Home

THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB

AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (U)

MG GEORGE R. FAY
INVESTIGATING OFFICER

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

"Combat Commanders desired that no security detainee be released for fear that any and all detainees could be threats to coalition forces. On occasion, Division Commanders overturned the recommendations of Division Staffs to release some detainees at the point of capture (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PHILLABAUM). The G2, 4 ID informed MG Fast that the Division Commander did not concur with the release of any detainees for fear that a bad one may be released along with the good ones. MG Fast described the 4ID’s response to efforts to coordinate the release of selected detainees, “…we wouldn’t have detained them if we wanted them released.”

-- "The Fay-Jones Report"

Table of Contents

1. (U) Appointing Officials' Instructions and Investigative Methodology

a. (U) Appointing Officials' Instruction.

(1) (U) On 31 March 2004, LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), appointed MG George R. Fay as an Army Regulation (AR) 381-10 Procedure 15 Investigating Officer. LTG Sanchez determined, based upon MG Antonio Taguba’s out brief of the results of an Article 15-6 investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq, that another investigation was warranted. MG Fay was to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility.

(a) (U) MG Fay was instructed as follows: Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation in accordance with (IAW) Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 into all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct on the part of personnel assigned and/or attached to the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, to include civilian interrogators and/or interpreters, from 15 August 2003 to 1 February 2004 at the Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility.

(b) (U) Specifically, you will investigate the following areas:

[1] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees at AG as preparation for interrogation operations.

[2] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations when questioning Iraqi security internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center.

(2) (U) The Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) requested a new appointing authority and investigating officer be assigned to the investigation. On 14 June 2004, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld requested the Acting Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) R.L.Brownlee assign an "officer senior to LTG Sanchez" to assume his duties as appointing authority, and a new or additional investigating officer should one be required. SECDEF provided the following additional guidance to the Acting SECARMY:

(U) The new appointing authority shall refer recommendations concerning issues at the Department of the Army level to the Department of the Army and recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense (DoD) level to the Department of Defense for appropriate action. The appointing authority shall refer the completed report to the Commander, United States Central Command for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to the ATSD(IO) [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight] in accordance with DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Matters concerning accountability, if any, should be referred by the appointing authority, without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition.

(3) (U) On 16 June 2004, Acting SECARMY Brownlee designated GEN Paul J. Kern, Commander of the US Army Materiel Command, as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. Acting SECARMY Brownlee’s instructions included the following:

(a) (U) I am designating you as the appointing authority. Major General Fay remains available to perform duties as the investigating officer. If you determine, however, after reviewing the status of the investigation, that a new or additional investigating officer is necessary, please present that request to me.

(b) (U) Upon receipt of the investigation, you will refer all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of the Army level to me and all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense level to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action. You will refer the completed report to the Commander, United States Central Command, for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to ATSD(IO) IAW DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Finally, you should refer matters concerning accountability, if any, without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition. If you determine that you need further legal resources to accomplish this mission, you should contact the Judge Advocate General.

(4) (U) On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. GEN Kern’s instructions to LTG Jones included the following:

(a) (U) Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, and AR 15-6, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation of alleged misconduct involving personnel assigned or attached to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Your appointment is as an additional investigating officer. MG Fay and his investigative team are available to assist you.

(b) (U) Specifically, the purpose of the investigation is to determine the facts and to determine whether the questionable activity at Abu Ghraib is legal and is consistent with applicable policy. In LTG Sanchez’s 31 March 2004 appointment letter to MG Fay, which I have adopted, he specified three areas into which the investigation was to look: whether the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade had been involved in Military Police detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib; whether 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel complied with established procedures, regulations, and laws when questioning internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center; and the facts behind several identified sworn statements. In addition, your investigation should determine whether organizations or personnel higher in the chain of command of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved directly or indirectly in any questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.

b. (U) Investigative Methodology.

(1) (U) The investigative team conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive review of available background documents and statements pertaining to the operations of the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade (205 MI BDE) at Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources, to include all previous investigations. Where possible, coordination was established with other ongoing investigations of the same nature.

(2) (U) Over 170 personnel were interviewed (some multiple times) during the course of the investigation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1). These interviews included personnel assigned or attached to the 205 MI BDE, the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade (800 MP BDE), CJTF-7, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), 28th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), the United States Navy, Titan Corporation, CACI International, Inc., and three detainees at Abu Ghraib. Written sworn statements were prepared as a result of these interviews. Several personnel invoked their rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution. In these cases and in cases where no sworn statements were collected, Memoranda for Record (MFR) were prepared to describe the nature of and information addressed in the interview.

(3) (U) Over 9,000 documents were collected, catalogued and archived into a database. Advanced analytic tools were used to organize, collate, and analyze this data as well as all collected interview data. Other analytical tools were used to prepare graphic representations of the data.

(4) (U) The investigative team consisted of 26 personnel to include investigators, analysts, subject matter experts and legal advisors.

2. (U) Executive Summary

a. (U) Background.

(1) (U) This investigation was ordered initially by LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7. LTG Sanchez appointed MG George R. Fay as investigating officer under the provisions of AR 381-10. MG Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205 MI BDE were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Specifically, he was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited MP personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. The investigative team conducted a comprehensive review of all available background documents and statements pertaining to Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources. Over 170 persons were interviewed concerning their knowledge of interrogation and detention operations at Abu Ghraib and/or their knowledge of and involvement in detainee abuse. On 16 June 2004, GEN Paul J. Kern, Commander, US Army Materiel Command (AMC), was appointed as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Jones, Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. MG Fay was retained as an investigating officer.

(2) (U) This investigation identified forty-four (44) alleged instances or events of detainee abuse committed by MP and MI Soldiers, as well as civilian contractors. On sixteen (16) of these occasions, abuse by the MP Soldiers was, or was alleged to have been, requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited by MI personnel. The abuse, however, was directed on an individual basis and never officially sanctioned or approved. MI solicitation of MP abuse included the use of isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse. In eleven (11) instances, MI personnel were found to be directly involved in the abuse. MI personnel were also found not to have fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP) were found to be poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity.

(3) (U) This investigation found that certain individuals committed offenses in violation of international and US law to include the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ and violated Army Values. Leaders in key positions failed properly to supervise the interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib and failed to understand the dynamics created at Abu Ghraib. Leaders also failed to react appropriately to those instances where detainee abuse was reported, either by other service members, contractors, or by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, and Medical Soldiers, and civilian contractors were found to have some degree of responsibility or complicity in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Twenty-seven (27) were cited in this report for some degree of culpability and seventeen (17) were cited for misunderstanding of policy, regulation or law. Three (3) MI Soldiers, who had previously received punishment under UCMJ, were recommended for additional investigation. Seven (7) MP Soldier identified in the MG Taguba Report and currently under criminal investigation and/or charges are also central figures in this investigation and are included in the above numbers. One (1) person cited in the MG Taguba Report was exonerated.

(4) (U) Looking beyond personal responsibility, leader responsibility and command responsibility, systemic problems and issues also contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse occurred. These systemic problems included: inadequate interrogation doctrine and training, an acute shortage of MP and MI Soldiers, the lack of clear lines of responsibility between the MP and MI chains of command, the lack of a clear interrogation policy for the Iraq Campaign, and intense pressure felt by the personnel on the ground to produce actionable intelligence from detainees. Twenty-four (24) additional findings and two (2) observations regarding systemic failures are included in the final investigative report. These findings ranged from doctrine and policy concerns, to leadership and command and control issues, to resource and training issues.

b. (U) Problems: Doctrine, Policy, Training, Organization, and Other Government Agencies.

(1) (U) Inadequacy of doctrine for detention operations and interrogation operations was a contributing factor to the situations that occurred at Abu Ghraib. The Army’s capstone doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations is Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated September 1992. Non-doctrinal approaches, techniques, and practices were developed and approved for use in Afghanistan and GTMO as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques, approaches, and practices became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards. Soldiers were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation techniques such as sleep adjustment, isolation, and the use of dogs. Many interrogators and personnel overseeing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib had prior exposure to or experience in GTMO or Afghanistan. Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non field-manual approaches and practices came from documents and personnel in GTMO and Afghanistan. By October 2003, interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at what level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved.

(2) (U) MP personnel and MI personnel operated under different and often incompatible rules for treatment of detainees. The military police referenced DoD-wide regulatory and procedural guidance that clashed with the theater interrogation and counter- resistance policies that the military intelligence interrogators followed. Further, it appeared that neither group knew or understood the limits imposed by the other’s regulatory or procedural guidance concerning the treatment of detainees, resulting in predictable tension and confusion. This confusion contributed to abusive interrogation practices at Abu Ghraib. Safeguards to ensure compliance and to protect against abuse also failed due to confusion about the policies and the leadership’s failure to monitor operations adequately.

(3) (U) By December 2003, the JIDC at Abu Ghraib had a total of approximately 160 personnel with 45 interrogators and 18 linguists/translators assigned to conduct interrogation operations. These personnel were from six different MI battalions and groups – the 519 MI BN, 323 MI BN, 325 MI BN, 470 MI GP, the 66th MI GP, the 500 MI GP. To complicate matters, interrogators from a US Army Intelligence Center and School, Mobile Training Team (MTT) consisting of analysts and interrogators, and three interrogation teams consisting of six personnel from GTMO, came to Abu Ghraib to assist in improving interrogation operations. Additionally, contract interrogators from CACI and contract linguists from Titan were hired in an attempt to address shortfalls. The JIDC was created in a very short time period with parts and pieces of various units. It lacked unit integrity, and this lack was a fatal flaw.

(4) (U) The term Other Government Agencies (OGA) most commonly referred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA conducted unilateral and joint interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. The CIA’s detention and interrogation practices contributed to a loss of accountability and abuse at Abu Ghraib. No memorandum of understanding existed on the subject interrogation operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and local CIA officers convinced military leaders that they should be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and procedures. CIA detainees in Abu Ghraib, known locally as “Ghost Detainees,” were not accounted for in the detention system. With these detainees unidentified or unaccounted for, detention operations at large were impacted because personnel at the operations level were uncertain how to report or classify detainees.

c. (U) Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) Physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib were by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee. These abuses are, without question, criminal. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse cannot be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being prosecuted claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians.

(2) (U) Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 November 2003. By that date, abuses of detainees was already occurring and the addition of dogs was just one more device. Dog Teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG G. Miller’s assessment team from GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues. Interrogations at Abu Ghraib, however, were influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. The use of dogs in interrogations to “fear up” detainees was utilized without proper authorization.

(3) (U) The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. They simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating “de- humanization” of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur.

(4) (U) There was significant confusion by both MI and MPs between the definitions of “isolation” and “segregation.” LTG Sanchez approved the extended use of isolation on several occasions, intending for the detainee to be kept apart, without communication with their fellow detainees. His intent appeared to be the segregation of specific detainees. The technique employed in several instances was not, however, segregation but rather isolation - the complete removal from outside contact other than required care and feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI. Use of isolation rooms in the Abu Ghraib Hard Site was not closely controlled or monitored. Lacking proper training, clear guidance, or experience in this technique, both MP and MI stretched the bounds into further abuse; sensory deprivation and unsafe or unhealthy living conditions. Detainees were sometimes placed in excessively cold or hot cells with limited or poor ventilation and no light.

3. (U) Background and Environment.

a. (U) Operational Environment.

(1) (U) The Global War on Terrorism began in earnest on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Soon after the 9/11 attacks, American forces entered Afghanistan to destroy the primary operating and training base of Al Qaida. Prisoners collected in these and other global counter-terrorist operations were transferred to Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba. Two Task Forces were formed at JTF- GTMO to manage intelligence collection operations with the newly captured prisoners. Military and civilian interrogators, counterintelligence agents, analysts, and other intelligence personnel from a variety of services and agencies manned the task forces and exploited the captured personnel for information.

(2) (U) US and coalition partners attacked Iraq on 20 March 2003 and soon after toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Iraq conflict transitioned quickly and unexpectedly to an insurgency environment. Coalition forces began capturing and interrogating alleged insurgents. Abu Ghraib prison, opened after the fall of Saddam to house criminals, was soon used for collecting and interrogating insurgents and other persons of intelligence interest. The unit responsible for managing Abu Ghraib interrogations was the 205 MI BDE.

b. (U) Law, Policy, Doctrine and Training.

(1) (U) Applicable Law.

(a) (U) Military Order of November 13th 2001 – Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Reference Annex J, Appendix 1).

(b) (U) Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Reference Annex J, Appendix 5).

(c) (U) AR 190-8 / OPNAVINST 3461.6 / AFJI 31-302/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and other Detainees, 1 October 1997 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2).

(d) (U) FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3).

(e) (U) Classification of Detainees. The overwhelming evidence in this investigation shows that most “detainees” at Abu Ghraib were “civilian internees.” Therefore, this discussion will focus on “civilian internees.”

[1] (U) Detainee. AR 190-8 defines a detainee as any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. By this definition, a detainee could be an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), a Retained Person, such as a doctor or chaplain, or a Civilian Internee. The term “detainee” is a generic one with no specific implied rights or protections being afforded to the individual; however, it is almost exclusively used by the Soldiers and other individuals interviewed in this investigation to refer to the individuals interned at Abu Ghraib. In order to understand the rights and protections that need to be provided to a “detainee,” further classification is necessary.

[2] (U) Civilian Internee. Using Geneva Convention IV (GC IV), Article 78, as further defined by AR 190-8, a “Civilian Internee” is someone who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03- 036). The overwhelming evidence in this investigation shows that all “detainees” at Abu Ghraib were civilian internees. Within the confinement facility, however, there were further sub-classifications that were used, to include criminal detainee, security internee, and MI Hold.

[a] (U) Criminal Detainee. A person detained because he/she is reasonably suspected of having committed a crime against Iraqi Nationals or Iraqi property or a crime not related to the coalition force mission (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036).

[b] (U) Security Internee. Civilians interned during conflict or occupation for their own protection or because they pose a threat to the security of coalition forces, or its mission, or are of intelligence value. This includes persons detained for committing offenses (including attempts) against coalition forces (or previous coalition forces), members of the Provisional Government, Non-Government Organizations, state infrastructure, or any person accused of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. Security internees are a subset of civilian internees (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036).

[c] (U) MI Hold. A directive to hold and not release a detainee/internee in the custody of the Coalition Forces, issued by a member or agent of a US Military Intelligence Organization (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036).

[d] (U) Most detainees located within Abu Ghraib, to include those in Tier 1A and 1B (Reference Annex F, Appendix 1, Abu Ghraib Overhead with Organizational Layout), were Civilian Internees and therefore, entitled to protections under GC IV. In addition to applicable international laws, ARs, and the FMs on Intelligence Interrogations further clarify US Policy regarding the protections afforded Civilian Internees.

(f) (U) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War. GC IV provides protections for civilians in time of war. The US is bound by the Geneva Conventions; therefore, any individual acting on behalf of the US during an armed conflict is also bound by Geneva Conventions. This includes not only members of the armed forces, but also civilians who accompany or work with the US Armed Forces. The following are some relevant articles to the discussion on detainee abuse:

[1] (U) Article 5. Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Conventions as would, if exercised in the favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State. Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Conventions. In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present [convention].

[2] (U) Article 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

[3] (U) Article 31. No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.

[4] (U) Article 32. The [Parties to the Convention] agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical and scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.

[5] (U) Article 37. Protected persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving a sentence involving loss of liberty, shall during their confinement be humanely treated.

[6] (U) Article 100. The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be consistent with humanitarian principles, and shall in no circumstances include regulation imposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs on the body is prohibited. In particular, prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drills, military drill and maneuver, or the reduction of food rations, are prohibited.

[7] (U) Article 143. Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where protected persons are, particularly to places of internment, detention and work. They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected persons and shall be able to interview the latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter. Such visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of military imperative, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. Their duration and frequency shall not be restricted. Such representatives and delegates shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The Detaining or Occupying Power, the Protecting Power, and when occasion arises the Power of origin of the persons to be visited, may agree that compatriots of the internees shall be permitted to participate in the visits. The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted for the approval of the Power governing the territories where they will carry out their duties.

(2) (U) AR 190-8.

Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and other Detainees is a joint publication between all services of the Armed Forces (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2).

(a) (U) US Policy Overview. The regulation (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5) sets out US Policy stating that “US policy, relative to the treatment of EPW, Civilian Internees and RP in the custody of the US Armed Forces, is as follows: All persons captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in US Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of the US forces until final release and repatriation.” The regulation further defines this policy.

(b) (U) Inhumane Treatment. Specifically, inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited and is considered a serious and punishable offense under international law and the UCMJ. The following acts are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory deprivation, collective punishment, execution without trial, and all cruel and degrading treatment. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(b)).

(c) (U) Protection from Certain Acts. All detainees will be protected against all acts of violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1- 5(c)). This is further reinforced in FM 34-52 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3), which states that the Geneva Conventions and US policy expressly prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation.

(d) (U) Photographs. Photographs of detainees are strictly prohibited except for internal administrative purposes of the confinement facility. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(d)).

(e) (U) Physical torture or moral coercion. No form of physical or moral coercion will be exercised against the Civilian Internee. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(a)(1)).

(f) (U) At all times, the Civilian Internee will be humanely treated and protected against all acts of violence or threats and insults and public curiosity. The Civilian Internee will be especially protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, reprisals of any kind, sexual attacks such as rape, forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(a)(2) & (3)).

(3) (U) Military Intelligence Doctrine and Training.

(a) (U) Doctrine.

[1] (U) The Army's capstone doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations is FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated September, 1992. This doctrine provides an adequate basis for the training of interrogators at the Soldier level (e.g., in the art of tactical interrogation and the Geneva Conventions); however, it is out of date with respect to the management and conduct of detainee operations. Joint Doctrine on the conduct of detainee operations is sparse even though the Army has operated JIDCs since 1989 in Operation JUST CAUSE, and because the Army is normally tasked by the Joint Force Commander to establish and manage EPW/Detainee operations for the deployed force (Reference Annex M, Appendix 1, APPENDIX G-3, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations). National level doctrine, in the form of a Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM), also contains very little doctrinal basis for the conduct and management of joint interrogation operations. A critical doctrinal gap at the joint and service level is the role of national level agencies (e.g., other governmental agencies [OGA]) in detainee operations to include appropriate protocols for sharing valuable intelligence assets. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported the following in a recent assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom detainee and interrogation operations (Reference Annex C, Appendix 5):

MP and MI doctrine at division and below must be modified for stability operations and support operations to reflect the need for long-term detention facilities and interrogation of captives at the tactical level.

[2] (U) It is possible that some of the unauthorized interrogation techniques employed in Iraq may have been introduced through the use of an outdated training manual (FM 34-52 dated 1987 vice FM 34-52 dated 1992). The superseded version (FM 34-52, dated 1987) has been used at various locations in OIF. In a prior AR 15-6 investigation of Camp Cropper (Reference Annex C, Appendix 2), the 1987 version was again used as the reference (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3). On 9 June 2004, CJTF-7 published an email (Reference Annex L, Appendix 4, email) that indicated the May 1987 version was used as CJTF-7’s primary reference. The section encapsulated below from the 1987 version has been removed from the 1992 version of FM 34-52. To the untrained, the reference in the outdated version could appear as a license for the interrogator to go beyond the current doctrine as established in the current FM 34-52. The 1987 version suggests the interrogator controls lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The section from the 1987 version that could be misunderstood is from Chapter 3 and reads as follows:

FM 34-52 (1987) Chapter 3, Establish and Maintain Control. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The interrogator must always be in control, he must act quickly and firmly. However, everything that he says and does must be within the limits of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as the standards of conduct outlined in the UCMJ.

[3] (U) Doctrine provides the foundation for Army operations. A lack of doctrine in the conduct of non-conventional interrogation and detainee operations was a contributing factor to the abuses at Abu Ghraib.

(b) (U) Training

[1] (U) Formal US Army interrogation training is conducted at the Soldier level, primarily as part of a Soldier's Initial Entry Training (IET). There is no formal advanced interrogation training in the US Army. Little, if any, formal training is provided to MI leaders and supervisors (Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Non-Commissioned Officers) in the management of interrogation and detainee operations. These skills can only be developed in the unit environment through assignments to an interrogation unit, involvement in interrogation training exercises, or on deployments. Unfortunately, unit training and exercises have become increasingly difficult to conduct due to the high pace of deployments of interrogation personnel and units. With very few exceptions, combined MI and MP training on the conduct of detainee operations is non-existent.

[2] (U) The IET course at the USAIC, Fort Huachuca, AZ, provides a 16.5 week course of instruction. The course consists of 758.2 hours of academic training time that includes collection prioritization, screening, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, termination of interrogations, and report writing in the classroom and practical exercise environments. The course focuses on the conduct of tactical interrogations in conventional war. Each student receives eight hours of classroom training on AR 381-10, Army Intelligence Activities (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2) and FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3) and 184 hours of practical exercise. The student's understanding of the Geneva Conventions and Law of Land Warfare is continually evaluated as a critical component. If at any time during an exercise, the student violates the Geneva Conventions, they will fail the exercise. A failure does not eliminate the student from the course. Students are generally given the chance to recycle to the next class; however, egregious violations could result in dismissal from the course.

[3] (U) The reserve components use the same interrogator program of instruction as does the active component. They are exposed to the same classes and levels of instruction. Like the active component, the reserve components' training opportunities prior to deployment in recent years have been minimal, if any. Those slated for deployment to the JTF-GTMO attend the Intelligence Support to Counter Terrorism (ISCT) Course.

[4] (U) Army Regulations require interrogators to undergo refresher training on the Geneva Conventions annually. Units are also expected to conduct follow-up training for Soldiers to maintain and improve their interrogation skills. This becomes difficult given that Soldiers fresh from the basic interrogation course are deployed almost as soon as they arrive to their unit of assignment. This leaves little, if any, time to conduct that follow-on training with their unit to hone the skills they have learned in school. In addition to the unit deployments, the individual interrogators find themselves deployed to a wide variety of global engagements in a temporary duty status -- not with their units of assignments. It is not uncommon for an individual to be deployed two or three times in the course of a year (e.g., the Balkans, Cuba [JTF-GTMO], Afghanistan, Iraq, or in support of Special Operations Forces [SOF]).

[5] (U) There is no formal advanced interrogation training in the US Army. The DoD manages a Strategic Debriefing Course for all services. While some of the skills are similar, the Strategic Debriefing Course is not an advanced interrogation course. Further, only interrogators being assigned to strategic debriefing assignments are authorized to attend this course. This prevents the tactical interrogator, the operator at Abu Ghraib, from further developing skills. Junior NCOs receive only limited interrogation-related training during his or her advanced NCO courses -- the Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) and the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer's Course (ANCOC). This limited training is restricted to the management of interrogation operations. The amount of time spent on the Geneva Conventions training during either of these courses is minimal. Officers receive limited training in interrogation or interrogation management in their entry level and advanced level courses. Like BNCOC and ANCOC, this training is focused on management and not the intricacies of interrogation operations or the legal restrictions applicable to interrogation operations.

[6] (U) Very little training is available or conducted to train command and staff elements on the conduct, direction, and oversight of interrogation operations. To address a portion of this shortfall, USAIC is standing up a course to teach the management of Human Intelligence to MI officers. A pilot course is scheduled and is designed to prepare the intelligence staffs (G2, S2) of a deploying Army Division with the capability to synchronize, coordinate, manage and de-conflict Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations within the division's area of responsibility.

[7] (U) Most interrogator training that occurred at Abu Ghraib was on-the-job training. The JIDC at Abu Ghraib conducted Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and interrogation operations training. The fast paced and austere environment limited the effectiveness of any training. After mid-September 2003, all Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had to read a memorandum titled IROE, acknowledging they understood the ICRP, and sign a confirmation sheet indicating they had read and understood the ICRP. Most Soldiers have confirmed they received training on the IROE. See attached CJTF-7 IROE standard signature sheet (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4) to view an example.

[8] (U) MG G. Miller led an assessment team to Abu Ghraib in early September 2003. This was followed by a training team from 2 October - 2 December 2003. There is no indication that the training provided by the JTF-GTMO Team led to any new violations of the Geneva Conventions and the law of land warfare. Training focused on screening, the use of pocket litter during interrogations, prioritization of detainees, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, interpreter control, deception detection, reporting, automation, and interrogation booths. The training provided at Abu Ghraib did not identify the abuses that were ongoing as violations of regulations or law, nor did it clarify issues involving detainee abuse reporting.

[9] (U) Interrogators learn as part of their training that the MPs provide the security for and run detention operations at the Collection Points (CPs), Corps Holding Areas (CHAs), and Internment/Resettlement (IR) facilities. The interrogator’s mission is only to collect intelligence from prisoners or detainees. Interaction with the MPs is encouraged to take advantage of any observations the MPs/guards might have concerning a particular prisoner or detainee. While the USAIC includes this in the interrogator's training, very little time is spent training MI/MP detention operations. In the past, the Army conducted large EPW/Detainee exercises (the Gold Sword and Silver Sword series) that provided much of the training critical to MPs' and Interrogators' understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities. These exercises were discontinued in the mid 1990s due to frequent deployments and force structure reductions, eliminating an excellent source of interoperability training. The increase in op-tempo since 9/11 has further exacerbated the unit training and exercise problem.

[10] (U) Contract Training.

[a] (U) The US Army employs contract linguists/translators and contract interrogators in military operations. Some IET is provided to familiarize military interrogators in the conduct of interrogations using translators. No training is conducted at any level (enlisted, NCO, Warrant Officer, or Officer) on the employment of contract interrogators in military operations. The use of contract interrogators and linguists at Abu Ghraib was problematic (See paragraph 4.g.) from a variety of perspectives. JIDC interrogators, analysts, and leaders were unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training to fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.

[b] (U) No doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders (NCO, Warrant Officer, and Officer) in the contract management or command and control of contractors in a wartime environment. These interrogators and leaders faced numerous issues involving contract management: roles and responsibilities of JIDC personnel with respect to contractors; roles, relationships, and responsibilities of contract linguists and contract interrogators with military personnel; and the methods of disciplining contractor personnel. All of these need to be addressed in future interrogation and interrogation management training.

[11] (U) Soldier interrogation training is adequate with respect to interrogation techniques and procedures for conventional warfare. It is far less suited to the realities of the GWOT and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and contract management. Despite the emphasis on the Geneva Conventions, it is clear from the results at Abu Ghraib (and elsewhere in operations in support of the GWOT) that Soldiers on the ground are confused about how they apply the Geneva Conventions and whether they have a duty to report violations of the conventions. Most Abu Ghraib interrogators performed their duties in a satisfactory manner without incident or violation of training standards. Some interrogators (See paragraph 5.e.- 5.h., below), however, violated training standards in the performance of selected interrogations. Army training at USAIC never included training on interrogation techniques using sleep adjustment, isolation, segregation, environmental adjustment, dietary manipulation, the use of military working dogs, or the removal of clothing. These techniques were introduced to selected interrogators who worked at Abu Ghraib from sources other than official Army training.

(4) (U) Military Police Doctrine and Training

(a) (U) DoD Directives 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other Detainees, and 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, require that the US military services comply with the principles, spirit, and intent of international laws of war, that the DoD observes and enforces the US obligations under the laws of war, that personnel know the laws of war obligations, and that personnel promptly report incidents violating the laws of war and that the incidents be thoroughly investigated.

(b) (U) AR 190-8, “Enemy Prisoner of War, Retained Personnel Civilian Internees and other Detainees,” is a multi-service policy that incorporates the directives from the DoD publications above. The regulation addresses the military police treatment of civilian internees, and directs that:

  • No physical or moral coercion be used

  • Internees be treated with respect for their person, honor, manner, and customs

  • Internees be protected against violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, or any form of indecent assault

It specifically prohibits:

  • Measures causing physical suffering, to include corporal punishment, and other measures of brutality

It specifies that disciplinary measures NOT:

  • Be inhumane, brutal, or dangerous to health

  • Include imprisonment in a place without daylight

The authorized disciplinary punishments include:

  • Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by regulation

  • Confinement, not to exceed 30 consecutive days

(Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8)

(c) (U) AR 190-12, Military Working Dog Program, notes that military police may potentially use dogs for EPW control, but limits their use against people to instances when the responsible commander determines it absolutely necessary and there have been reasonable efforts to use all lesser means of force. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-12)

(d) (U) Procedural guidance, found in FM 3-19.40 and the MP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Abu Ghraib (400th MP BN SOP for Camp Vigilant Detention Center), consistently follow directly from the DoD directives and the applicable ARs. The procedural guidance provides military police clear-cut guidance for permissible and impermissible practices during Internment Operations. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3, FM 3-19.40; Annex J, Appendix 4, 400 MP BN SOP Camp Vigilant Detention Center)

(5) (U) Intelligence and Interrogation Policy Development.

(a) (U) National Policy.

(1) (U) US forces and intelligence officials deployed to Afghanistan and elsewhere to conduct military operations pursuant to GWOT. Specific regulatory or procedural guidance concerning either “humane” treatment or “abuse” was not available in the context of GWOT and the recently promulgated national policies. Military and civilian intelligence agencies, to include the 519th MI Battalion (519 MI BN) in late 2002, conducted interrogations in Afghanistan in support of GWOT. As a result, deployed military interrogation units and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan developed certain practices. Later, some of these same techniques surfaced as interrogation techniques in Iraq. Prior to these deployments, US Army interrogators used the doctrine found in FM 34-52. The 1992 FM was what military interrogators at Abu Ghraib were trained on, and it contained the techniques and the restrictions they had been taught. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3; FM 34-52, Interrogation Operations, [1987 and 1992 versions])

(2) (S//NF)

(3) (S//NF)

(4) (S//NF)

(5) (U) On 16 April 2003, SECDEF approved approaches for use on the Guantanamo “unlawful” combatants, as defined by the President’s Military Order of 13 November 2001 and reiterated in the 7 February 2002 memorandum to DoD. Once this document was signed, it became policy at JTF-GTMO, and later became the bedrock on which the CJTF-7 policies were based. The first 18 approaches listed in the 16 April 2003 memo from the SECDEF all appear in the current, 1992, FM 34-52, except the Mutt-and-Jeff approach, which was derived from the superseded 1987 FM 34-52. The remaining approaches, similar to the ones identified in the OGC working group’s memorandum derived from the CJTF-180 memorandum and the JTF-GTMO request, included:

Change of Scenery Down
Dietary Manipulation
Environmental Manipulation
Sleep Adjustment
False Flag
Isolation

Although approving all approaches for use, the SECDEF required that he be notified prior to implementing the following approaches:

Incentive/Removal of Incentive
Mutt and Jeff
Pride and Ego Down
Isolation

(Reference Annex J, Appendix 2, Counter-Resistance Techniques)

(6) (U) No regulatory guidance exists for interrogators aside from DoD Directives 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other Detainees and 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program. The most current interrogation procedural guidance is in the 1992 FM 34-52. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 1, DoD Directive 2310.1; Annex M, Appendix 1, DoD Directive 5100.77).

(b) (U) Development of Intelligence and Interrogation Policy in Iraq and Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) In July 2003, the 519 MI BN, veterans of Afghanistan already at the BIAP facility, simultaneously conducted interrogations of the detainees with possible information of intelligence value and began to develop IROE for interrogators to meet the newly-focused mission. No known documentation exists concerning specific approaches and techniques used before September 2003.

(2) (S//NF)

(3) (U) Meanwhile, at Headquarters, CJTF-7, as the need for actionable intelligence rose, the realization dawned that pre-war planning had not included planning for detainee operations. Believing that FM 34-52 was not sufficiently or doctrinally clear for the situation in Iraq, CJTF-7 staff sought to synchronize detainee operations, which ultimately resulted in a methodology and structure derived from the JTF-GTMO system as presented by MG G. Miller. At the same time, LTG Sanchez directed that an interrogation policy be established that would address "permissible techniques and safeguards for interrogators" for use in Iraq. The CJTF-7 staff relied heavily on the series of SOPs which MG G. Miller provided to develop not only the structure, but also the interrogation policies for detainee operations (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ).

(4) (U) On 10 September 2003, CPT Fitch, assigned to the 205 MI BDE as the Command Judge Advocate, was tasked by COL Marc Warren, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for CJTF-7, to work with MAJ Daniel Kazmier and MAJ Franklin D. Raab from the CJTF-7 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) to produce a set of interrogation rules. The OSJA identified interrogation policies from the SECDEF 16 April 2003 memo for JTF-GTMO operations. OSJA provided CPT Fitch the 16 April 2003 SECDEF memorandum, which he copied almost verbatim onto a document entitled CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter- resistance Policy (ICRP). This document was developed without reference to the 519 MI BN’s July 2003 and August 2003 memos. CPT Fitch sent the policy memo to the 519 MI BN for coordination, and the 519 MI BN added the use of dogs, stress positions, sleep management, sensory deprivation, and yelling, loud music and light control from its 27 August 2003 memo. The use of all the techniques was to apply to interrogations of detainees, security internees, and EPWs. CPT Fitch finalized the combined memo and sent it back to the CJTF-7 SJA. It also went to the CJ-2, CJ-3, and the Commander, 205 MI BDE, who until that point had apparently not been involved in drafting or approving the policy. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FITCH, KAZMIER; Annex J, Appendix 3, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, [1st Draft], Annex J, Appendix 3, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, [2nd Draft])

(5) (U) Between 10 and 14 September 2003, the OSJA at CJTF-7 changed the 10 September 2003 memo to reflect the addition of the techniques that were not included in the JTFGTMO policy; i.e., the use of dogs, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control. Upon the guidance and recommendation of the SJA staff, it was decided that LTG Sanchez would approve the use of those additional methods on a case-by-case basis.

(6) (S//NF)

(7) (S//NF)

(8) (S//NF)

(9) (S//NF)

(10) (U) The 12 October 2003 policy significantly changed the tone and substance of the previous policy. It removed any approach not listed in the 1987 FM 34-52. While acknowledging the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the duty to treat all detainees humanely, it also cited Articles 5 and 78 noting specifically that those “detainees engaged in activities hostile to security of coalition forces had forfeited their Geneva Convention rights of communication.” It also included provisions found in the superseded 1987 FM 34-52 that authorized interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation, “to include lighting, and heating, as well as food, clothing and shelter given to detainees.” This phrase was specifically left out of the 1992 version (See section 3a(2), above). The 12 October 2003 policy also deleted references to EPWs and specified the policy was for use on civilian security internees.

(11) (S//NF)

(12) (S//NF)

(13) (S//NF)

(14) (S//NF)

(15) (U) On 16 October 2003, the JIDC Interrogation Operations Officer, CPT Carolyn A. Wood, produced an “Interrogation Rules of Engagement” chart as an aid for interrogators, graphically portraying the 12 October 2003 policy. It listed the approved approaches, and identified the approaches which had been removed as authorized interrogation approaches, which nonetheless could be used with LTG Sanchez’s approval. The chart was confusing, however. It was not completely accurate and could be subject to various interpretations. For example, the approved approaches list left off two techniques which previously had been included in the list (the Pride and Ego Down approach and the Mutt and Jeff approach). The right side of the chart listed approaches that required LTG Sanchez’s prior approval. What was particularly confusing was that nowhere on the chart did it mention a number of techniques that were in use at the time: removal of clothing, forced grooming, hooding, and yelling, loud music and light control. Given the detail otherwise noted on the aid, the failure to list some techniques left a question of whether they were authorized for use without approval. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4, CJTF-7 IROE training card)

(16) (U) By mid-October, interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than 30 days. Various versions of each draft and policy were circulated among Abu Ghraib, 205 MI BDE, CJTF-7 C2, and CJTF-7 SJA. Anecdotal evidence suggests that personnel were confused about the approved policy from as early as 14 September 2003. The SJA believed that the 14 September 2003 policy was not to be implemented until CENTCOM approved it. Meanwhile, interrogators in Abu Ghraib began operating under it immediately. It was not always clear to JIDC officers what approaches required LTG Sanchez’s approval, nor was the level of approval consistent with requirements in other commands. The JIDC October 2003 SOP, likewise created by CPT Wood, was remarkably similar to the Bagram (Afghanistan) Collection Point SOP. Prior to deployment to Iraq, CPT Wood's unit (A/519 MI BN) allegedly conducted the abusive interrogation practices in Bagram resulting in a Criminal Investigation Command (CID) homicide investigation. The October 2003 JIDC SOP addressed requirements for monitoring interrogations, developing detailed interrogation plans, delegating interrogation plan approval authority to the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC), and report writing. It failed to mention details concerning ICRP, approval requirements or procedures. Interrogators, with their section leaders’ knowledge, routinely utilized approaches/techniques without obtaining the required authority, indicating confusion at a minimum of two levels of supervision. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4, JIDC Interrogation SOP; Annex J, Appendix 4, CJTF-180 Bagram Collection Point SOP)

(17) (U) Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non-field manual approaches and practices clearly came from documents and personnel in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. The techniques employed in JTF-GTMO included the use of stress positions, isolation for up to thirty days, removal of clothing, and the use of detainees' phobias (such as the use of dogs) as the 2 December 2002 Counter-resistance memo, and subsequent statements demonstrate. As the CID investigation mentioned above shows, from December 2002, interrogators in Afghanistan were removing clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, using stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs and implementing sleep and light deprivation. Interrogators in Iraq, already familiar with the practice of some of these new ideas, implemented them even prior to any policy guidance from CJTF-7. These practices were accepted as SOP by newly-arrived interrogators. Some of the CJTF-7 ICRPs neither effectively addressed these practices, nor curtailed their use. (Annex J, Appendix 2, Tab A, Counter-Resistance Techniques; Annex J, Appendix 2, Interrogation Techniques; Annex E, Appendix 4, CID Report)

(18) (S//REL TO USA and MCFI)

(6) (U) Other Regulatory Procedural Guidance

(a) (U) On 13 November 2001, the President issued a military order entitled the Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non- Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. The order authorized US military forces to detain non-US citizens suspected of terrorism, and try them for violations of the law of war and other applicable laws. The order also authorized the SECDEF to detain individuals under such conditions he may prescribe and to issue related orders and regulations as necessary. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 1, Presidential Military Order)

(b) (S//NF)

(c) (U) The MP personnel and the MI personnel operated under different and often incompatible rules for treatment of detainees. The MPs referenced DoD-wide regulatory and procedural guidance that clashed with the theater interrogation and counter-resistance policies that the MI interrogators followed. Further, it appears that neither group knew or understood the limits imposed by the other’s regulatory or procedural guidance concerning the treatment of detainees, resulting in predictable tension and confusion.

(d) (U) For instance, a MI order to strip a detainee as an interrogation process conflicted with the AR 190-8 directive to treat detainees with respect for their person and honor (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 5-1a(2)); or to protect detainees against violence, insults, public curiosity, or any form of indecent assault (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190- , paragraph 5-1a(3)); and FM 3-19.40 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3) (which specifically directs that internees will retain their clothing). A MI order to place a detainee in isolation violated the AR 190-8 directive to not imprison a detainee in a place without daylight (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 6-11a(5)); to not confine for more than 30 consecutive days, (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 6- 12d(1)); and FM 3-19.40 which specifically directs that the facility commander must authorize any form of punishment. Finally, when interrogators ordered the use of dogs as an interrogation technique, the order violated the policy and intent of AR 190-12. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2)

4. (U) Summary of Events at Abu Ghraib.

a. (U) Military Intelligence Organization and Resources.

(1) (U) Task Organization.

(a) (U) The 205 MI BDE was organizationally, and geographically, the size of two MI Brigades. It was composed of four Active and three Reserve Battalions. The 205 MI BDE possessed no organic interrogation elements or personnel. All HUMINT assets (units and personnel) assigned to the 205 MI BDE were from other organizations. Major subordinate elements of the 205 MI BDE included three Tactical Exploitation Battalions (HUMINT and Counterintelligence), one Aerial Exploitation Battalion (Signal Intelligence [SIGINT]) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), an Operations Battalion (ANALYSIS), a Linguist Battalion (HUMINT Support) and a Corps Support Battalion (HUMINT). Elements of the Brigade were located throughout Iraq supporting a wide variety of combat operations. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab C, 205 MI BDE Command Brief).

205th MI Brigade Task Organization (August 2003)

(b) (U) The 205 MI BDE Commander, COL Thomas Pappas, had a reputation for being an excellent MI officer with a great background and experience before being selected for command. He took command of the 205 MI BDE on 1 July 2003 while the unit was already deployed in Iraq. His performance as Brigade Commander prior to the Abu Ghraib incidents was “outstanding” according to his rater, MG Wojdakowski, DCG, V Corps/CJTF-7 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOJDAKOWSKI). LTG Sanchez also believed COL Pappas was an excellent and dedicated officer (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Other key members of COL Pappas’s staff included MAJ Potter, Deputy Commander; MAJ M. Williams, Brigade Operations Officer (S-3); and CPT Fitch, Command Judge Advocate.

(2) (U) Resources.

(a) (U) As hostilities began to shift from a tactical fight to an insurgency, so did intelligence priorities. Iraq quickly became a HUMINT-focused environment in support of SASO with interrogation operations representing the intelligence ‘Center of Gravity’ (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Beginning in July 2003, demands placed upon interrogation operations were growing rapidly from both the tactical commanders as well as from the CJTF-7. The 205 MI BDE had the missions of providing Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT - small elements consisting of an interrogator, a linguist, and several combat arms Soldiers attached to maneuver elements to conduct tactical interrogations at “the point of the spear”) to forward deployed combat forces as well as operating a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).

(b) (U) As previously mentioned, the 205 MI BDE had no organic interrogation capability. Those assets were eliminated from the active force structure during the down-sizing of the Army in the 1990’s. The interrogation assets available to COL Pappas when he first took Command were A/519 MI BN and interrogation sections from the 325th MI Battalion (325 MI BN), US Army Reserve (USAR), and 323rd MI Battalion (323 MI BN), USAR. Because both of the USAR units were significantly under strength before being deployed to Iraq, they received many Soldiers from other USAR units country-wide to fill up their ranks. This process is known as "cross-leveling." Although it has the benefit of filling the ranks, it has the disadvantage of inserting Soldiers into units shortly before deployment who had never trained with those units. The Soldiers did not know the unit. The unit and the unit leadership did not know the Soldiers. The Army has always stressed “you train as you fight.” As COL Pappas began to focus his efforts on interrogation operations, all he had were disparate elements of units and individuals, including civilians, that had never trained together, but now were going to have to fight together.

(c) (U) Interestingly, and as a matter of comparison, Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) interrogation operations of high-level detainees at BIAP suffered no such shortages of interrogators. Roughly the same level of personnel supported the ISG interrogation operations at BIAP, even though the ISG facility had an order of magnitude less of detainees of intelligence interest to exploit than did the 205 MI BDE (100 at BIAP vs. over a 1000 at Abu Ghraib). Unfortunately, these much needed resources were unavailable for support to critical CJTF-7 mission needs (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ).

(d) (U) The number of interrogators initially assigned to the 205 MI BDE was sufficient for a small detainee population of only several hundred. In late July 2003, only 14 interrogation personnel were present in the 205 MI BDE to support interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. All of these personnel were from one unit – A/519 MI BN. By December 2003, Abu Ghraib (the JIDC) had approximately 160 205 MI BDE personnel with 45 interrogators and 18 linguists/translators assigned to conduct interrogation operations. These personnel were from six different MI battalions and groups – the 519 MI BN, the 323 MI BN (USAR), the 325 MI BN (USAR), the 470th MI Group (470 MI GP), the 66th MI Group (66 MI GP), the 500th MI Group (500 MI GP). Additional resources in the form of interrogators from one MTT consisting of analysts and interrogators, and at just about the same time, three "Tiger Teams" consisting of six personnel from JTF-GTMO, came to Abu Ghraib to assist in improving interrogation operations (See paragraph 4.j.(2)). Still short of resources, the Army hired contract interrogators from CACI International, and contract linguists from Titan Corporation in an attempt to address shortfalls (See paragraph 4.g.). Some units, such as the A/519 MI BN, had personnel who had been deployed to combat operations in theater in excess of 400 days so they also faced a rotation of selected personnel home with the resulting personnel turmoil.

b. (U) Establishment of the Prison at Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made the initial decision to use Abu Ghraib Prison as a criminal detention facility in May 2003 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Abu Ghraib began receiving criminal prisoners in June 2003. There were no MI Holds or security detainees in the beginning. All such categories of detainees were sent to Camp Cropper (located at BIAP) or to the other existing facilities throughout the country such as Camp Bucca (Reference Annex F, Appendix 1, AG Overhead Photo).

(2) (S//NF)

(3) (U) The Hard Site permanent building facilities at Abu Ghraib were not open for occupancy until 25 August 2003. The opening of the Hard Site was important because it marked the beginning of the serious abuses that occurred. CPT Wood, A/519 MI BN, believed that, based on her experience, the availability of an isolation area to house detainees determined to be of MI value would enhance results. She initiated the request through the 205 MI BDE to CPA for use of part of the Hard Site building for that purpose. Her request received strong support from the 205 MI BDE, specifically from its Operations Officer, MAJ Williams. The 519 MI BN was then granted use of Tier 1A (Reference Annex F, Appendix 1, AG Overview Briefing for diagram) to house detainees.

c. (U) Detention Operations and Release Procedures

(1) (S//NF)

(2) (S//NF)

(3) (S//NF)

(4) (S//NF)

(5) (S//NF)

(6) (U) The problems cited above contributed significantly to the overcrowding at Abu Ghraib. Overcrowding was even further exacerbated with the transfer of detainees from Camp Bucca to Abu Ghraib. The physical plant was totally inadequate in size and the construction and renovations that were underway were incomplete. Scarcity of resources – both personnel and equipment – to conduct effective confinement or interrogation operations made the situation worse.

(7) (U) There was general consensus (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FAST, CIVILIAN-12, LYONS, WOOD, SOLDIER14, SANCHEZ) that as the pace of operations picked up in late November – early December 2003, it became a common practice for maneuver elements to round up large quantities of Iraqi personnel in the general vicinity of a specified target as a cordon and capture technique. Some operations were conducted at night resulting in some detainees being delivered to collection points only wearing night clothes or under clothes. SGT Jose Garcia, assigned to the Abu Ghraib Detainee Assessment Board, estimated that 85% - 90% of the detainees were of no intelligence value based upon board interviews and debriefings of detainees. The Deputy C2X, CJTF-7, CIVILIAN-12, confirmed these numbers. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, GARCIA, CIVILIAN-12). Large quantities of detainees with little or no intelligence value swelled Abu Ghraib’s population and led to a variety of overcrowding difficulties. Already scarce interrogator and analyst resources were pulled from interrogation operations to identify and screen increasing numbers of personnel whose capture documentation was incomplete or missing. Complicated and unresponsive release procedures ensured that these detainees stayed at Abu Ghraib – even though most had no value.

(8) (U) To make matters worse, Abu Ghraib increasingly became the target of mortar attacks (Reference Annex F, Appendix 3 shows an image of mortar round strikes at Abu Ghraib prior to February 2004 and the times of mortar strikes from January-April 2004) which placed detainees – innocent and guilty alike – in harms way. Force protection was a major issue at Abu Ghraib. The prison is located in a hostile portion of Iraq, adjacent to several roads and highways, and near population centers. BG Karpinski recognized Abu Ghraib’s vulnerabilities and raised these concerns frequently to both MG Wojdakowski and LTG Sanchez (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KARPINSKI). LTG Sanchez was equally concerned with both the inherent vulnerability of Abu Ghraib and frustrated with the lack of progress in establishing even rudimentary force protection measures and plans (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). LTG Sanchez directed that measures be taken to improve the force protection situation even to the point of having the 82nd Airborne Division Commander meet with Abu Ghraib officers concerning the issue. But, little progress was made and the mortar attacks continued. In an effort to improve force protection at Abu Ghraib, LTG Sanchez directed COL Pappas assume Tactical Control (TACON) of the Abu Ghraib Forward Operating Base (FOB) (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 1108) on 19 November 2003. COL Pappas devoted considerable energy to improving security, even to the point of bringing a subordinate battalion commander to Abu Ghraib to coordinate force protection plans and operations. In spite of these efforts, the mortar attacks continued and culminated in an attack in April 2004 killing 22 detainees and wounding approximately 80 others, some seriously. This highlights the critical need for adequate force protection for a detainee center.

(9) (U) The Security Internee Review and Appeal Board was established on 15 August 2003. It served as the release authority for security internees and/or those on MI Hold who were deemed to be of no security threat or (further) intelligence value. It consisted of three voting members - the C2, CJTF-7 (MG Fast), the Commander 800 MP BDE (BG Karpinski), and the CJTF-  SJA (COL Warren), and two non-voting members (a SJA recorder and a MI assistant recorder). When first instituted, it was to meet on an "as required" basis; however, it appeared to be difficult to balance the schedules of three senior officers and the necessary support staff on a recurring, regular basis. Due to poor record keeping, accurate detainee release statistics are not available. We do know that by 2 October 2003, only 220 files had been reviewed by the board (Reference Annex H, Appendix 9, 031002 Oct CJTF7 JA Memo for CG). A preliminary screening board (Appellate Review Panel) at a level of authority below the General Officers on the Security Internee Review and Appeal Board was established to speed up the review of files by the General Officers. In the October – November 2003 timeframe, only approximately 100 detainee files a week were considered for release (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SUMMERS). As the detainee population increased, it became necessary to have the meetings on a much more frequent basis – initially twice a week. In the January 2004 timeframe, the board was meeting six times a week (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FAST). By February 2004, a standing board was established to deal with the ever increasing backlog. Even with more frequent meetings, the release of detainees from Abu Ghraib did not keep pace with the inflow. BG Karpinski believed that MG Fast was unreasonably denying detainees' release. By 11 January 2004, 57 review boards had been held and 1152 detained personnel had been released out of a total of 2113 considered. From February 2004 on, the release flow increased. (Reference Annex C, Appendix 1, Tab B, Annex 104)

(10) (U) As of late May 2004, over 8500 detainees had been reviewed for release, with 5300 plus being released and 3200 plus being recommended for continued internment. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 9, CJTF-7 C2X email). Even those that were initially deemed of no intelligence value and those that had been drained of intelligence information were not released on a timely basis – not as the result of any specific policy, but simply because the system that supported the release board (screening, interviews, availability of accurate records, and coordination) and the release board itself could not keep up with the flow of detainees into Abu Ghraib. Even with these long release delays (often 6 months and longer), there were concerns between the intelligence and tactical sides of the house. Combat Commanders desired that no security detainee be released for fear that any and all detainees could be threats to coalition forces. On occasion, Division Commanders overturned the recommendations of Division Staffs to release some detainees at the point of capture (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PHILLABAUM). The G2, 4 ID informed MG Fast that the Division Commander did not concur with the release of any detainees for fear that a bad one may be released along with the good ones. MG Fast described the 4ID’s response to efforts to coordinate the release of selected detainees, “…we wouldn’t have detained them if we wanted them released.” (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FAST, CIVILIAN-12). MG Fast responded that the board would ultimately release detainees if there was no evidence provided by capturing units to justify keeping them in custody.

(11) (U) The chart below depicts the rise in detainee ‘MI Hold’ population (those identified by the "system" to be deemed of intelligence interest) (Reference Annex H, Appendix 5). SOLDIER-14, the officer at Abu Ghraib primarily responsible for managing collection requirements and intelligence reporting, estimated that only 10-15% of the detainees on MI Hold were of actual intelligence interest. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14)

AG MI Hold Population

(12) (U) Interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib suffered from the effects of a broken detention operations system. In spite of clear guidance and directives, capturing units failed to perform the proper procedures at the point-of-capture and beyond with respect to handling captured enemy prisoners of war and detainees (screening, tactical interrogation, capture cards, sworn statements, transportation, etc.). Failure of capturing units to follow these procedures contributed to facility overcrowding, an increased drain on scarce interrogator and linguist resources to sort out the valuable detainees from innocents who should have been released soon after capture, and ultimately, to less actionable intelligence.

d. (U) Establishment of MP Presence at Abu Ghraib.

The first Army unit to arrive was the 72nd MP Company (72 MP CO), Nevada Army National Guard. When first assigned to Abu Ghraib, the 72 MP CO was a subordinate unit of the 400th MP Battalion (400 MP BN) headquartered at BIAP. The 320th MP Battalion (320 MP BN) advance party was the next to arrive at Abu Ghraib on 24 July 2003. The rest of the 320 MP BN Headquarters, commanded by LTC Phillabaum arrived on 28 July 2003. With the 320 MP BN came one of its subordinate units, the 447th MP Company (447 MP CO). The 72 MP CO was then reassigned from the 400 MP BN to the 320 MP BN. The next unit to arrive was the 229th MP Company (229 MP CO) on or about 3 August 2003. On 1 October 2003, SSG Frederick, CPL Graner and other MPs who have allegedly abused detainees, arrived as part of the 372 MP CO. The rest of the 320 MP CO arrived in late October 2003, followed by the 870th MP Company (870 MP CO) and 670 MP Company (670 MP CO) on approximately 14 November 2003.

e. (U) Establishment of MI Presence at Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) The first MI unit to arrive at Abu Ghraib was a detachment from A/519 MI BN on 25 July 2003. The person in charge of that contingent was 1SGT McBride. Soldiers from the 519 MI BN had been sent there to prepare for OVB. CPT Wood arrived at Abu Ghraib on 4 August 2003 to assume the duties of Interrogation Operations OIC. MAJ Thompson arrived on or about 10 September 2003 along with elements of the 325 MI BN. MAJ Thompson was sent by COL Pappas to set up the JIDC at Abu Ghraib. LTC Jordan arrived at Abu Ghraib on 17 September 2003 to become the Director of the JIDC. MAJ Price and elements of the 323 MI BN arrived at the end of September 2003. MAJ Price had been the OIC of the interrogation operation at Camp Bucca. He became the Operations Officer of the JIDC, working closely with MAJ Thompson and CPT Wood. Most of the personnel from the 323 MI BN element that arrived with MAJ Price were used as the Headquarters element and did not directly participate in interrogations.

(2) (U) Civilian CACI contract interrogators began to arrive in late September 2003. There are a number of shortfalls connected to this issue (See paragraph 4.g., below). It was another complicating factor with respect to command and control. CPT Wood relied on the CACI site manager, CIVILIAN-18, to interview contractors as they arrived and to assign them based on his interviews. She knew little of their individual backgrounds or experience and relied on “higher headquarters” to screen them before arrival. Such screening was not occurring.

(3) (U) During October 2003, in addition to the elements of the already mentioned MI units and the Titan and CACI civilians, elements of the 470 MI GP, 500 MI GP, and 66 MI GP appeared. These units were from Texas, Japan, and Germany, and were part of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), which tasked those subordinate units to send whatever interrogator and analyst support they had available. MAJ Thompson rotated back to the US on 15 November 2003. CPT Wood left on emergency leave on 4 December 2003 and never returned. MAJ Price, then, was the only commissioned officer remaining in the Operations Section.

(4) (U) It is important to understand that the MI units at Abu Ghraib were far from complete units. They were small elements from those units. Most of the elements that came to Abu Ghraib came without their normal command structure. The unit Commanders and Senior NCOs did not go to Abu Ghraib but stayed with the bulk of their respective units. The bringing together of so many parts of so many units, as well as civilians with very wide backgrounds and experience levels in a two month time period, was a huge challenge from a command and control perspective.

f. (U) Establishment, Organization, and Operation of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)

(1) (U) The idea for the creation of the JIDC came about after a number of briefings and meetings were held among LTG Sanchez, MG Fast, COL Pappas, and COL Steven Boltz, Assistant C2, CJTF-7. These meetings and briefings occurred about mid-August 2003 through early September 2003. They partially coincided with MG G. Miller’s arrival from GTMO. He and his team provided an assessment of detainee operations in Iraq from 31 August to 9 September 2003 (See Paragraph 4.j.(1)). MG G. Miller's discussions with the CJTF personnel and the 205 MI BDE personnel influenced the decision to create a JIDC and how it would be organized, but those discussions were already underway before his arrival. The objective for the establishment of the JIDC was to enhance the interrogation process with a view toward producing better, timelier, actionable intelligence (actionable intelligence provides commanders and Soldiers a high level of situational understanding, delivered with speed, accuracy, and timeliness, in order to conduct successful operations).

(2) (U) On 6 September 2003, COL Pappas briefed LTG Sanchez on a plan to improve interrogation operations resulting from a 31 August 2003 meeting (Reference Annex H, Appendix 10). LTG Sanchez approved the concept and directed COL Pappas to accelerate all aspects of the plan. This decision established the JIDC and modified previous interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. COL Pappas decided when standing up the JIDC not to make it a battalion operation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WILLIAMS), therefore deciding not to place one of his battalion commanders in charge of the JIDC but instead rely upon staff personnel to manage the entire operation. The current operation would be transitioned to a JIDC by personnel already assigned at Abu Ghraib with additional manning provided by the consolidation of security detainee interrogation operations from other locations (e.g., Camp Cropper). LTC Jordan would become the Director of the JIDC on 17 September 2003. Other key JIDC personnel included CPT Wood (OIC ICE), MAJ Thompson (JIDC Operations Officer), MAJ Price (JIDC Operations Officer), SOLDIER-14 and SOLDIER-23 (Interrogation Technicians). CJTF-7 decided to use the JTF-GTMO Tiger Team concept which uses an interrogator, an intelligence analyst, and an interpreter on each team. A re-organization of the JIDC took place in the late September to October 2003 timeframe which divided Tiger Teams into functional categories.

(3) (U) The reorganization introduced another layer of complexity into an already stressed Abu Ghraib interrogation operations environment. The Tiger Team worked well at GTMO. JTF-GTMO’s target population and mission, however, were different from what was faced in Iraq. The Tiger Team method was designed to develop strategic level information from the GTMO detainees who were primarily captured in Afghanistan. By the time they reached GTMO any tactical value they may have had was gone. The same is true for Abu Ghraib relative to Iraq. The best place to collect tactical intelligence from interrogations is at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence is the most perishable, and the faster you harvest it the more useful it will be to help that tactical unit. JIDC personnel at Abu Ghraib believed the thirst for intelligence reporting to feed the national level systems was driving the train. There was then a focus to fill that perceived void and feed that system. LTG Sanchez did not believe significant pressure was coming from outside of CJTF-7, but does confirm that there was great pressure placed upon the intelligence system to produce actionable intelligence (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). The Tiger Team concept should have only been used at Abu Ghraib for any high value targets identified. Those targets should receive careful planning and preparation, and be interrogated by the most experienced interrogators, analysts, and interpreters. Using a Tiger Team at Corps (the JIDC) for developing tactical intelligence did not work.

(4) (U) The JIDC is a non-doctrinal organization. Initially, there was no joint manning document for the JIDC (though one was developed by the 205 MI BDE over time and was submitted to CJTF-7). There was no approved structure for the JIDC. The manning document was being created as the JIDC was already operating (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WILLIAMS, Maurice). Because there is no JIDC doctrine (or training), procedures were ad hoc in nature – adapted from FM 34-52 where possible, though most processes and procedures were developed on the fly based upon the needs of the situation. The organization of the JIDC changed often (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab B) and contributed to the general state of turmoil at Abu Ghraib. Interrogators were not familiar with the new working arrangements (e.g., working with analysts) and were only slightly trained on the conduct of interrogations using translators. Note that most interrogators are only trained in conducting tactical interrogations in a conventional war environment (See paragraph 3.b.(3)). In spite of this turmoil, lack of training and doctrine, and shortages, the JIDC did mature over time and improved intelligence production derived from interrogations at Abu Ghraib.

(5) (U) Early in the formation of the JIDC, COL Pappas requested COL Boltz provide him with a Lieutenant Colonel to run the new organization because the responsibilities would require someone of that rank and commensurate experience. LTC Jordan had just arrived in Iraq four days earlier. He was originally sent to be COL Boltz’s Deputy C2 but then a decision was made to upgrade the C2 position from a COL to a MG. MG Fast was sent to CJTF-7 to be the C2, COL Boltz became the Deputy C2 and LTC Jordan became excess. Since LTC Jordan was available, COL Boltz assigned him to Abu Ghraib to run the JIDC. COL Boltz expected LTC Jordan to report to COL Pappas because COL Pappas had command responsibility for the JIDC. LTC Jordan was assigned to the JIDC verbally. He states that he never received orders (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, JORDAN, BOLTZ).

(6) (U) There is a significant difference between what LTC Jordan claims he was told when he was sent to Abu Ghraib and what COL Pappas and COL Boltz say he was told. LTC Jordan says he was sent to be a “liaison” officer between CJTF-7 and the JIDC. COL Pappas and COL Boltz say he was sent there to be in charge of it. Reference to titles is useless as a way to sort through this because there was no actual manning document for reference; people made up their own titles as things went along. Some people thought COL Pappas was the Director; some thought LTC Jordan was the Director. A major shortcoming on the part of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan was the failure to do a formal Officer Evaluation Report (OER) support form, Department of Army (DA) Form 67-8-1, to clearly delineate LTC Jordan’s roles and responsibilities. It is clear that both had their own ideas as to roles and responsibilities, and an initial goal-setting session formalized via the support form would have forced both parties to deal in specifics. Such sessions are frequently done after the fact; especially in stress-filled combat situations. The less organized the situation, however, the more such a process is needed in order to sort out the boundaries and lanes in the road. Abu Ghraib was certainly a place and a situation that required both clear boundaries and clear lanes in the road. LTC Jordan did provide a support form that he said he did some weeks after his assignment to Abu Ghraib and which he sent to COL Boltz. COL Boltz claims he never received it. LTC Jordan never received a signed copy back from COL Boltz and never followed up to get one. Even if LTC Jordan had sent the support form a few weeks later as he states, it was by then too late. The confusion/damage had been done. The early stages of the Abu Ghraib operation were the most critical to the disastrous end results (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1 BOLTZ, PAPPAS, JORDAN).

(7) (U) The preponderance of evidence supports the COLs Pappas/Boltz position that LTC Jordan was sent to run the JIDC. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS and BOLTZ). MAJ M. Williams, Operations Officer of the 205 MI BDE, and MAJ L. Potter, Deputy Commander of the 205 MI BDE, were adamant that LTC Jordan was sent for that reason. LTC Phillabaum believed LTC Jordan was in charge once he arrived at Abu Ghraib and started dealing directly with him. In all but one important aspect, interrogation operations, LTC Jordan began to act as if he were in charge.

(8) (U) As is now evident, LTC Jordan was a poor choice to run the JIDC. He was a Civil Affairs officer. He was an MI officer early in his career, but transferred to Civil Affairs in 1993. The MI experience he did have had not been in interrogation operations. LTC Jordan left the actual management, organization, and leadership of the core of his responsibilities to MAJ Thompson and CPT Wood. The reality of the situation was that MAJ Thompson and CPT Wood were overwhelmed by the huge demands of trying to organize, staff, equip, and train the JIDC while at the same time answering incessant requests for information from both the 205 MI BDE as well as from CJTF-7. What the JIDC needed in the beginning, more than ever, was a trained, experienced MI LTC. COL Pappas was correct in his assessment of what was required. In the critical early stages of the JIDC, as it was being formed, Abu Ghraib needed a LTC to take total control. The need was for a leader to get the JIDC organized, to set standards, enforce discipline, create checks and balances, establish quality controls, communicate a zero tolerance for abuse of detainees, and enforce that policy by quickly and efficiently punishing offenders so that the rest of the organization clearly understood the message. Well-disciplined units that have active, involved leaders both at the NCO and Officer level are less likely to commit abuses or other such infractions. If such instances do occur, they are seldom repeated because those leaders act aggressively to deal with the violators and reemphasize the standards (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, BOLTZ, PAPPAS, JORDAN).

(9) (U) LTC Jordan gravitated to what he knew, and what he was comfortable with, rather than filling the void noted above. He was actually a very hard working officer who dedicated himself to improving life for all of the Soldiers at Abu Ghraib. He is physically brave, volunteered for Iraq, and was wounded in action at Abu Ghraib during the mortar attack on 20 September 2003. He addressed shortcomings in the mess situation, lack of exercise equipment, protective gear, living conditions, and communications. He also enforced stricter adherence to the uniform policies and the wearing of protective gear by Soldiers and contractors. Many of the Soldiers that we spoke to, both MPs and MI, considered LTC Jordan the “go to guy” to get the types of things just enumerated done. BG Karpinski even remarked once to LTC Jordan during one of her visits “Do you ever sleep?” (Reference Annex B, Appendix 2, KARPINSKI). Unfortunately, all of the issues he was addressing should have been left to the staffs of the 205 MI BDE and the 320 MP BN. He was not the FOB Commander. LTC Phillabaum was the FOB Commander until the 19 November 2003 FRAGO. (Annex B, Appendix 1, JORDAN).

(10) (U) LTC Jordan became fascinated with the “Other Government Agencies,” a term used mostly to mean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were operating at Abu Ghraib. The OGA “Ghost Detainee” issue (housing of detainees not formally accounted for) was well known within both the MI and MP communities and created a mystique about what “they” were doing (See paragraph 4.h.). LTC Jordan allowed OGA to do interrogations without the presence of Army personnel (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOOD, THOMPSON, and PRICE). Prior to that time, JIDC policy was that an Army interrogator had to accompany OGA if they were interrogating one of the detainees MI was also interrogating. As noted above, LTC Jordan was little involved in the interrogation operations, but in this aspect he did become involved and it did not help the situation. The lack of OGA adherence to the practices and procedures established for accounting for detainees eroded the necessity in the minds of Soldiers and civilians for them to follow Army rules.

(11) (U) LTC Jordan and ten other Soldiers were wounded in the mortar attack that occurred on 20 September 2003. Two Soldiers died in that attack. LTC Jordan was extremely traumatized by that attack, especially by the two deaths and the agony suffered by one of those Soldiers before his death. He was still very emotional about that attack when interviewed for this investigation on 27 May 2004. He said he thinks about the attack and the deaths daily. That attack also had an impact on a number of other Soldiers at Abu Ghraib as did the very frequent mortar attacks that occurred at Abu Ghraib during this entire period. The Soldiers' and civilians' morale at Abu Ghraib suffered as the attacks continued. Additionally, there was a general feeling by both MI and MP personnel that Abu Ghraib was the forgotten outpost receiving little support from the Army. (Reference Annex F, Appendix 3, Mortar Attacks). The frequency of these attacks and the perceived lack of aggressive action to prevent them were contributing factors to the overall poor morale that existed at Abu Ghraib.

(12) (U) COL Pappas perceived intense pressure for intelligence from interrogations. This began soon after he took Command in July 2003. In fact, as the time progressed from July 2003 through January 2004, interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib became the central focus of his efforts despite the fact that he was in command of the entire MI Brigade. That pressure for better results was passed from COL Pappas to the rest of the JIDC leadership (including MAJ Thompson, MAJ Price, CPT Wood, SOLDIER-23, and SOLDIER-14) and from them to the interrogators and analysts operating at Abu Ghraib. Pressure consisted in deviation from doctrinal reporting standards (pressure to report rapidly any and all information in non-standard formats such as Interrogator Notes in lieu of standard intelligence reports), directed guidance and prioritization from "higher," outside of doctrinal or standard operating procedures, to pursue specific lines of questioning with specific detainees, and high priority ‘VFR Direct’ taskings to the lowest levels in the JIDC. This pressure should have been expected in such a critical situation, but was not managed by the leadership and was a contributing factor to the environment that resulted in abuses. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS, BOLTZ, LYONS, WOOD, JORDAN,WILLIAMS, Maurice, POTTER, THOMAS, PRICE; and Annex B, Appendix 2, FAST, GEOFFREY MILLER, THOMAS MILLER).

(13) (U) The most critical period of time for Abu Ghraib was when COL Pappas committed a critical error in judgment by failing to remove LTC Jordan as soon as his shortcomings were noted, on approximately 10 October 2003. Very shortly after LTC Jordan’s arrival at Abu Ghraib, on or about 17 September 2003, the 205 MI BDE Staff began to note LTC Jordan’s involvement in staff issues and his lack of involvement in interrogation operations. The situation as described above would have been a daunting challenge for the most experienced, well trained, MI Officer. COL Pappas knew LTC Jordan was not who was needed to fulfill the JIDC functions early on, but nevertheless chose to see if LTC Jordan could work out over time. COL Pappas made more frequent visits during this time period both because he was receiving increasing pressure for results but also because he could not rely on LTC Jordan to run the entire operation.

(14) (U) As pointed out clearly in the MG Taguba report, MP units and individuals at Abu Ghraib lacked sufficient training on operating a detainment/interrogation facility. MI units and individuals also lacked sufficient, appropriate, training to cope with the situation encountered at Abu Ghraib (See Paragraph 3.b.(4)). An insurgency is HUMINT intensive. The majority of that HUMINT comes from interrogations and debriefings. Yet at the JIDC, which was set up to be the focal point for interrogation operations, there was only one officer, CPT Wood, with significant interrogation operations experience. There were four MI Warrant Officers but all were used for staff functions rather than directly supervising and observing interrogations. There was a shortage of trained NCOs at the E-7/E-6 level. Each Section Leader had four or five Tiger Teams, too many to closely observe, critique, counsel, consult, and supervise. One Section Leader was an E-5. Several of the interrogators were civilians and about half of those civilians lacked sufficient background and training. Those civilians were allowed to interrogate because there were no more military assets to fill the slots. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS). Such a mixture together with constant demands for reports and documentation overwhelmed the Section Leaders. The analysts assigned to Tiger Teams were not all trained 96Bs, but were a mixture of all available intelligence Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Many of those assigned as analysts had never been trained nor had they ever served as analysts.

(15) (U) Guard and interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib were not adequately trained or experienced and were certainly not well versed in the cultural understanding of the detainees. MI personnel were totally ignorant of MP lanes in the road or rules of engagement. A common observation was that MI knew what MI could do and what MI couldn't do; but MI did not know what the MPs could or could not do in their activities. The same was true of MP ignorance of MI operational procedures. Having two distinct command channels (MI and MP – see Command and Control) in the same facility with little understanding of each other’s doctrinal and regulatory responsibilities caused uncertainty and confusion. There was a perception among both MI and MP personnel that the other group was not doing its fair share in mutually supportive tasks of running the physical plant. CIVILIAN-12 (Assistant CJTF-7 C2X) observed that confusion seemed to be the order of the day at Abu Ghraib. There was hostility between MI and MP personnel over roles and responsibilities (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN- 12). There was a distinct lack of experience in both camps. Except for some of the Reserve Component MPs who had civilian law enforcement experience, most of the MPs were never trained in prison operations. Because of the shortage of MPs, some MI personnel had to assume detainee escort duties, for which they received only the most rudimentary training.

(16) (U) Abu Ghraib rapidly evolved from a tactical interrogation operation in July 2003 to a JIDC beginning in September 2003. Doctrine, SOPs, and other tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for a JIDC were initially non-existent. The personnel manning the JIDC came from numerous units, backgrounds, and experiences. Equipment such as computers, software, IT infrastructure (networks, data storage), and connectivity to relevant intelligence data bases was very limited. Even file cabinets were in short supply which resulted in lost documents. One JIDC Soldier stated, “I can believe them (files for requests for exceptions to policy) getting lost because we often lost complete files. Our filing system was not the best. We did not have serviceable file cabinets and teams were given approval to place files in cardboard boxes.” (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, ADAMS) Initially there was only one computer available for every four interrogators. Ad hoc data bases were built, employed, and modified as requirements dictated. Data connectivity between interrogators and analysts was established using "thumb drives." Forms, intelligence products, and database formats came and went based upon their immediate utility – many times dictated by the changing structure of the JIDC itself as directed by leadership. Critical records regarding each detainee were located in several electronic and hardcopy locations – the operations officers maintained some files, others were maintained by section leaders, others by collection management personnel, and others by Detainee Release Board (DRB) personnel. Some interrogation related information was recorded on a whiteboard which was periodically erased. No centralized management system existed to manage interrogation operations. One result was that detainee records critical to the evaluation of prisoners for a variety of reasons (for intelligence value assessment, release, medical evaluation, etc.) were difficult to find or construct. MP records at Abu Ghraib were equally primitive. These documentation shortfalls not only hindered effective interrogation operations and information sharing, but also hindered the ability of the Security Internee Review and Appeal Board (which relied upon records reviews to make decisions to release or retain detainees). As addressed earlier, many detainees arrived at Abu Ghraib with little or no documentation from capturing units. Follow-on records maintained by the MP and MI personnel at Abu Ghraib would be sparse if the detainee had not been thoroughly interrogated. DRBs were reluctant to release a detainee if they knew little about him. MG Fast noted that one detainee file that was reviewed by the release board was completely empty. Even detainee medical records that should have been created and stored (Reference Annex H, Appendix 8) were not maintained appropriately. Medical doctors on site at Abu Ghraib claim that excellent medical records were maintained on detainees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, ACKERSON). Only a few detainee medical records could be found, indicating that they are not being maintained IAW AR 40-66 (Medical Records Administration and Healthcare Documentation).

g. (U) Contract Interrogators and Linguists

(1) (U) Contracting-related issues contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib prison. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the abuse of detainees were employees of government contractors. Two contractual arrangements were involved: one with CACI, for interrogators and several other intelligence-related occupational categories; and one with BTG, for linguists. Since 28 November 2001, BTG has been part of Titan Corporation. The contract is still in the name of BTG. Most people have referred to it as the Titan Contract. A brief description of these two contractual arrangements follows:

(a) (U) Linguist contract- Titan, Inc. - Contract DASC01-99-D-0001.

[1] (U) The need to supplement the Army’s capacity for linguists was first raised to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in a 1997 “Foreign Language Lay down.” It was proposed to establish a contract with the private sector to provide linguists, as needed, for contingencies and current intelligence operations.

[2] (U) As a result of this perceived need, INSCOM awarded Contract DASC01-99- D-0001 to Titan, in March 1999. The contract called for Titan initially to develop a plan to provide and manage linguists throughout the world, and later, implement the plan as required. The contract called for three levels of linguists - some were required to obtain security clearances and some were not. The linguist candidates were subject to some level of background investigations, based on individual requirements for security clearances. Since the award of the contract, hundreds of linguists have been provided, with generally positive results. It is noted that the contract calls for translation services only, and makes no mention of contractor employees actually conducting interrogations. Since the statement of work is limited to translation services, the linguists apparently were not required to review and sign the IROE at Abu Ghraib. A recent review of the contract indicated that the current contract ceiling is approximately $650 Million. Other agencies can order linguist services under this contract. For the most part, the ordering activity also provides the funds for these delivery orders. The contract contains a clause that allows the Contracting Officer to direct the contractor to remove linguists from the theater in which they are performing. This clause has been invoked on occasion for misconduct.

(b) Interrogator contract-CACI, Inc.

[1] (U) The second contractual arrangement is a series of Delivery Orders awarded to CACI, in August 2003, which call for the provision of numerous intelligence-related services such as “Interrogator Support,” “Screening Cell Support,” “Open Source Intelligence,” “Special Security Office,” “HUMINT Augmentee Contractors” (which includes “Interrogation Support,” “Junior Interrogators,” “Senior and Junior Counter-Intelligence Agents,” and “Tactical/Strategic Interrogators”).

[2] (U) These Delivery Orders were awarded under a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) (NBCHA01-0005) with the National Business Center (NBC), a fee for service activity of the Interior Department. The BPA between CACI and NBC set out the ground rules for ordering from the General Services Administration (GSA) pursuant to GSA Schedule Contract GS-35F- 5872H, which is for various Information Technology (IT) Professional Services. Approximately eleven Delivery Orders were related to services in Iraq. While CJTF-7 is the requiring and funding activity for the Delivery Orders in question, it is not clear who, if anyone, in Army contracting or legal channels approved the use of the BPA, or why it was used.

[3] (U) There is another problem with the CACI contract. A CACI employee, Thomas Howard, participated with the COR, LTC Brady, in writing the Statement of Work (SOW) prior to the award of the contract (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, BOLTZ). This situation may violate the provisions of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9. 505-2 (b) (1).

[4] (U) On 13 May 2004, the Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition) of the Army issued an opinion that all Delivery Orders for Interrogator Services should be cancelled immediately as they were beyond the scope of the GSA Schedule contract.

(2) (U) Although intelligence activities and related services, which encompass interrogation services, should be performed by military or government civilian personnel wherever feasible, it is recognized that contracts for such services may be required in urgent or emergency situations. The general policy of not contracting for intelligence functions and services was designed in part to avoid many of the problems that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib, i.e., lack of oversight to insure that intelligence operations continued to fall within the law and the authorized chain of command, as well as the government’s ability to oversee contract operations.

(3) (U) Performing the interrogation function in-house with government employees has several tangible benefits for the Army. It enables the Army more readily to manage the function if all personnel are directly and clearly subject to the chain of command, and other administrative and/or criminal sanctions, and it allows the function to be directly accessible by the commander/supervisor without going through a Contracting Officer Representative (COR). In addition, performing the function in-house enables Army Commanders to maintain a consistent approach to training (See Paragraph 3.b.(3)) and a reliable measure of the qualifications of the people performing the function.

(4) (U) If it is necessary to contract for interrogator services, Army requiring activities must carefully develop the applicable SOW to include the technical requirements and requisite personnel qualifications, experience, and training. Any such contracts should, to the greatest extent possible, be awarded and administered by an Army contracting activity in order to provide for the necessary oversight, management, and chain of command. Use of contracting vehicles such as GSA Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts should be carefully scrutinized given the complexity and sensitivities connected to interrogation operations.

(5) (U) Some of the employees at Abu Ghraib were not DoD contractor employees. Contractor employees under non-DoD contracts may not be subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (18 US Code 3261- 3267). The Act allows DoD contractor employees who are “accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States” to be subject to criminal prosecution if they engage in conduct that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States.

(6) (U) In the performance of such sensitive functions as interrogation, the Army needs to maintain close control over the entire operation. If a decision is made to contract for these services, the most effective way to do that and maintain a direct chain of command is to award, administer, and manage the contract with Army personnel. As learned in the current situation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to effectively administer a contract when the COR is not on site.

(7) (U) The Army needs to improve on-site contract monitoring by government employees (using CORs) to insure that the Army’s basic interests are protected. The inadequacy of the onsite contract management at Abu Ghraib is best understood by reviewing the statement of CPT Wood (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOOD), the Interrogation OIC, who indicated she never received any parameters or guidance as to how the CACI personnel were to be utilized. She also indicates that her primary point of contact (POC) on matters involving the CACI Delivery Orders was the CACI on-site manager. There is no mention of a COR. Another indication of the inadequacy of the contract management is reflected in the statement of SOLDIER14 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14), who indicated he was never informed that the Government could reject unsatisfactory CACI employees. It would appear that no effort to familiarize the ultimate user of the contracted services of the contract’s terms and procedures was ever made. In order to improve this situation, training is required to ensure that the COR is thoroughly familiar with the contract and gains some level of familiarity with the Geneva Conventions standards. It needs to be made clear that contractor employees are bound by the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.

(8) (U) If it is necessary to contract for interrogator services, more specific training requirements and personnel standards must be incorporated into the solicitation/contract to insure that the contractor hires properly trained and qualified personnel.

(9) (U) Emerging results from a DA Inspector General (DAIG) Investigation indicate that approximately 35% of the contract interrogators lacked formal military training as interrogators. While there are specific technical requirements in the linguist contract, the technical requirements for the interrogator contract were not adequate. It appears that the only mention of qualifications in the contract stated merely that the contractor employee needs to have met the requirements of one of two MOS, 97E or 351E, or “equivalent”. Any solicitation/contract for these services needs to list specific training, if possible, not just point to an MOS. If the training from the MOS is what is required, those requirements should be listed in the solicitation/contract in full, not just referenced. Perhaps the best way of insuring that contractor interrogators receive adequate training would be to utilize existing government training. For example, prospective contractor employees could be sent, at contractor expense, to the Tactical Human Intelligence Course for the 97E MOS, “Human Intelligence Collector.” Such a step would likely require some adjustments to the current program of instruction. Prospective contract interrogators could be given the course tests on Interrogation and the Geneva Conventions. If they can pass the examinations, no further training would be required. After a reasonable training period, prospective contractor interrogators who are unable to pass the exam would be rejected. There are, of course other training possibilities. The key point would be agreement on some standardization of the training of contractor interrogators. The necessity for some sort of standard training and/or experience is made evident by the statements of both contractor employees and military personnel. CIVILIAN-21 (CACI) seemingly had little or no interrogator experience prior to coming to Abu Ghraib (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,CIVILIAN-21, ADAMS), even though he was a Navy Reserve Intelligence Specialist. Likewise, numerous statements indicated that little, if any, training on Geneva Conventions was presented to contractor employees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25, CIVILIAN-10, CIVILIAN-21 and CIVILIAN-11). Prior to deployment, all contractor linguists or interrogators should receive training in the Geneva Conventions standards for the treatment of detainees/prisoners. This training should include a discussion of the chain of command and the establishment of some sort of “hotline” where suspected abuses can be reported in addition to reporting through the chain of command. If the solicitation/contract allows “equivalent” training and experience, the Contracting Officer, with the assistance of technical personnel, must evaluate and assess the offerors'/contractor’s proposal/written rationale as to why it believes that the employee has “equivalent” training. It appears that under the CACI contract, no one was monitoring the contractor’s decisions as to what was considered “equivalent.”

(10) (U) In addition, if functions such as these are being contracted, MI personnel need to have at least a basic level of contract training so they can protect the Army’s interests. Another indication of the apparent inadequacy of on-site contract management and lack of contract training is the apparent lack of understanding of the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, government civilian employees, and military personnel. Several people indicated in their statements that contractor personnel were “supervising” government personnel or vice versa. SGT Adams indicated that CACI employees were in positions of authority, and appeared to be supervising government personnel. She indicated a CACI employee named “First Name”  as listed as being in charge of screening. CIVILIAN-08 (CACI) was in charge of “B Section” with military personnel listed as subordinates on the organization chart. SOLDIER-14 also indicated that CIVILIAN-08 was a supervisor for a time. CPT Wood stated that CACI “supervised” military personnel in her statement, but offered no specifics. Finally, a government organization chart (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab B) showed a CIVILIAN-02 (CACI) as the Head of the DAB. CIVILIAN-02 is a CACI employee. On the other side of the coin, CIVILIAN-21 indicated in his statement that the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) was his supervisor. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14, CIVILIAN-21, ADAMS, WOOD)

(11) (U) Given the sensitive nature of these sorts of functions, it should be required that the contractor perform some sort of background investigation on the prospective employees. A clause that would allow the government to direct the contractor to remove employees from the theater for misconduct would seem advisable. The need for a more extensive pre-performance background investigation is borne out by the allegations of abuse by contractor personnel.

(12) (U) An important step in precluding the recurrence of situations where contractor personnel may engage in abuse of prisoners is to insure that a properly trained COR is on-site. Meaningful contract administration and monitoring will not be possible if a small number of CORs are asked to monitor the performance of one or more contractors who may have 100 or more employees in the theater, and in some cases, perhaps in several locations (which seems to have been the situation at Abu Ghraib). In these cases, the CORs do well to keep up with the paper work, and simply have no time to actively monitor contractor performance. It is apparent that there was no credible exercise of appropriate oversight of contract performance at Abu Ghraib.

(13) (U) Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management and monitoring. Failure to assign an adequate number of CORs to the area of contract performance puts the Army at risk of being unable to control poor performance or become aware of possible misconduct by contractor personnel. This lack of monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors at Abu Ghraib. The Army needs to take a much more aggressive approach to contract administration and management if interrogator services are to be contracted. Some amount of advance planning should be utilized to learn from the mistakes made at Abu Ghraib.

h. (U) Other Government Agencies and Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) Although the FBI, JTF-121, Criminal Investigative Task Force, ISG and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were all present at Abu Ghraib, the acronym “Other Government Agency” (OGA) referred almost exclusively to the CIA. CIA detention and interrogation practices led to a loss of accountability, abuse, reduced interagency cooperation, and an unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib.

(2) (U) CIA detainees in Abu Ghraib, known locally as “Ghost Detainees,” were not accounted for in the detention system. When the detainees were unidentified or unaccounted for, detention operations at large were impacted because personnel at the operations level were uncertain how to report them or how to classify them, or how to database them, if at all. Therefore, Abu Ghraib personnel were unable to respond to requests for information about CIA detainees from higher headquarters. This confusion arose because the CIA did not follow the established procedures for detainee in-processing, such as fully identifying detainees by name, biometric data, and Internee Serial Number (ISN) number.

(3) (U) DETAINEE-28, suspected of having been involved in an attack against the ICRC, was captured by Navy SEAL Team 7 during a joint TF-121/CIA mission. He reportedly resisted arrest, so a SEAL Team member butt-stroked DETAINEE-28 on the side of the head to subdue him. CIA representatives brought DETAINEE-28 into Abu Ghraib early in the morning of 4 November 2003, sometime around 0430 to 0530 hours. Under a supposed verbal agreement between the JIDC and the CIA, the CIA did not announce its arrival to JIDC Operations. SPC Stevanus, the MP on duty at the Hard Site at the time, observed the two CIA representatives come in with DETAINEE-28 and place him in a shower room in Tier 1B. About 30 to 45 minutes later, SPC Stevanus was summoned to the shower stall and when he arrived, DETAINEE-28 appeared to be dead. Removing the sandbag covering DETAINEE-28’s head, SPC Stevanus checked DETAINEE-28’s pulse. Finding none, he called for medical assistance, and notified his chain of command. LTC Jordan arrived on site at approximately 0715 hours, and found several MPs and US medical staff with DETAINEE-28 in the Tier 1B shower stall, face down, handcuffed with his hands behind his back. CIVILIAN-03, an Iraqi prison medical doctor, informed him DETAINEE-28 was dead. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01," a CIA representative, un-cuffed DETAINEE-28 and turned his body over. Where DETAINEE-28’s head had lain against the floor, LTC Jordan noted a small spot of blood. LTC Jordan notified COL Pappas (205 MI BDE Commander), and "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01" said he would notify “OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02,” his CIA supervisor. Once "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02" arrived, he requested that the Hard Site hold DETAINEE28’s body until the following day. DETAINEE-28’s body was placed in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. CID was notified. The next day, DETAINEE-28’s body was removed from Abu Ghraib on a litter, to make it appear as if he were only ill, so as not to draw the attention of the Iraqi guards and detainees. The body was transported to the morgue at BIAP for an autopsy, which concluded that DETAINEE-28 died of a blood clot in the head, likely a result of injuries he sustained during apprehension. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, JORDAN, PAPPAS, PHILLABAUM, SNIDER, STEVANUS, THOMPSON; Annex I, Appendix 1, photographs C5-21, D5-11, M65-69)

(4) (U) The systemic lack of accountability for interrogator actions and detainees plagued detainee operations in Abu Ghraib. It is unclear how and under what authority the CIA could place prisoners like DETAINEE-28 in Abu Ghraib because no memorandums of understanding existed on the subject between the CIA and CJTF-7. Local CIA officers convinced COL Pappas and LTC Jordan that they should be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and procedures. When COL Pappas raised the issue of CIA use of Abu Ghraib with COL Boltz, COL Boltz encouraged COL Pappas to cooperate with the CIA because everyone was all one team. COL Boltz directed LTC Jordan to cooperate. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS, BOLTZ)

(5) (U) In many instances, failure to adhere to in-processing procedures caused confusion and acrimony between the Army and OGA, and in at least one instance, acrimony between the US and Saudi Arabian entities. (Reference Annex K, Appendix 3, emails) For example, the CIA interned three Saudi national medical personnel working for the coalition in Iraq. CIA officers placed them in Abu Ghraib under false names. The Saudi General in charge of the men asked US authorities to check the records for them. A search of all databases using their true names came back negative. Ambassador Bremer then requested a search, which produced the same results. The US Embassy in Riyadh also requested a search, which likewise produced no information. Ultimately, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, requested a search, and as with the other requestors, had to be told that the three men were not known to be in US custody. Shortly after the search for the Secretary of State, a JIDC official recalled that CIA officers once brought three men together into the facility. A quick discussion with the detainees disclosed their true names, which matched the name search requests, and the men were eventually released. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN-12)

(6) (U) Another instance showing lack of accountability to the procedures or rules involved a CIA officer who entered the interrogation room after a break in the interrogation, drew his weapon, chambered a round, and placed the weapon in his holster. This action violated the rule that no weapons be brought into an interrogation room, especially weapons with live rounds. Detainees who have been interrogated by CIA officers have alleged abuse. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,CIVILIAN-12)

(7) (U) The death of DETAINEE-28 and incidents such as the loaded weapon in the interrogation room, were widely known within the US community (MI and MP alike) at Abu Ghraib. Speculation and resentment grew over the lack of personal responsibility, of some people being above the laws and regulations. The resentment contributed to the unhealthy environment that existed at Abu Ghraib. The DETAINEE-28 death remains unresolved. CIA officers operating at Abu Ghraib used alias' and never revealed their true names. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01" (alias) was the CIA officer with DETAINEE-28 on the morning of his death. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02" (alias) was not directly involved in DETAINEE-28's death, but participated in the discussions after his death. Had the CIA followed established Army procedures and in-processed DETAINEE-28 in accordance with those procedures, DETAINEE-28 would have been medically screened.

(8) (U) OGA never provided results of their abuse investigations to Commander, CJTF-7. This resulted in a total lack of visibility over OGA interaction with detainees held in CJTF-7 spaces. Additionally, the CJTF-7 charter provided no oversight or control over the ISG. LTG Sanchez could neither leverage ISG interrogation assets to assist the detainee operations in Abu Ghraib, nor could he compel ISG to share substantive intelligence reports with CJTF-7. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ)

Go to Next Page