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Site Map INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK |
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK From the foregoing considerations it is proper to suggest that the role played by espionage in the Pearl Harbor attack may have been magnified all out of proportion to the realities of the situation. The Japanese diplomatic establishments and others did, however, have uncensored channels of communication with Tokyo as a result of statutory restrictions imposed upon our own counterespionage agencies by the Communications Act of 1934. The position assumed in 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission was expressed in a memorandum dated September 29, 1944, by the Chairman, James Lawrence Fly, as follows: [312c] "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (see. 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph, cable telegraph, or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941." *The situation should never again be permitted whereby the efforts of our Government to combat forces inimical to our national security are hamstrung by restrictions of our own imposition which aid the enemy.* LIAISON BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT Consistent with instructions from the Chief of Staff, [313] General Short set about immediately upon assuming command of the Hawaiian Department to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship with Admiral Kimmel and his staff. That he was successful is undisputed and there can be no doubt that a bond of personal friendship developed between the commanders of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii. They addressed themselves to the task of preparing for war and set about to perfect plans for defense resulting in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. As has been seen, this plan was thorough, despite the recognized limitations of equipment, well conceived and if timely invoked using all of the facilities at hand was adequate to effect maximum defensive security. The evidence reflects, however, that personal friendship was obviously confused with effective liaison at a time when the latter was indispensable to the security of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. [314] They exchanged the warning messages of November 27 and discussed their import. They did not, however, in the face of these warnings sit down with one another to determine what they together had and what they could jointly do to defend the fleet and the fleet base. This action and this alone could have demonstrated effective liaison in a command by-mutual cooperation. After reading the "war warning" sent Admiral Kimmel, General Short assumed the [312c] See report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. [313] General Short testified: "The one thing that that letter (letter of February 7,1941, from General Marshall) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else." Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 355. [314] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, it should be noted, said: "General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated." See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 151 Navy would be conducting distant reconnaissance when ordered to effect a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war tasks. [315] Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army in the face of the warnings would be on an all-out alert. [316] In fact, he testified he didn't know the Army was alerted to prevent sabotage only that he thought they were on an all-out alert; and that he didn't know they had any other kind of alert. He also assumed the Army radar would be in full operation. Even though General Short testified that he conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 2, and 3 and they talked over every phase of what they were doing [317] these fatal assumptions still persisted. In short, when the time came for really effective liaison it was entirely absent. The Navy failed to advise General Short of information received on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments and in our own outlying islands. [318] General Short testified that had he known of these messages he would have ordered a more "serious alert." [319] On November 26 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District expressed to the Chief of Naval Operations the belief, based on radio intelligence, that a strong Japanese concentration of submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet, were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. In spite of the believed dangerous proximity to Hawaii of possible Japanese carrier units, the commanding general was not advised of this highly significant information. [320] While this information was questioned the same day by the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, it nevertheless displays the futility of General Short's assumption that the Navy would keep him informed of the location of Japanese warships. On November 28, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet directed a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations with a copy to Admiral Kimmel for information concerning the establishment by Japan of the celebrated "winds code" to be employed in "ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts" to advise when "diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed." 321 Certain Japanese phrases were set up to indicate a break of relations with the United States, England and the Netherlands, and Russia. Efforts were made by the Navy at Hawaii to monitor for a broadcast employing this code. On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel, advising of Japanese broadcast frequencies. [322] Despite the importance which was attached to the winds code at the time, General Short has testified this information was not supplied him by the Navy in Hawaii. [323] [315] Committee record pp. 7926, 7927. [316] Yet it is difficult to understand why he should have expected such an alert when in his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "On November 28th the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed (with General Short). We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably and Malaya the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order named. *In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii*" (p. 31 of statement). See committee exhibit No. 146 [317] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 242, 251. [318] See committee record, pp. 8366-8368 [319] Id., at p. 8397. [320] Id., at p. 8261. [321] Committee exhibit No. 142. See discussion of "Winds Code," Part. IV, infra. [322] Committee record p. 8374. [323] Id., at p. 8374. 152 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Beginning November 30, Admiral Kimmel made a daily memorandum entitled: "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next twenty-four hours," the last of these memoranda being reviewed and approved by him on the morning of December 6. Although conferences were held with Admiral Kimmel subsequent to the initiation of these memoranda, General Short has testified he did not know of these steps being taken by the Navy. [324] There is some indication that Admiral Kimmel acted as arbiter of what information General Short received. [325] Admiral Bellinger, who was not shown the war warning, has stated that between November 27 and December 7 he did not confer with the Army Air Force commander, General Martin, regarding long-range reconnaissance. [326] In other words, there were no discussions during this critical period between the two officers responsible for the air arms of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. It is to be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin prepared the estimate of possible Japanese action against Hawaii which reflected in such startling detail what did occur on the morning of December 7. At 3:42 a. m. On December 7 (Honolulu time) a Navy mine sweeper reported the sighting of a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in the defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. Between 6:30 and 6:45 a. m. a submarine was sunk in naval action. Both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch knew of this prior to the attack. Although the Martin-Bellinger estimate of possible enemy action had stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier, General Short was not advised of the fact that the submarine had been sighted and sunk. The Army radar at 7:02 a. m. December 7 detected a large contingent of airplanes which turned out to be the attacking force approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles away. This information was not supplied the Navy until after the attack. Although the Army radar plotted the withdrawal to the north of the Japanese force after the attack, this vital information was not employed following the raid in searches for the raiders. [327] This situation is traceable to faulty liaison and a complete failure in integration of Army-Navy effort. The Navy maintained a liaison officer in the Army operations section for purposes of informing the Fourteenth Naval District concerning action being taken by the Army. No liaison officer, however, was maintained in the Navy operations section by the Army, although an [324] Id, at pp. 8375-8378. [325] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked: "Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?" Admiral Kimmel replied: "We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed, and in general the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Marshalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by giving it to any agency who would have no part in the execution of the plan." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 282. [326] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 672. [327] Committee record, pp. 9343-9346. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 153 officer was assigned on an 8-hour shift to the harbor patrol. [328] That Admiral Kimmel was completely oblivious of what the Army was really doing evinces the ineffectiveness of the liaison that was maintained by the Navy in the Army operations section. No conferences were held by Admiral Kimmel and General Short between December 3 and the attack. [329] General Short said: 330 "I would say frankly that I imagine that as a senior admiral, Kimmel would have *resented it* if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out. * * * " The considerations which apparently occasioned Admiral Kimmel's failure to acquaint himself with what the Army was doing were voiced by him as follows: 331 "* * * when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, *it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them*." And yet when asked whether, in the method of mutual cooperation, it was necessary for one commander to know what the other commander was doing and what his plans were, Admiral Kimmel admitted that this knowledge was necessary. [332] While such concern for the sensibilities of another may have social propriety, it is completely out of place when designed to control the relationship of two outpost commanders whose very existence is dependent upon full exchange of information and coordination of effort. [333] It defeats the purpose of command by mutual cooperation and is worse than no liaison at all. At least, without the pretense of liaison, each commander would not be blindly relying on what the other was doing. It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period November 27 to December 7. [334] There was but little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities. [335] ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the Hawaiian commanders was the belief and conviction that Pearl Har- [328] Id., at pp. 8205, 8206. [329] See committee record, p. 8204 [330] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363. [331] Roberts Commission record, p. 631. [332] Id. [333] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, for example, commented: "Apparently Short was afraid that if be went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his lob, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing " See Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. [334] Admiral McMorris, Chief of War Plans to Admiral Kimmel, admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether the Army antiaircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed they were in a state of readiness. "* * * Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that from own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. *We were a bit too complacent there*. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their antiaircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. *Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or of the watches being kept*." Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 330-332. [335] See committee record, p. 8205 During the course of examination Admiral Kimmel was asked: "In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?" He replied: "And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time." Committee record, p. 7053. 154 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK bor would not be attacked. [336] It explains the reason for no effective steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of December 7. This was not occasioned through disregard of obligations or indifference to responsibilities but rather because of unfortunate errors of judgment. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department failed to appreciate the demands of their situation and the necessities of their responsibility in the light of the information and warnings they had received. More than anyone else it cannot be doubted that Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have desired to avoid the disaster of December 7. But unfortunately they were blinded by the self-evident; they felt that Japan would attack to the south and Hawaii was safe. Their errors of judgment were honest mistakes yet errors they were. The evidence reflects that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel addressed themselves assiduously to the task of training and other wise preparing the outpost of Hawaii and the Pacific Fleet for war Throughout their respective tenures as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet they manifested a keen awareness of the imperative necessity that personnel and material be increased commensurate with the realities and responsibilities in the Pacific. From the time of assuming command throughout the year 1941 their correspondence with the War and Navy Departments is replete with clear statements concerning shortages in equipment and expressions of the need for improving Hawaiian defenses. As will subsequently appear, they were successful in effecting marked improvement in the situation generally and the potential capacity of Hawaii to defend itself particularly. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were conscientious and indefatigable commanders. They were relentless in what they regarded as the consuming need in their commands training and preparation for war. One of the major responsibilities of Admiral Kimmel and the major responsibility of General Short was defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and the Pacific Fleet. They knew that an air attack on Hawaii was a possibility; they knew this to be the most dangerous form of attack to Oahu; they knew that extensive efforts had been made to improve Hawaiian defenses against air attack; they had been warned of war; they knew of the unfailing practice of Japan to launch an attack with dramatic and treacherous suddenness without a declaration of war; they had been given orders calling for defense action against an attack from without; they were the commanders of the Hawaii outpost. In the face of this knowledge it is difficult to understand that the withering Japanese attack should have come without any substantial effort having been made to detect a possible hostile force and with a state of readiness least designed to meet the onslaught. That the responsible commanders were surprised that Japan [336] During the course of counsel's examination of Admiral Kimmel, he was asked this question: "The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?" and Admiral Kimmel replied; "*If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would hare changed my viewpoint entirely*. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers." Committee record, p. 7054. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 155 struck Hawaii is understandable; that they should have failed to prepare their defenses against such a surprise is not understandable. [337] The estimate of the situation made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short is not altogether incredible in the light of the inevitable lassitude born of over 20 years of peace. [338] But the fact that their inaction is to a degree understandable does not mean that it can be condoned. The people are entitled to greater vigilance and greater resourcefulness from those charged with the duty of defending the Nation from an aggressor. Hawaii is properly chargeable with possessing highly significant information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor, including: Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and persisted that Hawaii was safe from an air attack although the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy commanders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. [339] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they received no information that Hawaii was to be attacked Yet commanders in the field cannot presume to expect that they will be advised of the exact time and place an enemy will attack or indeed that their particular post will be attacked. As outpost commanders it was their responsibility to be prepared against surprise and the worst possible contingency. [340] They have suggested that the War [337] This distinction was clearly recognized by Admiral Ingersoll when he was asked if he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He replied: "*I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, 'How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out*?' " Committee record, p. 11310 [338] Admiral Kimmel stated: "* * * and what is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were still at peace and still conducting conversations, and there were limits that I could take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by it just like everybody else." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, page 1126, 1127. [339] See note 336, supra. [340] Incident to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the following interrogation occurred: Question. "In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?" General Short. "Yes." Question: "That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?" General Short, "The worst." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 436 and 437. The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated: "It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation to *select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks*." (Citing Army Pearl Harbor Board record Pp. 1121, 2662.) Bee committee exhibit 1st for APHB Report. Mr. Stimson said, " One of the basic polices of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances with complete success, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it." Stimson's statement, committee record, p. 14397. Testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board General Herron, General Short's predecessor, was asked the question: "I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command (General Herron on June 17,1940 had been directed by Washington to institute an alert): Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?" He replied: "I always felt that I was entire responsible out there and I had better protect the island." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 228; also pp. 213-215. 156 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK and Navy Departments possessed additional information which they were not given. But the fact that additional information may have been available elsewhere did not alter fundamental military responsibilities in the field. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the responsible military commanders at Hawaii. They were officers of vast experience and exemplary records in their respective services. That Admiral Kimmel and General Short were supplied enough in formation as reasonably to justify the expectation that Hawaiian defenses would be alerted to any military contingency is irrefutable. [341] That there may have been other information which could have been supplied them cannot becloud or modify this conclusion. It is into the nature of this further information that we shall hereafter inquire. [341] And yet Admiral Kimmel has indicated he felt he was entitled to more warning. In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, he said: "I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a nature that I felt training could continue. *I felt that I was entitled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak of war*. I am convinced that my estimate based on the intelligence received was correct." (P. 38 of statement.) See committee exhibit No. 146. |