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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PART I

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  

1

JAPANESE RECORD OF DECEIT AND AGGRESSION

For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of the United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with a view to  settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far East. To  appreciate the realistic basis upon which the Government of the United  States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to consider  briefly the course of modern Japanese history in order to gauge her  diplomatic and military purposes. These purposes become apparent through  an outline review of Japanese aggression: [1]

Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895 Japan  annexed Formosa and indicated her purpose, not then realized, of  establishing herself in China.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a foothold in  Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwantung territory and  ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, at the same time acquiring  southern Sakhalin. 

In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed Korea. (In 1904  she had guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity.)

In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advantage of the  situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-one Demands.

In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-Allied plan whereby not exceeding  some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to Siberia to guard  military stores which might subsequently be needed by Russian forces, to  assist in organizing Russian self-defense, and to aid in evacuating  Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. Seizing upon this opportunity the  Japanese conceived the idea of annexing eastern Siberia, in which she  was unsuccessful, and sent more than 70,000 troops.

Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the agreements concluded. One of these agreements was the Nine  Power Treaty which was designed to provide for China full opportunity to  develop and maintain a stable government. Japan pledged herself to the  principles and policies of self-restraint toward China which was the  cornerstone of the Nine Power Treaty. Japan agreed to respect the  sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity  of China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of  equal opportunity in that country. Following the advent of the Cabinet  of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive policy toward China  and manifested an increasing disposition to interfere in Chinese  internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, subsequently  establishing the puppet regime of Manchukuo. (This action was a flagrant  violation of her agreements

SEE APPENDIX D FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS  BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE THROUGH  DECEMBER 8, 1941

[1] See committee record, pp. 1076-1085. Committee record references  throughout this report are to page numbers of the official transcript of  testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the  Committee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets.

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at the Washington Conference and was in complete disregard of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation  of war as an instrument of national policy.) [2] The Japanese delegate  to the League of Nations had stated on November 91, 1931: " We want no  more territory." The end of 1932 saw Japanese occupying the whole of  Manchuria. Later they moved southward and westward occupying vast areas  of China. When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton  Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Manchurian  situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February 24, 1933. On  March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw  from the League. [3]

On February 21,1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched  a note to the American Secretary of State expressing the conviction that  no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is  fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". [4] Yet on April 17, 1934  a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "hands off China"  statement making clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates  of Japan and to permit only such relations with China by other countries  as the Japanese Government saw fit.

In a formal declaration Japan on December 29,1934 announced her purpose  to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed  at Washington on February 6, 1922. [5] Thereafter she prepared her  armaments with a view to launching the invasion of China.

Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which Italy adhered in 1937. The  pact marked the genesis of the "Axis." Thus the parallel courses of  aggression being followed by these countries blended in an expression of  their common designs in foreign policy. [6]

Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese  and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July of 1937 began wholesale  invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying  forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape,  theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking  on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble  pages in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince  Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the  Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent  statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again on October  28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the  Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan  showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian  populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese  homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by  acts of horror and cruelty."

[2] Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy. 1931-41 (State  Department publication), p. 4. committee exhibit No. 28.

[3] Id., at p. 7.

[4] Id., at p. 18.

[5] Id., at p. 12.

[6] Id., at p. 41.

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On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River. [7]

(A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, on May  18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the thesis that world  peace could only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper  places in the world". It was suggested subsequently that Hiranuma was  prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a  conference if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out  Great Britain and France on the settling of European problems. [7a] The  proposal was received by the American Government with interest. The  suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the objective  of world peace by settling the "armed conflict and consequent political  disturbances in the Far East today." This suggestion reminded the  Japanese Government of "the methods of Japan in relations with China",  which perturbed American opinion. In consequence, the proposal of  Hiranuma withered with the Japanese refusal to settle her "incident"  with China, and to indicate her good faith in proposing a search for  world peace.) 

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any  development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East  Indies." But following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany,  Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies asking far-reaching  concessions, the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the  Indies a virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with  German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an agreement whereby  Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina.

On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact along with  Germany and Italy an alliance pointed directly at the United States. [8]  As stated by Secretary Hull: "It was designed to discourage the United  States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan  and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe,  when they could turn on the United States then standing alone."  Commenting on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the  press of October 1940, as having said:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of  Japan, Germany, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging  attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan  is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic  relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan  and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce  Russia, Britain, and the United States to suspend their operations in  assisting the Chiang regime."

On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy at that  place. On the following day Japan assured the Government of the United  States that her military would discontinue bombing the city area of  Chungking. Yet only 11 days later on August 11 the American Embassy  reported that during

[7] Id., at pp. 52 53.

[7a] Committee exhibit No. 177.

[8] The pact provided that Germany Italy and Japan would assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the  powers was attacked *by a power not then involved in the European war or  in the Chinese-Japanese conflict*. Peace and War p. 84.

[NOTE: Italics in the original text have been marked with asterisks in  the plain text version. LWJ]

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the preceding 4 days Chungking had been delivered unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave assurances that  American lives and property in China would be respected. Despite her  pledges ever increasing numbers of cases were reported of bombing of  American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.  Secretary Hull summarized the picture in the following words: "Time and  again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China  would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put  into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up,  discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied,  and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily  detained, and subjected to indignities."

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES

The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation and  disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcilable conflict with  the policy [9] voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on January  17, 1933:

"I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the  cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedicated  the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor:

"* * * the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does  so, respects the rights of others the neighbors who respects his  obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a  world of neighbors."

From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions on the part of the Government of the United States to incline the Government of  Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she proceeded in July of 1937  to invade China. In consequence of this policy of aggression by the  Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State made public a statement of  fundamental principles of international policy with a view to rallying  all countries to the support of peaceful processes. The Secretary said  on July 16, 1937: [10]

"I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions  arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

"Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains  which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but  which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world.  Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are  threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations  either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious  hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another  affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore  feel warranted in making in fact, I feel it a duty to make a statement  of this Government's position in regard to international problems and  situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

"This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of  peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We  advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of  policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations.  We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by  processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo-

[9] Committee record, pp. 1084-1094.

[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-41. (State Department publication), vol. 1, pp. 325-326.  Committee exhibit No. 29.

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cate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the  principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of  provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes  carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We  believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and  performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for  revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps  toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We  advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international  trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge  upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment.  We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the  necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security,  we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in  proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid  entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in  cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the  principles hereinbefore stated."

The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were given  express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of the  Secretary of State on August 23, 1937: [11]

"The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great  cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port  which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which  there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and  varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other  countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of  rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries,  including the United States.

"In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in  facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of  American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it  is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals  appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled  elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small  detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending  the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no  mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward  maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the  intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and  such remains its desire and expectation.

"The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the  present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate  question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United  States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately  connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the  general principles of policy to which attention was called in the  statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval  from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion  that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively  govern international relationships.

"When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or  the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all  nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the  controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We  urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles  which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most of the world,  should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable  throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles  set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is  comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many  treaties; including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg- Briand Pact of Paris.

"From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have  been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the  important of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We  have been participating constantly in consultation with interested  governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. The Government does not  believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in  extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the  purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those  objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our  well-

[11] Id., at pp. 355-356.

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defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this  Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far  Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our  people and making effective the policies especially the policy of peace  in which this country believes and to which it is committed."

On October 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated among  other things: [12]

"The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to  Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee  of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's  examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the  treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of  the League of Nations today, October 6.

"Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far Fast the  Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the  Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered  to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both  parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation  in the Far Fast.

"The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August  23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in  regard to international problems and international relationships  throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities  which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan.  Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the  United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to  be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in  the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of  other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by  process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations  for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established  obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of  treaties.

"On October 6 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles,  emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation  pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within  nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered  to by all, that international anarchy destroys every foundation for  peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security  of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital  interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for  treaties and international morality be restored.

"In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that  the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which  should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the  provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding  principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and  to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the  conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in  general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations."

Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United  States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated in a  conference convened at Brussels with a view to "study peaceable means of  hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far  East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to participate in the  conference which prevented bringing the conflict in China to an end and  resulted in the conference suspending its work on November 24. [13]

The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by law,  refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to the  conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed in  recognition of the fact that the arms-embargo provisions of the act  worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan. [14] 

[12] Id., at pp. 396-397.

[13] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1087, 1088; also Peace, and War, pp. 51, 52.

[14] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088.

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On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State: [15]

"EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has  been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between  the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what  changes may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which  such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the  Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the  Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan  which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions  which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such  consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting  American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in  Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its  desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice,  will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to  expire six months from this date."

In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified [16] that  the Treaty of commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate  protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied  portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most- favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of  retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termination of  the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to placing  restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed. 

In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the Japanese,  the Government of the United States placed into effect "moral  embargoes," adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. [17] On  July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers  and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to  the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose  armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations. In  1939 the "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane  manufacture and to facilities for production of high-quality gasoline.  [18] Following passage of the act of July 2, 1941, restrictions were  imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing  number of exports of strategic materials. These measures had the  additional purpose of deterring and expressing the opposition of the  United States to Japanese aggression. [19]

On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's  position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussion in the Netherlands East Indies, the  Japanese Foreign Minister replied: 20

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies,  Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in  ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East  Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to  say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing  to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce  repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not  only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above- mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of coexistence and  co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from  the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these  considerations, the Japanese Government cannot

[15] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, p. 189; also committee record. p. 1088.

[16] Committee record, p. 1088.

[17] Id.

[18] Peace and War, p. 89

[19] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088,1089.

[20] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 281.

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but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation  of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands  East Indies."

Referring to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made the  following comments on April 17, 1940: 21 

"I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for  Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese  Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies.

"Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly  affect the interests of many countries.

"The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international  relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend  for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the  Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on  the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole  world They produce considerable portions of the word's supplies of  important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et  cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend  substantially upon them for some of these commodities.

"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any  alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be  prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in  the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

"This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application  and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in  notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and  Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was  directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of  the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United  States, the British Empire, France and Japan as parties to the treaty  signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular  possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific  Ocean sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which  each of those Governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to  respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular  possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."

"All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the   basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation  for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic  affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the  faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when  needful, by orderly processes.

"It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States as it is  no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments that the attitudes  and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and  that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the  Pacific area, but also in every part of the world."

The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary Hull in  his testimony before the committee: [22]

"Throughout this period the united States increasingly followed a policy  of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This  took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of  Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American  rights. Loans and credits aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in  order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the  acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other  military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against  Japan.

"During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, and I was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with  whom I came in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military  leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific  area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South  Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration  with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had  the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order  in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

[21] Id., at p. 282.

[22] Committee Record, pp. 1089-92.

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"I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced  a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations  with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to  find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon  this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider  their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social  aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan,  if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not  have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social  welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the  world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United  States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop  internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded  the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable  relations.

"During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at  all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had  always felt that if a government makes a  threat it ought to be ready to  back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as  possible.

"I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by  previously modifying our neutrality Act, been in a position to send  military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might  well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back  the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm,  and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more  than we did in the face of the world situation."

In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt  declared [23] that "at no previous time has American security been as  seriously threatened from without as it is today." He observed that the  pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number  of independent nations with the aggressors still on the march  threatening other nations, great and small. The national policy of the  Government of the United States was outlined by the President as  committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of  resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and thereby  were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition that  principles of morality and considerations for our own security would  "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors."

In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease Act  before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives,  Secretary Hull said: [24]

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the  start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a  dominant position in the entire region of the Eastern Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain  that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an  area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world.  As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade  routes in that region."

As Secretary Hull testified [25]-

"I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized,  ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and  that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the  security of the Western Hemisphere.""

The hope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and conciliation based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompromising and  relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in the  Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domination by  force in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

[23] See Committee record pp. 1092, 1093.

[24] Committee record, p, 1093.

[25] Id.

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The backdrop of activity by Japan's partners left little doubt as to the program and methods of the Axis: [26]

On October 14,1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference  coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations.

On October 3,1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.

In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of 1936 to  occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland.

On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days later  proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria.

At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini extorted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland.

In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on March 14,1939.

With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939, which as Secretary Hull stated "weakened the position of all  countries. Including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in  the Pacific." He presented the picture in the following  terms:

"In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact.

"Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of  ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The  countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses.

"It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East  would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in  Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would  aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe."

STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO MEET THE THREAT OF AXIS AGGRESSION

With each threatened "annexation" or "occupation" of countries bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt had made an  appeal for the settlement of differences without recourse to force or  the threat of force; but the United States in line with its traditional  aloofness in European affairs had adopted no positive measures to deter  Hitler's course of aggression. In the face of the inexorable trend of  Axis militarism, however, progressive steps were taken by the Government  of the United States to build our defenses and throw our weight on the  side of France and Great Britain. For purposes of convenient reference  it would be well to review briefly these steps.

Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21, 1939,  the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our  citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas in order to  prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. On  November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby permitting large  shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had  been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, to  be shipped across the Atlantic for use in combating Nazi aggression.

[27]

[26] See committee record, pp. 1093-1095.

[27] Peace and War, pp. 69, 70.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 11

In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the President announced the policy of extending the material resources of the United  States to the opponents of force. He said:

"We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this  Nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of  those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have  equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. [28]"

With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Eastern Hemisphere an  agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the United States and  Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-aged destroyers and  the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in  Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the  Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. Referring to this  agreement, the President stated that the value to the Western Hemisphere  "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation." He considered  them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America,  the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and  our eastern and Gulf seaboards. [29]

On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was  enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The act  included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should  not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States  Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first time in the  history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory military  training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. [30]

President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed that  the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended not only to  dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave  the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe to dominate the  rest of the world. He pointed out that although some of our people liked  to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, it was  a matter of most vital concern that European and Asiatic war makers  should not gain control of the oceans which led to the Western  Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain went down the Axis  Powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the  high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military  and naval resources against this hemisphere. Warning of the danger  ahead, the President stated the Government was planning our defense with  the utmost urgency and in it we must "integrate the war needs of Britain  and the other free nations resisting aggression." Referring to the need  for increased production, the President said we must have more ships,  more guns, more planes; we must be the great "arsenal of democracy."

[31]

With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-lease  bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling the United  States to make the most effective use of our resources for our own needs  and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were determined to aid.  Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act would make it possible  for us to allocate our resources in ways best

[28] Id., at p. 76.

[29] Id., at p. 83.

[30] Id., at p. 84.

[31] Id., at pp. 86, 87.

12 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this continent. [32]

On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agreement  regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European war  there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of  aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agreement  accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting  Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and granted to the  United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields  and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this continent. [33]

In an address on May 27, 1941, the President declared an "unlimited national emergency," stating that our whole program of aid for the  democracies had been "based on a hard-headed concern for our own  security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished  to live." He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped to  keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day they were  held off gave us time in which to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships. [34]


On July 7, 1941, the President announced that in accordance with an  understanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces had  arrived in Iceland in order to supplement and eventually to replace the  British forces which had been stationed there to insure the adequate  defense of that country. The President pointed out that the United  States could not permit the occupation by Germany of a strategic outpost  in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack  against the Western Hemisphere. [35] Subsequently there was instituted  an escort to Iceland of United States and Iceland shipping. [36]

In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister  Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on  August 14, 1941. [37]

In a message of August 15, 1941, in which he was joined by Prime  Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the United  States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how best they  could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the  Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed and  that many shiploads had already left for the Soviet Union and more would  leave in the immediate future. [38]

On September 11, 1941, as a result of several incidents fully  demonstrating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United  States, the President warned that from that time forward, if German or  Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was  necessary for American defense, they would do so "at their own peril."  [39]

Despite the announcement of the "shooting orders", ships of the United  States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in the Atlantic  Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and in view of the  fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm-

[32] Id., at p. 100.

[33] Id., at pp. 103, 104.

[34] Id., at p. 111.

[35] Id., at p. 111.

[36] See committee record, p. 6111.

[37] "Peace and War," p. 111.

[38] Id., at p. 113.

[39] Id., at pp. 113-115.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 13

ing of United States merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce and prevented United States merchant ships from carrying cargoes to  belligerent ports, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping  for the cartage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other  nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United  States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked Congress to  modify the Neutrality Act. On November 17, 1941, in a joint resolution  of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed permitting United  States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports  anywhere. [40]

In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the  traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial,  commercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the  Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay  open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone of  the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington Naval  Treaty of 1922. [41]

To implement this policy Japan's course of aggression was countered by a  series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally to  the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation. These  measures included material aid to China, curtailment of trade with  Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii.

INITIAL UNITED STATE-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1941

Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by the  President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made to the  progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the United  States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Nomura might  desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the American Secretary of  State important phases of American-Japanese relations. Secretary Hull  made the following observations concerning the initial conversations  with the Japanese Ambassador: [42]

"On March 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese  Ambassador I emphasized that the American people had become fully  aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to  profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

"On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The  President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters  between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash  and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion  regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister  Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and  air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious  concern and suspicion.

"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.  I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which  our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that  the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its  present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which  our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between  nations should rest, as follows:

"(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each  and all nations;

"(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;

[40] Id., at pp. 115-117.

[41] Id., at p. 168.

[42] Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104.

14 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;

"(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to  consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as  would be consistent with those principles."

JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF MAY 12

The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States should  request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if the  Generalissimo should not accept the advice of the United States, that  the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese  Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and the United  States should be resumed, and (3) that the United States should help  Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural  resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the Southwest  Pacific area. [43] This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan's  adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan's  obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto  *if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the  Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly  excepted*. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said: [44]

"The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that  they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas  whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources,  facilities, and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to  station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense  against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of  China proper and inner Mongolia. 

"Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese  proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility  of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific  area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood."

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador Grew on May  14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined that Japan's  southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means "*unless  circumstances render this impossible.*" Replying to the inquiry as to  what circumstances he had in mind the Foreign Minister referred to the  concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures.  When it was pointed out by Ambassador Grew that such measures were  defensive in character, the Japanese Minister observed that the measures  in question were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public which  might bring pressure on the Government to act. [45]

President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, proclaimed  the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and declared in a  radio address on the same day that our whole program of aid for the  democracies had been based on concern for our own security. [46]

[43] There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped.  calling for joint guaranty of Philippine independence, for the  consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a  nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and  Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the  speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

[44] Committee record, pp. 1104-1106.

[45] See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107.

[46] Id., at p. 1107.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 15

Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary  conversations with Ambassador Nomura: [47]

"During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the  purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference.  We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points the necessity of  Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States  should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of  the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another  country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory;  application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial  relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of  Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were  seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an  instrument of peace.

"The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form  of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was  suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed  to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by  self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further  effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of  the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of  economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated  any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the  Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the  interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed  settlement with our stated principles."

JAPANESE REACTION TO GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany  attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia  removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and the  life-and-death struggle of the Soviet Union for existence was seized  upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire in the  Far East.

In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington  Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany and Russia was  unequivocally expressed: [48]

 "Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent  opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we  are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion.  The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much earlier  in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew to the State  Department: [49]

"Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that *the army and other elements in the country  see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into  effect their dreams of expansion*; the German victories have gone to  their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed  implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war  will probably (*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to  consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still  acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German  naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they  have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States  although carefully watching our attitude. *The ability of the saner  heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been  and is doubtful*. * * *

"Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide.  Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from  attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers;  *she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly  and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the  weakness of others*. Her policy of southward expansion

[47] Id., at pp. 1108,1109.

[48] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9.

[49] Committee exhibit No. 26.

16 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. And is a thrust at the British Empire in the east.

Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which "the  fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was  decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale.  From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called to the  colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were  suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan;  strict censorship of mails and communications was effected; and  conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire presaging a  major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme  that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never  before approached in its history. The United States was charged with  using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The  Japanese press warned that if the United States took further action in  the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese- merican relations would  face a final crisis. [50] This false propaganda was clearly designed to  condition the Japanese public for further military aggression.

In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for the  confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff, the  policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: [51]

"1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world  peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,  regardless of how the world situation may change. 

"2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of  the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing  southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection."

In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the "principal  points" upon which she proposed to proceed:

"For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing  pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means  of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions  shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and  various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in  the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be  reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French  Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German  war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,  every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall  be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations  shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available  shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining  the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power  Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed*."

TEMPORARY CESSATION OF NEGOTIATIONS

During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military  movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government of the  United States called to the attention of Japan the incompatibility of  such reports with the conversations then under way looking to an  agreement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts of the  situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the Japanese  movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by observing that  Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs, and  raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by

[50] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 339, 340.

[51] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 17

de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina  and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were determined  to encircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of southern  Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary  measure. [52]

The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast with an  intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: [53]

"Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is  as follows:

"1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable  resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in  thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry  this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary,  alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying  farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not  wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because  we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

"2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be  to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the  international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack.  This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may  arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China  peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force,  occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of  French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum  to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will  play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will  need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two * * *."

In commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on July 23, 1941, pointed out that any  agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government  at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on  Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this agreement could only be  looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world  domination and conquest. He further observed that conclusion of the  agreement under discussion by the Secretary of State and Ambassador  Nomura would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to  Japan than she could secure through occupation of Indochina; that the  policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy  or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not  menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been  concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the  Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of  the underlying principles stood for by the United States. He pointed out  that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as  constituting notice that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a  policy of force and conquest, and, since there was no apparent basis  calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as  a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan  was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and  conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary  said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State with whom he had  talked a few minutes before could not see any basis for pursuing further  the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been  engaged. [54]

On July 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the

[52] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 340.

[53] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.

[54] See Foreign Relations, vol., II, p. 341.

18 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

same terms as in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese  Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan endangered  the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to  jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials  such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and  that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the safety of other areas  of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. [66] 

Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by Japan  into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese  Government that French Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country.  This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the fullest and  freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and  other raw materials which on the basis of Japan's own representations  she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the  President's proposal. The answer of Japan was characteristically  pragmatic and well described in the following language: [56]

"Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern  Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the  southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of  the United States along with that of other powers. By this further  expansion in southern Indochina, Japan virtually completed the  encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces  within striking distance of vital trade routes. *This constituted an  overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other  powers that were at peace with Japan*. It created a situation in which  the risk of war became so great that the United States and other  countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of  avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military  forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence  that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese  infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further  attacks the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare  chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause  Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those  circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government  of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other  governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with  Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step as an open  warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense."

With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggression in  Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of an  agreement until August of 1941.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

It was clear that positive action must be taken under the circumstances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: [57]

"The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four  years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in  its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done  this notwithstanding constant violation by Japanese authorities or  agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in  neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and  statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread  conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The American  Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while  wielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amiable relations with  Japan. It had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of  their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful  policies.

[55] Id.

[56] Id., at p. 342.

[57] Committee record, pp. 1111-1113.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 19

"The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an  agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a  feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had  made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a  program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that  if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any  countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, our Government would  expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to  the region threatened.

"While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible  Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's  determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies.  Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had  declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was  based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of  her military activities was in progress, especially since early July.  Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese  Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by  Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese  Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an  authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there  for further southward movements."

Confronted with the implacable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt  issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in  the United States. This order brought under control of the Government  all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese  interests were involved. The effect of the order was to bring to virtual  cessation trade between the United States and Japan. [58]

It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces went into  French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese  Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign  Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the  new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made emphatic and  repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable  settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these representations of  peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued with mobilization  in Japan, and dispatched increasing numbers of armed forces to  Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing of American property in  China continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and  the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking. [59] An intercepted message of July  19, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin presented a candid estimate of the change  in the Japanese Cabinet: [60]

"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection ith National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign  policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the  principles of the Tripartite Pact"

RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  AND PREMIER KONOYE

The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal  which, so he stated, purported to be responsive to that of the  President. This proposal provided among other things:

(1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan;

[58] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343.

[59] Id., at p. 343

[60] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3.