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Chapter 3: The
Kennedy Years: 1961-1963
Highlights of
the Period: 1961-1963
The Pentagon study
reaches no conclusion as to how the course of
the Vietnam war might have changed if John F. Kennedy had lived -- but
it sums up the Kennedy years as a time of significantly deepening
U.S. involvement.
Here, arranged chronologically, are the highlights of those two
and a half years:
1961
A national intelligence estimate reported that an "extremely critical
period" for South Vietnam and the Saigon regime was "immediately
ahead."
The President ordered 400 Special Forces soldiers and 100 other
military advisers to South Vietnam, the study says. He also ordered
a clandestine campaign of "sabotage and light harassment" in the
North by South Vietnamese agents trained by the U.S.
A task force headed by Roswell L. Gilpatric proposed discussions
with President Diem on the "possibility of a defensive security
alliance"
despite the violation of the Geneva accords. The President
approved.
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, reporting on his mission to
Saigon, said the U.S. must decide "whether to help these countries"
or to "throw in the towel" and "pull back our defenses to San
Francisco."
President Diem, in a letter to President Kennedy, asked for a
"considerable" buildup in U.S. forces and a 100,000-man increase in
the South Vietnamese army. He used "inflated infiltration figures" to
support his contention of the Communist threat, the study says.
The White House agreed to finance a 30,000-man increase in
South Vietnam's army.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that 40,000 U.S. servicemen
would be needed to "clean up the Vietcong threat."
William P. Bundy, in a note to Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, urged "early and hard-hitting" U.S. intervention. He
gave this a 70 per cent chance of "arresting things," and estimated
there was a 30 per cent chance that "we would wind up like the
French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight."
A national intelligence estimate reported "little evidence" that the
Vietcong rely on external supplies, the Pentagon account says.
General Taylor met with President Diem. He recommended a
Mekong Delta flood-relief "task force, largely military in composition,"
including "combat troops" for protection. He recommended a
6,000-8,000-man U.S. force, warning that they "may expect to take
casualties," but that they could be withdrawn or "phased into other
activities."
He discounted the risk of a "major Asian war," and said the North
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was "extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing."
Mr. McNamara said he and the Joint Chiefs were "inclined to recommend"
General Taylor's proposal although the "struggle may be
prolonged."
General Taylor, in a message to President Kennedy, said a "U.S.
military task force is essential."
Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk, in a joint memo, backed General
Taylor's recommendations. They recommended, initially, "U.S. units
of modest size" for "direct support" and "as speedily as possible";
they insisted that government reforms be a precondition.
The President approved the major recommendations. President
Diem was said to be upset by the U.S. response. The demands for
reforms were softened, and the insistence on American participation
in decision-making was withdrawn.
1962
A military briefing paper for the President reported 948 U.S. servicemen
were in South Vietnam by the end of November; 2,646 by
the next January 9. There were also helicopter combat-support
missions.
Mr. McNamara ordered planning for U.S. withdrawal, partly on
the basis of what he called "tremendous progress," and also because
of the difficulty of holding public support for American operations
"indefinitely."
Michael V. Forrestal, a White House aide, reported to Kennedy
that a long, costly conflict should be anticipated. He said that
Vietcong
recruiting was so effective that the guerrillas could do without
infiltration from the North.
The U.S., by October, had 16,732 men in Vietnam. Planning for
withdrawal continued, the study says, on the basis of "the most
Micawberesque predictions" of progress.
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Chapter 3
The Kennedy Years: 1961-1963
-BY HEDRICK SMITH
The Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war concludes that
President John F. Kennedy transformed the "limited-risk
gamble" of the Eisenhower Administration into a "broad
commitment" to prevent Communist domination of South
Vietnam.
Although Mr. Kennedy resisted pressures for putting American
ground-combat units into South Vietnam, the Pentagon
analysts say, he took a series of actions that significantly
expanded the American military and political involvement in
Vietnam but nonetheless left President Lyndon B. Johnson
with as bad a situation as Mr. Kennedy inherited.
'The dilemma of the U.S. involvement dating from the
Kennedy era," the Pentagon study observes, was to use "only
limited means to achieve excessive ends."
Moreover, according to the study, prepared in 1967-68 by
Government analysts, the Kennedy tactics deepened the
American involvement in Vietnam piecemeal, with each step
minimizing public recognition that the American role was
growing.
President Kennedy made his first fresh commitments to
Vietnam secretly. The Pentagon study discloses that in the
spring of 1961 the President ordered 400 Special Forces troops
and 100 other American military advisers sent to South Vietnam.
No publicity was given to either move.
Small as the numbers seem in retrospect, the Pentagon
study comments that even the first such expansion "signaled
a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit on the size of
the U.S. [military] mission in Saigon, which, if it were done
openly, would be the first formal breach of the Geneva agreement."
Under the interpretation of that agreement in effect
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since 1956, the United States was limited to 685 military
advisers in Vietnam. Washington, while it did not sign the
accord, pledged not to undermine it.
On May 11, 1961, the day on which President Kennedy
decided to send the Special Forces, he also ordered the start
of a campaign of clandestine warfare against North Vietnam,
to be conducted by South Vietnamese agents directed and
trained by the Central Intelligence Agency and some Americ'1n
Special Forces troops. [See Document #20.]
The President's instructions, as quoted in the documents,
were, "In North Vietnam ... [to] form networks of resistance,
covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment."
The American military mission in Saigon was also
instructed to prepare South Vietnamese Army units "to conduct
ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam
as might prove necessary or appropriate."
The Pentagon study reports that the primary target of
the clandestine campaign against North Vietnam, and Laos
as well, was to be "lines of communication"-railroads, highways,
bridges, train depots and trucks.
The study does not report how many agents were actually
sent north, though documents accompanying it described some
of the build-up and training of the First Observation Group,
the main South Vietnamese unit conducting the covert campaign.
Within weeks of President Kennedy's May 11 decision,
moreover, the North Vietnamese Government made repeated
protests to the International Control Commission that its airspace
and territory were being violated by foreign aircraft
and South Vietnamese ground raids thrusting into the demilitarized
zone along the border between the two Vietnams.
In July, 1961, Hanoi announced publicly that it had captured
and was putting on trial three South Vietnamese participants
in undercover operations who had survived the crash
of a plane that was shot down, Hanoi said, while preparing
to drop them into North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese,
protesting formally to Britain and the Soviet Union-the cochairmen
of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam-described
in detail what they said the survivors had disclosed
about their American training and equipment.
Mr. Kennedy's May 11 orders, the study discloses, also
called for infiltration of South Vietnamese forces into southeastern
Laos to find and attack Communist bases and supply
lines.
On Oct. 13, moreover, the President reportedly gave additional secret
orders for allied forces to "initiate ground action,
including the use of U.S. advisers if necessary," against
Communist aerial resupply missions in the vicinity of Tchepone,
in the southern Laotian panhandle.
The Pentagon study does not analyze these covert operations
in detail, but it shows Mr. Kennedy's decisions as part of an
unbroken sequence that built up to much more ambitious
covert warfare against North Vietnam under President Johnson
in 1964.
The analysts handling the Kennedy period put more stress,
however, on the evolution of President Kennedy's decision in
November, 1961, to expand greatly the American military
advisory mission in Vietnam and, for the first time, to put
American servicemen in combat-support roles that involved
them increasingly in actual fighting.
In a cablegram to Washington on Nov. 18, cited in the
study, Frederick E. Nolting Jr., the United States Ambassador
in Saigon, described the significance attached to those moves.
He said he had explained to President Ngo Dinh Diem of
South Vietnam that the new roles of American servicemen
"could expose them to enemy action."
"In response to Diem's question," Mr. Nolting continued,
"[I] said that in my personal opinion these personnel would
be authorized to defend themselves if attacked. I pointed out
that this was one reason why the decisions were very grave
from U.S. standpoints."
Questions for Kennedy
The Pentagon study shows President Kennedy facing three
main questions on Vietnam during his term of office: whether
to make an irrevocable commitment to prevent a Communist
victory; whether to commit ground combat units to achieve
his ends; whether to give top priority to the military battle
against the Vietcong or to the political reforms necessary for
winning popular support.
President Kennedy's response during 34 months in office,
as the Pentagon account tells it, was to increase American
advisers from the internationally accepted level of 685 to
roughly 16,000 to put Americans into combat situations -- resulting
in a tenfold increase in American combat casualties
in one year-and eventually to inject the United States into
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the internal South Vietnamese maneuvering that finally
toppled the Diem regime.
The judgment of the Pentagon study is that while President
Kennedy's actions stopped short of the fundamental decision
to commit ground troops, nonetheless, "the limited-risk gamble
undertaken by Eisenhower had been transformed into an
unlimited commitment under Kennedy." Later, more cautiously,
the study says that Mr. Kennedy's policies produced a
"broad commitment" to Vietnam's defense, giving priority to
the military aspects of the war over political reforms.
The study also observes that the pervasive assumption in
the Kennedy Administration was that "the Diem regime's
own evident weaknesses-from the 'famous problem of
Diem as administrator' to the Army's lack of offensive spirit -- could
be cured if enough dedicated Americans, civilians and
military, became involved in South Vietnam to show the South
Vietnamese, at all levels, how to get on and win the war."
President Kennedy and his senior advisers are described
in the study as considering defeat unthinkable and assuming
that the mere introduction of Americans would provide the
South Vietnamese with what the authors call "the elan and
style needed to win."
The description of the debates in the Kennedy Administration
presented in the study are revealing-particularly when
the President decides against committing ground troops -- because
they emerge, in effect, as a rehearsal for the planning
in the Johnson era that led to outright war in 1965. Many
of the same officials advanced many of the same arguments,
and the intelligence community offered some of the same
ominous forewarnings.
President Kennedy was told that sending ground troops
would be a "shot in the arm" that would "spark real transformation"
of the Southern Vietnamese Army. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff calculated that, at worst, no more than 205,000
American soldiers would be required to cope not only with
the Vietcong but also with North Vietnam and Communist
China if they should intervene. Both military and civilian
advisers contended that American bombing of the North -- even
the mere threat of .it-would hold Hanoi and the other
Communist nations at bay.
In secretly urging the first commitment of American ground
troops to Vietnam in November, 1961, Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor, then the President's personal military adviser, discounted
the risks of a major land war. In a private message
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to the President from the Philippines, on his way home from
Saigon on Nov. 1, he said:
"The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way
of SVN are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely
vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should
be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to layoff
SVN.
"Both the D.R.V. [Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam]
and the Chicoms would face severe logistical difficulties
in trying to maintain strong forces in the field in SEA [Southeast
Asia], difficulties which we share but by no means to the
same degree. There is no case for fearing a mass onslaught
of Communist manpower into SVN and its neighboring states,
particularly if our airpower is allowed a free hand against
logistical targets."
In General Taylor's recommendations for an initial commitment
of 6,000 to 8,000 American ground troops, the account
relates, he had a co-author, Walt W. Rostow, then the
senior White House aide working on Southeast Asia.
On Nov. 5 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara sent
President Kennedy a memorandum stating that he and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were "inclined to recommend" General
Taylor's proposal-but with the significant warning that much
greater troop commitments were likely in the future. [See
Document #29.]
"The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping
may intervene overtly," ,the McNamara memorandum told
the President. It estimated that even so, "the maximum U.S.
forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not
exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men."
The President eventually rejected this approach. But the
Pentagon study comments that the ground-troop issue so
dominated the discussions that Mr. Kennedy's ultimate decisions
to approve the advisory build-up and the introduction
of combat-support troops was made "without a careful examination"
of precisely what it was expected to produce and how.
The study concludes that the Kennedy strategy was fatally
flawed from the outset for political as much as for military
reasons. It depended, the study notes, on successfully prodding
President Diem to undertake the kind of political, economic
and social reforms that would, in the slogan of that day, "win
the hearts and minds of the people."
"The U.S. over-all plan to end the insurgency was on
shaky ground on the GVN side," the study comments. "Diem
needed the U.S. and the U.S. needed a reformed Diem."
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It also says: "If he could not [reform], the U.S. plan to end
the insurgency was foredoomed from its inception, for it
depended on Vietnamese initiatives to solve a Vietnamese
problem."
And in the end, the Pentagon account relates, the Kennedy
Administration concluded that President Diem could not
reform sufficiently and in 1963 abandoned him.
Abandoning President Diem was what Ambassador Elbridge
Durbrow had suggested in September, 1960, [see Document
# 16.] and again that December, shortly before Mr. Kennedy
took office as President. Drawing on the Ambassador's reports,
among others, a national intelligence estimate provided for
Mr. Kennedy on March 28, 1961, gave a bleak appraisal of
the situation in Vietnam:
"An extremely critical period for President Ngo Dinh Diem
and the Republic of Vietnam lies immediately ahead. During
the past six months the internal security situation has continued
to deteriorate and has now reached serious proportions
...
"More than one-half of the entire rural region south and
southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are
under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas
are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately
backed by substantial armed force. The Vietcong's
strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move
closer in on the city . . . .
"The deterioration in the position of the Diem Government
reached a new extreme in November when army paratroop
officers joined forces with a number of civilian oppositionists in
a narrowly defeated attempt to overthrow Diem. On the surface,
Diem's position appears to have improved somewhat
since then ....
"However, the facts which gave rise to the coup attempt
have not been seriously dealt with and still exist. Discontent
with the Diem Government continues to be prevalent among
intellectual circles and, to a lesser degree, among labor and
business groups. There has been an increasing disposition within
official circles and the Army to question Diem's ability to
lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the
people in the fight against the Communists because of his
reliance on virtual one-man rule, his toleration of corruption
extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to
relax a rigid system of public controls."
This assessment, the Pentagon study relates, echoed the
themes and even some of the language of Ambassador Durbrow's cablegrams.
One of these, on Sept. 24, 1960, suggested
that if President Diem was unable to regain support through
political and social reforms, "it may become necessary for
U.S. Government to begin consideration alternative courses
of action and leaders."
A Challenge for the U.S.
However serious the problem in South Vietnam, the situation
in Laos was far more critical. "The Western position was
in the process of falling apart as Kennedy took office," the
Pentagon account says.
And during the spring of 1961, when President Kennedy
made his first series of Vietnam decisions, Laos-not Vietnam
-was the dominant issue and largely determined how Vietnam
should be handled, according to the Pentagon account.
The Eisenhower Administration had chosen to back rightwing
elements in Laos, and by early 1961 they were reeling
under Communist and neutralist attacks. President Kennedy
chose to seek a political compromise and a military cease-fire
rather than to continue to support the Laotian rightists.
Because of this shift in strategy in Laos, the Pentagon
study says, the Kennedy Administration felt impelled to show
strength in Vietnam to reassure America's allies in Asia.
In what the Administration saw as a global power competition
with the Soviet Union, the account notes, Washington
thought it dangerous to give ground too often. Summing
up the Administration's reasoning, the author writes: "After
the U.S. stepped back in Laos, it might be hard to persuade
the Russians that we intended to stand firm anywhere if we
then gave up on Vietnam."
Moreover, the Kennedy Administration sensed a particular
challenge in the declaration by the Soviet Premier, Nikita S.
Khrushchev, on Jan. 6, 1961, that Moscow intended to back
"wars on national liberation" around the world. In response,
counterinsurgency-as strategy against guerrilla war became
known-grew to be a primary preoccupation of the Kennedy
White House, as a steady flow of Presidential decision papers
testifies.
"Vietnam was the only place in the world where the Administration
faced a well-developed Communist effort to
topple a pro-Western government with an externally aided
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pro-Communist insurgency," the Pentagon study comments.
"It was a challenge that could hardly be ignored."
On April 12 Mr. Rostow, the senior White House specialist
on Southeast Asia and a principal architect of counterinsurgency
doctrine, put Vietnam directly before President
Kennedy with a memorandum [see Document #22] asserting
that the time had come for "gearing up the whole Vietnam
operation." He proposed a series of moves that the study calls
"pretty close to an agenda" for the Kennedy Administration's
first high-level review of Vietnam. Among other things Mr.
Rostow proposed these measures:
• "The appointment of a full-time first-rate backstop man
in Washington."
• "A possible visit to Vietnam in the near future by the
Vice President."
• "The raising of the MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory
Group] ceiling, which involves some diplomacy, unless we
can find an alternative way of introducing into the Vietnam
operation a substantial number of Special Forces types."
• "Setting the question of extra funds for Diem."
• "The tactics of persuading Diem to move more rapidly to
broaden the base of his Government, as well as to decrease
its centralization and improve its efficiency."
Virtually all the Rostow proposals eventually became policy
except his suggestion for a "first-rate backstop man." His
candidate, the study notes, was Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale,
a long-time Central Intelligence Agency operative who
was close to President Diem and who in 1961 was in charge
of "special operations" for the Pentagon. The State Department
blocked his appointment, the study reports.
On April 2D-the day after the collapse of the Bay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba-President Kennedy ordered a quick review
of the Vietnam situation. As quoted by Secretary McNamara,
the President's instructions were to "appraise . . . the Communist
drive to dominate South Vietnam" and "recommend
a series of actions (military, political and/ or economic, overt
and/ or covert) which, in your opinion, will prevent Communist
domination of that country."
The task force, headed by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, turned in its report on April 27.
The report, quoted in the Pentagon study, recommended
a 100-man increase in the American military advisory mission
in Saigon, more American arms and aid for the Vietnamese
regional forces known as the Civil Guard, the release
of funds for a previously approved expansion of the South
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Vietnamese Army and the dropping of earlier conditions that
President Diem undertake political and social reforms in return.
Allied efforts, the report said, should be infused with a
sense of urgency to impress friends and foes alike that "come
what may, the U.S. intends to win this battle." The emphasis
was in the original report.
Even before the report was submitted, it was overtaken by
events: The Laotian crisis was at its peak. President Kennedy
met with the National Security Council on April 26 to decide
whether to send troops into Laos. Late that night the Joint
Chiefs of Staff alerted the commander in chief of Pacific
forces, Adm. Harry D. Felt, "to be prepared to undertake air
strikes against North Vietnam, and possibly southern China,"
the account reports.
Overnight the Vietnam recommendations changed. "As insurance
against a conventional invasion of South Vietnam"
through the eastern, mountainous portions of Laos, the Gilpatric
task force recommended quick expansion of the South
Vietnamese Army by two divisions-40,000 men-plus the
first major input of American troops, as training forces, according
to the Pentagon study.
The April 28 "Laos annex," the narrative recounts, called
for "a 1,600-man [American] training team for each of the
two new [South Vietnamese] divisions, plus a 400-man Special
Forces contingent to speed up counterinsurgency forces:
a total of 3,600 men."
On April 29-described in the narrative as a day of "prolonged
crisis meetings at the White House"-Admiral Felt
was alerted to prepare to move one American combat brigade
of 5,000 men with air elements to northeastern Thailand and
another to Danang, on the South Vietnamese coast, as a
threat to intervene in Laos. "Decision to make these deployments
not firm," the Joint Chiefs of Staff cabled Admiral Felt.
The tactics were directly related to the Laos crisis.
Acting on Vietnam that day, the study reports, President
Kennedy approved the modest 100-man increase in the
American advisory mission and a few other steps suggested in
the first Gilpatric task force's report.
"The only substantial significance that can be read into
these April 29 decisions," the analyst writes, "is that they
signaled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit of the
U.S. military mission in Saigon." Publicity would have entailed
"the first formal breach of the Geneva agreements," the
study says, so the move was kept quiet.
By May I the acute fever of the Laos crisis had eased, the
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account goes on, and there was a "strong sense ... that the
U.S. would not go into Laos: that if the cease-fire failed, we
would make a strong stand, instead, in Thailand and Vietnam."
Vietnam planning was directly affected. The State Department
drafted the first of several revisions to tone down the
Gilpatric task force's recommendations. When the task-force
report finally went before the National Security Council on
May 9, the study recounts, the State Department had largely
prevailed. Shortly before that the White House announced
that Vice President Johnson was leaving within days for a
trip to Saigon and other Asian capitals.
The final task-force report, quoted in the Pentagon account,
recommended the deployment of 400 Special Forces soldiers
and an immediate Pentagon study of a further build-up "in
preparation for possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam,
which might result from an N.S.C. decision following
discussions between Vice President Johnson and President
Diem." The idea of sending 3,200 other soldiers right away
was dropped.
In place of a Pentagon proposal made on May 1 for unilateral
American intervention in Vietnam if that became
necessary to "save the country from Communism," the final
report by the Gilpatric task force proposed a new "bilateral
arrangement with Vietnam."
"On the grounds that the Geneva accords have placed inhibitions
upon Free World action while at the same time placing
no restrictions upon the Communists," the report said,
"Ambassador Nolting should be instructed to enter into preliminary
discussions with Diem regarding the possibility of a
defensive security alliance despite the inconsistency of such
action with the Geneva accords .... Communist violations,
therefore, justify the establishment of the security arrangements
herein recommended."
A Sterner Objective
On May 11, two days after Vice President Johnson's departure
for Saigon, President Kennedy made his decisions.
As recorded in National Security Action Memorandum 52, a
copy of which accompanies the Pentagon study, the American
objective was stated more bluntly and more ambitiously
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than in typical public pronouncements. The memorandum
said the American objective was "to prevent Communist
domination of South Vietnam," whereas six days earlier
President Kennedy himself spoke at a news conference of a
vaguer desire "to assist Vietnam to obtain its independence."
The memorandum also specified measures that were not
disclosed to the public: Presidential approval for the deployment
of 400 Special Forces troops, for Ambassador Nolting
to start negotiations on "a new bilateral arrangement with
Vietnam" and for the initiation of a covert-warfare campaign
against North Vietnam.
The one step, in the Pentagon analyst's view, that involved
the United States more than the President's public statements
suggested was the decision to send Special Forces. "Obviously
the President was sold on their going," the study comments,
"and since the Vietnamese Special Forces were themselves
supported by C.I.A. rather than the regular military-aid program,
it was possible to handle these troops covertly."
According to the documentary record, President Kennedy's
specific orders on covert warfare called for these steps:
• "Dispatch ... agents to North Vietnam" for intelligence
gathering.
• "Infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to southeast
Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and
lines of communications."
• "In North Vietnam, using the foundation established by
intelligence operations, from networks of resistance, covert
bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment."
• "Conduct overflights for dropping of leaflets to harass the
Communists and to maintain morale of North Vietnamese
population, and increase gray [unidentified-source] broadcasts
to North Vietnam for the same purposes."
• Train "the South Vietnamese Army to conduct ranger
raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam as might
prove necessary or appropriate."
The documents also show that Mr. Kennedy approved plans
"for the use in North Vietnam operations of civilian air crews
of American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition
to Vietnamese." The plans, quoted in full in the final report
of the Gilpatric task force, designate the South Vietnamese
Army's First Observation Group, stationed at Nhatrang, as
the main unit for carrying on unconventional warfare in
Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam.
In July, 1961, General Lansdale submitted to General
Taylor, the President's military adviser, a preliminary report
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on preparations for this clandestine warfare. By that time,
the report said, the First Observation Group had "some
limited operations in North Vietnam and some shallow penetrations
into Laos." [See Document #22.]
The Lansdale report stated, however, that most of the
unit's operations had been directed against the Vietcong in
South Vietnam and that this was being changed to focus it
entirely on North Vietnam and Laos-"denied areas," in
official terminology.
"The plan is to relieve the group from these combat assignments
[against the Vietcong] to ready its full strength for
denied-areas missions," General Lansdale said. As of July 6,
the unit was to be expanded to 805 men from 340. "Personnel
are volunteers who have been carefully screened by
security organizations," General Lansdale said. "Many are
from North Vietnam. They have been trained for guerrilla
operations at the group's training center at Nhatrang."
In addition, the Lansdale report said, 400 selected South
Vietnamese soldiers, 60 montagnard tribesmen and 70 civilians
were being formed into "additional volunteer groups,
apart from the First Observation Group, for similar operations."
The general listed 50 Americans-35 from the Defense
Department and 15 from the C.I.A.-engaged in
training these groups and preparing other South Vietnamese
intelligence and psychological-warfare operations. According
to the Pentagon study, these were to be augmented by some
of the 400 Special Forces soldiers President Kennedy ordered
to the field on May 11.
The study does not report on the actual operations of the
units during the Kennedy years.
Bernard Fall, in his history "The Two Vietnams," published
in 1963, described the organization of the First Observation
Group into IS-man combat teams and 24-man support teams.
"One such unit was captured near Ninhbinh (180 miles north
of the 17th Parallel) in July, 1961, when its aircraft developed
engine trouble," Mr. Fall reported.
In July the Hanoi radio, as monitored by the United States
Government, carried several English-language broadcasts on
the incident, saying that North Vietnam had shot down a
plane encroaching on its airspace and describing a number of
American-made items to try to authenticate the plane's origin.
According to the broadcasts, the plane was marked in red
letters "C-47," the oil tank "Douglas Aircraft" and the radio
apparatus "Bendix Radio, Baltimore, U.S.A.," and some of
the I0 men aboard carried "Colt" automatics. The generator
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was marked "Signal Corps U.S. Army," one broadcast said.
The North Vietnamese Government announced plans to try
three survivors on charges of sabotage and espionage, saying
that they confessed to having been trained by Americans who
gave them a map and traced out their flight route over North
Vietnam. Hanoi protested the incident formally to Britain
and the Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva
conference on Vietnam, asserting that since May 13, 1961-
two days after President Kennedy's orders were issued-the
"U.S.-Diem regime" had "continuously carried out espionage
and provocative acts against the North."
The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister described the
C-47 incident as "an extremely impudent violation of the
Geneva agreements." During July and August the North
Vietnamese also broadcast descriptions of the build-up of the
First Observation Group and the American organization and
training of that unit, with details that corresponded almost
exactly with the Lansdale report.
The North Vietnamese Government also formally protested
several times to the International Control Commission that
South Vietnamese units had conducted raids into the demilitarized
zone separating the two Vietnams.
On Nov. 1 The New York Times carried a dispatch from
Saigon quoting informants as reporting disaffection in North
Vietnam and citing as evidence the sabotaging of an industrial
plant at Vinh on Aug. 11 and other similar incidents.
Diem at the Fulcrum
President Kennedy's decision in May deferred-but did not
settle-the issue of combat troops for South Vietnam.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1961 the Administration's
debate on that crucial matter was significantly affected by the
attitude of President Diem, according to the Pentagon account.
Initially, it relates, Vice President Johnson found the South
Vietnamese leader reluctant; in midsummer he warmed to
the idea somewhat; by fall he was appealing to the United
States to become a co-belligerent.
The Vietnam troop decisions were also affected by the
confrontation with the Soviet Union over Berlin. At his meeting
in Vienna with Premier Khrushchev in June, President
Kennedy managed to strike a general bargain to seek neutralization in
Laos. But the Soviet leader applied pressure on
the Berlin issue by threatening to sign a peace treaty with
East Germany, making Western access to West Berlin extremely
vulnerable. The tension on this issue mounted-and
overshadowed developments in Southeast Asia-until, on
Oct. 17, Premier Khrushchev dropped the idea of the peace
treaty with East Germany.
Vice President Johnson, on his whirlwind mission through
Asia to bolster the confidence of America's allies, met with
President Diem on May 12. According to an embassy report
of their meeting, when Mr. Johnson raised the possibility of
sending American combat units to Vietnam or working out a
bilateral defense treaty, he found Mr. Diem uninterested. The
embassy report quoted President Diem as saying he wanted
American combat troops only in the event of an open invasion.
In his private report to President Kennedy on May 23,
the Vice President painted American alternatives in Asia in
blacks and whites, giving Thailand and Vietnam pivotal significance.
"We must decide whether to help these countries
to the best of our ability," he declared, "or throw in the towel
in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and
a 'Fortress America' concept." [See Document #21.]
Nonetheless, alluding to President Diem's response on the
troop question, Mr. Johnson told Mr. Kennedy: "Asian
leaders-at this time-do not want American troops involved
in Southeast Asia other than on training missions .... This
does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack
would bring calls for U.S. combat troops."
If this seemed to close the issue for President Kennedy, as
the study indicates, it was not the last word from President
Diem. Responding to a suggestion from Vice President Johnson,
the South Vietnamese leader spelled out his military proposals
in a letter to President Kennedy on June 9.
The letter, quoted extensively in the Pentagon account,
urged a major expansion of the South Vietnamese Army,
from 170,000 to 270,000 men, accompanied by "considerable"
United States build-up with "selected elements of the
American armed forces." President Diem said that the increases
were needed "to counter the ominous threat" of
Communist domination-a threat that he documented by
what the study calls "inflated infiltration figures."
The plea for "selected elements of the American armed
forces," according to the Pentagon narrative, sounded "very
much like" a request for the kind of forces that the Defense
99
Department had proposed in April and that the American
advisory mission in Saigon was urging in midsummer.
The real interest of the Joint Chiefs and other military officers,
the account says, was "in getting U.S. combat units into
Vietnam, with the training mission a possible device for
getting this accepted by Diem" and by civilian leaders in
Washington.
The White House, preoccupied by Berlin, sidestepped the
issue by agreeing in August to finance a much more modest
increase in the Vietnamese Army-30,OOO men-and by
postponing any build-up of American advisers, according to
the study.
Moreover, the writer suggests that the White House was
already developing other ideas about Southeast Asia. During
the summer discussions, Mr. Rostow once again produced
proposals that, in the study's words, were a "quite exact"
prescription for President Kennedy's decisions in the fall. In
what is described in the account as a handwritten note to
Secretary McNamara on a piece of scratch paper, probably
passed by hand during a meeting about June 5, Mr. Rostow
said:
"Bob:
"We must think of the kind of forces and missions
for Thailand now, Vietnam later.
"We need a guerrilla deterrence operation in Thailand's
northeast.
"We shall need forces to support a counterguerrilla
war in Vietnam:
"aircraft
"helicopters
"communications men
"special forces
"militia teachers
"etc.
"WWR"
The emphasis on deterrence was Mr. Rostow's.
In late fall President Diem jolted the Kennedy Administration
into its most urgent consideration of the troop issueand
its most significant military decisions-with a sudden,
secret request for the bilateral defense treaty he previously
spurned.
On Sept. 29 the study recounts, Mr. Diem had a gloomy
meeting with American officials, and Ambassador Nolting
sent Washington this cablegram:
100
"Diem asked for bilateral defense treaty. Large and unexplained
request. Serious. Put forward as result of Diem's
fear of outcome of Laos situation, SVN vulnerability to increased
infiltration, feelings that SEATO action would be
inhibited by U.K. and France in the case of SVN as in
Laos ....
"Our reaction is that the request should be seriously and
carefully treated to prevent feeling that U.S. is not serious
in intention to support SVN. But see major issues including
overriding Article 19, Geneva accords, possible ratification
problems as well as effect on SEATO.
"Diem's request arises from feeling that U.S. policy on
Laos will expose his flank [to] infiltration and lead to largescale
hostilities in SVN. So seeking a stronger commitment
than he thinks he has now through SEATO."
Admiral Felt, the Pacific commander, who was also present
at the Sept. 29 meeting, cabled a fuller report several days
later saying that President Diem wanted not only a treaty but
also an accelerated American "military build-up." Specifically,
Admiral Felt said, the President pressed for a "large increase
in advisers of all types" and American tactical air squadrons
to help break up the larger Vietcong units that had recently
been massing for attacks.
The Felt message explained that the stepped-up scale of
combat in Vietnam was worrying President Diem as much
as the threat of infiltration or attack from the Laotian side,
if not more. It added: "Diem said VC now able to assemble
large units, had extensive radio net, operating in one or more
battalions with heavy arms capable of raiding principle cities
in provinces .... Could enter a city, burn out stores, attack
leaders, withdraw."
The Pentagon narrative explains that the Vietcong, now
believed to be 17,000 strong, had nearly tripled the level of
their attacks to 450 a month in September.
"The most spectacular attack, which seems to have had a
shattering effect in Saigon," the writer goes on, "was the
seizure of Phuocthanh, a provincial capital only 55 miles
from Saigon," where the Vietcong held the town most of the
day and publicly beheaded the province chief, departing before
the South Vietnamese Army arrived.
For Washington the situation had become more alarming
than it was in the spring. Then Laos was the primary cause
of Vietnam's jitters. "This time," the study comments, "the
problem was not directly Laos, but strong indications of
101
moderate deterioration of Diem's military position and very
substantial deterioration of morale in Saigon."
Even before President Diem's request for a treaty, momentum
for American intervention in Southeast Asia had
been mounting.
By early October, the Pentagon papers recount, several
proposals had emerged: The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated
allied intervention to seize and hold major portions of Laos,
mainly to protect the borders of South Vietnam and Thailand;
the "Rostow proposal" urged sending a force of about
25,000 men from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
into Vietnam to try to guard the border with Laos; and
several other plans suggested putting American forces into
the Vietnamese Central Highlands or the port of Danang,
with or without a training mission.
In the bureaucratic maneuvering that led up to the important
National Security Council meeting of Oct. 11, a
significant new element was injected.
For the first time, the study notes, a proposal was put before
President Kennedy urging that the United States accept
"as our real and ultimate objective the defeat of the Vietcong."
The analyst says this was suggested in a compromise
paper drafted hastily by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under
Secretary of State. The paper said that "three divisions would
be a guess" on the number of American troops needed but
that a more precise estimate would be forthcoming from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The study describes this as a "somewhat confusing" blend
of earlier proposals by Mr. Rostow and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, put together on Oct. 10. "It was pretty clear," the account
continues, "that the main idea was to get some American
combat troops into Vietnam, with the nominal excuse
for doing so quite secondary."
The Joint Chiefs provided a supplemental note estimating
"that 40,000 U.S. forces will be needed to clean up the
Vietcong threat" and that 128,000 additional soldiers would
be sufficient to cope with possible North Vietnamese or
Chinese Communist intervention. The note, which accompanies
the historical study, cited the Berlin crisis as
another strain on American military manpower and urged
"a step-up in the present mobilization, possibly of major
proportions. "
A third paper, which the narrative terms notable for its
candor, also advocated "early and hard-hitting" intervention
in Vietnam. This paper, a note to Secretary McNamara from
102
William P. Bundy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense,
said:
"It is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being
made by the Vietcong. Walt Rostow made the point yesterday
that the Vietcong are about to move, by every indication,
from the small-unit basis to a moderate battalion-size basis.
Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set up a provisional
government' ... in the very Kontum area into which
the present initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the
Vietcong movement 'blooms' in this way, it will almost
certainly attack all the back-the-winner sentiment that understandably
prevails in such cases and that beat the French in
early 1954 and came within an ace of beating Diem in early
1955."
Mr. Bundy bluntly put the odds as he saw them:
"An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance
(70 per cent would be my guess) of arresting things and
giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up . . . It all
depends on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical.
The 30 per cent chance is that we would wind up like the
French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight.
"On a 70-30 basis, I would myself favor going in. But if
we let, say, a month go by before we move, the odds will
slide ... down to 60-40, 50-50 and so on."
The italics are Mr. Bundy's.
The intelligence community provided what the study calls a
"conspicuously more pessimistic (and more realistic)" assessment
than the formal recommendations of the Pentagon
or Mr. Rostow. In spite of all the American worry about
infiltration into South Vietnam through Laos, a special national
intelligence estimate on Oct. 5 reported "that 80-90
per cent of the estimated 17,000 VC had been locally recruited,
and that there was little evidence that the VC relied
on external supplies," according to the Pentagon account.
The intelligence estimate also included a warning about the
kind of enemy shrewdness and tenacity that became reality.
The estimate, drafted while the Administration was thinking
primarily of SEATO-rather than unilateral American-intervention,
forecast:
"The Communists would expect worthwhile political and
psychological rewards from successful harassment and
guerrilla operations against SEATO forces. The D.R.Y. would
probably not relax its Vietcong campaign against the GVN
[Government of (South) Vietnam] to any significant extent.
Meanwhile, Communist strength in south Laos would probably be increased
by forces from North Vietnam to guard
against an effort to partition Laos. . . . The Soviet airlift
would probably be increased with a heavier flow of military
supply into south Laos .... "
Confronted with such conflicting advice, President Kennedy
decided to send General Taylor to Saigon. According
to minutes of the National Security Council meeting on Oct.
11, quoted in the Pentagon account, the general was instructed
to consider three strategies:
• Bold intervention to "defeat the Vietcong," using up to
three divisions of American troops .
• Sending "fewer U.S. combat forces" to Vietnam, not to
crush the insurgency but "for the purpose of establishing a
U.S. 'presence' in Vietnam."
• "Stepping up U.S. assistance and training of Vietnam
units, furnishing of more U.S. equipment, particularly helicopters
and other light aircraft, trucks and other ground
transport"-short of using American combat forces.
The minutes said President Kennedy was to announce the
Taylor mission, at an afternoon news conference, "as an
economic survey." But, the account says, the President did
"not make the hardly credible claim that he was sending his
personal military adviser to Vietnam to do an economic
survey." After a vaguely worded announcement, the narrative
relates, President Kennedy was "noncommittal when
asked whether Taylor was going to consider the need for
combat troops."
Even before General Taylor and his party could leave
Washington, the Diem Government had sent new and urgent
requests for American combat troops. Ambassador Nolting
reported to Washington on Oct. 13 that Nguyen Dinh Thuan,
the Vietnamese Acting Defense Minister, had requested:
"U.S. combat units or units to be introduced into SVN as
'combat trainer units' ... Wanted a symbolic U.S. strength
near the 17th [Parallel] to prevent attacks there, free own
forces there. Similar purpose station U.S. units in several
provincial seats in Central Highlands. . . . Thuan said first
step quicker than [defense] treaty and time was of the essence.
Thuan said token forces would satisfy SVN and would be
better than treaty." [See Document #25.]
The South Vietnamese Government's state of alarm was
communicated by Mr. Nolting's additional report that Saigon
was considering asking Nationalist China "to send one division
of combat troops in the southwest." Ambassador Nolting
said he had tried to discourage this approach.
104
The Pentagon study goes on to report that Administration
officials effectively squelched press speculation about the
troop question with carefully managed news leaks at this
point.
It cites a dispatch on Oct. 14 in The New York Times reporting
that military leaders, including General Taylor, were
reluctant to send combat units to Vietnam and that this question
was "near the bottom of the list" of things the general
would consider.
From the way the dispatch was handled, the account says,
it clearly "came from a source authorized to speak for the
President, and probably from the President himself." He adds
that "in the light of the recommendations quoted throughout
this paper, and particularly most of the staff papers ... that
led up to the Taylor mission, most of this was simply untrue."
But he concludes: "The Times story had the apparently
desired effect. Speculation about combat troops almost disappeared
from news stories."
State of Emergency
The Taylor mission arrived in Saigon on Oct. 18 and was
greeted by what the Pentagon study calls a "spectacular
opening shot": President Diem's formal declaration of a
state of emergency. Within the next week General Taylor
met twice with the chief of state.
According to an embassy message to Washington on Oct.
20, President Diem told General Taylor at their first meeting
that he wanted a bilateral defense treaty, American support
for another expansion of the South Vietnamese Army
and a list of combat-support items very close to those suggested
in June by Mr. Rostow in his handwritten note to
Secretary McNamara.
"He asked specifically for tactical aviation, helicopter companies,
coastal patrol forces and logistic support (ground
transport) ," the embassy report said. He did not, however,
repeat the earlier request for actual American ground combat
units.
By the second Diem-Taylor meeting, on Oct. 24, American
and South Vietnamese officials had discussed the disastrous
flooding in the Mekong River Delta, where the American
105
military advisory mission, headed by Lieut. Gen. Lionel C.
McGarr, thought American troops might be of some help.
General Taylor had incorporated this idea in a series of
recommendations, which he put before President Diem at
the second meeting. Item E, the study reports, was headed
"Introduction of U.S. Combat Troops," and it proposed "a
flood-relief task force, largely military in composition, to work
with GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of
area. Such a force might contain engineer, medical, signal
and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the
protection of relief operations."
The general directed two messages to Washington after
that meeting, both quoted in the Pentagon account. The
first, sent through regular channels, reported that President
Diem's reaction to all of General Taylor's recommendations
-including the flood-relief task force-"was favorable."
In his second message, sent privately to President Kennedy
and the President's most senior advisers, General Taylor
was more specific. He proposed a force of 6,000 to 8,000
American soldiers, not only to cope with the flooding but
significantly, as the narrative points out, to assure "Diem of
our readiness to join him in a military showdown with Vietcong
or Vietminh." [See Documents #26 and #27.]
General Taylor said that he envisioned mostly logistics
forces but that "some combat troops" would be necessary
to defend the American engineer troops and their encampments.
He warned that "any troops coming to VN may expect
to take casualties."
The general underscored the propaganda advantage of relating
the introduction of American ground troops to the
need for flood relief as "offering considerable advantages in
VN and abroad" and leaving President Kennedy his choice
on further action. "As the task is a specific one," he explained,
"we can extricate our troops when it is done if we
so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities
if we wish to remain longer."
He acknowledged, in conclusion: "This kind of task force
will exercise little direct influence on the campaign against
the VC. It will, however, give a much needed shot in the arm
to national morale."
General Taylor's proposals engendered State Department
opposition. His messages, evidently relayed to Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, who was in Japan for a conference,
prompted Mr. Rusk to cable Washington, warning about the
106
risks of making a military commitment without reciprocal
political reforms by President Diem.
According to his Nov. 1 message, which is appended to the
Pentagon study, Mr. Rusk said that if, as previously, the
South Vietnamese leader was not willing to trust his military
commanders more and to take steps to bring more non-
Communist elements into influential roles, it was "difficult
to see how handful of American troops can have decisive influence."
While attaching the "greatest possible importance"
to the security of Southeast Asia, Mr. Rusk expressed reluctance
to see American prestige committed too deeply for
the sake of "a losing horse."
Similar reservations were already reflected by reports from
two middle-level State Department members of General
Taylor's mission. Sterling J. Cottrell and William J. Jorden
submitted separate dissents to General Taylor on their way
home by way of Bangkok and the Philippines.
Mr. Cottrell, head of the interagency Vietnam task force in
Washington, asserted in a memorandum dated Oct. 27 that
"since U.S. combat troops of division size cannot be employed
effectively, they should not be introduced at this stage" despite
the "favorable psychological lift" it would give the Vietnamese.
"Since it is an open question whether the GVN can succeed
even with U.S. assistance," he went on, "it would be a
mistake for the U.S. to commit itself irrevocably to the defeat
of the Communists in SVN." But if combined American and
Vietnamese efforts failed in the South, he recommended
moving "to the 'Rostow plan' of applying graduated punitive
measures on the D.R.V. with weapons of our choosing."
Mr. Jorden reported finding explosive pressures for political
and administrative change in South Vietnam as well as "near
paralysis" in parts of the Government because so many decisions
had to await personal approval by President Diem.
Many Government officials and military officers, he said,
"have lost confidence in President Diem and his leadership."
He urged that the United States not identify itself "with a
man or a regime."
Quite contrary pressures were being exerted on Washington,
however, by the American mission in Saigon. On Oct.
31, the study says, the embassy reported to Washington the
Vietnamese people's "virtually unanimous desire" for the introduction
of American troops.
From Baguio, in the Philippines, where he had stopped
to draft his formal report with Mr. Rostow and his other
107
aides, General Taylor sent two more messages to President
Kennedy on Nov. 1, urging a commitment of a "U.S. military
task force" to Vietnam.
But, the messages show, he now listed the flood-relief
mission as secondary to the objective of providing a "U.S.
military presence capable of raising national morale and of
showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the U.S. intent
to resist a Communist take-over."
Writing in more sweeping language than he used in Saigon
a week before, the general now advocated a "massive joint
effort" with the South Vietnamese "to cope with both the
Vietcong and the ravages of the flood." The presence of
American ground units, he said, was "essential" to "reverse
the present downward trend of events."
His second message discounted the risks of sliding into a
major Asian land war accidentally and sought to assure
President Kennedy that the American troops would not be
aggressively hunting down the Vietcong guerrillas though
they would be involved in some combat. He wrote:
"This force is not proposed to clear the jungles and forests
of Vietcong guerrillas. That should be the primary task of the
armed forces of Vietnam for which they should be specifically
organized, trained and stiffened with ample U.S. advisers down
to combat battalion levels.
"However, the U.S. troops may be called upon to engage
in combat to protect themselves, their working parties and
the area in which they live. As a general reserve, they might
be thrown into action (with U.S. agreement) against large,
formed guerrilla bands which have abandoned the forests for
attacks on major targets."
The parenthetical matter was in General Taylor's original
cablegram.
The message also repeated the theme, attributed by the
analyst and by Mr. Cottrell to Mr. Rostow, that bombing
of North Vietnam could be used as a diplomatic threat to
hold Hanoi at bay.
The language of all of General Taylor's messages, the
Pentagon study comments, suggests that the support forces
-helicopter companies, the expanded advisory mission,
tactical air support-"were essentially already agreed to by
the President before Taylor left Washington."
The general's interest, the study explains, was in getting a
commitment of "ground forces (not necessarily all or even
mainly infantrymen, but ground soldiers who would be out in
the countryside where they could he shot at and shoot back)."
108
His argument for ground troops, the study observes, was
based more on "psychological than military reasons."
The formal report by the Taylor mission, submitted on
Nov. 3, incorporated the proposal for what the analyst calls
a "hard commitment on the ground" and other measures,
all under the over-all concept of a new American role in
Vietnam: "limited partnership." The drift of the report, which
the Pentagon narrative says was probably written with Mr.
Rostow, was reflected in the proposal that the American
military advisory mission in Saigon not only should be
"radically increased" but also should undertake more active
direction of the war by becoming "something nearer [to]
-but not quite-an operational headquarters in a theater of
war."
The main evaluation section, the study comments, "puts
Saigon's weakness in the best light and avoids suggesting
that perhaps the U.S. should consider limiting rather than increasing
commitments to the Diem regime."
The dissents of Mr. Cottrell and Mr. Jorden were submitted,
along with a military annex, which said: "The performance
of ARVN [the Army of South Vietnam] is disappointing
and generally is characterized by a lack of aggressiveness
and at most levels is devoid of a sense of urgency."
The Taylor report, the Pentagon account notes, proposed
solving this type of problem through administrative reforms
in the army and the infusion of Americans. The writer comments
that there was no serious demand for pressing President
Diem to make the kind of reforms that Secretary Rusk
felt necessary.
Moreover, the Pentagon study notes two important underlying
assumptions for the report. The first was that South
Vietnamese problems-whether the Army's lack of spirit or
President Diem's bottlenecks-"could be cured if enough
dedicated Americans become involved." There was great
implicit faith, the study goes on, that Americans could provide
the South Vietnamese "with the elan and style needed to
win."
The second major assumption, the analyst notes, was that
"if worse comes to worst, the U.S. could probably save its
position in Vietnam by bombing the North."
Both these assumptions, as the Pentagon narrative recounts
in later sections, were essential ingredients of the advice given
to President Johnson in late 1964 and 1965, as he made the
decisions to move forcefully into the war.
As the Taylor recommendations were submitted to President Kennedy, he
also received a special national intelligence
estimate forecasting that American escalation would be
matched by Hanoi. According to the Pentagon account, the
Nov. 5 estimate considered four possibilities--expanding the
American advisory mission, plus an American airlift for
Vietnamese troops; sending an 8,000-to-10,000-man flood-relief
task force; sending a 25,000-to-40,000-man combat
force, and warning Hanoi, in conjunction with any of those
steps, that the United States "would launch air attacks against
North Vietnam" unless Hanoi stopped supporting the Vietcong.
"The gist" of the intelligence estimate, the Pentagon account
says, "was that the North Vietnamese would respond
to an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase
in infiltrated support for the Vietcong." The greater the
American involvement, the intelligence estimate prophesied,
the stronger the North Vietnamese reaction. The estimate
also implied, the narrative goes on, that "threats to bomb
would not cause Hanoi to stop its support for the Vietcong,
and . . . actual attacks on the North would bring a strong
response from Moscow and Peiping. . . ."
Nonetheless, the Taylor recommendations received backing
from Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a memo on Nov. 8 to President
Kennedy, reprinted in the study, Mr. McNamara summarized
their position:
"We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the
U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South
Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment
by the necessary military actions.
"If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the
recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward
its fulfillment."
But the memorandum warned President Kennedy that the
8,000-man task force "probably will not tip the scales
decisively," meaning that "we would be almost certain to get
increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle."
"In short," the study comments, "the President was being
told that the issue was not whether to send an 8,000-man
task force, but whether or not to embark on a course that,
without some extraordinary good luck, would lead to combat
involvement in Southeast Asia on a very substantial scale."
The Pentagon narrative says that while the Joint Chiefs'
position was clear, Mr. McNamara's position "remains a little
ambiguous," especially in view of his qualified phrase "in-
110
dined to recommend" sending ground troops. The implication
seems to be that Secretary McNamara was willing to go along
with the Joint Chiefs to this extent to draw them out for
President Kennedy on the full, long-term meaning of their
recommendations.
Moreover, as the study records, three days later Mr. McNamara joined Mr.
Rusk in a quite different recommendation
and, the analyst says, "one obviously more to the President's
liking (and, in the nature of such things, quite possibly
drawn up to the President's specifications)." [See Document
#30.]
This memorandum, almost totally adopted by President
Kennedy as policy, contained stronger rhetoric than the
earlier McNamara note but milder recommendations. The
memorandum, quoted nearly in full in the Pentagon account,
began wth a strong exposition of the domino theory:
"The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any
further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia
to the Free World; we would have to face the near certainty
that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would
move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if
not formal incorporation within the Communist bloc."
The language on the troop issue, omitting any mention of
the flood-relief task force, seems carefully drafted:
"The commitment of United States forces to South Vietnam
involves two different categories: (A) units of modest
size required for the direct support of South Vietnamese
military effort, such as communications, helicopter and other
forms of airlift, reconnaisance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence
units, etc., and (B) larger organized units with actual
or potential direct military missions. Category (A) should be
introduced as speedily as possible. Category (B) units pose a
more serious problem. . .. "
The italicized emphasis is in the original document.
The two Secretaries recommended that the United States
"now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective
of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and
that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United
States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve
this objective." But for the present it said only that the
Pentagon should prepare plans for ground combat forces.
Three lines of reasoning for opposing a commitment of
ground combat troops emerge from this document.
The first and possibly the most significant, the Pentagon
study suggests, is that such a move "prior to a Laotian settlement would
run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist
breach of the cease-fire and a resumption of hostilities
in Laos," leaving the President the unattractive choice of
"the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that
country to full Communist control." The second reason was
the need "to involve forces from other nations" as well; otherwise
it would be "difficult to explain to our own people
why no effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the
United States undertook to carry this burden unilaterally."
The third was the dilemma underlying the troop proposals -- that
"if there is a strong South Vietnamese effort, they may
not be needed [but] if there is not such an effort, United
States forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst
of an apathetic or hostile population."
The Rusk-McNam3ra memorandum fully acknowledged
that even sending support troops and more advisers would
mean openly exceeding military ceilings imposed by the
1954 Geneva accords. The memorandum proposed an exchange
of letters with President Diem in which President
Kennedy would assert "the necessity now of exceeding some
provisions of the accords in view of the D.R.V. violations."
It also called for the release of a white paper, "A Threat to
Peace," reporting on infiltration from North Vietnam and on
Vietcong terrorism.
Embracing the essence of Mr. Rusk's message from Japan,
the joint memorandum added a demand for reform from
President Diem before the United States build-up would be
put in motion.
The President accepted all major recommendations, according
to the study, except for the unqualified commitment
to the goal of saving South Vietnam from Communism. His
decisions were formally embodied on Nov. 22 in a national
security action memorandum, No. 111, entitled "First Phase
of Vietnam Program."
But on Nov. 14 Washington sent a summary of the President's
decisions-evidently made the day before-to Ambassador
Nolting. The message demanded "concrete demonstration
by Diem that he is now prepared to work in an
orderly way [with] his subordinates and broaden the political
base of his regime." For the first time it sought to inject the
United States more deeply into managing the war by asserting:
"We would expect to share in the decision-making
process in the political, economic and military fields as they
affect the security situation."
Possibly to assuage President Diem's expected disappointment, it noted
that the decision on combat-support troops
and many more advisers "will sharply increase the commitment
of our prestige to save SVN." It concluded by asserting
that while the Pentagon was preparing contingency plans for
ground combat forces, the "objective of our policy is to do
all possible to accomplish [our] purpose without use of U.S.
combat forces."
No Presidential paper in the Pentagon record clearly details
Mr. Kennedy's thinking, but two documents shed light:
the Nov. 14 message and some unsigned notes of a National
Security Council meeting that, according to the Pentagon
account, took place on Nov. 15.
The notes included these entries: "Pres expressed concern
over 2-front war. Another bother him, no overt Chicom
aggression in SVN, unlike Korea. These Diem's own people;
difficult operating area. If go beyond advisers need other nations
with us ... Pres receiving static from Congress; they
against using U.S. troops."
At another point, Mr. Kennedy reportedly asked why it
was important to retain South Vietnam and Laos. The notes
record the reply from Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "We would lose Asia all the way
Singapore. Serious setback to U.S. and P.W. [free world]."
President Kennedy was also reportedly concerned about
the lack of support from the British and worried about the
proposed letter acknowledging that the United States would
be breaking the Geneva accords. "Pres asked Rusk," the
notes say, "why do we take onus, saying we are going to
break Geneva accords (in letter to Diem). Why not remain
silent. Don't say this ourselves. Directed State to reword
letter." The parentheses were in the original notes.
The Nov. 14 message reflects similar reasoning. The implication
is that one important consideration for President
Kennedy was fear that sending ground combat forces to
South Vietnam, in the language of the message, "might wreck
chances for agreement" in Laos and lead to a breakdown of
the cease-fire there.
A second drawback cited in the message was the risk of
provoking confrontations with the Soviet Union elsewhere -- the
"two front" problem-especially in Berlin where the acute
crisis had eased less than a month before.
The decision disappointed President Diem who, according
to the Pentagon study, was seeking a firm U.S. commitment
to him. The account reports that Ambassador Nolting cabled
Washington on Nov. 18 to say that the South Vietnamese
113
leader had immediately inquired about ground combat units.
After hearing Mr. Nolting's response, the Ambassador said,
President Diem "took our proposals rather better than I
expected." Two days later the Ambassador said he was getting
high-level reports that President Diem was upset and brooding.
If this was a bargaining tactic to get the United States to
back down on its demands for reform, the study says, it
worked. On Dec. 7 Washington sent the embassy new instructions,
the account goes on, softening demands for reforms
and settling for "close partnership" and frequent consultation
with the South Vietnamese Government rather than
insisting, as before, on taking part in decision-making.
Whether intentionally or not, the Pentagon study contends,
the over-all effect of these actions was to give the military
side of the war higher priority than the political side.
"To continue to support Diem without reform," the study
comments, "meant quite simply that he, not we, would determine
the course of the counterinsurgent effort and that the
steps he took to assure his continuance in power would
continue to take priority over all else." The account says that
this emphasis came to plague the Kennedy Administration
when South Vietnamese disaffection with the Diem regime
boiled over in 1963.
Copters and Casualties
Even before the American decisions on the troop build-up
were announced formally on Dec. 14 with a public exchange
of letters between Presidents Kennedy and Diem, the
first two American helicopter companies had arrived-400
men with 33 H-21C helicopters. On Feb. 5 the press reported
that the first helicopter had been shot down by the enemy.
Despite the Administration's efforts to draw a careful
bureaucratic distinction between support troops ("Category
A") and combat troops ("Category B"), this was hard to
maintain in the field. The study records without comment
that by mid-February President Kennedy was asked at a news
conference if the Administration was being "less than candid"
about American involvement in Vietnam. He acknowledged
that American troops were "firing back" to protect themselves
114
although he contended that these were not combat troops "in
the generally understood sense of the word."
The Pentagon study goes on to record that on April 11,
two days after two American soldiers were killed in a Vietcong
ambush while on a combat operation with Vietnamese
troops, President Kennedy was asked at a news conference:
"Sir, what are you going to do about the American soldiers
getting killed in Vietnam?"
In reply, the President said: "We are attempting to help
Vietnam maintain its independence and not fall under the
domination of the Communists ... We cannot desist in Vietnam."
Months later, he admitted to increased casualties along
with the build-up he ordered.
According to Pentagon records, nearly 10 times as many
Americans were killed or wounded in action in 1962 as in
1961-figures closely paralleling the tenfold build-up in
American forces to 11,000 men by the end of 1962. The
Pentagon statistics show that the number of killed and
wounded in combat increased from 14 in 1961 to 109 in
1962 and to 489 in 1963.
Although the Pentagon study describes the Kennedy years
as a period of new commitments, it does not indicate whether
in this case President Kennedy-by putting American airmen
in position to fly tactical air missions and ground advisers
to take part in combat operations with South Vietnamese
units-crossed an important firebreak in the American involvement
in Vietnam.
Documents accompanying the Pentagon study amply recount
the rapid tempo of the American build-up-rapid by
standards of the previous seven years. A military briefing
paper for the President on Jan. 9, 1962, cited in the Pentagon
account reported:
• The number of American servicemen in Vietnam jumped
from 948 at the end of November to 2,646 by Jan. 9 and
would reach 5,576 by June 30.
• Two Army helicopter companies were flying combat support
missions and an air commando unit code-named Jungle
Jim was "instructing the Vietnamese Air Force in combat air
support tactics and techniques."
• United States Navy Mine Division 73, with a tender and
five minesweepers, was sailing from Danang along the coastline
.
• American aircraft from Thailand and from the Seventh
Fleet aircraft carriers off Vietnam were flying surveillance and
reconnaissance missions over Vietnam.
115
• Six C-123 spray-equipped aircraft "for support of defoliant
operations" had "received diplomatic clearance" to
enter South Vietnam.
At a news conference on March 18, 1962, Secretary McNamara acknowledged
under questioning that American
"training" of the South Vietnamese "occasionally takes place
under combat conditions." He added that "there has been
sporadic fire aimed at U.S. personnel, and in a few minor
instances they have returned the fire in self-defense." News
reports in the spring of 1962 told of American pilots flying
in the front, or action, seats of "trainer" aircraft while Vietnamese
trainees rode behind.
A Spurt of Optimism
Whatever public uneasiness was expressed in the news-conference
questions, the Pentagon study notes, official
American assessments on the war in the spring and summer of
1962 took on an increasingly favorable tenor.
One special object of praise and of American official confidence,
the account notes, was the development of the
strategic-hamlet program as an all-embracing counterguerrilla
strategy in rural Vietnam. But the Pentagon study comments
that the optimism proved misplaced.
Government documents available in the Pentagon records
describe this strategy as a program to regroup the Vietnamese
population into fortified hamlets in which the Government
was to undertake political, social and economic measures
designed both to weed out Vietcong sympathizers and to gain
popular allegiance through improved local services and better
security.
President Diem formally adopted the strategy for the
Mekong Delta in mid-March, 1962, and made it nationwide
in August. By Sept. 30, according to the study, the
Diem Government was stating that more than a third of the
total rural population was living in completed hamlets.
One flaw inherent in this strategy, the Pentagon study asserts,
was that Saigon and Washington had different objectives
for it: President Diem saw it as a means of controlling his
population, non-Communist as well as Communist, while
Washington saw it as a means of winning greater allegiance
and thereby squeezing out the Vietcong.
116
Moreover, the account goes on, popular allegiance was so
difficult to assess that even American officials turned increasingly
to physical aspects of the program for statistical evaluations
of progress. It left them vulnerable, the study notes, to
exaggerated Vietnamese reports, which they did not uncover
until after the Diem Government had been overthrown in
1963.
Fundamentally, the Pentagon analysts assert, the strategic
hamlets "failed dismally," like previous programs tried by
the French and the Vietnamese, "because they ran into resentment
if not active resistance" from peasants who objected to
being moved forcibly from their fields and their ancestral
homes.
The Pentagon study lays "a principal responsibility for the
unfounded optimism of U.S. policy" in 1962 and early 1963
on inadequate and relatively uninformed American intelligence
and reporting systems. The official optimism, the
Pentagon account discloses, reached its peak in the plans for
an American military "phase-out" in Vietnam on the assumption
that the war against the Vietcong would be won by the
end of 1965.
The tone was set, the analyst writes at a Honolulu conference
on Vietnam strategy. On July 23, 1962, the same
day that the Laotian peace agreement was signed in Geneva,
Secretary McNamara ordered the start of planning for American
withdrawal from Vietnam and long-term projections for
reducing American financial aid to the Saigon Government.
Mr. McNamara is depicted in the study as repeatedly
pressing the somewhat reluctant military command to come
up with a long-range plan for an American phase-out, in part
because of satisfaction with what he called the "tremendous
progress" in early 1962.
But Mr. McNamara's orders also reflected domestic political
problems. At the Honolulu conference, the account
says, "he observed that it might be difficult to retain public
support for U.S. operations indefinitely."
"Political pressures would build up as losses continued,"
it added.
The Pentagon account gives no indication that this planning
was personally originated by President Kennedy or that
it was ever presented to him in completed form. For roughly
18 months, with little urgency, documents flowed back and
forth between Mr. McNamara and the American military
mission in Saigon through Pentagon channels, with Mr. McNamara
constantly urging lower budget figures and reduction
117
to 1,500 American troops by late 1968. Even so, the President
was told in February, 1963, by a senior White House aide,
Michael V. Forrestal, to expect a long and costly war.
"No one really knows," Mr. Forrestal wrote in a report
to Mr. Kennedy on Feb. 11, "how many of the 20,000 'Vietcong'
killed last year were only innocent, or at least persuadable,
villagers, whether the strategic hamlet program is providing
enough govt. services to counteract the sacrifices it requires,
or how the mute mass of villagers react to the charges
against Diem of dictatorship and nepotism." The report,
which accompanies the Pentagon study, went on to say that
Vietcong recruitment inside South Vietnam was so effective
that the war could be continued even without infiltration from
the North.
Moreover, while the phase-out planning continued, the
American involvement grew to 16,732 men in October, 1963.
And the analyst comments that once the political struggle
began in earnest against President Diem in May, 1963, this
planning took on an "absurd quality" based on "the most
Micawberesque predictions" of progress.
"Strangely," the Pentagon study continues, "as a result of
the public White House promise in October and the power
of the wheels set in motion, the U.S. did effect a 1,000-man
withdrawal in December of 1963." But the study discounts
this as "essentially an accounting exercise" offset in part by
troop rotations.
Because of the complete political upheaval against the
Diem regime in 1963, the situation deteriorated so profoundly
in the final five months of the Kennedy Administration,
according to a private report from Secretary McNamara
quoted in the study, that the entire phase-out had to be
formally dropped in early 1964.
Thus, the Pentagon study relates, in spite of the military
build-up under the Kennedy Administration, President Kennedy
left President Johnson a Vietnamese legacy of crisis, of
political instability and of military deterioration at least as
alarming to policy makers as the situation he had inherited
from the Eisenhower Administration.
The decision to build up the combat support and advisory
missions, the Pentagon study comments, was made "almost by
default" because the Kennedy Administration was focused so
heavily in the fall of 1961 on the question of sending ground
combat units to Vietnam. That decision, the analyst writes,
was reached "without extended study or debate" or precise
expectation of what it would achieve.
118
Despite the tens of thousands of words in the Pentagon
account of the Kennedy Administration, backed by scores of
documents, the study does not provide a conclusive answer to
the most vigorously debated question about President Kennedy's
Vietnam policy since his death in November, 1963: If
President Kennedy had lived until 1965, would he have felt
compelled by events, as President Johnson was, to undertake
full-scale land war in South Vietnam and an air war against
the North?
The situation, as the Pentagon account discloses, had
changed significantly between 1961 and 1965. In 1961 President
Kennedy was confronted by other crises-Berlin, Cuba,
Laos-while he faced his harshest decisions on Vietnam, and
these acted as restraints; President Johnson did not have
quite the same distractions elsewhere. Too, President Diem
never pushed so aggressively for American escalation as did
Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the South Vietnamese leader in 1964
and 1965. Nor, as the analysts note, had other measures short
of full-scale air and ground combat been exhausted, without
producing success.
The Pentagon account, moreover, presents the picture of
an unbroken chain of decision-making from the final months
of the Kennedy Administration into the early months of
the Johnson Administration, whether in terms of the political
view of the American stakes in Vietnam, the advisory buildup
or the hidden growth of covert warfare against North
Vietnam.
"No reliable inference can be drawn," the Pentagon study
concludes, "about how Kennedy would have behaved in 1965
and beyond had he lived. (One of those who had advised retaining
freedom of action on the issue of sending U.S. combat
troops was Lyndon Johnson.) It does not prove that
Kennedy behaved soundly in 1961. Many people will think
so; but others will argue that the most difficult problem of
recent years might have been avoided if the U.S. had made
a hard commitment on the ground in South Vietnam in
1961."
119
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's
study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration
of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the
overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where
excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with
only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.
# 16
U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis of Threats
to Saigon Regime
Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador
in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A.
Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.
As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two
separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup
attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly
non-Communistic in origin but Communists can be expected to
endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more
serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over
countryside which, if current Communist progress continues,
would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers
are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden
them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-
Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is
partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over
in Viet-nam.
Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet
these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and
psychological measures required. For countryside danger security
measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures
needed. However both sets measures should be carried out
simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed
at both dangers.
Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and
other messages, including formation internal security council,
120
centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with
our political and economic recommendations. I realize some
measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most
[word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances.
But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem
government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion
prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that
Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived
other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to
ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative
but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required
to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my
frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more
suggestions
outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our
earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:
1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem
and explain our serious concern about present situation and his
political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am
raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk
to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him
the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in
Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present
serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under
instructions.)
I would particularly stress desirability of actions to
broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961
presidential elections required by constitution before end April.
I would propose following actions to President:
2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from
Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists
and convince population government taking effective measures to
deal with present situation, otherwise we fear matters could get
out of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:
(A) Because of Vice President Tho's knowledge of south
where Communist guerrilla infiltration is increasing so rapidly
would suggest that he be shifted from ministry national economy
to ministry interior. (Diem has already made this suggestion but
Vice President most reluctant take job.)
(B) It is important to remove any feeling within armed forces
that favoritism and political considerations motivate promotions
and assignments. Also vital in order deal effectively with Viet
Cong threat that channels of command be followed both down
and up. To assist in bringing about these changes in armed
forces, I would suggest appointment of full-time minister national
defense. (Thuan has indicated Diem has been thinking of giving
Thuan defense job.)
(C) Rumors about Mr. and Mrs. Nhu are creating growing
dissension within country and seriously damage political position
of Diem government. Whether rumors true or false, politically
important fact is that more and more people believe them to be
121
true. Therefore, becoming increasingly clear that in interest Diem
government some action should be taken. In analogous situation
in other countries including U.S. important, useful government
personalities have had to be sacrificed for political reasons. I
would suggest therefore that President might appoint Nhu to
ambassadorship abroad.
(D) Similarly Tran Kim Tuyen, Nhu's henchman and head
of secret intelligence service, should be sent abroad in diplomatic
capacity because of his growing identification in public mind
with alleged secret police methods of repression and control.
(E) One or two cabinet ministers from opposition should be
appointed to demonstrate Diem's desire to establish government
of national union in fight against VC.
3. Make public announcement of disbandment of Can Lao
party or at least its surfacing, with names and positions of all
members made known publicly. Purpose this step would be to
eliminate atmosphere of fear and suspicion and reduce public
belief in favoritism and corruption, all of which party's semi-covert
status has given rise to.
4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and
area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct,
with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department
of government with right to question any official except
President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A)
find some mechanism for dispelling through public investigation
constantly generated rumors about government and its personalities;
(B) provide people with avenue recourse against arbitrary
actions by some government officials, (C) assuage some of intellectual
opposition to government.
5. Require all government officials to declare publicly their
property and financial holdings and give National Assembly
authority to make public investigation of these declarations in
effort dispel rumors of corruption.
6. [Words illegible] of [word illegible] control over content
of the Vietnamese publication [word illegible] magazines, radio,
so that the [words illegible] to closing the gap between government
and [words illegible] ideas from one to the other. To insure
that the press would reflect, as well as lead, public opinion without
becoming a means of upsetting the entire GVN [word illegible],
it should be held responsible to a self-imposed code of ethics or
"canon" of press-conduct.
7. [Words illegible] to propaganda campaign about new 3-year
development plan in effort convince people that government
genuinely aims at [word illegible] their welfare. (This suggestion
[word illegible] of course upon assessment of soundness of development
plan, which has just reached us.)
8. Adopt following measures for immediate enhancement of
peasant support of government: (A) establish mechanism for
increasing price peasant will receive for paddy crop beginning
to come on market in December, either by direct subsidization
122
or establishment of state purchasing mechanism; (B) institute
modest payment for all corvee labor; (C) subsidize agroville
families along same lines as land resettlement families until
former on feet economically; (D) increase compensation paid
to youth corps. If Diem asks how these measures are to be
financed I shall suggest through increased taxes or increased
deficit financing, and shall note that under certain circumstances
reasonable deficit financing becomes a politically necessary measure
for governments. I should add that using revenues for these
fundamental and worthy purposes would be more effective than
spending larger and larger sums on security forces, which, while
they are essential and some additional funds for existing security
forces may be required, are not complete answer to current
problems.
9. Propose suggest to Diem that appropriate steps outlined
above be announced dramatically in his annual state of union
message to National Assembly in early October. Since Diem
usually [word illegible] message in person this would have maximum
effect, and I would recommend that it be broadcast live to
country.
10. At [words illegible] on occasion fifth anniversary establishment
Republic of Vietnam on October 26, it may become highly
desirable for President Eisenhower to address a letter of continued
support to Diem. Diem has undoubtedly noticed that
Eisenhower letter recently delivered to Sihanouk. Not only for
this reason, but also because it may become very important for
us to give Diem continued reassurance of our support. Presidential
letter which could be published here may prove to be very valuable.
Request any additional suggestions department may have and
its approval for approach to Diem along lines paras 1 to 9.
We believe U.S. should at this time support Diem as best available
Vietnamese leader, but should recognize that overriding U.S.
objective is strongly anti-Communist Vietnamese government which
can command loyal and enthusiastic support of widest possible
segments of Vietnamese people, and is able to carryon effective
fight against Communist guerrillas. If Diem's position in country
continues deteriorate as result failure adopt proper political,
psychological, economic and security measures, it may become
necessary for U.S. government to begin consideration alternative
courses of action and leaders in order achieve our objective.
# 17
Memo from Rostow to Kennedy with Nine
Proposals for Action
Memorandum from Walt W. Rostow, deputy Presidential
assistant for national security, to President Kennedy, April
12, 1961.
123
Now that the Viet-Nam election is over, I believe we must
turn to gearing up the whole Viet-Nam operation. Among the
possible lines of action that might be considered at an early
high level meeting are the following:
1. The appointment of a full time first-rate back-stop man in
Washington. McNamara, as well as your staff, believes this to
be essential.
2. The briefing of our new Ambassador, Fritz Nolting, including
sufficient talk with yourself so that he fully understands the
priority you attach to the Viet-Nam problem.
3. A possible visit to Viet-Nam in the near future by the Vice
President.
4. A possible visit to the United States of Mr. Thuan, acting
Defense Minister, and one of the few men around Diem with
operational capacity and vigor.
5. The sending to Viet-Nam of a research and development
and military hardware team which would explore with General
McGarr which of the various techniques and gadgets now available
or being explored might be relevant and useful in the Viet-Nam
operation.
6. The raising of the MAAG ceiling, which involves some
diplomacy, unless we can find an alternative way of introducing
into Viet-Nam operation a substantial number of Special Forces
types.
7. The question of replacing the present ICA Chief in Viet-Nam,
who, by all accounts, has expanded his capital. We need a vigorous
man who can work well with the military, since some of the rural
development problems relate closely to guerilla operations.
8. Sending the question of the extra funds for Diem.
9. The tactics of persuading Diem to move more rapidly to
broaden the base of his government, as well as to decrease its
centralization and improve its efficiency.
Against the background of decisions we should urgently take
on these matters, you may wish to prepare a letter to Diem
which would not only congratulate him, reaffirm our support,
and specify new initiatives we are prepared to take, but would
make clear to him the urgency you attach to a more effective
political and morale setting for his military operation, now that
the elections are successfully behind him.
# 18
Vietnam "Program of Action" by
Kennedy's Task Force
Excerpts from "A Program of Action for South Vietnam,"
May 8, 1961, presented to President Kennedy by
an interdepartmental task force comprising representatives
from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central
124
Intelligence Agency, the International Cooperation Administration,
the United States Information Agency and the Office
of the President .
. 2. MILITARY:
a. The following military actions were approved by the President
at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961:
( 1) Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective
implementation of the military portion of the program including
the training of a 20,000-man addition to the present G.V.N.
armed forces of 150,000. Initial appraisal of new tasks assigned
CHMAAG indicate that approximately 100 additional military
personnel will be required immediately in addition to the present
complement of 685.
(2) Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to
provide support and advice to the Self-Defense Corps with a
strength of approximately 40,000.
(3) Authorize MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force
of 68,000. MAP support is now authorized for 32,000; the remaining
36,000 are not now adequately trained and equipped.
(4) Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability
which will enable the G.V.N. to obtain warning of Communist
overflights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine
air supply purposes. Initially, this capability should be provided
from U.S. mobile radar capability.
(5) Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as
a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration
into South Vietnam by water. MAP support, which was not
provided in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, will include training of
junk crews in Vietnam or at U.S. bases by U.S. Navy personnel.
b. The following additional actions are considered necessary to
assist the G.V.N. in meeting the increased security threat resulting
from the new situation along the Laos-G.V.N. frontier:
( 1) Assist the G.v.N. armed forces to increase their border
patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by establishing an
effective border intelligence and patrol system, by instituting
regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by
applying modern technological area-denial techniques to control
the roads and trails along Vietnam's borders. A special staff
element (approximately 6 U.S. personnel), to concentrate upon
solutions to the unique problems of Vietnam's borders, will be
activated in MAAG, Vietnam, to assist a similar special unit in the
RVNAF which the G.V.N. will be encouraged to establish; these
two elements working as an integrated team will help the G.V.N.
gain the support of nomadic tribes and other border inhabitants,
as well as introduce advanced techniques and equipment to
strengthen the security of South Vietnam's frontiers.
(2) Assist the G.V.N. to establish a Combat Development and
Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modern
125
technology, new techniques for use against the Viet Cong forces.
(Approximately 4 U.S. personnel.)
(3) Assist the G.V.N. forces with health, welfare and public
work projects by providing U.S. Army civic action mobile training
teams, coordinated with the similar civilian effort. (Approximately
14 U.S. personnel.)
(4) Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximately 400 personnel)
to Nha Trang in order to accelerate G.V.N. Special
Forces training. The first increment, for immediate deployment in
Vietnam, should be a Special Forces company (52 personnel).
(5) Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to undertake an
assessment of the military utility of a further increase in the
G.V.N. forces from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two
new division equivalents for deployment to the northwest border
region. The parallel political and fiscal implications should be
assessed ....
4. ECONOMIC:
1. Objective : Undertake economic programs having both a
short-term immediate impact as well as ones which contribute to
the longer range economic viability of the country.
a. Undertake a series of economic projects designed to accompany
the counter-insurgency effort, by the following action:
( 1) Grant to ICA the authority and funds to move into a
rural development-civic action program. Such a program would
include short-range, simple, impact projects which would be
undertaken by teams working in cooperation with local communities.
This might cost roughly $3 to $5 million, mostly in local
currency. Directors of field teams should be given authority with
respect to the expenditure of funds including use of dollar instruments
to purchase local currency on the spot.
b. Assist Vietnam to make the best use of all available economic
1esources, by the following action:
( 1) Having in mind that our chief objective is obtaining a full
and enthusiastic support by the G.V.N. in its fight against the
Communists, a high level team preferably headed by Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury John Leddy, with State and ICA members,
should be dispatched to Saigon to work out in conjunction
with the Ambassador a plan whereby combined U.S. and Vietnamese
financial resources can best be utilized. This group's terms
of reference should cover the broad range of fiscal and economic
problems. Authority should be given to make concessions necessary
to achieve our objectives and to soften the blow of monetary
reform. Ambassador Nolting and perhaps the Vice President
should notify Diem of the proposed visit of this group stressing
that their objective is clearly to maximize the joint effort rather
than to force the Vietnamese into inequitable and unpalatable
actions.
(2) As a part of the foregoing effort, an assessment should be
126
undertaken of the fiscal and other economic implications of a
further force increase from 170,000 to 200,000 (as noted in the
Military section above).
c. Undertake the development of a long-range economic development
program as a means of demonstrating U.S. confidence
in the economic and political future of the country by the following
action:
(l) Authorize Ambassador Nolting to inform the G.V.N. that
the U.S. is prepared to discuss a long-range joint five-year development
program which would involve contributions and undertakings
by both parties ....
s. PSYCHOLOGICAL:
a. Assist the G.V.N. to accelerate its public information program
to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions
required to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public
confidence in the G.V.N.'s determination and ability to deal with
the Communist threat.
b. The U.S. Country Team, in coordination with the G.V.N.
Ministry of Defense, should compile and declassify for use of
media representatives in South Vietnam and throughout the world,
documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorists'
activities and the measures being taken by the G.V.N. to counter
such attacks.
c. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate G.V.N.
Ministry, USIS will increase the flow of information about unfavorable
conditions in North Vietnam to media representatives.
d. Develop agricultural pilot-projects throughout the country,
with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects.
This project would be accomplished by combined teams of Vietnamese
Civic Action personnel, Americans in the Peace Corps,
Filipinos in Operation Brotherhood, and other Free World nationals.
e. Exploit as a part of a planned psychological campaign and
rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in
South Vietnam. Testimony of rehabilitated prisoners, stressing the
errors of Communism, should be broadcast to Communist-held
areas, including North Vietnam, to induce defections. This
rehabilitation
program would be assisted by a team of U.S. personnel
including U.S. Army (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare
and Counter-Intelligence), USIS, and USOM experts.
f. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. participation
in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.
6. COVERT ACTIONS:
a. Expand present operations in the field of intelligence,
unconventional
warfare, and political-psychological activities to
support the U.S. objective as stated.
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b. Initiate the communications intelligence actions, CIA and
ASA personnel increases, and funding which were approved by
the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961.
c. Expand the communications intelligence actions by inclusion
of 15 additional Army Security Agency personnel to train the
Vietnamese Army in tactical COMINT operations ....
7. FUNDING:
a. As spelled out in the funding annex, the funding of the
counter-insurgency plan and the other actions recommended in
this program might necessitate increases in U.S. support of the
G.V.N. budget for FY 61 of as much as $58 million, making up
to a total of $192 million compared to $155 million for FY 60.
The U.S. contribution for the G.V.N. Defense budget in FY 62
as presently estimated would total $161 million plus any deficiency
in that Budget which the G.Y.N. might be unable to finance. The
exact amount of U.S. contributions to the G.V.N. Defense budgets
for FY 61 and FY 62 are subject to negotiation between the U.S.
and the G.Y.N.
b. U.S. military assistance to G.V.N., in order to provide the
support contemplated by the proposed program would total $140
million, or $71 million more than now programmed for Vietnam
in the U.S. current MAP budget for FY 62....
ANNEX 6
Covert Actions
a. Intelligence: Expand current positive and counter-intelligence
operations against Communist forces in South Vietnam and
against North Vietnam. These include penetration of the Vietnamese
Communist mechanism, dispatch of agents to North
Vietnam and strengthening Vietnamese internal security services.
Authorization should be given, subject to existing procedures, for
the use in North Vietnam operations of civilian air crews of
American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to
Vietnamese. Consideration should be given for overflights of
North Vietnam for photographic intelligence coverage, using
American or Chinese Nationalists crews and equipment as necessary.
b. Communications Intelligence: Expand the current program of
interception and direction-finding covering Vietnamese Communist
communications activities in South Vietnam, as well as North
Vietnam targets. Obtain further USIB authority to conduct these
operations on a fully joint basis, permitting the sharing of results
of interception, direction finding, traffic analysis and cryptographic
analysis by American agencies with the Vietnamese to the extent
needed to launch rapid attacks on Vietnamese Communist communications
and command installations.
128
This program should be supplemented by a program, duly
coordinated, of training additional Vietnamese Army units in
intercept and direction-finding by the U.S. Army Security Agency.
Also, U.S. Army Security Agency teams could be sent to Vietnam
for direct operations, coordinated in the same manner-Approved
by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961.
c. Unconventional Warfare: Expand present operations of the
First Observation Battalion in guerrilla areas of South Vietnam,
under joint MAAG-CIA sponsorship and direction. This should be
in full operational collaboration with the Vietnamese, using
Vietnamese civilians recruited with CIA aid.
In Laos, infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to Southeast
Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and lines
of communications. These teams should be supported by assault
units of 100 to 150 Vietnamese for use on targets beyond capability
of teams. Training of teams could be a combined operation
by CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces.
In North Vietnam, using the foundation established by intelligence
operations, form networks of resistance, covert bases and
teams for sabotage and light harassment. A capability should
be created by MAAG in the South Vietnamese Army to conduct
Ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam as
might prove necessary or appropriate. Such actions should try
to avoid any outbreak of extensive resistance or insurrection
which could not be supported to the extent necessary to stave off
repression.
Conduct overflights for dropping of leaflets to harass the Communists
and to maintain morale of North Vietnamese population,
and increase gray broadcasts to North Vietnam for the same
purposes.
d. Internal South Vietnam: Effect operations to penetrate political
forces, government, armed services and opposition elements
to measure support of government, provide warning of any coup
plans and identify individuals with potentiality of providing leadership
in event of disappearance of President Diem.
Build up an increase in the population's participation in and
loyalty to free government in Vietnam, through improved communication
between the government and the people, and by
strengthening independent or quasi-independent organizations of
political, syndical or professional character. Support covertly the
GVN in allied and neutral countries, with special emphasis on
bringing out GVN accomplishments, to counteract tendencies
toward a "political solution" while the Communists are attacking
GVN. Effect, in support, a psychological program in Vietnam and
elsewhere exploiting Communist brutality and aggression in North
Vietnam.
e. The expanded program outlined above was estimated to require
an additional 40 personnel for the CIA station and an increase
in the CIA outlay for Vietnam of approximately $1.5
million for FY 62, partly compensated by the withdrawal of
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personnel from other areas. The U.S. Army Security Agency
actions to supplement communications intelligence will require 78
personnel and approximately $1.2 million in equipment. The
personnel and fund augmentations in this paragraph were approved
by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961.
f. In order adequately to train the Vietnamese Army in tactical
COMIT operations, the Army Security Agency estimates that an
additional 15 personnel are required. This action has been approved
by the U.S. Intelligence Board.
# 19
'61 Memo from the Joint Chiefs on
Commitment of U.S. Forces
Memorandum on "U.S. Forces in South Vietnam" from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, May 10, 1961.
1. In considering the possible commitment of U.S. forces to
South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the overall
critical situation in Southeast Asia with particular emphasis
upon the present highly flammable situation in South Vietnam. In
this connection the question, however, of South Vietnam should
not be considered in isolation but rather in conjunction with
Thailand and their over-all relationship to the security of Southeast
Asia. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question
regarding the deployment of U.S. forces into Thailand were provided
to you by JCSM-31l-61, dated 9 May 1961. The current
potentially dangerous military and political situation in Laos, of
course, is the focal point in this area. Assuming that the political
decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the Communist sphere,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that U.S. forces should
be deployed immediately to South Vietnam; such action should be
taken primarily to prevent the Vietnamese from being subjected
to the same situation as presently exists in Laos, which would then
require deployment of U.S. forces into an already existing combat
situation.
2. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend
that the decision be made now to deploy suitable U.S. forces
to South Vietnam. Sufficient forces should be deployed to accomplish
the following purposes:
a. Provide a visible deterrent to potential North Vietnam and/or
Chinese Communist action;
b. Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense
positions to permit their fuller commitment to counter-insurgency
actions;
130
c. Assist in training the Vietnamese forces to the maximum
extent possible consistent with their mission;
d. Provide a nucleus for the support of any additional U.S. or
SEATO military operation in Southeast Asia; and
e. Indicate the firmness of our intent to all Asian nations.
3. In order to maintain U.S. flexibility in the Pacific, it is
envisioned that some or all of the forces deployed to South Vietnam
would come from the United States. The movement of these
troops could be accomplished in an administrative manner and
thus not tax the limited lift capabilities of CINCPAC.
4. In order to accomplish the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend that:
a. President Diem be encouraged to request that the United
States fulfill its SEATO obligation, in view of the new threat now
posed by the Laotian situation, by the immediate deployment of
appropriate U.S. forces to South Vietnam;
b. Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces could be immediately
deployed to South Vietnam in order to accomplish the
above-mentioned purposes. Details of size and composition of
these forces must include the views of both CINCP AC and
CHMAAG which are not yet available.
# 20
U.S. Approval, in 1961, of Steps to
Strengthen South Vietnam
National Security Action Memorandum 52, signed by
McGeorge Bundy, Presidential adviser on national security,
May 11, 1961.
1. The U.S. objective and concept of operations stated in report
are approved: to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam;
to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic
society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of
mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic,
psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.
2. The approval given for specific military actions by the President
at the National Security Council meeting on April 29, 1961,
is confirmed.
3. Additional actions listed at pages 4 and 5 of the Task Force
Report are authorized, with the objective of meeting the increased
security threat resulting from the new situation along the frontier
between Laos and Vietnam. In particular, the President directs an
assessment of the military utility of a further increase in G.V.N.
forces from 170,000 to 200,000, together with an assessment of
the parallel political and fiscal implications.
131
4. The President directs full examination by the Defense Department,
under the guidance of the Director of the continuing
Task Force on Vietnam, of the size and composition of forces
which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of
U.S. forces to Vietnam. The diplomatic setting within which this
action might be taken should also be examined.
5. The U.S. will seek to increase the confidence of President
Diem and his Government in the United States by a series of
actions and messages relating to the trip of Vice President Johnson.
The U.S. will attempt to strengthen President Diem's popular
support within Vietnam by reappraisal and negotiation, under the
direction of Ambassador Nolting. Ambassador Nolting is also
requested to recommend any necessary reorganization of the
Country Team for these purposes.
6. The U.S. will negotiate in appropriate ways to improve
Vietnam's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia,
and its standing in world opinion.
7. The Ambassador is authorized to begin negotiations looking
toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam, but no firm
commitment will be made to such an arrangement without further
review by the President.
8. The U.S. will undertake economic programs in Vietnam with
a view to both short-term immediate impact and a contribution to
the longer-range economic viability of the country, and the specific
actions proposed on pages 12 and 13 of the Task Force Report
are authorized.
9. The U.S. will strengthen its efforts in the psychological field
as recommended on pages 14 and 15 of the Task Force Report.
10. The program for covert actions outlined on page 15 of the
Task Force Report is approved.
11. These decisions will be supported by appropriate budgetary
action, but the President reserves judgment on the levels of funding
proposed on pages 15 and 16 of the Task Force Report and
in the funding annex.
12. Finally, the President approves the continuation of a special
Task Force on Vietnam, established in and directed by the Department
of State under Sterling J. Cottrell as Director, and
Chalmers B. Wood as Executive Officer.
# 21
Report by Vice President Johnson on
His Visit to Asian Countries
Excerpts from memorandum, "Mission to Southeast Asia,
India and Pakistan," from Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
to President Kennedy, May 23, 1961.
132
· .. I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the
problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -- and
to India and Pakistan-with many of those convictions
sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also
reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value
as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.
These conclusions are as follows:
1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast
Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there -- or
the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and
take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is
compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations
on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island
outposts-Philippines, Japan, Taiwan-have no security and the
vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by
no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is
possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and
turning the Communist surge. The will to resist-while now the
target of subversive attack-is there. The key to what is done by
Asians in defense of Southeast Asia freedom is confidence in the
United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast
Asia. Leadership in individual countries-or the regional
leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians-rests on the
knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer
because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive
action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success
at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva
would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we
must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the
area.
We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the
Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their
freedom. Such an organization should:
a) have a clear-cut command authority
b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social
justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. Asian leaders-at this time-do not want American troops
involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. American
combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not
desirable. Possibly Americans fail to appreciate fully the subtlety
that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon
governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of
Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involvement
dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or
elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing
fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements
133
made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or
disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for
U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack
seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our
policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened
domestically.
6. Any help-economic as well as military-we give less developed
nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part
of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States
help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared
to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can
be-and must be-unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful
to enunciate more clearly than we have-for the guidance of these
young and unsophisticated nations-what we expect or require of
them.
7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers
to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of
Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance,
poverty and disease. We must-whatever strategies we
evolve-keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make
imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in
such enterprises.
8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate-and most important-
trouble spots, critical to the U.S. These areas require
the attention of our very best talents-under the very closest
Washington direction--on matters economic, military and political.
The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide
whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw
in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San
Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More important, we
would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to
treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I
recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort
to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here
is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and
exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and
Thailand, we must move forward together.
a. In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems.
He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people,
is surrounded by persons less admirable and capable than he.
The country can be saved-if we move quickly and wisely. We
must decide whether to support Diem-or let Vietnam fall. We
must have coordination of purpose in our country team, diplomatic
and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related
operations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up
to maximum efficiency. The most important thing is imaginative,
creative, American management of our military aid program. The
Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that $50 million of U.S.
military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to
support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at
134
the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington
military judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and
Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed
and proceed forthwith.
b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably
as much is needed as in Vietnam-about $50 million of
military and economic assistance. Again, should our best military
judgment concur, I believe we should support such a program.
Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western than many of
his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence
to his country of a communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to
stand firm against neutralism, he must have-soon-concrete evidence
to show his people of United States military and economic
support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to
150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss
aid matters.
The fundamental decision required of the United States-and
time is of the greatest importance-is whether we are to attempt
to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast
Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the
area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a
full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in
terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must
be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced
with the further decision of whether we commit major United
States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should
our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision.
What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program
to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should
include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected
by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend
we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.
I believe that the mission-as you conceived it-was a success.
I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.
# 22
Lansdale Memo for Taylor on
Unconventional Warfare
Excerpts from memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward G.
Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen.
Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy's military adviser,
on "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia," undated
but apparently from July, 1961. Copies were sent to
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, Secretary of State
135
Dean Rusk, Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence,
and Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence.
This memo is in response to your desire for early information
on unconventional-warfare resources in Southeast Asia. The information
was compiled within Defense and CIA.
A. SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Vietnamese
a. First Observation Group
This is a Special Forces type of unit, with the mission of
operating in denied (enemy) areas. It currently has some limited
operations in North Vietnam and some shallow penetrations into
Laos. Most of the unit has been committed to operations against
Viet Cong guerillas in South Vietnam.
Strength, as of 6 July, was 340. The First Observation Group
had an authorized strength of 305 and now is being increased by
500, for a total of 805, under the 20,OOO-man force increase.
Personnel are volunteers who have been carefully screened by
security organizations. Many are from North Vietnam. They have
been trained for guerrilla operations, at the Group's training
center at Nha Trang. The unit is MAP-supported, as a TO&E
unit of the RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces). It
receives special equipment and training from CIA and U.S. control
is by CIA/MAAG.
The Group and its activities are highly classified by the Government
of Vietnam. Only a select few senior RVNMAF officers
have access to it. Operations require the approval of President
Diem, on much the same approval basis as certain U.S. special
operations. The unit is separate from normal RVNAF command
channels.
The Group was organized in February, 1956, with the initial
mission of preparing stay-behind organizations in South Vietnam
just below the 17th Parallel, for guerrilla warfare in the event of
an overt invasion by North Vietnamese forces. It was given combat
missions against Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam last
year, when these Communist guerrillas increased their activities.
The plan is to relieve the Group from these combat assignments,
to ready its full strength for denied area missions, as RVNAF
force increases permit relief. It is currently being organized into
twenty teams of 15 men each, with two RS-l radios per team, for
future operations.
b. Other RVNAF
MAAG-Vietnam has reported the formation of additional volunteer
groups, apart from the First Observation Group, for similar
operations to augment the missions of the Group. As of 6 July,
the additional volunteers were reported as:
136
1). 60 Mois (Montagnard tribesmen) recruited, being security
screened, to receive Special Forces training.
2). 400 military (RVNAF), to receive Special Forces training.
80 will be formed into small teams, to augment operations of the
First Operations Group. 320 will be formed into two Ranger (Airborne)
companies.
3). 70 civilians, being organized and trained for stay-behind
operations, penetration teams, and communicators.
Other special units of the RVNAF, now committed to operations
against the Viet Cong and with Special Forces/Ranger training,
are:
9,096 Rangers, in 65 companies.
2,772 more Rangers being activated, part of 20,000-man increase
4,786 Paratroopers
2,300 Marines
673 men in Psychological Warfare Bn.
In addition, cadres from all other combat elements of the
RVNAF have received Special Forces/Ranger training.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). There are approximately 6 officers and 6 enlisted men from
the 1st Special Group on Okinawa currently attached to the
MAAG to assist with Ranger-type training.
2). There are three 4-man intelligence training teams present
-Combat Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Photo-Interpretation
and Foreign Operations Intelligence (clandestine collection) in
addition to eight officers and two enlisted intelligence advisors on
the MAAG staff.
3). There are two Psychological Warfare staff officers on the
MAAG staff and a 4-man Civil Affairs mobile training team (3
officers-1 enlisted man) advising the G-5 staff of the Vietnamese
Army in the psy/ops-civic action fields.
b. CIA
1). There are 9 CIA officers working with the First Observation
Group in addition to one MAAG advisor.
2). CIA also has five officers working with the Vietnamese
Military Intelligence Service and one officer working with the
covert [one word illegible] of the Army Psychological Warfare
Directorate.
B. THAILAND
1. Thai
a. Royal Thai Army Ranger Battalion (Airborne)
A Special Forces type unit, its stated mission is to organize
and conduct guerrilla warfare in areas of Thailand overrun by the
enemy in case of an open invasion of Thailand. It currently has
the mission of supplying the Palace Guard for the Prime Minister.
137
Based at Lopburi, the Ranger Battalion has a MAP authorized
strength of 580. It is organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters
company, a Service company, and four Ranger companies.
The Battalion has 4 command detachments and 26 operations
detachments, trained and organized along the lines of U.S. Special
Forces in strength, equipment, and rank structure.
The Ranger Battalion is loosely attached to the 1st Division.
In reality, it is an independent unit of the Royal Thai Army, under
the direct control of Field Marshal Sarit, the Commander in Chief,
and receives preferential treatment.
Each ranger company has been assigned a region of Thailand,
in which it is to be prepared to undertake guerrilla warfare in
case of enemy occupation. Field training is conducted in these
assigned regions, to acquaint the detachments with the people,
facilities and terrain.
b. Police Aerial Resupply Unit (PARU)
The PARU has a mission of undertaking clandestine operations
in denied areas. 99 PARU personnel have been introduced
covertly to assist the Meos in operations in Laos, where their combat
performance has been outstanding.
This is a special police unit, supported by CIA (CIA control in
the Meo operations has been reported as excellent), with a
current strength of 300 being increased to 550 as rapidly as
possible. All personnel are specially selected and screened, and
have been rated as of high quality. Officers are selected from the
ranks.
Training consists of 10 weeks' basic training, 3 weeks' jumping,
3 weeks' jungle operations, 4 weeks' police law and 3 months of
refresher training yearly. Forty individuals have been trained as
WIT communicators.
All personnel have adequate personal gear to be self-sustaining
in the jungle. Weapons are M-l rifles, M-3 submachine guns and
BAR. In addition, personnel are trained to use other automatic
weapons, 2.34 rocket launchers, and 60-mm. mortars.
There are presently 13 PARU teams, totaling 99 men, operating
with the Meo guerillas in Laos. Combat reports of these operations
have included exceptionally heroic and meritorious actions by
PARU personnel. The PARU teams have provided timely intelligence
and have worked effectively with local tribes.
c. Thai Border Patrol (BPP)
The mission of the BPP is to counter infiltration and subversion
during peace-time, in addition to normal police duties, in the event
of an armed invasion of Thailand, the BPP will operate as guerrilla
forces in enemy-held areas, in support of regular Thai armed
forces.
The BPP has a current strength of 4,500. It was organized in
1955 as a gendarmerie patrol force (name changed to BPP in
1959), composed of 71 active and 23 reserve platoons, from
138
existing police units. It is an element of the Thai National Police,
subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.
Although technically a police organization, the BPP is armed
with infantry weapons, including light machine guns, rocket
launchers and light mortars. It is trained in small-unit infantry
tactics and counter-guerrilla operations. Training is currently being
conducted by a 10-man U.S. Army Special Forces team from
Okinawa, under ICA auspices.
This unusual police unit was created initially to cope with problems
posed by foreign guerrilla elements using Thailand as a
safehaven: the Vietminh in eastern Thailand and the Chinese
Communists along the Malayan border in the south. There has
been some tactical liaison with Burmese Army units.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). A Special Forces qualified officer is assigned to advise the
RTA Ranger Battalion.
2). A ten-man Special Forces team from the 1st Special Forces
Group in Okinawa is currently conducting training for the Thai
Border Patrol Police under ICA auspices.
3). There are 5 officers and 1 enlisted man attached to MAAG
as advisers to J-2 and the Thai Armed Forces Security Center.
b. CIA
1). 2 advisers with PARU.
2). 3 officers who work with the Border Patrol Police providing
advice, guidance and limited training in the collection and
processing of intelligence in addition to management of their
communications system.
c. LAOS
1. Lao
a. Commandos
According to CINCP AC, there are two special commando companies
in the Lao Armed Forces (FAL), with a total strength of
256. These commandos have received Special Forces training.
b. Meo Guerillas
About 9,000 Meo tribesmen have been equipped for guerrilla
operations, which they are now conducting with considerable
effectiveness
in Communist-dominated territory in Laos. They have
been organized into Auto-Defense Choc units of the FAL, of
varying sizes. Estimates on how many more of these splendid
fighting men could be recruited vary, but a realistic figure would
be around 4,000 more, although the total manpower pool is
larger.
Political leadership of the Meos is in the hands of Touby
Lyfoung, who now operates mostly out of Vientiane. The military
139
leader is Lt-Col Vang Pao, who is the field commander. Command
control of Meo operations is exercised by the Chief CIA
Vientiane with the advice of Chief MAAG Laos. The same CIA
paramilitary and U.S. military teamwork is in existence for advisory
activities (9 CIA operations officers, 9 LTAG/Army
Special Forces personnel, in addition to the 99 Thai PARU under
CIA control) and aerial resupply.
As Meo villages are over-run by Communist forces and as
men leave food-raising duties to serve as guerrillas, a problem is
growing over the care and feeding of non-combat Meos. CIA has
given some rice and clothing to relieve this problem. Consideration
needs to be given to organized relief, a mission of an ICA
nature, to the handling of Meo refugees and their rehabilitation.
c. National Directorate of Coordination
This is the Intelligence arm of the RLG. Its operations are
mainly in the Vientiane area at present. It has an armed unit consisting
of two battalions and is under the command of Lt-Col
Siho, a FAL officer. In addition to intelligence operations this
force has a capability for sabotage, kidnapping, commando-type
raids, etc.
d. There is also a local veteran's organization and a grass-roots
political organization in Laos, both of which are subject to CIA
direction and control and are capable of carrying out propaganda,
sabotage and harrassment operations. Both are located (in varying
degrees of strength and reliability) throughout Laos.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). There are 154 Special Forces personnel (12 teams) from
the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N. C., attached to
the MAAG and providing tactical advice to FAL commanders
and conducting basic training when the situation permits.
2). A 10-man intelligence training team is assisting the FAL
in establishing a military intelligence system.
3). An 8-man psychological warfare team is assisting the FAL
with psy war operations and operation of its radio transmitters.
b. CIA
1). Nine CIA officers are working in the field with the Meo
guerrillas, backstopped by two additional officers in Vientiane.
2). Three CIA officers plus 2-3 Vietnamese are working with
the National Directorate of Coordination.
D.OTHERS
1. Asian
a. Eastern Construction Company [Filipinos]
This is a private, Filipino-run public service organization, similar
to an employment agency, with an almost untapped potential
140
for unconventional warfare (which was its original mission). It
now furnishes about 500 trained, experienced Filipino technicians
to the Governments of Vietnam and Laos, under the auspices of
MAAGs (MAP) and USOMs (ICA activities). Most of these
Filipinos are currently augmenting U.S. military logistics programs
with the Vietnamese Army and Lao Army. They instruct
local military personnel in ordnance, quartermaster, etc. maintenance,
storage, and supply procedures. MAAG Chiefs in both
Vietnam and Laos have rated this service as highly effective.
CIA has influence and some continuing interest with individuals.
The head of Eastern Construction is "Frisco" Johnny San Juan,
former National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and
former close staff assistant to President Magsaysay of the Philippines
(serving as Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner
directly under the President). Its cadre are mostly either
former guerrillas against the Japanese in WW II or former Philippine
Army personnel. Most of the cadre had extensive combat
experience against the Communist Huk guerrillas in the Philippines.
This cadre can be expanded into a wide range of counter-
Communist activities, having sufficient stature in the Philippines
to be able to draw on a very large segment of its trained, experienced,
and well-motivated manpower pool.
Eastern Construction was started in 1954 as Freedom Company
of the Philippines, a non-profit organization, with President
Magsaysay as its honorary president. Its charter stated plainly that
it was "to serve the cause of freedom." It actually was a mechanism
to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian
countries, for unconventional operations, under cover of a public
service organization having a contract with the host government.
Philippine Armed Forces and government personnel were "sheep-dipped"
and served abroad. Its personnel helped write the Constitution
of the Republic of Vietnam, trained Vietnam's Presidential
Guard Battalion, and were instrumental in founding and
organizing the Vietnamese Veterans Legion.
When U.S. personnel instrumental in the organization and
operational use of Freedom Company departed from the Asian
area, direct U.S. support of the organization (on a clandestine
basis) was largely terminated. The Filipino leaders in it then
decided to carryon its mission privately, as a commercial undertaking.
They changed the name to Eastern Construction Company.
The organization survived some months of very hard times
financially. Its leaders remain as a highly-motivated, experienced,
anti-Communist "hard core."
b. Operation Brotherhood (Filipino)
There is another private Filipino public-service organization,
capable of considerable expansion in socio-economic-medical operations
to support counter-guerilla actions. It is now operating
teams in Laos, under ICA auspices. It has a measure of CIA control.
141
Operation Brotherhood (OB) was started in 1954 by the
International Jaycees, under the inspiration and guidance of
Oscar Arellano, a Filipino architect who was Vice President for
Asia of the International Jaycees. The concept was to provide
medical service to refugees and provincial farmers in South Vietnam,
as part of the 1955 pacification and refugee program. Initially
Filipino teams, later other Asian and European teams,
served in OB in Vietnam. Their work was closely coordinated
with Vietnamese Army operations which cleaned up Vietminh
stay-behinds and started stabilizing rural areas ....
c. The Security Training Center (STC)
This is a counter-subversion, counter-guerrilla and psychological
warfare school overtly operated by the Philippine Government
and covertly sponsored by the U.S. Government through CIA
as the instrument of the Country Team. It is located at Fort Mc-
Kinley on the outskirts of Manila. Its stated mission is: "To
counter the forces of subversion in Southeast Asia through more
adequate training of security personnel, greater cooperation, better
understanding and maximum initiative among the countries of
the area." ...
The training capability of the STC includes a staff of approximately
12 instructors in the subjects of unconventional and
counter-guerrilla warfare ....
d. CAT. Civil Air Transport (Chinese Nationalist)
CAT is a commercial air line engaged in scheduled and nonscheduled
air operations throughout the Far East, with headquarters
and large maintenance facilities located in Taiwan. CAT,
a CIA proprietary, provides air logistical support under commercial
cover to most CIA and other U.S. Government agencies' requirements.
CAT supports covert and clandestine air operations by
providing trained and experienced personnel, procurement of
supplies and equipment through overt commercial channels, and
the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of transport and other
type aircraft under both Chinat and U.S. registry.
CAT has demonstrated its capability on numerous occasions
to meet all types of contingency or long-term covert air requirements
in support of U.S. objectives. During the past ten years,
it has had some notable achievements, including support of the
Chinese Nationalist withdrawal from the mainland, air drop
support to the French at Dien Bien Phu, complete logistical and
tactical air support for the Indonesian operation, air lifts of
refugees from North Vietnam, more than 200 overflights of Mainland
China and Tibet, and extensive air support in Laos during
the current crisis ....
2. U.S.
b. CIA
1) Okinawa--Support Base
Okinawa Station is in itself a para-military support asset and,
142
in critical situations calling for extensive support of UW activity
in the Far East, could be devoted in its entirety to this mission.
Located at Camp Chinen, it comprises a self-contained base under
Army cover with facilities of all types necessary to the storage,
testing, packaging, procurement and delivery of supplies-ranging
from weapons and explosives to medical and clothing. Because of
it~ being a controlled area, it can accommodate admirably the
holding of black bodies in singletons or small groups, as well as
small groups of trainees ....
4). Saipan Training Station.
CIA maintains a field training station on the island of Saipan
located approximately 160 miles northeast of Guam in the
Marianas Islands. The installation is under Navy cover and is
known as the Naval Technical Training Unit. The primary mission
of the Saipan Training Station is to provide physical facilities and
competent instructor personnel to fulfill a variety of training
requirements
including intelligence tradecraft, communications,
counter-intelligence and psychological warfare techniques. Training
is performed in support of CIA activities conducted throughout
the Far East area.
In addition to the facilities described above, CIA maintains a
small ship of approximately 500 tons' displacement and 140 feet
in length. This vessel is used presently to provide surface
transportation
between Guam and Saipan. It has an American Captain
and First Mate and a Philippine crew, and is operated under the
cover of a commercial corporation with home offices in Baltimore,
Maryland. Both the ship and the corporation have a potentially
wider paramilitary application both in the Far East area and elsewhere.
# 23
Cable on Diem's Treaty Request
Cablegram from the United States Embassy in Saigon to
the State Department, Oct. 1, 1961. A copy of the message
was sent to the commander in chief of Pacific forces.
Discussion with Felt and party, 'McGarr, Nolting yesterday
Diem asked for bilateral defense treaty. Large and unexplained
request. Serious. Put forward as result of Diem's fear of outcome
of Laos situation, SVN vulnerability to increased infiltration, feelings
that SEATO action would be inhibited by UK and France
in the case of SVN as in Laos.
Nolting told Diem question had important angle and effect on
SEATO. Major repeated to Thuan and believe he understands
better than Diem some of thorny problems.
Fuller report of conversation with Diem will follow but would
143
like to get quick preliminary reaction from Washington on this
request.
Our reaction is that the request should be seriously and carefully
treated to prevent feeling that U.S. is not serious in inten~ion
to support SVN. But see major issues including overriding Article
19, Geneva Accords, possible ratification problems as well as
effect on SEATO.
Diem's request arises from feeling that U.S. policy on Laos
will expose his flank in infiltration and lead to large-scale
hostilities
in SVN. So seeking a stronger commitment than he thinks
he has now through SEATO. Changing U.S. policy on Laos,
especially SEATO decision to use force if necessary to protect
SVN and Thailand, would relieve pressure for bilateral treaty.
# 24
Note on a Plan for Intervention
Supplemental note to a paper entitled "Concept for
Intervention in Viet-Nam," Oct. 1I, 1961. According to the
Pentagon history, the paper was drafted mainly by U.
Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, and was either a "talking paper" for a
meeting that included Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Secretary of Defense McNamara "or a revision put together
later in the day, after the meeting."
As the basic paper indicates, the likelihood of massive DRV
and Chicom intervention cannot be estimated with precision. The
SNIE covers only the initial phase when action might be limited
to 20-25,000 men. At later stages, when the JCS estimate that
40,000 U.S. forces will be needed to clean up the Viet Cong threat,
the chances of such massive intervention might well become substantial,
with the Soviets finding it a good opportunity to tie
down major U.S. forces in a long action, perhaps as part of a
multiprong action involving Berlin and such additional areas as
Korea and Iran.
Because of this possibility of major Bloc intervention, the
maximum possible force-needs must be frankly faced. Assuming
present estimates of about 40,000 U.S. forces for the stated
military objective in South Vietnam, plus 128,000 U.S. forces for
meeting North Vietnam and Chicom intervention, the drain on
U.S.-based reserve forces could be on the order of 3 or 4 divisions
and other forces as well. The impact on naval capabilities
for blockade plans (to meet Berlin) would also be major. In light
of present Berlin contingency plans, and combat attrition, including
scarce items of equipment, the initiation of the Vietnam
144
action in itself should indicate a step-up in the present mobilization,
possibly of major proportions.
# 25
1961 Request by South Vietnam for
U.S. Combat Forces
Cablegram from United State Embassy in Saigon to the
State Department, Oct. 13, 1961, on requests by Nguyen
Dinh Thuan, Defense Minister of South Vietnam. Copies of
this message were sent to Commander in Chief of Pacific
forces and to the United States Embassies in Bangkok,
Thailand, and Taipei, Taiwan.
Thuan in meeting October 13 made the following requests:
1. Extra squadron of AD-6 in lieu of proposed T-28's and
delivery ASAP.
2. U.S. Civilian contract pilots for helicopters and C-47's for
"non-combat" operations.
3. U.S. combat units or units to be introduced into SVN as
"combat-trainer units". Part to be stationed in North near 17th
Parallel to free ARVN forces there for anti-guerrilla action in
high plateau. Also perhaps in several provincial seats in the highlands
of Central Vietnam.
4. U.S. reaction to proposal to request Nationalist China to
send one division of combat troops for operations in the Southwest.
Thuan referred to captured diary of VM officer killed in Central
SVN, containing information on VM plans and techniques. Being
analyzed, translated and would pass on. Said Diem in light of
situation in Laos, infiltration into SVN, and JFK's interest as
shown by sending Taylor, requested U.S. to urgently consider
requests.
On U.S. combat trainer units, Nolting asked whether Diem's
considered request, in view of repeated views opposed. Thuan so
confirmed, Diem's views changed in light of worsening situation.
Wanted a symbolic U.S. strength near 17th to prevent attacks
there, free own forces there. Similar purpose station U.S. units
in several provincial seats in central highlands, freeing ARVN
ground forces there. Nolting said major requests on heels of
Diem request for bilateral treaty. Nolting asked if in lieu of
treaty. Thuan said first step quicker than treaty and time was of
the essence. Thuan said token forces would satisfy SVN and
would be better than treaty (Had evidently not thought through
nor discussed with Diem).
Discussed ICC angle. Nolting mentioned value SVN previously
attached to ICC presence. Thuan agreed, felt case could be made
145
for introduction of U.S. units for guard duty not combat unless
attacked. Could be put in such a way to preserve ICC in SVN.
Nolting said doubted if compatable but could be explored (Mc-
Garr and I call attention to two points: in view of proposed units,
training function more a cover than reality; if send U.S. units
should be sufficient strength, since VC attack likely).
On Chinat force, Thuan said Chiang had earlier given some
indication (not too precise I gathered) of willingness. Thuan said
GVN did not want to follow-up without getting U.S. reaction.
Idea to use about 10,000 men in southwest as far from 17th as
possible. Also intended to draft eligibles of Chinese origin into
forces. Thuan thought perhaps Chinats could be introduced
covertly, but on analyses gave this up. Nolting said he thought
Chinats would want something out of deal, maybe political lift
from introducing Chinat forces on Asia mainland (Nolting thinks
trial balloon only).
Questions will undoubtedly be raised with Taylor. Obvious
GVN losing no opportunity to ask for more support as a result
of our greater interest and concern. But situation militarily and
psychologically has moved to a point where serious and prompt
consideration should be given.
(Note: Will be meeting on this in Admiral Heinz's office, 1330,
16 October to get reply out today. Applicable CINCPAC 140333,
140346)
# 26
Cable from Taylor to Kennedy on
Introduction of U.S. Troops
CabLegram from Baguio, the Philippines, by General
TayLor to President Kennedy, Nov. 1, 1961.
This message is for the purpose of presenting my reasons for
recommending the introduction of a U.S. military force into SVN.
I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we
are to reverse the present downward trend of events in spite of a
full recognition of the following disadvantages:
a. The strategic reserve of U.S. forces is presently so weak that
we can ill afford any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of
the Communist bloc where they will be pinned down for an uncertain
duration.
b. Although U.S. prestige is already engaged in SVN, it will
become more so by the sending of troops.
c. If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary
results, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce.
If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the
clean-up of the insurgents within SVN, there is no limit to our
possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi).
146
d. The introduction of U.S. forces may increase tensions and
risk escalation into a major war in Asia.
On the other side of the argument, there can be no action so
convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring
to the people and Government of SVN and to our other friends
and allies in SEA as the introduction of U.S. forces into SVN. The
views of indigenous and U.S. officials consulted on our trip were
unanimous on this point. I have just seen Saigon 575 to State and
suggest that it be read in connection with this message.
The size of the U.S. force introduced need not be great to
provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired
effect on national morale in SVN and on international opinion.
A bare token, however, will not suffice; it must have a significant
value. The kinds of tasks which it might undertake which would
have a significant value are suggested in Baguio 0005. They are:
(a) Provide a U.S. military presence capable of raising national
morale and of showing to SEA the seriousness of the U.S. intent
to resist a Communist takeover.
(b) Conduct logistical operations in support of military and
flood relief operations.
(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense
and for the security of the area in which they are
stationed.
(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces
of the GVN in the case of a heightened military crisis.
(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may
be introduced if CINCP AC or SEATO contingency plans are
invoked.
It is noteworthy that this force is not proposed to clear the
jungles and forests of VC guerrillas. That should be the primary
task of the Armed Forces of Vietnam for which they should be
specifically organized, trained and stiffened with ample U.S.
advisors down to combat battalion levels. However, the U.S.
troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves,
their working parties, and the area in which they live. As a
general reserve, they might be thrown into action (with U.S.
agreement) against large, formed guerrilla bands which have
abandoned the forests for attacks on major targets. But in general,
our forces should not engage in small-scale guerrilla operations
in the jungle.
As an area for the operations of U.S. troops, SVN is not an
excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate. While the
border areas are rugged and heavily forested, the terrain is comparable
to parts of Korea where U.S. troops learned to live and
work without too much effort. However, these border areas, for
reasons stated above, are not the places to engage our forces. In
the High Plateau and in the coastal plain where U.S. troops would
probably be stationed, these jungle-forest conditions do not exist
to any great extent. The most unpleasant feature in the coastal
areas would be the heat and, in the Delta, the mud left behind by
147
the flood. The High Plateau offers no particular obstacle to the
stationing of V.S. troops.
The extent to which the Task Force would engage in flood
relief activities in the Delta will depend upon further study of
the problem there. As reported in Saigon 537, I see considerable
advantages in playing up this aspect of the TF mission. I am
presently inclined to favor a dual mission, initially help to the
flood area and subsequently use in any other area of SVN where
its resources can be used effectively to give tangible support in the
struggle against the VC. However, the possibility of emphasizing
the humanitarian mission will wane if we wait long in moving in
our forces or in linking our stated purpose with the emergency
conditions created by the flood.
The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN
are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnerable
to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited
diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to layoff SVN. Both the
D.R.V. and the Chicoms would face severe logistical difficulties
in trying to maintain strong forces in the field in SEA, difficulties
which we share but by no means to the same degree. There is no
case for fearing a mass onslaught of Communist manpower into
SVN and its neighboring states, particularly if our airpower is
allowed a free hand against logistical targets. Finally, the starvation
conditions in China should discourage Communist leaders
there from being militarily venturesome for some time to come.
By the foregoing line of reasoning, I have reached the conclusion
that the introduction of [word illegible] military Task Force without
delay offers definitely more advantage than it creates risks
and difficulties. In fact, I do not believe that our program to save
SVN will succeed without it. If the concept is approved, the exact
size and composition of the force should be determined by Sec
Def in consultation with the JCS, the Chief MAAG and
CINCPAC. My own feeling is that the initial size should not
exceed about 8000, of which a preponderant number would be
in logistical-type units. After acquiring experience in operating in
SVN, this initial force will require reorganization and adjustment
to the local scene.
As CINCPAC will point out, any forces committed to SVN
will need to be replaced by additional forces to his area from the
strategic reserve in the V.S. Also, any troops to SVN are in
addition to those which may be required to execute SEATO Plan
5 in Laos. Both facts should be taken into account in current
considerations of the FY 1963 budget which bear upon the
permanent increase which should be made in the V.S. military
establishment to maintain our strategic position for the long pull.
148
# 27
Taylor's Summary of Findings on His
Mission to South Vietnam
Cablegram tram Baguio, the Philippines, by Gen.
Maxwell D. Taylor, Presidential military adviser, to Mr.
Kennedy, Nov. 1, 1961.
1. Transmitted herewith are a summary of the fundamental conclusions
of my group and my personal recommendations in response
to the letter of the President to me dated 13 October 1961.
At our meeting next Friday I hope to be allowed to explain the
thinking which lies behind them. At that time I shall transmit our
entire report which will provide detailed support for the
recommendations
and will serve as a working paper for the interested
departments and agencies.
2. It is concluded that:
a. Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia
by methods of subversion and guerrilla war which by-pass conventional
U.S. and indigenous strength on the ground. The interim
Communist goal-en route to total take-over-appears to be a
neutral Southeast Asia, detached from U.S. protection. This strategy
is well on the way to success in Vietnam.
b. In Vietnam "and Southeast Asia" there is a double crisis in
confidence: doubt that U.S. is determined to save Southeast Asia;
doubt that Diem's methods can frustrate and defeat Communist
purposes and methods. The Vietnamese (and Southeast Asians)
will undoubtedly draw-rightly or wrongly--definitive conclusions
in coming weeks and months concerning the probable outcome
and will adjust their behavior accordingly. What the U.S. does or
fails to do will be decisive to the end result.
c. Aside from the morale factor, the Vietnamese Government
is caught in interlocking circles of bad tactics and bad administrative
arrangements which pin their forces on the defensive in
ways which permit a relatively small Viet-Cong force (about onetenth
the size of the GVN regulars) to create conditions of frustration
and terror certain to lead to a political crisis, if a positive
turning point is not soon achieved. The following recommendations
are designed to achieve that favorable turn, to avoid a further
deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam, and eventually to
contain and eliminate the threat to its independence.
3. It is recommended:
GENERAL
a. That upon request from the Government of Vietnam (GVN)
to come to its aid in resisting the increasing aggressions of the
Viet-Cong and in repairing the ravages of the Delta flood which,
in combination, threaten the lives of its citizens and the security
149
of the country, the U.S. Government offer to join the GVN in
a massive joint effort as a part of a total mobilization of GVN
resources to cope with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages
of the flood. The U.S. representatives will participate actively in
this effort, particularly in the fields of government administration,
military plans and operations, intelligence, and flood relief, going
beyond the advisory role which they have observed in the past.
SPECIFIC
b. That in support of the foregoing broad commitment to a
joint effort with Diem, the following specific measures be undertaken:
(l) The U.S. Government will be prepared to provide individual
administrators for insertion into the governmental
machinery of South Vietnam in types and numbers to be worked
out with President Diem.
(2) A joint effort will be made to improve the military-political
intelligence system beginning at the provincial level extending
upward through the government and armed forces to the Central
Intelligence Organization.
(3) The U.S. Government will engage in a joint survey of the
conditions in the provinces to assess the social, political,
intelligence,
and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the
counter-insurgency in order to reach a common estimate of these
factors and a common determination of how to deal with them.
As this survey will consume time, it should not hold back the
immediate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcome.
(4) A joint effort will be made to free the Army for mobile,
offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the
training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense
Corps, relieving the regular Army of static missions, raising the
level of the mobility of Army forces by the provision of considerably
more helicopters and light aviation, and organizing a
Border Ranger Force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian
border against the Viet-Cong infiltrators. The U.S. Government
will support this effort with equipment and with military units and
personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam
cannot perform in time. Such tasks include air reconnaissance
and photography, airlift (beyond the present capacity of SVN
forces), special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques.
(5) The U.S. Government will assist the GVN in effecting
surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland
waterways, furnishing such advisors, operating personnel and
small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operations.
(6) The MAAG, Vietnam, will be reorganized and increased
in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these
recommendations.
150
(7) The U.S. Government will offer to introduce into South
Vietnam a military Task Force to operate under U.S. control for
the following purposes:
(a) Provide a U.S. military presence capable of raising national
morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the
U.S. intent to resist a Communist take-over.
(b) Conduct logistical operations in support of military and
flood relief operations.
(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense
and for the security of the area in which they are
stationed.
(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces
of the GVN in the case of a heightened military crisis.
(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be
introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked.
(8) The U.S. Government will review its economic aid program
to take into account the needs of flood relief and to give priority
to those projects in support of the expanded counter-insurgency
program.
# 28
Evaluation and Conclusions of Taylor's
Report on Vietnam
Excerpts from General Taylor's report, Nov. 3, 1961, on
his mission to South Vietnam for President Kennedy .
. . . LIMITED PARTNERSIllP
. Following are the specific categories where the introduction
of U.S. working advisors or working military units are suggested
... an asterisk indicating where such operations are, to some degree,
under way.
-A high-level government advisor or advisors. General Lansdale
has been requested by Diem; and it may be wise to envisage
a limited number of Americans-acceptable to Diem as well
as to us-in key ministries ....
-A Joint U.S.-Vietnamese Military Survey, down to the
provincial level, in each of three corps areas, to make recommendations
with respect to intelligence, command and control, more
economical and effective passive defense, the build-up of a reserve
for offensive purposes, military-province-chief relations, etc. . . .
-Joint planning of offensive operations, including border control
operations. '" ...
-Intimate liaison with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence
Organizations (C.I.O.) with each of the seven intelligence [rest of
sentence illegible].
151
-Jungle Jim ....
-Counter infiltration operations in Laos. * ...
-Increased covert offensive operations in North as well as in
Laos and South Vietnam. * ...
-The introduction, under MAAG operational control, of three
helicopter squadrons--one for each corps area-and the provision
of more light aircraft, as the need may be established ....
-A radical increase in U.S. trainers at every level from the
staff colleges, where teachers are short-to the Civil Guard and
Self-Defense Corps, where a sharp expansion in competence may
prove the key to mobilizing a reserve for offensive operations ....
-The introduction of engineering and logistical elements within
the proposed U.S. military task force to work in the flood area
within the Vietnamese plan, on both emergency and longer term
reconstruction tasks ....
-A radical increase in U.S. special force teams in Vietnam:
to work with the Vietnamese Ranger Force proposed for the
border area . . . ; to assist in unit training, including training of
Clandestine Action Service ....
-Increase the MAAG support for the Vietnamese Navy.* ...
-Introduction of U.S. Naval and/or Coast Guard personnel to
assist in coastal and river surveillance and control, until Vietnamese
naval capabilities can be improved ....
-Reconsideration of the role of air power, leading to more
effective utilization of assets now available, including release from
political control of the 14 D-6 aircraft, institution of close-support
techniques, and better employment of available weapons ....
To execute this program of limited partnership requires a
change in the charter, the spirit, and the organization of the
MAAG in South Vietnam. It must be shifted from an advisory
group to something nearer-but not quite-an operational headquarters
in a theater of war. ... The U.S. should become a
limited partner in the war, avoiding formalized advice on the one
hand, trying to run the war, on the other. Such a transition from
advice to partnership has been made in recent months, on a smaller
scale, by the MAAG in Laos.
Among the many consequences of this shift would be the rapid
build-up of an intelligence capability both to identify operational
targets for the Vietnamese and to assist Washington in making a
sensitive and reliable assessment of the progress of the war. The
basis for such a unit already exists in Saigon in the Intelligence
Evaluation Center. It must be quickly expanded ....
In Washington, as well, intelligence and back-up operations
must be put on a quasi-wartime footing ....
CONTINGENCIES
The U.S. action proposed in this report-involving as it does
the overt lifting of the MAAG ceiling, substantial encadrement and
the introduction of limited U.S. forces-requires that the United
152
States also prepare for contingencies that might arise from the
enemy's reaction. The initiative proposed here should not be undertaken
unless we are prepared to deal with any escalation the
communists might choose to impose. Specifically we must be prepared
to act swiftly under these three circumstances: an attempt
to seize and to hold the Pleiku-Kontum area; a political crisis in
which the communists might attempt to use their forces around
Saigon to capture the city in the midst of local confusion; an
undertaking of overt major hostilities by North Vietnam.
As noted earlier, the present contingency plans of CINCPAC
must embrace the possibility both of a resumption of the communist
offensive in Laos and these Vietnamese contingency situations.
Taken together, the contingencies in Southeast Asia which
we would presently choose to meet without the use of nuclear
weapons appear to require somewhat more balanced ground,
naval, and air strength in reserve in the U.S. than we now have
available, so long as we maintain the allocation of the six divisions
for the Berlin crisis.
Therefore, one of the major issues raised by this report is the
need to develop the reserve strength in the U.S. establishment
required to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold
in that area, as it is now envisaged. The call up of additional
support forces may be required.
In our view, nothing is more calculated to sober the enemy and
to discourage escalation in the face of the limited initiatives proposed
here than the knowledge that the United States has prepared
itself soundly to deal with aggression in Southeast Asia at any
level.
# 29
Conclusions of McNamara on Report by
General Taylor
Memorandum for the President from Secretary of Defense
McNamara, Nov. 8, 1961, as provided in the Pentagon
analysts' narrative.
The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the
U.S. shall:
a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall
of South Vietnam to Communism, and
b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions
and preparations for possible later actions.
The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric and I have reached the following
conclusions:
1. The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the
fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation
to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia
and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly
in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing
that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces
on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment that
the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful
but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and
setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.
3. The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an
initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to
Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the
shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean
business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively.
We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an
inconclusive struggle.
4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we
accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment
to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning
through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet
Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.
5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our
military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged
and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of
the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can
assume that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in
Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men
(CINCPAC Plan 32-59, Phase IV). Our military posture is, or
with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army
divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without
serious interference with our present Berlin plans.
6. To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious
decision. Military force is not the only element of what must
be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend
on factors many of which are not within our control -- notably
the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the
area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political
implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is
our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial
position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually,
and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The overall
effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and
may well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall
can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.
7. In sum:
a. We do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced
in South Vietnam unless we are willing to make an
affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this
memorandum.
b. We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S.
154
to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to
Communism and that we support this commitment by the
necessary military actions.
c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the
recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its
fulfillment.
# 30
1961 Rusk-McNamara Report to Kennedy
on South Vietnam
Excerpts from memorandum for President Kennedy from
Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, Nov. 11,
1961, as provided by the Pentagon
study.
1. United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam.
The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention
to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that
country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve
the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free
world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would
make pointless any further discussion about the importance of
Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near
certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would
move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not
formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United
States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect
to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty.
Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of
the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States representative
stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the
aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening
international
peace and security."
The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would not only
destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American
commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would
stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and
would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country
and harass the Administration ....
3. The United States' Objective in South Viet-Nam.
The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of
preventing the fall 0/ South Viet-Nam to Communist [sic]. The
basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the
Government of South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own
war against the Guerillas. We must insist that that Government
155
itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange
for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic
and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it
will probably not be possible for the GVN to win this war as
long as the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam
continues unchecked and the guerillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in
neighboring territory.
We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces
if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the
circumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces
to strike at the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam.
4. The Use of United States Forces in South Viet-Nam.
The commitment of United States forces to South Viet-Nam involves
two different categories: (A) Units of modest size required
for the direct support of South Viet-Namese military effort,
such as communications, helicopter and other forms of airlift,
reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units, etc., and
(B) larger organized units with actual or potential direct military
mission. Category (A) should be introduced as speedily as possible.
Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that they are
much more significant from the point of view of domestic and
international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities
of Communist bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United
States combat forces (in the absence of Communist bloc escalation)
involves a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South-
Vietnamese effort, they may not be needed; if there is not such
an effort, United States forces could not accomplish their mission
in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population. Under present
circumstances, therefore, the question of injecting United States
and SEATO combat forces should in large part be considered as
a contribution to the morale of the South Vietnamese in their
own effort to do the principal job themselves.
5. Probable Extent of the Commitment of United States Forces.
If we commit Category (B) forces to South Viet-Nam, the
ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast
Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi
and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the
logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that
the maximum United States forces required on the ground in
Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000
men (CINCPAC Plan 32/59 PHASE IV). This would be in
addition to local forces and such SEATO forces as may be engaged.
It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the
addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can
be made, adequate to furnish these forces and support them in
action without serious interference with our present Berlin
plans ....
156
In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense recommend that:
1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective
of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism
and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of
United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to
achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside
forces to achieve the foregoing objective our decision to introduce
United States forces should not be contingent upon
unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)
2. The Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the
use of United States forces in South Viet-Nam under one or more
of the following purposes:
(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to
signify United States determination to defend Viet-Nam and to
boost South Viet-Nam morale.
(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing
Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed
counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in
North Viet-Nam.
(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if
there is organized Communist military intervention.
3. We immediately undertake the following actions in support
of the GVN:
... (c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such
United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may
be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting
surveillance
and control over coastal waters and inland waterways ....
(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary
to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at
the provincial level and extending upward through the Government
and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.
(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and
additional personnel for United States military forces as are
required for increased United States participation in the direction
and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the
other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under
these recommendations ....
(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers for insertion
into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and
numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments ....
5. Very shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the
first increments of United States military personnel and equipment
proposed under 3., above, that would exceed the Geneva Accord
ceilings, publish the "Jorden report" as a United States "white
paper," transmitting it as simultaneously as possible to the
Governments of all countries with which we have diplomatic relations,
including the Communist states.
157
6. Simultaneous with the publication of the "Jorden report,"
release an exchange of letters between Diem and the President.
(a) Diem's letter would include: reference to the DRV violations
of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN
letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references to
GVN statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva
Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation;
reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto
by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the
USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed; the
necessity of now exceeding some provisions of the Accords in
view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent
with respect to the DRV; GVN intent to return to strict compliance
with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations
ceased; and request for additional United States assistance in
framework foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in
appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken and is taking
to reform Governmental structure.
(b) The President's reply would be responsive to Diem's request
for additional assistance and acknowledge and agree to
Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict
compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations
have ceased. . . .
# 31
Memo from Joint Chiefs Urging a
Greater Role in South Vietnam
Excerpts from memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Jan. 13, 1962.
On Jan. 27, 1962, Mr. McNamara sent the memorandum
to President Kennedy with a covering letter that said in
part: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked that the attached
memorandum ... be brought to your attention. The memorandum
requires no action by you at this time. 1 am not
prepared to endorse the experience with our present program
in South Vietnam."
3. Military Considerations ....
a. Early Eventualities-Loss of the Southeast Asian Mainland
would have an adverse impact on our military strategy and
would markedly reduce our ability in limited war by denying us
air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort with
lesser results, by complicating military lines of communication
and by the introduction of more formidable enemy forces in the
area. Air access and access to 5,300 miles of mainland coastline
would be outflanked, the last significant United Kingdom military
158
strength in Asia would be eliminated with the loss of Singapore
and Malaya and U.S. military influence in that area, short of war,
would be difficult to exert.
b. Possible Eventualities-Of equal importance to the immediate
losses are the eventualities which could follow the loss of the
Southeast Asian mainland. All of the Indonesian archipelago
could come under the domination and control of the USSR and
would become a communist base posing a threat against Australia
and New Zealand. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would have control of
the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan
could be pressured to assume at best, a neutralist role, thus
eliminating
two of our major bases in the Western Pacific. Our lines
of defense then would be pulled north to Korea, Okinawa and
Taiwan resulting in the subsequent overtaking of our lines of
communications in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutral
would be jeopardized and, as the Bloc meets success, its concurrent
stepped-up activities to move into and control Africa can
be expected ....
. . . 13. Three salient factors are of the greatest importance if
the eventual introduction of U.S. forces is required.
a. Any war in the Southeast Asian Mainland will be a peninsula
and island-type of campaign-a mode of warfare in which all
elements of the Armed Forces of the United States have gained
a wealth of experience and in which we have excelled both in
World War II and Korea.
b. Study of the problem clearly indicates that the Communists
are limited in the forces they can sustain in war in that area
because of natural logistic and transportation problems.
c. Our present world military posture is such that we now
have effective forces capable of implementing existing contingency
plans for Southeast Asia without affecting to an unacceptable
degree our capability to conduct planned operations in Europe
relating to Berlin or otherwise.
14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in any consideration
of further action which may be required because of
possible unacceptable results obtained despite Diem's full cooperation
and the effective employment of South Vietnam armed
forces, you again consider the recommendation provided you by
JCSM-320-61, dated 10 May 1961, that a decision be made to
deploy suitable U.S. forces to South Vietnam sufficient to accomplish
the following:
a. Provide a visible deterrent to potential North Vietnam and/or
Chinese Communist action;
b. Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense
positions to permit their future commitment to counterinsurgency
actions;
c. Assist in training the Vietnamese forces;
d. Provide a nucleus for the support of any additional U.S. or
SEATO military operations in Southeast Asia; and
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e. Indicate the firmness of our intent to all Asian nations.
We are of the opinion that failure to do so under such circumstances
will merely extend the date when such action must be
taken and will make our ultimate task proportionately more difficult.
# 32
State Department Study in Late '62 on
Prospects in South Vietnam
Excerpts from research memorandum from Roger Hilsman,
director of the State Department Bureau of intelligence
and Research, to Secretary of State Rusk, Dec. 3,
1962. The memorandum bore the title "The Situation and
Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam" and a footnote
said that the report was based on information available
through Nov. 12, 1962 .
. . . President Ngo Dinh Diem and other leading Vietnamese
as well as many U.S. officials in South Vietnam apparently believe
that the tide is now turning in the struggle against Vietnamese
Communist (Viet Cong) insurgency and subversion. This
degree of optimism is premature. At best, it appears that the rate
of deterioration has decelerated with improvement, principally in
the security sector, reflecting substantially increased U.S. assistance
and GVN implementation of a broad counterinsurgency program.
The GVN has given priority to implementing a basic strategic
concept featuring the strategic hamlet and systematic pacification
programs. It has paid more attention to political, economic, and
social counterinsurgency measures and their coordination with
purely military measures. Vietnamese military and security forces
-now enlarged and of higher quality-are significantly more
offensive-minded and their counter guerilla tactical capabilities are
greatly improved. Effective GVN control of the countryside has
been extended slightly. In some areas where security has improved
peasant attitudes toward the government appear also to have
improved.
As a result, the Viet Cong has had to modify its tactics and
perhaps set back its timetable. But the "national liberation war"
has not abated nor has the Viet Cong been weakened. On the contrary,
the Viet Cong has expanded the size and enhanced the
capability and organization of its guerilla force-now estimated
at about 23,000 in elite fighting personnel, plus some 100,000
irregulars and sympathizers. It still controls about 20 percent of
the villages and about 9 percent of the rural population, and
has varying degrees of influence among additional 47 percent
of the villages. Viet Cong control and communication lines to
160
the peasant have not been seriously weakened and the guerillas
have thus been able to maintain good intelligence and a high
degree of initiative, mobility, and striking power. Viet Cong influence
has almost certainly improved in urban areas not only
through subversion and terrorism but also because of its propaganda
appeal to the increasingly frustrated non-Communist anti-
Diem elements.
The internal political situation is considerably more difficult to
assess. Diem has strengthened his control of the bureaucracy and
the military establishment. He has delegated a little more authority
than in the past, and has become increasingly aware of the importance
of the peasantry to the counterinsurgency effort. Nevertheless,
although there are fewer reports of discontent with Diem's
leadership within official circles and the civilian elite, there are
still many indications of continuing serious concern, particularly
with Diem's direction of the counterinsurgency effort. There are
also reports that important military and civilian officials continue
to participate in coup plots. Oppositionists, critics, and dissenters
outside the government appear to be increasingly susceptible to
neutralist, pro-Communist, and possibly anti-U.S. sentiments. They
are apparently placing increased reliance on clandestine activities.
The Viet Cong is obviously prepared for a long struggle and
can be expected to maintain the present pace and diversity of its
insurgent-subversive effort. During the next month or so, it may
step up its military effort in reaction to the growing GVN-U.S.
response. Hanoi can also be expected to increase its efforts to
legitimatize its "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam"
(NFLSV) and to prepare further groundwork for a
"liberation government" in South Vietnam. On the present evidence,
the Communists are not actively moving toward neutralization
of South Vietnam in the Laos pattern, although they could
seek to do so later. Elimination, even significant reduction, of the
Communist insurgency will almost certainly require several years.
In either case, a considerably greater effort by the GVN, as well as
continuing U.S. assistance, is crucial. If there is continuing
improvement
in security conditions, Diem should be able to alleviate
concern and boost morale within the bureaucracy and the military
establishment. But the GVN will not be able to consolidate its
military successes into permanent political gains and to evoke
the positive support of the peasantry unless it gives more emphasis
to non-military aspects of the counterinsurgency program, integrates
the strategic hamlet program with an expanded systematic
pacification program, and appreciably modified military tactics
(particularly those relating to large-unit actions and tactical use
of air-power and artillery). Failure to do so might increase militant
opposition among the peasants and their positive identification
with the Viet Congo
A coup could occur at any time, but would be more likely if the
fight against the Communists goes badly, if the Viet Cong launches
161
a series of successful and dramatic operations, or if Vietnamese
army casualties increase appreciably over a protracted period.
The coup most likely to succeed would be one with non-Communist
leadership and support, involving middle and top echelon
military and civilian officials. For a time at least, the serious
disruption of government leadership resulting from a coup would
probably halt and possibly reverse the momentum of the government's
counterinsurgency effort. The role of the U.S. can be extremely
important in restoring this momentum and in averting
widespread fighting and a serious internal power struggle ....
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