INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

80               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to
searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as
command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief
of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the
important needs of the Department.

On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25]

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment
of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
is a matter of first priority."

In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General
Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction
and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short
again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of
aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense.
A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference
to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction
of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in
protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the
proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of
arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.

On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows:
[29]

"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are
making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following
agreements made with them: [30]

"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security
Measure.

"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above
agreement.

"3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the
Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army
and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the
situation requires.

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the
air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at
something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the
more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up
an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was
considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not
necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and
General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.

"Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal
to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much
encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall
write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will
interest you."

In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made
the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent
maneuvers: [31]

"The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted
of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer
Supplies for Field

[25] Id., at p. 10.
[26] Id., at pp. 11, 12.
[27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17.
[28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.
[29] Id., at pp. 19, 20
[30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier",
infra.
[31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             81

Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers
acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons
and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea.
The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol
planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers
and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers
represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to
attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our
bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were
dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I
believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy
Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise."

On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short
setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for
the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:

"I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance
of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly,
will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the
efficiency of such defense. [32]"

The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to
General Short: [33]

"The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian
Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am
particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For
instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the
mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu
against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional
battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

"*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air
strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum
operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of
fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base
defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two
antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving
the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at
locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as
there are in Hawaii."

On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that
he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground
defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the
best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps
training until they have completed their expansion program and have
their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned.
[35]

From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General
Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet
from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up
the defense against air attack.

PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding
of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in
the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of
the Hawaiian coastal frontier.

[32] Id., at pp. 40, 41.
[31] Id., at p. 42.
[34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on
October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating
Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details
and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and
organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no
assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the
assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers.
Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground
attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See
committee exhibit No. 53.
[35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45.

82             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This
category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major
attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the
basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the
formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the
following with respect to category D: [36]

"Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this
category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a
more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C
(coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor
attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea
areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-
gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be
organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to
facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be
developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of
operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans
made for use of the GHQ air force."

As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under
contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of
Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38]

"* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured.
This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted
as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its
bases * * *. "

The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense
was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941.
Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of
sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As
Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor 
[39]

"There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and
longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be
continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved
readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more
effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained,
will permit.

"Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation
for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans
must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to
provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that
are *now* available.

"A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing
is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor
defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much
remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect.
Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make
arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they
now are."

In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early
in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on
April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint

[36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry
exhibit No. 6.
[37] Id.
[38] Id., at p. 42.
[39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet
personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512.
[40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit
No. 7.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             83

Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on
which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and
mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the
plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities
wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and
if the method of unity of command were invoked.

Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the
Army and Navy were recognized:

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to
control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air
forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
shipping therein; to support the Army forces."

One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of
responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of
the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*."

On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General
Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures
and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement
was entered into                         [

"in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before
a general mobilization for war."

It was recognized that

"*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District)
*agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently
imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such
preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to
the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as
the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted * * *"

Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under
the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient
for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were
made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of
the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the
installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of
radar.

On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense
Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a
joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of
sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43]

(1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained;
uncertain, and varying.

(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration
of war.

[41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5.
[42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 44.

84            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations
on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the
Western Pacific for a long period.

(4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating
areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or
submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from
our intelligence service.

The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among
other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet
would be when several of the above elements were present and closely
coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii
were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a
patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese
carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was
elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run
daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360  but that this
could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and
material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not
therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a
surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44]

The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin-
Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred:
[45]

"(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
"1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
"2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
"3. A combination of these two.

"(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an
attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which
would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

"(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more
submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft
have been drawn away by the original thrust.

"(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a
considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier.

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be
delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be
using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a
diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The
major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and
attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the
carrier could use the night for escape

[44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral
Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan
was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this
decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic
deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*"

This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number
of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was
increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared.
As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu
to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time
after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will
be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger
and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in
contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number
of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased
before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120.
[45] Committee exhibit No. 44.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             85

and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a
successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the
day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under
the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for
until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive
action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of
the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better
chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be
coordinated with any air attack."

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the
Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in
operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised
form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two
assumptions, one being  [47]

"That a declaration of war may be preceded by 
"(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.
"(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
"(3) A combination of these two."

Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if
submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out 

"It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the
presence of more submarines waiting to attack "

that

"it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must,
therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and
daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet
enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air
Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through
General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of
long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several
observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48]

"The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of
Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an
attack on Oahu.

*     *     *     *     *     *     *

"Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of
six carriers against Oahu.

*     *     *     *     *     *     *

"* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action
open to the enemy.

*     *     *     *     *     *     *

[46] Id.
[47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the
fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war
may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see
committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement.  Admiral Kimmel
replied:

"*An airplane attack.  This was an assumption upon which to base our
training.  The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.*  I felt, as
the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor,
and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the
installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted.  I thought it was much
more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the
Fleet were away than if it were there.  However, at no time did I
consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence
would make us guard against."  See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287.
[48] See committee exhibit No. 13.

86             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is
highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover
of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable.
This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following
reasons:

"(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical
method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.

"(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at
close at range.

"(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a
successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He
will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably
make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept
his losses if his attack is successful.

*           *         *        *         *         *         *

"The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning
attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

"(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
the attack.
"(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before
the attack.
"(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
the attack.
"(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the
day of the attack

*           *         *        *         *         *         *

"He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
"a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
"b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian
materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of
detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable
avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0  (due north)
counterclockwise to 180  around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant
180  counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90  to 0 ."

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the
provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans
effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in
their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent
a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of
their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan
designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual
attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear
that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative
when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval
base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally
clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet
and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint
defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in
Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in

[49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he
(Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance,
because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl
Harbor Board Record, p 1753.

He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft
available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any."
Id.
[50] Committee exhibit No. 44.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK                 87

Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a
responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51]

From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is
inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated
the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared
detailed arrangements to meet this threat.

CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff
conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of
Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by
which the armed forces of the United States and the British
Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers
allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to
war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and
referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles
governing contemplated action, including: [53]

"Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the
Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The
principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater,
and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be
conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."

In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European
area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military
operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54]

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to
deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese
intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the
Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to
its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United
States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier
by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States
intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas
that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the
necessary forces for the Far East."

Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and
Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5," which
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the
Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific
Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This

[51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the
following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the
preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of
any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are
submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington
and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from
that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their
creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the
local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans
for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked
out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval
authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and
the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting
into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.
[52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part
IV, infra, this report.
[53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5.
[54] Id., at pp. 5, 6.
[55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred
to as "WPL-46."

88                 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five)
insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were
concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September
9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military
efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European
areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to
facilitate that effort.

In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among
other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be
toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other
outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces
widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area."
One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated
by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against
surprise attack by Japan."

Under phase IA (initial tasks Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among
other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the
Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was
"to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the
Marshall Island area."

From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest
protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major
consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily
that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the
fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in
harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian
Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it
possible for the Army to execute its primary mission.

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK

Considering all of the information made available to the commanding
officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming
command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General
Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked
the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest
peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to
provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack
was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible
officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal
declaration of war.

It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the
Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early
stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged
for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in
character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were
engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.

[56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)."
[57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3
[58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent
naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is
expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within
whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the
base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of
Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             89

The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, through information available to them, were adequately
informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to
contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense
of the fleet and the fleet base.

INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR

In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set
forth the following comments in a postscript: [59]

"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI
considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-
Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that
Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of
information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed
anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to
keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on
subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix
that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"

In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval
Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign
nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the
United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese
merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could
be issued more frequently.

On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of
a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the
possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the
"southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum
for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the
situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed
Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the
United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and
Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and
Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for
attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use
against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could
tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major
move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the
British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take
on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to
war with the United States at all.

The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he
Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval
districts: [61]

PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT
BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS
OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES

[59]Committee exhibit No. 106.
[60] Id.
[61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1.

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