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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and that if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consulting  Germany, "there is no telling what steps Germany may take without  consulting Japan" (ex. 1, pp. 4849).

In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks was not  enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported to the Foreign  Office on September 30:

"Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in  the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the  Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the  newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are  concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As  for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first  anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite  Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people  (ex. 1, p. 44)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO PREMIER KONOYE'S MESSAGE

(September 5, 1941)

President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to Premier  Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon of September  3 (Washington time) (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The President's  reply mentioned the reference in the statement which had accompanied the  Premier's message to the basic principles to which the United States  Government had long been committed and the President's desire to  collaborate in making these principles effective in practice. The  President stated that his deep interest in this matter made it necessary  for him to observe and take account of developments both in the United  States and Japan which had a bearing on Japanese-American relations, and  that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications

"of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely  entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful  collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure both of  us earnestly desire to follow (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."

The President then suggested:

"that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring  to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and  essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I  have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical  application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance  of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement  accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this  suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."

The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement  which referred to the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time)  and to the fact that subsequent conversations bad disclosed that there  were divergences of view between the two Governments with respect to  certain fundamental questions dealt with in those proposals. Reading  from the statement, the President expressed the desire of the United  States Government "to facilitate progress toward a conclusive  discussion" and its belief 

"that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above  mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific  questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of  the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under  reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591)."

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In connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the second Konoye Cabinet had resigned on July 16 (Japan time) and had been  replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 24).

In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary  Hull wrote:

"Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his  (i. e. Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the  question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three  fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered  in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the  discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into  Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588)."

JAPAN PRESENTS NEW PROPOSALS IN A NEW FORM

(September 6, 1941)

It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meeting with Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being discussed at a  Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War and Navy officials  in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these new proposals were intended  by the Foreign Office to bring up only "immediate and concrete problems"  and to focus the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and the  Premier on those problems. The Foreign Office took the position that it  was difficult to predict how long it would take to consider all of the  important fundamental principles dealt with in the proposals which had  been under consideration by the two Governments before the freezing  orders, and that consequently "the present crisis might not be averted"  if it should be necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint  Conference mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign  Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the request  that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador to overcome  any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 593).

Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull at a  meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that although the  new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Government before it  received President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 (Washington time),  nevertheless his Government believed that the contents of the new  proposals constituted a reply to the President.  He said that the  proposals were also in response to the view expressed by Secretary Hull  at the conference with him on the evening of August 28, namely, that it  would be desirable for the two Governments to reach an agreement in  principle on the fundamental questions involved before making  arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 606-607)

As presented to Secretary Hull the new Japanese proposals were as follows:

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941

The Government of Japan undertakes:

a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the    United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;

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(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,    without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan;

(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-   defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact    by Japan shall be independently decided;

(d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the    realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;    

(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be    carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of    nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will    cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of    natural resources in the said area which it needs;

 (g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of  normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in  connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control    regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

"The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;

(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;

(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

(d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement) reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol.   II, pp. 608-609)."

Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals-

"were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese  draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their  obligations under the Tripartite Pact.  There was a qualified  undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort  to military action against any region south of Japan.  No commitment was  offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to  China; nor any assurance of an intentionby Japan to respect China's  territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in  China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in  wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of  nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula  contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United  States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an  equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under  which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be  conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119)."

On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Ambassador Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda  regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in offering certain  of the new proposals, especially those relating to China (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister's replies to these questions were  received by Ambassador Grew on September 13 (Japan time) and promptly  cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 620-624).

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On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister Toyoda that it seemed that the matter of the preliminary  conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said that in such  conversations the United States would want to be advised of the peace  terms Japan would propose between Japan and China and would refuse to  act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and just; therefore, he  said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in advance of the  proposed "leaders conference." He also reported that the United States  wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China, and the Netherlands in  advance of the proposed conference, so that those countries would not  get the impression the United States was trading them off (ex. 1, p.  27). Two days later, Ambassador Nomura cabled that there were  "considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. Conference" at a  recent United States Cabinet meeting and that "there is no mistaking the  fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the  preliminary arrangements can be made" (ex. 1, p. 28). On September 22  (Washington time), he cabled a long report to the Foreign Minister  concerning conditions and attitudes in the United States generally. His  report concluded with the following estimate:

"Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up  forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be  restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render  economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31)."

In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6 and 13  (Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the basic peace  terms which it was prepared to offer to China (ex. 132-A, item D). A  document containing those terms (Annex C attached hereto) was handed to  Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23 (Washington time),  having been communicated by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in  Tokyo on September 22 (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633).  During this conference with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated  the desire of his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take  place at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that  the several documents which he had now presented were a full expression  of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that anything  further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the  proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 634-635). However, on September 27 (Washington time), he delivered  to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached hereto), which  had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of the American  proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and had been approved at a Joint  Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The new document, it was said,  incorporated all that the Japanese Government had communicated to the  American Government since June 21. A similar document had been delivered  to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641).

On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo celebrating  the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day Foreign Minister  Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and asked the  Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through Secretary Hull, the  anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet

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lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely  delayed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese  Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador Grew in  considerable detail his Government's position regarding the  conversations (ex. 29, vol. I1, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister  cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomura, saying that "in view of  internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep  postponing matters forever" (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura  communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary  Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was well  aware of the United States Government's position and had communicated it  to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed him to press for  an answer to the Japanese proposal. AS his personal opinion, he judged  that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the heads of  the two Governments, it might be difficult for Premier Konoye to retain  his position and that he then would be likely to be succeeded by a less  moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652).

AMBASSADOR GREW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"

(August-September 1941)

In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should not be held, or if it should be long  delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned of the  proposed "leaders conference" at a meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda  on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign Minister's lengthy remarks concerning the proposed meeting, Ambassador Grew had commented on  Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that, in spite of all  peaceful assurances, the United States Government in the light of the  steps Japan had taken "could only be guided by facts and actions and not  words." Notwithstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the  conclusion of the Foreign Minister's remarks Ambassador Grew had said  "that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a  meeting) his own. Personal support" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564).  Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary  Hull the following day in a message which included the following, as  paraphrased in the State Department:

"that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will  have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for  Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at  his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility  of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this  Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful  consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese  history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not  crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the  approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The  good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President  Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the  Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship,  such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister  Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently  insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 565)."

A month later, in a personal letter dated September 22 (Japan time) to  President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach

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Washington until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to  his conversations with Premier Konoye "who," he said

"in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements  in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's  relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for  having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now  sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to  hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of  policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has  led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business  and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in  Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her  commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present  Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than  has been the ease in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that  this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than  Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in  carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of  international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The  alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased  probability of war * * *. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can  come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree,  the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to  implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)"

A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting with  Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27 referred to above, Ambassador  Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which "in all deference  to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary  Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter  is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," he stated  at length his appraisal of the existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  645-650). The most significant part of this report was the following, as  paraphrased in the State Department:

"8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese  Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear- ut  commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to  principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations  will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet  and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United  States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is  hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time.  If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and  probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's  being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this  may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these  will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans,  while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a  situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war.  *The logical  outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the  formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the  disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the  United States.* There is a question that such a situation may prove to  be more serious even than the failure to produce a entirely satisfactory  agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and  Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  648-649)."

In connection with Ambassador Grew's reference to the "viewpoint of the  American Embassy in Japan," in his testimony before the Committee he  said:

"I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to  any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even  know that they existed (tr. 1481)."

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And again:

"I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents  the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were  deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the  President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or  telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State  Department from time to time documents of a secret nature, so of course  the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more  information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904)."

JAPAN DETERMINES ITS MINIMUM DEMANDS AND ITS MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

(September 6, 1941)

It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo far-reaching decisions had been made. The "Policy of the Imperial Government" which was decided upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had provided that in carrying out a southward advance the Government would not be deterred "by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America." It had also been decided at that conference that in carrying out Japan's preparations for war with Russia and in the use of Japan's military strength against Russia in case the German-Soviet war "should  develop to our advantage,"

"all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in  such a way as to place no serious obstacles *in the path of our basic  military preparations for a war with England and America* (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71)."

When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during the  latter part of July had brought about the termination of the  conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and the  American freezing order, Premier Konoye had come forward early in August  with his proposal for a "leaders conference" between President Roosevelt  and himself. While this proposal had received the support of the  Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the Japanese Army only provided  the Premier intended

"*to carry out a war against America if the President of the United  States still failed to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire*  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31).

As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began  advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United  States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier  Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the Army  and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 39-40).

It is now known that during those conferences there were developed  "Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government"  which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed in  carrying out the plans "for the southern territories" decided upon at  the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye submitted  these new "Plans" to the Emperor informally on September ,5 (Japan time)  in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference the next day, as  follows:

"1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved  in a war with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our  national existence, *we will proceed with war preparations so that they  be completed approximately toward the end of October*."

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"2. At the same time, *we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England*. Japan's  minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England),  together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the  attached document.

"3. *If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of  having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned  above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war  against America (and England and Holland).*

"Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern  territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid.  Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from  forming a united front against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

According to Premier Konoye, on examining the "Plans", Emperor Hirohito  was impressed by the fact that the document seemed "to give precedence  to war over diplomatic activities." The Premier explained that the order  of business in the agenda did not indicate any differences in degree of  importance. The Emperor then summoned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy  General Staffs. When they came, he questioned them sharply concerning  the probable length of hostilities in the event of a Japanese-American  conflict, and then asked whether it was not true that both of them "were  for giving precedence to diplomacy." Both answered in the affirmative  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs pp. 40-41).

At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time) the "Plans" were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 40).  However, at the Conference first the President of the Privy Council and  then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the views of the  Government as to whether the emphasis was not being placed by the  Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When none of the Supreme  Command replied, and only the Navy Minister representing the Government,  the Emperor is reported to have rebuked the Supreme Command by  indicating that he was striving for international peace. After this the  Chief of the Navy General Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of  the Supreme Command were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and  "advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way  out."  According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned "in an  atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 41).

Japan's "minimum demands" in the negotiations with America and England,  as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time), were  as follows, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs:

"1. America and England would be required to agree not to intervene in, or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the "China Incident", to close  the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any kind to China.

"2. America and England would be required to agree to take no action in  the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese Empire, and not to  establish military bases in Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies,  China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or increase their existing Far  Eastern military forces over their present strength. In this connection  Japan would not consider any demands 'for the liquidation of Japan's  special relations with French Indo-China'."

"3. America and England would be required to agree to cooperate with  Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials; to restore trade  relations with Japan and "furnish her with the

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"raw materials she needs" from British and American territories in the  Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close economic  relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78)."

The "maximum concessions" Japan was prepared to make in return for agreement to her "minimum demands" were as follows:

"1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for operations  against any neighboring countries 'with the exception of China'.

"2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from French Indochina 'as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East'."

"3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the  Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, p. 78). In  other words in an effort to take all possible advantage of the world  situation, the Japanese Government (determined at the Imperial  Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would accept  from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her troops from  French Indochina would be the agreement of America and England to cease  all aid to China, to accept a military and naval status in the Far East  inferior to Japan, and to furnish all possible material aid to Japan.  Furthermore, Japan did not intend to perform her part of the "bargain"  until after "a just peace" had been established in the Far East. From  the Japanese standpoint, this latter qualification meant after the  settlement of the "China Incident" by Japan on her own terms. The  substance of these "minimum demands" was contained in the ultimatum  which the Japanese Government later delivered to the United States on  November 20 (Washington time).

The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time), Premier Konoye,  with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers of War, Navy,  and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a private house under  conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his notes of the meeting,  Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had requested that his statements  be transmitted personally to President Roosevelt in the belief that they  might amplify and clarify the approach which he had made through  Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Grew noted that the Premier and,  consequently, the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly  agreed with the four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis  for the rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations. [1] In his  memoirs, however, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting  Ambassador Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull's four  principles he said "that they were splendid as principles but when it  came down to actual application a variety of problems arose" and that it  was in order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to  hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p.  42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly urged that  no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese- American relations would be presented, and that the Premier had

[1] In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference  which he had on that date with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador  Grew noted that the Foreign Minister told him that Ambassador Nomura had  been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the  United States memorandum of October 2 (Washington time) (*see infra*)  that Premier Konoye "fully subscribed" to the four principles should be  modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed "in principle" (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 664).

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said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army  and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed  conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could control any  opposition from within the Government, and that he was determined to  spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him to crown  his present endeavors with success. The Ambassador wrote that during the  conversation he had outlined in general terms

"the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the  failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by  former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all sincerity"

and had stated that, as the result

"the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese  promises or assurances."

He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in view  of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with  the President could be arranged "with the least possible delay" (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 604-606).

THE UNITED STATES ASKS JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS NEW PROPOSALS

(October 2, 1941)

Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one hand, was  vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go forward with the  proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest possible moment. It is  now known that this desire for haste reflected the decision of the  Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that

"*If by the early part of October* there is no reasonable hope of having  our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will  immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and  England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing of  these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan's peaceful intentions,  was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should  take place the two Governments should preliminary agree upon the  fundamental matters under consideration when the conversations were  broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of southern  French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in the reply to  Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura on  September 3, and had been repeated many times by Secretary Hull in his  subsequent conversations with the Ambassador.

The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt a  memorandum in Secretary Hull's handwriting, on White House stationery,  apparently written by the Secretary for the President before the latter  left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25 (Washington time) (ex.  179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum summarized Secretary Hull's views at the time:

"My suggestion on Jap situation for you to read later*." 

"C.H.

"When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as  getting troops out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade  in Pacific."

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"We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in  principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success  of the conference.

"Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic  questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.

"My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first  sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position *now*,  and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal  attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle  before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting (ex.  179). [Italics in original.]"

President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde Park in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington time):

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

"I wholly agree with your penciled note to recite the more liberal  original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting,  point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot  go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement  in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.
"F. D. R.
"(Ex. 179.)"

On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Ambassador Nomura the United States' reply to the Japanese Government's proposals  of September 6 and its subsequent statements of September 23 (Annex c)  and September 27 (Annex D). This reply briefly reviewed the course of  the conversations thus far, pointing out that developments from early  August up to September 6 had seemed to justify the United States  Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected  to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive  program covering the entire Pacific area. The reply continued:

"It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the  United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by  the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese  Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for  discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two  Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent  explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of  this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the  principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had  been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese  Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting  into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and  maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 658-659)."

It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent  continued to be qualified by phrases the need for which was not readily  apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were restricted  to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than the entire  Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's  intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and  French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful  intentions, as would additional clarification of the Japanese  Government's position with respect to the European war. The reply continued by stating that from what the Japanese Government had so far  indicated in regard to its purposes, the United States Government had  derived the impression that Japan had in mind a program by which the  liberal and progressive principles adhered to by the United States would  be circumscribed in their application by qualifications and exceptions.  The Japanese Government was

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 321

then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the proposed  Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to the high  purposes "which we have mutually had in mind." The reply concluded by  stating that it was the belief of the United States Government that  renewed consideration of the fundamental principles which it had long  advocated would aid in reaching a meeting of minds in regard to the  essential questions on which agreement was sought and would thus lay a  firm foundation for the proposed meeting, and that it was the  President's earnest hope that a discussion of the fundamental questions  might be so developed that the meeting could be held (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 656-661). After reading the reply, Ambassador Nomura commented that  he thought his Government would be disappointed because of its very  earnest desire to hold the meeting, but that in any case he would  transmit it to his Government, which he did the same day (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added that he was convinced that the  Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no  ulterior purpose. He said, however, that in view of the difficulties of  the internal situation in Japan, he did not think his Government could  go any further at this time (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655).

In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington time),  which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in  addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other high officers  in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor, Acting Assistant Chief  of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions:

"10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of  leaders nor economic concessions at this point would be of any material  advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw  from the Axis were obtained prior to the conference. * * *

"11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the  Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before  us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis  Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and  economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time,  the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the  Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the  Tripartite Pact.  The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy"  by the United States is still clearly indicated (ex. 33)."

The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson's handwriting, appears  at the end of his copy of the above memorandum:

"Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them  strongly.  I believe however that during the next three months while we are rearming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an  explosion by the Japanese Army. Put concretely this means, that while I  approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should  not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President  and P. M. [1] I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held  would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally  important relations with China (ex. 33)."

Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed or  approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and  Premier Konoye. He continued:

"I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the  President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss  something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement  regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished (tr.  6308).

[1] Prime Minister Konoye.

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In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at length the considerations which were taken into account in determining  the position to be taken by the United States Government regarding the  proposed "leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124).

The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded the United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister  Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United States as he saw it.  His report began by stating

"although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. Talks have finally  reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an  absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United  States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope  to penetrate through (ex. 1, p. 51-52)."

He expressed the view that an "understanding" between Japan and the  United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation of the  Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53).

During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated  efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States  Government state what further assurances it desired from the Japanese  Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konoye was daily  growing more difficult. Also during this period, Ambassador Nomura  appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign Minister Toyoda. In  a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8 (Washington time), the  Ambassador indicated that he agreed with many of Secretary Hull's  criticisms of the Japanese proposals of September 6, which the Foreign  Office had prepared. He expressed the opinion that

"In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did  we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal  conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees  we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated  concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We  limited the area to which the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment  would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was  geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the  question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China  (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands  which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that  they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact.  These points you probably already know (ex. 1, p. 59)."

As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the  three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e.,  which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the  withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's obligations under the  Tripartite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade,  Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington  time) (vol. II, pp. 670 672). The Ambassador's report of this meeting  (ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfactory to Foreign Minister Toyoda,  for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador's opinions and that what  he wanted was "the opinions of the American officials and none other."  Saying that "slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has  reached the decisive stage," and that he was doing his utmost "to bring  about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this  senseless procrastination," he told Ambassador Nomura:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 323

"You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with  these parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me  anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire  me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what  they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you  interview Hull or the President of the United States, please take  Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without delay the  complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63)."

On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda  requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their conversation  told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had been "unable to provide  the information" he had asked for and that-

"a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit  through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received,  would have measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p.  454)."

The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent  further delay he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Government to  reply to the following question:

"The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United  States with reference to certain questions proposals which are  apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will  the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its  consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government  which would be satisfactory to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II,  p. 678)?"

 He continued by saying that since

"he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the  question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to  assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral  Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the  personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official  in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to  undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the  Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in  the event that it was decided to send the official in question to  Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on  the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the  official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the  United-States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the  Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would  transmit his inquiry to my Government.

"In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to  me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of  expediting the progress of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679)."

Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toyoda's message of October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time):

"What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they  claim that our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that  our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements  and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory  talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters  mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other  objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not  understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at  least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance  with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. *I am sure  that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a  conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.*

"In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they  have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider  at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of  their answer of the 2nd (ex. I, p. 63).

On October 13 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled instructions  to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington,

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Mr. Wakasugi, who had just returned to Washington after 2 weeks in  Japan, to call upon Under Secretary Welles. In his message, the Foreign  Minister said that he was particularly anxious to be advised as soon as  possible as to whether he could assume that the United States had no  particular disagreements other than the three major points and whether  the United States would submit a counterproposal to the Japanese  proposals of September 27. He said:

"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, and it is becoming  absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of  Japanese-U S relations is to be accomplished (ex 1, p 64)."

Counselor Wakasugi talked with Under Secretary Welles on the afternoon of October 13 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 680-686). Admiral Nomura sent two  reports of that meeting to Tokyo, on the same day (ex. 1, pp. 66-68).  His first report stated that so far as Mr. Welles knew there were no  obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference other than  the three major points, though there might be one or two others, and  that the United States had no intention of submitting any  counterproposal other than those of June 21 and October 2. His second  report was a more detailed description of the Welles-Wakasugi meeting.  In reply, the Foreign Minister said that these reports had "clarified  many points" and "that there is no need for us to make any further move  until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the  concrete proposal any further" (ex. 1, pp. 69-70).

In Tokyo, the Japanese Government also made frequent overtures to the officials at the American Embassy. Thus, early on October 7 (Japan  time), the Premier's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor  Dooman (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 662-663) and complained that the failure of  the preliminary conversations to make any progress had made the  Premier's position difficult. He concluded his remarks with the comment  that

"the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American  Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the  undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut  reply as not forthcoming to bring the conversations to a close (ex 29,  vol. II, p 663)."

This meeting appears to have been preliminary to a meeting the same  morning between Ambassador Grew and the Foreign Minister, at the  latter's request. At that meeting, as on the occasion of subsequent  calls by Mr. Terasaki on Counselor Dooman and Ambassador Grew on October  8 and 9, the Japanese endeavored to obtain comments on the American  reply of October 2. It was again indicated that the Japanese Government  wished to know more definitely what undertakings the United States  Government wanted it to give. These efforts culminated in Foreign  Minister Toyoda's request of Ambassador Grew on October 10 that he  submit that question to Secretary Hull. On that occasion Ambassador Grew  commented at length on the opinion he had conveyed the day before to the  Foreign Minister, that the reports he had received of plans to dispatch  additional Japanese troops to Indochina in substantial numbers "could  not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 679).

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GERMANY DEMANDS THAT JAPAN WARN THE UNITED STATES THAT WAR BETWEEN  GERMANY AND ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD LEAD TO WAR BETWEEN JAPAN  AND THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT

(October 1941)

The intercepted Japanese messages show that during the latter part of September and the early part of October both the German and Italian  Ambassadors sought to obtain from Foreign Minister Toyoda confidential  information regarding the Japanese-American conversations. In contrast  with the policy followed by his predecessor, Foreign Minister Matsuoka,  from whom the Axis partners had obtained such information, Foreign  Minister Toyoda declined to give them any (ex. 1, p. 71).

Failing in this, after the German attacks on American merchant vessels  and the movement in the United States for revision of the Neutrality  Act, the Germans took a stronger line. This became known to the United  States not only from intercepted messages but also through statements  made by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, to  Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on October 15 (Japan time). Mr. Amau told  Ambassador Grew

"that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of  a statement by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the  interpretation given to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the  effect that Japan will declare war on they United States in the event of  war occurring between Germany and the United States. As a reply,  although it has not yet been decided when or whether such reply will be  rendered to the German Government, the Japanese Government is  considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that  maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact  and that the attention of the American Government has been sought for  its earnest consideration of Japan's obligations under the Pact (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 686)."

The following day, however, Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador  Nomura that early in October

"the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to  the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese  Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to  attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would  inevitably arise between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and the  United States, on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the  convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and  might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United  States. We have not as yet submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese- merican negotiations, we found it necessary to consider  carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The  German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request, and  there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any  longer. While Japan, on the one hand, finds it necessary to do something  in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power  Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is  desirous of making a success of the Japanese- merican negotiations.  Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United  States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my  separate telegram #672 and as would not affect the Japanese-American  negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me  and you (ex. 1, p. 71)."

The proposed "warning" to the United States sent to Ambassador Nomura in  the Foreign Minister's separate telegram #672 was as follows:

"The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war.  Should, however, the

Page 326             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a  state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite  Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in  its sincere desire that not only the German American relations will  cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be  alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now  requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government (ex. 1,  p. 71)."

Foreign Minister Toyoda never had an opportunity to select the  "appropriate moment" for the delivery of his warning, because the next  day Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet resigned *en bloc*. The German  Ambassador continued to press for action by Foreign Minister Togo;  Admiral Toyoda's successor, but by November 11 (Japan time) when the  Foreign Minister communicated with Ambassador Nomura concerning it, far  more vigorous measures were contemplated by the Japanese. Foreign  Minister Togo's reply erred on the side of understatement:

"I explained (to the German Ambassador) that there is a good chance that it would be more effective, under the present circumstances, for us to  present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations  to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether  a mere representation would bear any fruit (ex. 1, p. 117)."

THE KONOYE CABINET FALLS, AND AMBASSADOR NOMURA ASKS PERMISSION TO RETURN TO JAPAN

(October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941)

The attitude of the Japanese representatives in the conversations in  Washington and in Tokyo during the latter part of September and the  early part of October reflected developments within the Japanese  Government during that period. In turn, the course of those developments  was directly affected by the far-reaching decisions which had been made  at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time).  As has been  seen, it is now known that at that conference it had been decided that  if "by the early part of October" there should be "no reasonable hope"  of having the Japanese "demands" agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations

"we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against  America (and England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

This decision, according to Premier Konoye, had established a dead line  "beyond which negotiations could not proceed." The Japanese Government  "came more and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down" (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 43).

As Ambassador Nomura had told Secretary Hull, with the presentation of its new proposals of September 6, its proposals for basic peace terms  with China on September 23, and its revision of the American proposals  of June 91 which had been delivered to Secretary Hull on September 27,  the Japanese Government took the position that there was nothing more  that it desired to say and that the next move was up to the United  States. In his memoirs, Premier Konoye criticizes the action of the  Japanese Foreign Office in submitting three proposals during September  without deciding that it would proceed with the September 27 plan  "alone, in complete disregard of the plans of the past" (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p- 46).

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This action, which left the Japanese intentions confused, was largely  responsible for the fact that the United States Government, in its reply  of October 2 (Washington time), had asked for a further clarification of  the Japanese intentions.

It is now known that before the United States' reply of October 2 was received in Tokyo and as a result of the fact that the deadline set on  September 6 was approaching at a faster rate than the conversations were  progressing, Premier Konoye began frequent conferences with members of  his Cabinet. He conferred on September 24 and 25 (Japan time) with the  War Minister, Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, and President of the Navy  Planning Board. From September 27 to October 1 (Japan time) he had  discussions with the Navy Minister "concerning the atmosphere in his  circle." On October 4 (Japan time), after receipt of the United States  reply of October 2, Premier Konoye had an audience with Emperor  Hirohito, following which there was a Joint Conference attended by the  chiefs of the Japanese High Command. On the evening of October 5 (Japan  time) he conferred with General Tojo, the War Minister, to whom he expressed the opinion "that he would continue negotiations (with the   United States) to the very end" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On the evening of October 7 (Japan time), General Tojo called on Premier  Konoye and declared that the Army would find it difficult to submit to  the withdrawal of its troops from China. In view of this attitude, on  October 8 (Japan time) Premier Konoye conferred with the Navy Minister  and the Foreign Minister concerning "methods of avoiding a crisis." He  met twice with Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 10 (Japan time), the  day on which the Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Grew to inquire from  the United States Government what additional assurances it desired the  Japanese Government to give. A Joint Conference was held on October 11  (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On Sunday, October 12 (Japan time), Premier Konoye called a meeting  attended by himself and the Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs,  together with the President of the Planning Board, which he described in his memoirs as "almost the last conference relative to peace or war."  Before the meeting he had learned that the Navy, although not desiring a  rupture in the negotiations, and wishing as much as possible to avoid  war, nevertheless was unwilling to state this publicly, and would  therefore leave the question of peace or war up to the Premier. At the  meeting, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the Navy Minister  stated:

"We have now indeed come to the crossroads where we must determine  either upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely  up to the Premier.  And, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the  way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, we ought to  proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to  fruition. * * * If we are to have war, we must determine upon war here  and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If  we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to have us proceed  upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no matter  what happens (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

In reply to this, Premier Konoye said:

"If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I  myself would decide on continuing the negotiations (ex. 173. Konoye  Memoirs, p. 50)."

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General Tojo, the Minister of War, objected, saying:

"This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought  we not to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of  bringing the negotiations to fruition? *To carry on negotiations for  which there is no possibility for fruition, and in the end to let slip  the time for fighting, would be a matter of the greatest consequence*  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

General Tojo then asked Foreign Minister Toyoda whether he thought there was any possibility of bringing negotiations to fruition. In answer to  this question, the Foreign Minister replied that the most difficult  problem was the question of the withdrawal of troops from China. He continued:

"if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from  its former assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if  on this point the Army states that it will be all right to make  concessions, however small they may be, then we cannot say that there is  no hope of bringing the negotiations to fruition (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 50)."

General Tojo, however, would not yield, saying:

"The problem of the stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army, and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

According to Premier Konoye, although the conference lasted 4 hours, no  conclusion was arrived at before the meeting adjourned.  The following  day, October 13 (Japan time), Premier Konoye reported the situation to  Emperor Hirohito and Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and  a leader of the "senior statesmen." The next day the Premier met with  General Tojo before the Cabinet meeting and again asked his considered  opinion concerning the problem of the stationing of troops in China,  saying that he had a very great responsibility for the "China Incident,"  which was still unsettled, and that he found it difficult to agree "to  enter upon a greater war the future of which I cannot at all foresee."  He then urged, according to his memoirs, that Japan "ought to give in  for a time, grant to the United States the formality of withdrawing  troops, and save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war"  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 51).

In response to this, General Tojo declared

"if at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that  are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop.  The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the  honor and of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to  agree from the point of view of maintaining the fighting spirit of the  Army (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51)."

Premier Konoye records that thus General Tojo did not move from the  position he had taken, and the talk ended at odds. According to his  memoirs, at the Cabinet meeting which followed, General Tojo at the  outset "strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese- American negotiations should no longer be continued."  No further  reference to the question of continuing the negotiations was made at the  Cabinet meeting, as none of the Cabinet ministers would answer General  Tojo (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51.)

That evening General Tojo is reported to have sent a message to Premier  Konoye in which he said, in effect, that if the Navy's decision to  entrust the question of peace or war to the Premier was due to a desire  on the part of the Navy not to have a war, then the Imperial Conference  on September 6 "will have been fundamentally

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 329

overturned," as the decisions reached at that conference would not have taken into account such an attitude on the part of the Navy. He then  expressed the belief that the entire Cabinet should resign and "declare  insolvent everything that has happened up to now and reconsider our  plans once more." He said that it was very hard for him to ask the  Premier to resign but that, as matters had come to pass, he could not  help but do so, and begged the Premier to exert his efforts toward  having the Emperor designate Prince Higashikuni, the Chief of the  General Staff, as the next Premier, in the belief that only an imperial  prince would have power to keep control of the Army and the Navy and to  refashion a plan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52).

The next day, October 15 (Japan time), Premier Konoye was received by  Emperor Hirohito, to whom the Premier reported the foregoing  developments. The Emperor expressed doubts concerning the desirability  of naming Prince Higashikuni the next Premier, saying, according to  Premier Konoye:

"In time of peace it would be all right, but in a situation in which we  fear that there may be war, and when we also think further of the  interests of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing forth (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52)."

That evening the Premier secretly discussed the situation with Prince  Higashikuni, who said he desired several days to think the matter over.  However, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the situation would not  permit further delay, and the following morning all of the Cabinet  members submitted their resignations. The next day the "senior  statesmen" met in consultation regarding the selection of the next  Premier, but Prince Konoye did not attend (ex. 1, 3, Konoye Memoirs, pp.  52-53). Instead, he submitted a long letter explaining in detail the  chain of events leading to the resignation of his Cabinet (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, appendix IX, pp. 87-91).

Several of the intercepted Japanese messages confirm Prince Konoye's  emphasis upon the Army's stand regarding the withdrawal of Japanese  troops from China as one of the main causes of the resignation of the  Konoye Cabinet. Thus, on October 15 (Washington time), shortly after the  Cabinet meetings in Tokyo at which General Tojo refused to make any  concessions regarding the evacuation of troops from China, Ambassador  Nomura reported to the Foreign Office that the Japanese military attache  at the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been

"instructed by the Headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an  inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops.  They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand  regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point (ex. 1, p. 70)."

On October 17 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador  Nomura that the Cabinet had resigned, saying:

"The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is  true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the  matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However,  regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the  United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.  There shall be no changes in this respect.

"Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single  purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before (ex. 1, p.  76)."