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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

200            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

It is to be noted that, according to Mr. Stimson's diary, after
Secretary Hull had told him the matter was now in the hands of the Army
and Navy, he called the President who gave him a little different view
"He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent
statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a
reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular
position." [215] It was later during the day, while in conference with
the Secretary of Navy and General Gerow incident to preparing the
warning dispatch, that Mr. Stimson called Mr. Hull [216] and "got the
exact statement from him of what the situation was." [217] And from
information available on November 27 there was *only the barest
possibility*, precisely the statement in the warning, that Japan would
accept or respond with a counter proposal to the note of November 26.

It is to be noted that it was not until November 28 that a dispatch from
Tokyo to Washington was intercepted stating in part: [218]

"* * * with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken
off."

While this message would indicate at the time and we now know it to be a
fact that Japanese negotiations were thereafter a fraud, on the very
next day, November 29, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was
intercepted stating, [219] "We wish you would make *one more attempt*
verbally along the following lines," thereafter suggesting a line of
approach in the discussions and concluding, "In carrying out this
instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like
a breaking off of negotiations." Here there is manifested more than a
"bare possibility" that the Japanese would continue the negotiations and
had this *Magic* message been supplied General Short there is no doubt
he would have concluded the same thing even after November 27. Indeed,
had Admiral Kimmel and General Short been supplied all of the diplomatic
messages reviewed by this Committee it is concluded that their estimate
of the diplomatic situation would not have gone beyond a belief that
there was only the barest possibility that Japan would continue the
negotiations; for the messages indicate throughout a conflicting and
variable disposition by Japan. With respect to pursuance of the
negotiations and her desire for peace. [220]

*The message to General Short is regarded as more accurately stating the
status of the diplomatic negotiations than did the Navy message advising
flatly that negotiations had ceased*. The action taken by the Navy was
with a view to making clear beyond question the seriousness [221] of the
situation whereas the Army message, as stated by Secretary Stimson,
sought to give General Short the *exact* diplomatic situation. It is to
be noted that General Short had available the

[215] Committee record, p. 14422.
[216] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p. 1188.
[217] See Mr. Stimson's diary committee record, p. 14423; see also pp.
2686, 2687.
[218] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
[219] Id., at p. 199.
[220] See in this connection the testimony of Admiral Leigh Noyes,
committee record, pp. 12720-12722 It should be noted that Captain
McCollum said: "I discounted anything which showed that they were not
going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they
were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the situation
between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I
certainly should not have put my office on a 24-hour basis early in
November." Committee record, p. 9268.
[221] See testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, p. 5163.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:            201

Navy estimate of the situation inasmuch as he saw the "war warning" of
November 27 just as Admiral Kimmel, in turn, saw the War Department
warning of the same date.

Even conceding for purposes of discussion that the dispatch to General
Short should have contained the same statement as did the Navy message;
that is, "negotiations * * * have ceased", such does not in any way
alter the responsibilities in the case. Certainly in any situation no
commanding officer will determine his course of action on the basis of
the bare possibility that negotiations may be continued. How much more
is this true when in the same message he is told that hostilities are
possible at any moment and is given orders indicating the necessity for
defense against an attack from without!

It is in fact believed that had the message been otherwise worded,
stating only that there was a *possibility the negotiations would be
ruptured* and carrying the same orders, it was the duty of the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to gird his defense
against the implications of that possibility. General Short was advised
there was only the barest possibility that negotiations were *not
already ruptured*.

FAILURE TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE SHORT REPLY OF NOVEMBER 28

It is to be recalled that General Short's reply to the warning message
of November 27 signed "Marshall," [222] read: [223]

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad
our seven two twenty seventh."

The evidence reflects that it was the responsibility of the War Plans
Division of the War Department to prepare the warning and the orders it
contained for approval by the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War.
[224] Having instructed the commanding general in Hawaii to report
measures taken, it was the responsibility of the War Plans Division to
review the report and to advise the Hawaiian commander in the event the
action taken by him was not in keeping with the desires of the War
Department. The brief report of action taken, as sent by General Short,
was initialed by General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division and by
the Secretary of War. [225] The evidence is not clear as to whether the
report was seen by General Marshall inasmuch as it was not initialed by
him although he did initial other reports from overseas garrisons to
which the Short report may have been attached. [226]

[222] For reference convenience, this dispatch was as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first
overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
restricting as you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers." (Committee exhibit No. 32,
p. 7)
[223] See exhibit No. 32, p. 12. This is the form of the message as
paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department. The message as sent
read: "Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent
sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Short." It was addressed to the *Chief
of Staff*.
[224] See testimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2687 et seq.
[225] Id.
[226] Id.

202            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General Marshall testified: [227]

"I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short's reply, but the
presumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to
intervene which I did not do."

General Gerow testified that when the reply from General Short came
through he assumed it was in answer to the G-2 message that was sent by
General Miles to the Hawaiian Department [228] concerning the likelihood
of subversive activities. [229] He stated that after seeing the reply he
sent it to Colonel Bundy (now deceased) [229a] who headed the "plans
group" and that "it is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have
interpreted the message to mean, or the part of the message which said
'liaison with the Navy,' that the commanding general out there had
instituted protective measures against sabotage and was working with the
Navy to arrange for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance."
[230] It should be noted that General Gerow did not discuss the matter
with Colonel Bundy but merely suggested this as a reasonable assumption
from the way the message was worded General Gerow said: "I think my
executive officer, or the chief of any plans group, might possibly have
interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought
back to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not
explicitly cover the operation." [231] He observed that the reference to
a "No. 472" meant nothing to him at the time since this number was put
on the outgoing message by the Signal Corps and was not the number
assigned the document by the War Plans Division. [232]

General Gerow admitted that no inquiry was sent to General Short with
respect to his report of action taken and that in the light of
subsequent events he felt "it might have been desirable to send such an
inquiry, and had such an inquiry been sent it would probably have
developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not at that
time carrying out the directive in the message signed 'Marshall'." [233]
He remarked that "if that had been done, there would have been an
opportunity to correct the situation" but that he did not believe "the
message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage
measures only were being taken." [234] After stating that he interpreted
the report of General Short to be in reply to the Miles message
concerning subversive activities and noting that such an interpretation
left him without any reply whatever from the Hawaiian Department with
respect to the November 27 warning,

[227] Committee record, p. 3010. See also in this connection. Committee
Record, pp. 2899 and 3088.
[228] This message, addressed to G-2 Hawaiian Department, read:
"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may
ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commander General
and Chief of Staff only." Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
[229] Committee record, p. 2714
[229a] Col. Charles W. Bundy was killed in a plane crash shortly after
the attack while en route to Pearl Harbor.
[230] Id, at pp. 2713, 2714. In this connection Secretary Stimson said:
he (General Short) then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no
adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of
being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main
warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my
desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly
gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was
not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was
alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent
sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert
against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a
fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the
commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his
message that liaisons was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with
the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed
reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various
reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of
the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert
was in effect." See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp.
14408, 14409.
[231] Committee record, pp. 2716, 2717.
[232] Id., at p. 2715.
[236] Id., at p. 2716.
[234] Id.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             203

General Gerow explained: "I was handling a great many papers at that
time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division to
check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention anything
of importance that required action on my part." [235] He further
observed that it did not occur to him that General Short would not take
some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after receiving the
November 27 message "he was an experienced commander and it never
entered my mind that he would not take such action." [236] In the course
of counsel's examination reference was made to the following comments by
Secretary Stimson with respect to the investigation conducted by the
Army of the Pearl Harbor disaster: [237]

"Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in response to a message
which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and
a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War
Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on
the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air
raid or other hostile action.

"While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the
wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a
more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited
further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his
failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.

"The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a
report of he measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General
Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division.
A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not
done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would have
demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's
message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted."

General Gerow was asked if he felt the foregoing was a fair statement of
the situation. He replied: [238]

"Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to
the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short,
the responsibility must rest on War Plans Division, and *I accept that
responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division*."

Upon being asked if it were not the function of the Chief of Staff and
the Secretary of War to follow up on General Short's report, General
Gerow stated: [239]

"No, sir, I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group
of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those
messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans
Division should have drafted such an inquiry and presented it to the
Chief of Staff for approval. As I said, I was chief of that division,
and it was my responsibility."

[235] Committee record, p. 2717.
[236] Id., at pp. 2719, 2720.
[237] Id., at pp. 2727, 2728. See also committee exhibit No. 167.
[238] Committee record pp. 2726-2729. In the course of Committee
examination of General Marshall the following questions were propounded
and answers were given:

Question: "Well, a large number of people saw it (the Short reply)?
General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw
it he thought first that it was a response to a telegram sent out by G-2
relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact, when
I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was
called to the fact that this was a direct response to your telegram No.
472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed
his position and said, 'I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans
assume full responsibility.'

"Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this
examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just
as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same
responsibility that he did?"
Answer: "I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keefe, in relation to the
very thing you are talking about, when I was questioned in regard to
General Gerow's statement, that I thought there was a difference; that
he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is
that an answer to your questions?"
Question: "He had a direct responsibility?"
Answer: "And I had the full responsibility."
Question: "And you had the full responsibility. Well, just what do you
mean by that?"
Answer: "His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter
and he had a responsibility there. I am responsible for what the
General Staff did or did not do."

See Committee Record, pp. 3727, 3728.

204            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

As earlier pointed out, the War Plans Division had the duty of issuing
operational orders and directives; it directed an order to General Short
on November 27, instructing him to report measures taken; it failed
properly to supervise the report submitted by the commanding general
pursuant to direction. General Gerow, the head of the War Plans
Division, saw the report of measures taken in the Hawaiian Department
and presumed it was in response to a dispatch from Military Intelligence
warning of the likelihood of subversive activities. This is not a
tenable premise, however, inasmuch as the report by General Short was
addressed to the Chief of Staff and was therefore a reply to the warning
of November 27, signed "Marshall"; a reply to the message concerning
subversive activities would not have been addressed to the Chief of
Staff unless the latter had signed the message, which was not the case.
[240] Furthermore, the reference by General Short to the number of the
message to which he was replying necessarily entailed calling from file
the original outgoing dispatch in the event there was any doubt or
presumptions necessary in gauging to what the commanding general's
report was responsive. Knowing that a reply from General Short had been
called for, it was incumbent upon the War Plans Division to follow
closely the receipt of such reply and to insure that the action taken
was in accordance with that desired. While the reply from General Short
was ambiguous and misleading, it was nevertheless the duty of War Plans
to require a clear and unequivocal response. By its sheer brevity and
lack of detail alone, the report should have suggested the possibility
that the official mandate had not been adequately implemented.

The supervision by the War Plans Division in this instance was slipshod.
General Gerow, as head of the Division, must bear his share of
responsibility for this serious error, a responsibility which he has
unhesitatingly assumed. The primary responsibility, however, rests with
the appropriate subordinates of General Gerow who had the duty and
responsibility for supervision of details. [241]

THE "BERLIN MESSAGE"

An intercepted message from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30, 1941
(translated December 1) follows: [242]

"The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during
the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere
efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am
sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986) In the
face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview
Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially
communicate to them a summary of the developments. *Say to them that
lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude,
both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into
various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter
by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme
danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations
and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the
breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*."

[240] Id., at pp. 2721-2724.
[241] See section "Nature of Responsibilities," infra.
[242] Dispatch No. 985, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 204.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              205

Another message of the same date from Tokyo to Berlin read, in part:
[243]

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its
traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations,
re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in
the conversations carried on between the United States and England in
the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was
brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by
Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say,
the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan
was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of
friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand
they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency
to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. *That is to say that
it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has
become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could
no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear,
too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental
to our cause*."

And again: [244]

"The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon
the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the
Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in
case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese
Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It
is clearly a trick. *This clause alone, let alone others, makes it
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations*.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they
conferred with England, Australia the Netherlands, and China they did so
repeatedly. *Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy*."

This valuable intelligence added to the total of information pointing to
the mounting tenseness of relations but does not materially add to that
which was supplied our Hawaiian outpost in the warnings of November 27,
insofar as the prime duties of the commanders there were concerned.
These messages merely confirmed the conclusions already voiced three
days earlier to the outpost commanders that war was imminent; that
negotiations had ceased to all practical purposes; that hostile action
was possible at any moment.

CODE DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE

As has already been observed, Admiral Kimmel was advised by the Navy
Department concerning the intercepted messages relating to the
destruction of codes in various Japanese diplomatic establishments.
[245] While Admiral Kimmel failed to supply General Short this
intelligence it is apparent that the commanding general otherwise
obtained substantially the equivalent of this information. He was not,
however, supplied such information directly by the War Department.

In explaining the reason for the Army's not sending the code destruction
intelligence to Hawaii, General Miles testified: [246]

"The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least
the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much
more secure

[243] Dispatch No. 986, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 205-206.
[244] Id., at p. 206.
[245] See Part III, supra; also committee exhibit No. 37. For the
original intercepted messages concerning destruction of codes see
committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 209, 215, 216, 236, 249, among others.
[246] Committee record, p. 2221.

206            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security
that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every
reason to believe or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would
be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there."

The reason advanced by General Miles is consistent with the general
practice of the Army not to distribute Magic to field commanders for
security reasons. [247] While it appears that in some instances the Navy
in Hawaii was specifically advised to inform the Army of messages
received, the failure to instruct Admiral Kimmel to so inform General
Short concerning the Japanese destruction of codes did not by inference
or otherwise indicate that this intelligence should not be supplied the
Army. Considering that Hawaii was a command by mutual cooperation, the
War Department was properly privileged to take for granted that there
was a full exchange of information between the Army and Navy commanders,
[248] particularly after General Short had specifically stated in his
reply to the Department's warning of November 27 that he had established
*liaison with the Navy*.

The overwhelming preponderance of testimony by Army and Navy experts is
to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential documents
under the circumstances prevailing in early December of 1941 meant war
from a military standpoint. [249] It is clear that Washington adequately
discharged its responsibility in transmitting this information to
Hawaii. With the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel to read into this
intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-evident to him, it
is believed that in contemplation of the future the intelligence as well
as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof should be supplied
field commanders. [250]

THE MCCOLLUM DISPATCH

The Navy Department in Washington had available substantially the
information which was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel with respect
to radio intelligence concerning the location and movements of Japanese
vessels. It knew, as did Admiral Kimmel, that substantial carrier units
of the Japanese Fleet could not be located. This information was
carefully considered by the Office of Naval Intelligence. [251] Capt.
Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence,
was particularly charged with handling radio intelligence material and
it was he who drafted the dispatch of November 24,

[247] See section "The 'Magic' ", supra.
[248] See committee record, pp. 2220-2224. Secretary Stimson stated: "It
was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the
Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to
believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also
available to General Short." See statement of Secretary Stimson with
respect to Army Pearl Harbor Board's report, committee exhibit No. 157.
[249] Admiral Turner, for example stated: " * * * the destruction of
codes in that manner and in those places in my mind and experience is a
definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals
or other places those codes are destroyed. * * * It indicates war within
two or three days." Committee record, pp. 5294, 5295.

It is to be noted that Washington did not minimize the significance of
the code destruction intelligence despite the fact there were
indications this move by Tokyo might be in anticipation of the
possibility that the United States would close down her consulates. The
following intercepted dispatch of December 3, 1941, from Washington to
Tokyo is of pertinence in this regard: "*If we continue to increase our
forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will
close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to
steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls*."
Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 227.
[250] Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel said: " * * * the
Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I
feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have
enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant, I didn't draw the
proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can
gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusion from what I
got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that,
with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if
they had amplified and drawn the conclusions. See Roberts Commission
record, p. 589.
[251] See committee record, pp. 9119, 9120.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            207

1941, [252] to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, a copy of
which as sent Admiral Kimmel for information, instructing that the
commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District serve in effect as a
clearinghouse for data concerning Japanese naval movements inasmuch as
the information obtainable in the Philippine area was considered Lost
reliable.

Captain McCollum prepared a memorandum dated December 1, 1941, pointing
out that Japanese "service radio calls for units afloat were changed at
0000, 1 December 1941". [253] He also prepared another memorandum
bearing the same date summarizing the generally critical situation with
respect to Japan. [254] At a meeting attended by Admirals Stark,
Ingersoll, Turner and Wilkinson, among others, in the Navy Department on
the morning of December 1, Captain McCollum personally read his
memorandum last-mentioned, pointing out the imminence of war or rupture
of diplomatic relations. He requested information as to whether the
fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted and testified: "I was
given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner
that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing them on a war
basis had been sent." It is significant that at this time neither
Admiral Wilkinson nor Captain McCollum had knowledge of the "war
warning" message to Admiral Kimmel. [255]

About December 4, 1941, Captain McCollum prepared a dispatch designed to
alert naval outposts, based in part on his memorandum of December 1
outlining the critical situation in the Far East. He testified: [256]

"Captain McCollum. * * * I was put in the rather difficult position of
not personally knowing what had been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it
was none my business. As I pointed out to you, the basis of this
memorandum the formation it was based on was actually as of about the
28th of November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our
naval attaches in Tokyo Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all of
their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes
were destroyed.

"We were getting reports from our observers of the Japanese task force
which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our planes were sighting forces
moving; our submarines were trailing them. We had some little
information in addition. I still did not know what had been sent to the
fleet.

"I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty
much as is this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further and
stated that we felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of
hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was taken
by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we went in to see Admiral
Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact at the function of evaluation
of intelligence; that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been
transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division. I was
directed to take that dispatch and present it for the consideration of
Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did.

"Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of
corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it,
more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which
he had sent on the 27th which I believe is referred to as the "war
warning" dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the 24th
wasn't it?

"COUNSEL. That is right.

"Captain MCCOLLUM (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, and said
did not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh, you put in
the words 'war warning'. I do not know what could be plainer than that,
but, nevertheless I would like to see mine go too."

[252] Dispatch No. 242239, committee exhibit No. 37, p. 33.
[253] Committee exhibit No. 85.
[254] Id., No. 81.
[255] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, p. 9112-9123;
also testimony of Admiral Wilkinson.
[256] Committee record, pp. 9130-9134.

208                 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I
corrected it or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it" or
words to that effect

"I cannot presume to remember precisely.

"I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and he
said "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all.

"Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was prepared
on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch. It
was merely my recommendation to my superiors which they were privileged
to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the
official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation for the
dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the admiral,
and he could either throw them away, or use them. There is no record
kept of that sort of thing."

Admiral Turner's testimony with respect to the foregoing incident is as
follows: [257]

"COUNSEL. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime
between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed
a view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do
you know anything about that?

"Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and I was here yesterday when Senator
Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy Court of Inquiry, and I was a
little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not received
any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since
that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I arrived at
what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.

"From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with drafts of
memoranda to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them.
I think that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do
not believe that it was intended to go out as a dispatch but merely for
the information of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen
such a memorandum but I have a recollection of that.

"Now, about the 1st or 2d of December and this is sure, I am completely
sure of this, I remember it very distinctly about the 1st or 2d of
December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me a proposed
dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of
the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval
Operations send out to the fleets concerning the imminence of war. It
covered the same ground approximately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th
and 27th.

"Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had
seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them.

"COUNSEL. YOU mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches?

"Admiral TURNER. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th,
and he said "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to
him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think your
dispatch ought to go."

"He sat down and read them over and handed them back to me and he said,
"No" and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage
but was not as specific as these two messages.

"COUNSEL. Not as specific as those two that were sent?

"Admiral TURNER. Not quite; no, sir.

"COUNSEL. Can you give us any information from your recollection as to
what his proposed dispatch contained?

"Admiral TURNER. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the
situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he
had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the
commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely
said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches"
and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is
enough." "

Admiral Wilkinson had no independent recollection of the event attending
the McCollum dispatch. [258]

It is regarded as extremely regrettable that the proposed dispatch of
Captain McCollum is not in existence in order that an objective estimate
of its contents might be made. Captain Safford in testifying before
Admiral Hart, stated: [259]

[257] Id., at pp. 5217-5219.
[258] Id., at pp. 4655-4658.
[259] Hart inquiry record, p. 360.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            209

"* * * On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long
warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific
Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the
"Winds Message," and ending with the positive warning that war was
imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with
Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after
Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time,
on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the
message?" Admiral Noyes replied "I think it is an insult to the
intelligence of the Commander in Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do
not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy and had with a lot of
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and
I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given
this warning and I intend to see it if I can get it released by the
front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left, a few minutes
later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought
that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two
years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that
McCollum's message had not been sent."

The statement by Captain Safford that the proposed dispatch referred to
an implementation of the "winds code" was contradicted by Captain
McCollum who categorically testified that his dispatch contained no
reference to a winds execute message and that, in fact, his knowledge no
such message had been received. [260] As elsewhere pointed out, the
conclusion is made from all of the evidence that no execution message
based on the "winds code" was ever received in the War or Navy
Departments prior to December 7.

The fact that Admiral Kimmel already possessed the vital intelligence
with respect to the "lost" Japanese carriers and the unusual change in
service calls on December 1 would necessarily have conditioned any
consideration of an additional warning to him based hereon. However,
considering all of the significant intelligence available around
December 1, Captain McCollum, not knowing of the warning dispatches,
prepared at sometime between December 1 and 4 an alerting message which
he felt should have been dispatched. Admiral Turner looked with disfavor
on this message for the reason hat he felt it added nothing to what had
already been supplied the fleet and the further fact that he regarded
responsible commanders as adequately alerted, an attitude which
prevailed throughout the War and Navy Departments. Captain McCollum,
too, regarded the war warning" of November 27 as fully adequate but
testified he would also "like" to see his warning transmitted. There is
no evidence before the Committee indicating with any degree of accuracy
the contents of the so-called McCollum dispatch to assist in determining
whether it may have added anything to the warning dispatches of November
27 to the Hawaiian commanders. [261]

EVENTS OF DECEMBER 6 AND 7, 1941

An extensive amount of testimony has been taken concerning the events of
December 6 and 7, 1941, attending the interception, distribution, and
action taken with respect to four diplomatic dispatches from Japan to
her Washington ambassadors. These four dispatches, each of which will
elsewhere be discussed fully, were:

(1) The so-called "Pilot Message," No. 901, on December 6 advising that
a long 14-part memorandum for the United States

[260] Committee record, p. 9134.
[261] This same observation would apply with respect to a warning
dispatch said to have been prepared a the War Department by Colonel Otis
K. Sadtler which allegedly was not sent for the reason that military
outposts were regarded as adequately alerted. The facts concerning the
"Sadtler message" are seriously in doubt.

210            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

was to be sent as a result of the American proposal of November 26 and
that instructions concerning the time of presentation to the United
States would be provided in a separate message. [262]

(2) The 14-part memorandum, message No. 902 (transmitted in English) to
be presented to the Government of the United States. The first thirteen
parts were intercepted on December 6 and the fourteenth part on the
morning of December 7. [263]

(3) The message, No. 907, intercepted on December 7, directing the
Japanese Ambassador to submit the 14-part memorandum to the United
States at 1 p. m., December 7, Washington time. [264]

(4) Message No. 910, intercepted on December 7, directing that the
remaining cipher machine (in the Japanese Washington Embassy) be
destroyed along with all code machines and that similar disposition be
made of secret documents. [265]

Considering the time that has elapsed there has been an understandable
amount of discrepancy with respect to the recollection of the
participants as to the exact time of handling the foregoing messages in
Washington. However, as subsequently will appear, composite
consideration of all the testimony tends to present a reasonably
satisfactory picture. It is to be recalled that in December of 1941 the
Army and Navy cryptographic units were dividing the work incident to
decoding and translating Japanese diplomatic messages, the Magic, with
the Army generally assuming responsibility for messages bearing even
dates of the month and the Navy, the odd dates. [266] Immediately upon
decoding and translating messages both the War and Navy Departments each
received copies. It was the responsibility of the Army to make
distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the Secretary of
State, while the Navy was responsible for distribution within the Navy
Department and to the White House.

THE PILOT MESSAGE

At 6:56 a. m. on December 6 there was filed in Tokyo and between 7:15
and 7:20 a. m. intercepted by a Navy monitoring station [267] a dispatch
that has come to be known as the "Pilot Message": [268]

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of
the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for
the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. *I will send it in
fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am
not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I
want you to please keep it secret for the time being*.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United
States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in
the meantime to put in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to
present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

A teletype sheet containing this message in Japanese code was received
by the Army from the Navy at 12:05 p. m., December 6. [269] There is no
documentary evidence available as to the exact time of decoding,
translating, and typing of the pilot message by the Army

[262] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239
[263] Id., at pp. 239-245.
[264] Id., at p. 248.
[265] Id., at p. 249.
[266] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 122.
[267] See committee exhibit No. 41.
[268] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239.
[269] Id., No. 41.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            211

apart from the fact that these operations were completed on December
Capt. Alwyn D. Kramer was primarily responsible for distribution of
Magic on behalf of the Navy. He initially testified before the committee
that he was quite certain the pilot message was contained in the folder
also containing the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum which were
distributed by him during the evening of December 6. [270] Captain
Kramer subsequently modified this testimony, based on a study of records
available in the Navy Department relating to the Magic materials. He
testified: [271]

"Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-called
pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot
message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941,
or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Saturday
evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a result of
my study last night that *the pilot message was not disseminated, at
least in the Navy, until Sunday morning subsequent to 10 o'clock*, at
the time when the so-called hidden-word message and a number of other
short messages, including the 1 o'clock message, were disseminated."

It would seem in consequence, from the best testimony available, hat no
distribution was made of the pilot message in the Navy Department or to
the White House until the morning of December 7. However, it is to be
noted that Admiral Wilkinson testified he saw the pilot message before
leaving the Navy Department on December 6. [272]

It appears on the other hand that distribution of the message in the War
Department and to the State Department was made during the afternoon of
December 6. Col. Rufus Bratton, who was responsible for distribution of
Magic by the Army, testified: [273]

"Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon
(December 6) about 3 o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in
person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall
discussing the subject both with General Miles and General Gerow
Saturday afternoon. [273a]"

The military significance of the pilot message will be treated in
connection with the discussion of the first 13 parts of the 14-part
memorandum.

THE 14-PART MEMORANDUM

*First 13 Parts*

The first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum were received in the Navy
Department between 11:49 a. m. and 2:51 p. m. on December 6. [274] They
had been decoded and typed in the Navy Department and were ready for
distribution by approximately 9 p. m. on that late. Copies were
thereupon delivered to the War Department. [275]

Captain Kramer in making distribution of this material on behalf of the
Navy arrived at the White House between 9:30 and 10 p. m., delivering
the first 13 parts to Commander Schulz, [276] an assistant to Admiral
Beardall, [277] the President's naval aide, with the request they be
given the President at the earliest possible moment. Commander Schulz
did thereafter deliver the messages to the President who along

[270] Committee record, p. 10677.
[271] Id., at p. 10739.
[272] Id., at p. 4659.
[273] Id., pp. 12049, 12050.
[273a] The evidence tends to indicate some doubt, however, as to whether
the "Pilot Message" was seen by General Marshall on December 6. See
Committee record, p. 3472.
[274] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[275] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 152-171.
[276] Lt. (now Commander) Lester Robert Schulz.
[277] Admiral John R. Beardall.

212             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

with Mr. Harry Hopkins read their contents. Kramer then proceeded to the
Wardman Park Hotel where delivery was made to Secretary Knox, who read
the dispatches. He then went to the home of Admiral Wilkinson where a
dinner party was in progress attended by Admiral Beardall, General
Miles, and of course, Admiral Wilkinson, among others. The first 13
parts were read by these officers. [278] Kramer returned to the Navy
Department at approximately 1 a. m. and thereafter retired upon seeing
that the fourteenth part of the Japanese memorandum had not been
received. [279] Copies of the first 13 parts were delivered on the
evening of December 6 by an unidentified representative or
representatives of the Navy Department to Admirals Ingersoll and Turner
at their homes. [280]

The testimony with respect to distribution of the 13 parts by the, Army
is conflicting, the weight of the evidence indicating, however, that no
distribution was made to authorized recipients in the War Department on
December 6. The evidence is in dispute as to whether they were delivered
to a watch officer at the State Department on the evening of that date.
[280a]

The evidence indicates that the first 13 parts were read on the evening
of December 6, by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins,
Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson,
Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton
[281] It is concluded from the evidence of record that the message was
not seen by Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, Admiral
Stark, or General Gerow [282] prior to the morning of December 7.

*Analysis and Significance of First 13 Parts Proper*

In view of the conflicting interpretations that have been placed o the
first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum, they are being set forth in
their entirety: [283]

[278] Committee record, pp. 4663-4666.
[279] Id., at pp. 10451 et seq.
[280] Id., at pp. 5097 11295.
[280a] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into
his office some time between 9 and 1 o'clock that night, and that he was
in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (committee record
12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts
to the night duty officer at the State Department some time after 10
o'clock that night, telling the duty officer that it was a "highly
important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and
that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters, which he was
assured would be done committee record 12052-12053). This testimony is
directly contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenbury, then Colonel
Bratton's chief assistant, in the Clausen investigation. In his
affidavit, Colonel Dusenbury stated that he specifically recalled the
intercepted message in question and that "it started coming in the night
of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty
then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of
it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I
stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The
fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about
12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next
morning *to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the
fourteen parts and began the distribution of the fourteen parts
comprising this intercept* about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished
with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were
meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD
that morning I handed it to then Col. Thomas D. Handy, who, upon reading
it, said to me: "This means war," or words to that effect. *None of
these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning
of 7 December 1941* because the first half had been received while
Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it
delivered that night" (Clausen Investigation committee exhibit No. 148,
p. 50).

Colonel Dusenbury's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the
testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief of the Military Intelligence
Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel
Dusenbury, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and the
others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on
December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that
day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*"
(committee record 4123-4124).
[281] Captain McCollum is indicated to have seen the first 6 or 7 parts
before leaving his office on December 6. Committee record, pp. 9232,
9233.
[282] See committee record, p. 2741.
[283] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             213

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order
that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of
the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world
peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April
last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment
and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of
the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views,
concerning the claims the American Government has persistently
maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain
have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable
all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part
of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government
has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted
its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It
was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri
Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering
with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East
Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing
French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration
to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these
regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a
threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government
to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously
hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military
preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about
a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan
proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for
a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering
the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the
Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
agreement of view had been reached on fundamental (75 letters garbled)
The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula
proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration
past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal
points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to
reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to
its original proposal failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit
of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November
20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution
of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its
previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-
China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

214              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the
acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and
commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required
quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to
measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration
of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan
and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific
area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern
part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of
the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its
readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to
act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously
suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to
do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when
the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new
proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang
Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the
offer of the President to act as the so called "Introducer" of peace
between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it.
Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese
government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American
government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a
source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did
its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible
concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory
attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce,
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed
its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and
declared that along with the actual Practice of this principle in the
world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the
Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no
intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers
pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned
above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern
French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost
degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully
appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to
theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its
impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is
difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the
Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American
government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by
discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the
reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's
position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's
selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of
facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              215

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a
basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the
Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the
world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of
the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact
between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet
Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old
concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of
East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded
with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to
conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the
establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It
is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to
restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact
when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may
be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on
the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is
engaged. On the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to
attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that
are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is
totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American
Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through
peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly
upholds, objects to settling international issues through military
pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other
nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means
of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at
times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American
Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great
Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied
not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of
history that one countr (45 letters garbled or missing) been compelled
to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of
imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the es to the prosperity of
the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the
perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to
Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its
proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American
policy. That the six countries, Japan, the United States, Great Britain,
The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake
among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the
governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a
proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to
the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be
considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to
the n (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of East
Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional
application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International
Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to
destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The
attitude of the American government in demanding

216              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime
other than the regime at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence of
the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present
negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does,
in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the
Chunking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American
government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan
and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items
such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade
agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and
stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of
extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the
proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the
China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its
honour and prestige. *Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation*.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the
Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with Great Britain
and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the
American government. However, since the American government has made the
proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with
Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND* (probably
"and as") presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime
on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** (probably "China, can but") be
concluded that. All these countries are at one with the United States in
ignoring Japan's position.

The foregoing message is a long and argumentative rehash of the
Japanese-American negotiations. The motives and proposals of the
Japanese Empire are clothed in language of the most blathering terms
whereas the purposes of the United States are assigned a base character.
The language employed in the first 13 parts is much stronger than had
theretofore been employed by Japan in her proposals. In the thirteenth
part it is stated, "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation." Taken from its context this statement would indicate that
Japan is rejecting the November 26 note of our Government and would
possibly suggest that the current negotiations were to be broken off at
some time in the near future. But as pointed out by Admiral Wilkinson,
"It is one thing to break off negotiations and another thing to break
off diplomatic relations. The same negotiations, I believe, had been
broken off earlier and then resumed." [284]

Commander Schulz, who delivered the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply
to the President, testified that the President read the message and "Mr.
Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The
President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance I am not
sure of the exact words, but in substance, '*This means war*'. [285] Mr.
Hopkins agreed and they discussed then for perhaps 5 minutes the
situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment." [286]

[284] Committee record, p. 4668.
[285] Asked what his action would have been had he known of the
President's remark, General Marshall said: "I can't say. *I doubt if I
would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that
time*." Committee record, p. 13804.

Admiral Stark was asked: "* * * if you had known that the President did
say something in substance 'This means war,' about the 13-part message,
was there anything you would have done that night except to read the
message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in
the way of backsight or hindsight that you would have done that you did
not do?"

He replied: "It would not be backsight or hindsight, because when I read
it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to cause me to take any further
action on it," Committee record, pp. 13912, 13913.
[286] Committee record, p. 12441.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            217

To the query as to whether he could recall what either the President or
Mr. Hopkins said, Commander Schulz testified as follows: [287]

"Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I
in definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that I
believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first, that since war was imminent,
that the Japanese tended to strike when they were ready, at a moment
when all was most opportune for them when all was most opportune for
that. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their
advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese
forces had already landed there and there were implications of where
they should move next.

"The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese
Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in
effect requesting their withdrawal.

"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going
to be at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could
not strike e first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President
nodded and said, effect, "No we can't do that. We are a democracy and a
peaceful people. Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember
definitely. He said, "But we a good record."

"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that
record, we would not make the first overt move. We would have to wait
until it came.

"During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only
geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might
begin as not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was
no indication at tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that
impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the
news did come.

"COUNSEL. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the
subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were
being read?

"Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further
warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the
war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said
that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get
Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined I do not recall
exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that
Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

"COUNSEL. Now, that was from what was said there that you draw the
conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

"Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but
the national Theater was mentioned in my presence and the President went
on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that
he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or
otherwise when in theater where I believe the fact that he had a box
reserved was mentioned and at if he had left suddenly he would surely
have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm
might be caused and the President did not wish that to happen because he
could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case. [287a]"

In considering the remark [288] by the President to Mr. Hopkins that the
first 13 parts meant war it is significant that there was no indication
as to *when* or *where* war might be expected. [288a] The testimony of
Commander Schulz should be considered with that of Admiral Beardall, to
which reference will hereafter be made, in seeking to determine the
reaction of the President to the full Japanese 14-part memorandum.

[287] Id., at pp. 12441-12444.
[287a] The evidence tends to indicate that following his return home
after the theater, Admiral Stark was advised that the White House had
called, and that he did thereupon call the White House. See testimony.
Capt. H. D. Krick, U. S. Navy, before the committee.
[288] Referring to the comment made by the President, General Marshall
testified: "He didn't tell me, and didn't tell the Secretary of War. So
he made a statement offhand on reading the thing" (13 parts). Committee
record, p. 13803.
[288a] In connection with the remark attributed to the President it is
to be noted that at a meeting of the War Council on November 25,
President Roosevelt warned that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps
as soon as the following Monday, for the "Japanese are notorious for
making an attack without warning." See statement of Mr. Stimson,
committee record, p. 14390.

218            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The estimate given the first 13 parts by witnesses before the committee
who reviewed them on the night of December 6 follows: [289]

"Admiral TURNER. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was
about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the officer who
showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that
dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral
Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to
me. I considered the dispatch very important, but as long as those
officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any
action."

*              *              *                   *                 *

"Admiral INGERSOLL. [290] * * * when I read the 13 parts there was
nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take
action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese
position we had known, of course, all along."

*              *              *                   *                 *

"Admiral WILKINSON. [291] * * * both General Miles and myself, and to
some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it
was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white
papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification
of the Japanese position.

"The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next
morning.

*              *              *                   *                 *

Admiral Wilkinson agreed that he, General Miles, and Admiral Beardall
discussed the first 13 parts and referred to it as more or less a "white
paper" or diplomatic communication "A justification for the Japanese
position". [292]

"General MILES. [293] I called him for the purpose of finding out what
had been done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but
I wish to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13
parts as such was not of great military significance. We had already
discounted through many days the fact that in all probability the
Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be unfavorable and that
was all that the first 13 parts told us. When we got the fourteenth part
we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p. m. message we saw
quite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or
waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull,
on the night of December 6 that I could see.

"Captain KRAMER. [294] I have stated that the first part I recollect
seeing is part 8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is
nothing in that part in fact, the last half of that part quotes the
United States note that was materially different than the general tenor
of previous notes back and forth between the United States and Japan.

"When the first 13 parts were complete I did however, have that distinct
impression, that this note was far and appreciably stronger language
than earlier notes had been and that it indicated a strong probability
that the Japanese were concluding any further negotiations.

*              *              *                   *                 *

"Colonel BRATTON [295] * * * I considered the presence of the 13 parts
in Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening.

"I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now.
They contributed no information, they contributed no additional
information to the matters that we already had from magic and other
sources as to the impending crisis with Japan.

"The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth
part: "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government
regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation "

"This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of
State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of General Staff for it
was not an ulti-

[289] Committee record, p. 5097.
[290] Id., at p. 11377.
[291] Id., at p. 4665.
[292] Id., at p. 4667.
[293] Id., at pp. 2482, 2483.
[294] Id., at pp. 10445, 10446.
[295] Id., at pp. 12057, 12058.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            219

latum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of
diplomatic relations."

The committee has noted the emphasis, publicity and speculation
concerning the whereabouts of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff and
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, on the evening of December
6. General Marshall has testified that while he could not recall his
whereabouts with certainty he presumed he was at home. Admiral Stark
could not recall his whereabouts, but the evidence establishes that he
was at the National Theater seeing *The Student Prince*. [295a] Similar
emphasis has been placed on the fact that the Chief of Staff was
horseback riding on the morning of December 7, as was his Sunday-morning
custom. The first 13 parts were neither delivered to nor read by either
General Marshall or Admiral Stark on the evening of December 6. In any
event, the question of their whereabouts on Saturday evening, December
6, is by any construction unimportant inasmuch as both officers saw
nothing in the first 13 parts to serve as basis for additional warnings
o our outposts when they read them on the morning of December 7. [295b]
In this connection, it is to be noted that the evidence conclusively
establishes that no conferences were held at the White House or
elsewhere with respect to the Pacific situation by ranking military and
executive officials on the evening of December 6, 1941.

The consensus of testimony by officers of the War and Navy Departments
is to the effect that the first 13 parts, as such, of the 14-part
message bore little or no military significance. [296] While they
revealed a position assumed by Japan to which our Government could not
subscribe there was no statement that negotiations were to be ruptured
and certainly no intimation of the treacherous attack to be delivered at
Pearl Harbor the following morning. From the "pilot message" it was
clear that a fourteenth part was to be transmitted and that it would
probably be received on December 7. Considering this fact and the
further fact that the first 13 parts gave no indication of immediate
military action by Japan, there was no occasion on the evening of
December 6 to dispatch additional warnings to outposts, already regarded
as alerted, on the basis of a message that was manifestly not complete.
It is clear there was no intelligence contained in the message itself
which had not been known for some time.

*Military Significance of "Pilot" and 14-Part Messages Apart from Messages Proper*

An intercepted dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Tokyo to its
Washington ambassadors had stated, referring to Mr. Hull's note of
November 26: [297]

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The
Imperial Govern-

[295a] See note 287a, supra.
[295b] General Marshall said: "* * * the first 13 parts were not of the
nature of a vital threat as the 14th part. That was a message of direct
importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of
course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy who had been
collaborating with him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan."
Committee record, p. 3095.

For Admiral Stark's estimate of the first 13 parts see Note 296, infra.
[296] Admiral Stark stated that he regarded the first 13 parts, when he
saw them on the morning of December 7, as routine, a rehashing of the
attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been
accumulating over a period of weeks or months. In other words, that the
13 parts by themselves carried no implication other than indicated; that
it was a rehashing, a restatement of their attitude. Committee record,
p. 13722.
[297] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.

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