| PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               
      73 
 PART III
 
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
 
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      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
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 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               
      75
 
 PART III. RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER 
      FROM AIR ATTACK
 
 ADMIRAL 
      KIMMEL'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
 
 The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with
 virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at
 a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. [1]
 One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure
 to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in
 sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or
 minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the
 defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question
 therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the
 circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been
 surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to
 employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the
 morning of December 7, 1941? [2]
 
 The estimate of both Admirals Richardson [3] and Kimmel [4] in a letter
 which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval
 Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the
 war or committed an overt act against the United States our position
 would be primarily defensive in the Pacific. [5] There were outlined in
 the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific
 Fleet would be predicated, including:
 
 "(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan
 imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may
 take any form even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian
 flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be
 considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected
 against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on
 Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. "
 
 It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with
 respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security
 
 [1] See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra.
 [2] The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on
 December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was
 being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the
 antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with
 the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a
 distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were
 parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet
 was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which
 included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and
 Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near
 the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat
 divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent
 quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in
 close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them
 easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made
 the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full
 advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee
 Exhibit No. 157
 [3] Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as
 commander in chief of the Pacific.
 [4] Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States
 Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until
 December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral
 Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his
 selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for
 the position of commander in chief.
 [5] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70.
 
 76             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter
 there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies
 in the defenses of Oahu.
 
 Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a
 communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the
 commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the
 Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: [6]
 
 "The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of
 the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the
 Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This
 reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of
 the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of
 successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases.
 *If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
 hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
 the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.*
 
 "In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the
 Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be
 done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to
 withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.
 
 "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
 considered to be:
 
 "(1) Air bombing attack.
 "(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
 "(3) Sabotage.
 "(4) Submarine attack.
 "(5) Mining.
 "(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
 
 "Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have
 been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted
 principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2)
 above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.
 
 "Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out
 successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other
 operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at
 twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be
 launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.
 
 "The counter measures to be considered are:
 
 "(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
 before air attack can be launched;
 "(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
 objectives;
 "(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire
 "(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
 "(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
 
 "The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but,
 quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack
 initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft
 in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the
 operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
 aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and
 equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire
 control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on
 visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to
 four miles. * * *"
 
 The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he
 assumed command. [7]
 
 The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the
 Secretary of Navy in the following terms: [8]
 
 "1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility
 of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I
 wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter
 and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a
 hostile effort. The Hawaiian
 
 [6] Committee Exhibit No. 10.
 [7] Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary
 of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in
 February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286.
 [8] Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      77
 
 Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and
 continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected
 defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the
 Fleet.
 
 "2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight
 pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes,
 nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less
 efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes
 assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days,
 as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit
 group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat
 less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit
 planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be
 assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to
 Hawaii.
 
 "3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA
 guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber
 .50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch
 guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight
 caliber .50 AA machine guns.
 
 "4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment
 therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All
 arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the
 equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery
 of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.
 
 "5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to
 give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of
 balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base
 facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for
 installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941.
 At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured
 forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The
 Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred
 and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu
 is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and
 geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke
 impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the
 Commanding General will look into this matter again.
 
 "6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am
 forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding
 General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the
 local naval authorities in making those measures effective."
 
 In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, [9]
 Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of
 Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the
 highest priority.
 
 It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the
 Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch
 dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific
 Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored
 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": [10]
 
 "1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27
 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State
 Department to the following effect:
 
 " "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has
 heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event
 of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the
 Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all
 of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian
 Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered
 them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of
 my staff."
 
 "2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these
 rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present
 disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move
 against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable
 future.
 
 [9] Committee exhibit No. 106.
 [10] This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now
 Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941.  See committee exhibit 
      No.
 15.
 
 78             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian
 Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl
 Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24
 were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are
 in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an
 estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise
 attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and
 employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to
 the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future
 conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted
 by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief
 of Naval Operations he said: [11]
 
 "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl
 Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to
 minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force
 will pay."
 
 In a letter of February 15, 1941 [12] the Chief of Naval Operations
 wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection
 against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the
 congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited
 the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the
 letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited
 the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet
 might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes
 and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar
 communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth
 Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and
 comments concerning the matter. [13]
 
 In a letter of March 20, [14] Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the
 depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among
 others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in
 agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient
 net was developed. [15]
 
 However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a
 communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: [16]
 
 "1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and
 to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for
 the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their
 respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph
 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T
 baffles among which the following was stated:
 
 " "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to
 successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of
 torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this
 may be altered."
 
 "2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British
 torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three
 hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less
 than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it
 cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe
 when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a
 sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
 
 "3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be
 anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo-
 plane attack, it may
 
 [11] Committee exhibit No. 106.
 [12] Id., No. 116.
 [13] Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941.
 Committee exhibit No. 116.
 [14] See Committee exhibit No. 116.
 [15] Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12,1941,
 Committee exhibit No. 116
 [16] Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to
 commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This
 communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter
 of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain
 limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      79
 
 be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by
 any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10
 fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely.
 
 "4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at
 Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water,
 although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve
 fathoms. [17]"
 
 The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views
 concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack
 were in error.
 
 Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in
 June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers
 to the feet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the
 harbor, and similar matters. [18]
 
 GENERAL 
      SHORT'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
 
 On February 7, 1941, General Short [19] assumed command of the Hawaiian
 Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of
 conversations with General Herron, [20] his predecessor, with respect to
 problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had
 been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an
 alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid. [21] This alert was an all-
 out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It
 was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some
 time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the
 ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the
 plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide
 in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy
 attack.
 
 General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated
 January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set
 forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the
 air. [22]
 
 Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to
 General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility
 of General Short in his new command. [23] This letter, which referred to
 a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for
 additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for
 the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the
 Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid
 by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation;
 and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first
 concern is to protect the feet.
 
 On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall [24] pointing
 out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with
 the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair,
 maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the
 
 [16a] A fathom is 6 feet.
 [17] The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval
 Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light-
 weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116.
 [18] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.
 [19] Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the
 Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.
 [20] Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron.
 [21] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215.
 [22] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237.
 [23] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.
 [24] Id., at pp. 4-9.
 
 
 80               
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to
 searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as
 command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief
 of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the
 important needs of the Department.
 
 On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25]
 
 "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
 Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment
 of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
 is a matter of first priority."
 
 In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General
 Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the
 defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction
 and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short
 again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of
 aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense.
 A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference
 to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction
 of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in
 protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the
 proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of
 arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.
 
 On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows:
 [29]
 
 "Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are
 making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following
 agreements made with them: [30]
 
 "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
 Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security
 Measure.
 
 "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
 Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above
 agreement.
 
 "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the
 Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
 
 "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and
 we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army
 and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the
 situation requires.
 
 "We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the
 air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at
 something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the
 more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up
 an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was
 considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not
 necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and
 General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.
 
 "Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal
 to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much
 encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall
 write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will
 interest you."
 
 In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made
 the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent
 maneuvers: [31]
 
 "The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted
 of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer
 Supplies for Field
 
 [25] Id., at p. 10.
 [26] Id., at pp. 11, 12.
 [27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17.
 [28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.
 [29] Id., at pp. 19, 20
 [30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier",
 infra.
 [31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      81
 
 Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers
 acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons
 and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea.
 The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol
 planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers
 and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers
 represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to
 attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our
 bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were
 dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I
 believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy
 Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise."
 
 On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short
 setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for
 the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:
 
 "I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance
 of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly,
 will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the
 efficiency of such defense. [32]"
 
 The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to
 General Short: [33]
 
 "The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian
 Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am
 particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For
 instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the
 mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu
 against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional
 battalion of 500 men for military police duty.
 
 "*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air
 strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum
 operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of
 fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base
 defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two
 antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving
 the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at
 locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as
 there are in Hawaii."
 
 On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that
 he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground
 defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the
 best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps
 training until they have completed their expansion program and have
 their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned.
 [35]
 
 From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General
 Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet
 from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up
 the defense against air attack.
 
 PLANS FOR THE 
      DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER
 
 There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding
 of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in
 the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of
 the Hawaiian coastal frontier.
 
 [32] Id., at pp. 40, 41.
 [31] Id., at p. 42.
 [34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on
 October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating
 Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details
 and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and
 organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no
 assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the
 assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers.
 Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground
 attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See
 committee exhibit No. 53.
 [35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45.
 
 82             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This
 category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major
 attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the
 basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the
 formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the
 following with respect to category D: [36]
 
 "Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this
 category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
 the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
 operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
 defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a
 more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C
 (coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor
 attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea
 areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-
 gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be
 organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to
 facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be
 developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of
 operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans
 made for use of the GHQ air force."
 
 As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under
 contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of
 Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38]
 
 "* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured.
 This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted
 as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its
 bases * * *. "
 
 The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense
 was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941.
 Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of
 sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As
 Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor
 [39]
 
 "There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and
 longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be
 continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved
 readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more
 effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained,
 will permit.
 
 "Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation
 for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans
 must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to
 provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that
 are *now* available.
 
 "A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing
 is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor
 defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much
 remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect.
 Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make
 arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they
 now are."
 
 In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early
 in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
 Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on
 April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the
 Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint
 
 [36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry
 exhibit No. 6.
 [37] Id.
 [38] Id., at p. 42.
 [39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet
 personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512.
 [40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit
 No. 7.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      83
 
 Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on
 which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and
 mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the
 plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities
 wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and
 if the method of unity of command were invoked.
 
 Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the
 Army and Navy were recognized:
 
 "a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to
 control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
 
 "b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air
 forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
 
 "c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
 shipping therein; to support the Army forces."
 
 One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of
 responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of
 the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth
 Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*."
 
 On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint
 Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General
 Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures
 and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement
 was entered into                         
      [
 
 "in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
 Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile
 raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before
 a general mobilization for war."
 
 It was recognized that
 
 "*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
 Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District)
 *agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently
 imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such
 preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to
 the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as
 the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
 conducted * * *"
 
 Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under
 the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient
 for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were
 made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of
 the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the
 installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of
 radar.
 
 On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense
 Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a
 joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of
 sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
 The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43]
 
 (1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained;
 uncertain, and varying.
 
 (2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration
 of war.
 
 [41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5.
 [42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.
 [43] See committee exhibit No. 44.
 
 84            PEARL 
      HARBOR ATTACK
 
 (3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations
 on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the
 Western Pacific for a long period.
 
 (4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating
 areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or
 submarine force which initiates hostile action.
 
 (5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast
 raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from
 our intelligence service.
 
 The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among
 other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
 submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
 supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet
 would be when several of the above elements were present and closely
 coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii
 were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a
 patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese
 carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was
 elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run
 daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360  but that 
      this
 could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and
 material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not
 therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a
 surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44]
 
 The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin-
 Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred:
 [45]
 
 "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
 "1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
 "2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
 Harbor.
 "3. A combination of these two.
 
 "(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
 OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an
 attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which
 would probably approach inside of 300 miles.
 
 "(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more
 submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft
 have been drawn away by the original thrust.
 
 "(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a
 considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast
 ships accompanied by a carrier.
 
 "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be
 delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be
 using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
 pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a
 diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The
 major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and
 attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the
 carrier could use the night for escape
 
 [44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral
 Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan
 was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this
 decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic
 deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*"
 
 This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number
 of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was
 increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared.
 As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu
 to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time
 after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will
 be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger
 and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in
 contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number
 of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased
 before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120.
 [45] Committee exhibit No. 44.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      85
 
 and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a
 successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the
 day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under
 the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for
 until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive
 action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
 Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of
 the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
 certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
 attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better
 chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be
 coordinated with any air attack."
 
 Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the
 Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in
 operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised
 form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two
 assumptions, one being  [47]
 
 "That a declaration of war may be preceded by
 "(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.
 "(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
 "(3) A combination of these two."
 
 Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if
 submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out
 
 "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the
 presence of more submarines waiting to attack "
 
 that
 
 "it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate
 the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
 ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must,
 therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and
 daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet
 enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."
 
 A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air
 Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through
 General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of
 long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several
 observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48]
 
 "The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
 hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of
 Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an
 attack on Oahu.
 
 *     *     *     
      *     *     *     
      *
 
 "Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of
 six carriers against Oahu.
 
 *     *     *     
      *     *     *     
      *
 
 "* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action
 open to the enemy.
 
 *     *     *     
      *     *     *     
      *
 
 [46] Id.
 [47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the
 fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war
 may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see
 committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on
 ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement.  Admiral 
      Kimmel
 replied:
 
 "*An airplane attack.  This was an assumption upon which to base our
 training.  The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
 sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.*  I felt, 
      as
 the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor,
 and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the
 installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted.  I thought it was 
      much
 more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the
 Fleet were away than if it were there.  However, at no time did I
 consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence
 would make us guard against."  See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 
      287.
 [48] See committee exhibit No. 13.
 
 86             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 "It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is
 highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover
 of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable.
 This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following
 reasons:
 
 "(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical
 method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
 
 "(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at
 close at range.
 
 "(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a
 successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He
 will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably
 make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept
 his losses if his attack is successful.
 
 *           *         
      *        *         
      *         *         
      *
 
 "The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
 upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning
 attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
 
 "(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
 the attack.
 "(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before
 the attack.
 "(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
 the attack.
 "(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the
 day of the attack
 
 *           *         
      *        *         
      *         *         
      *
 
 "He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
 "a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
 "b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian
 materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of
 detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable
 avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0  (due north)
 counterclockwise to 180  around Oahu, the next probable*, the 
      quadrant
 180  counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90  to 0 ."
 
 Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the
 provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans
 effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in
 their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent
 a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of
 their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan
 designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual
 attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear
 that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative
 when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval
 base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
 is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally
 clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet
 and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint
 defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
 delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
 mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in
 Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in
 
 [49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he
 (Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance,
 because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl
 Harbor Board Record, p 1753.
 
 He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft
 available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any."
 Id.
 [50] Committee exhibit No. 44.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK                 
      87
 
 Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a
 responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51]
 
 From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is
 inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated
 the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared
 detailed arrangements to meet this threat.
 
 CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE 
      PACIFIC
 
 It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff
 conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of
 Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by
 which the armed forces of the United States and the British
 Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers
 allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to
 war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and
 referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles
 governing contemplated action, including: [53]
 
 "Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the
 Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The
 principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater,
 and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be
 conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."
 
 In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European
 area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military
 operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54]
 
 "Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
 Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to
 deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese
 intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the
 Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to
 its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United
 States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
 Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier
 by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States
 intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas
 that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the
 necessary forces for the Far East."
 
 Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and
 Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5," which
 was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the
 Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States
 Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific
 Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This
 
 [51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the
 following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the
 preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of
 any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are
 submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington
 and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from
 that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their
 creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the
 local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans
 for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked
 out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval
 authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and
 the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting
 into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
 demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report
 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.
 [52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part
 IV, infra, this report.
 [53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5.
 [54] Id., at pp. 5, 6.
 [55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred
 to as "WPL-46."
 
 88                 
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five)
 insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were
 concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September
 9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States
 Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military
 efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European
 areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to
 facilitate that effort.
 
 In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among
 other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be
 toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other
 outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces
 widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area."
 One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated
 by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against
 surprise attack by Japan."
 
 Under phase IA (initial tasks Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among
 other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the
 Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was
 "to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the
 Marshall Island area."
 
 From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest
 protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major
 consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily
 that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the
 fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in
 harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian
 Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it
 possible for the Army to execute its primary mission.
 
 CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
 
 Considering all of the information made available to the commanding
 officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming
 command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General
 Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked
 the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest
 peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to
 provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack
 was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible
 officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal
 declaration of war.
 
 It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the
 Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early
 stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged
 for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in
 character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were
 engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.
 
 [56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet
 Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)."
 [57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3
 [58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent
 naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is
 expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within
 whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the
 base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of
 Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      89
 
 The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and
 General Short, through information available to them, were adequately
 informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to
 contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense
 of the fleet and the fleet base.
 
 INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
 IMMINENCE OF WAR
 
 In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set
 forth the following comments in a postscript: [59]
 
 "I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI
 considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-
 Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that
 Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of
 information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed
 anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to
 keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on
 subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix
 that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"
 
 In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval
 Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander
 in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign
 nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the
 United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese
 merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could
 be issued more frequently.
 
 On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of
 a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the
 possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the
 "southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum
 for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the
 situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed
 Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the
 United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and
 Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and
 Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for
 attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use
 against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could
 tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major
 move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the
 British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take
 on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to
 war with the United States at all.
 
 The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he
 Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval
 districts: [61]
 
 PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT
 BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS
 OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES
 
 [59]Committee exhibit No. 106.
 [60] Id.
 [61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1.
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