landing craft. (4) Other units of the fleet were on isolated
missions of one type or another. See testimony of Admiral Inglis,
committee record, pp. 52-55.
[26] See committee exhibit No. 6.
[26a] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 131.
[27] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 128, 135,
136.
[28] See committee exhibit No. 6.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               65

DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE  ATTACK

The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in
action and 360 wounded. [29]

A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action this
figure including aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes
which were subsequently stripped for parts. [30]

In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on Army installations as
reflected by photographic evidence submitted to the committee. [31]

JAPANESE LOSSES

It has been estimated by our own sources, that the Japanese lost a total
of 28 planes, most of them being dive-bombers and torpedo planes, as a
result of Navy action. Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each,
carrying two torpedoes, were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy
action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered. From
reports available it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to
Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. One officer, an ensign, was taken
prisoner when he abandoned the submarine which grounded off Bellows
Field. [32]

General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army
pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire. [33]

Information developed through Japanese sources indicates, however that a
total of only 29 aircraft were lost and all of the 5 midget submarines.

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF LOSSES

As a result of the December 7 attack on Hawaii, military and naval
forces of the United States suffered 3,435 casualties; Japan, less than
100. We lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. We suffered severe damage
to or loss of 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4
miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines. The astoundingly
disproportionate extent of losses marks the greatest military and naval
disaster in our Nation's history. [35] The only compensating feature was
the many acts of personal valor during the attack.

[29] In addition 22 were missing in action, 2 died (nonbattle), 1 was
declared dead (Public Law 490), and 21 died of wounds. Committee exhibit
No. 5.
[30] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130. In a
statement by General Short concerning events and conditions leading up
to the Japanese attack, a total of 128 Army planes are indicated as
having been damaged in the raid. See Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7.
[31] See committee record, p. 130; exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.
[32] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 128.
[33] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 139
[34] Committee exhibit No. 8B.
[35] The Japanese estimate of losses inflicted was: 4 battleships, 1
cruiser, and 2 tankers sunk, 4 battleships heavily damaged; 1 battleship
lightly damaged; and 260 planes destroyed. Committee exhibit No. 8.
[36] In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers
have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest
traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the
behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired. References
to individual valor are replete with such acts as:
(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment
while they themselves needed help.
(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from
flooded compartments.
(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.
(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships
were sinking.
(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off
their own sinking vessels.

For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been
awarded and 60 Navy Crosses. (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee
record, pp. 131, 132.)

On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished
Service Crosses and 66 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for
heroism displayed during the December 7 attack. ( Testimony of Colonel
Thielen, committee record. p. 133.)

66              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

STATE OF READINESS TO MEET THE ATTACK

ATTACK A SURPRISE

The Japanese attack came as an utter surprise to the Army and Navy
commanders in Hawaii. The Army was on an alert against sabotage only
with the planes, which were on 4 hours' notice, lined up side by side as
perfect targets for an attack. The state of readiness aboard naval
vessels was the usual state of readiness for vessels in port. Fifty
percent of the Navy planes were on 4 hours' notice. Although the
Hawaiian forces were completely surprised, two significant events
occurred on the morning of December 7 which indicated a possible attack.

The first indication came at 3:50 a. m. when the United States coastal
minesweeper Condor reported sighting the periscope of a submerged
submarine while approximately 1 3/4 miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor
entrance buoys, an area in which American submarines were prohibited
from operating submerged. [37] The Navy destroyer Ward was informed and,
after instituting a search, sighted the periscope of an unidentified
submarine apparently trailing a target repair ship en route to Honolulu
harbor. This submarine was sunk shortly after 6:45 a. m. No action was
taken apart from dispatching the ready-duty destroyer U. S. S Monaghan
to proceed to sea, to close the net gate to Pearl Harbor, and to attempt
to verify the submarine contact report. The presence of the submarine
was not interpreted as indicating the possibility of an attack on Pearl
Harbor. [38]

The second indication of an attack came at approximately 7:02 a. m.,
December 7, when an Army mobile radar unit detected a large number of
planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3  east of
north. [39] These planes were the Japanese attacking force. The aircraft
warning information center, which closed down at 7 a. m. on the morning
of December 7, was advised of the approaching planes at 7:20 a. m. An
Army lieutenant, whose tour of duty at the information center was for
training and observation and continued until 8 a. m., took the call and
instructed the radar operators in effect to "forget it." His estimate of
the situation appears to have been occasioned by reason of a feeling
that the detected flight was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam
Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were
scheduled to arrive at Hawaii on December 7.

PERSONNEL.

A summarized statement of Navy personnel actually on board ship at the
beginning of the attack is as follows: [40]

                                                      On board
Commanding officers of battleships .................. 5 out of 8.
Commanding officers of cruisers ..................... 6 out of 7.
Commanding officers of destroyers ................... 63 percent.
Damage control officers of battleships .............. 6 out of 8.

[37] See committee exhibit No. 112 p. 96.
[38] See discussion, infra, of the submarine contact on the morning of
December 7.
[39] See committee exhibit No. 155.
[40] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 103.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              67

                                                       On board
Average percentage of officers:
  Battleships (approximate) .......................... 60 to 70 percent.
  Cruisers, battle force (approximate) ............... 65 percent.
  Destroyers, battle force (approximate) ............. 50 percent.
Average percentage of men:
  Battleships ........................................ 95 percent.
  Cruisers, battle force ............................. 98 percent.
  Destroyers, battle force ........................... 85 percent.

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore
installations.

In the case of the Army, a summary report compiled by the Adjutant
General of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of
the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., December
7. [41]

ANTIAIRCRAFT

All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were ship-
based; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time of the
attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned, and
within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and
firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condition;
the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be
negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on
board, except in a few instances where removal was necessary because of
repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready at the guns in accordance
with existing directives. Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire
immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes
practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers
were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4
minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost
immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into
action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10
minutes after the beginning of the attack. [42]

In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and
times at which antiaircraft units were in position: [43]

                                               In position and ready
Regiment                 Battery                       to fire

Sixty-fourth            A (searchlight) at Honolulu      10:00 a.m.
(alerted at 8:15 a.m.)  B (3-inch) at Aiea               10:00 a.m.
                        C (3-inch) at Aliamanu           10:30 a.m.
                        D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu     11:00 a.m.
                        E (searchlight) at Ewa-          (Time not
                           Pearl Harbor                   known)
                        F (3-inch) at Pearl City         11:05 a.m.
                        G (3-inch) at Ahua Point         10:30 a.m.
                        H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver        10:00 a.m.
                        I (37-mm) at Aliamanu            (Known only
                        K (37-mm) at Hickam Field        that batteries
                        L (37-mm) at Hickam Field        were in posi-
                                                         tion before
                                                         11:45 a.m.)
                        M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field       11:55 a.m.
Ninety-seventh          A (searchlight) at Fort 
                           Kamehameha                     8:34 a.m.
(alerted between 7:55   F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha     8:55 a.m.
and 8:10 a.m.).         G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver         8:30 a.m.
                        H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett       10:20 a.m.
Ninety-eighth.          A (searchlight) at Schofield     (Time not
                           Barracks                      known.)
                        B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks  9:55 a.m.
                        C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
                        D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump,
                           south of Ewa                  11:45 a.m.
                        F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
                           Station                        1:15 p.m.
                        G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
                           Station                        1:15 p.m.
                        H (3-inch) at Waipahu High
                           School                         1:30 p.m.

[41] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.
[42] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 5.

68              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

                                               In position and ready
Regiment                 Battery                       to fire

Two Hundred and         A (searchlight) at Ewa           (Time not
Fifty-first                                               known)
                        B (3-inch) at West Loch          11:45 a.m.
                        C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach          11:45 a.m.
                        D (3-inch) at South of Ewa       11:45 a.m.
                        E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard     
                           Pearl Harbor                  12:41 p.m.
                        F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
                           area                          12:30 p.m.
                        G (37-mm) at tank farm,
                           Schofield Barracks            11:00 a.m.
                        H (37-mm) at Navy Yard           12:05 p.m.

One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack
started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting
down two enemy planes at that time.

The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries,
27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in
several instances not for a considerable period of time after the
attack.

The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears
to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into
position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the
mobile batteries. [44]

AIRCRAFT

Seven Navy patrol flying boats were in the air at the time of the
attack. Three of these planes were engaged in a routine search of the
fleet operating area approximately 120 miles south of Oahu and the
remaining four were engaged in inter-type tactical exercises with United
States submarines near Lahaina Roads. Eight Scout bombers that had been
launched from the carrier Enterprise, which was 200 miles west of Pearl
Harbor at the time of the attack, for the purpose of searching ahead of
the ship and then landing at Ewa, arrived during the attack and engaged
Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed after the attack while
the remaining five were lost. [45] The majority of the Navy planes were
on 4 hours' notice. [46]

In the case of the Army, planes were generally on 4 hours' notice.
Between 25 and 35 planes, these being fighters, took off after the
attack began and before it was concluded. [47]

ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK

An effort was made in the course of and after the attack, through
planes already in the air and those that could get into the air during

[44] Colonel Thielen stated "* * * only a limited amount of ammunition
was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast
Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn,
ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft.
However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order
to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for
the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater
and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the Twenty-
fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine gun
and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and
mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots principally at
Schofield Barracks." Committee record, pp. 119, 120.

The situation with respect to artillery ammunition was testified to by
General Burgin as follows: "They were all ready to go into action
immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have
the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries
bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on
that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take
this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery
positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however,
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the
mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or
may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The
mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to
that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to
their field position. They were not in field positions." Roberts
Commission Record, pp. 2604-2605.
[45] See committee record, pp. 71, 72.
[46] Admiral Bellinger stated that of 69 patrol planes at Oahu, 2 were
on 15-minute notice, 8 on 30 minute notice, 9 were undergoing repairs,
and 42 were on 4 hours' notice. Committee record, p. 9303.
[47] See committee exhibit No. 5.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             69

and following the attack, to locate the Japanese carrier force but to no
avail. The attacking planes withdrew and were recovered by the fleet
units without the latter being detected.

While it appears some planes under Navy direction were assigned to
search the sector to the north of Oahu, generally regarded as the
dangerous sector from the standpoint of an air attack, they were
diverted to the southwest by reason of a false report that the Japanese
carriers were in that direction. [48]
 
The deplorable feature of the action following the attack was the
failure of the Navy and Army to coordinate their efforts through
intelligence at hand. The same Army radar unit that had tracked the
Japanese force in, plotted it back out to the north. [49] Yet this vital
information, which would have made possible an effective search, was
employed by neither service. [50]

DEFENSIVE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF THE NAVY AT HAWAII

The principal vessels in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were 8
battleships, 8 cruisers, and 29 destroyers. Inasmuch as there were no
naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the time
of the Japanese attack, these warships provided the chief antiaircraft
defense. The ship-based antiaircraft batteries totaled 780 guns, 427 of
which had an effective range of from 500 to 2,500 yards and the
remainder from 5,000 to 12,000 yards. [51]

The Navy is indicated to have had a total of 169 planes at Hawaii prior
to the attack, 71 of which were patrol bombers and 15 fighter planes.
[52] It is to be noted, however, that Admiral Bellinger in a report to
Admiral Kimmel on December 19, 1941, concerning the viability and
disposition of patrol planes on the morning of December 7 indicated 69
patrol planes as being at Hawaii. His tabulation was as follows: [63]

             In commis-  Top available  Under repair Ready at  In air
                 sion     for flight                  base
At Kaneohe      36           33            3           30          3
At Pearl        33           28            5           24          4
At Midway       12           11            1            4          7
                --           --           --           --         --
Total           81           72            9           58         14

It thus appears that a total of 61 patrol planes were available for
flight as of December 7. Fifty-four of the patrol planes were new PBY-
5's that had been recently ferried to Hawaii between October 28 and
November 23, 1941. Admiral Bellinger indicated that the new

[48] Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said he did not
get the information as to the probable location from which the Japanese
carriers launched the attack for some 2 days. There was a great deal of
confusion including false civilian reports of troop parachute landings
and a false report from one of own planes concerning an enemy carrier to
the south. A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriers was
taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7 but was not shown
the Navy until the afternoon. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 564.
 
With further respect to the confusion that prevailed, Captain Rochefort
stated that when the attack began his communications unit at Pearl
Harbor lost all contact with the "direction finder" stations, located at
Lualualei and Aiea, and that in consequence no bearings on the attacking
Japanese force were received by his unit. He commented that the failure
of communications was the result of an accident, caused by Army
personnel setting up new circuits. See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 63,
64.
[49] See committee exhibit No. 155 for original radar plot of Opana
station, December 7, 1941.
[50] Admiral Kitts said that on December 8 while in conference with
General Davidson he was shown a plot showing planes coming in to Oahu
and going out again. This plot was not reported to the Navy until Kitts
saw it on December 8. See Hewitt inquiry record, p. 520.
[51] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 122.
[52] See committee exhibit No. 6.
[53] See committee exhibit No. 120

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