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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation  to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He  was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be  shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. 

 "3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made  (copy attached) (ex. 45)."

In his prepared statement submitted to the Committee, Secretary Stimson  stated that at the meeting with General Gerow and Admiral Stark,  

"I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time  but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or  of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on  our part (tr. 14, 394)."

General Marshall summed up his viewpoint and that of Secretary Stimson  in his testimony before the committee: 

"He (Secretary Stimson) was very much afraid he feared that we would  find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our  disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when  the Japanese actually broke peace. 

"He also felt very keenly that; and thought about this part a great deal  more than I did because it was his particular phase of the matter, that  we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to  sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that. 

"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I  was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we  would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular  time. 

"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will  say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which  allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a  hopeless situation before the peace was broken and mine, which as I say  were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we  should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible  deficiencies in our defensive arrangements (tr. 13,820-13,821)."

The memorandum for President Roosevelt, although dated November 27  (Washington time), was signed by General Marshall upon his return to Washington on November 28 (Washington time), with the minor changes  suggested by Secretary Stimson, and was as follows:    

"Memorandum for the President 

"Subject: Far Eastern Situation. 

"If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack:  the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the  Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

"There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the  Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent  Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward. 

"The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct  attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat  exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.  

"Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives  involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly  within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the  Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful,  the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of  Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to  operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies; might relieve  internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic  pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road,  Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast. 

"The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to  gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to  the 

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Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The  process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate  concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000  are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is  important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before  hostilities commence. 

"Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long  as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more  positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval  and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered  and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands.  War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to  Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China. 

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch  military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military  counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan  attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the  United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies,  or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100o east or  south of 10o north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty  Islands. 

"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is  advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of  communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a  Japanese advance to the west of 100o east or south of 10o north,  immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent  that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might  lead to immediate hostilities should be taken. 

"It is recommended that: 

"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military  counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens  United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;  

"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the  United States, the British and the Dutch governments that advance beyond  the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;* 

"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and  Dutch for the issuance of such warning.*

"[S] G. C. MARSHALL
"[S] H. R. STARK (ex. 17)."

Before the meeting at the White House at 2 p. M. On November 27  (Washington time), Secretary Hull conferred briefly alone with President  Roosevelt (ex. 58). When the two Japanese Ambassadors arrived,  Ambassador Nomura seized the first opportunity to say that they were  disappointed over the failure of any agreement for a modus vivendi.  President Roosevelt expressed his grateful appreciation and that of the  United States Government to the peace element in Japan which had worked  hard in support of the movement for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific  area, and made it clear that the United States was not overlooking what  that element had done and was still ready to do. He added that most  people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution of the Pacific  problems, and that while he had not given up yet, the situation was  serious and that fact should be recognized. He pointed out that the  Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had had the effect of a cold  bath on the people of the United States as well as on the United States  Government, and intimated that a second such bath appeared to be in the  offing. He said that throughout the conversations there had been no real  indication of a desire for peace by any of Japan's leaders, and that  this also had had its effect on the conversations. According to his  memorandum of the meeting, Secretary Hull then 

"made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in  control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and  talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would  get anywhere as has been so  

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clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of  co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in  certain areas are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the  policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military  agencies of the political economic, social, and moral affairs of each of  the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that  direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military  and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern  Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 772)."

During the conversation, Ambassador Kurusu suggested that the trouble  was not with fundamentals so much as with their application. However,  with reference to a recent remark of President Roosevelt about  "introducing" Japan and China, when the Ambassador asked who would take  such action and the President said "both sides" meaning Japan as well as  China the Ambassador pointed out "that from a practical standpoint that  would be very difficult to accomplish" (ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 770-772). 

According to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo, as the meeting ended,  President Roosevelt told the Ambassadors that he was leaving the next  day, Friday, for Warm Springs, Ga., for a rest and was planning to  return the following Wednesday. He said that he would like to talk with  the Ambassadors then and would be very gratified if some means of  settlement could be discovered in the meantime (ex. 1, pp. 192-194). In  addition to Ambassador Nomura's cabled report of the meeting, Ambassador  Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the voice  code previously arranged, and said that in the conversation with the  President "there wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of  yesterday." He asked how things were in Tokyo, and was told that a  crisis appeared "imminent." The Ambassador reported that the United  States wanted to continue the negotiations, but Bureau Chief Yamamoto  said "we can't yield." The Ambassador concluded by saying that there was  nothing of particular interest in the day's talk with President  Roosevelt, except that the southward advance of Japanese troops was  "having considerable effect" (ex. 1, pp. 188-191).    

The record shows that President Roosevelt had an appointment with  Admiral Ernest J. King at 3:45 p. m. immediately after his conference  with the two Japanese Ambassadors (ex. 58), and that at about 4:00 p. m.  Secretary Stimson telephoned and talked with Secretary Hull (tr. 1167,  5547). At 5:00 p. m. Secretary Hull telephoned Admiral Stark, but was  unable to reach him and talked with Admiral Schuirmann instead (tr.  5547). 

In addition to the conversations Secretary Hull had with officials of  the United States Government on November 27 (Washington time), the  Secretary and Under Secretary Welles also conferred that day with  representatives of three of the governments that had been consulted in  connection with the proposed modus vivendi. The Netherlands Minister  called and handed Secretary Hull a memorandum of the same date in which  the Netherlands Foreign Minister took the position that inasmuch as the  modus vivendi proposal was only the beginning of negotiations, the  military and economic concessions suggested therein as a start seemed to  be "quite far reaching" and that it was "most unlikely" that Japan would  at the present moment leave the Axis (ex. 18). The Australian Minister,  Mr. Casey, also called on Secretary Hull and asked whether the 

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modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently. When Secretary Hull said he so considered it, Mr. Casey 

"expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of  Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further  consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British   communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong  for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation  but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with  qualifications such as were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter  fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by  all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt  unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here,  would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their  liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be  feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese, and I replied  that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the  Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government (ex. 18)."

Also that morning the British Ambassador "urgently" called on Under  Secretary Welles. The Under Secretary's memorandum of their conversation  noted that Lord Halifax said that Secretary Hull had telephoned him the  previous evening and told him the nature of the United States' reply to  Japan, and continued: 

"The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to  the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese  Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which  had so recently been under discussion. 

"I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in  this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was  the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier  proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated  questions by the British Government in regard thereto. 

"Lord Halifax said he could not understand this inasmuch as he had  communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British  Government.  

"To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the  President yesterday could hardly be regarded as "full support," but on  the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.    

"Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express  the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say  that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese  objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador  that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek  was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent  the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that  the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the  Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the  modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he  felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly  on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction  because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan  and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown  of Chinese morale.

"I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already  very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased  in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat  against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was  evident from the information received here that the Japanese were  preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the  situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated (ex. 18)."

While on November 27 (Washington time) both Secretary Hull and Under  Secretary Welles thus believed the situation could not be more serious,  the record before the Committee indicates that the political adviser to  the Secretary, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, was less concerned. In a  memorandum of that date entitled "Problem of Far Eastern relations  Estimate of Situation and certain probabilities," Dr. 

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Hornbeck expressed the opinion that he did not believe the United States  was "on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." He stated that in  his opinion there was less reason on November 27 than there was a week  before for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make war on  the United States. "Were it a matter of placing bets," he wrote, "the  undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and  Japan will *not* be at 'war' on or before Decem-15 [sic]." (Tr. 5523- 5537). [Italics in original.] 

Apart from the remark of Bureau Chief Yamamoto during his telephone  conversation with Ambassador Kurusu the evening of November 26  (Washington time), when Yamamoto told the Ambassador that he had  expected that the United States would not yield to the demands made by  the Japanese Government in its note of November 20, and Yamamoto's  remark the next day in his telephone conversation with the Ambassador  that Japan "can't yield," there is no evidence before the Committee that  the Japanese Foreign Office furnished the two Japanese Ambassadors any  official comment or instructions as to their next step until November 28  (Japan time). That day Foreign Minister Togo cabled the following  instructions: 

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite  of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating  proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. *The  Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.*  Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this  American proposal which l will send you in two or three days, the  negotiations *will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I  do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken  off.* Merely say to them that you awaiting instructions and that,  although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to  your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just  claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the  Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and  conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States  has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish  negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man  you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present  circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. [1] From now on  do the best you can (ex. 1, p. 195)."

This message, in the above form, was available in Washington on November  28 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 195), whether before or after the War  Council meeting that day is not known definitely, although, as noted  below, there is some indication that it was not available until  afterward. 

The War Council met at noon at the White House, with President  Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary  of the Navy Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark present. Secretary Hull repeated the comments he had made 3 days before, at the  War Council meeting on November 25, emphasizing again that there was  "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan,"  that the Japanese were likely "to break out at any time with new acts of  conquest," employing the element of surprise as "a central point in  their strategy," and that the "safeguarding of our national security was  in the hands of the Army and the Navy" (Tr. 1203). Earlier that day  Secretary Stimson had received from the Military Intelligence Division  (G-2) a summary of the available information regarding Japanese military  and naval move-

[1] This has reference to the suggestion made by the two Ambassadors on  November 26 (Washington time) that they be permitted to propose to  Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt send a personal message to  Foreign Minister Togo (ex. 1, p. 180). 

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ments in the Far East, and had taken it to President Roosevelt and  suggested that he read it before the War Council meeting, which the  President had called. In his notes of the meeting, Secretary Stimson  said:  

"When we got back there at 12:00 o'clock he had read the paper that I  had left with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the  Expeditionary Force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed  South, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an  attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops in Indo-China,  or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on  Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that  there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into  an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra  Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop  the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good  suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that  the present move that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of  about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere completely  changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could  address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already  had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if  this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo- China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or  further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers,  Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines.  It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we  discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into  the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if  the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that  if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo- China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of  going.

"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the  Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't  think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the  other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to  do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a  certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The  President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from  himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at  the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem  to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President.  In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be  couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn  an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of  the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I  said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the  United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an  address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have  to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this ides of a  message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his  letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not  publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send  his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and  then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more  understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the  final decision at that time and the President asked Hull and Knox and  myself to try to draft such papers (tr. 14,424-14,426)."

Shortly after the meeting ended, President Roosevelt left for Warm  Springs, Ga., telling reporters that the Japanese situation might  require his return at any time. [1] 

Also on November 28, the Netherlands Minister called on Secretary Hull  to inquire what reactions the Secretary had had from the Japanese  situation. The Secretary recorded that he handed the Minister  

"three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina  area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with  equipment, vessels, trans- 

[1] Earlier that day he had informed the press that American merchant  vessels sailing the Pacific would not be armed "under existing  circumstances." When asked how long he expected the existing  circumstances to prevail, the President had replied that that question  "should be asked In Tokyo" (Washington Post, November 29, 1941).    

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ports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He  examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the  Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very  serious situation.  

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally  in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I  abandoned on Tuesday evening. November twenty-fifth. Or practically  abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true  facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early  Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese  later ill the day the document containing a proposed draft of an  agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this  Government stands and has stood for, for many years. Especially  including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I  reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the  continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the  Pacific area and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and  parcel of these conversations and their objectives intended to  facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing  that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic  principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement.  The Minister said he understood the situation (tr. 4475-4476)."

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called on Dr. Hornbeck that  day to inquire whether the Japanese-American negotiations had in fact  "broken down" as, he said, was stated in a message the British armed  authorities had received from the United States armed authorities. [2]  Dr. Hornbeck told the Minister that so far as he was aware neither  Government had "declared or indicated" that the negotiations were  terminated, but that he was not in a position to confirm or deny the  statement referred to by the Minister (ex. 18). At 7 o'clock that  evening the State Department sent a telegram to Ambassador Gauss in  Chungking which summarized the Japanese demands of November 20 and the  terms of the proposed modus vivendi. The telegram briefly reviewed the  circumstances which led to the decision to withhold the modus vivendi  from the United States reply of November 26, concerning which Ambassador  Gauss had been previously informed, describing in some detail for the  Ambassador's information the position regarding the modus vivendi taken  by the Chinese Government (ex. 18). 

According to Secretary Stimson, the rest of the week-end after the war  council meeting on Friday "was largely taken up with preparing a  suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress"  (Tr. 14403). The record before the Committee shows that Friday afternoon  Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull on the White House telephone at 2:49  o'clock and talked with one of the officials of the State Department's  Far Eastern Division, and that at 5:25 o'clock Secretary Stimson called  Secretary Hull and talked with Dr. Hornbeck (Tr. 5548). The next day,  Saturday, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson and Secretary  Knox sent to Secretary Hull suggested drafts, which they had prepared,  of the proposed message to Congress decided upon the day before (ex.  161). In an attached note in his handwriting, Secretary Stimson  described his suggestions as a "memo which may be helpful as to certain  portions of the message to the Congress." Secretary Knox also forwarded  a copy of his suggestions to President Roosevelt en route to Warm  Springs, with an accompanying letter in which he said that he had had  the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in preparing the  summation of the military situation contained in his draft. He told the President: 

[2] The message referred to appears to have been the Navy "war warning"  dispatch of November 27 (Washington time) to Admiral Hart and Admiral  Kimmel, which was sent to the United States Naval Observer in London  with instructions to "inform British" (ex. 37). 

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"The news this morning indicates the Japs are going to deliberately  stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am  extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down  there and will come back feeling very fit (ex. 161)."

It seems probable that Secretary Knox's information that the Japs were  stalling "for two or three days" was based on Foreign Minister Togo's  message quoted above, in which the Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that with a report of his Government's views on the United  States' reply of November 26 "which I will send you in two or three  days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured" (ex. 1, p. 195). While  this is not conclusive as to whether or not that message was available  before the War Council meeting on November 28 (Washington time), it does  indicate that, although the message was translated by the Navy on  November 28 it was not seen by Secretary Knox until "this morning", i.  e., November 29 (Washington time). 

The suggestions sent by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox to  Secretary Hull were combined in a single draft (ex. 161-A), which then  underwent extensive revision and modification. The revised draft was  ready by noon the same day, Saturday, November 29 (Washington time),  according to a handwritten note accompanying a copy of it which Dr.  Hornbeck sent to Secretary Stimson the next day (ex. 161-A). It was  accompanied by a draft of a proposed message to Emperor Hirohito and by  the following memorandum for President Roosevelt dated November 29  (Washington time): 

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

"There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress to which  draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material  contributions, and the officers of the Department made further  contributions, which together comprise the draft of proposed message. 

"In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to  go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to  read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week end and  give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions. 

"I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible  message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as  on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except  for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such  complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday.   

"If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to  defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the  Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that  you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our  relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached. 

"I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor  through appropriate channels (ex. 19)."

The draft of a message to Emperor Hirohito was brief. In it, after  referring to the long period of unbroken peace between the United States  and Japan, the President was to state that he was addressing the Emperor  "because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in  formation." He was then to continue: 

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to  deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence  of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain  tragic possibilities.    

"The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which  your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their  enlightened decisions 

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and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and  better courses thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both  countries and to the peoples of other lands.    

"Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address  myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your  Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark  clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of  restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both  our people may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the  Pacific area (ex. 19)."

The draft of the proposed message to Congress was longer, a document of  some twenty typewritten pages (ex. 19). It will be remembered that the  War Council had decided on November 28 that the message was to be a message "to the people of the. United States" as well as "an address to  Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the  danger happened" (tr. 14426). If the President should send the message  to Emperor Hirohito, that, the War Council had decided, was to be "one  thing and a secret thing," as a message to an Emperor could not be  publicized as a message to Congress could, and the President was to make  his speech to Congress "as a separate and more understandable thing to  the people of the United States" (tr. 14426). The proposed message began  with these words: 

"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I come before you to report to you on  serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in  the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese  Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay  before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely  serious implications (ex. 19)."   

It then briefly reviewed the development of American foreign policy in  the Far East since 1833, discussing American relations with China, the  acquisition by the United States of sovereignty over the Philippines  with its attendant responsibilities, and the relations between the  United States and Japan since 1908, including a brief discussion of the  Nine Power Treaty of 1921. It considered the policy of aggression  followed by the Japanese first in Manchuria commencing in 1931 and then  in China, during the course of which American lives and property had  been imperiled and damaged in disregard for American rights under  existing treaties. 

The proposed message then took up the relationship of Japan to Germany  and Italy in their scheme of world-wide conquest. It pointed out that in  flat defiance of its covenants Japan had invaded and sought to overthrow  the Government of China and that step by step the Japanese armed forces,  passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the  Philippine Islands, had invaded and taken possession of French Indo- China. It continued: 

"Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into  the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where  they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China's  lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through  which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between  the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.  

"To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening  activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation  of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands,  she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and  fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the  Philippines. 

"By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western,  northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process  go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital  interests of the United States. 

*               *                 *              *              *

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This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds  unmistakable threats to our interests, especially our interest in peace  and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the  Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific. 
 
Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity, and fair dealing are restored, we  will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already  transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler  seeks dominion by ruthless force (ex. 19). 

It was then pointed out that throughout the period in which Japan had  been making it clear that this was her program, the Government of the  United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that  Japan's best interests lay in maintaining and cultivating friendly  relations with the United States and other countries that believe in  orderly and peaceful processes. Reference was made to the 8 months of  conversations with the Japanese which had been carried on by the  Secretary of State and the President for the purpose of arriving, if  possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments, and the  principles for which the United States had stood, as set forth in the  United States note of November 26 to Japan, were summarized. It was  stated that in this effort the United States Government had had the  agreement and support of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia,  the Netherlands, and China. Every effort had been made, it was said,  toward reaching a fair and workable agreement, and to commit Japan to  practices in line with the principles advocated by the United States. 

These efforts, the proposed message continued, had failed, and Japan had  refused to change her position or her practices, an(l relations between  the two nations were threatened with rupture. The supreme question  presented to the United States, it was said, was the question of self- defense; the immediate question was whether the United States would, or  would not, stand by while Japan went forward with a program of conquest.  The effects of that program of conquest, if successful, on China and the  Philippines were then described, and it was said that  

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon, and  were to succeed in conquering, the regions which they are menacing in  the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies  and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports  from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports  in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of  commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and  with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an  interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic (ex. 19). 

The proposed message then concluded by stating that the United States  did not want war with Japan, but that if war should come, the fault and  responsibility would be those of Japan, and that the primary cause would  have been the pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression. The policy of  the United States and its relation with Japan should not be influenced  by fear of what attacks, acting unlawfully and with resort to force,  Japan might make upon the United States  

but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and  security and 

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justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it  is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make  upon us because of our pursuit of that course (ex. 19)."

Also on November 29 (Washington time), the British Ambassador called on  Secretary Hull to learn of any further developments in the Japanese  situation, especially with reference to the question of the proposed  modus vivendi. As Secretary Hull described the conversation:

"This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for  the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments  resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly  impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and  safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for  example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different  Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the  State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding  into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the  facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located  here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press  and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have  correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which  is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too  fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et  cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the  recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that  it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's  loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing  the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying  and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the  British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable  back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same  zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening  and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were  now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement  between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a  procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this  calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by  peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter  into with China.

"*I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with  Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the  officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I  have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great  confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country  and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of  resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move  suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the  peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer  and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on  the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited  conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble  and requires the utmost boldness and risk.*

"*I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese  Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to  see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added  that the extremist fire-eating elements in Japan who have preached a  general forward movement supported by the Army and Navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a movement,  would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation  but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have  advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to  consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that  they would virtually halt and engage in some movements into Thailand and  into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front. The  Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did  not disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the  conduct of diplomatic relations between several of our countries in  these critical times (ex. 18). *"

Also that day the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, called on Secretary  Hull and intimated that he was prepared to suggest to the Japanese  Ambassador that Australia would be glad to act as mediator between Japan  and the United States. In his memorandum of the

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 401

conversation, Secretary Hull noted that he gave the matter no serious attention, except to tell the Minister 

"that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a  move of that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive comment  before the Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the  assumption that he would develop a set of facts along lines that he  began to intimate (ex. 174)."

That afternoon the State Department received from Ambassador Grew the  text of a Japanese note protesting the alleged flight of an American  airplane over the island of Formosa on November 20, claiming this was a  violation of Japanese territory and requesting that the matter "be  brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned."  Ambassador Grew was informed on December 6 (Washington time) that the  requested action had been taken, and that on November 24 an unidentified  airplane had carried out a reconnaissance of Guam (ex. 130). The same  afternoon (November 29) Secretary Hull received a request from the  British Ambassador for a copy of the text of the United States' note of  November 26 to send to the British Foreign Minister, to whom the general  character of the note had previously been communicated (ex. 158). A copy  of the note was sent to the Ambassador by Under Secretary Welles the  following Tuesday (tr. 1338). Also that afternoon the State Department  instructed American diplomatic and consular offices at Saigon, Bangkok  and Singapore to report "all movements of military or naval units"  promptly to the American Consul at Manila, who was told to transmit such  information to Admiral Hart, the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet  (ex. 21).

Overshadowing the other events of the day, however, was an Associated  Press report of a speech made by Premier Tojo in Tokyo before a rally  sponsored by the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" and the "Dai  Nippon East Asia League," in commemoration of the first anniversary of  the Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo and the  Wang Ching-wei regime in Japanese-occupied China (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  122). [1] In his speech, Premier Tojo said:

"It is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three powers to have the  privilege of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open  the thorny way, and 1 year has already gone by since we started this  honorable work together, and if it is not the greatest task of the  present century what else can it be.

"However if we look around we find that there are still many countries  who are indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to  throw obstacles in the way of the construction of the East Asia co- prosperity sphere and are trying to enjoy the dream of exploitation of  East Asia at the cost of the 1,000 million populace of the East Asiatic  peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.

"The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain,  America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young  men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of  Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East  Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp  the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the  United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice  from East Asia with a vengeance (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 148)."

The reports of this speech by Premier Tojo commenced coming in on  November 29, the date fixed by Foreign Minister Togo as the final  deadline before which Ambassador Nomura was to obtain the written

[1] Extracts from Premier Tojo's speech were carried in American  newspapers on November 30 under such headlines as "Japan Threatens to  Purge Asia of U. S. And Britain" (Washington Post, November 30, 1941). 

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agreement of the United States to the Japanese demands of November 20 or  else things would "automatically" begin to happen (ex. 1, p. 165). It must be assumed Secretary Hull was aware of this and of the Foreign  Minister's message to Ambassador Nomura stating that the negotiations  would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days (ex. 1, p. 195). 

Late Saturday evening, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Hull  telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm Springs and had a lengthy  conversation with him, after which the President's press secretary told  reporters:

"In view of the reported statement an Associated Press dispatch by the  Premier of Japan, the President tonight is of the opinion that he may  have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad  schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon (tr. 14337)."

Secretary Hull testified that "the gravity of the situation was evident  from many sources", and that as Premier Tojo's statement reflected the  extreme acuteness of the situation, "in that sense it may be said that  the statement prompted my telephone call and the President's return"  (Tr. 14,340).

In the meantime, after cabling Ambassador Nomura on November 28 (Japan  time) that he did not wish the Ambassador "to give the impression that  the negotiations are broken off" (ex. 1, p. 195), Foreign Minister Togo  had followed up that message with another the next day in which he  instructed the Ambassador:

"*We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:*

"The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial  position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the  claims of both sides.

"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be  made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which  ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the  prestige of the Imperial Government.

"With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. Government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

"*(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does  not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations)* (ex. 1, p.  199)."

This message was translated and available in Washington on Sunday,  November 30 (Washington time). Late that evening Ambassador Kurusu  telephoned Bureau Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo that arrangements had been  made for the two Ambassadors to meet with Secretary Hull the next  morning, Monday. The Ambassador reported that President Roosevelt was  returning to Washington the next day because of Premier Tojo's speech,  and cautioned against such "ill-advised statements," saying that it put  the two Ambassadors "in a very difficult position." When Yamamoto urged  the Ambassador to continue the negotiations, Ambassador Kurusu said they  would need Tokyo's help, and both the Premier and the Foreign Minister  would need "to change the tone of their speeches."  Ambassador  continued:

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of  happenings in the South.  You understand that don't you? (Ex. 1, p.  207)"

Yamamoto replied:

"Yes, yes (ex. 1, p. 207)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 403

Secretary Hull testified that he telephoned the President that Sunday  [1] "after conferring With our military regarding the Japanese Prime  Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far  Eastern situation" (tr. 1163). The record shows that the Secretary had  two telephone conversations that morning with Admiral Stark at 10:30 and  12:08 o'clock (tr. 1167). Admiral Stark attended the Secretary's  conference with President Roosevelt at 11:45 a. m. The next day  immediately following the President's return to Washington, and it would  seem probable that the arrangement for Admiral Stark to attend that  conference was made during the Secretary's telephone conversations with  him.

At 1:28 o'clock Sunday afternoon there was received in the State  Department, through Ambassador Winant in London, the following message  from Prime Minister Churchill for President Roosevelt:

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war  between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret  or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by  Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequence. I realize your  constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into  war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the  dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider  whether, *at the moment which you judge right which may be very near*,  you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel  you to place the gravest issues before Congress", or words to that  effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a  joint declaration, and in any ease arrangements are being made to  synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for  presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it  might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the  war (ex. 24)."

Also that Sunday both the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, and the  British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, called on Secretary Hull. The  Australian Minister gave the Secretary the substance of a talk he had  had with Ambassador Kurusu. Secretary Hull recorded:

"This amounted to very little and there was really nothing new in what  he said except that Kurusu made it repeatedly clear that the Japanese  were very desirous of continuing conversations with this Government. The  Minister then referred to his notes and said that the British Ambassador  desired to urge, along with him, the Australian Minister, that I do the  best possible to continue our relations with Japan so as to avoid a  military conflict at this time, the idea being that they needed more  time for preparation to resist in the Pacific area. This view has been  asserted constantly during recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the  Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister (ex. 168)."

One of the purposes of the British Ambassador's call was to hand  Secretary Hull the following memorandum:

"MOST SECRET

"There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand  and this attack will include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic  points in the Kra isthmus.

"We have plans for the rapid movement of a force from Malaya to hold a  line across the Kra isthmus in the neighborhood of Singora. Time is the  essence of this plan, particularly at this season of the year when the  Kra isthmus is water logged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies  with the side which gets there first.

"R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for  three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East  has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake  air recon-

[1] Newspaper accounts of Secretary Hull's s activities that Sunday  state that the Secretary again telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm  Springs before his departure for Washington (Washington Post, December  1, 1941).

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naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. Commander in  Chief Far East, has asked for permission to move into Kra isthmus, if  air reconnaissance establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are  approaching the coast of Thailand, and he asks for an immediate decision  on this point.

"To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay  frontier would be an obvious threat to Singapore even though at the  present season it might not develop at once. We have also to bear in  mind the encouragement which the Japanese success would give to their  extremists. Demands of appetite would grow and other Far East peoples  would be correspondingly depressed. It looks therefore as though, to  ensure the defense of Singapore and for wider reasons we might have to  take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese (ex. 21)."

In his memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador  Secretary Hull stated that the Ambassador 

"was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States would do if  the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base  on the Kra Isthmus. *I said that the President was returning tomorrow  morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on  Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to  notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry*. * * *  The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his  Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He  assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps that  we might pursue to this end (ex. 21)."

The next day Lord Halifax sent Secretary Hull a copy of a telegram he  had received from the British Foreign Office, "as the point may possibly  arise in the course of your discussions this morning." "You will  remember," he wrote the Secretary, "you mentioned the point to me as I  was leaving your office yesterday" (ex. 158). The Foreign Office  telegram was as follows:

"It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the  question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our  treaty of nonaggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know  therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.

"In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the  grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty.  Similarly  (although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government)  we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering  Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending.  But  it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in  co-operation with the Thai Government.  If therefore it were decided to  undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure  Thai's consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai  Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of   leakage to the Japanese (ex. 158).

Thus the record before the Committee shows that as President Roosevelt  returned to Washington from Warm Springs, the information available to  his advisors in Washington indicated that a crisis was fast approaching,  if not already at hand.

A series of intercepted Japanese messages that were translated and  available in Washington the next day, December 1 (Japan time), fully  confirmed this view. In a telegram dated December 1 (Japan time) to  Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Ambassador  that 

"The date set in my message No. 812 has come and gone and the situation  continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United  States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been instructing the  Press and others that though there are some wide differences between  Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing.

(The above is for only your information) (ex. 1, p. 208).

That same day the Japanese Foreign Office informed the Ambassador that its four offices "in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 405

have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to  dispose of them," and that the machine in Batavia had been returned to  Japan (ex. 1, p. 209). From a message dated November 29 from the  Japanese Ambassador in Thailand to Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo, it  was learned that the Ambassador was conspiring with the pro-Japanese  faction in Thailand to place that country in a position where it would  be compelled to declare war on Great Britain. The Japanese Ambassador in  Thailand reported to Tokyo that the question of joint military action  between Thailand and Japan had been brought up in the Thai Government, but that the Government had expressed a desire to pursue a course of  strict neutrality. He told Foreign Minister Togo that the Thai  Government 

"had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether  they be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered  Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper,  she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. *For the  purpose of accomplishing this Japan should carefully avoid Thai  territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of Kotaparu in  British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade  Thailand from Patanbessa.*

"*The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.* This  strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has  the approval of Chief of Staff Bijitto. Our naval Attache has advised  the Naval General Staff also, I think (ex. 1, p. 203)."

While the record before the committee shows that all of these Japanese  messages were translated and available in Washington on December 1, it  does not show the exact hour when translation was completed. It  therefore cannot be said with certainty which, if any, of the messages  were seen by Secretary Hull before his conference with the Japanese  Ambassadors that morning, or which of the messages were seen by  President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark before their  conference immediately after the President's return to Washington from  Warm Springs.

THE INVASION OF THAILAND BY JAPANESE FORCES FROM FRENCH INDOCHINA  APPEARS IMMINENT

(December 1-7, 1941)

Thus on December 1 (Washington time) there was much information in  Washington that pointed toward Thailand as the next objective of  Japanese aggression. Geographically, Thailand lies between French  Indochina on the east and Burma on the west, and, with the Gulf of Siam,  between French Indochina on the northeast and the British Malay States  on the south. After the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina  in late July, Thailand thus became a barrier between those forces and  two possible objectives, the Burma Road on the one hand and Singapore on  the other. This strategic location of Thailand had been emphasized by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their joint memorandum of November  5 (Washington time) when they concluded that no military action against  Japan should be undertaken by the United States unless, among other  contingencies, the Japanese should move their forces "into Thailand to  the west of 100  east (i. e., toward the Burma Road) or south of 10   north" (i. e., toward Singapore) (ex. 16).

It is desirable here to review briefly the situation with respect to  Thailand as it had developed since July. The record before the Com-

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mittee shows that after the Japanese invasion and occupation of French  Indochina late in July, the Thai Government, fully aware of Thailand's  strategic position and importance to the Japanese, on August 12  (Washington time) had formally asked the State Department whether, in  the event Thailand should be attacked and should resist attack, the  United States Government would extend material assistance to it, the  Thai Government having determined and formally announced that it would  defend itself against attack by any other country. Mr. Maxwell M.  Hamilton, then Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, to  whom the question was presented, had advised the Thai Minister that the  matter would be taken up with higher officers of the Department and that  he would then communicate further with the Minister (ex. 169, item 6).  The Thai Minister had previously made informal inquiry of the State  Department to the same effect, after Secretary Hull had stated at a  press conference on August 6 (Washington time) that the United States  was becoming increasingly concerned over events in the southwestern  Pacific area (ex. 169, item 1-6). Again on August 14, the Thai Minister  had called at the State Department and stated that he had received  another telegram from his Government which, "in the gravity of its tone,  indicated that a critical state had been reached in respect of the  threat of invasion." He had further stated that he had been instructed  "to spare no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American  Government in this situation," and that the Thai Government was ready  and able to purchase in America the arms it needed (ex. 169, item 7).

On August 15 (Washington time) the State Department had received from  the United States Minister at Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies a  telegram containing the substance of a message from the Netherlands  Minister of Colonies in London to the Governor-General of the  Netherlands East Indies. In it the Minister of Colonies advised the  latter that he had been assured by the British Foreign Minister that in  the event of an attack by Japan upon the Netherlands East Indies; the  British Empire would back up the Netherlands completely. The Governor- General was also advised that a further conference would soon be held in  London with the British Foreign Minister in this connection 

"since it has become clear now that the United States and England will  not resist Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is  also brought to your attention that any guarantee or certainty of United  States participation by force of arms is absolutely excluded (ex. 169,  item 8)."

Secretary Hull had conferred with the Thai Minister in Washington on  August 18 (Washington time). In reply to the Minister's previous  inquiries as to the attitude of the United States Government toward  Thailand if Thailand should be attacked and should endeavor in good  faith to defend itself, Secretary Hull had stated that the United States  had been aiding China in many ways against the aggression of Japan and  that, in the contingencies mentioned, the United States Government would  place Thailand in the same category (ex. 169, item 9).

The next action of importance in connection with Thailand appears to  have occurred on October 27 (Washington time), when the British Minister  in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, discussed the Thailand situation  with Under Secretary Welles and left with him two memoranda dated  October 25 dealing with possible material aid to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 407

Thailand, including guns, ammunition, planes and aviation gasoline and  lubricating oil, by Great Britain and the United States (ex. 169, item  13). It will be recalled that it was about this time that Generalissimo  Chiang Kai-shek had appealed to Great Britain and the United States for  planes and pilots to defend the Burma Road against an anticipated attack  by the Japanese from northern French Indochina. The American reply to  the British memoranda of October 25 had been delayed in order that both  of these matters could be considered at the same time (ex. 169, item  11). On November 6 (Washington time), that reply, in the form of an aide  memoire, had been handed to the British Minister (ex. 169, item 13). The aide memoire pointed out that for some weeks it had been the policy of  the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to  priority and export applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government  and, whenever practicable in the face of demand from other areas upon  American production, to take favorable action upon such applications.  Regarding the proposals contained in the British memoranda, the United  States reply commented that the British proposal to require the  acceptance of British instructors along with the howitzers and field  guns which were to be offered to the Thai Government might serve as a  pretext upon which the Japanese Government might exert additional  pressure upon Thailand. As to planes, the memoranda suggested that the  British might wish to consider the release to Thailand of a number of  airplanes at Singapore which it was understood were in excess of the  number for which pilots were available there. If this should not be  practicable, it was suggested that if the British should decide to make  available to Thailand planes from those being supplied to it from the  United States, the United States Government would be agreeable to such  an arrangement. Concerning aviation gasoline and lubricating oil, it was  stated that a reply would be made in the near future, after further  investigation (ex. 169, item 13). 

On November 18 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok that it had explored the possibility of  making available to the Thai Government antitank and antiaircraft guns  and ammunition, but that it had been found impossible to spare any of  such items at the moment (ex. 169, item 15). Four days later, on  November 22 (Washington time), the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok that the question of supplying planes to  Thailand had been under active consideration by the British and the  United States Governments but that neither Government was in a position  to supply any planes to Thailand at the present time. The Minister had  been advised that the supplying of aviation gasoline and aviation  lubricating oil had also been under consideration, and that the British  Government was prepared to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline  and the United States Government was endeavoring to arrange to supply  aviation lubricating oil (ex. 169, item 16). The same day reports had  reached the State Department from the British Embassy of Japanese  requests for the use of Thai airfields for "survey flights" and for  aviation gasoline, presumably for such flights (ex. 169, item 17).

The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, had called on Under Secretary  Welles on November 25 (Washington time) regarding a report from the  British Minister at Bangkok that the Thai Government was again becoming  very shaky and that unless some practical action were

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taken by Great Britain and the United States the Japanese influence  would again become predominant. The British Ambassador had reported that  title aviation gasoline and artillery the British had given the Thai  Government had been regarded by the latter as completely insufficient  "and had had no appreciably beneficial effects." When Lord Halifax had  said that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining  airplanes, the Under Secretary had said that the United States was  building up its air strength as rapidly as possible in the Philippines  and that he had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark  that the planes the United States had in the Philippines were infinitely  more valuable to the United States there than they would be in Thailand.  The British Ambassador had then suggested on behalf of his Government  that the situation "might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to  Thailand by the United States." Under Secretary Welles had said that  this matter would be given immediate consideration (ex. 169, item 18).

On November 27 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok concerning renewed instructions which were  given on November 22 to American diplomatic and consular officers in  Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hongkong and French Indochina  regarding the withdrawal of American citizens from those areas, and had  authorized him to inform American citizens in Thailand of those  instructions (ex. 169, item 20). The next day the Thai Minister had  called at the State Department and stated that he feared a Japanese  attack on Thailand was imminent. He had said that Thailand would resist  any such attack with all its forces. Referring to the statement  previously made to him that the United States would place Thailand in  the same category as China and would offer assistance in the case of an  attack by an aggressor, he had suggested that immediate consideration be  given to making planes and other supplies available to Thailand. He had  been advised that the matter would be promptly brought to the attention  of the appropriate authorities (ex. 169, item 23).

On November 29 (Washington time) the State Department had received a  telegram from the American Minister at Bangkok stating that on the  previous day the Thai Prime Minister had urged his people to be neutral  but to prepare to fight if war became inevitable. The Thai Prime  Minister had been reported as saying 

"that Great Britain and the United States had promised not to attack  Thailand and that the Japanese Ambassador had guaranteed that Japanese  troops in Indo-China are not intended for attack on this country in any  circumstances (ex. 169, item 28)."

On December 1 (Washington time), the day President Roosevelt returned to  Washington, from Warm Springs, the Thai Minister, accompanied by his  military attache, called at the State Department and described in detail  the general military situation in Thailand, stating that the military  equipment now most urgently needed by Thailand was heavy artillery,  bombing planes, and pursuit planes. The Minister expressed the hope that  means could be found to make this equipment available immediately in  order that Thailand might be better able to resist aggression by Japan  (ex. 169, item 26).

The following day the State Department sent a telegram to the American  Consul at Singapore requesting him to render all possible assistance in  connection with the immediate delivery of small quanti-

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ties of appropriate aviation lubricating oils to Thailand, arrangements  for which, the Department said, had been tentatively agreed upon between  representatives of this Government and representatives in Washington of  the British and the Netherland Governments (ex. 169 item 28).

GERMANY TELLS JAPAN THE TIME IS RIPE 10 STRIKE AT THE UNITED STATES, AND  PROMISES TO JOIN WITH JAPAN IN WAR AGAINST THE  UNITED STATES (November 29, 1941)

Several additional intercepted Japanese messages between Tokyo and  Berlin that were translated and available in Washington on December 1  (Washington time) disclosed that Germany once again was exercising  pressure upon Japan under the Tripartite Pact. In a message dated  November 29, 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in Berlin to  Foreign Minister Togo, the Ambassador reported a conversation he had had  with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the day before, following a  conference of high German Government and military officials at the  official residence of Chancellor Hitler. The Ambassador reported that it  was an absolute certainty that at that conference Japan's moves were  discussed in connection with discussion of the German war against  Russia. He quoted von Ribbentrop as saying:

"It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without  losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be  a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so  important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and  establishes her European New Order all the military might of Britain and  the United States will be concentrate against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the  very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We  have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of  the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of  the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the ease, and if Japan reaches a decision  to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will  not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would  bring about favorable results for Japan herself (ex. 1, p. 200)."

The Japanese Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister in Tokyo that von  Ribbentrop had said that the Germans would like to end their war with  Russia during the next year, and that he had then continued

"should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States,  Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely  no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the  United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on  that point (ex. 1, p. 202)."

Foreign Minister Togo replied to this message on November 30 (Japan  time). His message was in three parts, only the first and third of which  were ever intercepted. [1] Both of those parts were translated and  available in Washington, however, on December 1 (Washington time):

"1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April  during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere  efforts of the

[1] In this connection, the War Department advised the Committee that  the microfilms of Japanese files received from General MacArthur's  headquarters did not contain the second part of this message (tr.  13665).