| 130              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter.
 [252] The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner
 as to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the radar
 information center.
 
 As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken with a
 view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities for
 defense.
 
 THE "CODE DESTRUCTION" 
      INTELLIGENCE
 
 As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised "for action" on December 3
 of information received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent
 on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,
 Singapore, Batavia, *Manila, Washington*, and London to destroy most of
 their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
 confidential and secret documents. [253]
 
 Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence, Admiral Kimmel
 stated that both he and his staff noted that *most* of the codes and
 ciphers *not all* were to be destroyed and that this information
 appeared to fit in with the information "we had received about a
 Japanese movement in South East Asia." He commented that Japan would
 naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her
 communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia caused
 Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over diplomatic
 residences. [254]
 
 Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had
 received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and
 confidential documents. He testified: "I didn't consider that of any
 vital importance when I received it * * * ." [255]
 
 General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not
 provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the
 greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning
 the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code machine
 [256] General Short said: "The one thing that would have affected me
 more than the other matter was the fact they had ordered their code
 machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they
 are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly
 sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three
 or four days * * *." [257] He further testified that had the Navy given
 him any of the dispatches received concerning the destruction of codes
 he would have gone into a more serious alert. [258]
 
 In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken
 by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the
 most significant information received between November 27 and December 6
 with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of
 the testimony is to effect that orders to
 
 [252] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2697.
 [253] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40.
 
 On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information of the
 substance of an intercepted Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering
 London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code) machine.
 It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to
 Tokyo and on December 2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but
 one copy of other systems and all secret documents, that the British
 Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit
 No. 37, p. 41.
 [254] Committee record, p. 6723.
 [255] Id., at p. 7477.
 [256] This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War
 Department which was not received by General Short until after the
 attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra.
 [257] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
 [258] Committee record, p. 8397.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      131
 
 destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing war within
 a very few days. [259]
 
 It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this
 intelligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of
 this information was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably
 narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike.
 While orders to burn codes may not always mean war in the diplomatic
 sense, it very definitely meant war and soon in a military sense after
 the "war warning" of November 27. Admiral Kimmel received this
 intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave him an
 opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute distant
 reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with the
 likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning. Nothing was
 done General Short was not even informed.
 
 On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised
 for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all secret and
 confidential publications and other classified matter except that
 essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly,
 in event of emergency, all classified matter. [260] This intelligence
 was of the greatest significance. It meant that not only was war almost
 immediately at hand but that a landing operation by Japan against Guam
 was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done.
 
 On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral
 Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international situation
 and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he was
 authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and
 confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater
 emergency." [261] This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing
 operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway.
 
 GENERAL SHORT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BY  
      JAPANESE CONSULATE
 
 The evidence reflects that although Admiral Kimmel received significant
 information on four different occasions between December 3 and 6
 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in
 Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying
 possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short.
 Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained
 adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential matter
 by Japanese diplomatic establishments. Col. George W. Bicknell,
 assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, stated that he learned from
 Navy sources in Hawaii about December 3 that diplomatic representatives
 of Japan in Washington,
 
 [259] see Part IV, infra re code destruction.
 [260] Committee exhibit No .37, p. 44.
 [261] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45.
 
 A memorandum submitted by the Navy Department concerning this dispatch
 under date of January 29, 1946 stated OpNav dispatch 061743 was
 transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6, 1941 Washington
 local time" (committee record, p.11441).
 
 It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was
 asked whether he had testified as to when he had received the message of
 December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers
 referred to in the preceding paragraph Admiral Kimmel said "I will look
 at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received but to the best of my
 recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an even bet as
 to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn't get it
 until after the attack. * * * I have no record upon which I can
 definitely state that. I can only state my recollection."
 
 Going on, Admiral Kimmel said "*At any rate, if I did receive this
 before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the
 circumstances. * * * And that (referring to the message) was not
 particularly alarming*," see committee record pp. 7649,7650.
 
 132             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying their
 codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he learned
 from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter had
 intercepted a telephone "message from the Japanese consulate Honolulu,
 which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was burning and
 destroying all his important papers." Colonel Bicknell said: [262]
 
 "In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference
 conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those
 assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned
 concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese
 consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information
 which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such
 papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was
 about to happen somewhere."
 
 General Fielder stated that he was present at the staff conference and
 that on December 6 he gave to General Short the information that the
 Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. [263]
 Colonel Phillips also stated that this information was given by him to
 General Short.
 
 The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December 3 the
 district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could verify
 information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was burning his
 codes and papers; that about 2 hours later the FBI intercepted a
 telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese consulate and a
 Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook stated that the
 consul general was "burning and destroying all his important papers." He
 stated that he immediately gave this information to the district
 intelligence officer of the Navy and the assistant G-2 of the Army; and
 thereupon sent a dispatch to Director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington:
 "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all
 important papers." [264]
 
 In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated that he
 received no information from his intelligence officer until after the
 attack that the consular records were being burned. He stated: [265]
 
 "As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything
 until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted
 the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the
 previous day."
 
 Before the committee, however, General Short corrected his former
 testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of December 6
 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers. [266]
 
 While the evidence would indicate that General Short was advised on
 December 6 that the Japanese consul was burning his *codes* and
 *papers*, a point has been made by the commanding general that his
 information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his
 papers without reference to *codes*. Even conceding this to be true, the
 fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short had been
 informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of adequate import
 to impress the commanding general with the fact that our relations with
 Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is
 
 [262] See affidavit. Dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before
 Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
 [263] See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated
 May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen.
 [264] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before
 Major Clausen.
 [265] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
 [266] Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399.
 
 concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially
 the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential
 papers *by Japanese diplomatic representatives*, although he was not
 informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the Navy
 Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes *in certain of
 our own outlying possessions*.
 
 THE 
      "LOST" JAPANESE CARRIERS RADIO INTELLIGENCE AT HAWAII
 
 Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in chief
 of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible point of
 attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii.
 This unit was engaged in "traffic analyses"; that is, identifying,
 locating, and determining the movements of Japanese warships through
 their call signals. The location of vessels was effected through radio-
 direction methods. [267]
 
 Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the Radio
 Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of
 Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelligence bulletins
 incorporating information received from the radio intelligence units in
 the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued by the Office of Naval
 Intelligence. These bulletins were made available to Admiral Kimmel.
 
 Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning
 Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received from
 the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines) were
 considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on, November
 24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,
 among others, that other reports should be carefully evaluated and sent
 to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District for action and to the
 Office of Naval Operations for information. After combining all incoming
 reports the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct
 dispatches to the Office of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral
 Kimmel for information setting forth his evaluation and best possible
 continuity. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November
 26 advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of the
 Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information with respect to
 Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at
 Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This dispatch expressed the
 belief that a strong concentration of Japanese submarines and air
 groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
 carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet were located in
 the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The estimate of the situation was
 to the effect that a strong force might be preparing to operate in
 southeastern Asia, while some units might operate from Paleo and the
 Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio Intelligence Unit in the
 Philippines advised, among others, the commander in chief of the Pacific
 Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations, in commenting on the November
 26 dispatch from Hawaii, that traffic analysis for the past few days
 indicated that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was
 directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently
 would be divided into two
 
 [267] See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp.
 182-292.
 
 134             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China
 area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second
 section included Carrier Division 3 "Ryujo, and one Maru." This dispatch
 further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District
 could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force
 were in the Mandated Islands and that his best indications were that all
 known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. The opinion was
 expressed that this evaluation was regarded as reliable.
 
 Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports from
 the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the
 movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan. These
 reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, did
 not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers.
 
 The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice after
 November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information received
 through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications. [268]
 These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet Intelligence
 Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the
 following morning. On November 28, an intelligence summary, reviewed by
 Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further information concerning the
 presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were
 still located in home waters." The next day he received the November 28
 summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese
 radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon United States
 Naval Communications and "is getting results." There was no information
 set forth in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day,
 Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indicating that
 Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the commander in
 chief, Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral Kimmel received the previous
 day's summary which stated with respect to carriers that the presence of
 a unit of "plane guard" destroyers indicated the presence of at least
 one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed. The
 Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1 [269] received by
 Admiral Kimmel from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington
 stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese naval situation
 that " * * * the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as
 well as the greatest portion of the carriers." This summary related to
 information obtained during the 2 weeks preceding its date of December 1
 and the Washington estimate of the situation was necessarily based on
 radio intelligence information received largely from the Philippines and
 Hawaii before the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of
 Japanese vessels on December 1. The December 1 summary, which Admiral
 Kimmel received from Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service
 radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December 1;
 that previously service calls had been changed after a period of 6
 months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941.
 This summary stated:
 
 "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an
 additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large
 scale*."
 
 [268] For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115a.
 [269] Committee exhibit No. 80.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      135
 
 This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary also
 stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were
 believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and that as to
 carriers there was "no change."
 
 On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton
 had prepared on December 1 at his request. This contained Layton's
 estimate, on the basis of all available information, concerning the
 location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-
 Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4, which included
 four carriers, and the Kasuga Maru (believed to have been a converted
 carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "*Koryu* (?) plus plane
 guards" in the Marshalls area.
 
 Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions
 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate, the
 reason being that Layton considered the information as to the location
 of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of
 their whereabouts. [270]
 
 On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Admiral Kimmel
 had the following conversation: [271]
 
 "Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said "What! You
 don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
 replied, "No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do
 not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty
 confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as
 sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially
 with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could
 be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that
 effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or
 words to that effect."
 
 Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his mind and
 that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete ignorance as to
 the location of the Japanese carrier divisions. However, the very
 reference by Admiral Kimmel to the carriers rounding "Diamond Head" was
 recognition by him of this possibility and his complete lack of
 knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral Kimmel and Captain Layton
 discussed
 
 "radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and
 yet the over-all picture that it will produce. *Whether then or at other
 times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders,
 proceed under radio silence and never be detected by visual or other
 sighting*. [272]"
 
 The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to
 Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows:
 
 "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
 identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
 since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
 change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been
 recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
 
 The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4
 stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary
 delivered on December 5 contained no mention of carriers. The summary
 delivered on December 6 stated "No traffic from the Commander Carriers
 or Submarine Force has been seen either."
 
 Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources,
 the only way by which Admiral Kimmel would have obtained in-
 
 [270] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212.
 [271] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213.
 [272] Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215.
 
 136              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from
 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnaissance.
 Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to the
 commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions very
 definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese vessels
 were changed on December 1, a most unusual procedure inasmuch as they
 had been changed only a month previously on November 1. Admiral Kimmel
 fully appreciated the significance of this change and actually
 underscored the statement submitted to him: "*The fact that service
 calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in
 preparing for operations on a large scale*." It would appear Admiral
 Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in anticipation of a Japanese
 movement to South East Asia.
 
 The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers could
 not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known, however,
 that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a movement to the
 south since such an operation would be open to visual observation by our
 forces in the Philippines as well as by friendly powers. In consequence,
 only two reasonable alternatives remained either the carriers were in
 home waters or they were engaged in an operation under radio silence in
 some direction other than to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel's duty to
 be prepared for the alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded
 that the unusual change in service signals on December 1 clothed a
 Japanese major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could
 have predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such
 an attack would come. [273]
 
 Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio
 intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which
 his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese
 vessels. [273a] Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence
 analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility
 as commander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the
 sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio
 Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the
 picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant
 information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese would
 possibly attack.
 
 [273] Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: "I am of the view that
 the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval
 forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding
 the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had
 received, including the 'war warning' and other messages from the Chief
 of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an
 attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack
 could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." See "Fourth
 Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No.
 157.
 And again: "The 
      absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to
 them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific,
 and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should
 have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to
 reduce the effectiveness of such an attack." Id.
 
 [273a] In this regard, Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: "The
 failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December
 first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During
 the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight
 to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about
 the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months
 preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of
 positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese
 First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the
 location of the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet
 was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months
 preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty-
 four days in twelve separate periods each ranging from nine to twenty-
 two days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic
 analysis was uncertain." Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      137
 
 THE "MORI CALL"
 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to
 responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript
 of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation [274]
 between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" [275] and an individual in
 Japan. The transcript of this conversation indicated, among other
 things, that the individual in Japan was interested in the daily flights
 of airplanes, particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether
 searchlights were being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl
 Harbor. Reference was made during the conversation to various flowers,
 [276] the significance of which was not known, but which conceivably
 could have been an open code employed to convey information concerning
 the presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese
 attack force, which could have listened in on the conversation.
 
 Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office of
 the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should be
 studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until after
 the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation was not
 seen by Admiral Kimmel before December 7. The transcript was delivered
 to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of December 6 by Colonel
 Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great significance to
 the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that the special agent in
 charge of the FBI was alarmed at what he considered the military
 implications of the Mori conversation with respect to Pearl Harbor and
 that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, considering the conversation
 as very irregular and highly suspicious. He stated, however, that "both
 Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too
 'intelligence conscious' and that to them the message seemed to be quite
 in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about." [277] No action
 whatever was taken by General Short.
 
 Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the "Mori call," the
 conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest
 significance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the
 Mori family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known
 to the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by
 Japan in the daily flights of "large airplanes" and whether searchlights
 were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders who were
 properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the worst in the
 knowledge that hostilities were imminent a desire to know whether air
 reconnaissance was being conducted and whether searchlights were
 employed for defense against air attack. The undecipherable and
 suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified alertness by
 reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be gathered.
 *The Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii*.
 
 The decision of the District intelligence Office of the Navy to place
 the matter aside for further study was inexcusable and reflects the
 apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command.
 
 [274] See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the
 conversation.
 [275] The Mori family included Dr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko
 Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The
 family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii.
 [276] In the course of the conversation the question was asked, "What
 kind of dowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply was:
 "Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year.
 However the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now."
 [277] See affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 25, 1945,
 before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
 
 138             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 DETECTION 
      OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE ON MORNING OF DECEMBER
 
 The U. S. S. Condor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time)
 December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance
 buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines had
 been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by visual
 signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer of the
 Inshore Patrol between 3:50 and 3:58 a. m. After receiving this
 information the Ward searched for the submarine for approximately one
 and one-half hours without results. It thereupon contacted the Condor,
 inquiring as to the distance and course of the submarine that was
 sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but the Ward was unable to
 effect the submarine's location on the basis of this information. The
 commander of the Ward thought the Condor had been mistaken in concluding
 that it had seen a submarine and made no report to higher authority.
 [278] The radio conversation between the Ward and the Condor was
 overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point
 Oahu, a radio station under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol,
 Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely
 between the ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request
 was made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to
 higher authority.
 
 At 6:30 a. m. The U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a
 barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small
 submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate, and
 at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop
 two "smoke pots" near the object. At 6:40 the Ward sighted an
 unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares. The Ward opened
 fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of the Ward, noted
 about the same time that a Navy patrol plane appeared to drop depth
 charges or bombs on the submarine. When the submarine keeled over and
 started to sink, the Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges.
 
 At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "We
 have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."
 The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch with a supplemental
 message at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges
 upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." This information was
 received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty
 Officer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15. Admiral Kimmel stated he received
 this information between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m.
 
 Admiral Bloch, according to his testimony, was informed by his Chief of
 Staff, but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts,
 their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if
 it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty destroyer could take
 care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to whom the information had
 been referred had the power to take any action which might be desired.
 [279] Admiral Kimmel testified: [280]
 
 "Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty
 Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer
 to assist the Ward,
 
 [278] See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429.
 [279] Id., at pages 414 416; 452-469. For further details concerning
 this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76.
 [280] Committee record, p. 6760-6770.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      139
 
 and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward's
 report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In
 my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine
 attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action
 in view of the number of such contacts which had not been been verified
 in the past."
 
 It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Kimmel's own statement he
 refers to only two reports concerning possible submarine contacts after
 November 3 in addition to the Ward incident. He stated: [281]
 
 "* * * On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported that a radar
 operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against
 submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A
 search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area
 produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S.
 Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-
 23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no
 conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine."
 
 The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on the
 morning of December 7, in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, even though
 not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on the qui vive
 and when at 6:40 a. m. The presence of a submarine was definitely
 established, the entire Navy command should have been on a full alert.
 In the Martin-Bellinger estimate annexed to the Joint Coastal Frontier
 Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single submarine attack may
 indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed
 of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. Admiral Kimmel in his letter to
 the Fleet, 2CL-41 (Revised), *dated October 14, 1941*, made this
 identical statement and followed it with the words: [282] "The Task
 Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as
 the situation and daylight conditions warrant *in order to be prepared
 to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other
 means*."
 
 The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a
 submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of such
 frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance to
 the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true when it
 is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral Kimmel's
 own estimates indicated the extreme significance of submarine activity.
 As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents appear to be the
 *first* instance of reported sighting and sinking of a submarine since
 the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan.
 
 The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., *over 4 hours before the
 Japanese air force struck*. Appearing before the Roberts Commission,
 General Short commented as follows with respect to the Ward incident:
 [283]
 
 "That would under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was
 danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine
 attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it
 was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that
 information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of
 Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine
 attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me
 that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely
 wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the
 information to me had not at any rate, I did not get the information
 until after the attack."
 
 [281] Id, at p. 6769.
 [282] Hewitt inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44.
 [282] Roberts Commission record, p. 311.
 140              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. And the attack upon a
 submarine at 6:45 a. m., December 7, should have been recognized as
 immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military contingencies.
 [284]
 
 RADAR DETECTION OF 
      JAPANESE RAIDING FORCE
 
 The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday morning, December 7
 from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. [284a] The normal operation for training
 purposes after 7 a. m. Was discontinued for this particular Sunday by
 reason of special authorization obtained from the control officer.
 
 At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates
 Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m.
 Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to
 quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7 a.
 m. in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation of
 the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction. As
 the machine was being adjusted, Private Lockard saw on the radar screen
 an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine. Inasmuch
 as the indicator reflected a large number of planes coming in and he was
 confident there was nothing like it in the air, he felt that the machine
 must be at fault. After additional checking he found, however, that the
 machine was operating properly and concluded at 7:02 a. m. that there
 was a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles
 from 3  east of north. [285]
 
 After some discussion concerning the advisability of informing the
 information center, Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m.
 advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from the
 direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General Short stated,
 "At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except the telephone
 operator had folded up their equipment and left." [286] The switchboard
 operator was unable to do anything about the call and accordingly, since
 the information center personnel had departed, referred it to Lt. Kermit
 A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps whose tour of duty at the
 center was until 8 a. m. He was there solely for training and
 observation.
 
 Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a large number
 of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to "forget it."
 He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight
 of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that
 were scheduled to arrive on December 7.
 
 [284] In the light of the known and declared significance to be attached
 to the presence of a Japanese submarine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor,
 this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion
 made by the Navy Court of Inquiry that: "There was nothing, however, in
 the presence of a single sub marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate
 that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent " See Navy Court of
 Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157.
 [284a] In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked
 it radar was put on the alert after the warning of November 27. General
 Short replied: " That was put into alert during. what I considered the
 most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7
 o'clock a. m. daily."
 
 Asked if just putting the radar into operation as effective without an
 Information Center that worked with it, General Short said: " The
 information center was working with it." Committee record page 8054.
 
 The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar
 stations had not been completed. The mobile sets had been in operation,
 however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory
 results See in this regard Note 287, infra.
 [285] For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army
 Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record
 p. 628-343; testimony of George E. Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor Board
 record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and
 committee record, p. 13380-13499.
 [286] Committee record, p. 7976,
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      141
 
 General Short stated: [287]
 
 "If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been
 time if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes.
 There would not have been time to get them in the air. * * *. It would
 have made a great difference in the loss * * *. It would have been a
 question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action."
 
 In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said: [288]
 
 "If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese,
 there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the
 engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of
 this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to
 the control officer, Major Tyndall after the information center was
 manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention
 until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this
 incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th,
 he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate
 the carriers."
 
 If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted, Lieutenant
 Tyler's position would be indefensible. He was at the information center
 for training and observation, had no knowledge on which to predicate any
 action, and accordingly should have consulted higher authority. His
 fatal estimate "Forget it" was empty assumption. The fact that
 Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he did, merely tends to demonstrate
 how thoroughly unprepared and how completely lacking in readiness the
 Army command really was on the morning of December 7.
 
 Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott debated
 the advisability of informing the Information Center concerning the
 approach of a large number of planes. It would appear that this unusual
 information concerning a large number of planes so unusual in fact that
 Private Lockard stated he had never before seen such a formation should
 have provided immediate and compelling reason for advising the
 Information Center had the necessary alert been ordered after the
 November 27 warning and the proper alertness pervaded the Army command.
 
 While it was not possible with the then state of radar development to
 distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no
 application to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately
 alerted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy character of
 approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to be noted
 General Short has stated that if Lieutenant Tyler had alerted the
 interceptor command there would have been time to disperse the planes
 and to have reduced the losses. The real reason, however, that the
 information developed by the radar was of no avail was the failure of
 the commanding general to
 
 [287] Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum
 dated November 14, 1941, Lt. Col. C . A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian
 Department, stated: "In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian
 Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very
 satisfactory. The exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning
 and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took
 off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this
 distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would
 circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.
 
 "As soon as the planes were assembled they proceeded toward Hawaii.
 *This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit
 aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming
 bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor* . . ."
 
 A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941,
 to Mr. Harvey E. Bundy special assistant to the Secretary of War. See
 committee exhibit No. 136.
 [288] Committee record, p. 7977.
 
 142              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by the
 War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment.
 
 OTHER 
      INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY ARMY AND NAVY IN HAWAII
 
 CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE
 
 Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible intelligence
 officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate information from
 all sources and of all pertinent types for their superiors. The record
 reflects full exploitation of all sources for this purpose including the
 interview of passengers transiting Hawaii. The record also reflects that
 the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Hawaii were
 supplying Army and Navy intelligence officers with data available. [289]
 
 The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI at Honolulu, for example, stated
 that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio communication
 from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect "that peace negotiations
 between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the
 alert at all times as anything could happen" and that, on the same day,
 he delivered this information to responsible Army and Navy intelligence
 officers in Hawaii. [290]
 
 THE "MANILA MESSAGE"
 
 Both the Army and Navy intelligence offices received about December 3,
 1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila through a
 British representative in Honolulu: [291]
 
 "We have received considerable intelligence confirming following
 developments in Indochina:
 A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.
 2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 
      100,000
 troops and considerable 
      quantities fighters, medium bombers,
 tanks, and guns (75 mm).
 B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed
 Washington Nov 21 by American Military 
      Intelligence here.
 C. *Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early
 hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan 
      does not repeat not
 intend to attack Russia at present but will 
      act in South*.
 You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence
 Honolulu."
 
 The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the
 foregoing intelligence to General Short. [292]
 
 THE HONOLULU PRESS
 
 The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press and the
 attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl Harbor can
 to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the headlines
 appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headlines were the
 following: [293]
 
 [288a] Illustrative of the insufficiency of the radar alert is the fact
 that although the charts plotting the Japanese force in and plotting the
 force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the
 course of the attack, this information was not employed to assist in
 locating the Japanese task force and it appears no inquiries were made
 concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack.
 [289] See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint
 committee, committee record, pp. 13536-13620.
 [290] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before
 Major Clausen; Clausen investigation, pp. 88-91.
 [291] See exhibits, Clausen investigation.
 [292] See supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated
 August 14, 1945, before Clausen.
 [293] Committee record, p. 13622-13627.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      143
 
 Honolulu Advertiser
 
 November 7, 1941
 
 "Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo Japan Ready
 to Act Unless Tension Eases."
 "Japan Waits Before Move in Far East-Aggression in Pacific Appears
 Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S."
 "Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials Offensive May Start in Middle
 East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present."
 
 November 13, 1941
 
 "Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on Any Military Moves Only Logical
 Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says."
 "Envoy Undismayed Carries Broad Powers to Act Kurusu Denies Taking
 Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope."
 
 November 14, 1941
 
 "Japanese Confident of Naval Victory."
 
 November 26, 1941
 
 "Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China."
 "Hull Reply to Japan Ready."
 
 November 27, 1941
 
 "U.S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement Full Surrender
 Demanded in U. S. Statement."
 "Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades."
 
 November 28, 1941
 
 "Parris Island, S. C. This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage
 balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air
 monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure
 protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to
 protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points thereby
 differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over
 London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special
 training school on these balloons."
 
 November 29, 1941
 
 "U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East-Washington Insists on Maintenance
 of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army."
 "U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road Protective Force of 200 Planes,
 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese."
 
 November 30, 1941
 
 "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle Foreign Affairs Expert
 Attacks Tokyo Madness."
 
 144 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 "Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at
 Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops alerted."
 
 December 1, 1941
 
 "Japanese Press Warns Thailand."
 "Burma Troops Are Reinforced British, Indian Units Arrive Rangoon."
 "F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis."
 
 December 2, 1941
 
 "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S. Thailand Now in
 Allied Bloc, Press Charges."
 "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations Prepares for Action in Event
 of Failure."
 "Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization."
 "Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay."
 
 December 3, 1941
 
 "Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted Pepper Visions
 Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns."
 "U S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves Americans Prepare for Any
 Emergency; Navy Declared Ready."
 
 December 4, 1941
 
 "Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session."
 "Japanese Pin Blame on U. S. Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R."
 
 December 5, 1941
 
 "Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate-Spy Inquiry
 Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. By State Department."
 "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today."
 "Japan Calls in Nationals."
 "Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents."
 
 December 6, 1941
 
 "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo China Hull May Ask
 Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall."
 "Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front Military Observers Say Few
 Units Have Been Posted in North."
 
 December 7, 1941
 
 "F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis-Japanese Deny
 Massing Troops for Thai War."
 "British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards May Isolate Concession to
 'Prevent' Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors."
 "Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army."
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 145
 
 Honolulu Star Bulletin
 
 November 10, 1941
 
 "Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor."
 
 December 1, 1941
 
 "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension
 Grows."
 "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension."
 
 December 4, 1941
 
 "Japan Spurns U. S. Program Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible."
 
 December 5, 1941
 
 "Japan Parries Open U. S. Break."
 "Further Peace Efforts Urged Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in
 Washington as One of Force and Conquest."
 
 December 6,1941
 
 "Singapore on War Footing Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions State
 of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given."
 "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock
 with U. S. Proposed."
 
 It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone upon reading the
 newspapers alone [294] could have failed to appreciate the increasing
 tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs of
 war.[295]
 
 THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE 
      ATTACK
 
 It has been suggested that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should be
 charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting extensive
 espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they should have
 exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the realization that Japan
 knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet base and the defenses
 available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that
 superior intelligence possessed by Japan concerning Pearl Harbor
 conditioned her decision to strike there or,
 
 [294] Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department,
 Secretary Stimson expressed this idea in the following terms:
 
 "Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November
 7) the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not
 know that the relations between Japan and the United States were
 strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the
 only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers
 were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an
 intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the
 Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read
 his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in
 respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p.
 14408.
 [295] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the
 fact that after the warnings of November 27 they were dependent on the
 newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations and from
 the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is
 to be recalled, however, that the "code destruction" intelligence was
 made available after November 27 and indicated with unmistakable clarity
 that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear
 anomalous that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the
 commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would permit unofficial
 newspaper accounts to take precedence over official War and Navy
 Department dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations.
 Admiral Kimmel, himself, admitted that he did not act on newspaper
 information in preference to official information supplied to him by the
 Navy Department, after having previously observed that he obtained a
 major portion of his "diplomatic information from the newspapers."  
      See
 Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307.
 
 146               
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor on the
 morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual and superior
 intelligence. Virtually every report that has been heretofore prepared
 concerning the disaster has referred to the probability of supposed
 extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the peculiar vulnerability of
 the fleet base to such activity by reason of the surrounding mountainous
 terrain. [296]
 
 There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals several
 salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian espionage was
 not particularly effective and that from this standpoint there was
 nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear beyond
 reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had nothing
 whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Among the
 considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the following:
 
 1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting
 approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capabilities would
 seem clear if for no other reason than on November 22 her consul in
 Panama advised her that the United States had set up airplane detector
 bases and "some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a
 plane 200 miles away." [297] The attacking force was actually detected
 through radar over 130 miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed
 the fact that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that
 fact, it would seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have come
 in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would have
 flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage of the radar
 electrical horizon presupposing of course that Japan possessed at least
 an elementary working knowledge of radar and its potentialities.
 
 2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the attacking force
 could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for effectively
 prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the oil-storage tanks around
 Pearl Harbor. [298] These tanks were exposed and visible from the air.
 Had they been hit, inexplicable damage would have resulted. Considering
 the nature of installations that were struck during the attack, it is
 questionable whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the
 extraordinary vulnerability of the oil storage to bombing and its
 peculiar and indispensable importance to the fleet.
 
 3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other Japanese
 consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information as the Honolulu
 consulate. [299] Information supplied by the Manila and Panama consuls
 was detailed in character and related meticulously to defenses available
 and those in process of development. It appears that it was not until a
 few days before December 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied his
 Japanese superiors any significant information concerning the defenses
 of Oahu, and
 
 [296] See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry,
 committee exhibit No. 157.
 [297] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49.
 [298] Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil
 supply at Oahu, the dry-dock repair shop, barracks, and other facilities
 instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States
 would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was
 concerned. See Hart inquiry record, p. 94. It is, of course, known that
 the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks
 as reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry,
 exhibit No. 30.
 [299] From evidence before the Committee it appears that the Manila and
 Panama consuls were supplying Tokyo more information and of a type far
 more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii. See
 section "Ships in Harbor Reports," Part IV, infra, this report.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      147
 
 at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to Pearl
 Harbor. [300]
 
 4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November 25 with
 December 7 set as the time for the attack. This departure, it would seem
 clear, was in anticipation of the failure to secure concessions from the
 United States through further negotiations. The date December 7 had been
 recognized as suitable for the attack in discussions prior to November
 7. It is hardly credible that superior intelligence should have
 precipitated or otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to
 strike on December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the
 interim between the decision and the attack date the entire defensive
 situation at Hawaii could have changed. [301] As a matter of fact two of
 our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders were en route for
 the attack.
 
 5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese sources
 since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7 was made on the
 basis of the general assumption that units of the fleet ordinarily came
 into Pearl Harbor on Friday and remained over the week end. [302]  
      With
 this realization providing adequate odds that substantial units of the
 Pacific Fleet would-be in Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date
 was selected.
 
 6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have stated,
 
 "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning
 unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed. [303]"
 
 This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by several
 witnesses before the committee that Japan would open her attack on us by
 hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might be whether at Pearl Harbor,
 Manila, Panama, or on the west coast in order to immobilize it as a
 threat to Japanese moves to the south. [304] The fleet happened to be
 based at Pearl Harbor and in consequence that was where Japan struck.
 
 7. The "Mori call," to which reference has heretofore been made, was on
 the evening of December 5. It would appear doubtful that Japan should
 have been seeking information just before the attacking the rather
 inexpert manner displayed in the call if she possessed any wealth of
 intelligence gleaned through espionage agents in Hawaii.
 
 8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates as a matter
 of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul and his staff,
 played no role whatever in the attack. [305] The sources of information
 employed, according to Japanese interviewed, were naval attaches to the
 Japanese Embassy in Washington, public newspapers in the United States,
 American radio broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which
 put in at Honolulu, and general information. [306]
 
 [300] See committee exhibit No. 2.
 [301] Committee exhibit No. 8.
 [302] Id.
 [303] Committee exhibit No. 8D.
 [304] See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp.
 9115-9288; testimony of Capt. Ellis Zacharias, committee record, pp.
 8709-8778, 8909 9044.
 [305] See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report.
 [306] Id.
 
 148               
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its Honolulu
 consul
 
 "whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or
 if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me
 whether the warships are provided with antimine nets. [307]"
 
 On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo:
 
 "In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
 not known. I will report the results of my investigation. [308]"
 
 The foregoing is hardly indicative of any superior sources or facilities
 for obtaining intelligence. It is reported that the decision to employ a
 horizontal-bombing attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air-
 torpedo attack was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether
 ships at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the horizontal
 bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage if the torpedo
 attack failed. [309]
 
 10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precautions to
 protect the raiding task force which was of itself very formidable,
 probably more so as a striking force than the entire fleet based at
 Pearl Harbor. A large striking force was held in readiness in the Inland
 Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force if the latter were detected
 or attacked. [310] It is proper to suggest that such precautions would
 seem unlikely and misplaced if Japan had known through superior
 espionage information that there was no air or other reconnaissance from
 Oahu and the defenses were not properly alerted. The evidence reflects
 that the raiding task force probably determined the extent of
 reconnaissance through plotting in our plane positions with radio
 bearings. Further, the Japanese force followed the broadcasts from
 Honolulu commercial radio stations on the theory that if the stations
 were going along in their normal manner, the Hawaiian forces were still
 oblivious to developments. [311]
 
 11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese ran the risk
 of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scouting planes a
 considerable period of time ahead of the bombers. [312]  They took 
      the
 further risk of having several submarines in the operating sea areas
 around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed extraordinary intelligence
 concerning the state of Hawaiian defenses or lack thereof, it would seem
 improbable that she would have invited disaster by taking such risks.
 
 12. Reference has been made to the large number of semiofficial consular
 agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the implication being they were
 engaged in widespread espionage activity Yet the facts before the
 committee reflect no evidence that these agents committed a single act
 of espionage, except as it may be inferred from the information sent by
 the Honolulu consul to Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more
 extensive than was being received from other consulates.
 
 [307] See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21.
 [308] Id., at pp. 27, 28.
 [309] See committee exhibit No. 8.
 [310] Id.
 [311] See committee exhibit No. 8D.
 [312] Id.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               
      149
 
 13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most effective
 striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the carriers, to be in
 Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The raiders, for example, as
 testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a vessel with lumber on its upper
 deck, apparently thinking it was a carrier. In the light of
 retrospection and the experiences of the war, it is suggested that Japan
 would not have indulged the Pyrrhic victory of destroying our lumbering
 battleships if she had not also hoped to find the fast striking units of
 the fleet.
 
 14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposition of
 United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect to Hawaii,
 as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes, 150; 4-engine
 planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance and patrol planes, 35;
 and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635 planes. [312a] This estimate
 is roughly twice that of the actual number of planes at Hawaii and
 reflects a thoroughly erroneous impression as to the ratio of planes in
 a particular category. The inability to make an approximation of enemy
 strength within more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited
 as superior intelligence.
 
 15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese
 espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real strength
 of our Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese fleet was
 superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would have been unable,
 based on the testimony of witnesses questioned on the subject, to have
 proceeded, for example, to the aid of General MacArthur in the
 Philippines even had Pearl Harbor not been attacked. Our war plan in the
 Pacific, particularly in the early stages, was essentially defensive in
 character, save for sporadic tactical raids.
 
 If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet they must
 also have known that it did not present a formidable deterrent to
 anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As already suggested, the
 question presents itself: *Why, if Japanese espionage in Hawaii was
 superior, would Japan invite the unqualified wrath of the American
 people, weld disunited American public opinion, and render certain a
 declaration of war by the Congress through a sneak attack on Pearl
 Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our Pacific Fleet, presented
 itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan had in mind*? A logical
 answer would seem to be that Japan had not been able to determine and,
 in consequence, was not cognizant of our real naval weakness in the
 Pacific.[312b] The extremely large raiding force and the excessive
 number of attacking planes would appear to be further confirmation of
 this conclusion.
 
 [312a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a
 letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the
 Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Committee
 record, p. 14626.
 [312b] When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet
 based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might have on Japanese aggressive
 action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: "The Pacific Fleet
 had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to
 leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it
 just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the
 area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with
 impunity." Committee record, p. 11370.
 
 It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his
 estimate of Japanese knowledge concerning the capacity of the Pacific
 Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed
 by Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor. During the war games carried on at
 the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, *it was
 assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of
 one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that
 one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost*. See
 committee record, p. 457.
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