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Site Map INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK |
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The "war warning" dispatch of November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet contained no cautions, admonitions, or restraints whatever. [173] THE "WAR WARNING" AND TRAINING It has been pointed out by Admiral Kimmel that had he effected all-out security measures upon receiving each alarming dispatch from Washington, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war. [174] To appraise the merit of this observation it is necessary to consider the nature of instructions with respect to training under which the fleet operated. Admiral Kimmel has stated he was under a specific injunction to continue the training program, referring in this connection to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations dated April 3, 1941. [175] In this letter, however, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated the question was *when* and not *whether* we would enter the war and that in the meantime he would advise that Admiral Kimmel devote as much time as may be available to training his forces in the particular duties which the various units might be called upon to perform under the Pacific Fleet operating plans. Clearly the suggestion that training be conducted was made pending a more critical turn indicating the imminence of war. The dispatch of November 27 with vivid poignance warned of war with Japan. It stated that negotiations with Japan looking to stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had *ceased* and that an *aggressive move* by Japan was expected *within the next few days*. The time for training for a prospective eventuality was past the eventuality, war, was at hand. [175] In none other of the dispatches had the commander in chief been so emphatically advised that war was imminent. Indeed the November 27 dispatch used the words "war warning," an expression which Admiral Kimmel testified he had never before seen employed in an of official dispatch in all of his 40 years in the Navy. Manifestly the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would not expect that it would be necessary for the Navy Department to advise him to put aside his training now that war was imminent. The "war warning" provided adequate indication that the primary function thereafter was not training but defense against a treacherous foe who had invariably struck without a declaration of war. THE TERM DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT AND FAILURE TO INSTITUTE DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE Admiral Kimmel has made particular reference to the fact that the term "defensive deployment" was nontechnical and that it was to be [173] Referring to the November 27 warning, Admiral Stark said: "This message begins with the words 'This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.' These words were carefully weighed and chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words 'war warning' had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what we felt." Committee record, pp. 5650, 5651. [174] Committee record p. 6703, see also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, p. 9350. [175] Committee record p. 6702. For letter see committee exhibit No. 106. [176] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel stated, after outlining the circumstances attending the decision, testified: "* * * I made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but to continue until further developments." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 285. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 111 effected "preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." This plan called for a raid upon the Marshall Islands by the Pacific Fleet very shortly after hostilities with Japan should begin. Admiral Kimmel has pointed out that the prime purpose of the raids was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. He has observed that the only patrol planes of consequence at Pearl Harbor were assigned to the fleet and that these planes would be required in the raid on the Marshalls. He further pointed out that he had only 49 patrol planes in flying condition, an insufficient number to conduct each day a 360 distant reconnaissance from Oahu. In this connection he observed that to insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it was necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles and that this required 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours to cover the 360 perimeter. He testified that, of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make a 16-hour flight every day and therefore for searches of this character over a protracted period 250 patrol planes would be required. He observed that a search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name and that he manifestly had an insufficient number of planes for this purpose. [177] In consequence of this situation, Admiral Kimmel decided to undertake no distant reconnaissance whatever from Pearl Harbor and regarded the deployment of the task forces and other measures already indicated as an adequate defensive deployment within the terms of the order contained in the war warning. [178] In this connection, as heretofore pointed out, Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt Inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [179]" He further stated that the language with respect to a defensive deployment in the war warning was a "direction" and that he considered the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment; that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment; and that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake. He said, however, that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act but that "no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements. [180]" Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said that following the war warning of November 27 the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans. [181] [177] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6752-6750. [178] See committee record, pp. 6759-6761; also Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 1144, 1145. [179] In Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 321, 322. [180] Id., at pp. 323, 324. [181] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 372, 373. 112 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, who had a principal part in preparing the November 27 war warning, testified as follows with respect to the term *defensive deployment*: [182] "Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in identical terms. "A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL-6 is to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal zones, and to defend our shipping. "Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama. "The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment. "The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment. "The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings. "Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north because there were not little outlying islands there from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach, which the long-range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them. "Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider arc. "Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a position from which they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels. "It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese waters." [182] Committee record, pp. 5168-5172. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 113 With respect to the same matter, Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness measures, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and that the plans previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. [183] In considering the validity of Admiral Kimmel's position that the order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment is inseparable from the language "preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL-46" it is necessary to consider what the purport of the message would have been without the words "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." In such case Admiral Kimmel might conceivably have been partially justified in making all preparations with a view to carrying out the tasks assigned after war began. But under the terms of the dispatch as received by him he was to do something else. He was to execute a defensive deployment preparatory to carry-ing out these tasks a defensive deployment before war broke. Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel received for his information the message of November 28 directed for action to the naval commanders on the west coast. [184] After quoting the Army dispatch of November 27 to the commander of the Army Western Defense Command, this message stated: "* * * Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." The west coast commanders were not ordered to effect a defensive deployment, only to *be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46*. Here was a clear indication to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet that he was to do something significantly more than merely getting prepared to carry out war tasks. He was to execute a *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out such tasks. And among Admiral Kimmel's tasks under the war plans, prior to outbreak of war, were the maintenance of fleet security and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan." As has already been seen in the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier it was recognized that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas and a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor; that it appeared "the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." 185 [183] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 54-62, 84. Asked what was meant by the "defensive deployment" in the message of November 27, Admiral Stark said: "My thought in that message about the defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing and perhaps he did to it was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it." "* * * *a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum effect to avoid surprise and if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangement which had previously been made for just this sort of thing*." Committee record, pp. 5705, 5706. [184] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. [185] See committee exhibit No. 44. Admiral Bellinger testified that in his opinion an air attack was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. Committee record, p. 9355. He further testified that the Martin-Bellinger estimate was not an estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting the war but rather an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, in other words, that it was not an estimate which indicated that Japan was going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy but rather if they were going to strike Oahu this was the estimate of how it would be done. Committee record, p. 9382. 114 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK With the clear recognition that Japan might attack before a declaration of war and with a war warning carrying an order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to performing tasks during war, it is difficult to understand why Admiral Kimmel should have concluded that no distant air reconnaissance should be conducted, particularly in the dangerous sector to the north. Apart from radio intelligence which will be later discussed, distant reconnaissance admittedly was the only adequate means of detecting an approaching raiding force in sufficient time to avoid a surprise attack. Certainly the sector from the west to the south was covered, partially at least, by the three task forces. And yet the most dangerous sector, the 90 counterclockwise from due north to due west, the sector through which the Japanese striking force approached, was given no attention whatever. [186] Admiral Bellinger testified that had distant reconnaissance been conducted it would have been to the north [187] and, although he was responsible for Navy patrol planes, Admiral Bellinger was not even shown the war warning. [188] Admiral Kimmel has suggested that under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Admiral Bloch was responsible for distant reconnaissance and had the latter desired planes he could have called upon the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. [189] This suggestion, apart from being incompatible with Admiral Kimmel's stating he made the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, is not tenable. Admiral Bloch had no planes with which to conduct distant patrols and Admiral Kimmel knew it. [190] While he was on the ground, it was the responsibility of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to take all necessary steps in line with a defensive deployment and in recognition of the realities at Hawaii to protect the fleet. [191] Admiral Kimmel's assertion that only a 360 -distant; reconnaissance is worthy of the name ignores the fact that a 90 arc to the southwest was being partially covered, a fact concerning which he has made a point in testifying before the committee. Manifestly, to have conducted reconnaissance to any extent would have been more effective than no reconnaissance at all. [192] And Admiral Kimmel had adequate [186] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, pp. 9369, 9370; also section "Plans for the Defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," Part III, this report. [187] Committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 506, 507. In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked what he could consider the most probable areas of approach for a surprise attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor. He replied: "I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the northern sector was the most probable. I thought at the time that the aircraft had come from the north the time I testified I mean and I didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from any direction. There is no outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360 arc, minus the very small line which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. I would say that while all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably search the western 180' sector first." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305. [188] Committee record, pp. 9305, 9306; also 9362, 9363. [189] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125. [190] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "The Naval Base Defense Officer (Admiral Bloch) was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [191] Admiral Bellinger testified that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. Hart Inquiry record, p. 125. [192] Admiral Bellinger testified that covering certain selected sectors was a possible and feasible operation. Admiral Kimmel admitted that "Of course, any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as surface ship." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125. Admiral Stark testified: "When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it can you cover." Committee record p. 5702. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 115 patrol planes to conduct distant reconnaissance for an extended period throughout the most dangerous sectors. The evidence reflects that there were 81 planes available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. [193] Estimates of the number which can properly be regarded as in a state of readiness to conduct reconnaissance flights from Oahu as of December 7 range from 48 to 69. In addition the Army had six long-range bombers [194] which were available to the Navy under the plans for joint air operations at Hawaii. Even with the minimum estimate of 48 and the conservative basis of employing each plane only once every 3 days, [195] a sector of 128 could have been covered daily for several weeks. [196] This fact, when considered with the reconnaissance sweeps from Midway and by the task forces, leaves clear that the most dangerous sectors could have been fully covered. [197] In all events it would have been entirely possible and proper to have employed aircraft to any extent available for distant reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, using submarines, destroyers, or other vessels in the less dangerous approaches to Oahu. [198] That substantial and effective distant reconnaissance could have been conducted is demonstrated by the fact that it was instituted immediately after the attack despite the fact that over half the available planes were rendered inoperative by the attack. [199] Yet Admiral Kimmel contends that use of all his available planes would have unduly impaired his ability to carry out the offensive measures assigned the Pacific Fleet in the event of war. [200] The evidence establishes, however, that his plans for the conduct of [193] See committee exhibit No 120. [194] Admiral Bellinger stated; however, that the Army reported 8 B-17's available for December 6 1941. Committee record, p. 9307 [195] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9328, 9329. [196] Id., Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 480-507. See also committee record, p. 9330 where Bellinger stated the patrol could be maintained for 11 days to 2 weeks, perhaps longer. Admiral Bellinger testified that 1 patrol plane could cover 8' to 700 miles. Committee record p. 9325. [197] Admiral Davis, fleet aviation officer, said that the entire 360' circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360' search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. Hart Inquiry record, pp. 98, 99; 240, 241. [198] The evidence before the committee contradicts the following conclusion of the Navy Court of Inquiry: "Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty (reconnaissance) even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines over an extensive sea area is a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war." *The committee regards the employment of surface vessels for the purpose of reconnaissance as sound military procedure where reconnaissance is imperative and the more adaptable facilities, patrol planes, are not sufficiently available. See also note 192, supra. It is highly significant that the Commandant of the *15th Naval District (Panama*) was taking the following action, as reported by General Andrews to the War Department under date of November 29, 1941: "In the Panama Sector, *the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol*. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance." See Committee Exhibit No. 32, p. 18. [199] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9371, 9372. [200] In his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "Having covered the operating areas by air patrols it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans." When questioned concerning the time that Admiral Kimmel would be expected to start a raid against the Marshall Islands after war began, Admiral Ingersoll stated that Admiral Kimmel "*could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.*" If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified, and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence base their plans. As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connections with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor." Committee record, p. 11457. 116 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK offensive operations, after outbreak of war, contemplated the use of a maximum of 24 patrol planes. [201] Even if this number were deducted from those available, there were still sufficient planes to have covered at least the entire dangerous northwest sector. The offensive tasks of the future did not justify disregarding the danger that the Pacific Fleet might be caught by surprise while still in port and before offensive operations could begin. In making the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel erred. [202] In determining whether making the decision that he did evinced poor judgment consideration must be given his responsibility as commander in chief and the realities of his situation. It was essentially his duty to protect the Pacific Fleet from all dangers to the utmost of his ability. He knew that the primary function of the Pacific Fleet in the early stages of the war was a defensive one, save for sporadic raids and limited offensive operations, in recognition o the fact that our Pacific Fleet was inferior to that of Japan. He was ordered to effect an appropriate defensive deployment. This was a general directive consistent with his specific suggestion that the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. [203] He was given free rein to effect defensive security, in line with his more intimate knowledge of the detailed and peculiar problems affecting the Pacific Fleet, prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Pacific war plans. He knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan. He knew that the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate time to combat it was by distant reconnaissance. He knew the Japanese reputation for deceit and treachery. He knew the greatest danger to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the possibility of an air raid. He knew that the maintenance and protection of the fleet while in its base constituted a fundamental element in making military dispositions at Pearl Harbor. He had been categorically warned of war. He knew or must have known that the necessity of Japan's striking the first blow required of him greater vigilance consistent with his fundamental duty as commander in chief to prepare for the worst contingency. He had adequate facilities to patrol the most dangerous approaches to Pearl Harbor. The decision was not a simple one, but, failing to resolve his dilemma by seeking advice from the Navy Department, [204] Admiral Kimmel displayed poor judgment in failing to [201] See committee record, p. 9316 et seq. As to the use of long-distance patrol Planes by Admiral Kimmel in prospective raids on the Marshall Islands under the war plans, Admiral Ingersoll stated: "The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere m the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate. They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them, that is 600 miles from those positions." Committee record, p. 11450. [202] There is no substantial evidence of any specific discussions between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning" concerning the advisability or practicability of distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral McMorris, war plans officer, thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The commander of the fleet patrol Planes, Admiral Bellinger, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no discussion with him concerning the matter. [203] See memorandum from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 23, 1941, committee exhibit No. 106. Admiral Stark testified that the handling of the Pacific Fleet was up to the commander in chief: "* * * it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been handling the fleet. That was not my job." Committee record, p. 5705. [204] Referring to the order to execute an appropriate "defensive deployment," Admiral Kimmel stated: "This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was something similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had been approved by the originator of both these dispatches (Chief of Naval Operations), and I therefore made the dispositions which I have outlined." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 117 employ every instrumentality at his command to defend the fleet. [205] Conceding for purposes of discussion that Admiral Kimmel's decision to employ none of the fleet patrol planes for distant reconnaissance was a reasonable military decision under the circumstances the very fact of having made such decision placed upon him the affirmative responsibility of determining that every other available means for reconnaissance was being employed to protect the fleet. His determination not to conduct long-range reconnaissance is of itself a recognition by him that it was his obligation to provide such reconnaissance. He knew that the Army was depending upon him for certain defensive measures. [206] Further, the fact that there was an agreement with the Army at Hawaii whereby the Navy was to perform distant reconnaissance placed upon Admiral Kimmel the obligation of advising General Short that he had decided not to conduct such reconnaissance. Indeed, General Short, who saw the war warning, testified that in his opinion the "defensive deployment" which the Navy was directed to execute "would necessarily include distant reconnaissance." [207] Admiral Kimmel's clear duty, therefore, in the absence of Navy reconnaissance was to confer with General Short to insure that Army radar, antiaircraft, and planes were fully utilized and alerted. None of these things were done. And there appears to be no substantial reason for failure to call upon the Army, consistent with the joint plans, for the six long-range bombers which were admittedly available to the Navy at Hawaii for the asking. [208] ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE "WAR WARNING" As has been seen, following the warning dispatch of November 27 no distant reconnaissance as such was instituted. [208a] This meant that there was no adequate means whatever taken by the Navy to detect [205] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "It is a fact that the use of fleet patrol planes for daily long-range all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time." The committee is in essential disagreement with this conclusion. Admiral Kimmel was warned in categorical fashion of war on November 27, 2 days after the Japanese Task Force bad left Hitokappu Bay and while on the way to Pearl Harbor. *It is difficult to imagine hour it would hare been possible from Washington to have narrowed the limits of time in which Japan might strike in any more timely fashion, particularly inasmuch as Radio Intelligence had lost track completely of substantial carrier units of the Japanese Fleet*. This being true, distant reconnaissance was the only possible means of detecting the striking force within adequate time to prepare to meet the attack. There was no other channel for indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time or otherwise. Going on, the Navy Court of Inquiry stated: "It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of fleet planes available." The court is here of course referring to all- around reconnaissance from Oahu. *As has been clearly indicated, there were adequate facilities for patrolling the more dangerous sectors, a procedure that was practical, feasible, and desirable*. [204] As stated by the commander in chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King: "In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because principle, this is not normally a fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciate properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have bee strong enough for self-defense. The fact that *it was* not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the fleet in the defensive measures." See "Second Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. Admiral King also observed, "I think * * * that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general." Id. [207] Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927. [208] See in this connection testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, p. 9310. [208a] When questioned as to any reason why Admiral Kimmel should not have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through to the time Japan struck, with whatever planes we had eve if it were only "three," Admiral Ingersoll replied: "I had every reason to expect that he would do that and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected * * * I expected that it would be done not only because the plane were there, but because this (WPL-46) plan inferred that it was going to be done. It never occurred to him that it was not being done." Committee record, p. 11420. 118 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the approach of a raiding force in sufficient time to repel it or effectively minimize the force of an attack. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel were operating in accordance with schedules prepared as of November 22, 1941, stressing training operations. These schedules were not changed prior to the attack. No effort was made to secure the available long-range bombers of the Army for reconnaissance. No change was made in the condition of readiness of vessels in Pearl Harbor which had been in effect for a considerable period of time preceding November 27. [209] This condition of readiness has been referred to as "an augmented Navy No. 3," the No. 3 condition being the lowest state of readiness. [210] The three conditions of readiness established for the Navy were: No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action imminent. No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity. No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the second- ary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter. While it appears that condition No. 3 prevailed subsequently during wartime at Pearl Harbor and is the condition normally maintained in port, there nevertheless was an extensive distant reconnaissance designed to alert the fleet to a higher condition of readiness prior to possible attack and to afford a considerable measure of protection. This means of protection was not available to the fleet on the morning of December 7. [211] [209] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked: "On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?" Admiral Kimmel replied: "The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL 41 had been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date in question." P. 278 The three conditions of readiness with respect to naval base defense, as set forth in 2CL-41 follow: Condition I. General quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. Condition II. One-half of antiaircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. Condition III. Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector) manned and ready (minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer. See committee exhibit No. 44. Admiral Kimmel was asked whether, upon receipt of the November 27 war warning, he consulted with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on any measures of security to be adopted in the Fourteenth Naval District that were different from any then in effect. He replied that he discussed the message with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District but no additional measures of security were deemed advisable as a result of the conversation. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 303. [210] While virtually all antiaircraft guns aboard ship were firing within 10 minutes, only about one-fourth were "ready machine guns" available to fire immediately. Inasmuch as by far the greatest damage was effected by the torpedo planes in the first wave, a higher degree of readiness would have reduced beyond question the effectiveness of this initial thrust. Admiral Kimmel said: "*Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would hare been enormously less*." Roberts record, p. 547. For the indicated reason the conclusion of Navy Court of Inquiry that "a higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to the defense" is in error. See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157. [211] In its report, the Navy Court of Inquiry has observed: "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval Personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it would not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December. This statement contains within itself the certain proof of its invalidity. It was for the very reason that it could not be known when an attack would take place that it was essential a higher degree of readiness prevail. If it were possible to know with definitiveness when the attack would come the necessity for a higher state of readiness would be obviated until the time for the attack had approached. Furthermore, the extreme state of readiness suggested by the court is a far cry from the lowest conditions of readiness which prevailed at the time of the attack in both the Army and Navy Commands. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 119 No change was effected in the state of readiness of naval aircraft. The aircraft on the ground and the patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take to the air promptly. Approximately 50 percent of the planes on December 7 were on 4 hours' notice. Having elected to institute no distant reconnaissance by aircraft, no effort was made to inaugurate patrols by surface or subsurface craft to compensate and partially serve in lieu of distant reconnaissance by planes. [212] The evidence shows there were 29 destroyers and 5 submarines in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. [213] While the employment of surface craft or submarines in lieu of distant air reconnaissance is not altogether satisfactory or fully effective, it nonetheless would have provided a measure of protection more to be desired than no reconnaissance whatever. No effort was made to maintain a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible raiding forces approaching through the dangerous northern sector. [214] No change was made in the schedules of ships proceeding to Pearl Harbor with a view to maintenance of a minimum force at harbor with provision for entry into port at irregular intervals. After the decision to institute no distant reconnaissance, the Navy did not check or otherwise maintain effective liaison with the Army as to the readiness of Army antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning installations. ESTIMATE AND ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT WITH RESPECT TO THE WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department does not appear to have taken any appreciable action, apart from his normal training operations, on the basis of any information received by him with respect to our critical relations with Japan prior to the warning of November 27 from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. This dispatch, No. 472, [215] advised that negotiations with Japan appeared terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue; that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment. It stated that if hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act. It pointed out, however, that this policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. It ordered the commanding general, prior to hostile Japanese action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary but admonished that these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. It instructed that should hostilities occur, General Short should carry out the tasks assigned in the war plans insofar as they applied to Japan. He was to limit the dissemination of "this highly secret information to minimum essential officers" and to report measures taken. [212] See note 192, supra. [213] Committee exhibit No. 6. [214] Id. [215] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
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