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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

410             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am sending you an
outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this,
our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will
Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a
summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the
United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that
they are planning to move military forces into various places in East
Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops.
*Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war
may come quicker than anyone dreams.*

*         *        *       *       *       *

"4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you
about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified
our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that
by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure
against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England
and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to
turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our
advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to
refrain from any direct moves in the north.

"5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must
under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes
without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and
Italians how important secrecy is.

"6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this
to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier
Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set far a
conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

"Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the
separate message (ex. 1, pp. 204-205)."

In the separate message (#986) referred to above, Foreign Minister Togo
reviewed the course of the Japanese-American negotiations for Ambassador
Oshima's benefit. He stated that during the 6 months of negotiations

"the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as
the cornerstone of the international policy regardless of the
vicissitudes of the international situation, and that Japan had based
her hopes for a solution between Japan and the United States definitely
within the scope of that Alliance (ex. 1, p. 205)."

The Foreign Minister said that the American and Japanese views on the
question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and French
Indochina "were completely in opposition to each other." He said that
the United States had taken the position that as long as the Imperial
Government of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy there could
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United
States, and that the United States had begun to demonstrate a tendency
to demand the divorce of the Japanese Government from the Tripartite
Alliance. "That is to say," the Foreign Minister continued,

"it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial
Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States.
It became clear, too, that a continuance of negotiations would
inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into
with the third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing
upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in
the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that
in ease the United States enters the European war at any time the
Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and
Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes
it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for
negotiations. What is

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         411

more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China they did 80
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy (ex. 1, p. 206)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RETURNS TO WASHINGTON AS THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION  MOVES RAPIDLY TOWARD A CLIMAX

(December 1, 1941)

When the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull on Monday
morning, December 1 (Washington time), it was their first conference
with the Secretary since their meeting with him and President Roosevelt
5 days before. Ambassador Nomura's description of their arrival at the
State Department shows that many assumed the Ambassadors had requested
the meeting with the Secretary to present the Japanese Government's
reply to the American note of November 26. Ambassador Nomura reported to
Tokyo:

"Upon our arrival at the State Department we found not only
newspapermen, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding
the corridors. Some of these spectators were of the opinion that the
issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general,
the scene was highly dramatic (ex. 1, p. 210)."

At the start of the conference Ambassador Kurusu asked the reason for
President Roosevelt's sudden return to Washington, and Secretary Hull
indicated that one of the reasons was the recent "loud talk" of the
Japanese Premier. The Ambassador endeavored to minimize the Premier's
recent speech and stated, in accordance with the instructions he had
received from Tokyo, that the American note of November 26 had been
communicated to his Government and that within a few days the Japanese
Government's observations concerning it would be presented to the
Secretary. He said that his Government believed its proposals of
November 20 to be equitable, and had found it difficult to understand
the position taken by the United States Government. He had been
directed, he said, to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United
States in the conversations and to request the United States Government
to make "deep reflection of this matter." He said that the Japanese
offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still stood
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 772-774)

Secretary Hull replied that the United States Government had to take
into account the "bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo" and that
there never would be possible any peaceful arrangements if such
arrangements had to be based upon principles of force. Later, the
Secretary called attention to reports received from the press and other
sources 

"of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make
it clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we
have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese
statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out
that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to
do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its
forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to
puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this
situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the
Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese
Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing
should come

412             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had
represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an
agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals
seem to carry the two sides further away than before.

"The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the
direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn
us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead
in view of all the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the
acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the
Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in
having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu
brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China
had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flaunt
Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the
United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he
has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and
utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if
something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that
they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept
pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the
confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where
he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that
his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals, and that
these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered
the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first
on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything
that Japan was doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction
from the course we have been talking about in our conversations, and
that these should be reversed by his government before we can further
seriously talk peace (vol. II, pp. 775-776)."

The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people
coming out in Japan and expressing themselves, whether anybody in Japan
would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. When the Ambassador
commented that the Japanese People were not talking about conquest,
Secretary Hull pointed out that everyone in America understood the
implications of such terms as "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-
prosperity sphere". The Secretary went on to say:

"that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and
Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan
does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of
the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion
the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 776-777)."

When Ambassador Kurusu, after remarking that war in the Pacific would be
a tragedy, added that the Japanese people believed that the United
States wanted to keep Japan fighting China, and to keep Japan strangled,
and that they believed they were faced with the alternative of
surrendering to the United States or fighting, Secretary Hull said that
he had practically exhausted himself here, that the American people were
going to assume that there was real danger to this country in the
situation, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent it (ex. 29,
vol. 2, p. 777).

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Togo that during the
conference Secretary Hull had emphasized:

"The tone and trend of the 'Japanese Government's expressions and
movements and that of the general public opinion organs, and the
increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China (ex. 1, p.
210)."

He reported that from the beginning of the conference the Secretary had
worn "a deeply pained expression," but that during the course of their
explanations the Secretary "showed visible signs of relief (ex. 1, p.
210).

President Roosevelt reached Washington from Warm Springs shortly before
noon on Monday, December 1, and went directly to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         413

the White House for his conference with Secretary Hull and Admiral
Stark. [1] It will be recalled that in Secretary Hull's memorandum of
his conversation with the British Ambassador the day before, the
Secretary stated that he laid before President Roosevelt on Monday " all
phases" of the matters he discussed with the British Ambassador, which
had included the Ambassador's inquiry as to "what the United States
would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to
establish a base on the Kra Isthmus", and that "the President agreed to
notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry" (ex.
21). Clearly, a further subject discussed at the White House conference
was Secretary Hull's conversation that morning with the Japanese
Ambassadors. It would also seem probable that at the conference the
other events mentioned above that had occurred after the President's
departure the preceding Friday were discussed. These included Secretary
Hull's revised draft of the proposed message to Congress and the
accompanying draft of a message to Hirohito; the significance of Premier
Tojo's speech; the information received from the British Ambassador
concerning a possible Japanese move into Thailand, which appeared to be
confirmed that day by the intercepted Japanese message revealing the
intrigues of the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand; Prime Minister
Churchill's plea for similar or joint declarations by the United States
and Great Britain that "any further act of aggression" would "lead
immediately to the gravest consequence," at whatever moment the
President should judge right "which may be very near"; and the
intercepted Japanese messages showing that the Japanese Government was
only making a pretense of continuing the conversations. In addition, the
President, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark must be assumed to have
seen either before or after the White House conference the exchange of
messages between the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo and the Japanese
Ambassador in Berlin showing the strong German pressure on Japan to make
war on Great Britain and the United States and the Japanese reply that
"*war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan *
* * quicker than anyone dreams*."

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meeting between
President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, during the
period December 1-7 (Washington time), and no reference to such a
meeting has been found in newspaper accounts of President Roosevelt's
activities that week. However, the Washington Post reported on December
2 that after the President's conference on December 1 with Secretary
Hull and Admiral Stark, the President had a luncheon conference with Mr.
Harry Hopkins, who had been driven to the White House from the Naval
Hospital for that purpose, returning to the Naval Hospital after the
conference; that thereafter

[1] The next day referring to this meeting the Washington Post reported:

"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and
military moves relating to Japan as the lights of peace flickered low in
the Orient and Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador told reporters
that 'there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation.'

"It was in a tense atmosphere that the President reached the White House
from Warm Springs shortly before noon to receive a report from Secretary
of State Hull on his conversation yesterday morning with official
Japanese representatives and to confer with diplomatic, naval and
personal advisers.

"Washington reports indicate that Japan is massing troops in southern
Indochina for a possible military move into Thailand which an
authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States
could not tolerate. In Manila the leaves of United States naval and
military forces have been canceled and London reports said military and
air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies
(Washington Post December 2, 1941)."

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the President called Under Secretary Welles to the White House for a
brief conference, after which the Under Secretary "on orders" conferred
briefly with Lord Halifax; and that after the latter conference Sir.
Welles returned to the White House for a further conference with the
President that lasted an hour and a half. The record before the
Committee does not show what matters were discussed at the conference
between Under Secretary Welles and the British Ambassador. [1]

In the absence of other evidence concerning the subjects discussed at
the White House conference that noon, the evidence before the Committee
of action taken that evening and the next morning at the direction of
President Roosevelt is important. Just before midnight that day,
December 1 (Washington time), the Navy Department sent the following
dispatch, marked priority, to Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the
United States Asiatic Fleet:

"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and
within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small
vessels to form a "defensive information patrol."  Minimum requirements
to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer
and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews
may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose
which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China
Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue,
one vessel off the Indo-China coast between, Camranh Bay and Cape St.
Jaques and one vessel off Pointe De Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by
President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report
measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform
me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at
sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines
and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures (ex.
37)."

In Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) the Japanese Cabinet met at the
official residence of Premier Tojo. Domei, the authoritative Japanese
news agency, issued a report stating that at the meeting the Japanese
Cabinet had decided to continue negotiations with the United States,
despite the divergence of views of the two Governments. In a telegram to
Secretary Hull received the evening of December 1 (Washington time),
Ambassador Grew reported that 

"Tonight s newspapers reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today,
while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of
the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington
conversations (ex. 25)."

As already noted, Ambassador Grew testified before the Committee that
although he knew that the Cabinet meeting took place, he "did not (know)
and could not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on
Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615).

[1] The record before the Committee does, however, contain the
following: On December 6, 1941, Captain John Creighton, the United
States Naval Attache at Singapore, sent a message to Admiral Hart,
commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, at Manila which stated, among
other things, that Brooke Popham (the British commander in chief at
Singapore) received Saturday from War Department London quote: 'We have
now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: 1.
We are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of
Kra or take action in reply to Nips Invasion any other part of Siam * *
*.' " (tr. 13520-13521) Captain Creighton testified before the Committee
that he did not know or recall who it was that gave him the information
upon which this message was based, or where that person had obtained the
information, and that it was really nothing more than rumor (tr. 13530).
Upon receipt of this message, Admiral Hart, on December 6, 1941, sent
the following message to Admiral Stark in Washington: "Learn from
Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four
eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."
(Ex. 40) Admiral (now Senator) Hart testified that he never received a
reply to his message (tr. 12850-12851). In this connection see also the
discussion infra of the second message received by the State Department
on December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador Winant in London
regarding the two Japanese naval convoys moving toward the Kra Isthmus
in which Ambassador Winant said. Among other things: "British feel
pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing
Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before
British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out
President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" (ex. 21)
and Under Secretary Welles testimony before the Committee in connection
therewith.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            415

However, it is now known that at this meeting the Japanese Cabinet gave
its formal approval to the commencement of hostilities against the
United States, and that immediately thereafter an Imperial Naval Order
was issued on instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters:

"Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense,
has reached a position to declare war on the United States of America
(tr. 438)."

By that time, the Japanese naval striking force which had left its
rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) had
steamed nearly half the distance to Pearl Harbor.

In Washington, however, Ambassador Nomura that day cabled the Foreign
Minister there were indications that the United States desired to
continue the negotiations "even if it is necessary to go beyond their
stands on the so-called basic principles" (ex. 1, p. 213).

He continued:

"If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a
leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a
conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence
(for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States
and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting
could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and
navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one
final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their
discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

"We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to
war or peace (ex. 1, p. 213)"

It seems doubtful that Ambassador Nomura would have sent this message,
if in fact he knew that that day the Tojo Cabinet had formally approved
the commencement of hostilities against the United States. The Foreign
Minister's message in reply to the Ambassador's suggestion, which was
translated and available in Washington on December 3 (Washington time),
avoided any reference to the Cabinet's action:

"As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a
meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but
the proposals failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be
inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time.
Please be advised of this decision (ex. 1, p. 224)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASKS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITS PURPOSE  IN MOVING ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN INDO-CHINA

(December 2, 1941)

The next day, Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time), the two Japanese
Ambassadors called on Under Secretary Welles at the latter's request,
Secretary Hull being ill and absent from the State Department. Under
Secretary Welles told the Ambassadors that he had been asked by
President Roosevelt to communicate to them the following, which he then
read and handed to Ambassador Nomura:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese
troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very
rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by
Japan in Indochina.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement and
there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement between
Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of
Japanese forces per-

416             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was
very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already
there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would
seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of
further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be
required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could
conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands
of the East Indies; against Burma, against Malaya or either through
coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of
undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of
course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken
against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been
repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.

"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador
Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual
reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is
the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and
rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in
the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German
Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon
the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the
utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that
reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I
should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government (vol. II,
p. 779)."

Ambassador Kurusu said that he was not informed by the Japanese
Government of its intentions but that he would communicate the foregoing
statement immediately to his Government. Then followed an inconclusive
discussion of the general situation, during which Under Secretary Welles
pointed out that the settlement which the United States was offering
Japan in the United States note of November 26 (Washington time) was one
which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japanese
economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which
Japan might feel was open to her. Ambassador Kurusu said that in view of
the actual situation in the Far East there were points in the United
States proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find
it difficult to accept. When asked by Under Secretary Welles whether a
reply to the American proposal would be received from the Japanese
Government, Ambassador Nomura answered in the affirmative, but said that
it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it
raised for the Japanese Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 778-781).

In his report of this conversation to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador
Nomura said:

"Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is
anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am
convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233
(ex. 1, pp. 222-223)."

Soon after his meeting with the two Japanese Ambassadors, Under
Secretary Welles attended a meeting at noon at the White House at which,
in addition to President Roosevelt and Mr. Welles, only Secretary
Stimson and Secretary Knox were present. Secretary Stimson described the
meeting in his notes as follows:

"I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o'clock and there were
present there just Knox, Sumner Welles and myself, as Hull is laid up
with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I
think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese
through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of
southern Indo-China just what they are going to do and has demanded a
quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a
message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against
it,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK       417

but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, and he will make a
Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when
he left us (tr. 14,427)."

That afternoon, at his press conference, President Roosevelt was asked 

"if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States
Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent
asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the
information requested from the Japanese representatives this morning.
The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many
questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing
with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is
permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed
that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of
June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that
objective there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We
were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent
troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief
negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the
Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to
this number of troops principally because they were powerless to do
anything else.

"Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and
again we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking
meant the taking of no additional territory by anyone in the Pacific
area. We received word the other day that there were large additional
bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds, including troops, planes,
war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces were on the way.
Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already there had
greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the
number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning
very politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention
of the Japanese Government was as to the future, eliminating the
necessity of policing Indochina which is a very peaceful spot and we
hope to receive a reply in the near future.

"In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set,
the President said that there had naturally been no time limit set (ex.
167)."

The same day Ambassador Nomura sent a special report to the Japanese
Foreign Office concerning this press conference, as follows:

"On the 2d in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us
an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-
China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated
that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days
and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had
both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations
(see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview
since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be
paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations (ex. 1, p.
223)."

Also that day the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Terasaki,
called on officials of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and
delivered a document in which it was denied that Premier Tojo had ever
made the speech attributed to him on November 30. Mr. Terasaki claimed
that when Ambassador Kurusu referred to the Premier's speech in his
telephone conversation with Bureau Chief Yamamoto the preceding Sunday
evening, Yamamoto had been nonplused and had asked "What speech?" (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 777-778). The record of that telephone conversation
before the Committee shows no such statement by Yamamoto; on the
contrary Yamamoto is shown to have taken no exception to Ambassador
Kurusu's references to the Premier's speech (ex. 1, pp. 206-207). That
day the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, delivered to the State
Department a memorandum in further explanation of the position of the
Chinese

418             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Government on the modus vivendi, which ended by stating that the Chinese
Foreign Minister had expressed 

"great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary (Hull) to the
Japanese envoys, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental
principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government (ex.
18)."

Two intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations
generally were translated and available in Washington on Tuesday,
December 2 (Washington time). One was a message sent from the Foreign
Office in Tokyo to Washington on November 27 (Japan time), for
retransmittal by Washington to Japanese diplomatic establishments in
various North and South American cities. "With international relations
becoming more strained," the message set up an emergency system of
dispatches in hidden word codes to be used in communicating with those
establishments. These emergency dispatches consisted of instructions
regarding radio communications and the evacuation of Japanese Embassies,
messages stating that relations between Japan and countries whose names
were to be inserted were not in accordance with expectations or had been
severed, and messages stating that Japan's armed forces had clashed with
the armed forces of countries whose names were to be inserted or that
Japan and countries whose names were to be inserted were entering a
"full fledged general war" (ex. 1, pp. 186-188). The second message was
from Hsinking to Tokyo, dated November 28, and contained the following:

"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent
authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of
British and American nationals in Manchukuo *in the event that war
breaks out with England and the United States* are as outlined below. We
are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions
regarding them, please wire me at once.

"I. Policy. *On the outbreak of war with England and the United States*,
after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals
together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a
date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are
to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.

"The control of such property as they might leave behind will be
administered by the Manchukuo Government (ex. 1, p. 198)."

On December 3 (Washington time) Secretary Hull held a press conference
at which he repeated in large measure the statements he had made at his
press conference on November 27 (Washington time), making it plain that
at no time had the Japanese Government shown any disposition to modify
its basic policies, which he described as at complete variance with
those of the United States (tr. 1163). [1] That afternoon the Secretary
had a telephone conversation with Admiral Stark at 4:45 o'clock (tr.
1167).

That day, and again the next day, the State Department received
telegrams from the American Minister at Bangkok expressing the hope of
the Thai Government 

"that the American and British Governments will issue public statements
to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and
armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand (ex.
169, item 30)."

Other than Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's
conference with Under Secretary Welles on December 3, and Foreign
Minister Togo's reply to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding a
"leaders conference", both of which have been mentioned above, there is
no evidence before the Committee of other

[1] Cf. Washington Post, December 4, 1941.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         419

intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations
generally that were translated and available in Washington on December 3
(Washington time).

The next morning, Thursday, December 4 (Washington time), six majority
and minority leaders of the Senate and House met with President
Roosevelt for 2 hours and thoroughly canvassed the Far Eastern situation
"in connection with the defense of our own territories and vital
interests in the Far East", and were reported to have left the White
House "with the impression that the situation is critical, but will not
necessarily come to a show-down with the presentation of Japan's reply"
to the President's request for an accounting for the continued Japanese
troop movements into southern French Indochina (Washington Post,
December 5, 1941). That afternoon at 2:15 o'clock the President
conferred for an hour with Secretary Knox (ex. 58). As he left the
meeting Secretary Knox told reporters that, among other things, he knew
definitely that there would be an investigation of the publication that
day by the Chicago Tribune, practically in full, of a copy of United
States plans for fighting a global war if it should eventuate, "the most
highly secret paper in the possession of the Government" (tr. 14,411;
Washington Post, December 5, 1941). At 3:30 o'clock, President Roosevelt
conferred at the White House with Secretary Hull (ex. 58). That evening,
according to a message dated December 6 (Washington time) from
Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo 

"those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him
against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the
President is his usual attitude (ex. 1, p. 247)."

In explanation of this information, Ambassador Nomura told the Foreign
Minister that-

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and
Hull we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members
having close relations with the President and through individuals
equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State
Department, please keep this point strictly secret) (ex. 1, p. 247)."

That day, Thursday, December 4, there were translated and available in
Washington the first intercepted Japanese messages from Tokyo directing
the destruction of code machines and machine codes by the Japanese
Embassy in Washington. As already noted, there had been translated and
available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) a message sent
from Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) which informed the Japanese
Embassy in Washington that the Japanese diplomatic offices in London,
Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to abandon the use
of code machines and to "dispose of them." This message had specifically
stated, however, that regardless of other instructions, "the U. S.
(Office) retains the machines and the machine codes" (ex. 1, p. 209).
However, on December 2 (Japan time), in one of the intercepted messages
translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time),
the Japanese Foreign Office had instructed the Japanese Embassy in
Washington to destroy one code machine unit completely, as well as to
burn all telegraphic codes except "those now used with the machine," and
the various other codes. The Embassy was also instructed

420             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to dispose of "all files of messages coming and going and all other
secret documents" at the time and in the manner "you deem most proper"
(ex. 1, p. 215). This message was followed by a second message on
December 4 (Japan time) which gave more detailed instructions concerning
the burning of certain codes recently brought to Washington by a
Japanese official from the Japanese Embassy in Mexico City, and directed
that a certain code keying be kept in Ambassador Nomura's custody "until
the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 231).

Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, testified that about
the 4th or 5th of December, in connection with the delivery of "Magic"
to the President, he called the President's particular attention to a
message about the burning of codes. He testified that to the best of his
recollection the gist of his conversation with the President was as
follows:

"I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he
read very carefully, and he said "Well, when do you think it will
happen?" I said, "Most any time" (tr. 14035-14036)."

He testified that when the President said, "When do you think it sill
happen," he understood the President to mean, "When is war going to
break out, when are we going to be attacked, or something" (tr. 14037).

A third intercepted message translated and available in Washington on
December 4 (Washington time) was from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese
Foreign Office, in which the Ambassador said:

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it I8
expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore
consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with
the evacuation of the Consuls (ex. 1, p. 227)."

Also that day there was translated and available in Washington Foreign
Minister Togo's reply, dated December 3 (Japan time), to Ambassador
Nomura's report of his and Ambassador Kurusu's conference with Secretary
Hull on December 1 (Washington time). In it, the Foreign Minister put
forward arguments for the Ambassadors' use in their forthcoming meeting
with Secretary Hull. The Foreign Minister claimed that the United States
was using the recent statements of Japanese officials and the Japanese
troop movements in the South "as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in
wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S.
Negotiations," and complained that Britain, the United States and others
had been making military preparations against Japan "at an increasing
tempo" and had been acting in a "more and more antagonistic manner of
late. "We are insisting", the Foreign Minister said, "that all aid to
Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the
instigation of the United States are launched" (ex. 1, pp. 225-226).

On December 5 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew sent a rush telegram to
Secretary Hull in which he stated:

"You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being
represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of
"fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and
that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if
implemented would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with
that security political as well as economic which she affects to seek by
exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said
that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful
principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-
balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating
order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong
disappointment that the private individual

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         421

is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a
matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the
American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an
attitude of intransigence on the putt of the Japanese would be viewed
with regret by the masses.

"It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our
proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the
proposal, notably complete evacuation of China. Would be strong and
indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an
agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the
elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan
to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you
will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as
possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even
without the latter's assent if that should not be forthcoming (tr. 1821-
1823)."

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ITS TROOP MOVEMENTS IN FRENCH INDOCHINA  ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY THE CHINESE

(December 5, 1941)

In the meantime, on December 3 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo had
sent Ambassador Nomura his message No. 875 containing the Japanese
Government's formal reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry regarding the
movement of additional Japanese troops into southern French Indochina
(ex. 1, p. 224). This reply took the position that the Japanese
reinforcements were a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in
bordering Chinese territory. Ambassador Nomura had regarded the reply as
unsatisfactory, and had at once cabled the Foreign Minister:

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this
reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The
United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this
reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it
is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key
deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United
States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will
take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really
the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the
explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor
prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made
for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in
view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to
the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives
a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore,
reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once (ex. 1,
pp. 227-228)."

The Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Nomura had come back the next
day:

"What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it
would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set
forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results
might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned
message (ex. 1, p. 232)."

Accordingly, on December 5 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassadors
called on Secretary Hull and presented their Government's reply to
President Roosevelt's inquiry'(ex. 29, vol. II, pp.

[1] It is significant that press reports which reached Washington early
in the morning of December 5 (Washington time), stated that in Tokyo
that day the authoritative Japanese news agency had announced that
"Japan cannot accept" the provisions of the United States' note of
November 26. Domei was reported to have said: "Such a document cannot
serve as a basic datum in Japanese-American negotiations henceforth".
These statements, together with Japanese comment critical of Secretary
Hull's remarks at his press conference on December 3 (Washington time),
were carried in morning newspapers in Washington on December 5 under
such headlines as "JAPAN 'CAN'T ACCEPT' TERMS" and "JAPAN EXPECTED TO
REJECT TERMS" (Washington Post December 5, 1941). Secretary Hull
conferred for a short time with President Roosevelt before his meeting
with the Japanese Ambassadors (Washington Post, December 6, 1941).

422             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

781-783). The Japanese reply as handed to the Secretary follows in full:

Reference is made 1;e your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese
Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in
French Indochina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as
follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along
the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese
troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have
been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French
Indochina. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have
been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress
the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan std
France (vol. II, p. 784).

After reading the reply, Secretary Hull said:

that he understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern
Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he
had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern
Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The
Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was
on the defensive in Indochina (vol. II, p. 781).

Ambassador Nomura then repeated to the Secretary the gist of the Foreign
Minister's message of December 3 (Japan time) mentioned above, claiming
that the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval and military
preparation of the "ABCD" powers in the southwest Pacific, and asserting
that the Japanese Government was "very anxious" to reach an agreement
with this Government and that the United States ought to be willing to
agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China
and Japan were initiated. The remainder of the conversation consisted
largely of a repetition of matters expressed many times before by both
the Japanese. And the Secretary (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 781-783).

That morning, December 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt had
received a memorandum from Under Secretary Welles passing on to him a
suggestion from the Australian Prime Minister that if Sir. Wendell
Willkie should visit Australia with the "imprimateur" of the President,
his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government. The
President had immediately dictated a letter to Mr. Willkie regarding
this, in which he said:

"There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is
definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if
the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines,
Dutch Indies or Malaya or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will
decide the matter (ex. 111). "

Following his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary Hull
had lunch at 1 o'clock at the White House with President Roosevelt,
after which both the President and the Secretary attended a full Cabinet
meeting at 2 o'clock (ex. 58).

That day the American Minister at Bangkok reported to the State
Department that he had been informed by the Thai Minister for Foreign
Affairs that the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand had told the Minister
that the Japanese forces in Indochina "definitely would not be used to
invade Thailand and that they were concentrated for use against the
Burma Road" (ex. 169, item 31). Also that day, Lord Halifax, the British
Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull, who recorded that the Ambassador 

"said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office,
setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate
cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of
course relates to the matter of defense against Japan. I expressed my
appreciation (tr. 14,515)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            423

The evening of December 5 (Washington time) the State Department sent a
telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Peiping by naval radio for
the information of the American Embassy in Chungking and the American
consul at Hong Kong containing instructions applicable to all offices in
Japan Japanese-occupied areas in China, Hong Kong Indochina, and
Thailand. Those instructions were 

"intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in
case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take
appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees,
archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff,
et cetera (tr. 1967-A)."

The telegram included the following paragraph concerning the destruction
of codes:

"It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals,
codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be
destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of
at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained
(tr. 1967-D)."

It ended as follows:

"The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary
measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is
intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden
emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal
with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that
discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided (tr. 1967-
E)."

Previously, on November 27 (Washington time), the day after the delivery
of the United States reply, the State Department had sent a telegram to
Ambassador Grew which strongly suggested the probability that the
Japanese-American conversations might "lapse" and result "in withdrawal
of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan," and that he
should quietly prepare for that eventuality (ex. 18). Also, on November
19 (Washington time), the State Department had sent a telegram to the
American Embassy in Tokyo via Shanghai by naval radio for the
information of the American Embassies at Chungking, Peiping, and the
American consul at Hong Kong, in which it was stated that the Department
desired that 

"the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the
attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied
areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice
previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that
the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because
of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be
possible to retain in the Pacific even the the [sic] present facilities
(tr. 4508 4509)."

The telegram of November 19 (Washington time) was the last of three
major warnings sent by the State Department during 1940 and 1941
advising American nationals to leave the Orient, the other major
warnings have been sent on October 6, 1940, and February 11, 1941 (tr.
4502-4508).

On December 5 (Washington time), there was translated and available in
Washington a message sent 2 days earlier by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign
Minister Togo in which the Ambassador said:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an
occupation of Thailand (ex. 1, p. 227).

At the Japanese Embassy in Washington that day, Councilor Iguchi cabled
the Japanese Foreign Office, in response to its instruc-

424             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

tions to destroy one code machine unit and to burn all telegraphic codes
except those used with the machine:

"We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese
negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire
to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine (ex. 1,
p. 236)."

The Foreign Office promptly replied that its instructions regarding code
machines were:

"of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is
equipped, you are to burn one set and *for the time being* to continue
the use of the other (ex. 1, p. 237)."

Both of these intercepted Japanese messages were translated and
available in Washington the next day.

THE LAST HOURS

(December 6-8, 1941)

The next day was Saturday, December 6 (Washington time). In the
southwest Pacific, the Japanese naval and military forces whose
movements in and toward French Indochina had commenced in earnest soon
after the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) and
had been observed both by British and American forces based in Malaya
and in the Philippines, had begun their final dispositions. It is now
known that at the same time, in the mid-Pacific some 6,000 miles away,
the Japanese naval force that had left its rendezvous in northern Japan
on November 25 (Washington time) still undiscovered and now almost
within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands was steaming at high
speed toward its target, the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor.

While reports of the final Japanese movements in the southwest Pacific
began to reach Washington before noon on December 6 (Washington time),
the record before the Committee conclusively shows that no one in the
United States Government or in its military and naval forces, either in
Washington or in the field, knew of the approach of the Japanese naval
striking force to the Hawaiian Islands.

That morning, at 10:40 o'clock, the State Department received the
following telegram from Ambassador Winant in London, marked "Triple
priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret to the Secretary and
the President":

"British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two
parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14
hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10
destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers (ex.
21)."

The State Department file copy of this message bears the stamp "Sent to
the President," but does not indicate the hour when that action was
taken. The same information had been received in Washington by the Navy
Department earlier that morning in a message sent by Admiral Hart from
Manila at 7:55 a. m. (Washington time) to Admiral Stark (tr. 4344, ex.
66). The information so received by the Navy Department was communicated
to the State Department in a memorandum of December 6 signed by Admiral
Schuirmann (ex. 66). Secretary Hull's engagement books for that day show
that he had an appointment with Admiral Schuirmann at 1:50 p. m. (Tr.
1168), at which time the memorandum was presumably handed to the
Secretary by Admiral Schuirmann. Similar information was received

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         425

in the State Department from the War-Department early the next morning
(tr. 14,290). The record of outside telephone calls through the White
House switchboard on December 6 shows that Secretary Hull was again
called by Secretary Stimson at 12:58 p. m. and by Admiral Stark at 1:09
p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). At 3:05 p. m. that afternoon the State
Department received a second message from Ambassador Winant, marked
"Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret for the
Secretary," containing additional information concerning the
Ambassador's earlier message regarding the Japanese naval movement. The
second message follows in full:

"Again from Cadogan. Admiralty conference on information just forwarded,
Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of
parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.

"Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our
naval despatch. Latter stating 3 a. m. Greenwich time, by despatch as
given me 3 a. m. London time. Believe former correct.

"British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support
Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext
protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but
wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles
to Halifax.

"Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your
number 5682, December 5 although I had previously pressed on him each of
the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the
exception of paragraph seven which I agree is not clear and which I will
clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to
do with the insertion of the reference to the I. L. O.

"I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place
in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over
private wires in ease you wish to communicate with me [1] (ex. 21). "

At 5:15 o'clock that afternoon Secretary Hull again telephoned Admiral
Stark (tr. 1168).

That morning at 11 o'clock the State Department received the following
telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking:

"The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed
a member of my staff yesterday that "the British wanted to move into
Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of
the American attitude." He said that this report came from a very
reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the
report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent
tendency to play up the situation (ex. 169, item 32)."

At 6 p. m. that day the Department sent a telegram to the American
Minister at Bangkok informing him that he might assure the Thai
authorities that the extension of credit to Thailand for its current
needs was fully agreed to in principle and that the Department expected
no delay in working out the details with the appropriate lending
agencies of the United States Government (ex. 169, item 33).

In the meantime, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had given
renewed attention to the proposal to send a message to Emperor Hirohito.
It will be recalled that a draft of such a message had been prepared the
preceding Saturday and probably discussed the next

[1] Under Secretary Welles was questioned at length by Senator Ferguson
regarding the "message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" referred to in
Ambassador Winant's telegram quoted above (tr. 1300-1316; 1337-1340). At
Senator Ferguson's request, Mr. Welles undertook to make a special
search for the message (tr. 1316), after which he reported to the
Committee that it was his understanding that the message in question was
the message from President Roosevelt which he communicated to the
Japanese Ambassadors on December 2 (Washington time) and a copy of which
he sent to the British Ambassador the same day (tr. 1338). The State
Department advised Committee counsel that no written record of the
message referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram could be found in
its files, and that accordingly it must be assumed the message was oral
(tr. 1300). See in this connection the discussion supra of Under
Secretary Welles reported conference with Lord Halifax on December 1
(Washington time).

Telegram number 5682 referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram appears
in the record before this Committee as exhibit No. 166. It does not deal
with the situation in the Far East in any way.

426             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Monday by the Secretary with the President upon his return from Warm
Springs. The next day, Tuesday (December 2), Secretary Stimson had
recorded in his notes:

"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the
Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in
addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a
message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country (tr. 14,427)."

Secretary Hull testified that he was in consultation with President
Roosevelt at all stages of the drafting of the President's message to
the Emperor (tr. 14,297). The record contains a note in President
Roosevelt's handwriting, undated but bearing a stamp showing that it was
received in Secretary Hull's office on December 6, which reads:

"DEAR CORDELL: Shoot this to Grew I think can go in grey code-saves
time I don't mind if it gets picked up.

"F. D. R. (ex. 20)."

The message to Emperor Hirohito attached to the President's memorandum
was returned to the President attached to a "Memorandum for the
President," also dated December 6 and initialled by Secretary Hull, as
follows:

"There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three
of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I
spoke to you on the telephone.

"If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets
off to Grew at once (ex. 20)."

Beneath Secretary Hull's initials appears the following in President
Roosevelt's handwriting:

"C. H. O K send the amended p. 3 to the British Ambassador & send a copy
to me. F. D. R. (ex. 20)."

The amended page 3 bears the President's handwritten "O. K.," followed
by his initials (ex. 20). There is no explanation in the record before
the Committee of the reason for the President's instruction to send a
copy of the amended page three to the British Ambassador.

The first three and last paragraphs of the message as thus finally
revised were substantially the same as those of the draft message
attached to Secretary Hull's memorandum of November 29 to the President.
The remainder of the message sent comprising the main part consisted of
material that is not found in any of the drafts in evidence before the
Committee. Secretary Hull testified that the message actually sent to
the Emperor 

"was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions
made in the White House as well as material contained in the drafts
prepared in the State Department during the preceding weeks (tr.
14,264)."

At 8 o'clock that evening (December 6), the State Department dispatched
to Ambassador Grew a brief telegram stating that an important telegram
to him was being encoded and that it contained the text of a message
from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, to be communicated by
Ambassador Grew to the Emperor at the "earliest possible moment" (ex.
20). Both messages were initialled for Secretary Hull by Dr. Hornbeck
(ex. 20), which may indicate that after approving the message in final
form the Secretary had left the Department for the day. The telegram
containing President Roosevelt's

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         427

message to Emperor Hirohito was dispatched from the State Department at
9 o'clock that evening (ex. 20). The message follows in full:

"Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to
the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the
people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was
accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which
has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their
peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have
substantially helped humanity.

"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries
need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I
should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency
which appears to be in formation.

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to
deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence
of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain
tragic possibilities.

"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of
nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations
between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for
a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. Vs e have
hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way
that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side
without fear of invasion that unbearable burdens of armaments could be
lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without
discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me,
that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States
should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed
essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

"!More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement
v I h the Vichy- Government by which five or six thousand Japanese
troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the
protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further
north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further
Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for
the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saving
that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been
contemplated.

"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that
Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern
Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the
part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China
is not defensive in its character.

"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such
large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the
southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the
people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East
Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether
these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one
or more of these many directions.

"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these
peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and
their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand
why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance
at the establishment of military, naval, and air bases manned and
equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of
offense.

"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either
indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of
invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be
withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of
the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of
Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the
part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese
forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout
the whole of the South Pacific area.

"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope
that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite
emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that
both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great
countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have
a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and
destruction in the world (vol. II, pp. 784-786)."

428             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Also at 9 o'clock that evening a telegram from Secretary Hull to
Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was dispatched by the State Department,
instructing the Ambassador to communicate to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek a copy of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, for
the Generalissimo's confidential information. This telegram was also
initialled for the Secretary by Dr. Hornbeck. After quoting the
President's message in full, the telegram concluded:

"In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state
orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been
sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the
situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last
diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to
desist from its present course; that if the slender c

chance of acceptance
by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been
taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped
that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese
Government circles adverse comment (tr. 14,517)."

The final comment may well have been intended to forestall comment such
as the Generalissimo had made at the time the modus vivendi was under
consideration.

Ambassador Grew testified that he first learned of the President's
message the evening of December 7 (Japan time) while listening to a
radio broadcast from San Francisco (tr. 1501-1503; ex. 30, pp. 486-487).
He immediately instructed Mr. Dooman, the Embassy Counselor, to stand
by, and not long thereafter the first, short telegram from Secretary
Hull was received. Although it showed on its face it had been received
in Tokyo at 12 noon (Japan time), an hour after its dispatch from
Washington at 11 a. m. (Japan time), the Secretary's second telegram
containing President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor was not
delivered at the Embassy until 10:30 p. m. "In other words," Ambassador
Grew testified, "the telegram appears to have been delivered to the
Japanese post office, which handled telegrams, 1 hour after its receipt,
and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until-10:30 p. m."
(Japan time) (tr. 1501), or 8:30 a. m. December 7 (Washington time).
Ambassador Grew saw Foreign Minister Togo at about a quarter past 12
that night. He read President Roosevelt's message aloud to the Foreign
Minister, handed him a copy, and then requested an audience with the
Emperor to present the President's message personally. Not until after
Ambassador Grew had found it necessary to repeat his request did the
Foreign Minister agree to present the matter to the Throne, (tr.
14,516).

To return to events in Washington, President Roosevelt's appointments
for Saturday, December 6, as shown by his engagement book were two, both
at the White House and both in the morning. The first was at 10 o'clock
with Justice William O. Douglas, and the second was at 11:15 o'clock
with Budget Director Harold O. Smith (ex. 58). The President had no
scheduled appointments that afternoon. That evening the President and
Mrs. Roosevelt entertained at dinner at 8 o'clock at the White House
(ex. 58). Apart from the evidence already mentioned of the President's
activities that day in connection with his message to Emperor Hirohito,
the only other evidence before the Committee affirmatively showing the
President's activities before the White House dinner that evening is a
statement contained in a letter dated May 22, 1946, from an official of
the Australian Legation in Washington in answer to certain inquiries
made by the Committee through the State Department (tr. 14,631-14,632).
Referring to a telegram from the Australian Minister for

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            425

External Affairs in Canberra to the British Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom in London, a paraphrase of which
is quoted below, that letter states:

"The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Australian
Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister-
at Washington. This message was dispatched from Washington at 9:30 p. m.
On December 6th, 1941. *The information contained therein regarding the
procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the
President late in the afternoon of December 6th.*" (Tr. 14,631).

The paraphrase of the Australian Minister for External Affairs' telegram
is as follows:

"Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of
warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning,
we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's
Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at
Washington just received notes that

"1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.

"2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by
him from the Emperor by Monday evening

"(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,

"(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until
Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered
repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington (tr. 13, 741-13, 742)."

It would seem clear that the "draft" referred to in the telegram quoted
above was the document, a copy of which was obtained by the Committee
from the files of President Roosevelt, attached to an unsigned
memorandum dated December 7, 1941, on stationery bearing the official
seal of the British Government (tr. 13,738). The memorandum was as
follows:

"The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the
President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the
Japanese Government.

"The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text.
They are being consulted urgently.

"The Netherlands government have been given a copy of the draft (tr.
13,738)"

The draft declaration to the Japanese Government which was attached to
this memorandum was as follows:

"YOUR EXCELLENCY:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed
to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government
on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada,
the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South
Africa.

"His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth
of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely
in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in
which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a
view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's
Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government
the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which
prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese
Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that
enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard
to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve their views the
reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese
forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and
heavily augmented.

"There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this
concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption
that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive
move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.

"Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the
Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to