INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

170            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

some of the statements in the report had political implications. [64]
One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was
subsequently incorporated *as a recommendation* in the joint memoranda
of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military
counteraction should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or
directly. threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United
States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if
the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100  east or south of
10  north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. [65]

As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlantic
Conference in August of 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill that the Governments of both the United States and Great
Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible
Japanese attack in the Far East. [66] It was agreed, however, that steps
should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggressive action by
her against neighboring countries would result in each country being
compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate
rights of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety
and security. [67] Accordingly, upon returning to Washington the
President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Ambassador that if
the Japanese Government took any further steps in line with a program of
military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring
countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to
take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate
rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United
States. [68]

During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American
objections to the "ADB" report proceeded slowly until discussions were
opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart, commander in
chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the British Far
Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of war, the two
commanders completed arrangements for initial American and British naval
dispositions to meet probable Japanese action in the Far East. Admiral
Hart's report of his conversations with Admiral Phillips was received in
the Navy Department about 11 p. m., December 6, 1941, and was approved
in a dispatch sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 7
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [69]

On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval Operations
concerning a report received from Singapore that the United States had
"assured British armed support under three or four eventualities". [70]
None of the witnesses who were questioned on this

[64] See committee exhibit No. 65. Also testimony Of Admiral Turner,
committee record, pp. 5118, 6119.
[65] See section, infra, Avoidance of War.
[66] See Part I, this report.
[67] Id.
[68] Id.
[69] See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee.
[70] Admiral Hart's dispatch was based on a communication which he had
received on December 6, l941, from Capt. John M, Creighton, who was a
naval attache in Singapore, as follows:  "Brooke Popham received
Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance
of American armed support in cases as follows: Affirm we are obliged
execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take
action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch
Indies are attacked and we go to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us
the British. Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if
first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent
intention of landing in Kra, second if the Nips violate any part of
Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon
between British and Dutch. Unquote." Committee record, pp. 13520,13521.

In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton
stated he had no knowledge of an agreement between the United States and
Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to Admiral
Hart must have come to him second-hand.  Committee record, pp. 13516-
13637.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            171

point, including Admiral Hart, [71] was aware of any evidence to
substantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations
suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception as to
the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference. [72] There
is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the "ABC" and
"ADB" conversations was an inducing factor to Japan's decision to attack
the United States coincident with her thrust to the south. Indeed, the
idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was conceived before these
conversations were initiated. [73] Manifestly any estimate which the
Japanese made of American probable action was based on this country's
long-standing Far Eastern policy and the course of diplomatic
negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical discussions on a staff
level. [74]

It should be noted that on November 7 the President took an informal
vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people
would support a strike against Japan in the event she should attack
England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The cabinet was
unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The
following significant statement appears in the diary of Secretary
Stimson for December 2: 

"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the
Emperor although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in
addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a
Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country. [75]"

From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for
the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing he United
States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the
British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his
Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our
position in the Far East become intolerable. [76] Further, the reports
of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any
political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these
conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an
agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally,
all the witnesses who were questioned on the point [77] including the
ranking military and naval leaders of he country at the time testified
that *in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress
to declare war was scrupulously re-

[71] Committee record, pp. 12785-12875.
[72] Id., at p. 6317.
[73] See Part II, this report re Japanese plans for the attack.
[74] Before the committee, General Marshall was asked: "Let us assume
first that they (the Japanese) knew that we were going to go to war if
they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on
the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we
were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions
as to action be affected by that knowledge?"

He replied:  "Japanese Psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army
domination being what it was their general scheme for the assumption of
power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific being
known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one
way or the other." Committee record, p. 13786.
[75] See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427.
[76] Admiral Stark said: "Under our Constitution the Congress had to
declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as
hostilities were concerned." Committee record, p. 13875.

Again, " * * * as to our striking after declaration of war on our part,
if the situation became intolerable us, and our national safety, if the
Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled we
did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional
manner." Committee record, pp. 13892-12893.

Further, " * * * I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on
the record, so far as my thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not
attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety
because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the
Congress." Committee record, p. 13895.
[77] See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall,
Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, General Gerow before
the committee.

172            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

spected. [78] The preliminary planning done at these conferences
manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would
have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these
conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by
the Axis. [79] This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan
struck.

While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that
the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States Britain
and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted November 30
dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: [80]

"* * * it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those
nations (England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided
to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washington
Embassy to Tokyo related: [81]

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war is a definite certainty, in the event of an
occupation of Thailand."

There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any
relationship to the Hawaiian situation; to have advised the commanders
there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British or Dutch as
tantamount to an attack upon the United States would have added nothing
they had already been categorically warned that hostile action by Japan
against the United States itself was possible at any moment.

AVOIDANCE OF WAR

As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the Pearl
Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national honor to
forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of the United
States *condemned aggression*; the policy of Japan was *predicated on
aggression*. It was only a question of time, therefore, before these two
irreconcilable principles would engender war. [82] Officials of our
Government were faced with the problem of effecting a delicate balance
between gaining time to improve our military preparedness on the one
hand and not forsaking our principles, national honor, and Allies on the
other.

[78] That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was
recognized in discussions with other governments is revealed by the
following dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated
November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill
to President Roosevelt: 

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war
between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret
or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by
Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. *I realize your
constitutional difficulties* but it would be tragic if Japan drifted
into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely
the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider
whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near you
should not *say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you
to place the gravest issues before Congress*' or words to that effect.
We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint
declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize
our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to
press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all
the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war." Committee
exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee
record, pp. 2785 2786.
[79] In the course of counsel's examination, General Gerow was asked: "*
*   * has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time
immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the
contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities
with other nations?"

He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for
operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir *
* * at one time I think we had plans against almost everybody sir, and I
think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation."
Committee record pp. 2673, 2674.

As stated by Admiral Stark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any
contingency." Committee record, p, 13977.
[80] Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205.
[81] Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however,
indicating that no agreement whatsoever existed for military action on
our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee
exhibit No. 169.
[82] See Part I, supra, this report.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            173

In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared o
him in November of 1941, Mr. Stimson said: [83]

"1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
"2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then
desperately fighting Germany England, Russia, or China should be knocked
out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in.
"3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare,
nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight
against Japan for the Philippines even if we had to enter the war at
that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the
Philippines.
"4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of
unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history,
that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot,
if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but Japan should
appear in her true role as the real aggressor."

It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised Admiral
Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula,
or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not enter the war 

"that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would
enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid
making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations
expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter
the war. [84]"

On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming
(Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and that military
support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. [85]
The Secretary of State requested the advice of the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude which this Government
should assume toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma
Road. In a joint memorandum for the President dated November 5 they set
forth the following conclusions and recommendations, after reviewing the
situation in China: [86]

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in
the following conclusions: 

"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective
of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and
Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In
any ease, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against
Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the
Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

"(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United
States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should
be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies: 

"(1) *A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or
the Netherlands East Indies*;

"(2) *The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100
degrees East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New
Caledonia, or the loyalty Islands*.

"(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic
lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be
primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening
Japan's economic position.

[83] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385.
[84] Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684.
[85] See committee exhibit No. 16A. Similar messages were received
through the American ambassador in Chungking, the Magruder Mission and
the United States naval attache.  Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A.
[86] Committee exhibit No. 16.

174 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming,
into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia,
would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be
extended to the Chinese Central Government.

"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete
coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields,
should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British
Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention
against Japan in China be disapproved.

"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.

"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was handed to
the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed the recommendations
of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It pointed out that it did not
appear preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had
advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of
an attack and observed, among other things: [87]

" * * * Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the
world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we
feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this
moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our lend-
lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American
volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are 
subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in
many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great
Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other
countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In
addition. Our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our
rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and
with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward
achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.
Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard
to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented,
with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable
ways possible."

In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of November
27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out that "if the
current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma
Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;
the Russian Maritime Provinces." [88] They observed that:

"*The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to
gain time*. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed
to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached.
The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate
concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine
Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000
are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is
important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before
hostilities commence. *Precipitance of military action on our part
should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. The
longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention
of these islands as a naval and air base.

[87] Id.
[88] Committee exhibit No. 17.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            175

Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps
seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with
Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and
probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken *only in case Japan
attacks or directly threatens the territory mandated territory of the
United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies,
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees
East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, Nets Caledonia, or
the Loyalty Islands* [89]

"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is
advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of
communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a
Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees
North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is
patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which
might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

"It is recommended that:

"Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens
United States, British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined;

"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the
United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance
beyond the lines indicated may lead to war, prior to such warning no
joint military opposition be undertaken;

"Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and
Dutch for the issuance of such warning. [90]"

It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated November 27,
1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our
Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. The
evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered at an Army-
Navy Joint Board meeting on the morning of November 26, following the
meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at which Secretary Hull
had stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement
being achieved with Japan. [91] The memorandum of the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations conveys two cardinal thoughts governing
the approach of the military to the negotiations; i. e., *the most
essential thing was to gain time, and the precipitance of military
action should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. In
this connection General Marshall referred to the reaction of the Army
and Navy to the dropping of the thought of a modus vivendi in the
following terms: [92]

"My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our
disappointment that from the military point of view, meaning Army and
Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these
discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we
possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made
that endangered us from a military point of view."

[89] General Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the
conference of military leaders held in Singapore in April of 1941. He
was asked: "When you say that the Dutch, British, and the United States
military authorities had *agreed* to that action did you mean that they
had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to
recommend it to their governments?"

General Marshall replied: "*Agreed to recommend it*. They had no power
whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated * * *."
Committee record, pp. 2784, 2785.
[90] See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra.
[91] With reference to the Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President
dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit No. 17), Admiral Ingersoll recalled
that he "* * * presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently the day
before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the
arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here
to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever
presented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only
satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And
this was based on that." Committee record, p. 11366.
[92] Committee record, p. 13775.

176            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of
Secretary Stimson, [93] General Marshall said: [94]

"He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid he feared that we would
find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our
disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when
the Japanese actually broke peace.

"He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal
more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that
we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to
sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.

"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I
was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we
would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular
time.

"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which
allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a
hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I
say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been,
that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the
terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements."

It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time insofar as
consistent with national policy and not at the expense of forsaking the
honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: [95]

"Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means
to fight. * * * *I wanted time, and the question was how much time could
be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not
get ourselves in a hopeless position.*"

Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of war by
the United States; that is, no affirmative steps should be taken by the
United States to bring about war with Japan "precipitance of military
action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national
policy."

As observed in reviewing the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor
attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan was not a
precipitant of war it was merely a laudable restatement of the
principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient. There
can, therefore, be no question that the delivery to Japan of the
American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention of the
expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo advised her
emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus vivendi would not
be acceptable to Japan, [96] and in consequence had our Government
submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more time would have been
afforded the Army and Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark had
themselves recommended that we take military counter-action should Japan
attack the very territory which she was already poised to attack in the
event she failed to secure the demands contained in the Japanese
ultimatum of November 20*. [97]

Indeed, at the very time Japan's ambassadors were discussing a temporary
truce, her military was continuing its move to the South. Secretary
Stimson's diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the following comments,
among others: [98]

[93] In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented:  "Knox and
Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow.
Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very
much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and
Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I
didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States
or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part."
Committee record p. 14422.
[94] Committee record, p. 13821.
[95] Id., at p. 13822.
[96] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160.
[97] Id., No. 17.
[98] Committee record, p. 14420

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            177

". . . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him
whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night
about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down
towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to
speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole
situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the
Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce an entire
withdrawal (from China) they should be sending this expedition down
there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me
through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got
another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him
by special messenger."

It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson's diary for November 25, 1941,
describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President;
Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral
Stark. It states, in part: [99] "There the President, instead of
bringing up the Victory Parade [100] brought up entirely the relations
with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be
attacked (as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was
what we should do. *The question was how we should maneuver them into
the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger
to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition*." [101]

In referring to Mr. Stimson's comment concerning maneuvering the
Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much
danger to ourselves, [102] General Marshall testified: [103]

"* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than
firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by
arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a
dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to
take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for
the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a
military arrangement."

The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to what
the *diplomatic* procedure was to be; not the *military* procedure.
[104]

On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President inasmuch as
Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of the information in
regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and "it amounted
to such a statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it
to the President before he got up." Referring to his conversation with
the President on this occasion, Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary: [105]

"He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself
as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and
only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His
alternatives were first,

[99] Id., at p. 14418.
[100] This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan
of national action in case of war in Europe.
[101] Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and
naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese
to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without
attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418.
[102] In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: 
"Now, I want to know why if you know, there was a distinction between
the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot."

He replied: "Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She
had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them I
think it was in October or November, along in there, between September
and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and
wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back
to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted
billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get
that material through not simply to use this money for material and let
it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters
defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters.
The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the
Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came
in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the
hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which
provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within
that area, and we did do it * * * I think that that situation is not
comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not
attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident." Committee
record, pp. 13981, 13982.
[103] Committee record, p. 13801.
[104] Id., at p. 13799.
[105] Id., at p. 14423.

178            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at
once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think
anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said
of the other two my choice was the latter one."

Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the War
Council meeting on November 28: [106]

"It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese) that there
was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops
aimed for a landing some where completely changed the situation when we
last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan
about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It
was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to
get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the
Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific
blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore the Netherlands,
and ourselves in the Philippines. *It was the consensus of everybody
that this must not be allowed*. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It
was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British
would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would
have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was
allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of
disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the
force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't
think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the
other, which we didn't think we could that the only thing for us to do
was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a
certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from
himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at
the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem
to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President.
In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn
an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of
the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I
said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the
United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have
to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a
message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his
letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and
then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the
final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox and
myself to try to draft such papers."

Mr. Stimson's diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following
comments concerning a meeting at the White House: [107]

"The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made
up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles
what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China just what
they are going to do and has demanded a quick reply. The President is
still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although
all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that *he is
quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and
will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he
was going to take the matters right up when he left us*."

On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the Emperor;
and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our Ambassador in
Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese Memorandum of
December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the United States coincident
with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded as the Emperor's reply to
the President. [108]

[106] Id., at pp. 14424, 14425.
[107] Id., at p. 14427.
[108] See Part I, supra, this report.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            179

It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his
advisers that the United States must fight if the British and Dutch ere
attacked was predicated on the necessities of our own security and not
occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement requiring
such action on the part of the United States. [109] That our Government
was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed [110] made
manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending warning to
Japan on "Tuesday afternoon or evening" (December 9) if no answer was
received from the Emperor by Monday (December 8.) [111] In referring to
the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said: [112]

"The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of
course knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-
off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of
attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, *the President
believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an
additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served
to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in
maintaining peace up to the very last minute*."

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON

THE "MAGIC"

With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness,
regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War
and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic
codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages
between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a
wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was
available in Washington. [113]

Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the United
States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japanese radio
communications. These stations operated under instructions mandating
from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to Washington
without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate the material. The
only exception to this procedure was in the case of the Corregidor
station which had been provided with facilities for exploiting many of
the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its advantageous location
from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo traffic. [114]

Insofar as the commanding officers in Hawaii were concerned they
received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War and
Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned form or,
operationally, through instructions predicated on this source of
intelligence. While the highest military officials in Washington did not
know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in Hawaii, it
is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not

[109] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418. Also
committee exhibits Nos. 16,17.
[110] Admiral Stark was asked: "Was not that our intention (of doing
anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese) right up to December
7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and
principles?"

He replied:  "Yes, sir, and we had been working for months on that, and
the record is complete in that regard." Committee record, p. 13915.
[111] See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742.
[112] See Secretary Hull's replies to committee interrogatories.
Committee record, p. 14266.
[113] See committee exhibits Nos. I and 2. For a discussion of Magic and
its great significance to the prosecution of the war see letters dated
September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey.
Committee record pp. 2979-2989.
[114] For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic see testimony of
Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and
Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army; before the
committee.

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