INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

500            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these instances
did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be the case in the
Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure and results in each
case did honor to the committees concerned and proved salutary for the
Nation. Complete concurrence with the most admirable outline of the
purposes and scope of the investigation of the events leading up to
Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World War as presented to the Senate
by the author of the resolution at the time of its introduction and
hearty approval of much that has been done by the Committee must not
blind us to the extent to which the investigation lived up to its
advance billing by its distinguished sponsor.

At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this
character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the entire
history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected and
neither of the two members of the Committee who had received rather
extended training under the then Senator Truman were allowed to follow
the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that had repeatedly
produced most gratifying results in their earlier experience.

This firm refusal by the Committee majority, consisting of six Democrats
as against four Republicans, at the very outset to allow the scope to
individual members even with every safeguard proposed against the
alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and disquieting.

Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light of this
iron curtain that was thus imposed.

Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing records.
Vigorous and public denial was made presumably on Executive authority
that any records were missing. Subsequently it developed that several
records were missing and most inadequate explanations were supplied. How
any public interest could possibly have been prejudiced by affording any
opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this character
has never been satisfactorily explained.

These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep entire
control of the investigation in the hands of the Committee majority who
were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to themselves the
capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate investigation of their own
administration. The history of human conduct furnishes few precedents to
justify such confidence.

Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the data and
testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty
surrounding the work of the Committee.

Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health did
not permit him to undergo the strain. Access to his diary was denied by
majority vote.

To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness, Senator
Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the
official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in open
hearing of the Committee (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14437 ff.).

Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the
Committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these questions,
which were highly pertinent to the inquiry.

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Later, Senator Ferguson submitted a supplementary list of 61 questions
to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476).

Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his answers
are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make up for the
deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176 questions.

Secretary Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he gave
his official version of the matters before the Committee and was briefly
examined by the counsel, but minority members of the Committee were not
permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers to written
interrogatories from Committee members proved unresponsive, there was no
way to secure further information from him.

The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise denied to the
Committee. The assertion of its confidential character was somewhat
belied by its submission for examination to certain individuals with a
view to its commercial publication.

The denial to the Committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was
particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of the
diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the
prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the
record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand
the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the
Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpoenas for their
production.

Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston Churchill and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to December 7, 1941, were
not available to the Committee, although there is good reason to believe
that they bore on the gathering crisis. Other messages between Mr.
Churchill and the British Embassy and American authorities were made
available to the Committee, but our Government replies or action taken
were not so available.

The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country not on
official business while hearings of this Committee were going on. His
intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would have
cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a request for
the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused.

President Roosevelt's secretary, Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to
determine for herself and the Committee and the country what portions of
the official correspondence of the late President had any relevancy to
Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the
responsibility placed upon this Committee.

One of the very important questions concerning the defense of Hawaii
dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to install
radar and other warning devices. Members of the Committee sought to
inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., in this
connection, but the Committee decided against it.

The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible to
avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl Harbor
tragedy was left largely unexplored.

We are permitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but these are
fascinating.

A modus vivendi was under discussion with Japan in November 1941 to run
for 3 months. This had been strongly urged by the War and Navy
authorities in order to supply absolutely essential time for

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preparation. Secretary Stimson and Knox went over the terms of this
document and advised Secretary Hull that it adequately protected our
interest.

Suddenly the modus vivendi was dropped from the agenda and there was
substituted the Hull message which was followed shortly after by the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

Early on the morning after the delivery of the Hull message Lord Halifax
arrived at the State Department. He found Mr. Welles in charge and asked
him what has become of the modus vivendi. Mr. Welles replied that it was
dropped because of Chinese lack of interest. Lord Halifax intimated a
continuing British interest and Mr. Welles significantly replied: "That
is not the way London sounded yesterday."

The message from Churchill of the preceding day certainly bears out the
Welles' observation. The Committee was told by the State Department that
there is no record of any telephone conversations between Mr. Churchill
and President Roosevelt. This certainly invites inquiry.

The Halifax early morning visit in apparent ignorance of the Churchill
message of the day before and of the decision to drop the modus vivendi
is not in tune with usual British diplomatic procedure.

Whether or not the Japanese would have accepted the modus vivendi must
remain a matter of opinion.

Whether or not it should have been submitted is a matter on which light
might well be shed.

Particularly is this the case when we have the testimony of Gen. George
C. Marshall that a delay by the Japanese from December 1941 into January
1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the
wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before
Moscow in December 1941.

Whether or not such a development would have been one to be desired must
remain for future investigation when more of the diplomatic history of
the closing months of 1941 can be more thoroughly explored.

In short the Committee labored under great difficulties and was not in
possession of the full historical record pertinent to the ease before
it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing amount of
material was developed in the limited time allowed to cover such a vast
field. It is the duty of the Committee to render a report, regardless of
the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts are at hand to pass on
the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. A
careful review of the evidence is convincing enough that these issues
can be decided now.

FORM OF THIS REPORT

Accepting the primary obligations of the Committee thus defined and
regarding the questions presented above as directly relevant to this
inquiry, we have reviewed the testimony, documents, and other materials
before the Committee, and we have drawn the following conclusions in
respect of responsibility for the catastrophe, which we submit, are
fully warranted by the evidence before the Committee. For convenience,
we present the conclusions seriatim and then re-

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produce each conclusion separately with comment and citations Of
evidence in support of it whenever it is not a mere statement taken from
the evidence before the Committee.

These citations, of course, do not exhaust all the evidence which would
be adduced to support the respective conclusions. To make them so
comprehensive would require the reproduction of hundreds, if not
thousands, of pages of testimony and documents. The conclusions stated
below resolve all the evidence developed by the Committee. The citations
are in each case merely representative and authoritative by way of
explanation and clarification of what is confirmed by numerous witnesses
and exhibits and stated by men who were in a position to know what was
known and done by officials of he United States, civil and military, in
relation to Pearl Harbor. In other words, citations of hearsay,
controverted evidence, and gossip have been avoided in an effort to keep
the conclusions within the bounds of unmistakable fact.

Another point with regard to the conclusions listed should be
emphasized: *Collectively, they constitute one statement* in answer to
the general question and the four specific questions presented above as
necessarily raised by the primary duty of this Committee; and many items
of evidence cited in support of one or more conclusions also help
sustain other conclusions. Hence in testing the validity of any one
among the conclusions, attention must be given to the cross references
to other items of evidence which are made in various parts of the text.
This unfortunately makes for some unavoidable duplication has been held
to a minimum.

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND RESPONSIBILITY

1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
after November 26 the immediate imminence of war.

2. By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached
the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such point as to
convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at
Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration
"what the tactics would be" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415). Unless Japan
yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States,
there were three choices on tactics before the President and the
Cabinet; they could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without
a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue
of peace or war before Congress (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.).

3. So imminent was war on November 25, that the President in a
conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson,
General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were
likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1);
and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should
maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position firing the first shot
without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).

4. Having considered without agreeing upon the proposition that message
on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President and the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-

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tary of the Navy, pursued from November 25 to December 7 the tactics of
waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.

5. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization
for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior
to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to
make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the
imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.

6. Through the Army and Navy Intelligence Services extensive information
was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs by intercepted and
decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the growing danger of
war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence of a Japanese
attack.

7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war
was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national
preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations.

8. Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities
in Washington and the Commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for
expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make Lt
surprise attack on the United States.

9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other
information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of
the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding
from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the
probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence
to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary
from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable and that
President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account before
December 7.

10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of the
President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at least
10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few days was
so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having reached this
conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their armed
forces on an all-out alert for war.

11. The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await
the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress
increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use
the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full
alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7,
1941.

12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and operations
which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed
in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor
commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate
instructions to the latter in language not open to misinterpretation as
to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions.

13. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
authorities in Washington during November were couched in such
conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            505

the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations
with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting
the particular actions to be taken orders that were beyond all
reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard
the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.

14. High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the
evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which
indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and they
failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian
commanders.

15. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and
consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and
sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in
considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation,
unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in
Washington.

16. The President of the United States was responsible for the failure
to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the
Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and dispatching
clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated
the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the
United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested this power in
him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people
of the United States.

17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities for their failures in
this respect.

18. Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and
whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for Japanese attack,
attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military
administration requires taking note of the fact that they were
designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington all of whom
were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of
subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed
forces of the United States.

19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its
ultimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence
information, direction of affairs and constitutional duty to plan e
defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the
commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet
essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do
those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost.
Washington authorities failed in (1); and the commanding officers at
Hawaii failed in (2).

20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American
outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday morning,
December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick
and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by
the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship

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rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
establishment of the Republic to our own times.

21. The contention coming from so high an authority as President Truman
on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken.

CONCLUSIONS RESTATED WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

1. *The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
after November 26 the immediate imminence of war*.

The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from March
4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws, and established practice of the
United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, such correspondence and communications relating thereto as he
deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to him it was
the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed of all
transactions that were critical in nature and especially those involving
the possible use of the armed forces of the United States.

At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that
affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become
involved in a war with Japan. On that day Admiral Richardson asked the
President "if we were going to enter the war." According to the
admiral's account the President replied 

"that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the
Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked
the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they
(the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the
war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they
would make a mistake and have would enter the war (Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 683-
4).

In a letter dated January 21, 1941, President Roosevelt informed
Ambassador Grew that "our interests are menaced both in Europe and in
the Far East. * * * Our strategy of self-defense must be a global
strategy * * *" and that "our strategy" must envisage "helping to
prevent a closing of channels of communication" between Great Britain
and various parts of the world (Grew. Ten Years in Japan, pp. 361-363).
Grew's letter dated December 14, 1940, to the President contained this
sentence, "* * * the principal point at issue, as I see it, is not
whether we call a halt to the Japanese program. But when." (Grew, Ibid.,
p. 360.) The President replied in a letter: "I find myself in decided
agreement with your conclusions."

There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January 1941
President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global war
and that his decisions as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief must
thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction. This evidence
is as follows: Beginning in January 1941 representatives of the American
armed forces and representatives of British and Dutch armed forces on
the suggestion of the United States started a series of conversations in
respect of cooperation against Japan in the Far East. Out of these and
subsequent conversations were developed

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            507

American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against Japan
if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against British, Dutch,
*or* American possessions in the Far East. President Roosevelt approved
these plans, "except officially," as Admiral Stark testified

The President's commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed by
understandings previously reached between American, British, and Dutch
military authorities. In a memorandum to the President dated November
27, 1941 (exhibit 17), General Marshall and Admiral Stark stated:

"After consultation with each other United States, British, and Dutch
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan
attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the
United states the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100  East or
South of the 10  North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands."

The agreement referred to by Admiral Stark and General Marshall was
reached at conferences in Singapore in April 1941 between United States,
British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. It provided
that they would advise their respective Governments to authorize
military operations against Japan in the event of any of the following
Japanese movements (exhibit 50, par. 26):

"(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not
possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of
war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which although
technically an act of war could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is
recognized the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war
must lie with the government concerned.

"(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to
the West of 100  East or to the South or 10  North.

"(c) The movement or a large number of Japanese warships or of a convoy
of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships which from its position
and course as clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands. The East
coast of the Isthmus of Kra of the East coast of Malaya or had crossed
the parallel of 6  North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from
the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island or the Equator East of Waigeo.

"(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

"(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands."

The report of the Singapore conversations and the memoranda to the
President by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on November 5 and 27,
1941, set forth definite geographic lines, over which a Japanese advance
was considered to require armed resistance from the United States, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands. One line ran north and south through
Thailand. It was parallel to longitude 100  east. A Japanese movement
west of it was prohibited. This line protected Burma and the Indian
Ocean. Another line ran east and west across the Isthmus of Kra and was
parallel with latitude 10  north. A Japanese movement over this line was
forbidden. This line in effect protected the Malay Peninsula and
Singapore. The Singapore report sets out certain additional lines. One
such line was parallel of latitude 6  north and extended between Malaya
and the Philippines.

This line protected the Dutch East Indies. They were also protected from
Japanese attack, particularly one originating in the

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Palau Islands, by another line extending from the Gulf of Davao in the
Philippines to Waigeo Island in the Dutch East Indies. On December 4,
1941, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent to the British and
Dutch Admiralties his recommendation 

"that if the Dutch authorities considered a warning should be given
Japan it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of
the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces
crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be
attacked (exhibit 79 p. 12)."

While the President did not approve written agreements on these
understandings he and the high authorities in Washington acted with the
British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made. Likewise the
Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United States, Britain, and
Netherlands East Indies were working together. There is ample evidence
in the record to this effect. (Ex. 1, p. 205  Tokyo to Berlin dispatch:
Id. P. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.)

Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were based upon
the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the Dutch Netherlands,
China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan for the simple defense
of American possessions against Japan was developed by the armed forces
of the United States between January 1941 and December 7, 1941, with a
view to safeguarding American interests separately. After the Japanese
attack on December 7, American, British, Dutch, and Australian
operations in the Pacific theater were conducted on the cooperative
principle which had governed the military and naval conversations and
planning between January and December 1941.

The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of discussion
between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941, and agreements or understandings reached by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at that Conference were
based on a common program for dealing with Japan and close cooperation
between the United States and Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and
naval affairs in respect of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their
chief understandings as thus far disclosed by official records were
three in number:

(1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking any further
steps in dominating neighboring countries by force or threat of force.

(2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States
with protective assistance by British armed forces in guarding against a
possible Nazi thrust from the mainland.

(3) Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in "the
policing of the world" during a transition period following the close of
the war.

Admiral Stark and General Marshall did not approve these Singapore
agreements because they were of a "political nature," beyond their
authority to sanction. They recommended, however, that these be taken up
by the political departments of the governments involved. Further, under
other provisions of the Singapore agreements, Britain entrusted the
naval defense of her vital interests in the so-called Malay barrier
exclusively to the United States and the Dutch. Only three British
vessels were allocated to the defense of this area, and

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            509

these only for escort and patrol. This arrangement was not approved by
Stark and Marshall (exhibit 65).

After an understanding was reached at the Atlantic Conference on common
diplomatic action against Japan 

"the President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any
further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in
war *could be held off for at least thirty days*." [*Italics supplied*.]

The Prime Minister thought that there was a reasonable chance of
averting a war in the Pacific (Sumner Welles, Memorandum of
Conversation, August 11, 1941; Ex. 22-C, p. 9).

It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister
Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, President Roosevelt
would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with Great
Britain in "the policing of the world" for a transition period after the
war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the development of
the war the United States would become involved in it.

In his statement to the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday, August 17, 1941,
immediately following his return from the Atlantic Conference, President
Roosevelt warned Japan against further attempts to dominate "neighboring
countries," not merely the possessions of the United States, and used
diplomatic language which, according to long-established usages, had
only one meaning, namely, that such further attempts would result in a
conflict with the United States. His statement read:

"* * * this Government (of the United States) now finds it necessary to
say the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes *any
further steps* in pursuance of a policy or program of military
domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the
Government of the United States *will be compelled to take immediately
any and all steps* which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the
legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American
nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United
States. [Italics supplied; Foreign Relations of the United States:
Japan, vol. II, p. 556-557.]"

In urging upon the State Department, in September 1941, an acceptance of
the Japanese proposal for a conference between President Roosevelt and
Premier Konoye, the American Ambassador in Tokyo Joseph Grew, declared
that, in his opinion, unless a certain amount of confidence be placed by
the United States in the professed sincerity of the Premier Konoye and
his supporters in making arrangements for he proposed conference:

"the ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be
successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of
Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be
avoided in the Pacific (Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 436-442)."

Accordingly, in rejecting the Japanese proposal for this conferences
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull whatever their reasons and
however justifiable these reasons may have been, had before them the
deliberate judgment of the American Ambassador in Tokyo that such action
would reduce the chances of peace and increase the probability of war.
The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, after all Japanese efforts
to bring about the conference between President Roosevelt and Premier
Konoye had failed.

On November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President
Roosevelt, rejected the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a

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