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Chapter 1: The
Truman and Eisenhower Years: 1945-1960
Highlights of
the Period: 1945·1960
South Vietnam, the
secret Pentagon account contends, is essentially
the creation of the U.S., and the formative years were those of
the Truman and-in particular-the Eisenhower Administrations.
Here, in chronological order, are key events-actions, decisions,
policy formulations-of this period:
1945-46
Ho Chi Minh wrote a series of appeals for U.S. support to President
Truman and the Secretary of State. There is no indication, the
account says, of any reply.
1950
A National Security Council study urged the U.S. to "scrutinize
closely the development of threats from Communist aggression" in
Asia and to aid "directly concerned" governments.
The U.S. recognized the Bao Dai regime, not Ho; the French
requested military aid; Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that the
alternative would be the "extension of Communism" throughout
Southeast Asia "and possibly westward." The aid decision, the
account says, meant the U.S. was "thereafter" directly involved "in
the developing tragedy in Vietnam."
1953
The National Security Council reported that the loss of Indochina
to Communism "would be critical to the security of the U.S."
1954
The National Security Council urged President Eisenhower to
warn that "French acquiescence" in a negotiated settlement would
end U.S. aid to France, and suggested that the U.S. might continue
the war on to "military victory."
The French asked for a U.S. air strike with disguised planes. The
President's nonintervention decision was still tentative. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles said he would give a "broad hint" to the
French that U.S. intervention was a possibility, with preconditions.
Eisenhower ordered a draft Congressional resolution, and the Defense
Department prepared a memo on the U.S. forces that would be
required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memo, said Indochina was "devoid
of decisive military objectives."
May-Dienbienphu fell and the Geneva meetings began.
June-Cot. Edward G. Lansdale of the C.I.A. arrived in Saigon to
head a team of agents for "paramilitary operations" and "political-
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psychological warfare" against the North.
July-The Geneva sessions ended in accords "temporarily" dividing
Vietnam until reunification through free elections in 1956 and
prohibiting foreign military use of Vietnamese territory.
August-A national intelligence estimate termed the chances for a
strong regime in the South poor. The National Security Council
found the Geneva accords a "disaster" that completed a "major forward
stride of Communism," the study says. A Joint Chiefs' memo
said a "strong, stable civil government" was the "absolutely essential"
basis for U.S. military-training aid. But Mr. Dulles felt the military-
training program was "one of the most efficient means" of
stabilizing a regime. With the President's approval of the Council's
recommendations for direct economic and military aid to South
Vietnam, "American policy toward post-Geneva Vietnam was
drawn," the account says.
October- The Lansdale team undertook the "delayed sabotage" of
the Hanoi railroad and other operations.
December-Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. special representative,
urged the removal and replacement of Ngo Dinh Diem as the
leader, or the "re-evaluation of our plans" for aid to the area. Mr.
Dul1es replied that he had "no other choice but to continue our aid to
Vietnam and support of Diem."
1955
April-Mr. Dulles, after meeting with General Collins, cabled the
embassy in Saigon to seek an alternative to Diem.
May-Mr. Diem, with the aid of Lansdale, quashed the sect uprising
in Saigon. Mr. Dulles canceled his previous cable.
December-Mr. Dulles, in a cable to the embassy in Saigon, said
the U.S. should not act to "speed up present process of decay of
Geneva accords" but also should not make the "slightest effort to
infuse life into them."
1956
The U.S. sent 350 additional military men to Saigon; the account
says this was an "example of the U.S. ignoring" the Geneva accords.
1960
A national intelligence estimate predicted that "discontent with
the [Diem] Government will probably continue to rise."
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Chapter 1
The Truman and Eisenhower
Years: 1945-1960
-BY Fox BUTTERFIELD
The secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war discloses
that a few days after the Geneva accords of 1954, the Eisenhower
Administration's National Security Council decided that
the accords were a "disaster" and approved actions to prevent
further Communist expansion in Vietnam.
These National Security Council decisions, the Pentagon
account concludes, meant that the United States had "a direct
role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva settlement."
That judgment contradicts the repeated assertion of several
American administrations that North Vietnam alone was to
blame for the undermining of the Geneva accords.
According to the Pentagon writer, the National Security
Council, at a meeting on Aug. 8, 1954, just after the Geneva
conference, ordered an urgent program of economic and military
aid-substituting American advisers for French advisers
-to the new South Vietnamese Government of Ngo Dinh
Diem.
The objectives set by the Council were "to maintain a
friendly non-Communist South Vietnam" and "to prevent a
Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections."
Under the Geneva settlement, Vietnam was to be temporarily
divided into two zones pending reunification through
elections scheduled for 1956. The introduction of foreign
troops or bases and the use of Vietnamese territory for
military purposes were forbidden. The United States, which
did not join with the nations that endorsed the accords,
issued a declaration taking note of the provisions and promising
not to disturb them.
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But a lengthy report, accompanying the Pentagon study,
describes in detail how the Eisenhower Administration sent a
team of agents to carry out clandestine warfare against North
Vietnam from the minute the Geneva conference closed.
The team, headed by the legendary intelligence operative
Col. Edward G. Lansdale, gave a graphic account of the
actions just before evacuating Hanoi in October 1954. [See
Document #15.]
The report says the team "spent the last days of Hanoi in
contaminating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual
wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking actions for delayed
sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with
a C.I.A. special technical team in Japan who performed their
part brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets
for future para-military operations."
"U. S. adherence to the Geneva agreement," the authors of
the report said, "prevented [the American team] from carrying
out the active sabotage it desired to do against the power
plant, water facilities, harbor and bridge."
"The team had a bad moment when contaminating the oil.
They had to work quickly at night, in an enclosed storage
room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking
them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces
with handkerchiefs and completed the job."
The report is attributed to a hastily assembled group identified
as the Saigon Military Mission. Its authors do not explain
why they believed sabotage of buses and the railroad was
allowed under the Geneva accords if sabotage of the power
plant and harbor was forbidden.
The Pentagon study, which was commissioned by Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara to determine how the United
States became involved in the Vietnam war, devotes nine
lengthy sections to the nineteen-forties and fifties.
At key points during these years, the Pentagon study says,
the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations made far-reaching
decisions on Vietnam policy that the public knew
little about or misunderstood. And by the time John F. Kennedy
became President in 1961, the writers recount, the
American Government already felt itself heavily committed to
the defense of South Vietnam.
One of the earliest disclosures in the account is that in late
1945 and early 1946, Ho Chi Minh wrote at least eight letters
to President Truman and the State Department requesting
American help in winning Vietnam's independence from
France. [See Document # 1.]
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The analyst says he could find no record that the United
States ever answered Ho Chi Minh's letters. Nor has Washington
ever revealed that it received the letters.
A key point came in the winter of 1949-50 when the
United States made what the account describes as a watershed
decision affecting American policy in Vietnam for the
next two decades: After the fall of mainland China to the
Chinese Communists, the Truman Administration moved to
support Emperor Bao Dai and provide military aid to the
French against the Communist-led Vietminh.
This decision, which was made amid growing concern in
the United States over the expansion of Communism in Eastern
Europe and Asia, reversed Washington's long-standing reluctance
to become involved with French colonialism in
Indochina.
With this action, the account says, "the course of U. S.
policy was set to block further Communist expansion in
Asia." And "the United States thereafter was directly involved
in the developing tragedy in Vietnam."
Another key point came in the spring of 1954, the writer
discloses, when the Eisenhower Administration strongly
hinted to France twice that it was willing to intervene with
American military forces to prevent French defeat in Indochina.
While some information has been made public about these
proposals, the Pentagon study says that the public has not
understood how seriously the Eisenhower Administration debated
intervention.
It adds that during the second episode, which occurred in
May and June, 1954, while the Geneva conference was in
session, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had aides draft a
resolution requesting Congressional authority to commit
American troops in Indochina.
The National Security Council was so opposed to France's
negotiating an end to the war, the analyst relates, that "the
President was urged to inform Paris that French acquiescence
in a Communist take-over of Indochina would bear on its
status as one of the Big Three" and that "U.S. aid to France
would automatically cease."
Then in August, 1954, came the decision that the Pentagon
account says determined United States policy toward Vietnam
for the rest of the decade: The National Security Council
launched its program of economic and military aid to Mr.
Diem, then Premier and later President, though its action
was not made public for months. [See Document #4.]
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The Pentagon account discloses that most of these major
decisions from 1950 on were made against the advice of the
American intelligence community.
Intelligence analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency,
the State Department and sometimes the Pentagon repeatedly
warned that the French, Emporer Bao Dai and Premier Diem
were weak and unpopular and that the Communists were
strong.
In early August, 1954, for example, just before the National
Security Council decided to commit the United States
to propping up Premier Diem, a national intelligence estimate
warned:
"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese,
even with firm support from the U.S. and other powers, may
be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we
believe that the chances for this development are poor and
moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to
deteriorate progressively over the next year."
"Given the generally bleak appraisals of Diem's prospects,
they who made U.S. policy could only have done so by assuming
a significant measure of risk," the study says of the
Eisenhower commitments.
The Pentagon study does not deal at length with a major
question: Why did the policy-makers go ahead despite the
intelligence estimates prepared by their most senior intelligence
officials?
The most important reason advanced by the Pentagon study
is that after the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and
the hardening of American anti-Communist attitudes, "Indochina's
importance to U.S. security interests in the Far East
was taken for granted."
The basic rationale for American involvement-what later
came to be called the domino theory-was first clearly
enunciated by the National Security Council in February,
1950, when it decided to extend military aid to the French in
Indochina.
"It is important to U.S. security interests," the Council
said, "that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further
Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a
key area and is under immediate threat.
"The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could
be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina
is controlled by a Communist government. The balance of
Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard."
Subsequent Council decision papers throughout the nine-
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teen-fifties repeated this formulation with ever-increasing
sweep.
A Council paper approved by President Eisenhower in January,
1954, predicted that the "loss of any single country" in
Southeast Asia would ultimately lead to the loss of all Southeast
Asia, then India and Japan, and finally "endanger the
stability and security of Europe."
"The domino theory and the assumptions behind it were
never questioned," the Pentagon account says of the Eisenhower
years. The result was that the Government's internal
debate usually centered more on matters of military feasibility
than on questions of basic national interests.
U.S. Policy in "Disarray"
The Pentagon study, which begins its account of American
involvement in Vietnam with World War II, says that American
policy from 1940 to 1950 has been a subject of "significant
misunderstanding."
American policy toward Vietnam during these years, the
study says, was "Less purposeful" than most people have
assumed, and more characterized by "ambivalence and indecision."
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the writer relates, never
made up his mind whether to support the French desire to
reclaim their Indochina colonies from the Japanese at the end
of the war.
And at his death, American policy toward Indochina was
in "disarray," the writer says.
He recounts that at first the Truman Administration had
no clear-cut reaction to the conflict that broke out in 1945
and 1946 between the French and the Vietminh and eventually
led to full-scale war. American policy, he adds, remained
"ambivalent. "
In a cablegram still kept secret in State Department files,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall described the Government's
quandary to the embassy in Paris:
"We have fully recognized France's sovereign position and
we do not wish to have it appear that we are in any way
endeavoring undermine that position.
"At same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact there are
two sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a
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lack of French understanding other side and continued existence
dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and method in
areas.
"On other hand we do not lose sight fact that Ho Chi
Minh has direct Communist connections and it should be
obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire
administrations supplanted by philosophy and political organization
directed from and controlled by Kremlin.
"Frankly we have no solution of problem to suggest."
On this reasoning, the Truman Government refused French
requests for American planes and ships to transport French
troops to Indochina and similarly turned down appeals for
American arms to help fight the Vietminh.
But the Truman Administration also rebuffed the appeals
from Ho Chi Minh. In August and September, 1945, the account
relates, while his forces were in control of Hanoi, he
sent a request to President Truman through the Office of
Strategic Services, precursor of the C.I.A., asking that Vietnam
be accorded "the same status as the Philippines" for a
period of tutelage pending independence.
From October, 1945, until the following February, the account
continues, Ho Chi Minh wrote at least eight letters to
President Truman or to the Secretary of State, formally appealing
for United States and United Nations intervention
against French colonialism.
There is no record, the analyst says, that any of the appeals
were answered.
"Nonintervention by the United States on behalf of the
Vietnamese was tantamount to acceptance of the French,"
the Pentagon account declares.
In 1948 and 1949, as concern about the Soviet Union's
expansion in Eastern Europe grew in the United States, Washington
became increasingly anxious about Ho Chi Minh's
Communist affiliations. Nevertheless, the account discloses, a
survey by the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research
in the fall of 1948 concluded that it could not find any
hard evidence that Ho Chi Minh actually took his orders
from Moscow.
"If there is a Moscow-directed conspiracy in Southeast
Asia, Indochina is an anomaly so far," the study reported in
its evaluation section.
With its growing concern about Communism, Washington
began to press Paris harder to give more independence to the
Indochina states. The American Government thus hoped to
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encourage Vietnamese popular support for Bao Dai as a non-
Communist alternative to Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh.
Yet, the narrative relates, even when in March, 1949,
France did agree with Emperor Bao Dai to grant Vietnam independence
within the French Union, the Truman Administration
continued to withhold its backing, fearful that Bao Dai
was still weak and tainted with French colonialism.
In a cablegram to the Paris embassy, the State Department
outlined its concern:
"We cannot at this time irretrievably commit the U.S. to
support of a native government which by failing to develop
appeal among Vietnamese might become virtually a puppet
government separated from the people and existing only by
the presence of French military forces."
But when Mao Tse-tung's armies drove Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek out of China in late 1949, Washington's ambivalence
ended dramatically.
On Dec. 30 President Truman approved a key National
Security Council study on Asia, designated N.S.C. 48/2. With
it, the Pentagon study says, "The course of U. S. policy was
set to block further Communist expansion in Asia."
"The United States on its own initiative," the document
declared, "should now scrutinize closely the development of
threats from Communist aggression, direct or indirect, and
be prepared to help within our means to meet such threats
by providing political, economic and military assistance and
advice where clearly needed to supplement the resistance of
other governments in and out of the area which are more
directly concerned."
The Council document concluded that "particular attention
should be given to the problem of French Indochina."
The basic policy decisions having been made, the Pentagon
account relates, developments followed swiftly.
When Peking and Moscow recognized Ho Chi Minh's
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in January, 1950, Washington
followed by recognizing Bao Dai that Feb. 7.
Nine days later, the French requested military aid for the
war in Indochina. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in recommending
a favorable reply, wrote in a memorandum to
President Truman:
"The choice confronting the U. S. is to support the legal
governments in Indochina or to face the extension of Communism
over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast
Asia and possibly westward."
On May 8, Washington announced that it would provide
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economic and military aid to the French in Indochina, beginning
with a grant of $10-million.
The first step had been taken. "The U.S. thereafter was
directly involved in the developing tragedy in Vietnam," the
account says.
Ultimately, the American military aid program reached
$1.1-billion in 1954, paying for 78 per cent of the French war
burden.
Brink of Intervention
In the spring of 1954, as the French military position in
Indochina deteriorated rapidly and the date for the Geneva
conference approached, the Eisenhower Administration twice
hinted to France that it was ready to intervene with American
forces.
The Pentagon study contends that while some information
about these two episodes has become public, the American
people have never been told how seriously the Eisenhower
inner circle debated intervening.
"The record shows plainly," the analyst says, "that the
U.S. did seriously consider intervention and advocated it to
the U.K. and other allies."
The first of these episodes, during March and April before
the fall of the French fortress at Dienbienphu, was disclosed
not long afterward by American journalists. But the story of
the second, in May and early June while the Geneva conference
was in session, has never been fully revealed. Mr.
Eisenhower himself, in his 1963 book "Mandate for Change,"
mentioned the second debate over intervention but gave only
a sketchy account and did not report asking Secretary Dulles
to draft a Congressional resolution.
The Eisenhower Administration felt intervention might be
necessary, the study says, because without American help the
French were likely to negotiate a "sellout" at Geneva to escape
an unpopular war.
As early as August, 1953, the National Security Council
decided that American policy should be that "under present
conditions any negotiated settlement would mean the eventual
loss to Communism not only of Indochina but of the whole
of Southeast Asia. The loss of Indochina would be critical to
the security of the U.S."
The Eisenhower Administration stated its opposition to a
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negotiated settlement most fully in an N.S.C. paper, "United
States Position on Indochina to be Taken at Geneva," late in
April in the week the conference opened.
It was at this point, according to the study, that the Council
urged President Eisenhower "to inform Paris that French
acquiescence in a Communist take-over of Indochina would
bear on its status as one of the Big Three" and that "U.S. aid
to France would automatically cease."
In addition, the Council's policy paper said that the United
States should consider continuing the war itself, with the
Indochina states, if France negotiated an unsatisfactory settlement.
America's goal should be nothing short of a "military
victory," the Council said.
The Government's internal record shows, the study says,
that while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Adm.
Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
pushed hard for intervention, other service chiefs, particularly
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway of the Army, were more cautious.
They remembered the bitter and protracted experience in
Korea and were not eager to repeat it.
President Eisenhower finally reached a decision against
intervention on April 4 after a meeting of Mr. Dulles and
Admiral Radford with Congressional leaders the previous day
showed that the Congress would not support American action
without allied help.
As journalists wrote, at the time, the President felt he must
have Congressional approval before he committed American
troops, and the Congressional leaders insisted on allied participation,
especially by Britain.
At the very time the President was reaching this conclusion,
Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris was cabling that the
French had requested the "immediate armed intervention
of U.S. carrier aircraft at Dienbienphu." [See Document #5.]
Mr. Dillon noted that the French had been prompted to
make the request because they had been told by Admiral
Radford that "he would do his best to obtain such help from
the U.S. Government."
Moreover, the President's decision of April 4, contrary to
what was written at the time, was only tentative. The debate
on intervention was still very much alive, the Pentagon account
says.
In fact, the following day, April 5, the National Security
Council, in an action paper, concluded:
"On balance, it appears that the U.S. should now reach a
decision whether or not to intervene with combat forces if
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that is necessary to save Indochina from Communist control,
and tentatively the form and conditions of any such intervention."
On May 7, with the news that Dienbienphu had just fallen
and with the delegates already in Geneva, President Eisenhower
met with Mr. Dulles in the White House to again consider
intervention.
According to a memorandum by Robert Cutler, the President's
executive assistant, they discussed how "the U.S. should
(as a last act to save Indochina) propose to France" that if
certain conditions were met "the U.S. will go to Congress for
authority to intervene with combat forces." The words in
parentheses appeared in the memorandum. [See Document
#8.]
Mr. Cutler noted that he explained to the President that
some members of the Council's Planning Board "felt that it
had never been made clear to the French that the United
States was willing to ask for Congressional authority" if the
preconditions were met.
Mr. Dulles said he would mention the subject to the French
Ambassador, Henry Bonnet, that afternoon, "perhaps making
a more broad hint than heretofore."
The preconditions included a call for the French to grant
"genuine freedom" to the Indochina states-Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam.
They also stipulated that American advisers in Vietnam
should "take major responsibility for training indigenous
forces" and "share responsibility for military planning."
American officers in Vietnam had long chafed under the
limits on the role the French allowed them, the study says.
Participation by the British, who had shown themselves extremely
reluctant to get involved, was no longer cited as a
condition.
The French picked up Mr. Dulles's hint, and on May 10
Premier Joseph Laniel told Ambassador Dillon that France
needed American intervention to save Indochina. That evening
the President again met with Mr. Dulles, along with
Admiral Radford and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson,
to discuss the French appeal.
During the meeting President Eisenhower directed Secretary
Dulles to prepare a resolution that he could take before
a joint meeting of Congress, requesting authority to commit
American troops in Indochina.
From a document included in the Pentagon chroniclet -- he
partial text of a legal commentary by a Pentagon official
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on the draft Congressional resolution-it is clear that such a
Congressional resolution was prepared and circulated in the
State Department, the Justice Department and the Defense
Department.
Both the State Department and the Defense Department
then undertook what the account describes as "contingency
planning" for possible intervention-the State Department
drawing up a hypothetical timetable of diplomatic moves and
the Defense Department preparing a memorandum on the
U.S. forces that would be required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to Secretary of
Defense Wilson on May 20, recommended that the United
States limit its involvement to "air and naval support directed
from outside Indochina."
"From the point of view of the United States," the Joint
Chiefs said, "Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives
and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed
forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited
U.S. capabilities."
In the debates over intervention, the study says, advocates
of American action advanced several novel ideas. Admiral
Radford proposed to the French, for example, that the United
States help create an "International Volunteer Air Corps"
for Indochina. The French in April had suggested an
American air strike with the planes painted with French
markings. And late in May the French suggested that the
President might be able to get around Congress if he sent just
a division of marines-some 15,000 men.
But all the arguments in favor of intervention came to
naught. The French Cabinet felt that the war-weary National
Assembly would balk at any further military action.
And the military situation in the Red River Delta near
Hanoi deteriorated so badly in late May and early June that
Washington felt intervention would now be useless. On June 15
Secretary Dulles informed Ambassador Bonnet that the time
for intervention had run out.
The Geneva "Disaster"
When the Geneva agreements were concluded on July 21,
1954 the account says, "except for the United States, the
major powers were satisfied with their handiwork."
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France, Britain, the Soviet Union, Communist China and
to some extent North Vietnam believed that they had ended
the war and had transferred the conflict to the political
realm.
And. the study says, most of the governments involved
"anticipated that France would remain in Vietnam." They expected
that Paris would retain a major influence over the Diem
regime, train Premier Diem's army and insure that the 1956
elections specified by the Geneva accords were carried out.
But the Eisenhower Administration took a different view,
the Pentagon account relates.
In meetings Aug. 8 and 12, the National Security Council
concluded that the Geneva settlement was a "disaster" that
"completed a major forward stride of Communism which
may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia."
The Council's thinking appeared consistent with its decision
in April before the conference began, that the United
States would not associate itself with an unsatisfactory
settlement. Secretary Dulles had announced this publicly on
several occasions, and in the end the United States had only
taken note of the agreements.
But before the Council reached a final decision in August
on exactly what programs to initiate in Indochina, several
dissenting voices rose inside the Government.
The national intelligence estimate of Aug. 3 warned that
even with American support it was unlikely that the French
or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government.
And the National Intelligence Board predicted that the
situation would probably continue to deteriorate.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also objected to proposals
that the United States train and equip the South Vietnamese
Army.
In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on Aug.
4, the Joint Chiefs listed their preconditions for U.S. military
aid to the Diem regime:
"It is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably
strong, stable civil government in control. It is hopeless to
expect a U. S. military training mission to achieve success
unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform
those governmental functions essential to the successful
raising and maintenance of armed forces."
The Joint Chiefs also called for the complete "withdrawal
of French forces, French officials and French advisers from
Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis
for the establishment of national armed forces."
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Finally the Joint Chiefs expressed concern about the
limits placed on American forces in Vietnam by the Geneva
accords-they were restricted to 342 men, the number of
American military personnel present in Vietnam when the
armistice was signed.
Despite these arguments, the study says, Secretary of
State Dulles felt that the need to stop Communism in Vietnam
made action imperative.
In a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson, he said that
while the Diem regime "is far from strong or stable," a
military training program would be "one of the most efficient
means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to
become strong."
In the end, the study recounts, Secretary Dulles's views
were persuasive.
On Aug. 20 the President approved a National Security
Council paper titled "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far
East." It outlined a threefold program:
• Militarily, the United States would "work with France
only so far as necessary to build up indigenous forces able
to provide internal security."
• Economically, the United States would begin giving aid
directly to the Vietnamese, not as before through the
French. The French were to be dissociated from the levers
of command."
• Politically, the United States would work with Premier
Diem, but would encourage him to broaden his Government
and establish more democratic institutions.
With these decisions, the account says "American policy
toward post-Geneva Vietnam was drawn." The commitment
for the United States to assume the burden of defending
South Vietnam had been made.
"The available record does not indicate any rebuttal" to
the warnings of the National Intelligence Board or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the account reports. "What it does indicate
is that the U.S. decided to gamble with very limited resources
because the potential gains seemed well worth a
limited risk."
Although this major decision for direct American involvement
in Vietnam was made in August, the Pentagon account
shows that the Eisenhower Administration had already
sent a team of Americans to begin secret operations against
the Vietminh in June, while the Geneva conference was still
in session.
The team was headed by Colonel Lansdale, the C.I.A.
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agent who had established a reputation as America's leading
expert in counter-guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, where
he had helped President Ramon Magsaysay suppress the
Communist-led Hukbalahap insurgents.
So extensive were his subsequent exploits in Vietnam in
the nineteen-fifties that Colonel Landsdale was widely known
as the model for the leading characters in two novels of
Asian intrigue-"The Quiet American," by Graham Greene,
and "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and
Eugene Burdick.
A carefully detailed 21,000-word report by members of
Colonel Lansdale's team, the Saigon Military Mission, is
appended to the Pentagon chronicle. [See Document # 15.]
According to that report, in the form of a diary from
June, ] 954, to August, 1955, the team was originally instructed
"to undertake paramilitary operations against the
enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare."
"Later," it adds, "after Geneva, the mission was modified
to prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations
in Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional
warfare."
One of Colonel Lansdale's first worries was to get his team
members into Vietnam before the Aug. 11 deadline set by
the Geneva agreements for a freeze on the number of
foreign' military personnel. As the deadline approached, the
report says, it appeared that the Saigon Military Mission
"might have only two members present unless action was
taken."
It adds that Lieut. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, chief of the
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, "agreed
to the addition of 10 S.M.M. members under MAAG
cover, plus any others in the Defense pipeline who arrived
before the deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in
Korea, Japan and Okinawa were selected and rushed to Vietnanl."
While the report says that the team members were given
cover by being listed as members of MAAG, the report
also points out that they communicated with Washington
through the C.I.A. station in Saigon.
Colonel Lansdale himself is identified as a member of the
C.I.A. in a memorandum on the actions of the President's
Special Committee on Indochina, written Jan. 30, 1954, by
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel 3d. [See Document #3.]
The memorandum, which is appended to the Pentagon
study, lists Colonel Lansdale as one of the C.I.A. representatives
present at the meeting. Allen W. Dulles, Director of
Central Intelligence, also attended the meeting.
In the fall of 1954, after all the members had arrived in
Vietnam, the report says, the team's activities increased.
Under Colonel Lansdale, "a small English-language class
[was] conducted for mistresses of important personages at
their request."
This class provided valuable contacts for Colonel Lansdale,
enabling him to get to know such people as the
"favorite mistress" of the army Chief of Staff, Gen. Nguyen
Van Hinh, the report recounts.
When the Oct. 9 deadline for the French evacuation of
Hanoi approached, the team sought to sabotage some of
Hanoi's key facilities.
"It was learned that the largest printing establishment in
the north intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with
the Vietminh," the report relates. "An attempt was made by
S.M.M. to destroy the modern presses, but Vietminh security
agents already had moved into the plant and frustrated the
attempt."
It was the mission's team in Hanoi that spent several
nights pouring contaminant in the engines of the Hanoi bus
company so the buses would gradually be wrecked after
the Vietminh took over the city.
At the same time, the mission's team carried out what
the report calls "black psywar strikes"-that is, psychological
warfare with materials falsely attributed to the other
side. The team printed what appeared to be "leaflets signed
by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for
the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October,
including items about property, money reform and a three-day
holiday of workers upon take-over." The attempt to
scare the people worked.
"The day following the distribution of these leaflets," the
report adds, "refugee registration [of those wishing to flee
North Vietnam] tripled. Two days later Vietminh currency
was worth half the value prior to the leaflets.
"The Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the
leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that
even most of the rank-and-file Vietminh were sure that the
radio denunciations were a French trick."
In the South, the team hired Vietnamese astrologers-in
whose art many Asians place great trust-to compile
almanacs bearing dire predictions for the Vietminh and good
omens for the new Government of Premier Diem.
18
To carry out clandestine operations in North Vietnam
after the team evacuated Hanoi, the report adds, Maj. Lucien
Conein, an officer of S.M.M., recruited a group of Vietnamese
agents under the code name of Binh.
"The group was to be trained and supported by the U.S.
as patriotic Vietnamese," the report says, "to come eventually
under Government control when the Government was
ready for such activities. Thirteen Binhs were quietly exfiltrated
through the port of Haiphong ... and taken on the
first stage of the journey to their training area by a U.S.
Navy ship."
Until Haiphong was finally evacuated in May, 1955, Civil
Air Transport, the Taiwan-based airline run by Gen. Claire
Chennault, smuggled arms for the Binh team from Saigon
to Haiphong.
In exchange, the report says, the Lansdale Mission got
C.AT. the lucrative contract for flying the thousands of
refugees out of North Vietnam.
As the report describes the team's actions, "Haiphong was
reminiscent of our own pioneer days as it was swamped
with people whom it couldn't shelter. Living space and food
were at a premium, nervous tension grew. It was a wild time
for our northern team."
Another team of 21 agents, code-named the Hao group,
were recruited in Saigon, smuggled out on a U.S. Navy
ship while disguised as coolies, and taken to a "secret site"
for training, the report goes on.
Arms for the Haos were smuggled into Saigon by the
United States Air Force, the report says, adding that
S.M.M. brought in eight and a half tons of equipment. This
included 14 radios, 300 carbines, 50 pistols, 300 pounds of
explosives and 100,000 rounds of ammunition.
The Lansdale team's report does not tell what kinds of
intelligence or sabotage activities the Binh and Hao groups
carried out in North Vietnam. But it does recount that one
Binh agent was mistakenly picked up by Premier Diem's
troops on his return to South Vietnam.
"He was interrogated by being handcuffed to a leper, both
beaten with the same stick to draw blood, told he would
now have leprosy, and both locked up in a tiny cell together,"
it says. "S.M.M. was able to have him released."
For fiscal year 1955, the report shows, expenses for the
Saigon Military Mission ran to $228,000. This did not include
salary for the American officers or costs of weapons drawn
from American stocks.
19
The largest item, $123,980, was listed as payment for
operations, including pay and expenses for agents, safehouses
and transportation.
Lansdale In the Breach
While Colonel Lansdale's team carried out its covert operations,
the major policy decisions made by the National
Security Council in August, 1954, were being put into
practice.
In December, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, who had been
chosen by President Eisenhower as his personal representative
to Vietnam, signed an agreement with the French providing
for the United States to take over all military training
duties from them.
The agreement was put into effect in February, 1955, the
account says, and the French, under American pressure,
began their unexpected withdrawal from South Vietnam.
Despite the decision in August, 1954, to back Premier
Diem, there was still widespread uneasiness in the American
Government over his lack of support and the fragile political
situation in Saigon, the Pentagon account goes on.
General Collins, who had been given the rank of Ambassador,
felt that Premier Diem was unequal to the task
and urged that he be removed.
If the United States was unwilling to replace Mr. Diem,
General Collins wrote to Washington in December, 1954,
then "I recommend re-evaluation of our plans for assisting
Southeast Asia." This is the "least desirable but in all
honesty and in view of what I have observed here to date
this may be the only sound solution," he said.
Still Secretary Dulles remained convinced, as he cabled in
reply to General Collins's message, that "we have no other
choice but continue our aid to Vietnam and support of
Diem." And he told Assistant Secretary of State Walter
Robertson several days later that the United States must
"take the plunge" with Mr. Diem, the narrative adds.
In the spring of 1955 the crisis in Saigon worsened. The
Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armed sects formed a united front
with the Binh Xuyen, a group of gangsters who controlled
Saigon's police against Premier Diem, and sporadic fighting
20
broke out in the city. The French told Washington they
thought Premier Diem was "hopeless" and "mad."
General Collins, now adamant that Mr. Diem must go,
flew back to Washington in late April to press his case
personally with the Secretary of State.
On April 27, after a meeting with General Collins, Secretary
Dulles reluctantly agreed to the replacing of Premier
Diem. He cabled the embassy in Saigon to find an alternative.
But Colonel Lansdale was working hard to support his
friend Mr. Diem. In October the colonel had foiled a coup
against Mr. Diem by Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, the army
Chief of Staff, by inviting General Hinh's two key aides to
visit the Philippines for a tour of secret projects.
The authors of the Lansdale group's report do not specifically
state that the team's instructions included supporting
Mr. Diem against internal non-Communist opposition.
But it is apparent from Colonel Lansdale's actions that he
considered this an important part of his mission.
During the fall of 1954 Colonel Lansdale helped Mr. Diem
recruit, pay and train reliable bodyguards. He had been
shocked to discover when he visited Mr. Diem at the palace
during a coup attempt that the official bodyguards had all
deserted. "Not a guard was left on the grounds," the report
says. "President Diem was alone upstairs, calmly getting his
work done."
With permission from the embassy, the Saigon Military
Mission then began secretly paying funds to a Cao Dai
leader, Gen. Trinh Minh The, who offered his services to
Premier Diem.
Colonel Lansdale also brought from the Philippines
President Magsaysay's senior military aide and three assistants
to train a battalion of Vietnamese palace guards.
When the sect crisis broke out in the spring of 1955,
Colonel Lansdale visited Mr. Diem nearly every day, the
S.M.M. report says. "At President Diem's request, we had
been seeing him almost nightly as tensions increased, our
sessions with him lasting for hours at a time."
During the sect armies' uprising, the Saigon Military
Mission helped Premier Diem plan measures against the
Binh Xuyen, and Colonel Lansdale repeatedly pressed the
embassy to support the Premier.
With the acting C.I.A. station chief, Colonel Lansdale
formed a team to help take action against the Binh Xuyen.
The S.M.M. report recounts that "all measures possible
21
under the narrow limits permitted by U.S. policy were
taken."
Uncharacteristically, the report adds, "These will not be
described here, but there were a number of successful
actions."
On what proved to be the crucial day, April 28, the
Pentagon study reports, Premier Diem summoned Colonel
Lansdale to the palace and outlined his troubles. He had just
"received word from his embassy in Washington that the
U.S. appeared to be about to stop supporting him."
This was probably a reference to Secretary Dulles's decision
of the previous day.
Premier Diem also reported that Binh Xuyen units had
begun firing on his troops.
Colonel Lansdale sought to reassure him. "We told him
that it looked as though Vietnam still needed a leader," the
report says, "that Diem was still President, that the U.S.
was still supporting him."
That afternoon .Premier Diem ordered a counterattack
against the Binh Xuyen, and within nine hours achieved a
major victory.
"Washington responded with alacrity to Diem's success,
superficial though it was," the narrative says. Saigon was
told to forget Secretary Dulles's order to drop Diem. The
embassy then burned the April 27 message.
Thereafter Mr. Diem had full American backing, the
study reports, and moved with more confidence. The next
October he organized a referendum to choose between himself
and Bao Dai.
After winning what the Pentagon narrative describes as a
"too resounding" 98.2 per cent of the vote, Premier Diem
proclaimed himself President.
Elections Balked
In July, 1955, under the provisions of the Geneva agreements,
the two zones of Vietnam were to begin consultations
on the elections scheduled for the next year.
But Premier Diem refused to talk with the Communists.
And in July, 1956, he refused to hold elections for reunification.
He asserted that the South Vietnamese Government
22
had not signed the Geneva accords and therefore was not
bound by them.
American scholars and government officials have long
argued over whether the United States was responsible for
Mr. Diem's refusal to hold the elections and therefore, in a
sense, whether Americans had a role in turning the Communists
from politics back to warfare.
The Pentagon study contends that the "United States did
not-as it is often alleged-connive with Diem to ignore the
elections. U.S. State Department records indicate that
Diem's refusal to be bound by the Geneva accords and his
opposition to pre-election consultations were at his own
initiative."
But the Pentagon account also cites State Department
cables and National Security Council memorandums indicating
that the Eisenhower Administration wished to postpone
the elections as long as possible and communicated its feelings
to Mr. Diem.
As early as July 7, 1954, during the Geneva conference,
Secretary Dulles suggested that the United States ought to
seek to delay the elections and to require guarantees that
the Communists could be expected to reject.
In a secret cablegram to Under Secretary of State Walter
BedelI Smith, who filled in for him after he withdrew from
the Geneva conference, Secretary Dulles wrote:
"Since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually
mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, this makes it
al1 more important they should be only held as long after
cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from
intimidation to give democratic elements best chance."
Following similar reasoning the National Security Council
in May, 1955, shortly before consultations on the elections
were supposed to begin, produced a draft statement, "U.S.
Policy on AI1-Vietnam Elections."
According to the Pentagon study, it "held that to give no
impression of blocking elections while avoiding the possibility
of losing them, Diem should insist on free elections by
secret ballot with strict supervision. Communists in Korea
and Germany had rejected these conditions; hopeful1y the
Vietminh would follow suit."
But on June 9, the account says, the Council "decided to
shelve the draft statement. Its main features had already been
conveyed to Diem."
Secretary Dul1es's ambivalent attitude toward the Geneva
accords is also reflected in a cablegram he sent to the
23
United States Embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955, outlining
Washington's position toward the International Control
Commission.
"While we should certainly take no positive step to speed
up present process of decay of Geneva accords," it said,
"neither should we make the slightest effort to infuse life
into them."
In May, 1956, in what the Pentagon account says is an
"example of the U.S. ignoring" the Geneva accords, 350
additional military men were sent to Saigon under the pretext
of helping the Vietnamese recover and redistribute
equipment abandoned by the French.
This was "a thinly veiled device to increase the number
of Americans in Vietnam," the Pentagon account says.
These men, who were officially designated the Temporary
Equipment Recovery Mission or TERM, stayed on as a
permanent part of the Military Assistance Advisory Group,
the narrative says, to help in intelligence and administrative
work.
Washington dispatched the TERM group, the Pentagon
study discloses, "when it was learned informally that the
Indian Government would instruct its representative on the
I.C.C. to interpose no objection."
The I.C.C. is composed of representatives from Poland,
India and Canada, with the Indian usually considered the
neutral representative.
After the crisis with the sects in the spring of 1955 and
the uneventful passing of the date for elections in 1956,
American officials were hopeful that President Diem had
succeeded.
"It seemed for a while that the gamble against long odds
had succeeded," the Pentagon account says. "The Vietminh
were quiescent; the Republic of Vietnam armed forces were
markedly better armed and trained than they were when the
U.S. effort began; and President Diem showed a remarkable
ability to put down factions threatening the GVN [Government
of Vietnam] and to maintain himself in office."
The American aid effort, the study reports, was focused
almost entirely on security. Eight out of every 10 dollars
went to security, and much of what was intended for agriculture,
education, or transportation actually went to security-directed
programs.
For example, the account says, a 20-mile stretch of highway,
built between Saigon and Bienhoa at the insistence of
the MAAG commander, Gen. Samuel T. Williams, received
24
more aid money than all the funds provided for labor,
community development, social welfare, health and education
from 1954 to 1961.
But despite American hopes and the aid effort, the insurgency
in the countryside began to pick up again in 1957
and particularly in 1959. The number of terrorist murders
and kidnappings of local officials rose dramatically, and
enemy units began to attack in ever-increasing size.
As the insurgency grew, the small American intelligence
network "correctly and consistently estimated" the nature of
the opposition to President Diem and his own weaknesses,
the Pentagon study says. The American intelligence estimates
"were remarkably sound," it adds.
A special national intelligence estimate in August, 1960,
for example, said that:
"In the absence of more effective Government measures
to protect the peasants and to win their positive cooperation,
the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Vietcong
control in the countryside, particularly in the southwestern
provinces.
"Dissatisfaction and discontent with the Government will
probably continue to rise.
"These adverse trends are not irreversible, but if they
remain unchecked, they will almost certainly in time cause
the collapse of Diem's regime."
However, the study relates, "the national intelligence
estimates re Diem do not appear to have restrained the
N.S.C. in its major reviews of U.S. policy" toward Vietnam.
The basic Eisenhower Administration policy papers on
Southeast Asia in 1956, 1958 and 1960 repeated American
objectives in "virtually identical" language, the Pentagon
account reports.
According to the 1956 paper by the National Security
Council, these were among the goals of American policy
toward Vietnam:
• "Assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and
constitutional government to enable Free Vietnam to assert
an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the
present Communist zone."
• "Work toward the weakening of the Communists in
North and South Vietnam in order to bring about the
eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent
Vietnam under anti-Communist leadership."
• "Support the position of the Government of Free Vietnam
that all-Vietnam elections may take place only after it
25
is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout
both zones of Vietnam."
During the late nineteen-fifties, the study relates, United
States officials in Saigon were also optimistic in their public
comments about the situation, despite the pessimistic secret
reports they forwarded to Washington.
"While classified policy paper thus dealt with risks," the
account says, "public statements of U.S. officials did not
refer to the jeopardy. To the contrary, the picture presented
the public and Congress by Ambassador Durbrow, General
Williams and other Administration spokesmen was of continuing
progress, virtually miraculous improvement, year in
and year out."
Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow and General Williams for
example, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the
summer of 1959 that Vietnam's internal security was "in no
serious danger" and that South Vietnam was in a better position
that ever before to cope with an invasion from the
North.
The next spring General Williams wrote to Senator Mike
Mansfield that President Diem was doing so well that the
United States could begin a "phased withdrawal" of American
advisers in 1961.
That was the situation that confronted President Kennedy
when he took office early in 1961.
"The U.S. had gradually developed a special commitment
in South Vietnam," writes the Pentagon analyst charged
with explaining the problems facing President Kennedy. "It
was certainly not absolutely binding-but the commitment
was there ... "
"Without U.S. support," the analyst says, "Diem almost
certainly could not have consolidated his hold on the South
during 1955 and 1956.
"Without the threat of U.S. intervention, South Vietnam
could not have refused to even discuss the elections called
for in 1956 under the Geneva settlement without being
immediately overrun by the Vietminh armies.
"Without U.S. aid in the years following, the Diem regime
certainly, and an independent South Vietnam almost
as certainly, could not have survived ... "
In brief, the analyst concludes, "South Vietnam was essentially
the creation of the United States."
26
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the
Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in the
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Except where excerpting
is specified, the documents appear verbatim, with only unmistakable
typographical errors corrected.
# I
Report of Ho's Appeals to U.S. in '46 to
Support Independence
Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified
as Landon, to State Department, Feb. 27, 1946,
as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.
Ho Chi Minh handed me 2 letters addressed to President of
USA, China, Russia, and Britain identical copies of which were
stated to have been forwarded to other governments named. In 2
letters to Ho Chi Minh request USA as one of United Nations
to support idea of Annamese independence according to Philippines
example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take
steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being
endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina. He asserts
that Annamese will fight until United Nations interfered in support
of Annamese independence. The petition addressed to major
United Nations contains:
A. Review of French relations with Japanese where French
Indochina allegedly aided Japs:
B. Statement of establishment on 2 September 1945 of PENW
Democratic Republic of Viet Minh:
C. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China began 23
Sept 1945 and still incomplete:
D. Outline of accomplishments of Annamese Government in
Tonkin including popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes,
expansion of education and resumption as far as possible of normal
economic activities:
E. Request to 4 powers: (l) to intervene and stop the war in
Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring
the Indochinese issue before the United Nations organization.
27
The petition ends with the statement that Annamese ask for full
independence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO
decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablishment
of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted to
Department soonest.
# 2
1952 Policy Statement by U.S. on Goals
in Southeast Asia
Statement of Policy by the National Security Council,
early 1952, on "United States Objectives and Courses of
Action With Respect to Southeast Asia." According to a
footnote, the document defined Southeast Asia as "the
area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and
Indonesia,"
OBJECTIVE
1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing
into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop will and
ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute
to the strengthening of the free world.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast
Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically
endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.
a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist
aggression would have critical psychological, political and
economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely
counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead
to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism
by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment
with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India,
and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable
exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability
progressively follow: Such widespread alignment would
endanger the stability and security of Europe.
b. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render
the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious
and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests
in the Far East.
c. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the
principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer
of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. The
rice exports of Burma and Thailand are critically important to
28
Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable significance
to Japan and India, all important areas of free Asia.
d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia,
could result in such economic and political pressures in
Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual
accommodation to communism.
3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast
Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed. In
order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this
paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will
be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus
reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized
increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military
forces in being, or both.
4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast
Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive
Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued
communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion.
The primary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises
from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate
as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a
result of the inability of the governments of France and of the
Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion,
the military strength of which is being steadily increased by
virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime and its
allies.
5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention
in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However,
should Burma come under communist domination, a communist
military advance through Thailand might make Indochina, including
Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of the following
U.S. courses of action with respect to individual countries
of the area may vary depending upon the route of communist
advance into Southeast Asia.
6. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia
require sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure
the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for
the general area, and on the other, to accommodate to the greatest
practicable extent to the individual sensibilities of the several
governments, social classes and minorities of the area.
COURSES OF ACTION
Southeast Asia
7. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:
a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate,
in relation to the area to foster increased alignment of the people
with the free world.
b. Continue, as appropriate, programs of economic and techni-
29
cal assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist
governments of the area.
c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and
expand their commerce with each other and with the rest of the
free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources
of the area to the free world.
d. Seek agreement with other nations, including at least France,
the UK, Australia and New Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist
China regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression
against Southeast Asia, the issuance of such a warning
to be contingent upon the prior agreement of France and the UK
to participate in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs
10 c, 12, 14 f (l) and (2) and 15 c (l) and (2), and such
others as are determined as a result of prior trilateral consultation,
in the event such a warning is ignored.
e. Seek UK and French agreement in principle that a naval
blockade of Communist China should be included in the minimum
courses of action set forth in paragraph 10c below.
f. Continue to encourage and support closer cooperation among
the countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and
the United States, Great Britain, France, the Philippines, Australia,
New Zealand, South Asia and Japan.
g. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist
in the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.
h. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the
overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to organize and
activate anti-communist groups and activities within their own
communities, to resist the effects of parallel pro-communist groups
and activities and, generally, to increase their orientation toward
the free world.
i. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of the
area, and encourage and support the spirit of resistance among
the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression
and to the encroachments of local communists.
j. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast
Asia to the security of the United States so that they may be
prepared for any of the courses of action proposed herein.
Indochina
8. With respect to Indochina the United States should:
a. Continue to promote international support for the three Associated
States.
b. Continue to assure the French that the U.S. regards the
French effort in Indochina as one of great strategic importance
in the general international interest rather than in the purely
French interest, and as essential to the security of the free world,
not only in the Far East but in the Middle East and Europe as
well.
c. Continue to assure the French that we are cognizant of the
sacrifices entailed for France in carrying out her effort in Indo-
30
china and that, without overlooking the principle that France has
the primary responsibility in Indochina, we will recommend to
the Congress appropriate military, economic and financial aid to
France and the Associated States.
d. Continue to cultivate friendly and increasingly cooperative
relations with the Governments of France and the Associated
States at all levels with a view to maintaining and, if possible,
increasing
the degree of influence the U.S. can bring to bear on the
policies and actions of the French and Indochinese authorities
to the end of directing the course of events toward the objectives
we seek. Our influence with the French and Associated States
should be designed to further those constructive political, economic
and social measures which will tend to increase the stability
of the Associated States and thus make it possible for the French
to reduce the degree of their participation in the military, economic
and political affairs of the Associated States.
e. Specifically we should use our influence with France and the
Associated States to promote positive political, military, economic
and social policies, among which the following are considered essential
elements:
(1) Continued recognition and carrying out by France of its
primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina.
(2) Further steps by France and the Associated States toward
the evolutionary development of the Associated States.
(3) Such reorganization of French administration and representation
in Indochina as will be conducive to an increased feeling
of responsibility on the part of the Associated States.
(4) Intensive efforts to develop the armies of the Associated
States, including independent logistical and administrative services.
(5) The development of more effective and stable Governments
in the Associated States.
(6) Land reform, agrarian and industrial credit, sound rice
marketing systems, labor development, foreign trade and capital
formation.
(7) An aggressive military, political, and psychological program
to defeat or seriously reduce the Viet Minh forces.
(8) U.S.-French cooperation in publicizing progressive developments
in the foregoing policies in Indochina.
(9) In the absence of large scale Chinese Communist intervention
in Indochina, the United States should:
a. Provide increased aid on a high priority basis for the French
Union forces without relieving French authorities of their basic
military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States in
order to:
(1) Assist in developing indigenous armed forces which will
eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without
assistance from French units.
(2) Assist the French Union forces to maintain progress in
the restoration of internal security against the Viet Minh.
31
(3) Assist the forces of France and the Associated States to
defend Indochina against Chinese Communist aggression.
b. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation, involving
possible large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order
that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action
may be appropriate in such circumstances, make the plans necessary
to carry out the courses of action indicated in paragraph 10
below.
c. In the event that information and circumstances point to
the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the
burden in Indochina, or if France presses for an increased sharing
of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or
directly with the U.S. Government, oppose a French withdrawal
and consult with the French and British concerning further measures
to be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination.
10. In the event that it is determined, in consultation with
France, that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers)
have overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina, or are covertly
participating to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the
Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, the United States
should take the following measures to assist these forces in preventing
the loss of Indochina, to repel the aggression and to restore
peace and security in Indochina:
a. Support a request by France or the Associated States for
immediate action by the United Nations which would include a
UN resolution declaring that Communist China has committed an
aggression, recommending that member states take whatever action
may be necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France
and the Associated States in meeting the aggression.
b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek
the maximum possible international support for, and participation
in, the minimum courses of military action agreed upon by the
parties to the joint warning. These minimum courses of action
are set forth in subparagraph c immediately below.
c. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action,
either under the auspices of the UN or in conjunction with
France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments:
(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United
States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be
practicable.
(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines
including those in China.
(3) The United States would expect to provide the major
forces for task (2) above; but would expect the UK and France
to provide at least token forces therefor and to render such other
assistance as is normal between allies, and France to carry the
burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States,
the ground forces for the defense of Indochina.
32
11. In addition to the courses of action set forth in paragraph
10 above, the United States should take the following military
actions as appropriate to the situation:
a. If agreement is reached pursuant to paragraph 7-e, establishment
in conjunction with the UK and France of a naval blockade
of Communist China.
b. Intensification of covert operations to aid anti-communist
guerrilla forces operating against Communist China and to interfere
with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines of communication
and military supply areas.
c. Utilization, as desirable and feasible, of anti-communist Chinese
forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces in military operations
in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.
d. Assistance to the British to cover an evacuation from Hong
Kong, if required.
e. Evacuation of French Union civil and military personnel
from the Tonkin delta, if required.
12. If, subsequent to aggression against Indochina and execution
of the minimum necessary courses of action listed in paragraph
10-c above, the United States determines jointly with the
UK and France that expanded military action against Communist
China is rendered necessary by the situation, the United States
should take air and naval action in conjunction with at least
France and the U.K. against all suitable military targets in China,
avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the
boundaries of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct
Soviet involvement.
13. In the event the concurrence of the United Kingdom and
France to expanded military action against Communist China is
not obtained, the United States should consider taking unilateral
action.
# 3
Eisenhower Committee's Memo on
French Requests for Aid
Excerpts from memorandum for the record, Jan. 30,
1954, by Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel 3d on meeting
of President's Special Committee on Indochina.
1. The Special Committee met in Mr. Kyes' office at 3: 30 p.m.
29 January 1954 ....
3. Admiral Radford said he had been in touch with General
Ely, French Chief of Staff, through General Valluy. Ten B-26
aircraft are on the way to Indochina this week. These would
contribute to filling the French request for aircraft to bring two
B-26 squadrons up to a strength of 25 operational aircraft each.
However, an additional 12 are needed to fill the full requirement
33
because a total of 22 are needed (12 to fill the annual attrition
plus 10 to fill the additional French request). There was some
discussion on the seeming differences in requests reaching Washington
via Paris and those coming through the MAAG. Subsequently
in the meeting it was agreed that the French should be
informed that the U.S. would act only on requests which had
been approved by General O'Daniel after General O'Daniel was
set up in Indochina.
4. Admiral Radford indicated that to fill the entire requirement
for 22 B-26's on an urgent basis would mean taking some of them
from U.S. operational squadrons in the Far East, but this could
be done. The aircraft would not all have "zero" maintenance time
on them.
5. As to the additional French request for 25 B-26's to equip a
third squadron, it was decided that final decision to furnish them
should await the return of General O'Daniel. However, the Air
Force has been alerted that they may have to be furnished on
short notice.
6. As to the provision of a small "dirigible," it was decided to
inform the French that this could not be furnished.
7. Regarding the French request for 400 mechanics trained in
maintenance of B-26 and C-47 aircraft, there was considerable
discussion. Admiral Radford said he had informed General Ely,
through General Valluy, that the U.S. does not believe the French
have exhausted all efforts to get French civilian maintenance
crews. He suggested the French try to find them through "Air
France" Mr. Kyes mentioned the possibility of obtaining French
personnel from their eight aircraft factories or from the big
Chateauroux maintenance base where the U.S. employed French
mechanics. General Smith inquired about the possibility of lowering
French NATO commitments to enable transfer of French
military mechanics. Admiral Radford said General Valluy had informed
him the French Staff have carefully considered the idea
but the French Air Force does not have enough military mechanics
trained in B-26 or C-47 maintenance to fill the requirement.
Therefore, there would be such a delay while their military
mechanics were being trained on these aircraft that the urgent
requirement could not be met. He had also said that the employment
of French civilian mechanics presented a difficult problem
in security clearance.
8. General Smith recommended that the U.S. send 200 U.S.
Air Force mechanics to MAAG, Indochina, and tell the French
to provide the rest. Admiral Radford said this could be done and
that the Air Force is, somewhat reluctantly, making plans to this
end. He had let the French know that if American mechanics
were sent they must be used only on air bases which were entirely
secure from capture. General Smith wondered, in light of additional
French requests, if the Committee should not consider
sending the full 400 mechanics.
9. Mr. Kyes questioned if sending 200 military mechanics would
34
not so commit the U.S. to support the French that we must be
prepared eventually for complete intervention, including use of
U.S. combat forces. General Smith said he did not think this
would result-we were sending maintenance forces not ground
forces. He felt, however, that the importance of winning in Indochina
was so great that if worst came to the worst he personally
would favor intervention with U.S. air and naval forces-not
ground forces. Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. Kyes felt this consideration
was so important that it should be put to the highest
level. The President himself should decide. General Smith agreed.
Mr. Allen Dulles wondered if our preoccupation with helping to
win the battle at Dien Bien Phu was so great that we were not
going to bargain with the French as we supplied their most urgent
needs. Mr. Kyes said this was an aspect of the question he was
resisting, Admiral Radford read from a cable just received from
General O'Daniel, which indicated General Navarre had been
most cordial to General O'Daniel at their meeting and had indicated
he was pleased with the concept of U.S. liaison officers being
assigned to his general headquarters and to the training
command. General Navarre and General O'Daniel agreed to try
to work out a maximum of collaboration at the military level.
10. Later in the meeting, Mr. Allen Dulles raised the question
as to sending the CAP pilots the French had once requested. It
was agreed that the French apparently wanted them now, that
they should be sent, and CIA should arrange for the necessary
negotiations with the French in Indochina to take care of it.
11. Mr. Kyes said that if we meet the French urgent demands
they should be tied to two things: first, the achievement of
maximum collaboration with the French in training and strategy,
and secondly, the strengthening of General O'Daniel's hand in
every way possible. General Smith agreed and felt we should
reinforce General O'Daniel's position not only with the French in
Indochina but also at the highest level in Paris ....
12. Summary of Action Agreed Regarding Urgent French Requests
It was agreed:
a. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanics who
would be assigned as an augmentation to MAAG, Indochina,
these mechanics to be provided only on the understanding that
they would be used at bases where they would be secure from
capture and would not be exposed to combat.
c. To send the CAP pilots, with CIA arranging necessary
negotiations.
d. Not to provide a "dirigible."
e. To await General O'Daniel's return to Washington before
making a decision on the other French requests. Efforts should
continue to get the French to contribute a maximum number of
mechanics.
It was further agreed that General Smith would clear these
recommended actions with the President.
35
13. The next item discussed was the status of General O'Danieil
Mr. Kyes said General Trapnell, the present Chief of MAAG,
is being replaced at the normal expiration of his tour. General
Dabney had been chosen to replace General Trapnell and is about
to leave for Indochina. Admiral Radford pointed out that General
O'Daniel could be made Chief of MAAG without any further
clearance with the French Government. General Smith said this
would be all right but should not preclude further action to increase
the position of General O'Daniel. General Erskine pointed
out that the MAAG in Indochina is not a "military mission" but
only an administrative group concerned with the provision of
MDAP equipment. He thought the MAAG status should be raised
to that of a mission which could help in training. It was agreed
that General a'Daniel should probably be first assigned as Chief
of MAAG and that, for this reason, General Dabney's departure
for Indochina should be temporarily held up. General Dabney
should, however, go to Indochina to assist General O'Daniel by
heading up the present MAAG functions. Admiral Davis was
requested to assure that General Dabney did not depart until
further instructions were given.
20. Mr. Allen Dulles inquired if an unconventional warfare officer,
specifically Colonel Lansdale, could not be added to the
group of five liaison officers to which General Navarre had agreed.
Admiral Radford thought this might be done and at any rate
Colonel Lansdale could immediately be attached to the MAAG,
but he wondered if it would not be best for Colonel Lansdale to
await General a'Daniel's return before going to Indochina. In
this way, Colonel Lansdale could help the working group in its
revision of General Erskine's paper. This was agreeable to Mr.
Allen Dulles.
21. Present at the meeting were:
Department of Defense--Mr. Kyes, Admiral Radford, Admiral
Davis, General Erskine, Mr. Godel, BIG Bonesteel, Colonel
Alden.
Department of State-General Smith, Mr. Robertson.
CIA-Mr. Allen Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Aurell, Colonel
Lansdale.
# 4
'54 Report by Special Committee on the
Threat of Communism
Excerpts from Part 1I of the Special Committee's Report
on Southeast Asia, April 5,1954. Part I was not made available
with it.
IV CONCLUSIONS
A. The special Committee considers that these factors reinforce
the necessity of assuring that Indo-China remain in the non-
36
Communist bloc, and believes that defeat of the Viet Minh in
Indo-China is essential if the spread of Communist influence in
Southeast Asia is to be halted.
B. Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-
China and without compromising in any way' the overwhelming
strategic importance of the Associated States to the Western position
in the area, the U.S. should take all affirmative and practical
steps, with or without its European allies, to provide tangible
evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat Communism;
to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by the
free world; and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast
Asian states with these purposes.
C. That for these purposes the Western position in Indo-China
must be maintained and improved by a military victory.
D. That without compromise to C, above, the U.S. should in
all prudence reinforce the remainder of Southeast Asia, including
the land areas of Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines.
RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTlON*
A. The Special Committee wishes to reaffirm the following
recommendations which are made in NCS 5405, the Special Committee
Report concerning military operations in Indo-China, and
the position paper of the Special Committee, concurred in by the
Department of Defense, concerning U.S. courses of action and
policies with respect to the Geneva Conference:
(I) It be U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military
victory in Indo-China.
(2) It be the U.S. position to obtain French support of this
position; and that failing this, the U.S. actively oppose any
negotiated settlement in Indo-China at Geneva.
(3) It be the U.S. position in event of failure of (2) above to
initiate immediate steps with the governments of the Associated
States aimed toward the continuation of the war in Indo-China,
to include active U.S. participation and without French support
should that be necessary.
(4) Regardless of whether or not the U.S. is successful in
obtaining French support for the active U.S. participation called
for in (3) above, every effort should be made to undertake this
active participation in concert with other interested nations.
B. The Special Committee also considers that all possible political
and economic pressure on France must be exerted as the
obvious initial course of action to reinforce the French will to
continue operatings [sic] in Indo-China. The Special Committee
recognizes that this course of action will jeopardize the existing
French Cabinet, may be unpopular among the French public, and
-The Department of State representative recommends the deletion of
paragraphs
A and B hereunder as being redundant and included in other
documents.
37
may be considered as endangering present U. S. policy with respect
to EDC. The Committee nevertheless considers that the
free world strategic position, not only in Southeast Asia but in
Europe and the Middle East as well, is such as to require the most
extraordinary efforts to prevent Communist domination of Southeast
Asia. The Committee considers that firm and resolute action
now in this regard may well be the key to a solution of the entire
problem posed by France in the free world community of nations.
C. In order to make the maximum contribution to the free
world strength in Southeast Asia, and regardless of the outcome
of military operations currently in progress in Indo-China, the
U. S. should, in all prudence, take the following courses of action
in addition to those set forth in NSC 5405 and in Part I of the
Special Committee Report:
Political and Military:
( 1) Ensure that there be initiated no cease-fire in Indo-China
prior to victory whether that be by successful military action or
clear concession of defeat by the Communists.
Action: State, CIA
(2) Extraordinary and unilateral, as well as multi-national,
efforts should be undertaken to give vitality in Southeast Asia to
the concept that Communist imperialism is a transcending threat
to each of the Southeast Asian states. These efforts should be so
undertaken as to appear through local initiative rather than as a
result of U.S. or UK, or French instigation.
ACTION: USIA, State, CIA
(3) It should be U.S. policy to develop within the UN Charter
a Far Eastern regional arrangement subscribed and underwritten
by the major European powers with interests in the Pacific.
a. Full accomplishment of such an arrangement can only be
developed in the long term and should therefore be preceded by
the development, through indigenous sources, or regional economic
and cultural agreements between the several Southeast
Asian countries and later with Japan. Such agreements might take
a form similar to that of OEEC in Europe.
Action: State, CIA, FOA
b. Upon the basis of such agreements, the U.S. should actively
but unobtrusively seek their expansion into mutual defense agreements
and should for this purpose be prepared to underwrite such
agreements with military and economic aid and should [rest unavailable].
D. The courses of action outlined above are considered as
mandatory regardless of the outcome of military operations in
Indo-China.
(1) If Indo-China is held they are needed to build up strength
and resistance to Communism in the entire area.
(2) If Indo-China is lost they are essential as partial steps:
a. To delay as long as possible the extension of Communist
domination throughout the Far East, or
38
b. In conjunction with offensive operations to retake Indo-
China from the Communists.
(3) Should Indo-China be lost it is clear to the Special Committee
that the involvement of U. S. resources either in an attempt
to stop the further spread of Communism in the Far East,
(which is bound, except in terms of the most extensive military
and political effort, to be futile) or to initiate offensive operations
to retake and reorient Indo-China, (which would involve a major
military campaign), will greatly exceed those needed to hold
Indo-China before it falls.
(4) Furthermore, either of these undertakings (in the light of
the major setback to U.S. national policy involved in the loss
of Indo-China) would entail as an urgent prerequisite the restoration
of Asian morale and confidence in U.S. policy which will
have reached an unprecedentedly low level in the area.
(5) Each of these courses of action would involve greater risk
of war with Communist China, and possibly the Soviet Union,
than timely preventive action taken under more favorable circumstances
before Indo-China is lost.
# 5
Dillon Cable to Dulles on Appeal for Air
Support at Dienbienphu
Cablegram from Douglas Dillon, United States Ambassador
to France, to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on
April 5,1954.
URGENT. I was called at 11 o'clock Sunday night and asked
to come immediately to Matignon where a restricted Cabinet
meeting was in progress. On arrival Bidault received me in Laniel's
office and was joined in a few minutes by Laniel. They said that
immediate armed intervention of U.S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien
Phu is now necessary to save the situation.
Navarre reports situation there now in state of precarious
equilibrium and that both sides are doing best to reinforce-Viet
Minh are bringing up last available reinforcements which will
way outnumber any reinforcing French can do by parachute
drops. Renewal of assault by reinforced Viet Minh probable by
middle or end of week. Without help by then fate of Dien Bien
Phu will probably be sealed.
Ely brought back report from Washington that Radford gave
him his personal (repeat personal) assurance that if situation at
Dien Bien Phu required U.S. naval air support he would do his best
to obtain such help from U.S. Government. Because of this information
from Radford as reported by Ely, French Government now
asking for U.S. carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre
feels that a relatively minor U.S. effort could turn the tide but
naturally hopes for as much help as possible. French report
39
Chinese intervention in Indochina already fully established as
follows:
First. Fourteen technical advisors at Giap headquarters plus
numerous others at division level. All under command of Chinese
Communist General Ly Chen-hou who is stationed at Giap headquarters.
Second. Special telephone lines installed maintained and operated
by Chinese personnel.
Third. Forty 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at
Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently
are from Korea. These AA guns are now shooting through clouds
to bring down French aircraft.
Fourth. One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived
since 1 March, all driven by Chinese army personnel.
Fifth. Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is well
known.
Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished U.S. be informed
that U.S. air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to
Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Nevertheless,
government
was making request for aid.
Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of
Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Geneva
would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu.
This was reason for French request for this very serious action
on our part.
He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack
which is expected before end of week. He thanked U.S. for
prompt action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that
he had received Dulles' proposal for Southeast Asian coalition,
and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as
restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision.
New Subject. I passed on Norstad's concern that news of airlift
(DEPTEL 3470, April 3) might leak as planes assembled. PI even
was called into room. He expressed extreme concern as any leak
would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He said at all costs operation
must be camouflaged as training exercise until troops have
arrived. He is preparing them as rapidly as possible and they will
be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and Laniel pressed him to
hurry up departure date of troops and he said he would do his
utmost.
# 6
Dulles Cable Barring Intervention
Cablegram from Secretary Dulles to Ambassador Dillon
in Paris, April 5, 1954.
As I personally explained to Ely in presence of Radford, it is
not (rpt not) possible for U.S. to commit belligerent acts in Indo-
40
china without full political understanding with France and other
countries. In addition, Congressional action would be required. After
conference at highest level, I must confirm this position. U.S. is
doing everything possible as indicated my 5175 to prepare public,
Congressional and Constitutional basis for united action in Indochina.
However, such action is impossible except on coalition basis
with active British Commonwealth participation. Meanwhile U.S.
prepared, as has been demonstrated, to do everything short of
belligerency.
FYI U.S. cannot and will not be put in position of alone salvaging
British Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia and New
Zealand. This matter now under discussion with UK at highest
level.
# 7
Dillon Reply on French Reaction
Cablegram from Ambassador Dillon to Secretary Dulles,
April 5, 1954.
I delivered message DEPTEL 3482 to Bidault Monday evening.
He asked me to tell Secretary that he personally could well understand
position US Government and would pass on your answer
to Laniel.
He asked me to say once more that unfortunately the time for
formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be
decided in the next ten days at Dien-Bien-Phu. As I left he said
that even though French must fight alone they would continue
fighting and he prayed God they would be successful.
# 8
Memo of Eisenhower-Dulles Talk
on the French Cease-Fire Plan
Memorandum by Ro'bert Cutler, special assistant TO
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, May 7, 1954.
At a meeting in the President's office this morning with Dulles,
three topics were discussed.
1. Whether the President should approve paragraph 1b of the
tentative Record of Action of the 5/6/54 NSC meeting, which
covers the proposed answer to the Eden proposal. The Secretary
of State thought the text was correct. Wilson and Radford preferred
the draft message to Smith for Eden prepared yesterday by
MacArthur and Captain Anderson, and cleared by the JCS, which
included in the Five Power Staff Agency Thailand and the
Philippines. Radford thinks that the Agency (which has hitherto
been not disclosed in SEA) has really completed its military
41
planning; that if it is enlarged by top level personnel, its actions
will be necessarily open to the world; that therefore some Southeast
Asian countries should be included in it, and he fears Eden's
proposal as an intended delaying action.
The President approved the text of paragraph 1b but suggested
that Smith's reply to Eden's proposal should make clear the following:
1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, is
not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political
coalition which will include the Southeast Asian countries
which are to be defended.
2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see
how these nations can give military aid to the Southeast Asian
countries in the cooperative defense effort.
3. The United States will not agree to a "white man's party"
to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.
I was instructed to advise Wilson and Radford of the above, and
have done so.
2. The President went over the draft of the speech which
Dulles is going to make tonight, making quite a few suggestions
and changes in text. He thought additionally the speech should
include some easy to understand slogans, such as "The U.S. will
never start a war," "The U.S. will not go to war without Congressional
authority," "The U.S., as always, is trying to organize cooperative
efforts to sustain the peace."
3. With reference to the cease-fire proposal transmitted by
Bidault to the French cabinet, I read the following, as views
principally of military members of the Planning Board, expressed
in their yesterday afternoon meeting:
1. U.S. should not support the Bidault proposal.
2. Reasons for this position:
a. The mere proposal of the cease-fire at the Geneva Conference
would destroy the will to fight of French forces and
make fence-sitters jump to Vietminh side.
b. The Communists would evade covertly cease-fire controls.
3. The U.S. should (as a last act to save IndoChina) propose to
France that if the following 5 conditions are met, the U.S. will go
to Congress for authority to intervene with combat forces:
a. grant of genuine freedom for Associated States
b. U.S. take major responsibility for training indigenous forces
c. U.S. share responsibility for military planning
d. French forces to stay in the fight and no requirement of
replacement of U.S. forces
(e. Action under UN auspices?)
This offer to be made known simultaneously to the other members
of the proposed regional grouping (UK, Australia, NZ, Thailand,
Associated States, Philippines) in order to enlist their participation.
I then summarized possible objections to making the above
proposal to the French:
42
a. No French Government is now competent to act in a lasting
way.
b. There is no indication France wants to "internationalize" the
conflict.
c. The U.S. proposal would be made without the prior assurance
of a regional grouping of SEA states, a precondition of Congress;
although this point might be added as another condition to the
proposal.
d. U.S. would be "bailing out colonial France" in the eyes of the
world.
e. U.S. cannot undertake alone to save every situation of trouble.
I concluded that some PB members felt that it had never been
made clear to the French that the U.S. was willing to ask for
Congressional
authority, if certain fundamental preconditions were
met; that these matters had only been hinted at, and that the
record of history should be clear as to the U.S. position. Dulles
was interested to know the President's views, because he is talking
with Ambassador Bonnet this afternoon. He indicated that he
would mention these matters to Bonnet, perhaps making a more
broad hint than heretofore. He would not circulate any formal
paper to Bonnet, or to anyone else.
The President referred to the proposition advanced by Governor
Stassen at the April 29 Council Meeting as not having been
thoroughly thought out. He said that he had been trying to get
France to "internationalize" matters for a long time, and they are
not willing to do so. If it were thought advisable at this time to
point out to the French the essential preconditions to the U.S.
asking for Congressional authority to intervene, then it should
also be made clear to the French as an additional precondition
that the U.S. would never intervene alone, that there must be an
invitation by the indigenous people, and that there must be some
kind of regional and collective action.
I understand that Dulles will decide the extent to which he
cares to follow this line with Ambassador Bonnet. This discussion
may afford Dulles guidance in replying to Smith's request about a
U.S. alternative to support the Bidault proposal, but there really
was no decision as to the U.S. attitude toward the cease-fire proposal
itself.
# 9
Eisenhower's Instructions to U.S.
Envoy at Geneva Talks
Cablegram from Secretary of State Dulles to Under
Secretary Walter Bedell Smith, May 12, 1954.
The following basic instructions, which have been approved by
the President, and which are in confirmation of those already
43
given you orally, will guide you, as head of the United States
Delegation, in your participation in the Indochina phase of the
Geneva Conference.
1. The presence of a United States representative during the
discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring
peace in Indochina" rests on the Berlin Agreement of February
18, 1954. Under that agreement the U.S., UK, France, and USSR
agreed that the four of them plus other interested states should
be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the purpose
of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and
agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina"
would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers
represented at Berlin, and Communist China and other interested
states.
2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist
regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically
recognized by the United States, on any terms which imply
political recognition or which concede to that regime any status
other than that of a regime with which it is necessary to deal
on a de facto basis in order to end aggression or the threat of
aggression, and to obtain peace.
3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase
of the Geneva Conference is that of an interested nation which,
however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation.
4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of
the Conference in order thereby to assist in arriving at decisions
which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy territorial
integrity and political independence under stable and
free governments with the opportunity to expand their economies,
to realize their legitimate national aspirations, and to develop
security through individual and collective defense against aggression,
from within or without. This implies that these people
should not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of imperialistic
dictatorship.
5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied
approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement
which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful
governments
of the three aforementioned states or of permanently
impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the
forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise
contravened the principles stated in (4) above.
6. You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions,
cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations
of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference.
7. If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina
phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United
States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you
should immediately so inform your Government, recommending
either withdrawal or the limitation of the U.S. role to that of an
44
observer. If the situation develops such that, in your opinion,
either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and
time is lacking for consultation with Washington, you may act
in your discretion.
8. You are authorized to inform other delegations at Geneva
of these instructions.
# 10
1954 Study by the Joint Chiefs
on Possible U.S. Intervention
Excerpts from memorandum from Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary
of Defense Charles E. Wilson, May 26, 1954, on
"Studies With Respect 10 Possible U.S. Action Regarding
Indochina."
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Acting Secretary
of Defense, dated 18 May 1954, subject as above, wherein
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare certain studies,
and agreed outline answers to certain questions relating thereto,
for discussion with the Acting Secretary of Defense on or before
24 May, and for subsequent submission to the National Security
Council (NSC).
2 a. The Studies requested by the Acting Secretary of Defense
were developed within the parameters prescribed in the memorandum
by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 18 May 1954, subject
as above. This memorandum is interpreted as assuming no
concurrent involvement in Korea. This assumption may be quite
unrealistic and lead to malemployment of available forces. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out their belief that, from the
point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East
as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives
and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina
would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities. The
principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina.
The destruction or neutralization of these sources in China
proper would materially reduce the French military problems in
Indochina.
b. In connection with the above, it may be readily anticipated
that, upon Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the
French would promptly request the immediate deployment of
U.S. ground and air forces, additional naval forces, and a considerable
increase in MDAF armament and equipment. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their belief that committing to
the Indochina conflict naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier
Task Force and supporting forces as necessary in accordance with
the developments in the situation, of basing substantial air forces
45
in Indochina, will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce
readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere
in the Far East. Simultaneously, it is necessary to keep in mind
the considerable Allied military potential available in the Korea-
Japan-Okinawa area.
c. In light of the above, it is clear that the denial of these
forces to Indochina could result in a schism between the United
States and France unless they were employed elsewhere. However,
it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have plans, both
approved and under consideration, which provide for the employment
of these forces in combat operations outside Indochina.
Nevertheless, it is desired to repeat that this particular report is
responsive to the question of U.S. intervention in Indochina only.
ASSUMING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
INTERVENE
3. Strategic Concept and Plan of Operation
Seek to create conditions through the destruction of effective
Communist forces and their means for support in the Indochina
action and by reducing Chinese Communist capability for further
aggression, under which Associated States forces could assume
responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the light of this
concept the major courses of action would be as follows:
a. Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, as well
as other weapons, conduct offensive air operations against selected
military targets in Indochina and against those military
targets in China, Hainan, and other Communist-held offshore
islands which are being used by the Communists in direct support
of their operations, or which threaten the security of U.S. and
allied forces in the area.
b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces, augmented by U.S.
naval, and air forces, would exploit by coordinated ground, naval,
and air action such successes as may be gained as a result of
the aforementioned air operations in order to destroy enemy
forces in Indochina.
c. Conduct coordinated ground, naval, and air action to destroy
enemy forces in Indochina.
d. In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, and
subject to an evaluation of the results of operations conducted
under subparagraphs a and b above, be prepared to take further
action against Communist China to reduce its war-making capability,
such as:
(1) Destruction of additional selected military targets. In connection
with these additional targets, such action requires an enlarged
but highly selective atomic offensive in addition to attacks
employing other weapons systems.
(2) Blockade of the China coast. This might be instituted
progressively from the outset.
(3) Seizure or neutralization of Hainan Island.
46
(4) Operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalist
forces ....
ASSUMING CHINESE COMMUNISTS
DO NOT INTERVENE
9. Strategic Concept and Plan of Action
Seek to create conditions by destroying effective Communist
forces in Indochina, under which the Associated States Forces
could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the
light of this concept, the major courses of action which would
be undertaken are as follows:
a. Conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina.
The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the
event that such course appears militarily advantageous.
b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces augmented by such
armed forces of the Philippines and Thailand as may be committed
would, in coordination with U.S. naval and Air Force
forces, conduct coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy
enemy forces in Indochina ....
# 11
Cable by Dulles on Negotiations at Geneva
on Vietnam Elections
Cablegram by Secretary Dulles to United States Embassy
in Paris with copies to the United States Embassies in
London and Saigon and to the United States Consul General
in Geneva for Under Secretary Bedell Smith, July 7, 1954.
We see no real conflict between paragraphs 4 and 5 U.S.-UK
terms. We realize of course that even agreement which appears
to meet all seven points cannot constitute guarantee that Indochina
will not one day pass into Communist hands. Seven points
are intended provide best chance that this shall not happen.
This will require observance of criteria not merely in the letter
but in the spirit. Thus since undoubtedly true that elections might
eventually mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh this
makes it all more important they should be only held as long after
cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from
intimidation
to give democratic elements best chance. We believe important
that no date should be set now and especially that no conditions
should be accepted by French which would have direct or
indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of
agreement ensuring political as well as military guarantees. Also
note paragraph 3 of President and Prime Minister joint declaration
of June 29 regarding QTE unity through free elections supervised
by the UN UNQTE.
47
Our interpretation of willingness QTE respect UNQTE agreement
which might be reached is that we would not (repeat
not) oppose a settlement which conformed to seven points contained
Deptel 4853. It does not (repeat not) of course mean
we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily
support it publicly. We consider QTE respect UNQTE as strong
a word as we can possibly employ in the circumstances to indicate
our position with respect to such arrangements as French
may evolve along lines points contained DEPTEL 4853. QTE
respect UNQTE would also mean that we would not seek directly
or indirectly to upset settlement by force.
You may convey substance above to French.
# 12
Chinese Communists' Position on a
Neutralized Indochina
Cablegram from Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith
at Geneva to Secretary Dulles, July 18, 1954.
Following despatch given us in advance by Topping of Associated
Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist
position and was given Topping in order that we would become
aware of it. It begins:
QUOTE
The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States
guarantee the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in
an agreement to neutralize the whole country, a responsible
Chinese Communist informant said today.
The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier
Chou En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire
agreement by next Tuesday's deadline if the Western powers
agree to 'bar all foreign military bases from Indochina and
keep the three member states out of any military bloc.'
The informant said the Communists are pressing for the
stamp of American approval on the armistice agreement-already
okayed in principle by Britain and France-which would divide
Vietnam between Communists leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh
and Bao Dai's pro-Western regime.
'We believe that the U.S. as a member of the conference
should and is obligated to subscribe to and guarantee any settlement.
Morally, there is no reason for the U.S. to avoid this
obligation. '
But the informant did not (repeat not) rule out the chance
of an Indochina cease-fire even if the U.S. refuses to okay the
armistice agreement.
The Eisenhower administration has told France and Britain that
48
they can go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement
based on partition of Vietnam. But Washington has made it
clear that it is not (repeat not) ready to associate itself formally
with the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese
under Red rule.
The Communist informant said the 'crucial issue' now in
the Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western
powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina.
'Refusal to join in such a guarantee,' the informant said, 'could
seriously deter a final settlement. On other important points in
the negotiations we are in agreement or close to it. We are
hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a settlement by
July 20.'
French Premier Pierre Mendes-France has promised to resign
with his Cabinet if he fails to end the bloody eight-year-old
war by next Tuesday. Fall of the French Government probably
would doom the Geneva negotiations. The informant declared
that American efforts to organize a Southeast Asia Treaty organization
(SEATO) is a 'threat to any possible Indochina agreement.'
'Success or failure of the Geneva Conference may depend
on the attitude of the American delegation in this regard,' he
added.
END QUOTE
The above seems to me extremely significant, particularly in
view of the fact that in my discussion with Eden last night he expressed
pessimism, which he said was now shared for the first
time by Krishna Menon. Latter had begun to feel, as I do,
that Molotov wishes to force Mendes-France's resignation. Eden
remarked that Molotov had now become the most difficult and
intransigent member of Communist delegation. You will note
obvious intention to place on shoulders of U.S. responsibility
for failure of Geneva Conference and fall of French Government
if this occurs.
Molotov is insisting on a meeting this afternoon which French
and British are trying to make highly restricted as they are
apprehensive of what may occur. If such a meeting is held and
if demands are made for U.S. association in any agreement, I
will simply say that in the event a reasonable settlement is
arrived at which U.S. could "respect", U.S. will probably issue
a unilateral statement of its own position. If question of participation
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in security pact is raised,
I will reply that this depends on outcome of conference.
Eden has already told Molotov that security pact is inevitable,
that he himself favored it some time ago and that he would
not (repeat not) withdraw from that position, but he made the
mistake of saying that no consideration had been given to inclusion
of Laos and Cambodia.
This final gambit is going to be extremely difficult to play
and I do not (repeat not) now see the moves clearly. How-
49
ever, my opinion as expressed to you before leaving, i.e., that
Molotov will gain more by bringing down Mendes Government
than by a settlement, has grown stronger.
# 13
Details on Chinese Informant
Cablegram from Under Secretary Bedell Smith at Geneva
to Secretary Dulles, July 19, 1954.
Topping has supplied in confidence following background information
concerning his story on views of Chinese Communist
delegation.
He stated his informant was Huang Hua, whom he has known
for many years. Interview was at Huang's initiative, was called
on short notice, and was conducted in extremely serious manner
without propaganda harangues.
Topping said he had reported Huang's statement fully in his
story but had obtained number of "visual impressions" during
interview. When Huang spoke of possibility American bases in
Indochina or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became
very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English
broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter. Huang also
spoke seriously and with apparent sincerity concerning his belief
that I have returned to Geneva to prevent settlement. Topping
believes Chinese Communists convinced Americans made deal
with French during Paris talks on basis of which Mendes-France
has raised price of settlement.
# 14
"Final Declaration" at Geneva Conference
and U.S. Statement Renouncing
Use of Force
Following are the texts of the "final declaration"
signed by France and the Vietminh at the end of the
Geneva conference in July, 1954, and of the statement of
United States policy delivered at the concluding session by
Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. The "final
declaration," agreement also constitutes the Geneva accords
on Vietnam.
THE 'FINAL DECLARATION'
FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the
Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-
50
China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of
China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America
took part.
1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending
hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international
control and the supervision of the execution of the
provisions of these agreements.
2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of
hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses
its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out
in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation
of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam henceforth
to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty,
in the peaceful community of nations.
3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the
Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to
adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the
national community, in particular by participating in the next
general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of
each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the
year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for
fundamental freedoms.
4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement
on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction
into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel
as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The
Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the
Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to
request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in
instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of their
territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the
agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.
5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement
on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no
military base under the control of a foreign State may be
established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter
having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall
not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be
utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an
aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations
of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect
that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this
agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military
alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of
the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as
their security is not threatened, the obligation not to establish
51
bases on Cambodia or Laotian territory for the military forces of
foreign powers.
6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the
agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with
a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation
line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as
constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference
expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set
out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the
cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement
in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.
7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned,
the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis
of respect for the principles of independence, unity and
territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy
the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions
established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.
In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of
peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain
for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be
held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission
composed of representatives of the Member States of the
International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement
on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on
this subject between the competent representative authorities of
the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.
8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of
hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of
property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular,
allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he
wishes to live.
9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern
and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of
Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective
reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with
one of the parties during the war, or against members of such
persons' families.
10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the
Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready
to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and
Viet-Nam, at the requests of the Governments concerned and
within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the
parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two
parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at
specified points and for a specified time.
11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French
Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the
problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation
of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government
will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each
member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the
sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial
integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any
interference in their internal affairs.
13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one
another on any question which may be referred to them by the
International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such
measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements
on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam
are respected.
THE AMERICAN STATEMENT
As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to
join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted.
However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of
its position in these matters:
"The Government of the United States being resolved to devote
its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the
agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between
(a) The Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the
Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command
and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam;
(c ) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the
Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of
the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21,
1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs
that (i) it will refrain from the theat or the use of force
to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter
of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in
violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as
seriously threatening international peace and security.
"In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning
free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear
its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in
Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:
" 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall
continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised
by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted
fairly.'
"With respect to the statement made by the representative of
the State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional
position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future
and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder
53
this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does
indicate any departure from this traditional position.
"We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia,
Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and
sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will
enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future."
# 15
Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon
Mission in '54 and '55
Following are excerpts from the report of the Saigon
Military Mission, an American team headed by Edward
G. Lansdale, covering its activities in the 1954-55 period.
The report accompanies the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam
war, which cites it without identifying the author or
date. The excerpts appear verbatim, with only unmistakable
typographical errors corrected.
I. FOREWORD
. . . This is the condensed account of one year in the operations
of a "cold war" combat team, written by the team itself
in the field, little by little in moments taken as the members
could. The team is known as the Saigon Military Mission. The
field is Vietnam. There are other teams in the field, American,
French, British, Chinese, Vietnamese, Vietminh, and others. Each
has its own story to tell. This is ours.
The Saigon Military Mission entered Vietnam on 1 June 1954
when its Chief arrived. However, this is the story of a team, and
it wasn't until August 1954 that sufficient members arrived to
constitute a team. So, this is mainly an account of the team's first
year, from August 1954 to August 1955.
It was often a frustrating and perplexing year, up close. The
Geneva Agreements signed on 21 July 1954 imposed restrictive
rules upon all official Americans, including the Saigon Military
Mission. An active and intelligent enemy made full use of legal
rights to screen his activities in establishing his stay-behind
organizations south of the 17th Parallel and in obtaining quick
security north of that Parallel. The nation's economy and communications
system were crippled by eight years of open war. The
government, including its Army and other security forces, was in
a painful transition from colonial to self rule, making it a year of
hot-tempered incidents. Internal problems arose quickly to points
where armed conflict was sought as the only solution. The enemy
was frequently forgotten in the heavy atmosphere of suspicion,
hatred, and jealousy.
54
The Saigon Military Mission received some blows from allies
and the enemy in this atmosphere, as we worked to help
stabilize the government and to beat the Geneva time-table of
Communist takeover in the north. However, we did beat the
time-table. The government did become stabilized. The Free
Vietnamese are now becoming unified and learning how to cope
with the Communist enemy. We are thankful that we had a
chance to help in this work in a critical area of the world, to be
positive and constructive in a year of doubt.
H. MISSION
The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) was born in a Washington
policy meeting early in 1954, when Dien Bien Phu was still
holding out against the encircling Vietminh. The SMM was to
enter into Vietnam quietly and assist the Vietnamese, rather than
the French, in unconventional warfare. The French were to be
kept as friendly allies in the process, as far as possible.
The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary
operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological
warfare. Later, after Geneva, the mission was modified to
prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations in
Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional warfare
....
HI. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR
a. Early Days
The Saigon Military Mission (SMM) started on 1 June 1954,
when its Chief, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, arrived in
Saigon with a small box of files and clothes and a borrowed
typewriter, courtesy of an SA-16 flight set up for him by the 13th
Air Force at Clark AFB. Lt-General John O'Daniel and Embassy
Charge Rob McClintock had arranged for his appointment
as Assistant Air Attache, since it was improper for U.S. officers
at MAAG at that time to have advisory conferences with Vietnamese
officers. Ambassador Heath had concurred already. There
was no desk space for an office, no vehicle, no safe for files. He
roomed with General O'Daniel, later moved to a small house
rented by MAAG. Secret communications with Washington were
provided through the Saigon station of CIA.
There was deepening gloom in Vietnam. Dien Bien Phu had
fallen. The French were capitulating to the Vietminh at Geneva.
The first night in Saigon, Vietminh saboteurs blew up large
ammunition dumps at the airport, rocking Saigon throughout the
night. General O'Daniel and Charge McClintock agreed that it
was time to start taking positive action. O'Daniel paved the way
for a quick first-hand survey of the situation throughout the
country. McClintock paved the way for contacts with Vietnamese
political leaders. aur Chief's reputation from the Philippines had
55
preceded him. Hundreds of Vietnamese acquaintanceships were
made quickly.
Working in close cooperation with George Hellyer, USIS Chief,
a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese
Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after,
a refresher course in combat psywar was constructed and Vietnamese
Army personnel were rushed through it. A similar course
was initiated for the Ministry of Information. Rumor campaigns
were added to the tactics and tried out in Hanoi. It was almost
too late.
The first rumor campaign was to be a carefully planted story
of a Chinese Communist regiment in Tonkin taking reprisals
against a Vietminh village whose girls the Chinese had raped, recalling
Chinese Nationalist troop behavior in 1945 and confirming
Vietnamese fears of Chinese occupation under Vietminh rule; the
story was to be planted by soldiers of the Vietnamese Armed
Psywar Company in Hanoi dressed in civilian clothes. The troops
received their instructions silently, dressed in civilian clothes,
went on the mission, and failed to return. They had deserted to the
Vietminh. Weeks later, Tonkinese told an excited story of the
misbehavior of the Chinese Divisions in Vietminh territory.
Investigated,
it turned out to be the old rumor campaign, with
Vietnamese embellishments.
There was political chaos. Prince Buu Loc no longer headed
the government. Government ministries all but closed. The more
volatile leaders of political groups were proposing a revolution,
which included armed attacks on the French. Col. Jean Carbonel
of the French Army proposed establishing a regime with Vietnamese
(Nungs and others) known to him close to the Chinese
border and asked for our backing. Our reply was that this was a
policy decision to be made between the FEC top command and
U.S. authorities.
Oscar Arellano, Junior Chamber International vice-president
for Southeast Asia, stopped by for a visit with our Chief; an idea
in this visit later grew into "Operation Brotherhood."
On 1 July, Major Lucien Conein arrived, as the second member
of the team. He is a paramilitary specialist, well-known to the
French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin
against the Japanese in 1945, the one American guerrilla fighter
who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. He was
assigned to MAAG for cover purposes. Arranged by Lt-Col
William Rosson, a meeting was held with Col Carbonel, Col
Nguyen Van Vy, and the two SMM officers; Vy had seen his
first combat in 1945 under Conein. Carbonel proposed establishing
a maquis, to be kept as a secret between the four officers. SMM
refused, learned later that Carbonel had kept the FEC Deuxieme
Bureau informed. Shortly afterwards, at a Defense conference
with General O'Daniel, our Chief had a chance to suggest Vy for
a command in the North, making him a general. Secretary of
56
State for Defense Le Ngoc Chan did so, Vy was grateful and
remained so.
Ngo Dinh Diem arrived on 7 July, and within hours was in
despair as the French forces withdrew from the Catholic
provinces of Phat Diem and Nam Dinh in Tonkin. Catholic
militia streamed north to Hanoi and Haiphong, their hearts filled
with anger at French abandonment. The two SMM officers stopped
a planned grenade attack by militia girls against French troops
guarding a warehouse; the girls stated they had not eaten for
three days; arrangements were made for Chinese merchants in
Haiphong to feed them. Other militia attacks were stopped, including
one against a withdrawing French artillery unit; the militia
wanted the guns to stand and fight the Vietminh. The Tonkinese
had hopes of American friendship and listened to the advice
given them. Governor [name illegible] died, reportedly by poison.
Tonkin's government changed as despair grew. On 21 July, the
Geneva Agreement was signed. Tonkin was given to the Communists.
Anti-Communists turned to SMM for help in establishing a
resistance movement and several tentative initial arrangements
were made.
Diem himself had reached a nadir of frustration, as his country
disintegrated after the conference of foreigners. With the
approval of Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel, our Chief
drew up a plan of overall governmental action and presented it to
Diem, with Hellyer as interpreter. It called for fast constructive
action and dynamic leadership. Although the plan was not
adopted, it laid the foundation for a friendship which has lasted.
Oscar Areliano visited Saigon again. Major Charles T. R.
Bohanan, a former team-mate in Philippine days, was in town. At
an SMM conference with these two, "Operation Brotherhood"
was born: volunteer medical teams of Free Asians to aid the
Free Vietnamese who have few doctors of their own. Washington
responded warmly to the idea. President Diem was visited; he
issued an appeal to the Free World for help. The Junior Chamber
International adopted the idea. SMM would monitor the operation
quietly in the background.
President Diem had organized a Committee of Cabinet Ministers
to handle the problem of refugees from the Communist
North. The Committee system was a failure. No real plans had
been made by the French or the Americans. After conferences
with USOM (FOA) officials and with General O'Daniel, our
Chief suggested to Ambassador Heath that he call a U.S. meeting
to plan a single Vietnamese agency, under a Commissioner of
Refugees to be appointed by President Diem, to run the Vietnamese
refugee program and to provide a channel through which
help could be given by the U.S., France, and other free nations.
The meeting was called and the plan adopted, with MAAG under
General O'Daniel in the coordinating role. Diem adopted the
plan. The French pitched in enthusiastically to help. CAT asked
SMM for help in obtaining a French contract for the refugee
57
airlift, and got it. In return, CAT provided SMM with the means
for secret air travel between the North and Saigon ....
b. August 1954
An agreement had been reached that the personnel ceiling of
U.S. military personnel with MAAG would be frozen at the number
present in Vietnam on the date of the cease-fire, under the
terms of the Geneva Agreement. In South Vietnam this deadline
was to be 11 August. It meant that SMM might have only two
members present, unless action were taken. General O'Daniel
agreed to the addition of ten SMM men under MAAG cover,
plus any others in the Defense pipeline who arrived before the
deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in Korea, Japan,
and Okinawa were selected and were rushed to Vietnam.
SMM had one small MAAG house. Negotiations were started
for other housing, but the new members of the team arrived before
housing was ready and were crammed three and four to a
hotel room for the first days. Meetings were held to assess the
new members' abilities. None had had political-psychological warfare
experience. Most were experienced in paramilitary and clandestine
intelIigence operations. Plans were made quickly, for time
was running out in the north; already the Vietminh had started
taking over secret control of Hanoi and other areas of Tonkin
still held by French forces.
Major Conein was given responsibility for developing a paramilitary
organization in the north, to be in position when the
Vietminh took over. . . . [His] . . . team was moved north
immediately as part of the MAAG staff working on the refugee
problem. The team had headquarters in Hanoi, with a branch
in Haiphong. Among cover duties, this team supervised the
refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French. One
day, as a CAT C-46 finished loading, they saw a small child
standing on the ground below the loading door. They shouted for
the pilot to wait, picked the child up and shoved him into the
aircraft, which then promptly taxied out for its takeoff in the
constant air shuttle. A Vietnamese man and woman ran up to the
team, asking what they had done with their small boy, whom
they'd brought out to say goodbye to relatives. The chagrined
team explained, finally talked the parents into going south to
Free Vietnam, put them in the next aircraft to catch up with
their son in Saigon ....
A second paramilitary team was formed to explore possibilities
of organizing resistance against the Vietminh from bases in the
south. This team consisted of Army Lt-Col Raymond Wittmayer,
Army Major Fred Allen, and Army Lt Edward Williams. The
latter was our only experienced counter-espionage officer and
undertook double duties, including working with revolutionary
political groups. Major Allen eventually was able to mount a
Vietnamese paramilitary effort in Tonkin from the south, barely
58
beating the Vietminh shutdown in Haiphong as his teams went in,
trained and equipped for their assigned missions.
Navy Lt Edward Bain and Marine Captain Richard Smith were
assigned as the support group for SMM. Actually, support for an
effort such as SMM is a major operation in itself, running the
gamut from the usual administrative and personnel functions to
the intricate business of clandestine air, maritime, and land supply
of paramilitary materiel. In effect, they became our official
smugglers as well as paymasters, housing officers, transportation
officers, warehousemen, file clerks, and mess officers. The work
load was such that other team members frequently pitched in and
helped.
c. September 1954
Highly-placed officials from Washington visited Saigon and, in
private conversations, indicated that current estimates led to the
conclusion that Vietnam probably would have to be written off as
a loss. We admitted that prospects were gloomy, but were positive
that there was still a fighting chance.
On 8 September, SMM officers visited Secretary of State for
Defense Chan and walked into a tense situation in his office. Chan
had just arrested Lt-Col Lan (G-6 of the Vietnamese Army) and
Capt Giai (G-5 of the Army). Armed guards filled the room.
We were told what had happened and assured that everything
was all right by all three principals. Later, we discovered that
Chan was alone and that the guards were Lt-Col Lan's commandos.
Lan was charged with political terrorism (by his "action"
squads) and Giai with anti-Diem propaganda (using G-5 leaflet,
rumor, and broadcast facilities).
The arrest of Lan and Giai, who simply refused to consider
themselves arrested, and of Lt Minh, officer in charge of the Army
radio station which was guarded by Army troops, brought into
the open a plot by the Army Chief of Staff, General Hinh, to
overthrow the government. Hinh had hinted at such a plot to his
American friends, using a silver cigarette box given him by
Egypt's Naguib to carry the hint. SMM became thoroughly involved
in the tense controversy which followed, due to our Chief's
closeness to both President Diem and General Hinh. He had met
the latter in the Philippines in 1952, was a friend of both
Hinh's wife and favorite mistress. (The mistress was a pupil in a
small English class conducted for mistresses of important personages,
at their request. ...
While various U.S. officials including General O'Daniel and
Foreign Service Officer Frank [name illegible] participated in
U.S. attempts to heal the split between the President and his
Army, Ambassador Heath asked us to make a major effort to end
the controversy. This effort strained relations with Diem and
never was successful, but did dampen Army enthusiasm for the
plot. At one moment, when there was likelihood of an attack by
armored vehicles on the Presidental Palace, SMM told Hinh
59
bluntly that U.S. support most probably would stop in such an
event. At the same time a group from the Presidential Guards
asked for tactical advice on how to stop armored vehicles with
the only weapons available to the Guards: carbines, rifles, and
hand grenades. The advice, on tank traps and destruction with
improvised weapons, must have sounded grim. The following
morning, when the attack was to take place, we visited the
Palace; not a guard was left on the grounds; President Diem was
alone upstairs, calmly getting his work done.
As a result of the Hinh trouble, Diem started looking around
for troops upon whom he could count. Some Tonkinese militia,
refugees from the north, were assembled in Saigon close to the
Palace. But they were insufficient for what he needed. Diem made
an agreement with General Trinh Minh The, leader of some
3,000 Cao Dai dissidents in the vicinity of Tayninh, to give
General The some needed financial support; The was to give
armed support to the government if necessary and to provide a
safe haven for the government if it had to flee. The's guerrillas,
known as the Lien Minh, were strongly nationalist and were still
fighting the Vietminh and the French. At Ambassador Heath's
request, the U.S. secretly furnished Diem with funds for The,
through the SMM. Shortly afterwards, an invitation came from
The to visit him. Ambassador Heath approved the visit. ...
The northern SMM team under Conein had organized a paramilitary
group, (which we will disguise by the Vietnamese name
of Binh) through the Northern Dai Viets, a political party with
loyalties to Bao Dai. The group was to be trained and supported
by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese, to come eventually under
government control when the government was ready for such
activities. Thirteen Binhs were quietly exfiltrated through the port
of Haiphong, under the direction of Lt Andrews, and taken on
the first stage of the journey to their training area by a U.S.
Navy ship. This was the first of a series of helpful actions by Task
Force 98, commanded by Admiral Sabin.
Another paramilitary group for Tonkin operations was being
developed in Saigon through General Nguyen Van Vy. In
September this group started shaping up fast, and the project was
given to Major Allen. (We will give this group the Vietnamese
name of Hao) ....
Towards the end of the month, it was learned that the largest
printing establishment in the north intended to remain in Hanoi
and do business with the Vietminh. An attempt was made by
SMM to destroy the modern presses, but Vietminh security agents
already had moved into the plant and frustrated the attempt. This
operation was under a Vietnamese patriot whom we shall call
Trieu; his case officer was Capt Arundel. Earlier in the month
they had engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets
signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave
for the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October,
including items about property, money reform, and a three-day
60
holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution
of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later
Vietminh currency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets.
The Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets
were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank and
file Vietminh were sure that the radio denunciations were a French
trick.
The Hanoi psywar strike had other consequences. Binh had enlisted
a high police official of Hanoi as part of his team, to effect
the release from jail of any team members if arrested. The
official at the last moment decided to assist in the leaflet
distribution
personally. Police officers spotted him, chased his vehicle
through the empty Hanoi streets of early morning, finally opened
fire on him and caught him. He was the only member of the
group caught. He was held in prison as a Vietminh agent.
d. October 1954
Hanoi was evacuated on 9 October. The northern SMM team
left with the last French troops, disturbed by what they had seen
of the grim efficiency of the Vietminh in their takeover, the contrast
between the silent march of the victorious Vietminh troops
in their tennis shoes and the clanking armor of the well-equipped
French whose Western tactics and equipment had failed against
the Communist military-political-economic campaign.
The northern team had spent the last days of Hanoi in contaminating
the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual
wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking the first actions for
delayed
sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a
CIA special technical team in Japan who performed their part
brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for
future paramilitary operations (U.S. adherence to the Geneva
Agreement prevented SMM from carrying out the active sabotage
it desired to do against the power plant, water facilities, harbor,
and bridge). The team had a bad moment when contaminating the
oil. They had to work quickly at night, in an enclosed storage
room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them
out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with handkerchiefs
and completed the job.
Meanwhile, Polish and Russian ships had arrived in the south
to transport southern Vietminh to Tonkin under the Geneva
Agreement. This offered the opportunity for another black psywar
strike. A leaflet was developed by Binh with the help of Capt
Arundel, attributed to the Vietminh Resistance Committee.
Among other items, it reassured the Vietminh they would be kept
safe below decks from imperialist air and submarine attacks, and
requested that warm clothing be brought; the warm clothing item
would be coupled with a verbal rumor campaign that Vietminh
were being sent into China as railroad laborers.
SMM had been busily developing G-5 of the Vietnamese Army
61
for such psywar efforts. Under Arundel's direction, the First
Armed Propaganda Company printed the leaflets and distributed
them, by soldiers in civilian clothes who penetrated into southern
Vietminh zones on foot. (Distribution in Camau was made while
columnist Joseph Alsop was on his visit there which led to his
sensational, gloomy articles later; our soldier "Vietminh" failed
in an attempt to get the leaflet into Alsop's hands in Camau;
Alsop was never told this story). Intelligence reports and other
later reports revealed that village and delegation committees complained
about "deportation" to the north, after distribution of
the leaflet. ...
Contention between Diem and Hinh had become murderous
.... Finally, we learned that Hinh was close to action;
he had selected 26 October as the morning for an attack on the
Presidential Palace. Hinh was counting heavily on Lt-Col Lan's
special forces and on Captain Giai who was running Hinh's
secret headquarters at Hinh's home. We invited these two officers
to visit the Philippines, on the pretext that we were making an
official trip, could take them along and open the way for them
to see some inner workings of the fight against Filipino Communists
which they probably would never see otherwise. Hinh
reluctantly turned down his own invitation; he had had a
memorable time of it on his last visit to Manila in 1952. Lt-
Col Lan was a French agent and the temptation to see behind-the-
scenes was too much. He and Giai accompanied SMM
officers on the MAAG C-47 which General O'Daniel instantly
made available for the operation. 26 October was spent in the
Philippines. The attack on the palace didn't come off.
e. November 1954
General Lawton Collins arrived as Ambassador on 8 November.
...
Collins, in his first press conference, made it plain that the
U.S. was supporting President Diem. The new Ambassador
applied pressure on General Hinh and on 29 November Hinh left
for Paris. His other key conspirators followed.
Part of the SMM team became involved in staff work to back
up the energetic campaign to save Vietnam which Collins pushed
forward. Some SMM members were scattered around the Pacific,
accompanying Vietnamese for secret training, obtaining and shipping
supplies to be smuggled into north Vietnam and hidden
there. In the Philippines, more support was being constructed to
help SMM, in expediting the flow of supplies, and in creating
Freedom Company, a non-profit Philippines corporation backed
by President Magsaysay, which would supply Filipinos experienced
in fighting the Communist Huks to help in Vietnam (or elsewhere)
....
On 23 November, twenty-one selected Vietnamese agents and
two cooks of our Hao paramilitary group were put aboard a Navy
62
ship in the Saigon River, in daylight. They appeared as coolies,
joined the coolie and refugee throng moving on and off ship, and
disappeared one by one. It was brilliantly planned and executed,
agents being picked up from unobtrusive assembly points throughout
the metropolis. Lt Andrews made the plans and carried out
the movement under the supervision of Major Allen. The ship
took the Hao agents, in compartmented groups, to an overseas
point, the first stage in a movement to a secret training area.
f. December 1954
discussions between the U.S., Vietnamese and French had
reached a point where it appeared that a military training mission
using U.S. officers was in the immediate offing. General O'Daniel
had a U.S.-French planning group working on the problem,
under Col. Rosson. One paper they were developing was a plan
for pacification of Vietminh and dissident areas; this paper was
passed to SMM for its assistance with the drafting. SMM wrote
much of the paper, changing the concept from the old rigid
police controls of all areas to some of our concepts of winning
over the population and instituting a classification of areas by the
amount of trouble in each, the amount of control required, and
fixing responsibilities between civil and military authorities. With
a few changes, this was issued by President Diem on 31 December
as the National Security Action (Pacification) Directive ....
There was still much disquiet in Vietnam, particularly among
anti-Communist political groups who were not included in the
government. SMM officers were contacted by a number of such
groups who felt that they "would have to commit suicide in
1956" (the 1956 plebiscite promised in the 1954 Geneva agreement),
when the Vietminh would surely take over against so
weak a government. One group of farmers and militia in the
south was talked out of migrating to Madagascar by SMM and
staying on their farms. A number of these groups asked SMM for
help in training personnel for eventual guerrilla warfare if the
Vietminh won. Persons such as the then Minister of Defense and
Trinh Minh The were among those loyal to the government who
also requested such help. It was decided that a more basic
guerrilla training program might be undertaken for such groups
than was available at the secret training site to which we had
sent the Binh and Hao groups. Plans were made with Major
Bohanan and Mr. John C. Wachtel in the Philippines for a
solution of this problem; the United States backed the development,
through them, of a small Freedom Company training camp
in a hidden valley on the Clark AFB reservation.
Till and Peg Durdin of the N. Y. Times, Hank Lieberman of
the N. Y. Times, Homer Bigart of the N. Y. Herald-Tribune,
John Mecklin of Life-Time, and John Roderick of Associated
Press, have been warm friends of SMM and worked hard to
penetrate the fabric of French propaganda and give the U.S. an
63
objective account of events in Vietnam. The group met with us
at times to analyze objectives and motives of propaganda known
to them, meeting at their own request as U.S. citizens. These
mature and responsible news correspondents performed a valuable
service for their country ....
g. January 1955
The Vietminh long ago had adopted the Chinese Communist
thought that the people are the water and the army is the fish.
Vietminh relations with the mass of the population during the
fighting had been exemplary, with a few exceptions; in contrast,
the Vietnamese National Army had been like too many Asian
armies, adept at cowing a population into feeding them, providing
them with girls. SMM had been working on this problem from the
beginning. Since the National Army was the only unit of government
with a strong organization throughout the country and with
good communications, it was the key to stabilizing the situation
quickly on a nation-wide basis. If Army and people could be
brought together into a team, the first strong weapon against
Communism could be forged.
The Vietminh were aware of this. We later learned that months
before the signing of the Geneva Agreement they had been
planning for action in the post-Geneva period; the National Army
was to be the primary target for subversion efforts, it was given
top priority by the Central Committee for operations against its
enemy, and about 100 superior cadres were retrained for the
operations and placed in the [words illegible] organization for
the work, which commenced even before the agreement was
signed. We didn't know it at the time, but this was SMM's major
opponent, in a secret struggle for the National Army ....
General O'Daniel was anticipating the culmination of long
negotiations to permit U.S. training of the Vietnamese Armed
Forces, against some resistance on the part of French groups.
In January, negotiations were proceeding so well that General
O'Daniel informally organized a combined U.S.-French training
mission which eventually became known as the Training Relations
& Instruction Mission (TRIM) under his command, but
under the overall command of the top French commander,
General Paul Ely.
The French had asked for top command of half the divisions
in the TRIM staff. Their first priority was for command of the
division supervising National Security Action by the Vietnamese,
which could be developed into a continuation of strong French
control of key elements of both Army and population. In conferences
with Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, it was
decided to transfer Colonel Lansdale from the Ambassador's staff
to TRIM, to head the National Security division. Colonel Lansdale
requested authority to coordinate all U.S. civil and military
efforts in this National Security work. On 11 January, Ambassador
64
Collins announced the change to the country team, and gave him
authority to coordinate this work among all U.S. agencies in
Vietnam ....
President Diem had continued requesting SMM help with the
guard battalion for the Presidential Palace. We made arrangements
with President Magsaysay in the Philippines and borrowed his
senior aide and military advisor, Col. Napoleon Valeriano, who
had a fine combat record against the Communist Huks and also
had reorganized the Presidential Guard Battalion for Magsaysay.
Valeriano, with three junior officers, arrived in January and went
to work on Diem's guard battalion. Later, selected Vietnamese
officers were trained with the Presidential Guards in Manila. An
efficient unit gradually emerged. Diem was warmly grateful for
this help by Filipinos who also continuously taught our concept of
loyalty and freedom.
The patriot we've named Trieu Dinh had been working on an
almanac for popular sale, particularly in the northern cities and
towns we could still reach. Noted Vietnamese astrologers were
hired to write predictions about coming disasters to certain
Vietminh leaders and undertakings, and to predict unity in the
south. The work was carried out under the direction of Lt Phillips,
based on our concept of the use of astrology for psywar in
Southeast Asia. Copies of the almanac were shipped by air to
Haiphong and then smuggled into Vietminh territory.
Dinh also had produced a Thomas Paine type series of essays
on Vietnamese patriotism against the Communist Vietminh, under
the guidance of Capt. Arundel. These essays were circulated
among influential groups in Vietnam, earned front-page editorials
in the leading daily newspaper in Saigon. Circulation increased
with the publication of these essays. The publisher is known to
SMM as The Dragon Lady and is a fine Vietnamese girl who
has been the mistress of an anti-American French civilian. Despite
anti-American remarks by her boy friend, we had helped
her keep her paper from being closed by the government . . .
and she found it profitable to heed our advice on the editorial
content of her paper.
Arms and equipment for the Binh paramilitary team were
being cached in the north in areas still free from the Vietminh.
Personnel movements were covered by the flow of refugees.
Haiphong was reminiscent of our own pioneer days as it was
swamped with people whom it couldn't shelter. Living space and
food were at a premium, nervous tension grew. It was a wild time
for our northern team.
First supplies for the Hao paramilitary group started to arrive
in Saigon. These shipments and the earlier ones for the Binh
group were part of an efficient and effective air smuggling effort
by the 581st [word illegible] Wing, U.S. Air Force, to support
SMM, with help by CIA and Air Force personnel in both
Okinawa and the Philippines. SMM officers frequently did coolie
labor in manhandling tons of cargo, at times working throughout
65
the night. . . . All ... officers pitched in to help, as part of our
"blood, sweat and tears" ....
By 31 January, all operational equipment of the Binh paramilitary
group had been trans-shipped to Haiphong from Saigon,
mostly with the help of CAT, and the northern SMM team had
it cached in operational sites. Security measures were tightened at
the Haiphong airport and plans for bringing in the Hao equipment
were changed from the air route to sea. Task Force 98,
now 98.7 under command of Captain Frank, again was asked to
give a helping hand and did so ....
. . . . Major Conein had briefed the members of the Binh
paramilitary team and started them infiltrating into the north as
individuals. The infiltration was carried out in careful stages over
a 30 day period, a successful operation. The Binhs became normal
citizens, carrying out every day civil pursuits, on the surface.
We had smuggled into Vietnam about eight and a half tons of
supplies for the Hao paramilitary group. They included fourteen
agent radios, 300 carbines, 90,000 rounds of carbine ammunition,
50 pistols, 10,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, and 300 pounds
of explosives. Two and a half tons were delivered to the Hao
agents in Tonkin, while the remainder was cached along the Red
River by SMM, with the help of the Navy ....
j. April 1955
the Hao paramilitary team had finished its training at the
secret training site and been flown by the Air Force to a holding
site in the Philippines, where Major Allen and his officers briefed
the paramilitary team. In mid-April, they were taken by the Navy
to Haiphong, where they were gradually slipped ashore. Meanwhile,
arms and other equipment including explosives were being
flown into Saigon via our smuggling route, being readied for shipment
north by the Navy task force handling refugees. The White
team office gradually became an imposing munitions depot. Nightly
shootings and bombings in restless Saigon caused us to give
them dispersed storage behind thick walls as far as this one big
house would permit. SMM personnel guarded the house night and
day, for it also contained our major files other than the working
file at our Command Post. All files were fixed for instant destruction,
automatic weapons and hand grenades distributed to all
personnel. It was a strange scene for new personnel just
arriving ....
Haiphong was taken over by the Vietminh on 16 May. Our
Binh and northern Hao teams were in place, completely equipped.
It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work to beat the
Geneva deadline, to locate, select, exfiltrate, train, infiltrate, equip
the men of these two teams and have them in place, ready for
actions required against the enemy. It would be a hard task to do
66
openly, but this had to be kept secret from the Vietminh, the
International Commission with its suspicious French and Poles
and Indians, and even friendly Vietnamese. Movements of personnel
and supplies had had to be over thousands of miles ....
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