570
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This message, received in Washington on November 30, so moved President
Roosevelt that he expressed a desire to retain or have a copy of it
(Tr., Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).
(2) The message transmitted at 10:40 o'clock in the morning of December
6 by Ambassador Winant in London from the British Admiralty, stating
that large Japanese expeditionary forces were moving swiftly toward Kra
a threat which was to bring into play American-British war plans for
combined action against Japan unless the President refused to give
official sanction to the plans he had approved "except officially."
Knowing all these things and more besides, including the zero hour of 1
o'clock fixed by the Japanese Government for the delivery of the message
that meant a de facto rupture of relations, unable under the
Constitution to commit the overt act of striking Japan at once, waiting
for the Japanese to fire "the first shot without allowing too much
danger to ourselves," President Roosevelt was under direct and immediate
obligation to make certain that urgent messages be sent to the outpost
commanders, including General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and sent not
later than 11 o'clock on Sunday morning by the swiftest possible means
of communication.
For his failure to take this action Saturday night, December 6, or early
Sunday morning, December 7, President Roosevelt must bear a
responsibility commensurate with his powers and duties under the
Constitution, with his position as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, and with the trust vested in him as the Chief Executive by the
people of the United States.
21. *The contention committing from so high an authority as President
Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken*.
How could the desire of the American people in the months before
December 7, 1941, to keep out of war be responsible for the *specific
failures* of Washington and Hawaii in the defense of Pearl Harbor?
How could Congress be to blame for unpreparedness when it enacted into
law greater defense appropriations than the President and his Budget
Bureau recommended? (See Conclusion No. 17.)
How could the American people be held responsible for the secret
diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many
secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high
authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan
which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.
A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril.
If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the
exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors, public
opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their
leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their
leader's actions.
On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to the
President and his close advisors that Japan had informed Hitler on
December 1 that war was imminent. They knew this by intercepting the
following message from Tokyo to Berlin:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
571
[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
#985. (Part 1 Of 3) [a]
Re my Circular #2387. [b]
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April
during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere
efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am
sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c]). In
the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
determination. Will Your Honor therefore, immediately interview
Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially
communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that
lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude,
both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into
various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter
by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme
danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations
and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the
breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
Army 25552 JD: 6943
Translated 12-141 (NR)
(Source: Exhibit No. 1, page 204.)
The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully
aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these
movements would involve the United States in war.
Notwithstanding this intimate knowledge of the imminence of war the
Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5 that the
negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite the
extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the "War Cabinet," the
President permitted the Senate and the House of Representatives to
adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of December 8
without having informed them of the impending danger to the country.
(See Conclusion 20.) This seems to follow consistently the understanding
observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the President a proposed draft of a
message to Congress which was never used. Mr. Hull said: "I think we
agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of
our relations, relating to actual hostilities." (Exhibit 19; see also
Conclusion No. 2.)
How could the American people be responsible for the warlike operations
conducted from Washington over which the people had no control and about
which they were never informed?
In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American
diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if
imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies
upon the enemy's first overt act to insure effective popular support for
the Nation's final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the
atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging
than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close coordination
between American public opinion and American diplomacy.
Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era.
Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided
[a] Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.
[b] Not available.
[c] See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.
572
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration by
all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who there lost their lives.
Exhaustive attention has been given to the military aspects of the
events leading up to Pearl Harbor and an invaluable record has been
compiled for future students of the situation.
A far less complete record has been written of its diplomatic aspects
and here there is the most urgent need of further exploration in justice
to the future generations of Americans who may learn here a little of
the lessons for which America has paid so great a price.
How to avoid war and how to turn war if it finally comes to serve the
cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today as
yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding all the petty
episodes that finally add up to war. No war comes in a moment. War is
the sum of many minor decisions and some that are major. In this
diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor investigation has sadly failed to
live up to the lofty prospectus with which it was launched
In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the charge
that the "country" is to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor cannot
be sustained.
Conclusion:
In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates that the
tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws
or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested
responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of
official judgment, management, cooperation, and action as were displayed
by authorities and agents of the United States in connection with the
events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941.
This demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political head of the
Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the activities
of the military branches, particularly in the area of intelligence, and
unification of command. The major lesson to be learned is that this
coordination should be accomplished in advance of a crisis.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES
Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and
having analyzed the same in the foregoing Conclusions of Fact and
Responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and
ultimate conclusion:
The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense
rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of *interdependent*
responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in
Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field
in charge of the fleet and of the naval base. (See Conclusion No. 19.)
The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities were
inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The
commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready
successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable
information, materiel, trained manpower and clear orders from
Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
573
readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders the
spot.
The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential the
defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military
authorities:
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War.
FRANK KNOX Secretary of the Navy.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
HAROLD R. STARK Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.
LEONARD T. GEROW Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans
Division.
The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the
military commanders:
WALTER C. SHORT Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious
failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform
their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too
numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.
Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of Japanese-
American negotiations bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic
conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no
duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility
stemming from the Commander in Chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the
defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic
phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.
HOMER FERGUSON.
OWEN BREWSTER.
574
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
575
MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
INDEX
Page
American-British-Dutch:
Conversations
506-508
Modus vivendi
511, 561 ff.
Parallel action
538, 561 ff.
American people:
Not to blame for Pearl Harbor
570 ff.
Must be informed
571
Army-Navy intelligence services:
Intercepts
504, 514, 515, 524
Distribution of information
520, 524, 525
Uncovers Japanese reaction to November 26 note
525, 532, 564
Destruction of Japanese codes
526
On December 6-7 messages
520, 526 530
Information withheld from Hawaii
531, 532
Dead-line messages
515, 532
Delays in translating secret information
539
Army Pearl Harbor Board [APB]
495
Report on intercepts
515
Expectation of Hawaiian attack
524
"Winds messages"
526
Reports information withheld from Hawaii
531
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient
533, 537
Finds "war warnings" conflicting
534
Notes failure to prepare Hawaii
543
Stimson diary
559
Notes Washington failures
564
Atlantic Conference: Roosevelt-Churchill discussion
508-509
Barkley, Senator Alben W.: Expounds resolution for investigation
495-496, 533
Beardall, Admiral John R.: December 6-7 messages
528
Bellinger, Martin: Report on Hawaii
523
Bicknell, Lt. Col. George W.: Reports burning of Japanese papers
554
Bomb-plot messages:
Indicate Hawaiian attack
516 ff.; 523, 524, 556
Washington aware of
525
Bratton, Col. Rufus S.:
Distributes bomb-plot messages
519
December 6-7 messages
528, 567
Brewster, Senator Owen:
Dissent with majority
493
Duty of Joint committee
496
British Embassy: Messages
501
Chiang Kai-shek:
Modus vivendi
512, 563
Roosevelt message regarding Japanese
522
Chief of Naval Operations (see Stark): Receives secret information
504
Chief of Staff (see Marshall): Receives secret information
504
Churchill, Winston:
Roosevelt-Churchill messages
501, 502
Atlantic conference discussions
508, 509
On Roosevelt appeal to Congress
510, 530
On fleet at Hawaii
522
On modus vivendi
563
576
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Congress:
Appeal to
510, 512, 513, 530, 558
Appropriations for military operations
524, 549, 550, 570
Power to declare war
530
Powers conferred on President by
541-542
Permitted to adjoin at crucial time
571
Constitution
496-497
Duties of President under
541
Coolidge Calvin: Enforces freedom of investigation
499
Dead-line messages
515, 532
December 6-7, 1941: Intercepted Japanese messages
520, 526-530
Federalist, The: On nature of Federal executive
541
Ferguson, Senator Homer:
Dissent with majority
493
Duty of joint committee
496
Written questions to Stimson
500-501
Fielder, Lt. Col. K. J.: Informs General Short on Japanese codes and
papers
554
Gerow, Gen. Leonard T.:
December 6-7 messages
527
Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message
536, 557, 559
On "war warning" message
559
Found responsible
573
Great Britain:
United States cooperation with
508-509
"Winds messages"
526
Grew, Joseph C.:
Diary denied
501
Letter on war strategy
506
Urges Roosevelt-Konoye conference
509
Warns of surprise attack
521
On position of Hawaii
523
Halifax, Lord:
Modus vivendi
502
Warned of surprise attack
521
Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement
562
Hart, Admiral Thomas C.: Inquiry on "winds messages"
526
Hawaii:
Defense
505, 544 ff., 553
Bomb plot messages concerning
516 ff.
As fleet base
545 ff.
Failures at
555, 572
Herron, General: 1940 alert to
536
Hitler, Chancellor: Warned of Japanese-American war
615, 525, 532, 569, 570
Hopkins, Harry:
Unavailable to committee
497
December 6-7 messages
528, 566
Hull, Cordell:
Illness prevents cross-examination of
497, 501
Modus vivendi
501-502, 510, 511, 561 ff.
Conference of November
25, 503, 511
Diplomatic duties of
506
Roosevelt-Konoye conference
509
Turns war problem over to Army-Navy
510
Draft message to Congress
511, 571
On American neutrality
512
Receives secret information
520
Aware of surprise attack
521
Expected war with Japan
524
December 6-7 messages
527-530, 567
On "war warning" message
559
Fails to inform General Marshall
560
Fails to inform Cabinet officials
560
Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E.:
Testimony on "winds messages"
526
December 6-7 messages
528
Consulted on fleet data
528
On warning Hawaii
540
On defense of Hawaii
549
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
577
Page
Jaluit: Japanese fleet at
531-532
Japan:
Surprise attacks
504; 521, 534, 539
Warned by Roosevelt
509
Intent to attack United States
515, 569
Dead-line dates
515, 531
Message to Berlin
515, 571
Bomb plot messages
516 ff.
Rupture of relations with United States
532, 564
Modus vivendi
561 ff.
Aware of American-British-Dutch parallel action
561 ff.
Japanese Emperor: Message to
513
Joint Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee:
Duty
495 496, 497, 533
Difficulties of
497-502
Partisan character
498, 500
Form of report
502-503
Conclusions of fact and responsibility
503 ff.
Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers
555
Diplomacy not thoroughly investigated (see also Table of contents)
572
Keefe, Representative Frank B.: On expectation of attack
561
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E
496
Confusing orders to
504, 532, 533, 560
Entitled to bomb plot messages
519
Not adequately informed
521, 531, 532, 534, 538
Not warned December 6-7
529
November 24 message
534
November 27 message
535, 537
On Hawaiian defense
548, 553
Messages sent to
554
Liaison with General Short
554
Failures at Hawaii
555, 565, 573
Failures in Washington concerning
556
Letter from Admiral Stark on United States plans
535, 560
Knox, Frank:
Unavailable to committee
497
Modus vivendi
501, 561 ff.
Conference of November 25
503, 511
Receives bomb plot messages
518
Receives secret information
520
Attitude toward Japanese war
523
December 6-7 messages
528-530, 567
Duty to alert Hawaii
530, 558
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Prime responsibility
573
Konoye, Premier: Conference proposal to Roosevelt
509
Kramer, Commander A. D.:
Distributes bomb plot messages
518
December 6-7 messages
528, 567, 569
Krick, Capt. H. D.: Refreshes Stark's memory about December 6
568
Kurusu, Mr.: On Secretary Hull's message
563
Leahy, Admiral William D.: Concerning fleet at Hawaii
522
Lend-Lease Act: President's powers under
544
MacArthur, General: Secret information available to
534
Marshall, George C.:
Modus vivendi
502
Conference of November 25
503, 511
American-British-Dutch conversations
507-509
Appeals for time
512, 561
Receives bomb plot messages
519
Receives secret information
520
December 6-7 messages
527-530, 540, 560, 569
Duty to alert Hawaii
530, 559, 565, 566
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message
536, 537, 559
Duty to prepare Hawaii
543, 546
Prime responsibility
573
578
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Marshall Islands: Japanese fleet at
531
McCollum, Capt. Arthur N.: Attempts to alert Kimmel
540
Miles, General Sherman:
December 6-7, messages
527-528
Testimony on information withheld from Hawaii
531
Admits difficulties in Army-Navy intelligence
539
Morgenthau, Jr., Henry: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement
562
Navy Court of Inquiry
495
Report on intercepts
515
Reports information withheld from Hawaii
531
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient
533
Criticizes "war warning" message
534
Recommendations
534
Notes failure to prepare Hawaii
543
Navy Department (see Knox, Stark)
498
Notice of end of negotiations
510, 511
Requested to furnish fleet data
528
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Confusing messages to Hawaii
533, 536, 560, 561
November 24 messages to Kimmel
534
November 27 message to Kimmel
535-537
On Hawaiian defense
543 ff.
Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister: Warned of Japanese-American War
515, 525, 532, 569
Richardson, Admiral J. O.:
Inquiry about Japanese war
506
Protest against fleet at Hawaii
522, 543
Fleet defense
545, 549
Roberts commission
495
Shortcomings of
497
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient
533, 534
Exonerates Washington officials
533
Notes War Department failure
536
Expectation of war in Far East
538
Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers
555
Roberts, Justice Owen: Failure to gather evidence
497
Roosevelt, Franklin D.:
Unavailable to committee
497
Papers unavailable
501
War tactics
503, 558
Conference with Cabinet
503
Aware of probable attack on Hawaii
504, 521, 522, 524, 538, note
Postpones address to Congress
504, 530, 558
Responsibility for coordinatio
505, 514, 539, 540 ff.
Fails at crucial time
505, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570
Diplomatic duties of
506
War strategy
506, 558
American-British-Dutch conversations
507, 538
Atlantic conference discussions
508-509
Roosevelt ultimatum of August 17
509
Tactics pending Japanese war
510, 511, 513, 558
Conference on imminence of war
511, 515
Hampered by neutrality laws
512
Interest in Japanese message to Berlin
515, 532, 571
Receives bomb-plot messages
518
Messages of December 6-7
520, 528-530, 565
Receives secret information
521
On fleet at Hawaii
522
Duty to alert Hawaii
524, 530, 558
Detailed direction of fleet operations
528, note, 543, 544
On modus vivendi
561 ff.
Permits Senate and House to adjourn at crucial time:
571
Prime responsibility
573
Russia:
"Winds messages"
526
Possible attack by Japan
535
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
579
Page
Sadtler, Col. Otis K.: On "winds messages"
526
Schulz, Commander L. R.:
Testimony
511
Delivery of December 6 message to Roosevelt
567
Short, Walter C
496
Confusing orders to
504, 532
Entitled to bomb-plot messages
519
Receives Marshall warning too late
529-530
Not adequately informed
531, 532, 533, 534, 538
November 27 message
535, 537
On Hawaiian defense
548, 553
Testimony before Roberts Commission
555
Failures at Hawaii
555, 565, 573
Failures in Washington concerning
556, 557
Singapore conversations. (See American-British-Dutch conversations.)
Stark, Harold R.:
Conference of November 25
503, 511
American-British-Dutch conversations
507-509
Appeals for time
512, 561
Receives bomb-plot messages
518
Receives secret information
520
December 6-7 messages
527-530, 539, 540, 568
Consulted on fleet data
528
Duty to alert Hawaii
530, 540, 565, 566
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Letter to Kimmel on United States action
535, 560
Duty to prepare Hawaii
543, 545
Reply to Keefe on expectation of attack
561
Prime responsibility
573
State Department (see also Hull, Welles)
498
Views on neutrality laws
512
Permits Japanese consuls at Hawaii
514
Attitude toward Japanese war
523
Stimson, Henry L.:
Illness prevents testimony of
497, 500
Diary
500, 512, 559
Fails to answer questions
500-501
Modus vivendi
502, 561 ff.
Conference of November 25
503, 511
Seeks end of Japanese negotiations
512, 560
On appeal to Congress
513
Receives bomb-plot messages
519
Receives secret information
520
Aware of surprise attack
521, 524
December 6-7 messages
527-530, 567
Requests Pacific Fleet data
528
Duty to alert Hawaii
530, 536, 558, 559
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Neglect of Hawaii
534
On "war warning" message
559
Aware of Japanese message to Berlin
571
Prime responsibility
573
Truman (Mead) committee: Procedure
499-500
Truman, Harry:
Executive orders dealing with evidence
497
Truman committee procedure
499
Blame of American people not sustained
506, 570
Tully, Grace: Control over Roosevelt papers
501
Turner, Admiral R. K.:
Testimony on winds messages
526
December 6-7 messages
527-528
On warning Hawaii
540
Walsh, Senator Thomas: Teapot Dome investigation
499
War Cabinet
513-515, 528, 540
War Council
513-515, 528, 540
580
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
War Department (see also Stimson, Marshall)
498
Notice of end of negotiations
510-511
Information withheld from General Short
532
Blamed by President's Commission
533
Conflicting messages to Hawaii
533, 535, 536
November 27 message to Short
535, 537
On Hawaiian defense
543 ff.
War-warning messages
532-537, 559
Washington authorities:
Responsibilities and failures of
504-505, 510, 522, 523,
530, 538, 539, 540, 553, 555, 559, 572
Attitude toward Japan
513
Knowledge of bomb-plot messages
516 ff.
Expectation of attack on Hawaii
524
Knowledge of Japanese intentions
525, 537, 565
Duty to alert Hawaii
530-531, 534, 536, 558
Sends confusing orders
532, 536
Undertakes detailed direction of affairs
533, 553
Exonerated by President's Commission
533
Directs attention away from Pearl Harbor
537-538
Failure to prepare Hawaii
543
Responsible for Hawaiian defense
553
Modus vivendi
561 ff.
Secret diplomacy
570
Welles, Sumner:
Modus vivendi
502
Memorandum on Atlantic Conference
509
On avoidance of war
565
Wheeler, Senator Burton K.:
Freedom to investigate
499
Daugherty investigation
499
Wilkinson, Admiral T. S.:
December 6-7 messages
527-528
On warning Hawaii
540
Winant, Ambassador: Message on Japanese movements
522, 565, 570
Winds message
525-526
WPL-46: Meaning
535 note, 548, 558
Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.: No investigation of
501
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