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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Appendix D

REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  JAPAN, AND RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, 1941  THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 1941

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Committee and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is  annexed, the diplomatic conversations between the United States and  Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941  through December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as including  all of the material contained in the record before the Committee that  touches upon those conversations during that period, it does attempt to  set forth the material facts in connection therewith.

Prior to the Committee's investigation, nearly all of the information  concerning the diplomatic conversations during 1941 between the United  States and Japan that had been made public was contained in the official  State Department publications, "Peace and War" (ex. 28) [1] and "Foreign  Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29), together  with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's book, "Ten Years in Japan" (ex.  30), which were published during the war and were subject to wartime  restrictions. To the basic material contained in those publications, the  Committee has added hundreds of documents, personal as well as official,  from the files of the State Department and of the late President  Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, the Committee has received in  evidence hundreds of messages between the Japanese Foreign Office in  Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington as intercepted,  translated, and available at the time to high official; in the United  States Government in Washington, including President Roosevelt and  Secretary of State Cordell Hull. There 1S also before the Committee  testimony of former Secretary of State Hull and of former United States  Ambassador in Japan Joseph. C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to  interrogatories submitted by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,  and collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George  C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers of  the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also contains  hundreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of  interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander, Gen.  Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Committee, many of which are  directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately preceding  Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the memoirs of  Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October

[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to exhibits introduced at the hearings before the Committee.

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16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentary evidence, from so many different and independent sources, and including official documents of  the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United States  Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by cross-checking

By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the documentary  evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix attempts to  reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the diplomatic  conversations between the United States and Japan during the 4 months  that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Only  thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages  between Tokyo and Washington be examined in the surrounding  circumstances in which they were first seen by high officials in the  United States Government, for those messages were the day-to-day  instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to the  Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guiding them in  their conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, and the  Ambassadors' reports and comments to the Japanese Foreign Office  concerning those conversations. While in American hands the diplomatic  messages between Tokyo and Washington not only provided Secretary Hull  and President Roosevelt with advance knowledge of the Japanese plans for  the conduct of the conversations but also were one of the most important  and significant types of intelligence information available to the Army  and Navy in Washington, they did not contain any information pointing  toward Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack.

Since the report to which this appendix is annexed discusses in detail  the military aspects and implications of the diplomatic conversations  between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted Japanese  diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no attempt is made  here to tie in the events on the "diplomatic front" with the various  warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from Washington to the  commanders in the Pacific, although the latter messages were to a  considerable extent based upon the state of Japanese-American diplomatic  relations at the time they were dispatched. Neither does this appendix  attempt to describe the process of building up American military  strength in the Pacific area which was underway during the period in  question, although by taking up the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of  November 5 and November 27 in connection with the events that gave rise  to each, it does indicate in general terms the over-all military and  naval considerations that affected American policies in the Pacific  during the latter part of 1941. Parenthetically, it may be noted here  that the inherent relationship between diplomatic policies and military  and naval power was succinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he  testified before the Committee that soon after he came to the State  Department he learned that the representatives of the aggressor nations  with whom he talked "were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our  Army," and that the diplomatic strength of the United States went up or  down with their estimate of what the United States Army and Navy "amounted to."

The record before the Committee shows that the United States Government  participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort to dissuade  the Japanese Government from its course of military aggression and its  Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that

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the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was  believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country who  disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese  Government; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the  principles to which the United States Government adhered would have had  many material and other advantages for both the United States and Japan.  American participation in the conversations had the further purpose of  giving the United States Army and Navy more time to prepare their  defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital to the safety and  security of the United States. Recognition of this dual purpose is the  key to an understanding of the day-to-day course of the conversations.  Every action taken, every move made, on the American side must be  considered in the light of those objectives.

BRIEF RESUME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE  ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

This narrative begins in August, 1941 with the President of the United  States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference on a  warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to prevent the  outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941 with Japanese  bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl  Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British Malaya, and  with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippine  Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway. 

Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of which lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese occupation of  southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of the Japanese- American conversations and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United  States which had immediately followed that Japanese move. By August  1941, there was but a slim chance that the Japanese Government would  "reverse the engine," as Ambassador Grew expressed it, and abandon the  course of aggression through force of arms to which it had been  committed. Although it was true that the informal conversations in  Washington between the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo  Nomura, had revealed an apparent willingness on the part of the Japanese  Government to go along with certain of the peaceful principles to which  the United States was committed, *provided those principles were stated  in sufficiently general terms to make their application in specific  situations wholly unpredictable*, those conversations had disclosed  three crucial points of difference between the two Governments: the  question of nondiscrimination in international trade, the question of  the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and the question of  Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact.

During the latter part of January 1941, through private Japanese and  American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt and  Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity  to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward the  "China Incident" (ex. 29, vol. II, PP. 328-329; ex. 179).  The initial  reaction of the United States Government had been one of caution (ex.  29, vol. II, P. 330).  Secretary Hull testified that -

"In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide  divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had  been pursuing

[Pairs of asterisks have been used to replace italics in the original text.  LWJ]

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in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement.   Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the  signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling  for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would  contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we  should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

"We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful,  fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific  area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and  beliefs of the American people.  Moreover, the President and I  constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military  authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having  time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United  States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to  enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line  with our need to rearm for self-defense.

"The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's  course of aggression.  We realized that so much was involved in a  reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any  substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would  require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an  endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We  carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a  basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not  only to Japan but to all countries (tr. 1101-11025)." [1]

In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached  Washington in February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope that  the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind that would  offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the problems in  the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the United States  Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might  offer that was consistent with the principles to which, the Secretary  had made it clear, the United States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  331-332).  Secretary Hull testified as follows regarding his meeting on  April 16, 1941, with Ambassador Nomura:

"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.  I pointed out that *the one paramount preliminary question about which  our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that  the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its  present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which  our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between  nations should rest*, as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to  consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as  could be consistent with those principles (tr. 11041104)."

As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull, upon  instructions from his Government, a document (Annex A attached hereto)  containing a proposal for a general settlement between the United States  and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 418-425). This document had revealed  authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in  mind as the basis for an agreement

[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to  pages of the transcript of the hearings before the Committee.

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between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Between May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of conferences  between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Japanese  proposal and related matters were discussed.  In the meantime a  counterproposal by the United States had been prepared, and on June 21  (Washington time) this counterproposal (Annex B attached hereto) had  been handed to the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492).

On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon  Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have  far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations.  It had quickened  the appetites of those in the Japanese Government who believed that  then, or never, Japan's destiny was in her own hands. Intensive  consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question  whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,  p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course.  According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier  at the time, the attention of the Government became so centered upon  this question that the American counterproposal of June 21, which by  that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in  Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial  Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia  had been temporarily shelved in favor of "an advance into the southern  regions," and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans "which  have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be  prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern  territories" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) It is  now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was  also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United  States should break down, "preparations for a war with England and  America will also be carried forward"; that all plans, including the  plan to use Japan's military strength to settle the Soviet question if  the German-Russian war should develop to Japan's advantage, were to be carried out

"in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America;"

and that

"In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America  into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations  under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and  method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 71)."

The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time)  had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese  Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same  day:

"(National Secret)

"At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 'The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation' were decided. This Policy consists of the following two  parts. The first part 'The Policy' and the second part 'The Principal Points.' (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep 

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the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,  regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, *and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward* in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, *increasing  pressure shall be added from various points in the south*, and by means  of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions  shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and  various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in  the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be  reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French  Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German  war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,  every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall  be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations  shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available  shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining  the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power  Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed* (ex. 1, pp.  1-2)." [1]

It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was translated and available in Washington [2] on July 8 (Washington time),  did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the United States.

Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had  proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from 1  to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant  vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon  travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and  communications. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on the theme  that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never  equaled in all Japanese history. The United States had been charged with  using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The  Japanese press had warned that if the United States took further action  in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would  face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 339-340).

Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Government regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of June 21,  Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned *en bloc* on July 16  (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24). Prince Konoye had  then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to organize the new Cabinet, which  he had done, the only important change being the appointment of Admiral  Toyoda as Foreign Minister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 25)  The views of the latter had been one of the principal  causes of the disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to  the

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been supplied.

[2] The expression "translated and available in Washington," as used in  this appendix, means that English translations of the particular  intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time  stated to those officials of the United States Government in Washington  to whom the Army and Navy were distributing "Magic" at the time. It  should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is  made in this appendix were so available: specific reference has been  made to the date when a message became available only in those instances  where knowledge of the exact date is important.

While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was available at the time, the information contained herein  which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (exhibits 8 and  132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of  course, available at the time.

American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change while  Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Ambassador  Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated protestations of  Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific  problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had contained such  statements as "there is more reason than ever before to arm ourselves to  the teeth for all-out war" (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing of American  property in China had continued, including bursts which damaged the  American Embassy and the U. S. S. TUTUILA at Chungking (ex. 29, vol. II,  p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19 (Japan time) from Tokyo to  Berlin had contained the following estimate of the change in the  Japanese Cabinet:

"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection  with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign  policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the  principles of the Tripartite Pact (ex. 1, p. 3)."

In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in accordance with the Japanese plans for the "southward advance" had begun in  earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).  Those military and naval movements, plus the failure as yet of the  Japanese Government to make any reply to the American proposals of June  21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instructions from the Secretary  of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that  Secretary Hull "could not see that there was any basis now offered for  the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been  engaged" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). About this time, Colonel Hideo  Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in  the conversations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24  (Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador attended  by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval  Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that, if the Japanese  Government would withdraw its forces from French Indochina, he would  endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese, and the Netherlands  Governments, and the United States Government itself would give, a  solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a  neutralized country, provided the Japanese Government would give a  similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 527-530). Nevertheless, the  Japanese troop movements into French Indochina had continued, and on  July 26 (Washington time) President Roosevelt had issued an Executive  order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 267). The effect of this order had been to bring about very soon  the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 343).

In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and  available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new Foreign  Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the Imperial  Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Government had been  devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of the policies  there decided upon. He told the Ambassador:

"Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire

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must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep.  That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

"That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

[Discontinuous text]

"We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

"6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order  to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for  each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean  to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not  necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should  trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each  use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

"Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a  determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the  Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an  Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those  objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to  engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9- 10.)"

In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21 had been  transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura in Washington  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had not presented it to Secretary  Hull, however, because of the change in Japanese Cabinets, because he  thought it would not be acceptable to the United States Government, and  because he had received no instructions from the new Cabinet as to how  to proceed under the circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).  Still another proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new  proposal had been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador  Nomura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to  President Roosevelt's suggestion for the neutralization of French  Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal had  asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States

"(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue  furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for  the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the  Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of  a special military position and a permanent preferential political and  economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to  procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States  and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was  committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station  Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than  Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina  for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the  menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well  as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the  southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344)."

About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to propose a  personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had presented this idea  to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4 (Japan time). Before that  day ended, the Navy Minister had expressed complete accord and had even  anticipated the success of the proposed conference (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister of War, General Tojo, however, had replied  in writing as follows:

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"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the  United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which  are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the  same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created.  For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The  attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime  Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's  intention to attend such a meeting *with determination to firmly support  the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"  Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the  United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the  Empire even after this final effort is made*, the Army is not  necessarily in disagreement.

"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making  preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with  someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a  lesser capacity. (2) *You shall not resign your post as a result of the  meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be  prepared to assume leadership in the war against America* (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31)."

On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by Emperor  Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for the meeting (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier had sent a telegram to  Ambassador Nomura, which was translated and available in Washington on  August 8 (Washington time), directing him to propose such a meeting (ex. 1, pp. 12-13).

Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8 (Washington  time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had presented the proposal for  a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull  had informed the Ambassador that the new Japanese proposal of August 6  was not responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion of July 24  (Washington time) mentioned above, and, regarding the proposal for a  meeting between the President and Premier Konoye, had said that it  remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find  means of shaping its policies along lines that would make possible an  adjustment of views between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  550-551).

The next day, August 9 (Washington time), Secretary Hull had conferred  with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had inquired about the  amount of aid the United States Government would be able to give in case  the Japanese should attack Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Secretary  Hull recorded:

"I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a  broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to  invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and  continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to  the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape  of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade  routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad  military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in  Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel.  I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the  problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this  Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of  resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive  situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American  naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain  at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements  south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a  conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine  more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in  the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711).

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Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic  Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the  two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the  immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the  United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern  French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura  was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a  peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent  breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of  Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the  two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the  Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great  strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many  directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China  Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and  the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south,  at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at  Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East  Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the  purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed.

When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23  (Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that  the United States could only assume, first-

"that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the  United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy  of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts  on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety  in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that  the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon  a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in  the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that  region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525).

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

(August 9-14, 1941)

The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,  each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took  place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, during the second week in  August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the  joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the  Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364).  Their conversations also dealt with  steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their  safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German  Government and other governments associated with the German Government.  They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary  Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy  route into the

[1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however, that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254).

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British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the  Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied  by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis  aggressors (ex. 22-C).  The President and the Prime Minister also  discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr.  Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United  States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves  of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the  Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22).  The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11  (ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that  discussion

"The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements  handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

"The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the  implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that  she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their  economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval  defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including  the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of  which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)."

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and  after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to  prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with  respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to  Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador  Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory  assurances that it would not further station its troops in the  Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the  Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn,  the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations  with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that  if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake  further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief  various steps would have to be taken by the United States  notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might  result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C).  Mr.  Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C).

There was then discussed-

"the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a  statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the  Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)."

Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved  was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force  in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the  President intended to make 

"might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern  Pacific area (ex. 22 C).

[1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941,  just before the Lend-Lease Act described by Prime Minister Churchill as  "the Bill on which our hopes depend" was enacted by Congress, the Prime  Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon  President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by  the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158).

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The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken  in that sense" (ex. 22-C).

Consideration was then given the question whether or not President  Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a  statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and  Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the  President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning  those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 554-559).

Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days  before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request.  Upon his arrival,  he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the  President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of  the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final  conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A  revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16,  1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his  advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador  Nomura by the President (tr. 1272).

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE  SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS

(August 17, 1941)

President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17 (Washington time). Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the  President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's  request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt  read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document

[1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or  not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the  British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the  United States Government.

The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the  Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex.  22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by  President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime  Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the  President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the  British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr.  Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal,  was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being  left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise  given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a  warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached  between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President  made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United  States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to  the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the  President on August 17" (tr. 1428).

While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by  President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British  Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he  "took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e.  promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is  also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him  that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles  said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember,  did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as  previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that  any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and  there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel  to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British  Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and  "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by  President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course,  neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the  Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee,  Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary  Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116).

[2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the  discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo  between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese  Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department  records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign  Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon  intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting  such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear  being indicated-in all eases. Reference is made to such records and  reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or  summarized here.

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drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and  Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific  and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the  "neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had  continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East  and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President  Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the  present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in  the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend  to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further aggression, saying:

"Such being the ease, this Government now finds it necessary to say to  the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any  further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination  by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of  the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all  steps which it may deem necessary toward safe- guarding the legitimate  rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and  toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 556-557)."

On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese- American  diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised  as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt  and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had  been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese  occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he  felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in  French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to Secretary Hull, were necessary. 

The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August  8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and  to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The  President said that the United States Government would be prepared to  resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that  Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist  activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along  the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His  statement concluded:

"the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of  the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal  conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both  Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or  proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be  so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as  to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has  repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)."

In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized  the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S.  relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal  for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier  Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States  Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President  hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124).

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The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a  message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with  Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not  learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request  on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal  conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that

"I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in  the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the  proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made  to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the  statement we had discussed (ex. 70)."

The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the  British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by  President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the  Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took  such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would  probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the  State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no  record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480).  Furthermore, as late as  November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message  to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in  averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain  declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further  act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest  consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or  share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows  that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a  draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other  hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the  Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said:

"But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by  aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking  to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing  as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying  the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China.  Japanese armies have been  wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them  carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now  they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They  snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French.  They menace by their  movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and  menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States.

"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to  secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with  infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will  give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We  earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say:  That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves  unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480- 4481)."

While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast  by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this  address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr.  Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles'

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judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form  of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1]

On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to  Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364).  This  message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in  general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no  specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under  Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a  warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have  been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful  solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277).

JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA

(August 27, 1941)

The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17  (Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished  as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28  (Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador  Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on  the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of  the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the  President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders  conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a  report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador  Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that  he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On  August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura  that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the  United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders  conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador  Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted  the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he  gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created  that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' "  if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported  British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124;  ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568).

At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to  Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had  already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that  the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan.  General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign  Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the  Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very  careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August  22 (Japan time), the Foreign

[1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K.  Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February  28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the  British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning"  against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108).

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Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention  of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become  known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and  other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might  have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19;  ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their  conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by  the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally  give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo  to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make  representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may  reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general  viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p.  21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in  Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27  (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull  against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters.  Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the  shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 570).

PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING  THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"

(August 28, 1941)

Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17 (Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed  to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of  August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a  statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the  President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would  furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had  as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572).

In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the  meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as  possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that  were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and  content," nevertheless

"the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion  confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet  the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may  produce unforeseen contingencies

"I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the  Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all  important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific  area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation.   Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations  between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)."

The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among  other things, to the-

"principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States  Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a  program for the Pacific area

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and continued

"The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest  manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be  applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world.  Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 575)."

However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's  peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or  conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its  troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is  settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet- Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action  "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese  neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any  action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese  Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without  provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 573-576).

Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt "  vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124).  The President  had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three  days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question  as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The  Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said  during his reading of the message:

"Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I  wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those  conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during  Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)."

The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador  Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas  concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.  During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura  the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed  meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were  involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations."  The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in  an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both  Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the  purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential  points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577).  Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the  comment:

"In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is  considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in  fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize  (ex. 124)."

GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY

(August 29-30, 1941)

It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left  the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and  Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that

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the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from  Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull  or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the  Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result  of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that  the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret,  fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a  settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura  twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to  guard against leaks (ex. 124).

This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations  and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by  the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on  Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call  by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time)  (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first  conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at  some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington  about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then  communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda  that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay  and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States  postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the  order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's  memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no  illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to  agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary  Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with  discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken  by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took  advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an  agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference,"  and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an  agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 583-585).

As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a  brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting  his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary  replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad  to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the  foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579,  586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was  needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador  Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29  (Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement  that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28  and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating  "Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan  and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew  advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579).

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Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly  complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given  to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124).  What the Foreign  Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable  to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said:

"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial  talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the  Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)."

In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese  documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier  Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German  Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau,  and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the  policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been  secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet  was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The  Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been  "a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in  our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he  told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and  to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador  Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme  to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her  advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the  matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan  with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon  Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from  joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview  with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of  August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to  know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated  to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been  any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations  to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The  German Ambassador said:

"In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities  thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an  attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up  taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion  might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese  government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that  it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your  Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)."

Admiral Toyoda replied:

"In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the  same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item  C)."

The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941,  that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the  German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan."  He said  that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in