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INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
530             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

knowledge of these intercepts and their minute direction of affairs
placed an obligation on them to convey precise information to outpost
commanders and to make sure that they were on an all-out alert for war.
Owing to inexcusable delays in Washington this final warning to General
Short did not reach him until after the Japanese attack.

General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk to
call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, nearly 2
hours before the attack, and give him the same information which he sent
in the delayed telegram which reached General Short after the attack.
General Marshall testified that among the possible factors which may
have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the
possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was
alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act (Tr., Vol. 20, pp.
3389-3390).

"The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such
portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were
committing an act that forced action on their part (Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3193)."

This explanation is no excuse for the failure to put the Hawaiian
commanders on the full alert for defense. Such an alert could not be
considered a hostile or aggressive act on the part of the United States.

11. *The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to
await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by
Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington
to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a
full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December
7, 1941*.

The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese
hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack or
attacks (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) was recognized by the President and
his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare war was
vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Minister Churchill,
who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Conference (conclusion
1) again suggested to President Roosevelt, on November 30, 1941, that
the President inform the Japanese that further aggression on their part
would compel him "to place the gravest issues before Congress" (Tr.,
Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roosevelt must have given serious thought to
the constitutional difficulty during the several days prior to December
7, while he was considering plans for a special message to Congress
(conclusions 3 and 4).

After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress it
then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Secretary
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of
Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warning messages to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly formulated as to mean to
them an all-out alert of the forces under their command.

12. *Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and,
operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington
differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl
Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to
formulate instructions to the latter in language not open

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             531

to misinterpretations as to the obligations imposed on the commanders by
the instructions*.

Since Washington authorities knew that vital information in their
possession diplomatic, military, and naval was not being sent to General
Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that this was because of Washington's own
decision, it was obligatory for them to give particular care to the
formulation of messages to the commanders which revealed the growing war
tension, the menacing imminence of the breach in American-Japanese
relations, and the resolve of those high authorities to wait for an
attack, while still carrying on maneuvering (conclusions 1-5 and below,
conclusion 20).

The increasing assumption of the detailed direction of affairs by high
authorities in Washington added to the obligation of those high
authorities to give precise instructions to the outpost commanders.

For information in possession of Washington authorities not sent to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel, see Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry reports, top secret reports, and top
secret memoranda. It is true that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had a
great deal of information as to Japanese designs and operations which
was not in the messages sent to them by the War Department and the Navy
Department. It is also true that there were differences of opinion among
high authorities in Washington over the nature of the information
conveyed by certain intercepts; for example, the so-called "winds
message" and the activating "winds message." But it is beyond all
question that Washington authorities had a large volume of information,
particularly as to vital diplomatic decisions and Japanese intentions
which was not transmitted to the Hawaiian commanders. This withholding
of information from General Short and Admiral Kimmel was in part due to
general policy adopted in Washington.

General Sherman Miles, at the hearing of November 30, testified at
neither the intercepted messages nor essential information derived from
them had been sent to Hawaii, although in exceptional cases the
substance of some messages had been transmitted in naval code. The
exceptional practice of sending the substance in some messages was
stopped in July 1941 and General Miles testified that, so far as he
knew, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not notified of this change
this discontinuance of sending even the substance of some intercepts.
(Tr., Vol. 13, pp. 2140-2142.)

Admiral Kimmel had requested all information and was assured by Admiral
Stark he would get it. A few messages were sent up until December 7, but
he had no notice that he was not getting all the information available.

From among the numerous items of crucial information in possession of
Navy Intelligence and Washington authorities and *not* transmitted to
General Short one may be selected as particularly pertinent to Pearl
Harbor. Through its intelligence sources in the Fourteenth Naval
District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, the Navy discovered the
presence at Jaluit, in the Marshall Islands, of a Japanese fleet
composed of aircraft carriers and other vessels, but lost track of it
about December 1. Jaluit is 1,500 miles nearer to Pearl Harbor than is
the mainland of Japan. The Japanese fleet there was a strong force
capable of attacking Hawaii. Information about this

532            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Japanese fleet was delivered to the War Department, but it was not
transmitted to General Short. General Short testified during the Army
board hearings on Pearl Harbor that knowledge of the Japanese fleet at
Jaluit would have materially modified his point of view and actions
(Army Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 146-147).

Japan had fixed a dead-line date of November 25 (Exhibit 1, p. 100),
extended to November 29 (Exhibit 1, p. 165) (see Japanese messages), for
reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at
least six messages. If the dead-line date passed without agreement, the
Japanese Government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are
automatically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the dead-
line date was stressed by Japan in these terms:

"The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days; (and
also) we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die (Exhibit
1, p. 137, 93)."

On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "dead line" date, the United
States Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note which the
intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating
proposal," impossible of acceptance (Exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted
diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture"
negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American
note of November 26 (Exhibit 1, p. 195). To prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious Japan instructed her envoys in
Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this
Japanese reply was ready for delivery (Exhibit 1,p.208).

A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent
on November 30, was intercepted and translated to the Navy in Washington
on December 1 (Exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese
Ambassador was instructed to 

"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and confidentially communicate to them a summary of development. * * *
Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may
come quicker than anyone dreams."

The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained
a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the intercepted
messages (Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).

On December 2, 1941, elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted
dealing in precise detail with the method of interment of American and
British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the
United States" (Exhibit 1, p. 198).

None of these messages showing the imminence of war was sent to Admiral
Kimmel or General Short.

13. *The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
authorities in Washington during November were couched in such
conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to the
commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations
with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting
the particular actions to be taken orders that were beyond all
reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard
the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            533

On this subject the Committee has before it hundreds of pages of
testimony, exhibits, and documents in which conflicting views are
expressed by men presumably of competence and understanding as to he
sufficiency or insufficiency of the war warnings to General Short and
Admiral Kimmel. According to the obligations conferred upon the
Committee by the joint resolution creating it, as explained by Senator
Barkley in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, the Committee
is bound to weigh all messages and information available to General
Short and Admiral Kimmel.

A full review of all the testimony, exhibits, and papers relative to the
so-called war-warning messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel
would fill a volume of at least 500 pages, so we content ourselves with
presenting the following facts in respect to the conflicting, imprecise,
and insufficient character of these messages.

It should be here observed that Washington had taken unto itself such a
minute direction of affairs as regards outposts that the usual
discretion of outpost commanders was narrowly limited.

First of all, it is to be noted that the four reports by the Army and
Navy boards created to investigate Pearl Harbor found the warning
messages insufficient to put the Hawaiian commanders on a full war
alert; and the President's Commission on Pearl Harbor, while finding the
commanders guilty of dereliction of duty, itself places neglect on the
part of the War Department, in respect to such orders, as among the
contributory causes of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor; thus qualifying
its own conclusions.

The President's Commission, though limited by his instructions to a
search for derelictions of duty and errors of judgment on the part of
the Army and Navy personnel, made a point of declaring that the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy
had fulfilled their obligations with regard to matters bearing in the
situation at Pearl Harbor and that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations had fulfilled their command responsibilities in issuing
warning messages to the two commanders.

But the Commission includes among the grounds for charging General Short
and Admiral Kimmel with dereliction of duty their failure "to consult
and confer" with each other "*respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings*." Thus the Commission in effect concedes that the war warning
messages were couched in language so imprecise that the commanders would
have to consult and confer in order to discover what the messages meant.

Having made this statement, the Commission goes on to lay some of the
blame for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe on the War Department and the
Navy Department (that is, upon Secretary Stimson. Secretary Knox, and/or
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, whom the Commission had earlier in
its report exculpated). The Commission declared that among the 

"causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive
Japanese action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures. Failure
of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-
sabotage measures instituted by the commanding General Hawaiian
Department."

Had the Commission been in a mind to do so, it might have added: Failure
of the War and Navy Departments to mention in these messages the
probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

534            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Secretary Stimson apparently was not considering the attack at Pearl
Harbor when the message of November 27 was prepared, for he said: "The
main question has been over the message that have shall send to
MacArthur" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14422). General MacArthur, having the magic
intercepts, was in a better position to judge the situation than was
Admiral Kimmel who had to rely upon the inadequate and ambiguous
information from Washington.

Finally, it is to be noted that the Commission also places among the
"contributory causes" the "non-receipt by the interested parties, prior
to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941." As a matter
of fact the "non-receipt" of this warning message was due to inexcusable
delays of high authorities in Washington (conclusion 20).

Hence, it appears that the President's Commission, by direct statements
and by implication, admits definitely that the war-warning messages to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel were imprecise, indefinite, and
constituted no sufficient warning for an all-out alert, particularly the
messages to General Short, whose primary duty it was to defend Pearl
Harbor and protect the fleet while in the harbor.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, after a careful examination and comparison
of the war-warning messages, concluded that the messages of November 27
were "conflicting" and that the statements in the message to General
Short were "inadequate" and "misleading" (APHB, pp. 229, 129-133). The
Army Board also criticized the War Department for failure to send
"specific directives" to outpost commanders (Ibid; p. 159).

Despite its conclusion that General Short had displayed lack of
judgment, the Army Board laid against him no charge of dereliction of
duty and made no recommendations in that respect. The Navy Court of
Inquiry likewise criticized the war-warning messages for lack of
directives as to actions at Pearl Harbor (1-34) and concluded that "no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of
any person or persons in the naval service." It recommended no further
proceedings be had in the matter (1-46,1-47).

In the testimony and other evidence presented to this Committee there is
no proof that warrants traversing the judgment reached by the
President's Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or the Navy Pearl
Harbor Court to the effect that the war-warning messages were not in
fact clear and unmistakable directives for an all-out alert against a
probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The fundamental messages in
the nature of "war warnings" were those of November 24 and 27.

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message
marked for action:

"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL.  THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND  MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT  *A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON  PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS  DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY  OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO  COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION.  GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY (Ex. No. 37, p. 32)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            535

On the next day, November 2S, Admiral Stark confused the directions in
this message and diluted its effectiveness by sending a letter to
Admiral Kimmel in which Admiral Stark concluded "I won't go into the
pros and cons of what the United States may do. I'll be damned if I
know. I wish I did." The postscript of this letter read:

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
Have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack. From any angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I
included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I
have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for; or we may do nothing I think it is more likely to be "anything"
(Exhibit No. 106)."

If any candid person has doubt about their insufficiency to constitute
orders for an all-out alert to meet a probable Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, he can allay his doubt by examining carefully the messages of
November 27 to General Short and Admiral Kimmel printed below in
parallel columns: [1] [but not in the ASCII version, LWJ]

To General Short*

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated *to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable* but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit
the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense.
Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary *but these
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken*. Should
hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far
as they pertain to Japan. *Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers.

To Admiral Kimmel*

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific *have ended*. Japan is
expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or
possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of their naval task forces*. You will
execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL-46 only. [2] *Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have
been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar
warning is being sent by the War Department*. Inform naval district and
Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

*Italics supplied.

The use of the term "war warning" in constant reference to this message
of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel creates a wrong im-

[1] In addition to the above messages General Short was sent during the
last week in November two other messages relating solely to sabotage.

Admiral Kimmel also received several messages assigning his carriers to
the movement of planes to other islands.

[2] WPL 46 was an over-all plan of action to be placed in effect by
United States forces, in association with the British and Dutch, when
war finally broke out.

536            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

pression. The entire message is of the utmost importance and should be
read as a whole rather than adopt two words from it which when taken
alone create the wrong impression.

In response to the message to him, General Short soon replied that he
had alerted his command against sabotage:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage Liaison with the Navy.
Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh (Exhibit 32, p. 12)."

The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army, General Leonard T.
Gerow, saw General Short's reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit 46).
General Marshall saw General Short's reply, initialed the document to
which it was appended, and routed it to the Secretary of War (exhibit
46) (Tr., Vol. 22, pp. 3722-3723). The Secretary of War saw, noted, and
initialed General Short's reply (Exhibit 46).

General Marshall had in May 1941 taken with him to the President an aide
memoire concerning the defense of Hawaii. It contained the following
sentence:

"In point of sequence sabotage is first to be expected and may within a
very limited time cause great damage. On this account and in order to
assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military
control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the
Far East. (Committee Exhibit No. 59.)"

To General Short's response, the War Department made no answer whatever.
The President's Commission on Pearl Harbor took note of this failure on
the part of the War Department and placed it among the contributory
causes of the catastrophe. In their testimony before this Committee,
General Marshall and General Gerow admitted that the failure to inform
General Short immediately as to the insufficiency of his anti-sabotage
alert was a mistake on their part and General Marshall took full
responsibility upon himself for this failure (Tr., Vol. 19, pp. 3126 and
3164). Reasonably conclusive evidence that the war warning messages
which had been sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel on November 27
were insufficient to constitute a proper and adequate war warning is
provided by General Marshall's decision to send another warning message
to General Short on the morning of December 7, despite the insistence of
other high authorities in Washington that the previous messages were
sufficient.

Two points in the message of November 27 to General Short deserve
special consideration. It informed him that "the United States desires
Japan to commit the first overt act," if hostilities cannot be avoided.
And it also informed him that such measures as he deemed necessary to
adopt "should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or
disclose intent." A limitation on dissemination was to "minimum
essential officers."

As to "overt act," it is to be emphasized that an all-out alert for
defense against a possible or probable attack by an enemy is not an
overt act of war. Nor did the Government of the United States regard it
as such, for, on the basis of reports respecting a probable Japanese
attack, General Marshall, on June 17, 1940, instructed General Herron,
the Commanding General in Hawaii, to order an all-out, full, war alert
and the armed forces were set in motion immediately and kept alerted for
six weeks (testimony Tr., Vol. 17, pp. 2775 ff.). This message reads:

"Immediately alert complete defense organization to deal with possible
trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating
public hysteria

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            537

or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest
maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for
secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you
shortly. Acknowledge."

No United States official then regarded this action as an overt act
against Japan. Moreover, when in this 1940 case Washington authorities
were worried about hostile Japanese action, they ordered the commanding
general at Hawaii to an immediate "complete defense organization to deal
with possible trans-Pacific raid" in language that was crystal clear.

The fact is that the War Department and Navy Department did not instruct
General Short and Admiral Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war
alert, and the War Department was informed by General Short that he had
actually put into effect the alert against sabotage. Furthermore, the
actions of the War Department in instructing General Short in November
and December as the Army Pearl Harbor Board correctly stated, showed "a
lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department
and to control its actions" (APHB, p. 240).

The War Department failed to reply to General Short's anti-sabotage
report. It failed to give him further instructions for a stronger alert.
These failures, it is reasonable to say, contributed heavily to the
unpreparedness existing at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck.

It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes,
instead of being scattered, were bunched together wing to wing;
ammunition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in
storehouses; antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in
their permanent quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl
Harbor Board stated:

"Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti-
sabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In
short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air
attack, and the Japanese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp.
193-94). This was known to the War Department by General Short's reply
to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action. The
President's lack of power under the Constitution to meet the Japanese
menace by an attack without a declaration of war by Congress increased
the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost
care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on full alert for
defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. This
they did not do.

14. *High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to
the evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations
which indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and
they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the
Hawaiian commanders.

Washington authorities had before them prior to December 7 conclusive
evidence that the Japanese Government and its agents were giving minute
attention to American military and naval installations, ship movements,
and preparedness in the Hawaiian area, as well as in other areas. But
despite their knowledge of this fact, those authorities failed to
emphasize, in orders to the Hawaiian commanders, the perils of an attack
on Pearl Harbor. They did worse than fail in this respect. With poor
judgment as to the effect of their own words upon the com-

538            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

manders, they went out of their way to emphasize the probability of 
attack elsewhere. The following passage in the war-warning message of
November 27 from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel reflected the
loose thinking that prevailed widely in Washington:

"Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days.
An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment
of Japanese troops and by the organization of their naval forces."

These words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Washington
authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but also
gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression. Although the
message of the War Department to General Short on the same day did not
contain these misleading words, General Short, in conferring with
Admiral Kimmel on "the meaning and intent" of their messages learned
about this expectation that the Japanese attack would occur in the Far
East.

Notwithstanding their apparent ignorance of the full meaning of Japanese
movements in the Southeastern Pacific, Washington authorities knew or
should have known from their understandings of parallel action with the
British and Dutch, that a Japanese attack on the Philippines, Thai, or
the Kra Peninsula meant war with America. It also meant, in view of the
strategic principle that the flank of an advancing force must be
guarded, that Japan would not leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its
left flank without doing something about it. This was the meaning to
Washington of the Japanese move in the Southeastern Pacific. [1] Without
having the benefit of these diplomatic understandings, it did not have
the same meaning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to in no way
traverse the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President's Commission which
found:

"The *opinion* prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles and
in the public press," was "that any immediate attack by Japan would be
in the Far East." [ Italics supplied.]

15. *The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and
consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and
sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in
considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation,
unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in.
Washington*.

The record before this Committee is crowded with items of evidence which
sustains this conclusion.

As to delays, take for example section 13 of *Japanese Messages
Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc*. [Exhibit 2].
Pages 16-29 give "messages translated after December 7,1941." Here are
messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents

[1] Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in
regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are
presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most
practicable way possible. * * *

Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval
defensive forces the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily
increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along
the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-China,
are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are
the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their 
territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved
by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to
Chiang Kai-shek).

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            539

which were intercepted by American intelligence services before December
7, *but not translated until after December 7. Special attention should
be drawn to the message from a Japanese agent in Honolulu to Tokyo on
December 6, 1941, listing the ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor on that
day and reporting to Tokyo:

"It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet
air arm "

a fact with which high authorities in Washington were not acquainted, if
the testimony before this Committee is accepted as accurate and
comprehensive.

One of the great tragedies was that a message sent from Honolulu to
Tokyo December 6, 1941, was not translated until December 8, 1941, after
the attack. The following appeared in the message "at the present time
there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for
a surprise attack against these places" (Exhibit 2, p. 27)

Another message intercepted and translated in the rough and available on
the desk of a responsible officer in the Naval Intelligence on the
afternoon of December 6, 1941, provided for land-sea signals at Hawaii.
These signals were intended to disclose to Japanese the location of our
ships in Pearl Harbor apparently nothing was done about the message
either in evaluating it in Washington or transmitting it to the
commanders in Hawaii (Exhibit 2, p. 22).

As to mismanagement, non-cooperation, unpreparedness, and negligence,
the evidence cited in the following pages is sufficient (Conclusions 8,
10, and 16).

Since President Roosevelt was convinced as early as the middle of August
that a clash with Japan was a matter of a few weeks, the responsible
officers of his administration had ample time to strengthen, organize,
and consolidate the agencies in Washington, especially the Army and Navy
communication and intelligence services, in such a manner to assure the
speedy translations of intercepts, prompt distribution to the
appropriate officials, swift evaluation, and proper decisions based on
such information and evaluation. Lack of time cannot be pleaded as an
excuse for this failure, despite the difficulties involved in securing
competent and reliable specialists.

General Miles admitted at the hearing on December 3, 1945, that there
had been no meeting of the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee
between October 11 and December 8 or 9, 1941, and declared:

"I regret to say, Mr. Congressman there were still discussions and
difficulties going on between the war and Navy Departments as to just
what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what
rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetra."

There was lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy regarding
the fourteen parts of the Japanese final message between 9:30 p. m. on
December 6 and the morning of December 7 about 10:30. The existence of
the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message, which President
Roosevelt received between 9 and 10 o'clock on Saturday evening and
interpreted as meaning war, was known more or less accidentally to
certain high Army and Navy authorities about the same time. But Admiral
Stark testified before this Committee at the hearing on January 1, 1946,
that the first thirteen parts and the di-

540            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

rective for delivery to Secretary Hull at one o'clock Sunday, did not
come to his attention until late on the morning of December 7. Admiral
Stark *thought* that he went to his office between 10:30 and 11 o'clock
that morning and that as nearly as he could remember he did not see the
directive message for one o'clock delivery until about 10:40 that
morning. It was the final part of the Japanese message, and the one
o'clock directive that convinced General Marshall that war was
immediately at hand and led him to send the warning dispatch which
reached General Short after the Japanese attack.

For this non-cooperation and mismanagement, high authorities in
Washington were fully responsible. The President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General
Marshall, and Admiral Stark were all in Washington or environs. It is
true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark when they appeared before
this Committee could not remember where they were during the evening and
night of December 6 but they were at least accessible to officers of the
Army and Navy Departments, or should have been; hence, there was no
excuse for the failure of these high authorities to assemble on the
evening of December 6, inquire into the defensive preparedness of
outpost Commanders, and send peremptory directives to them.

The setting up of so many councils and committees, and the intermeddling
of so many men created such a state of confusion in Washington that the
high principle of *individual responsibility* was apparently lost to
sight. The result was that no one among the President's chief
subordinates was enough concerned on the night of December 6 to do
anything about the 13 parts which indicated a crucial stage in Japanese-
American relations. (See Conclusion No. 10.)

In the lower, operating echelons of the Army and Navy, on the other
hand, men seemed to see or to sense the gathering crisis and even the
immediate danger to Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet it but were
discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident in the
testimony of Captain Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section
of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on December 4, 1941, he
prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific. He tried
to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended by Admiral
Stark, Ingersoll, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discouraged from doing
so on the ground that the messages of November 24 and 27 to Admiral
Kimmel was sufficient. He protested that it was not sufficient and that
he would like to send his December 4 dispatch anyway. The dispatch he
prepared and wanted to send was never sent, and the result was tragic.
(See testimony of Captain McCollum, Tr., Vol. No. 49, p. 9132 ff.)

Finally, there is no excuse for the failure of General Marshall and
Admiral Stark to be on the alert early Sunday morning or for their
failure, after they did meet near the middle of the morning, to reach
the outpost Commanders with a definite war-warning message before the
Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor. This failure was all the more
inexcusable for the reason that some time in July 1941, the practice of
sending intercepts to General Short and Admiral Kimmel had been
abandoned.

16. *The President of the United States was responsible for the failure
to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               541

and the Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and
dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as
events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and
laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief
Executive and  Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested
this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility
to the people of the United States*.

As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of the
President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catastrophe
at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Constitution
and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil.

The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible
executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appointments
and treaties by the Senate.

The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoints high officers, civil and military.

He is Chief Magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to
the maintenance and operation of the Military and Naval Establishments.

Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf the
United States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretary of State, such
duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his own
instructions and authorizations.

Under the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief of the armed
forces of the United States, and with the approval of the Senate he
appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns them to their
duties in his discretion except in the case of the Chief Staff and Chief
of Naval Operations these appointments must approved by the Senate.

And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense powers in
one magistrate not in a directory or a single official checked by a
council, as was proposed in the Convention of 1787?

The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of *The
Federalist*. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural
executive was to assure "energy in the Executive," "a due dependence the
people," and "a due responsibility." A plural Executive, it is there
argued, "tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they
can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, *first*, the
restraints of public opinion * * *; and, *secondly*, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct persons they
trust * * *."

The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations, powers,
and duties of the Military Establishments under the President
particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation them;
in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions the civil
Secretaries and also directly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations.

Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the
Chief Executive.

From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt was
President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United
States and in him was vested all Executive powers under the Constitution
and the laws.

542                PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and retained him
in that office during this period.

He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this
period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs
of Naval Operations during this period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as
military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and he
assigned them to their posts of duty.

In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with supreme
Executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we have more
recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940,
on a subject of administrative actions, President Roosevelt aid: "There
were two or three cardinal principles; and one of them is the fact that
you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the
United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is
responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he
does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate
responsibility that rests on him" (Public Papers, 1940 volume, p. 623).

Although there were two departments for the administration of military
and naval affairs during this period, they were both under the supreme
direction of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in
all matters relative to separate and joint planning or defense and war,
to disposition of forces and materiel, to preparedness for operation in
case of an attack. In respect of the President's power, the two
departments were one agency for over-all planning and operational
purposes.

The President had power to issue directions and orders to the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and indirectly to
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and on occasions
used this power.

Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt
had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize the
Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed it
necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation
between the Departments. Since he did not reorganize the two Departments
under that act, he must have deemed them properly constructed as they
were.

By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during this
period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations of
diplomatic decisions and war plans.

In fine, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General
Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Kimmel were all men
of President Roosevelt's own choice not hang-over appointees from
another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed and the
President had ample power to direct them, coordinate their activities,
and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies in the
defense of the United States.

Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotiations,
the President decided long before December 7, at least as early as the
Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            543

matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent
as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation or that war.
Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war
and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt
act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an
overt act by Japan an attack on territory of the United States.
Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering
it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme
responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and
dispositions necessary to that end were taken.

During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7,
1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings,
discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or
severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that
attack or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor
the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack
effectively.

In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding
conclusions and more of the same kind that could be cited. This failure
cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their
immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their
powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and
responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the
President of the United States.

This does demonstrate the weakness of dependence on the political head
of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the
operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the areas
of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this
coordination should be done in advance of a crisis.

17. *High authorities in, Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities or their failures in
this respect*.

The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of
authority. In reports of the President's Commission, of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this
respect are accepted as plain facts: (1) The ultimate power to allocate
arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested in
the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of
General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (2) General Short and Admiral Kimmel
made repeated demands upon their respective Departments or additional
material, which they represented as necessary to the effective defense
of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities, having full discretion
in this regard, made decisions against General Short and Admiral Kimmel
and allocated to the Atlantic theater, where the United States was at
least nominally at peace, materiel, specially bombing and reconnaissance
planes, which were known to be absolutely indispensable to efficient
defense of Pearl Harbor. (See exhibits 106 and 53, request for
materials.)

The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the President
in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.

544            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point of
view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The President it is true had
powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his
first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care
for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese
attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel,
especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized
decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable
materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive
forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington
and Hawaii.

When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made certain
definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to have been
fully known and appreciated by the responsible command at Washington.

The base is a shallow-water bass with limited base mobility, with no
chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air beaches to
properly park the necessary defensive air equipment. Entrance to the
base is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties at reduced speed,
and in single file, and presenting the possibility of a blockade of the
base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance.

The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the city of
Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with installations
and movements within the base at all times.

The base is located on an island where the population was heavily
Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espionage was rampant,
and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency of any kind or
nature would be open to Japanese information.

All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from the
mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the necessity for
complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base.

The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed movement
of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to the shore, thereby
favoring such methods of hostile attack.

The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360 , with open sea
available on all sides.

The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its Pearl
Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a safe base,
it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which facilities
must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical characteristics
of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate defensive
facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the decision
to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington, the
responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet rested
primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22, 1940, Tr.,
Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to consider what
defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base,
whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons
for such failure.

The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of
the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most
essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            545

the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of
long-distance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance
covering a 360  perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such
reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes,
with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation,
and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a continuous
patrol.

Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack
which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175
planes.

The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of
antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and
sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.

The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffles. It
would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in
Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with
ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse
to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl
Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less
defenseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship
batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, Italy,
brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore. Admiral
Stark wrote on November 22, 1940 expressing fear of a "sudden attack in
Hawaiian waters" on the fleet, and asking about torpedo net protection.
(Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Richardson, then in command, expressed no
anxiety about the security of the fleet, and thought torpedo nets
unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet must be carried out, even
at the expense of fleet training and extra discomfort. Approximately
four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of
torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes tacking the base at low
altitudes. Against such an attack, anti-torpedo baffles and nets would
have been of extraordinary value.

The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly
discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been
sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes
more than 100 miles away.

It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily,
to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be performed
by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army. The fleet,
however, is always to be expected to furnish every available defensive
effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base. The record discloses
that with full knowledge of the defense necessities inherent in the
defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the dangers
and peril imposed upon the fleet while based at the Pearl Harbor base,
and with full knowledge of the equipment essential to a proper
protection of the fleet at such base, it was decided by President
Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland bases and base it at
Pearl Harbor.

The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl
Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii, both
in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at
Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor
base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record

546            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of
the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii.
On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly
recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the
equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested
defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.

It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than
for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such
an explanation is that Hawaii was the only non-mainland base charged
with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet, and the equipment
supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received
much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii
could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be
able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. General Marshall reported to
the President in March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that "Oahu was believed to be
the strongest fortress in the world" and practically invulnerable to
attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause
great damage.

The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the
Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as
to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that
such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in
Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense
equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the
defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said,
such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon
the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are
forced to conclude, therefore, that in view of the obligations assumed
by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have just
referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to properly
contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only
alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant
peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base the
fleet at Pearl Harbor, and *thereupon return the fleet to its several
mainland bases*. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would
have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a
mainland base would only be 180  instead of 360 , thus permitting
distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The
transportation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be
immensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities. The
mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved and
the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have been
avoided. *We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should not have
been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were assured*.

Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained
based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equipment to which
we have referred plus the fact that the precise status of the defense
weakness must be assumed to have been open to the unusual Japanese
espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo war office
must be assumed to have been cognizant of the status of affairs at Pearl
Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to remove the fleet
from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             547

as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of
the Japanese attack on December 7.

The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between
February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of long-distance patrol
planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the
Army received between February 1 and December 1, 1941, approximately 600
long-distance bombers capable of flying loaded, missions, of 1,200 miles
or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines.
During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long-
distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers
in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately
5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the
Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this
equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii
instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position.

We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl Harbor
base, together with the identification of the essential defense
equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the
demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment, the
agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the
continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to
provide such equipment.

It seems proper here to note the extent to which the Pearl Harbor base
was deprived of needed and essential equipment.

(1) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered 360 .
Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for the full
360 . The evidence discloses that it would take approximately 200 patrol
planes to furnish such reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would require
flights of not less than 750 miles from Oahu. The evidence shows that
the wear and tear upon patrol planes engaged in such distant operations
would be heavy, that a certain proportion of available planes would have
to be under repair and adjustment, and that only about one-third of the
assigned planes would be available for a particular day's patrol. In a
similar way, in connection with the overhaul and repair of planes, a
proper store of repair parts would be essential and of even greater
importance, spare crews for the operation of the planes would be
required, since the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily.

The record seems to establish that there were available at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for distant
patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition. The supply
of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficient extra crews for
a continuous operation.

With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute. An
estimate appears in the record that 185 fighter planes would be
necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105
available fighter planes, which, if properly alerted, would have been
available for base defense.

The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic
theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as
a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.

548            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharp dilemma. He was the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL-46 he was given
specific duties which required him to have his fleet ready for action
promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had available 50 or 60 patrol
planes, and he would need these planes in aid of fleet movements if his
fleet was to take the offensive against the enemy. If he used these
patrol planes for base defense, such heavy duty would reduce their
efficiency and ultimately put them up for repair in event the distance
patrol duty should cover an extended period. In such an event his fleet
could not sail against the enemy as required by WPL-46 because his
patrol planes would be out of commission. He had therefore to make a
choice between fleet training and preparation and base defense. He says
his decision not to carry on distant reconnaissance was based upon his
belief, in common with his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger
from a Japanese attack. We think in making such a decision Admiral
Kimmel was unjustified in concluding, first, that there was no danger of
attack at Pearl Harbor, and, second, that such a decision did not
violate the fundamental proposition that no disposition should be taken
which unnecessarily increased fleet peril. The absence of distant
reconnaissance immediately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think
the abandonment of distance reconnaissance was unjustified.

(2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting full use of the fleet
at sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the
location of such fuel supplies was such as to make them vulnerable to
any raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at
frequent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such
refueling slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast
tankers to permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the
inescapable fact that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily
immobilize the entire fleet.

(3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the
sufficiency of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at
Pearl Harbor on December 7. General Short testified as to the number of
guns available on December 7, 1941, as compared with the number
available in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun
equipment had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl
Harbor attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft
batteries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is
that practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and
ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were not in
attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was the
common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor and
therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there had been twice
as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there is no reason to
believe the condition of alert would have been different.

The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo
protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of
aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high
command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a defense was
well known and could have been provided and, if provided,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              549

might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the fleet
during the raid, even though Admiral Richardson in 1940 thought such
defense unnecessary. But it could not have been provided at Hawaii; it
had to come from Washington. Washington's advices on the subject did
more harm than good, because they intimated that an attack was possible
even in shallow water, but at the same time, negatived the probability
of attack. (See letter of June 13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief
of Naval Operations (R. E. Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, among others.)

The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed. It was
a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was known that
there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to protect the
base, and this made the availability of radar all the more necessary. It
seems we could have priority for radar protection in New York and other
mainland points, where no attack was probable; but none in Hawaii, where
radar information was essential. The result was that fixed radio
installations were not accomplished at all prior to the Pearl Harbor
attack, and such fixed installations would have furnished the most
distant services. The mobile sets available had, by reason of the delay,
been operating only on a short experimental basis. There was a scarcity
of trained operators. The operators were trying to learn and operate at
the same time. The selected hours of operation, which proved of vast
importance, were not wisely fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very
time when the danger was acute.

No suitable information center had been established, and it is conceded
that such a center was essential to radar information. This was
particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed
the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be
ascertained. The information as to whether approaching planes were,
therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence at an
information center of representatives of the military services who could
instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such information
center was established, and no assignment of trained operators to such
stations was ever made. Thus, there was no one on duty who could have
known whether the approaching planes were enemy planes, or, instead, our
own B-17's, en route from the mainland.

The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of
appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. A table showing these
appropriations as requested by the President in his budget estimates and
as finally passed by Congress follows: