Site Map

INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

90             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS  OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE  THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT.

In a letter of April 3, 1941, [62] Admiral Stark expressed his
observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief,
Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion
of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark
stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United
States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the
Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval
forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the
Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be
supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific
Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the
Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing
on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time
Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch,
and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the
addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling
that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a
stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and
not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was
that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2
months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain
out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility.
In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted
to training.

Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval
observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an
information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of
all intelligence reports directly to him. [63]

In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and
that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of
all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest
secure means possible. [64]

[62] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[63] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3.
[64] Admiral Kimmel said:
"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. 
He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or
change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and,
as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own
situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him
and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry
out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends
to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that
singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the
international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may
militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though
necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action
to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training
of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions,
or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this
same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well
informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the
status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more
necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*.

"*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all
important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available*." See committee exhibit No. 106.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             91

In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters
of naval policy were reviewed with him. [65]

On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action"
by the Chief of Naval Operations, [66] that the unmistakable deduction
from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese
Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all
principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy
probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an
advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely
ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion
that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present
to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina.
The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would
be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against
Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward
the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the
collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese
vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of
the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag
shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels
were being requisitioned. Vith an admonition to secrecy, instructions
were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in
chief's own immediate subordinates.

In another dispatch of July 3, [67] Admiral Kimmel was advised for
action that definite information had been received indicating that
between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7
of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean
areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under
routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the
Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese
business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be
attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese
might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information
of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July
2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: [68]

"JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN  ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST  (SIC) AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME  JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN  AND THE UNITED STATES. NEW INDOCHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND  BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY."

And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: [69]

"OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART, "MATSUOKA WILL  SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE  GOING TO FIGHT

[65] See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113.
[66] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4.
[67] Id., at p. 5.
[68] Id., at p. 6.
[69] Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on
the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report.

92             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE
SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED
IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS."

The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15, [70] sent
Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the
effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial
negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the
name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina
naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to
station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if
possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to
use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or
interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information
received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to
guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian
type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with
Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was
regarded as necessary.

In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was
advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an
answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as:

(1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French
Indochina;
(2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases;
(3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move
about freely;
(4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible
clashes;
(5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with
Japanese either before or after landing;
(6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of
occupation.

This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the
Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of
intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its
plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered.

On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the
substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as
follows: [72]

"THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE  RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL  EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE  BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH  AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORGES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE  DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR  WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. * * * IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT  PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF  OFFERED AND

[70] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic.
[71] Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic.
[72] Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see
committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             93

SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID  ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION  NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE  SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART. ARMY WILL  NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE  NETHERLANDS INDIES WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU,  SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH SUBMARINE  FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE KILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN  MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US."

On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from
Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there
would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed
the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would
also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. [73]
In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted
Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the
Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance
regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. [74]

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941, [75] sending a
copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a
2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral
Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that
the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very
plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He
advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and
minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the
establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time
being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt
the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early
action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the
possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his
in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them.
Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no
open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better.

On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the
United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it
was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and
the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system
for certain material. [76] It was further pointed out that funds in the
United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under
licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed:

"*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use
of military means but you are furnished this information in order that
you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile
eventualities.*"

[73] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11.
[74] Id., at p. 12.
[75] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[76] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14.

94             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941, [77] Admiral Stark
discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after
the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they
should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along
with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He
stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally
held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I. [78] but that Admiral
Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He
commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said
his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia
she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation
more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the
Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A
postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that             .

"*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate;
this is one thing that is factual*."

Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly
completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled
sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than
China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. [79]

The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among
others, for action: [80]

"CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY  EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF  THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN  WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE  DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL  BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE  FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE  CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA.  FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO [81] AFTER  ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222  EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100  WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR  OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC  SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER  SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE  STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE  FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED  STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN  THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC  SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE  PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO  MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS

[77] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[78] Netherlands East Indies.
[79] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15.
[80] Id., at p. 16.
[81] Chief of Naval Operations.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             99

MAY BE REQUIRED. ACTION ADEES [82] AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE  INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONs HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT."

In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941. [83] Admiral
Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese 
situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at
another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages
had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not
know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move,
such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying
before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark
said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he
wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of
September 12, 1941 [84] such as whether he should not issue shooting
orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral
Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts
off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said:

"As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to
bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb
contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941, [85] and stated, among
other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders
only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the
longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the
better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to
shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the
Navy Regulations. [86] The letter also stated, in connection with the
question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information
that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the
Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i.
e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas,
were appropriate, and continued:

"If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that
Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory,
then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such
submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not
believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be
sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances
that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet
could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker
than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in
one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral
Stark inquired:

"* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some
pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull
had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had

[82] Addressees.
[83] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[84] Id.
[85] Id.
[86] These regulations provide for the use of force in self-
preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last
resort.

96             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get
nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as
some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A
second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation
between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually
came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there
was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that
conversations without results could not last forever and that if the
conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could
only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to
Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He
said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed;
and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let
Kimmel know.

With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General
Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to
strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other
things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San
Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.

The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in
chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: [87]

"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION.  IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC  AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT  IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT  WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A  STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY  JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY  THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES  YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS  WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS  AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL  DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE."

Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of
the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to
Admiral Kimmel: [88]

"Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the
message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered
the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope
not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said:

"Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a
reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a
Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him
that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt
it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships
so far as we can, a carefully planned raid

[87] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
[88] Committee exhibit No. 106.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             97.

on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my
advice to him was not to worry. [89]"

On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information
that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag
shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be
routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well
clear of the Japanese Mandates. [90] On the same day he was advised for
action that-

"BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REINFORCE THE  PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL  PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS OR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY.  [91]"

Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until
further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports,
ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military
cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. [92]

On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete
withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels
appeared in progress. [93]

A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented,
among other things: [94]

"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just
when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it
all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and
worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable
policies cannot go on forever  particularly if one party cannot live
with the set-up. It doesn't look good."

On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other
things: [95]

"The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has
been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better
understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his
visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number
of points by the Japan Times and

[89] Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated
October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in
the Japanese Cabinet, stating:

"I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in
the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political
thought or action.

"The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled
for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy
of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military
based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what
they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic
maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties."

After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed
disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial
action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's
policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may
have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed
Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise
during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for
further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of
goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the
moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had
been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was
Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded:

"Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better
and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack
Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be
determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they
can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit
No. 106).
[90] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21.
[91] Id., at p. 22.
[92] Id., at p. 23.
[93] Id., at p. 24.
[94] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[95] Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy
of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall
had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning
Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to
dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military
support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching
American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a
discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report.

98             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for
the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the
United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this
country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible
to reconcile such divergent points of view."

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message
marked for action: [96]

"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL.  THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND  MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT  *A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON  PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS  DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY  OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO  COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION.  GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY."

The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark
to Admiral Kimmel read: [97]

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I
included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I
have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for, or we may do nothing I think it is more likely to be "anything." "

On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for
action: [98]

"*THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING*. NEGOTIATIONS WITH  JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC *HAVE  CEASED* AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW  DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION  OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER  THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. *EXECUTE AN  APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46*. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO [99] INFORM BRITISH. CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE."

[96] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for
action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the
Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts.
[97] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[98] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been
referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning."
[99] Special naval observer.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              99

The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the
November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information:
[100]

"* * * ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND  "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL  PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION  UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES  CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT  THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS  RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR  DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE  St-CH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE  MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL  POPULATION- OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE  MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES  IN UNITED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS  ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL  OFFICERS." WPL 52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE  PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST  PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO  OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO  CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE  HOSTILITIES OCCUR."

On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a
dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The
dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya
in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into
Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon
Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as
a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a
position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a]

[100] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action
to the naval commanders on the west coast.
[100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read: "AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN  BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE  FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS  AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA AS  COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BHARU SINCE THAI INTENDS TO  CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN  MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD  THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE  APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE  BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN PRO-BRITISH AND PRO-ORANGE UNTIL TWENTY  FIVE NOVEMBER BUT NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION  WITH ORANGE HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIER  PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE  UNQUOTE " See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67.

100            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following
information for action: [101]

"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT  INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR  POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO  DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER  IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."

And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for
his information: [102]

"CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON,  HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE  ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY,  ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH  ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."

On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to
destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to
destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter.

A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that
"in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our
outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in
such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under
later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of
communication to support "our current operations an special
intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment.

From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is
concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive
deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the
imminence of war with that nation.

INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE  IMMINENCE OF WAR

The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations
supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not
appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by
the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related
largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the
Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect
thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to
acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the
international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates
and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The

[101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts.
[102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action
to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the
Sixteenth Naval District.
[103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.
[104] Id., at p. 45.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            101

evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any
intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the
feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the
Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from
the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii
adequate information concerning the critical international situation and
the impending likelihood of war with Japan.

The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other
things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from
numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy
involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General
Short. [106]

Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information
contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions
against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107]

The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General
Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108]

"THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I  HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION  CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY  BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET  REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE  RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN  JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED  STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS  ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF  THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH  PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR  CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." "

In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department
advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its
estimate of the situation in the following terms:

"TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]"

Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the
dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111]
advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of
negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112]

[105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222.
[106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1.
[107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2.
[108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3.  See Army
Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279.
[109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General.
[110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board
record, p. 4258.
[111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5
[112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.

102            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading
in part as follows: [113]

"* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK  ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL  RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO  THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * *  INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN  AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]"

The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115]
contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact
see this warning.

On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent
General Short by the War Department: [117]
 
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL  PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION  UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF  HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES  THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT  NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT  JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE  DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM  NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT  NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES  TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN  RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF  THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."

The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27,
was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119]
 
"JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY  ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL  AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY."

On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short,
as follows: [120]
 
"CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY  AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE  RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY  FORTY FIVE). ALSO

[113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6.
[114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were
not made ready prior to the December 7 attack.
[115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.
[117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
[118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence.
[119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
[120] Id., at p. 13.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              103

DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO  PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT  AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE  PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES  NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE  MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING  UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION  IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT  REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS.  [120a]"

Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent
the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121]

"ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS  SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER  YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES  WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT  (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30 45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION  DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT  ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO  PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE  PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND  PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND  ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES.  AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE  CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY.

"IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE  SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO  COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD."

A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the
assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to
 
"CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH  NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]"

ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM  WASHINGTON

DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation;

[120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant
General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17.
[121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams."
[122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20.
[123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be
found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report.
[124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.

104            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and
Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United
States and Great Britain; and that he should 

"take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions
against Japan."

Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war
patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with
additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional
marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he
placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in
west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan,
and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a
west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with
orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and
placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating
areas. [126]

On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these
dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter
dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet: [128]

"OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent
change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is what next?"

DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very
doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces 

"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."

This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the
mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an
estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have
been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated
that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had
already taken. [132]

"WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27

The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch
is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the

[125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in
this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other
than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709.
[126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709.
[127] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[128] Id.
[129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32.
[130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53.
[131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not
consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for
putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee
record, p. 5159.
[132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299.
[133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made
a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a
characterization of the specific information which the dispatch
contained." Committee record, p. 6717.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            105

Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within
the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or
possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL 46."

After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision
not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against
possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135]
Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following
deployments were made and action taken:

1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in
command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three
heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon
searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The
sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November
26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part

"in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available
for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to
station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake
provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be
necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu
to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]"

Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy
conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He
stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake
Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go;
that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith
said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral
Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which
Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith
stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had
received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it.
[140]

2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in
command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three
heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted
scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the
fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of
the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not
even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no
knowledge of the dispatches of October

[135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral
Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to
conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet,
for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such
reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no
routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full
responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was
not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military
decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with
experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all
the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit
No. 157.
[136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also
testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299.
[137] Office of Naval Operations.
[138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee
exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart
inquiry record, p. 299.
[139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298.
[140] Id., at p. 43.
[141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also
testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318.

106              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction
of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he
read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the
increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special
orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no
special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of
flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of
the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming
of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine.
[142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is
in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In
his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and
information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's
superior. [142a]

3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to
Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143]  

4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines
found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked
for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts.
[144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port
except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they
began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145]

5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of
patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas
en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to
a distance of 525 miles. [146]

6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace
the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol
planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to
Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching
Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not
less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3,
4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes
were searching the sector 120  to 170  from Midway, to a distance of 450
miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at
the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from
Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with
bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147]  

Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified
before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was
executed, stating 

"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the
fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to
Midway and

[142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318.
[142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he
was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown
before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143.
[143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751
[144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee
exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115
[145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395.
[146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.
[147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also
testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684.

It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written
record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either
from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm.
Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp.
70-73.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             107

Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers,
to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]"

While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been
primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the
war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above-
mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the
patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to
Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to
Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as
it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path,
bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of-
ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November
27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150]
The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively
screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl
Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an
approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest,
recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the
justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152]

EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27, ON WHERE THE  ATTACK MIGHT COME

Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did
not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it
state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area
was imminent or probable. [153]

The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a
specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be
recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch
[153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in
any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a
possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would
possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did
nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that
just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154]

[148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
[149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313.
[150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752.
[151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee
record, pp. 9321, 9324.
[152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324,
9325, also 9436, 9437.
[153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of
November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian
area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the
Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a
detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might
come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p.
301.
[153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98,
supra.
[153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra.
[154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words
"in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a
possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack.
See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299.

It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in
the "war warning" *an amphibious operation to the South* is to be
distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction*
mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an
amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressive movement is such that a
war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way
superseded the estimate of surprise aggressive action mentioned in the
November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the testimony of Admiral
Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020.

108              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take "an appropriate
*defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL-46" indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger
requiring such action. [155] It was Washington's responsibility to give
Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic enemy
effort would come. [156] It was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility as
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst
contingency, and when he was warned of war and ordered to execute a
defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such
action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian
situation was fraught. [157]

OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27

Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received on
November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy Departments
did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.
[158] The first of these dispatches read: [159]

"Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for
reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this
desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for
advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide
any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and
advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended
armament."

The second read: [160]

"*In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft wing
available for expeditionary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed
to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake
provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary
for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these
stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination
and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools and
ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular
Naval supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in
tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and
transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be
allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to
Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if
necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army
bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations?
Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable."

Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the day
before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to be
controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of Wake and
Midway was left up entirely to Admiral Kimmel both as to feasibility and
desirability. [161] The fact that other outposts needed reinforcements
and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim

[155] In this connection it is to be noted that the "war warning"
dispatch was directed for action to the commander in chief of the
Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee
exhibit No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral
Kimmel that the same defensive action was expected of him as of Admiral
Hart in the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese
move to the south: that the message of November 27 placed in the same
category exposed to the same perils and requiring the same action the
Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets.
[156] See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record,
pp. 839-842.
[157] See discussion regarding "Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger
from air attack " Part III p. 75 et seq., supra.
[158] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717.
[159] Committee exhibit No. 112, p. 54.
[160] Id., at p. 55.
[161] Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he
regarded the proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer
Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine
planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See
Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 307.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              109

inate the necessity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped outpost
the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of
attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a
crossroads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere;
Hawaii was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had
adequate facilities to be such a crossroads.

"PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAPS" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL

In his testimony Admiral Kimmel has suggested that one can appreciate
the "psychological handicaps" that dispatches he received placed upon
the Navy in Hawaii. He stated:

"In effect, I was told:
     "Do take precautions" [162]
     "Do not alarm civilians" [163]
     "Do take a preparatory deployment" [164]
     "Do not disclose intent" [165]
     "Do take a defensive deployment" [166]
     "Do not commit the first overt act." [167]

In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions
mentioned, which were contained largely in Army messages, were not to
alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first
overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant
reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a
maneuver basis if necessary none of these steps would have alarmed the
civilian population of Hawaii, [168] have disclosed intent, or have
constituted an overt act against Japan. Admiral Kimmel's contention must
be judged in light of the fact that on November 28 on his own
responsibility, [169] he instructed the fleet to depth bomb all
submarine contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.
[170] The Office of Naval Operations acquiesced in this order to depth
bomb submarine contacts. Admiral Halsey, prior to departing for Wake
Island on November 28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he
interpreted as permitting him to sink "even a Japanese sampan" if he
found it. [171] Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he "should go"
Admiral Kimmel replied, "Use your common sense." [172]

[162] Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating in part, "You will take
due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against
Japan." See committee exhibit No. 37.
[163] Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral
Kimmel for information and incorporating a portion of an Army message
sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which latter
message stated in part, "The United States desires that Japan commit the
first overt act * * *. Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm
civil population or disclose intent." See committee exhibit No. 37.
[164] Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra.
[165] Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes
162 and 163, supra.
[166] Referring to the "war warning" dispatch of November 27. Committee
exhibit No. 37.
[167] Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra.
[168] There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May
12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1, 20; September 5, 27; October 13,
27; and November 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 120.
[169] As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: "* * * he (Admiral Kimmel)
has issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified
submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and
sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and *ran
the risk of committing an overt act against Japan*, but did so feeling
that it is best to follow the rule 'shoot first and explain
afterwards'." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No.
157.
[170] See dispatch No. 280355 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet
with a copy for information to the Office of Naval Operations; committee
exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating sea
areas, see committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3.
[171] See Hart inquiry record, p. 43.
[172] Id., at pp. 297, 298.