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PART I DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 1 JAPANESE RECORD OF DECEIT AND AGGRESSION For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of the United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with a view to settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far East. To appreciate the realistic basis upon which the Government of the United States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to consider briefly the course of modern Japanese history in order to gauge her diplomatic and military purposes. These purposes become apparent through an outline review of Japanese aggression: [1] Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895 Japan annexed Formosa and indicated her purpose, not then realized, of establishing herself in China. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a foothold in Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, at the same time acquiring southern Sakhalin. In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed Korea. (In 1904 she had guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity.) In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advantage of the situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-one Demands. In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-Allied plan whereby not exceeding some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might subsequently be needed by Russian forces, to assist in organizing Russian self-defense, and to aid in evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. Seizing upon this opportunity the Japanese conceived the idea of annexing eastern Siberia, in which she was unsuccessful, and sent more than 70,000 troops. Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the agreements concluded. One of these agreements was the Nine Power Treaty which was designed to provide for China full opportunity to develop and maintain a stable government. Japan pledged herself to the principles and policies of self-restraint toward China which was the cornerstone of the Nine Power Treaty. Japan agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity in that country. Following the advent of the Cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive policy toward China and manifested an increasing disposition to interfere in Chinese internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, subsequently establishing the puppet regime of Manchukuo. (This action was a flagrant violation of her agreements SEE APPENDIX D FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 1941 [1] See committee record, pp. 1076-1085. Committee record references throughout this report are to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the Committee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets. 2 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK at the Washington Conference and was in complete disregard of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.) [2] The Japanese delegate to the League of Nations had stated on November 91, 1931: " We want no more territory." The end of 1932 saw Japanese occupying the whole of Manchuria. Later they moved southward and westward occupying vast areas of China. When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Manchurian situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February 24, 1933. On March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw from the League. [3] On February 21,1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched a note to the American Secretary of State expressing the conviction that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". [4] Yet on April 17, 1934 a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "hands off China" statement making clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates of Japan and to permit only such relations with China by other countries as the Japanese Government saw fit. In a formal declaration Japan on December 29,1934 announced her purpose to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. [5] Thereafter she prepared her armaments with a view to launching the invasion of China. Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which Italy adhered in 1937. The pact marked the genesis of the "Axis." Thus the parallel courses of aggression being followed by these countries blended in an expression of their common designs in foreign policy. [6] Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July of 1937 began wholesale invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape, theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble pages in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again on October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty." [2] Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy. 1931-41 (State Department publication), p. 4. committee exhibit No. 28. [3] Id., at p. 7. [4] Id., at p. 18. [5] Id., at p. 12. [6] Id., at p. 41. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 3 On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River. [7] (A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, on May 18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the thesis that world peace could only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper places in the world". It was suggested subsequently that Hiranuma was prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France on the settling of European problems. [7a] The proposal was received by the American Government with interest. The suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the objective of world peace by settling the "armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today." This suggestion reminded the Japanese Government of "the methods of Japan in relations with China", which perturbed American opinion. In consequence, the proposal of Hiranuma withered with the Japanese refusal to settle her "incident" with China, and to indicate her good faith in proposing a search for world peace.) On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." But following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies asking far-reaching concessions, the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the Indies a virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an agreement whereby Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina. On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact along with Germany and Italy an alliance pointed directly at the United States. [8] As stated by Secretary Hull: "It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone." Commenting on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the press of October 1940, as having said: "If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain, and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime." On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy at that place. On the following day Japan assured the Government of the United States that her military would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking. Yet only 11 days later on August 11 the American Embassy reported that during [7] Id., at pp. 52 53. [7a] Committee exhibit No. 177. [8] The pact provided that Germany Italy and Japan would assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the powers was attacked *by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict*. Peace and War p. 84. [NOTE: Italics in the original text have been marked with asterisks in the plain text version. LWJ] 4 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the preceding 4 days Chungking had been delivered unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Despite her pledges ever increasing numbers of cases were reported of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. Secretary Hull summarized the picture in the following words: "Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities." FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation and disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcilable conflict with the policy [9] voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on January 17, 1933: "I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest." In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedicated the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor: "* * * the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others the neighbors who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions on the part of the Government of the United States to incline the Government of Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she proceeded in July of 1937 to invade China. In consequence of this policy of aggression by the Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State made public a statement of fundamental principles of international policy with a view to rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes. The Secretary said on July 16, 1937: [10] "I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world. "Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore feel warranted in making in fact, I feel it a duty to make a statement of this Government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern. "This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo- [9] Committee record, pp. 1084-1094. [10] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-41. (State Department publication), vol. 1, pp. 325-326. Committee exhibit No. 29. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 5 cate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated." The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were given express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of the Secretary of State on August 23, 1937: [11] "The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States. "In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation. "The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the
present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate
question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United
States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately
connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the
general principles of policy to which attention was called in the
statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval
from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion
that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively
govern international relationships. "From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the important of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. The Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well- [11] Id., at pp. 355-356. 6 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies especially the policy of peace in which this country believes and to which it is committed." On October 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated among other things: [12] "The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6. "Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far Fast the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far Fast. "The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties. "On October 6 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all, that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored. "In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations." Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated in a conference convened at Brussels with a view to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to participate in the conference which prevented bringing the conflict in China to an end and resulted in the conference suspending its work on November 24. [13] The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by law, refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to the conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed in recognition of the fact that the arms-embargo provisions of the act worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan. [14] [12] Id., at pp. 396-397. [13] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1087, 1088; also Peace, and War, pp. 51, 52. [14] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 7 On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State: [15] "EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what changes may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to expire six months from this date." In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified [16] that the Treaty of commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most- favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termination of the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed. In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the Japanese, the Government of the United States placed into effect "moral embargoes," adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. [17] On July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations. In 1939 the "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to facilities for production of high-quality gasoline. [18] Following passage of the act of July 2, 1941, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing number of exports of strategic materials. These measures had the additional purpose of deterring and expressing the opposition of the United States to Japanese aggression. [19] On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussion in the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied: 20 "With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence. "Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above- mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of coexistence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government cannot [15] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, p. 189; also committee record. p. 1088. [16] Committee record, p. 1088. [17] Id. [18] Peace and War, p. 89 [19] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088,1089. [20] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 281. 8 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Referring to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made the following comments on April 17, 1940: 21 "I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. "Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries. "The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole world They produce considerable portions of the word's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities. "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. "This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those Governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." "All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when needful, by orderly processes. "It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States as it is no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments that the attitudes and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world." The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary Hull in his testimony before the committee: [22] "Throughout this period the united States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan. "During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, and I was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves. [21] Id., at p. 282. [22] Committee Record, pp. 1089-92. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 9 "I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable relations. "During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible. "I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by previously modifying our neutrality Act, been in a position to send military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more than we did in the face of the world situation." In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt declared [23] that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today." He observed that the pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations with the aggressors still on the march threatening other nations, great and small. The national policy of the Government of the United States was outlined by the President as committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and thereby were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors." In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, Secretary Hull said: [24] "It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Eastern Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region." As Secretary Hull testified [25]- "I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere."" The hope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and conciliation based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompromising and relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domination by force in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." [23] See Committee record pp. 1092, 1093. [24] Committee record, p, 1093. [25] Id. 10 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The backdrop of activity by Japan's partners left little doubt as to the program and methods of the Axis: [26] On October 14,1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations. On October 3,1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia. In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of 1936 to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland. On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days later proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria. At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini extorted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland. In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on March 14,1939. With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on September 1,
1939, which as Secretary Hull stated "weakened the position of all
countries. Including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in
the Pacific." He presented the picture in the following terms: "Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses. "It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe." STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO MEET THE THREAT OF AXIS AGGRESSION With each threatened "annexation" or "occupation" of countries bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt had made an appeal for the settlement of differences without recourse to force or the threat of force; but the United States in line with its traditional aloofness in European affairs had adopted no positive measures to deter Hitler's course of aggression. In the face of the inexorable trend of Axis militarism, however, progressive steps were taken by the Government of the United States to build our defenses and throw our weight on the side of France and Great Britain. For purposes of convenient reference it would be well to review briefly these steps. Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21, 1939, the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. On November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby permitting large shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, to be shipped across the Atlantic for use in combating Nazi aggression. [27] [26] See committee record, pp. 1093-1095. [27] Peace and War, pp. 69, 70. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 11 In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the President announced the policy of extending the material resources of the United States to the opponents of force. He said: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this Nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. [28]" With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Eastern Hemisphere an agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the United States and Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-aged destroyers and the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. Referring to this agreement, the President stated that the value to the Western Hemisphere "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation." He considered them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our eastern and Gulf seaboards. [29] On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The act included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first time in the history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory military training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. [30] President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed that the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. He pointed out that although some of our people liked to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, it was a matter of most vital concern that European and Asiatic war makers should not gain control of the oceans which led to the Western Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain went down the Axis Powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. Warning of the danger ahead, the President stated the Government was planning our defense with the utmost urgency and in it we must "integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression." Referring to the need for increased production, the President said we must have more ships, more guns, more planes; we must be the great "arsenal of democracy." [31] With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-lease bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling the United States to make the most effective use of our resources for our own needs and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were determined to aid. Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act would make it possible for us to allocate our resources in ways best [28] Id., at p. 76. [29] Id., at p. 83. [30] Id., at p. 84. [31] Id., at pp. 86, 87. 12 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this continent. [32] On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agreement regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European war there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agreement accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and granted to the United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this continent. [33] In an address on May 27, 1941, the President declared an "unlimited national emergency," stating that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been "based on a hard-headed concern for our own security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished to live." He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped to keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day they were held off gave us time in which to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships. [34]
In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on August 14, 1941. [37] In a message of August 15, 1941, in which he was joined by Prime Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the United States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how best they could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed and that many shiploads had already left for the Soviet Union and more would leave in the immediate future. [38] On September 11, 1941, as a result of several incidents fully demonstrating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United States, the President warned that from that time forward, if German or Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was necessary for American defense, they would do so "at their own peril." [39] Despite the announcement of the "shooting orders", ships of the United States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in the Atlantic Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and in view of the fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm- [32] Id., at p. 100. [33] Id., at pp. 103, 104. [34] Id., at p. 111. [35] Id., at p. 111. [36] See committee record, p. 6111. [37] "Peace and War," p. 111. [38] Id., at p. 113. [39] Id., at pp. 113-115. ing of United States merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce and prevented United States merchant ships from carrying cargoes to belligerent ports, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping for the cartage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked Congress to modify the Neutrality Act. On November 17, 1941, in a joint resolution of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed permitting United States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports anywhere. [40] In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial, commercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone of the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. [41] To implement this policy Japan's course of aggression was countered by a series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally to the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation. These measures included material aid to China, curtailment of trade with Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii. INITIAL UNITED STATE-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1941 Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by the President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made to the progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Nomura might desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the American Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations. Secretary Hull made the following observations concerning the initial conversations with the Japanese Ambassador: [42] "On March 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims. "On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion. "On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows: "(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; "(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; [40] Id., at pp. 115-117. [41] Id., at p. 168. [42] Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104. 14 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; "(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with those principles." The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if the Generalissimo should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and the United States should be resumed, and (3) that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the Southwest Pacific area. [43] This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto *if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted*. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said: [44] "The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities, and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and inner Mongolia. "Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood." The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador Grew on May 14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means "*unless circumstances render this impossible.*" Replying to the inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind the Foreign Minister referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When it was pointed out by Ambassador Grew that such measures were defensive in character, the Japanese Minister observed that the measures in question were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public which might bring pressure on the Government to act. [45] President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and declared in a radio address on the same day that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. [46] [43] There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped. calling for joint guaranty of Philippine independence, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe. [44] Committee record, pp. 1104-1106. [45] See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107. [46] Id., at p. 1107. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 15 Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary conversations with Ambassador Nomura: [47] "During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace. "The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles." JAPANESE REACTION TO GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and the life-and-death struggle of the Soviet Union for existence was seized upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire in the Far East. In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany and Russia was unequivocally expressed: [48] "Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much earlier in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department: [49] "Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that *the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into effect their dreams of expansion*; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. *The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful*. * * * "Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; *she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others*. Her policy of southward expansion [47] Id., at pp. 1108,1109. [48] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9. [49] Committee exhibit No. 26. 16 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. And is a thrust at the British Empire in the east. Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale. From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called to the colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan; strict censorship of mails and communications was effected; and conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire presaging a major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never before approached in its history. The United States was charged with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The Japanese press warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese- merican relations would face a final crisis. [50] This false propaganda was clearly designed to condition the Japanese public for further military aggression. In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for the confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff, the policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: [51] "1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. "2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection." In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the "principal points" upon which she proposed to proceed: "For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed*." TEMPORARY CESSATION OF NEGOTIATIONS During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government of the United States called to the attention of Japan the incompatibility of such reports with the conversations then under way looking to an agreement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts of the situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by observing that Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs, and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by [50] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 339, 340. [51] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 17 de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were determined to encircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of southern Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary measure. [52] The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast with an intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: [53] "Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows: "1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude. "2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two * * *." In commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on July 23, 1941, pointed out that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world domination and conquest. He further observed that conclusion of the agreement under discussion by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Nomura would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could secure through occupation of Indochina; that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States. He pointed out that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and, since there was no apparent basis calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State with whom he had talked a few minutes before could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged. [54] On July 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the [52] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 340. [53] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2. [54] See Foreign Relations, vol., II, p. 341. 18 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK same terms as in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. [66] Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by Japan into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese Government that French Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which on the basis of Japan's own representations she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President's proposal. The answer of Japan was characteristically pragmatic and well described in the following language: [56] "Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with that of other powers. By this further expansion in southern Indochina, Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. *This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were at peace with Japan*. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further attacks the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense." With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggression in Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of an agreement until August of 1941. It was clear that positive action must be taken under the circumstances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: [57] "The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while wielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amiable relations with Japan. It had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies. [55] Id. [56] Id., at p. 342. [57] Committee record, pp. 1111-1113. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 19 "The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to the region threatened. "While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress, especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southward movements." Confronted with the implacable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in the United States. This order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved. The effect of the order was to bring to virtual cessation trade between the United States and Japan. [58] It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces went into French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made emphatic and repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these representations of peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued with mobilization in Japan, and dispatched increasing numbers of armed forces to Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing of American property in China continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking. [59] An intercepted message of July 19, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin presented a candid estimate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet: [60] "The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection ith National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact" RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PREMIER KONOYE The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which, so he stated, purported to be responsive to that of the President. This proposal provided among other things: (1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan; [58] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343. [59] Id., at p. 343 [60] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3. |