| PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      493 
 THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
 
 We, the undersigned, find it impossible to concur with the findings and
 conclusions of the Committee's report because they are illogical, and
 unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee.
 The conclusions of the diplomatic aspects are based upon incomplete
 evidence.
 
 We, therefore, find it necessary to file a report setting forth the
 conclusions which we believe are properly sustained by evidence before
 the committee.
 
 HOMER FERGUSON
 OWEN BREWSTER
 
 494             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
 
 Page
 
 Duty of the committee 
      .............................................  495
 Fundamental 
      questions before the joint committee ..................  496
 Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the record 
      ..........................................................  497
 Form of this report 
      ...............................................  502
 Conclusions of fact and 
      responsibility ............................  503
 Conclusions 
      restated with supporting evidence [1] .................  506
 No. 1 (Growing 
      tension with Japan) ..............................  506
 No. 2 (Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............  
      510
 No. 3 (Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................  
      511
 No. 4 (Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the first shot' 
      by the Japanese) ..............................  512
 No. 5 (Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to warn 
      Hawaiian commanders) .................................  513
 No. 6 (Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ...  
      514
 No. 7 (Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities in 
      Washington) ............................................  520
 No. 8 (Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the United 
      States) ...........................................  521
 No. 9 (Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ......................  
      521
 No. 10 (Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost  
      commanders for war) ......................................  524
 No. 11 (Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the decision 
      to await Japanese attack) .......................  530
 No. 12 (Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to the 
      Hawaiian commanders ..................................  530
 No. 13 (Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............  
      532
 No. 14 (Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize probability, of a 
      Pearl Harbor attack) ...................  537
 No. 15 (Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in Washington) 
      ..............................................  538
 No. 16 (President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation between high 
      military authorities in Washington) .........  540
 No. 17 (Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to the 
      Hawaiian commanders) .................................  543
 No. 18 (Washington's responsibility for the competence of subordinate 
      officers) ....................................  553
 No. 19 (Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii)  
      553
 No. 20 (Failure of the President to take instant Executive action on 
      December 6 and 7) ..............................  565
 No. 21 (American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) ..........  
      570
 Conclusion ......................................................  
      572
 Summary of responsibilities .......................................  
      572
 
 [1] Substance of conclusions, paraphrased.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      495
 
 INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 THE DUTY OF THE COMMITTEE
 
 The duty of this Committee is fixed by the terms of the joint resolution
 under which it was created, as expounded by Senator Barkley, author of
 the resolution, in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945,
 explaining the purpose of the resolution.
 
 Section 2 of the joint resolution reads:
 
 "The Committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts
 relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the
 attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory
 of Hawaii n December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the
 House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946 (later extended
 to July 16, 1946), the results of its investigation, together with such
 recommendations as it may seem advisable."
 
 In his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, Senator Barkley
 pointed out the need for this investigation by declaring that the
 reports on Pearl Harbor by the President's Pearl Harbor Commission, the
 Roberts Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of
 Inquiry, and other authorities "are confusing and conflicting, when
 compared to one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and
 inconsistencies within themselves." In this connection he referred to
 the "widespread confusion and suspicion" that prevailed "among the
 American people and among the Members of Congress."
 
 In all these reports, which had resulted in contradictions, confusion,
 and inconsistencies, the central issue had been the fixing of
 responsibility for the catastrophe that befell the American forces at
 Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This fact Senator Barkley fully
 recognized in his statement that the first purpose of the investigation
 is that of "fixing responsibility" for the Pearl Harbor disaster "upon
 an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which
 they operated or cooperated or failed to do either." In fulfillment of
 this obligation, Senator Barkley said, the investigation
 
 "should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any
 responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living
 or dead. * * * Congress itself should make its *own thorough,
 impartial*, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and
 conditions prevailing *prior* to and *at the time of the Pearl Harbor
 attack*, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to
 appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the
 attack (Congressional Record, p. 8480, September 6, 1945)."
 
 The Joint Committee, therefore, is charged with the duty of
 investigating the entire subject de novo. It is and should be free from
 the findings and conclusions of all previous investigations and in
 
 496            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 quiries except such material as members of this committee in their
 discretion may see fit to cite or incorporate in their report.
 
 The second purpose of the investigation, Senator Barkley explained, is
 that of ascertaining whether in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor
 the findings might be useful to Congress in legislating with regard to
 military and naval forces and the executive departments having control
 of them, or which are supposed to work with them.
 
 These views of the obligation of the committee were supported
 wholeheartedly on the floor of the Senate by Senator Brewster and
 Senator Ferguson and thereafter the Senate unanimously passed the
 resolution as so interpreted.
 
 Of necessity, as used in relation to the obligation of this committee,
 responsibility means responsibility for failure on the part of
 individual officers or groups of officers or civilian officials to do
 their full official duty in preparing for and meeting effectively the
 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and the term "duty"
 means duty according to the Constitution, laws, and established
 administrative practices under which all such individuals and groups of
 individuals were bound to operate prior to and on the day of that
 catastrophe.
 
 FUNDAMENTAL 
      QUESTIONS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE
 
 Inasmuch as all decisions and activities connected with this occurrence
 at Pearl Harbor were decisions and activities of executive authorities
 of the Government of the United States, the issue of responsibility for
 the degree of success attained by the Japanese attack involves at least
 one general question and four subsidiary and specific questions:
 
 The general question is: Did all the civil, military, and naval
 authorities of the United States charged with responsibility for the
 conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government and for
 preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor competently, efficiently, and
 with proper regard for the trust imposed in them fulfill the duties of
 their respective offices under the Constitution and laws of the United
 States?
 
 The subsidiary and specific questions are:
 
 1. Did the high civil, military, and naval authorities in Washington
 secure in advance of 10 o'clock a. m. (E. S. T.) December 7, 1941,
 information respecting Japanese designs and intentions sufficient to
 convince them beyond all reasonable doubt that war with Japan was
 immediately imminent?
 
 2. If so, did they give to General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband
 E. Kimmel, the commanders at Pearl Harbor, clear and definite orders,
 immediately prior to the Japanese attack, instructing them to be fully
 alert for defense against such an attack?
 
 3. Was Hawaii adequately equipped for its defense against a Japanese
 attack in accordance with the known circumstances?
 
 4. Did the commanders at Pearl Harbor take the appropriate measures
 required by the orders issued to them from Washington, by the duties of
 their respective offices, and by the information in their possession and
 the resources at their disposal, to maintain the security of the
 possessions of the United States as far as that responsibility was
 invested in them?
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      497
 
 The question of the wisdom of the foreign policy pursued by the
 Government of the United States is excluded by the terms of the
 committee's instructions. In any case, to go into this issue would
 involve thcommittee in the complexities of history extending back more
 than 50 years and in matters of opinion which cannot be settled by
 reference to anything as positive and definite as the Constitution,
 laws, and established administrative practices of the United States
 Government. To understand the questions involved, however, an
 examination of our relations in the Far East, and of the diplomatic
 negotiations leading up to December 7, 1941, are part and parcel of the
 explanation of the responsibilities involved in this inquiry.
 
 DIFFICULTIES FACING THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND INCOMPLETENESS OF THE RECORD
 
 When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence
 duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes apparent that
 the record is far from complete. The Committee did not have an
 opportunity to cross-examine any of the high civil executive principals
 in the Pearl Harbor affair. President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox had
 died before the Committee was created. Harry Hopkins, who was intimately
 and officially associated with President Roosevelt, died shortly after
 the Committee began its work. The health of Secretary of War Stimson and
 Secretary of State Hull prevented the Committee from getting the full
 benefit of their knowledge, except for the information they voluntarily
 furnished.
 
 It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so
 hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under
 oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The
 Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were
 available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The
 Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts
 contained, who received them, or what was done about them, although the
 failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital
 intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those commanders
 performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this
 Committee:
 
 "I would not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic)
 if it had been shown to us (Tr., Vol. 47, p. 8836):"
 
 If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many
 shortcomings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of
 our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require an
 extended criticism of the Roberts Report.
 
 It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal
 experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving
 evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the
 Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in
 Washington. They could not then have been ignorant of their whereabouts
 at important times or have forgotten the details of events and
 operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would
 have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these
 obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the
 attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation.
 
 498            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stemming from
 Presidential restraints on the Committee and from the partisan character
 of the Committee itself.
 
 Even before the Committee commenced its work, it was confronted with an
 order issued on August 28, 1945, and signed by President Truman, which
 severely limited the power of the Committee to gain access to the full
 facts. The order is as follows (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 26):
 
 "AUGUST 28, 1945.
 
 "Memorandum for The Secretary of State.
 The Secretary of War.
 The Secretary of the Navy.
 The Attorney General.
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 The Director of the Budget.
 The Director of the Office of War Information.
 
 "Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent
 release to the public, except with the specific approval of the
 President in each case, of
 
 "Information regarding the past or present status, technique or
 procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any
 cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States
 Government or any Department thereof.
 
 "HARRY S. TRUMAN.
 
 "Restricted."
 
 It was not until October 23, 1945, that President Truman made the order
 less stringent by a new order. The modification left much to be desired.
 
 The application of the new order was limited to the State, War, and Navy
 Departments. It relaxed the secrecy of records only so far as "the Joint
 Committee" was concerned, while it continued to prevent "individual"
 members of the Committee from searching records as responsible Members
 of Congress either alone, in groups, or even when accompanied by
 Committee counsel. By one way or another, control over papers, records,
 and other information remained in the hands of the majority party
 members.
 
 The President's October order also contained the unfortunate phrase "any
 information in their possession *material to the investigation*," which
 provided a cloak for those reluctant to yield information requested by
 members of the Committee. It was always possible to confront individual
 members with the view that the papers, data, and information desired was
 not "material to the investigation." Decisions were made by the majority
 ruling out evidence as "not material to the investigation" without
 members of the Committee ever seeing the material about which the
 decision was made.
 
 No subsequent modifying orders wholly removed these restrictions. In an
 order of November 7, 1945, President Truman relaxed restraints on
 executives of the Government in order that they may speak freely to
 *individual members* of the Committee, but the order closed with the
 direction: "This does not include any files or written material"
 
 In this fashion every facility and concession afforded to members of the
 Joint Committee was hedged about with troublesome qualifications and
 restraints. The relaxation of restraints was often publicized while the
 continuing qualifications were but little discussed. The effect was to
 restrict individual members of the Committee in practice while the
 appearance of their freedom of operations was
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      499
 
 held out to the public. In justice to Committee counsel and to
 individual majority members of the Committee, efforts made by them to
 overcome these restrictions should be recognized. It is a great tribute
 to their fairness that the Committee did not break up over this issue
 but continued to work despite the handicaps which were never wholly
 removed.
 
 The plain fact that an investigation could not be an investigation of
 committee members remained mere spectators, persuaded some members that
 restraints on their freedom were not justified. The flimsiness of the
 argument for restrictions became even more evident when permission to
 search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual
 members *even when accompanied by Committee counsel*. Rightly or wrongly
 it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block
 the search for the truth.
 
 Such a view was supported by the knowledge that restrictions on
 individual members of congressional investigatory bodies were contrary
 to the best practices in other investigations. Some celebrated instances
 were recalled. Speaking in the Senate on November 9, 1945, during one of
 the discussions on Committee powers, the Senator from Montana (Mr.
 Burton K. Wheeler) observed:
 
 "I concur in what the Senator from Illinois has said with reference to
 the authorizing of a single member of the committee to hold hearings. I
 have served on a good many investigations since I have been a Member of
 the Senate, and some very important ones. I assisted to quite an extent
 in the Teapot Dome investigation carried on by my colleague, Senator
 Walsh, of Montana, and likewise I carried on the investigation of the
 Department of Justice. I was a minority member of the committee.
 
 "In all my experience with any investigating committee, I have never
 known of any one member of a committee not being permitted to go and
 look over the files in any department of the Government of the United
 States. This is the first time I have every known anything of that kind
 being questioned * * *.
 
 "* * * I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation
 I sent for files myself, I asked for files from the Attorney General of
 the United States, Mr. Daugherty. He refused to give them to me. I have
 forgotten the ground he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them
 to me. When he did so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge,
 called him in and asked for his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was
 eliminated from the office of Attorney General. After that time, when
 the new Attorney General was appointed, every single file I ever asked
 for, as a minority member of the committee, was furnished to me.
 
 "* * * As I have stated, my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, was a
 minority member of the committee investigating the Teapot Dome
 situation. I know of my own personal knowledge that he got from the
 Department, and from officials in the Department, information which he
 afterward used, and if he had not been permitted to do that, and if I
 had not been permitted to do it, I am sure there would have been a
 complete failure of the investigation of the Department of Justice.
 (Congressional Record, vol. 91, No. 198, November 9, 1945, p. 10755.)"
 
 Another instance is the more recent one in which President Truman
 himself is well versed. As Senator, Mr. Truman headed a distinguished
 committee bearing the popular designation "The Truman Committee" (now
 the Mead Committee). The cardinal principle of the Truman Committee in
 the 4 years during which it won the respect and confidence of the
 American people, rested on the proposition that every individual member
 of the committee was wholly free to search for any information deemed by
 him to be relevant wherever and whenever he thought it could be found.
 Never once did the chairman or the majority of the committee refuse to
 recognize that right and that responsibility of each individual member.
 
      500            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these instances
 did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be the case in the
 Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure and results in each
 case did honor to the committees concerned and proved salutary for the
 Nation. Complete concurrence with the most admirable outline of the
 purposes and scope of the investigation of the events leading up to
 Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World War as presented to the Senate
 by the author of the resolution at the time of its introduction and
 hearty approval of much that has been done by the Committee must not
 blind us to the extent to which the investigation lived up to its
 advance billing by its distinguished sponsor.
 
 At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this
 character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the entire
 history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected and
 neither of the two members of the Committee who had received rather
 extended training under the then Senator Truman were allowed to follow
 the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that had repeatedly
 produced most gratifying results in their earlier experience.
 
 This firm refusal by the Committee majority, consisting of six Democrats
 as against four Republicans, at the very outset to allow the scope to
 individual members even with every safeguard proposed against the
 alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and disquieting.
 
 Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light of this
 iron curtain that was thus imposed.
 
 Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing records.
 Vigorous and public denial was made presumably on Executive authority
 that any records were missing. Subsequently it developed that several
 records were missing and most inadequate explanations were supplied. How
 any public interest could possibly have been prejudiced by affording any
 opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this character
 has never been satisfactorily explained.
 
 These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep entire
 control of the investigation in the hands of the Committee majority who
 were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to themselves the
 capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate investigation of their own
 administration. The history of human conduct furnishes few precedents to
 justify such confidence.
 
 Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the data and
 testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty
 surrounding the work of the Committee.
 
 Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health did
 not permit him to undergo the strain. Access to his diary was denied by
 majority vote.
 
 To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness, Senator
 Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the
 official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in open
 hearing of the Committee (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14437 ff.).
 
 Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the
 Committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these questions,
 which were highly pertinent to the inquiry.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      501
 
 Later, Senator Ferguson submitted a supplementary list of 61 questions
 to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476).
 
 Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his answers
 are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make up for the
 deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176 questions.
 
 Secretary Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he gave
 his official version of the matters before the Committee and was briefly
 examined by the counsel, but minority members of the Committee were not
 permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers to written
 interrogatories from Committee members proved unresponsive, there was no
 way to secure further information from him.
 
 The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise denied to the
 Committee. The assertion of its confidential character was somewhat
 belied by its submission for examination to certain individuals with a
 view to its commercial publication.
 
 The denial to the Committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was
 particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of the
 diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the
 prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the
 record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand
 the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the
 Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpoenas for their
 production.
 
 Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston Churchill and
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to December 7, 1941, were
 not available to the Committee, although there is good reason to believe
 that they bore on the gathering crisis. Other messages between Mr.
 Churchill and the British Embassy and American authorities were made
 available to the Committee, but our Government replies or action taken
 were not so available.
 
 The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country not on
 official business while hearings of this Committee were going on. His
 intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would have
 cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a request for
 the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused.
 
 President Roosevelt's secretary, Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to
 determine for herself and the Committee and the country what portions of
 the official correspondence of the late President had any relevancy to
 Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the
 responsibility placed upon this Committee.
 
 One of the very important questions concerning the defense of Hawaii
 dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to install
 radar and other warning devices. Members of the Committee sought to
 inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., in this
 connection, but the Committee decided against it.
 
 The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible to
 avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl Harbor
 tragedy was left largely unexplored.
 
 We are permitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but these are
 fascinating.
 
 A modus vivendi was under discussion with Japan in November 1941 to run
 for 3 months. This had been strongly urged by the War and Navy
 authorities in order to supply absolutely essential time for
 
 502            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 preparation. Secretary Stimson and Knox went over the terms of this
 document and advised Secretary Hull that it adequately protected our
 interest.
 
 Suddenly the modus vivendi was dropped from the agenda and there was
 substituted the Hull message which was followed shortly after by the
 attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
 Early on the morning after the delivery of the Hull message Lord Halifax
 arrived at the State Department. He found Mr. Welles in charge and asked
 him what has become of the modus vivendi. Mr. Welles replied that it was
 dropped because of Chinese lack of interest. Lord Halifax intimated a
 continuing British interest and Mr. Welles significantly replied: "That
 is not the way London sounded yesterday."
 
 The message from Churchill of the preceding day certainly bears out the
 Welles' observation. The Committee was told by the State Department that
 there is no record of any telephone conversations between Mr. Churchill
 and President Roosevelt. This certainly invites inquiry.
 
 The Halifax early morning visit in apparent ignorance of the Churchill
 message of the day before and of the decision to drop the modus vivendi
 is not in tune with usual British diplomatic procedure.
 
 Whether or not the Japanese would have accepted the modus vivendi must
 remain a matter of opinion.
 
 Whether or not it should have been submitted is a matter on which light
 might well be shed.
 
 Particularly is this the case when we have the testimony of Gen. George
 C. Marshall that a delay by the Japanese from December 1941 into January
 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the
 wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before
 Moscow in December 1941.
 
 Whether or not such a development would have been one to be desired must
 remain for future investigation when more of the diplomatic history of
 the closing months of 1941 can be more thoroughly explored.
 
 In short the Committee labored under great difficulties and was not in
 possession of the full historical record pertinent to the ease before
 it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing amount of
 material was developed in the limited time allowed to cover such a vast
 field. It is the duty of the Committee to render a report, regardless of
 the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts are at hand to pass on
 the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. A
 careful review of the evidence is convincing enough that these issues
 can be decided now.
 
 FORM OF THIS REPORT
 
 Accepting the primary obligations of the Committee thus defined and
 regarding the questions presented above as directly relevant to this
 inquiry, we have reviewed the testimony, documents, and other materials
 before the Committee, and we have drawn the following conclusions in
 respect of responsibility for the catastrophe, which we submit, are
 fully warranted by the evidence before the Committee. For convenience,
 we present the conclusions seriatim and then re-
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      503
 
 produce each conclusion separately with comment and citations Of
 evidence in support of it whenever it is not a mere statement taken from
 the evidence before the Committee.
 
 These citations, of course, do not exhaust all the evidence which would
 be adduced to support the respective conclusions. To make them so
 comprehensive would require the reproduction of hundreds, if not
 thousands, of pages of testimony and documents. The conclusions stated
 below resolve all the evidence developed by the Committee. The citations
 are in each case merely representative and authoritative by way of
 explanation and clarification of what is confirmed by numerous witnesses
 and exhibits and stated by men who were in a position to know what was
 known and done by officials of he United States, civil and military, in
 relation to Pearl Harbor. In other words, citations of hearsay,
 controverted evidence, and gossip have been avoided in an effort to keep
 the conclusions within the bounds of unmistakable fact.
 
 Another point with regard to the conclusions listed should be
 emphasized: *Collectively, they constitute one statement* in answer to
 the general question and the four specific questions presented above as
 necessarily raised by the primary duty of this Committee; and many items
 of evidence cited in support of one or more conclusions also help
 sustain other conclusions. Hence in testing the validity of any one
 among the conclusions, attention must be given to the cross references
 to other items of evidence which are made in various parts of the text.
 This unfortunately makes for some unavoidable duplication has been held
 to a minimum.
 
 CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND 
      RESPONSIBILITY
 
 1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
 preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
 after November 26 the immediate imminence of war.
 
 2. By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached
 the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such point as to
 convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at
 Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration
 "what the tactics would be" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415). Unless Japan
 yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States,
 there were three choices on tactics before the President and the
 Cabinet; they could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without
 a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue
 of peace or war before Congress (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.).
 
 3. So imminent was war on November 25, that the President in a
 conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson,
 General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were
 likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1);
 and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should
 maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position firing the first shot
 without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).
 
 4. Having considered without agreeing upon the proposition that message
 on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President and the
 Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-
 
 504            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 tary of the Navy, pursued from November 25 to December 7 the tactics of
 waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.
 
 5. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization
 for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior
 to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to
 make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the
 imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.
 
 6. Through the Army and Navy Intelligence Services extensive information
 was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs by intercepted and
 decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the growing danger of
 war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence of a Japanese
 attack.
 
 7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war
 was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national
 preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the
 Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the
 Chief of Naval Operations.
 
 8. Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities
 in Washington and the Commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for
 expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make Lt
 surprise attack on the United States.
 
 9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other
 information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of
 the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding
 from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the
 probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence
 to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary
 from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable and that
 President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account before
 December 7.
 
 10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of the
 President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at least
 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few days was
 so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having reached this
 conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
 was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and the Secretary
 of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their armed
 forces on an all-out alert for war.
 
 11. The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await
 the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress
 increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use
 the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full
 alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7,
 1941.
 
 12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and operations
 which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed
 in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor
 commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate
 instructions to the latter in language not open to misinterpretation as
 to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions.
 
 13. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
 authorities in Washington during November were couched in such
 conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      505
 
 the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations
 with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting
 the particular actions to be taken orders that were beyond all
 reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard
 the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.
 
 14. High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the
 evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which
 indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and they
 failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian
 commanders.
 
 15. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and
 consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and
 sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in
 considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation,
 unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in
 Washington.
 
 16. The President of the United States was responsible for the failure
 to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the
 Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the
 Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and dispatching
 clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated
 the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the
 United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and
 Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested this power in
 him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people
 of the United States.
 
 17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
 commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
 to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
 the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities for their failures in
 this respect.
 
 18. Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and
 whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for Japanese attack,
 attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military
 administration requires taking note of the fact that they were
 designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington all of whom
 were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of
 subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed
 forces of the United States.
 
 19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
 responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its
 ultimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence
 information, direction of affairs and constitutional duty to plan e
 defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the
 commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet
 essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do
 those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost.
 Washington authorities failed in (1); and the commanding officers at
 Hawaii failed in (2).
 
 20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American
 outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday morning,
 December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick
 and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by
 the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship
 
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      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
 establishment of the Republic to our own times.
 
 21. The contention coming from so high an authority as President Truman
 on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
 individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
 cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
 whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken.
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
      RESTATED WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
 
 1. *The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
 preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
 after November 26 the immediate imminence of war*.
 
 The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from March
 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin D.
 Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws, and established practice of the
 United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State, Cordell
 Hull, such correspondence and communications relating thereto as he
 deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to him it was
 the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed of all
 transactions that were critical in nature and especially those involving
 the possible use of the armed forces of the United States.
 
 At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that
 affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become
 involved in a war with Japan. On that day Admiral Richardson asked the
 President "if we were going to enter the war." According to the
 admiral's account the President replied
 
 "that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the
 Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked
 the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they
 (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the
 war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they
 would make a mistake and have would enter the war (Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 683-
 4).
 
 In a letter dated January 21, 1941, President Roosevelt informed
 Ambassador Grew that "our interests are menaced both in Europe and in
 the Far East. * * * Our strategy of self-defense must be a global
 strategy * * *" and that "our strategy" must envisage "helping to
 prevent a closing of channels of communication" between Great Britain
 and various parts of the world (Grew. Ten Years in Japan, pp. 361-363).
 Grew's letter dated December 14, 1940, to the President contained this
 sentence, "* * * the principal point at issue, as I see it, is not
 whether we call a halt to the Japanese program. But when." (Grew, Ibid.,
 p. 360.) The President replied in a letter: "I find myself in decided
 agreement with your conclusions."
 
 There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January 1941
 President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global war
 and that his decisions as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief must
 thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction. This evidence
 is as follows: Beginning in January 1941 representatives of the American
 armed forces and representatives of British and Dutch armed forces on
 the suggestion of the United States started a series of conversations in
 respect of cooperation against Japan in the Far East. Out of these and
 subsequent conversations were developed
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      507
 
 American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against Japan
 if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against British, Dutch,
 *or* American possessions in the Far East. President Roosevelt approved
 these plans, "except officially," as Admiral Stark testified
 
 The President's commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed by
 understandings previously reached between American, British, and Dutch
 military authorities. In a memorandum to the President dated November
 27, 1941 (exhibit 17), General Marshall and Admiral Stark stated:
 
 "After consultation with each other United States, British, and Dutch
 military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
 counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan
 attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the
 United states the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies
 or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100  East or
 South of the 10  North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the 
      Loyalty
 Islands."
 
 The agreement referred to by Admiral Stark and General Marshall was
 reached at conferences in Singapore in April 1941 between United States,
 British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. It provided
 that they would advise their respective Governments to authorize
 military operations against Japan in the event of any of the following
 Japanese movements (exhibit 50, par. 26):
 
 "(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
 or mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not
 possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of
 war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which although
 technically an act of war could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is
 recognized the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war
 must lie with the government concerned.
 
 "(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to
 the West of 100  East or to the South or 10  North.
 
 "(c) The movement or a large number of Japanese warships or of a convoy
 of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships which from its position
 and course as clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands. The East
 coast of the Isthmus of Kra of the East coast of Malaya or had crossed
 the parallel of 6  North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line 
      from
 the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island or the Equator East of Waigeo.
 
 "(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
 
 "(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty
 Islands."
 
 The report of the Singapore conversations and the memoranda to the
 President by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on November 5 and 27,
 1941, set forth definite geographic lines, over which a Japanese advance
 was considered to require armed resistance from the United States, Great
 Britain, and the Netherlands. One line ran north and south through
 Thailand. It was parallel to longitude 100  east. A Japanese movement
 west of it was prohibited. This line protected Burma and the Indian
 Ocean. Another line ran east and west across the Isthmus of Kra and was
 parallel with latitude 10  north. A Japanese movement over this line 
      was
 forbidden. This line in effect protected the Malay Peninsula and
 Singapore. The Singapore report sets out certain additional lines. One
 such line was parallel of latitude 6  north and extended between 
      Malaya
 and the Philippines.
 
 This line protected the Dutch East Indies. They were also protected from
 Japanese attack, particularly one originating in the
 
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      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Palau Islands, by another line extending from the Gulf of Davao in the
 Philippines to Waigeo Island in the Dutch East Indies. On December 4,
 1941, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent to the British and
 Dutch Admiralties his recommendation
 
 "that if the Dutch authorities considered a warning should be given
 Japan it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of
 the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces
 crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be
 attacked (exhibit 79 p. 12)."
 
 While the President did not approve written agreements on these
 understandings he and the high authorities in Washington acted with the
 British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made. Likewise the
 Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United States, Britain, and
 Netherlands East Indies were working together. There is ample evidence
 in the record to this effect. (Ex. 1, p. 205  Tokyo to Berlin 
      dispatch:
 Id. P. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.)
 
 Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were based upon
 the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the Dutch Netherlands,
 China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan for the simple defense
 of American possessions against Japan was developed by the armed forces
 of the United States between January 1941 and December 7, 1941, with a
 view to safeguarding American interests separately. After the Japanese
 attack on December 7, American, British, Dutch, and Australian
 operations in the Pacific theater were conducted on the cooperative
 principle which had governed the military and naval conversations and
 planning between January and December 1941.
 
 The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of discussion
 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic
 Conference in August 1941, and agreements or understandings reached by
 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at that Conference were
 based on a common program for dealing with Japan and close cooperation
 between the United States and Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and
 naval affairs in respect of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their
 chief understandings as thus far disclosed by official records were
 three in number:
 
 (1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking any further
 steps in dominating neighboring countries by force or threat of force.
 
 (2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States
 with protective assistance by British armed forces in guarding against a
 possible Nazi thrust from the mainland.
 
 (3) Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in "the
 policing of the world" during a transition period following the close of
 the war.
 
 Admiral Stark and General Marshall did not approve these Singapore
 agreements because they were of a "political nature," beyond their
 authority to sanction. They recommended, however, that these be taken up
 by the political departments of the governments involved. Further, under
 other provisions of the Singapore agreements, Britain entrusted the
 naval defense of her vital interests in the so-called Malay barrier
 exclusively to the United States and the Dutch. Only three British
 vessels were allocated to the defense of this area, and
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      509
 
 these only for escort and patrol. This arrangement was not approved by
 Stark and Marshall (exhibit 65).
 
 After an understanding was reached at the Atlantic Conference on common
 diplomatic action against Japan
 
 "the President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any
 further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in
 war *could be held off for at least thirty days*." [*Italics supplied*.]
 
 The Prime Minister thought that there was a reasonable chance of
 averting a war in the Pacific (Sumner Welles, Memorandum of
 Conversation, August 11, 1941; Ex. 22-C, p. 9).
 
 It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister
 Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, President Roosevelt
 would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with Great
 Britain in "the policing of the world" for a transition period after the
 war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the development of
 the war the United States would become involved in it.
 
 In his statement to the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday, August 17, 1941,
 immediately following his return from the Atlantic Conference, President
 Roosevelt warned Japan against further attempts to dominate "neighboring
 countries," not merely the possessions of the United States, and used
 diplomatic language which, according to long-established usages, had
 only one meaning, namely, that such further attempts would result in a
 conflict with the United States. His statement read:
 
 "* * * this Government (of the United States) now finds it necessary to
 say the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes *any
 further steps* in pursuance of a policy or program of military
 domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the
 Government of the United States *will be compelled to take immediately
 any and all steps* which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the
 legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American
 nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United
 States. [Italics supplied; Foreign Relations of the United States:
 Japan, vol. II, p. 556-557.]"
 
 In urging upon the State Department, in September 1941, an acceptance of
 the Japanese proposal for a conference between President Roosevelt and
 Premier Konoye, the American Ambassador in Tokyo Joseph Grew, declared
 that, in his opinion, unless a certain amount of confidence be placed by
 the United States in the professed sincerity of the Premier Konoye and
 his supporters in making arrangements for he proposed conference:
 
 "the ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be
 successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of
 Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be
 avoided in the Pacific (Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 436-442)."
 
 Accordingly, in rejecting the Japanese proposal for this conferences
 President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull whatever their reasons and
 however justifiable these reasons may have been, had before them the
 deliberate judgment of the American Ambassador in Tokyo that such action
 would reduce the chances of peace and increase the probability of war.
 The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, after all Japanese efforts
 to bring about the conference between President Roosevelt and Premier
 Konoye had failed.
 
 On November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President
 Roosevelt, rejected the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a
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