| 570             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 This message, received in Washington on November 30, so moved President
 Roosevelt that he expressed a desire to retain or have a copy of it
 (Tr., Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).
 
 (2) The message transmitted at 10:40 o'clock in the morning of December
 6 by Ambassador Winant in London from the British Admiralty, stating
 that large Japanese expeditionary forces were moving swiftly toward Kra
 a threat which was to bring into play American-British war plans for
 combined action against Japan unless the President refused to give
 official sanction to the plans he had approved "except officially."
 
 Knowing all these things and more besides, including the zero hour of 1
 o'clock fixed by the Japanese Government for the delivery of the message
 that meant a de facto rupture of relations, unable under the
 Constitution to commit the overt act of striking Japan at once, waiting
 for the Japanese to fire "the first shot without allowing too much
 danger to ourselves," President Roosevelt was under direct and immediate
 obligation to make certain that urgent messages be sent to the outpost
 commanders, including General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and sent not
 later than 11 o'clock on Sunday morning by the swiftest possible means
 of communication.
 
 For his failure to take this action Saturday night, December 6, or early
 Sunday morning, December 7, President Roosevelt must bear a
 responsibility commensurate with his powers and duties under the
 Constitution, with his position as Commander in Chief of the Army and
 Navy, and with the trust vested in him as the Chief Executive by the
 people of the United States.
 
 21. *The contention committing from so high an authority as President
 Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
 individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
 cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
 whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken*.
 
 How could the desire of the American people in the months before
 December 7, 1941, to keep out of war be responsible for the *specific
 failures* of Washington and Hawaii in the defense of Pearl Harbor?
 
 How could Congress be to blame for unpreparedness when it enacted into
 law greater defense appropriations than the President and his Budget
 Bureau recommended? (See Conclusion No. 17.)
 
 How could the American people be held responsible for the secret
 diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many
 secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high
 authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan
 which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.
 
 A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril.
 If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the
 exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors, public
 opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their
 leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their
 leader's actions.
 
 On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to the
 President and his close advisors that Japan had informed Hitler on
 December 1 that war was imminent. They knew this by intercepting the
 following message from Tokyo to Berlin:
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      571
 
 [Secret]
 From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 #985. (Part 1 Of 3) [a]
 Re my Circular #2387. [b]
 
 1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April
 during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere
 efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am
 sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c]). In
 the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
 determination. Will Your Honor therefore, immediately interview
 Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially
 communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that
 lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude,
 both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into
 various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter
 by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme
 danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations
 and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the
 breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
 
 Army 25552 JD: 6943                               
      Translated 12-141 (NR)
 
 (Source: Exhibit No. 1, page 204.)
 
 The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully
 aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these
 movements would involve the United States in war.
 
 Notwithstanding this intimate knowledge of the imminence of war the
 Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5 that the
 negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite the
 extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the "War Cabinet," the
 President permitted the Senate and the House of Representatives to
 adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of December 8
 without having informed them of the impending danger to the country.
 (See Conclusion 20.) This seems to follow consistently the understanding
 observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the President a proposed draft of a
 message to Congress which was never used. Mr. Hull said: "I think we
 agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of
 our relations, relating to actual hostilities." (Exhibit 19; see also
 Conclusion No. 2.)
 
 How could the American people be responsible for the warlike operations
 conducted from Washington over which the people had no control and about
 which they were never informed?
 
 In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American
 diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if
 imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies
 upon the enemy's first overt act to insure effective popular support for
 the Nation's final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the
 atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging
 than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close coordination
 between American public opinion and American diplomacy.
 
 Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era.
 Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided
 
 [a] Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.
 [b] Not available.
 [c] See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.
 
 572            
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration by
 all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who there lost their lives.
 
 Exhaustive attention has been given to the military aspects of the
 events leading up to Pearl Harbor and an invaluable record has been
 compiled for future students of the situation.
 
 A far less complete record has been written of its diplomatic aspects
 and here there is the most urgent need of further exploration in justice
 to the future generations of Americans who may learn here a little of
 the lessons for which America has paid so great a price.
 
 How to avoid war and how to turn war if it finally comes to serve the
 cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today as
 yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding all the petty
 episodes that finally add up to war. No war comes in a moment. War is
 the sum of many minor decisions and some that are major. In this
 diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor investigation has sadly failed to
 live up to the lofty prospectus with which it was launched
 
 In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the charge
 that the "country" is to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor cannot
 be sustained.
 
 Conclusion:
 
 In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates that the
 tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws
 or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested
 responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of
 official judgment, management, cooperation, and action as were displayed
 by authorities and agents of the United States in connection with the
 events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
 1941.
 
 This demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political head of the
 Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the activities
 of the military branches, particularly in the area of intelligence, and
 unification of command. The major lesson to be learned is that this
 coordination should be accomplished in advance of a crisis.
 
 SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES
 
 Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and
 having analyzed the same in the foregoing Conclusions of Fact and
 Responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and
 ultimate conclusion:
 
 The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense
 rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of *interdependent*
 responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in
 Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field
 in charge of the fleet and of the naval base. (See Conclusion No. 19.)
 
 The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities were
 inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The
 commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready
 successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable
 information, materiel, trained manpower and clear orders from
 Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      573
 
 readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders the
 spot.
 
 The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential the
 defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military
 authorities:
 
 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT President of the United States and Commander in
 Chief of the Army and Navy.
 
 HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War.
 
 FRANK KNOX Secretary of the Navy.
 
 GEORGE C. MARSHALL General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
 
 HAROLD R. STARK Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.
 
 LEONARD T. GEROW Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans
 Division.
 
 The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the
 military commanders:
 
 WALTER C. SHORT Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
 
 HUSBAND E. KIMMEL Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
 
 Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious
 failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform
 their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too
 numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.
 
 Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of Japanese-
 American negotiations bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic
 conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no
 duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility
 stemming from the Commander in Chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the
 defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic
 phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.
 
 HOMER FERGUSON.
 OWEN BREWSTER.
 
 
 574              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              
      575
 
 MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
 
 INDEX
 
 Page
 American-British-Dutch:
 Conversations                                                  
      506-508
 Modus vivendi                                             
      511, 561 ff.
 Parallel action                                           
      538, 561 ff.
 American people:
 Not to blame for Pearl Harbor                                  
      570 ff.
 Must be informed                                                   
      571
 Army-Navy intelligence services:
 Intercepts                                          
      504, 514, 515, 524
 Distribution of information                              
      520, 524, 525
 Uncovers Japanese reaction to November 26 note           
      525, 532, 564
 Destruction of Japanese codes                                      
      526
 On December 6-7 messages                                  
      520, 526 530
 Information withheld from Hawaii                              
      531, 532
 Dead-line messages                                            
      515, 532
 Delays in translating secret information                           
      539
 Army Pearl Harbor Board [APB]                                        
      495
 Report on intercepts                                               
      515
 Expectation of Hawaiian attack                                     
      524
 "Winds messages"                                                   
      526
 Reports information withheld from Hawaii                           
      531
 Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                      
      533, 537
 Finds "war warnings" conflicting                                   
      534
 Notes failure to prepare Hawaii                                    
      543
 Stimson diary                                                      
      559
 Notes Washington failures                                          
      564
 Atlantic Conference: Roosevelt-Churchill discussion              
      508-509
 Barkley, Senator Alben W.: Expounds resolution for investigation
 495-496, 533
 Beardall, Admiral John R.: December 6-7 messages                     
      528
 Bellinger, Martin: Report on Hawaii                                  
      523
 Bicknell, Lt. Col. George W.: Reports burning of Japanese papers     
      554
 Bomb-plot messages:
 Indicate Hawaiian attack                        
      516 ff.; 523, 524, 556
 Washington aware of                                                
      525
 Bratton, Col. Rufus S.:
 Distributes bomb-plot messages                                     
      519
 December 6-7 messages                                         
      528, 567
 Brewster, Senator Owen:
 Dissent with majority                                              
      493
 Duty of Joint committee                                            
      496
 British Embassy: Messages                                            
      501
 Chiang Kai-shek:
 Modus vivendi                                                 
      512, 563
 Roosevelt message regarding Japanese                               
      522
 Chief of Naval Operations (see Stark): Receives secret information
 504
 Chief of Staff (see Marshall): Receives secret information           
      504
 Churchill, Winston:
 Roosevelt-Churchill messages                                  
      501, 502
 Atlantic conference discussions                               
      508, 509
 On Roosevelt appeal to Congress                               
      510, 530
 On fleet at Hawaii                                                 
      522
 On modus vivendi                                                   
      563
 
 576             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Page
 Congress:
 Appeal to                                      
      510, 512, 513, 530, 558
 Appropriations for military operations              
      524, 549, 550, 570
 Power to declare war                                               
      530
 Powers conferred on President by                               
      541-542
 Permitted to adjoin at crucial time                                
      571
 Constitution                                                     
      496-497
 Duties of President under                                          
      541
 Coolidge Calvin: Enforces freedom of investigation                   
      499
 Dead-line messages                                              
      515, 532
 December 6-7, 1941: Intercepted Japanese messages           
      520, 526-530
 Federalist, The: On nature of Federal executive                      
      541
 Ferguson, Senator Homer:
 Dissent with majority                                              
      493
 Duty of joint committee                                            
      496
 Written questions to Stimson                                   
      500-501
 Fielder, Lt. Col. K. J.: Informs General Short on Japanese codes and
 papers                                                             
      554
 Gerow, Gen. Leonard T.:
 December 6-7 messages                                              
      527
 Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message         
      536, 557, 559
 On "war warning" message                                           
      559
 Found responsible                                                  
      573
 Great Britain:
 United States cooperation with                                 
      508-509
 "Winds messages"                                                   
      526
 Grew, Joseph C.:
 Diary denied                                                       
      501
 Letter on war strategy                                             
      506
 Urges Roosevelt-Konoye conference                                  
      509
 Warns of surprise attack                                           
      521
 On position of Hawaii                                              
      523
 Halifax, Lord:
 Modus vivendi                                                      
      502
 Warned of surprise attack                                          
      521
 Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement      
      562
 Hart, Admiral Thomas C.: Inquiry on "winds messages"                 
      526
 Hawaii:
 Defense                                              
      505, 544 ff., 553
 Bomb plot messages concerning                                  
      516 ff.
 As fleet base                                                  
      545 ff.
 Failures at                                                   
      555, 572
 Herron, General: 1940 alert to                                       
      536
 Hitler, Chancellor: Warned of Japanese-American war
 615, 525, 532, 569, 570
 Hopkins, Harry:
 Unavailable to committee                                           
      497
 December 6-7 messages                                         
      528, 566
 Hull, Cordell:
 Illness prevents cross-examination of                         
      497, 501
 Modus vivendi                               
      501-502, 510, 511, 561 ff.
 Conference of November                                    
      25, 503, 511
 Diplomatic duties of                                               
      506
 Roosevelt-Konoye conference                                        
      509
 Turns war problem over to Army-Navy                                
      510
 Draft message to Congress                                     
      511, 571
 On American neutrality                                             
      512
 Receives secret information                                        
      520
 Aware of surprise attack                                           
      521
 Expected war with Japan                                            
      524
 December 6-7 messages                                     
      527-530, 567
 On "war warning" message                                           
      559
 Fails to inform General Marshall                                   
      560
 Fails to inform Cabinet officials                                  
      560
 Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E.:
 Testimony on "winds messages"                                      
      526
 December 6-7 messages                                              
      528
 Consulted on fleet data                                            
      528
 On warning Hawaii                                                  
      540
 On defense of Hawaii                                               
      549
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      577
 
 Page
 Jaluit: Japanese fleet at                                        
      531-532
 Japan:
 Surprise attacks                                    
      504; 521, 534, 539
 Warned by Roosevelt                                                
      509
 Intent to attack United States                                
      515, 569
 Dead-line dates                                               
      515, 531
 Message to Berlin                                             
      515, 571
 Bomb plot messages                                             
      516 ff.
 Rupture of relations with United States                       
      532, 564
 Modus vivendi                                                  
      561 ff.
 Aware of American-British-Dutch parallel action                
      561 ff.
 Japanese Emperor: Message to                                         
      513
 Joint Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee:
 Duty                                                 
      495 496, 497, 533
 Difficulties of                                                
      497-502
 Partisan character                                            
      498, 500
 Form of report                                                 
      502-503
 Conclusions of fact and responsibility                         
      503 ff.
 Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers                     
      555
 Diplomacy not thoroughly investigated (see also Table of contents)
 572
 Keefe, Representative Frank B.: On expectation of attack             
      561
 Kimmel, Admiral Husband E                                            
      496
 Confusing orders to                                 
      504, 532, 533, 560
 Entitled to bomb plot messages                                     
      519
 Not adequately informed                        
      521, 531, 532, 534, 538
 Not warned December 6-7                                            
      529
 November 24 message                                                
      534
 November 27 message                                           
      535, 537
 On Hawaiian defense                                           
      548, 553
 Messages sent to                                                   
      554
 Liaison with General Short                                         
      554
 Failures at Hawaii                                       
      555, 565, 573
 Failures in Washington concerning                                  
      556
 Letter from Admiral Stark on United States plans              
      535, 560
 Knox, Frank:
 Unavailable to committee                                           
      497
 Modus vivendi                                             
      501, 561 ff.
 Conference of November 25                                     
      503, 511
 Receives bomb plot messages                                        
      518
 Receives secret information                                        
      520
 Attitude toward Japanese war                                       
      523
 December 6-7 messages                                     
      528-530, 567
 Duty to alert Hawaii                                          
      530, 558
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Prime responsibility                                               
      573
 Konoye, Premier: Conference proposal to Roosevelt                    
      509
 Kramer, Commander A. D.:
 Distributes bomb plot messages                                     
      518
 December 6-7 messages                                    
      528, 567, 569
 Krick, Capt. H. D.: Refreshes Stark's memory about December 6        
      568
 Kurusu, Mr.: On Secretary Hull's message                             
      563
 Leahy, Admiral William D.: Concerning fleet at Hawaii                
      522
 Lend-Lease Act: President's powers under                             
      544
 MacArthur, General: Secret information available to                  
      534
 Marshall, George C.:
 Modus vivendi                                                      
      502
 Conference of November 25                                     
      503, 511
 American-British-Dutch conversations                           
      507-509
 Appeals for time                                              
      512, 561
 Receives bomb plot messages                                        
      519
 Receives secret information                                        
      520
 December 6-7 messages                           
      527-530, 540, 560, 569
 Duty to alert Hawaii                                
      530, 559, 565, 566
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message         
      536, 537, 559
 Duty to prepare Hawaii                                        
      543, 546
 Prime responsibility                                               
      573
 
 578              
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Page
 Marshall Islands: Japanese fleet at                                  
      531
 McCollum, Capt. Arthur N.: Attempts to alert Kimmel                  
      540
 Miles, General Sherman:
 December 6-7, messages                                         
      527-528
 Testimony on information withheld from Hawaii                      
      531
 Admits difficulties in Army-Navy intelligence                      
      539
 Morgenthau, Jr., Henry: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement    
      562
 Navy Court of Inquiry                                                
      495
 Report on intercepts                                               
      515
 Reports information withheld from Hawaii                           
      531
 Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                           
      533
 Criticizes "war warning" message                                   
      534
 Recommendations                                                    
      534
 Notes failure to prepare Hawaii                                    
      543
 Navy Department (see Knox, Stark)                                    
      498
 Notice of end of negotiations                                 
      510, 511
 Requested to furnish fleet data                                    
      528
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Confusing messages to Hawaii                        
      533, 536, 560, 561
 November 24 messages to Kimmel                                     
      534
 November 27 message to Kimmel                                  
      535-537
 On Hawaiian defense                                            
      543 ff.
 Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister: Warned of Japanese-American War
 515, 525, 532, 569
 Richardson, Admiral J. O.:
 Inquiry about Japanese war                                         
      506
 Protest against fleet at Hawaii                               
      522, 543
 Fleet defense                                                 
      545, 549
 Roberts commission                                                   
      495
 Shortcomings of                                                    
      497
 Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                      
      533, 534
 Exonerates Washington officials                                    
      533
 Notes War Department failure                                       
      536
 Expectation of war in Far East                                     
      538
 Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers                     
      555
 Roberts, Justice Owen: Failure to gather evidence                    
      497
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.:
 Unavailable to committee                                           
      497
 Papers unavailable                                                 
      501
 War tactics                                                   
      503, 558
 Conference with Cabinet                                            
      503
 Aware of probable attack on Hawaii       
      504, 521, 522, 524, 538, note
 Postpones address to Congress                            
      504, 530, 558
 Responsibility for coordinatio                  
      505, 514, 539, 540 ff.
 Fails at crucial time                
      505, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570
 Diplomatic duties of                                               
      506
 War strategy                                                  
      506, 558
 American-British-Dutch conversations                          
      507, 538
 Atlantic conference discussions                                
      508-509
 Roosevelt ultimatum of August 17                                   
      509
 Tactics pending Japanese war                        
      510, 511, 513, 558
 Conference on imminence of war                                
      511, 515
 Hampered by neutrality laws                                        
      512
 Interest in Japanese message to Berlin                   
      515, 532, 571
 Receives bomb-plot messages                                        
      518
 Messages of December 6-7                             
      520, 528-530, 565
 Receives secret information                                        
      521
 On fleet at Hawaii                                                 
      522
 Duty to alert Hawaii                                     
      524, 530, 558
 Detailed direction of fleet operations             
      528, note, 543, 544
 On modus vivendi                                               
      561 ff.
 Permits Senate and House to adjourn at crucial time:               
      571
 Prime responsibility                                               
      573
 Russia:
 "Winds messages"                                                   
      526
 Possible attack by Japan                                           
      535
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               
      579
 Page
 Sadtler, Col. Otis K.: On "winds messages"                           
      526
 Schulz, Commander L. R.:
 Testimony                                                          
      511
 Delivery of December 6 message to Roosevelt                        
      567
 Short, Walter C                                                      
      496
 Confusing orders to                                           
      504, 532
 Entitled to bomb-plot messages                                     
      519
 Receives Marshall warning too late                             
      529-530
 Not adequately informed                        
      531, 532, 533, 534, 538
 November 27 message                                           
      535, 537
 On Hawaiian defense                                           
      548, 553
 Testimony before Roberts Commission                                
      555
 Failures at Hawaii                                       
      555, 565, 573
 Failures in Washington concerning                             
      556, 557
 Singapore conversations. (See American-British-Dutch conversations.)
 Stark, Harold R.:
 Conference of November 25                                     
      503, 511
 American-British-Dutch conversations                           
      507-509
 Appeals for time                                              
      512, 561
 Receives bomb-plot messages                                        
      518
 Receives secret information                                        
      520
 December 6-7 messages                           
      527-530, 539, 540, 568
 Consulted on fleet data                                            
      528
 Duty to alert Hawaii                                
      530, 540, 565, 566
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Letter to Kimmel on United States action                      
      535, 560
 Duty to prepare Hawaii                                        
      543, 545
 Reply to Keefe on expectation of attack                            
      561
 Prime responsibility                                               
      573
 State Department (see also Hull, Welles)                             
      498
 Views on neutrality laws                                           
      512
 Permits Japanese consuls at Hawaii                                 
      514
 Attitude toward Japanese war                                       
      523
 Stimson, Henry L.:
 Illness prevents testimony of                                 
      497, 500
 Diary                                                    
      500, 512, 559
 Fails to answer questions                                      
      500-501
 Modus vivendi                                             
      502, 561 ff.
 Conference of November 25                                     
      503, 511
 Seeks end of Japanese negotiations                            
      512, 560
 On appeal to Congress                                              
      513
 Receives bomb-plot messages                                        
      519
 Receives secret information                                        
      520
 Aware of surprise attack                                      
      521, 524
 December 6-7 messages                                     
      527-530, 567
 Requests Pacific Fleet data                                        
      528
 Duty to alert Hawaii                                
      530, 536, 558, 559
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Neglect of Hawaii                                                  
      534
 On "war warning" message                                           
      559
 Aware of Japanese message to Berlin                                
      571
 Prime responsibility                                               
      573
 Truman (Mead) committee: Procedure                               
      499-500
 Truman, Harry:
 Executive orders dealing with evidence                             
      497
 Truman committee procedure                                         
      499
 Blame of American people not sustained                        
      506, 570
 Tully, Grace: Control over Roosevelt papers                          
      501
 Turner, Admiral R. K.:
 Testimony on winds messages                                        
      526
 December 6-7 messages                                          
      527-528
 On warning Hawaii                                                  
      540
 Walsh, Senator Thomas: Teapot Dome investigation                     
      499
 War Cabinet                                            
      513-515, 528, 540
 War Council                                            
      513-515, 528, 540
 
 580             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Page
 War Department (see also Stimson, Marshall)                          
      498
 Notice of end of negotiations                                  
      510-511
 Information withheld from General Short                            
      532
 Blamed by President's Commission                                   
      533
 Conflicting messages to Hawaii                           
      533, 535, 536
 November 27 message to Short                                  
      535, 537
 On Hawaiian defense                                            
      543 ff.
 War-warning messages                                        
      532-537, 559
 Washington authorities:
 Responsibilities and failures of
 504-505, 510, 522, 523, 
      530, 538, 539, 540, 553, 555, 559, 572
 Attitude toward Japan                                              
      513
 Knowledge of bomb-plot messages                                
      516 ff.
 Expectation of attack on Hawaii                                    
      524
 Knowledge of Japanese intentions                         
      525, 537, 565
 Duty to alert Hawaii                            
      530-531, 534, 536, 558
 Sends confusing orders                                        
      532, 536
 Undertakes detailed direction of affairs                      
      533, 553
 Exonerated by President's Commission                               
      533
 Directs attention away from Pearl Harbor                       
      537-538
 Failure to prepare Hawaii                                          
      543
 Responsible for Hawaiian defense                                   
      553
 Modus vivendi                                                  
      561 ff.
 Secret diplomacy                                                   
      570
 Welles, Sumner:
 Modus vivendi                                                      
      502
 Memorandum on Atlantic Conference                                  
      509
 On avoidance of war                                                
      565
 Wheeler, Senator Burton K.:
 Freedom to investigate                                             
      499
 Daugherty investigation                                            
      499
 Wilkinson, Admiral T. S.:
 December 6-7 messages                                          
      527-528
 On warning Hawaii                                                  
      540
 Winant, Ambassador: Message on Japanese movements          
      522, 565, 570
 Winds message                                                    
      525-526
 WPL-46: Meaning                                       
      535 note, 548, 558
 Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.: No investigation of                       
      501
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