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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
240            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

materials of war consistent with the overwhelming demands and
requirements from many quarters, and of performing the innumerable
functions of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations in a
democracy that was all too slowly preparing itself against the
inevitable day of war. [370] Such diversity and magnitude of
responsibilities is to be distinguished from that of the outpost
commander with his singleness of purpose and well-defined sphere of
activity. It was the duty of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to alert
our military and naval garrisons which they attempted to do and felt
assured they had done. To superimpose the administrative burden of
supervising details would be to enmesh them in such a confusing and
bewildering network of detail as to defeat the very purpose for which
the positions of Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations were
created.

UNITY 0F COMMAND

The evidence adduced in the course of the various Pearl Harbor
investigations reveals the complete inadequacy of command by *mutual
cooperation* where decisive action is of the essence. Both the Army and
Navy commanders in Hawaii failed to coordinate and integrate their
combined facilities for defense in the crucial days between November 27
and December 7, 1941. While they had been able over a period of time to
conceive admirable plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier consistent with the system of mutual cooperation, when the time
came for the implementation of these plans they remained hollow and
empty contracts that were never executed. Had the responsible commanders
conferred together in such manner as to reach joint decisions consonant
with their plans, the system of mutual cooperation would have proved
adequate. It is clear, however, that this system presents unnecessary
and inevitable opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. The
ubiquitous tendency to "let George do it," to assume the other fellow
will take care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by
mutual cooperation.

The tragic assumptions made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short
concerning what the other was doing are a manifestation of this fact.
Each was the victim of the natural human reluctance to pry into what is
regarded as another's business. [370a] The commander in chief assumed
that the Army would be on a full alert the antiaircraft, the aircraft
warning service, and the interceptor command yet he

[370] Mr. Stimson said: "Our General Staff officers were working under a
terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was
probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of the offices and
almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief
in danger which now seems incredible. * * * The officers of the Army
were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually
hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was not awake to its danger. We are
now engaged in passing judgment upon their actions in the wholly
different atmosphere of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors
of the greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it
would be highly unjust to them if this complete difference of atmosphere
was not given the weight which it deserves." Statement of Mr. Stimson to
the Committee. Committee record, pp. 14410, 14411.
[370a] See testimony of General Short, Committee record, pp. 8122, 8123. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            241

did not inquire to determine whether this was the case, apparently
because it might not "sit very well" with General Short. [371] The,
commanding general assumed that the Navy would be conducting
reconnaissance which would afford him adequate warning in order properly
to alert his command. Yet he did not inquire as to whether, the Navy was
conducting the reconnaissance upon which he was relying or his
protection, presumably because he felt such an inquiry might be
"resented" by Admiral Kimmel. [372]

The conduct of operations in this state of joint oblivion was possible n
a command by *mutual cooperation*; but none of these false and
unwarranted assumptions could have obtained under *unity of command*.
Under the latter system a single commander would have been charged with
complete responsibility; all of the warnings, intelligence, and orders
would have been his to interpret, estimate, and implement; it would have
been his duty only to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the
realities of the situation. Conceivably, a single commander might have
arrived at the same estimate as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short;
namely, that Hawaii would not be attacked. But such a decision would
have been clear-cut and devoid f all the anomalous and incompatible
assumptions that are in strange contradiction of the estimate made by
the Hawaiian commanders that their outpost was safe. He would not have
arrived at a conclusion concerning the defensive measures required on a
fallacious assumption with respect to the decisions and defensive
measures of someone else, nor could he have interpreted the same order
at once in two different and inconsistent ways.

Furthermore, in a command by mutual cooperation there is the unfailing
likelihood of conflicting and overlapping prerogatives. In the case of
the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, it was the
joint mission of the Army and Navy to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval
base, each being specifically charged with supporting the other. It was
necessary that the local commanders jointly agree upon the existence of
the appropriate emergency as a condition precedent to the detailed
allocation of specific missions as between the two services. The Navy
was primarily responsible for distant reconnaissance and long-range
attacks against hostile vessels, while the Army was charged with short-
range defense. In the case of each of these defensive measures, one
service was charged with supporting the forces of the other service
having primary responsibility; and particularly, in the case of air
operations, the service having the primary responsibility was to control
the available planes of the other service. This was a sliding and
shifting arrangement with respect to primary responsibility depending on
the nature of the attack. The mutual agreement required by such
operations would necessarily be forth-

[371] See Roberts Commission record, p. 631.
[372] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363.

242            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

coming only when a particular type of attack was sufficiently imminent
as to suggest the advisability of the Army or the Navy, as the case
might be, assuming primary responsibility to meet the attack. [373]

*The completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy in
Hawaii at a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was
absolutely imperative dictates that military and naval intelligence,
particularly, must be consolidated*. [374] The extraordinarily anomalous
situation of the one hand not knowing what the other hand knew or was
doing should never be permitted to exist again.

Invocation of unity of command was within the scope of the authority of
the responsible commanders in Hawaii, upon agreement as to the service
that should exercise command, [374a] or of the Secretaries of War and
Navy, acting jointly. [375] Inasmuch as there was a complete failure of
the system of mutual cooperation on December 7, 1941, and unity of
command had not been effected by or imposed upon the Hawaiian
commanders, it is proper to inquire as to the reason for unity of
command not having been invoked at least as soon as it was known that
hostilities were possible at any moment.

The evidence reflects that during the period from November 27 to
December 7 the leading subject of conferences between Admiral Kimmel and
General Short was the question and near-dispute as to whether the Army
or the Navy should exercise command over the islands of Wake and Midway
after the Marines on these islands were relieved by Army troops. [376]
No agreement was concluded in this regard before the outbreak of war. If
neither would agree to the

[373] See section, supra, concerning plans for the defense of the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Part III this report.
[374] *General Marshall said he thought unity of consolidation (sic) or
centralization of military and naval intelligence was very necessary*.
Committee record, p. 2966.
[374a] Admiral Kimmel testified that he never had any discussions with
the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of
putting unity of command into effect. He said he would not have effected
unity of command, or accepted responsibility for the Army actions,
without reference to the Navy Department. See Navy Court of Inquiry
record, pp. 296, 297.
[375] See committee exhibit No. 44. General Gerow said: "A fact
frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination
under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major
operation is being conducted under that principle, *joint operations
subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity
of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned*.
This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces
having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two
services." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff
dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48.
[376] Admiral W. W. Smith testified: "He (Admiral Kimmel) had a shock,
though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the
Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department,
to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the marines off the
outlying islands, and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes,
and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor
was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether
to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes
they put on Wake would remain their for the duration, in case of war,
because they would have to be taken off from a carrier and could not
come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them
off, and during the discussion on this with General Short and his staff,
the commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and
Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans
officer, the Operations Officers and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral
Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General
Martin replied, 'We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off
shore.' That was a shock all of us and Admiral Kimmel's reply was,
'Then, they will be no damn good to me.' The exchange was never made
because the war broke before-hand. *The only dispute between the Army
and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, 'If I have the
man these islands, I shall have to command them.' Admiral Kimmel
replied, 'No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I
wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports,' or words to that
effect, and General Short said, 'Mind you, I do not want to man these
islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I
must command them.' That was as near to a dispute between General Short
and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted
but never carried out*," Hart inquiry record, pp. 40, 41.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            243

other's commanding Wake or Midway, it is not in the least surprising 
unexpected that neither one of the commanders would have agreed to
subordinate himself and his entire command to the other.

In the case of Washington, the matter of establishing unity of command
at our outposts was under consideration and discussion by le War and
Navy Departments throughout the year 1941 and especially during the few
weeks prior to December 7. [377] No decision, however, was reached
concerning unity of command at Hawaii or at any of our outposts until
the responsible officials were confronted by war with powerful
adversaries on two fronts and the barrier of departmental prerogative
had been severely jolted by the Pearl [arbor disaster. The Joint Board
of the Army and Navy during 1941 ad considered specific proposals for
unity of command as made by each of the services but prior to December 7
no effective agreement was reached as to which service should exercise
command at a particular outpost. It generally appears, however, that it
was agreed le system of mutual cooperation in the Caribbean, at Panama
and t Hawaii should be replaced by unity of command. The Navy proposed
that command in the Caribbean be vested in the Navy; at 'Panama in the
Army, except when major naval forces were based ere; and at Hawaii in
the Navy, except when no major naval forces ere based there. [378] The
Army, on the other hand, proposed unity of command in all coastal
frontiers, command to rest in the Army except hen a major portion of the
fleet was operating against comparable hostile forces within the range
of possible support by Army aviation and when the Army and Navy
commanders should agree to transfer command from one to the other. [379]

In view of these conflicting proposals following virtually a year of
discussion, General Gerow, chief of War Plans in the War Department,
recommended to the Chief of Staff on November 17, 1941, that the system
of command in the outposts remain by mutual cooperation, thereby
suggesting abandonment of the idea of unity of command. [380] In
testifying before the committee, General Gerow explained his action by
stating he thought the only way to have effective unity of command was
for the heads of the Army and Navy to say that "So and so is in command,
and he is in command from now on." He observed that [381] "You cannot
vary that command

[377] See committee record pp. 2749-2761, also 2963 et seq.
[378] Committee record pp. 2750-2757 see also committee exhibit No 48.
[379] Id.
[380] Id. General Gerow recommended: "That coordination of joint
operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers
continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is
approved such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the
Joint Planning Committee." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for
Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48.

Referring to this memorandum, General Marshall stated in a memorandum
for General Gerow dated December 5, 1941: "I would like this matter of
Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval section of the Joint
Planning committee. However I think it is important that a general
policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided
on, expressed in carefully considered sentences as to the *application*
of unity of command.

"A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your
memorandum and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it
presented in a concise form." Committee exhibit No. 48A.
[381] Committee record, p. 2757.

244            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:

from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be
responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be
responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it." He pointed out
that the joint Army-Navy planning committee had contemplated an
arrangement whereby command would shift back and forth from the Army to
the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack
or defense. [382] General Gerow said that he thought the system of
mutual cooperation would be better than such a continual switching of
command. [383] He commented:

"I did not think either the Army or Navy Planning Group would agree to
say wholeheartedly 'You take everything and it will be agreeable to us'.
Neither would agree to that." [384] He agreed that it would be necessary
that "somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell
them what to do." [385] General Marshall epitomized the essentially
human proclivities characterizing the situation: [386]

"I have said this before: I will repeat it again. *It is a very simple
thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man*. But
that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among
ourselves and always will continue to be so."

The ultimate result was that no agreement was reached between the War
and Navy Departments before Pearl Harbor for the establishment of unity
of command in our military and naval outposts. The factors and
considerations attending eventual invocation of unity of command were
expressed by the Chief of Staff in a letter dated December 20, 1941, to
General Short's successor, Gen. Delos C. Emmons: [387]

"Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning
units of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of
command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

"For your confidential information, this action was taken in the
following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no
question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts
I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in
various critical regions have been unavailing. *All sorts of Naval
details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the
coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives and similar
matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was
proposed. I must say at the same time that some off the Army staff
brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control*. Both Stark and
I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th
the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost
insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have
been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I
feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local
embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger
decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

"I am giving you this information in order that you may better
appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me
by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

[382] Id.
[383] Id., at p. 2758.
[384] Id.
[385] Id.
[386] Committee record pp. 2962, 2963.
[387] See committee exhibit No. 48; also committee record pp. 2759-
2761.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            245

"Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be
brought our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and
myself. *These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to
affect efficiency*.

"This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with
him is morning, You have my complete confidence and I will do everything
possible to support you."

The foregoing considerations evince more than mere reluctance and
procrastination toward effecting action by command rather than by joint
agreement; they reveal that inherent in our system of separate services
there exists the basic deficiency of conflicting interests which
precipitate serious and unnecessary obstacles to the solution of
pressing military problems. It is to be necessarily noted, however, that
while considering the advisability of unity of command, Washington was
assuming that the system of mutual cooperation was working within its
limitations and that local commanders were fully discharging their
responsibilities. It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster
at the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual
cooperation were exposed. [388]

As earlier indicated, the failure to integrate and coordinate Army-Navy
efforts in Hawaii appears to have been attributable to a feeling n the
part of each commander that he would intrude upon the prerogatives of
the other and thereby invite similar intrusion if he inquired as to what
the sister service was doing. In Washington, the failure to impose unity
of command was occasioned by the inability of the Army and the Navy as
entities to agree upon a basis for unified command.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

THE "WYMAN MATTER"

The Committee has carefully reviewed the investigation conducted by the
Army Pearl Harbor Board with respect to the activities of Col. Theodore
Wyman, Jr., while district engineer in the Hawaiian Department, insofar
as his activities may have relationship to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
[389] The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded from the evidence that Wyman
performed the duties of district engineer in a wholly unsatisfactory
manner. Under his administration, engineering and construction work in
the Hawaiian Department was defective and was characterized by delays.

The activities of Wyman and his associates were not fully inquired into
by the Committee inasmuch as they did not appear to have contributed in
any material or proximate manner to the disaster for

[388] In the course of counsel's examination, General Marshall was
asked: "Without asking you any questions about the unity of command,
complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Departments,
limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for
instance, do you want to express any views as to the wisdom of
maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?"

The Chief of Staff replied "*I think it is an imperative necessity*."
[389] See in this regard the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Committee Exhibit No. 157.

246            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

reasons heretofore set forth. [390] It is recommended, however, that the
Wyman matter be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate
or the House of Representatives.

THE PHILIPPINE ATTACK

The Committee has considered in the course of its proceedings the
Japanese attack on the Philippines on December 7, 1941, and has
concluded that this attack bears no relevant relationship to the
disaster at Pearl Harbor. In consequence, the Philippine attack was not
made the subject of detailed inquiry although the reader will find an
account of this attack in the committee's record. [391]

PRIOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

We have not presumed to pass judgment on the nature of or charges of
unfairness [392] with respect to seven prior inquiries and
investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, feeling that by conducting a
full and impartial hearing our report to the Congress along with the
Committee's record would present to the American people the material and
relevant facts of the disaster. The Committee does desire to observe,
however, that charges to the effect that the original report of the
Roberts Commission was abridged, modified, or amended, or portions
deleted were found to be without foundation in fact. [393] Prior
investigations were conducted during the course of the most devasta-

[390] As has been seen the disaster was the failure, with attendant
increase in personnel and material losses of the Army and Navy in Hawaii
to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to
effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war
was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling
the Japanese.
[391] See in this regard, Committee record, pp., 14133-14173,
[392] In referring to the inquiry conducted by the Roberts Commission,
Admiral Kimmel has stated (Committee record, pp. 6809-6811):

(1) That he was told he was not on trial (Roberts Commission record, p.
581);
(2) That he was not permitted to be present at the testimony of other
witnesses or to examine or cross-examine them;
(3) That the Roberts Commission was informed of or impressed with the
fact that Hawaii was given all of the information available to the Navy
Department (referring in this regard to committee record, pp. 4893-
5022);
(4) That it appeared the so-called Magic was freely discussed before the
Commission and in consequence the latter likely received the impression
that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded
by Washington by Admiral Kimmel or available to him in Hawaii.

Testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated:

(1) That the Commission's investigation was not intended to be a trial.
"This seemed to me a preliminary investigation, like a grand jury
investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that was to be taken
as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before
his peers. In other words, you would not conduct a proceeding without
cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. *It was not
a trial. * * * It was an investigation and it was the formation of a
judgment to be handed the President*." (Committee record, pp. 8801,
8802).

(2) That, as indicated, one would not conduct a proceeding without
cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. He observed
the proceedings were closed and every witness asked to observe secrecy
for the reason "that there were questions of broken codes. We were
informed that the Army and Navy were getting invaluable information
every day, that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were
broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about
the thing for fear there might be some leak from our Commission. Of
course, if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do a great
damage to our forces, our military program" (id., at pp. 8788, 8789).

(3) That the Roberts Commission knew outposts were not getting the
Magic. "We knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the
breaking of the code" (id., at p. 8813).

(4) That "*We were never shown one of the Magic messages*" nor the
substance thereof (id., at pp. 8828, 8829) although the Commission did
know codes were being broken and generally what was obtained from the
traffic (id., at p. 8829; also pp. 8836, 8846).

[393] See testimony of Mr. Justice Roberts before the Committee. 
Committee record, pp. 8779-8908.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             247

ing war in history and within the necessary limitations of secrecy
imposed by war and the national security. Public hearings concerning he
disaster were properly deferred until the cessation of hostilities; to
have done otherwise would have been to imperil the entire war effort.
Parties in interest during previous inquiries, who for necessary
security reasons did not have the full and ready access to information
throughout the war that may have been desired, did have such information
available for consideration before the Committee. Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, as well as others, have attested to the full, fair, and
impartial hearing which they were afforded by the Committee.

It is believed that with the additional evidence developed since VJ-Day
and the greater accessibility of witnesses, together with the greater
scope of inquiry conducted, we are in a much better position to form
proper estimates and conclusions concerning responsibilities elating to
the disaster than has heretofore been possible because of the proper and
necessary restrictions within which other inquiries: and investigations
were conducted during wartime.

Shortly after the disaster both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
retired from active duty. Consideration was thereafter given by the War
and Navy Departments to the question of whether the errors made in
Hawaii justified proceedings by court martial. Admiral Kimmel and
General Short were requested in the interest of the nation's war effort
to waive their rights to plead the statute of limitations in bar of
trial by general court martial for the duration of the war and 6 months
thereafter. [394] Both these officers properly and commendably did so
waive their rights. It was the duty of the offices of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army and the Navy to consider the facts of the disaster
as relating to the responsibilities of he Hawaiian commanders, even
though after inquiry and deliberation it was determined that the errors
were errors of judgment and of derelictions of duty. 

On the morning of December 7, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were catapulted by the Empire of Japan into the principal roles in one
of the most publicized tragedies of all time. That improper and
incorrect deductions were drawn by some members of the public, with
consequent suffering and mental anguish to both officers, cannot e
questioned, just as erroneous conclusions were made by others with
respect to the extent and nature of responsibility in Washington. But
this is the result of the magnitude of public interest and speculation
inspired by the disaster and not the result of mistreatment of anyone.
The situation prevailing at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 in
the wake of the Japanese attack cast everyone, whether immediately or
remotely concerned, beneath the white light of world scrutiny.

[394] See Committee exhibits Nos. 170,171.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             248

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