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THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB |
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6. (U) Findings and Recommendations. From 25 July 2003 to 6 February 2004, twenty-seven (27) 205 MI BDE personnel allegedly:
(U) Explanation: Some MI personnel encouraged, condoned, participated in, or ignored abuse. In a few instances, MI personnel acted alone in abusing detainees. MI abuse and MI solicitation of MP abuse included the use of isolation with sensory deprivation (“the Hole”), removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs to “fear up” detainees, and on one occasion, the condoned twisting of a detainee’s cuffed wrists and the smothering of this detainee with a cupped hand in MI’s presence. Some MI personnel violated established interrogation practices, regulations, and conventions which resulted in the abuse of detainees. While Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP) were poorly defined and changed several times, in most cases of detainee abuse the MI personnel involved knew or should have known what they were doing was outside the bounds of their authority. Ineffective leadership at the JIDC failed to detect violations and discipline those responsible. Likewise, leaders failed to provide adequate training to ensure Soldiers understood the rules and complied. (U) Recommendation: The Army needs to re-emphasize Soldier and leader responsibilities in interrogation and detention operations and retrain them to perform in accordance with law, regulations, and Army values and to live up to the responsibilities of their rank and position. Leaders must also provide adequate training to ensure Soldiers understand their authorities. The Army must ensure that future interrogation policies are simple, direct and include safeguards against abuse. Organizations such as the JIDC must possess a functioning chain of command capable of directing interrogation operations. b. (U) Other Findings and Recommendations. (1) (U) Finding: There was a lack of clear Command and Control of Detainee Operations at the CJTF-7 level. (U) Explanation: COL Pappas was rated by MG Wojdakowski, DCG, V Corps/CJTF-7. MG Wojdakowski, however, was not directly involved with interrogation operations. Most of COL Pappas' direction was coming from LTG Sanchez directly as well as from MG Fast, the C2. BG Karpinski was rated by BG Diamond, Commander, 377th Theater Support Command (377 TSC). However, she testified that she believed her rater was MG Wojdakowski and in fact it was he she received her direction from the entire time she was in Iraq (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KARPINSKI). The 800 MP BDE was TACON to CJTF-7. Overall responsibility for detainee operations never came together under one person short of LTG Sanchez himself until the assignment of MG G. Miller in April 2004. (U) Recommendation: There should be a single authority designated for command and control for detention and interrogation operations. (DoD/DA) (2) (U) Finding: FRAGO 1108 appointing COL Pappas as FOB Commander at Abu Ghraib was unclear. This issue did not impact detainee abuse. (U) Explanation: Although FRAGO 1108 appointing COL Pappas as FOB Commander on 19 November 2003 changed the command relationship, it had no specific effect on detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib. The FRAGO giving him TACON of the 320 MP BN did not contain any specified or implied tasks. The TACON did not include responsibility for conducting prison or “Warden” functions. Those functions remained the responsibility of the 320 MP BN. This FRAGO has been cited as a significant contributing factor that allowed the abuses to happen, but the abuses were already underway for two months before CJTF-7 issued this FRAGO. COL Pappas and the Commander of the 320 MP BN interpreted that FRAGO strictly for COL Pappas to exercise the external Force Protection and Security of Detainees. COL Pappas had a Long Range Reconnaissance Company in the 165 MI BN that would augment the external protection of Abu Ghraib. The internal protection of detainees, however, still remained the responsibility of the 320 MP BN. The confusion and disorganization between MI and MPs already existed by the time CJTF-7 published the FRAGO. Had there been no change of FOB Command, it is likely abuse would have continued anyway. (U) Recommendation: Joint Task Forces such as CJTF-7 should clearly specify relationships in FRAGOs so as to preclude confusion. Terms such as Tactical Control (TACON) should be clearly defined to identify specific command relationships and preclude confusion. (DoD/CJTF-7) (3) (U) Finding: The JIDC was manned with personnel from numerous organizations and consequently lacked unit cohesion. There was an absence of an established, effective MI chain of command at the JIDC. (U) Explanation: A decision was made not to run the JIDC as a unit mission. The JIDC was manned, led and managed by staff officers from multiple organizations as opposed to a unit with its functioning chain of command. Responsibilities for balancing the demands of managing interrogation operations and establishing good order and discipline in this environment were unclear and lead to lapses in accountability. (U) Recommendation: JIDCs need to be structured, manned, trained and equipped as standard military organizations. These organizations should be certified by TRADOC and/or JFCOM. Appropriate Army and Joint doctrine should be developed defining JIDCs' missions and functions as separate commands. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7) (4) (U) Finding: Selecting Abu Ghraib as a detention facility placed soldiers and detainees at an unnecessary force protection risk. (U) Explanation: Failure adequately to protect and house detainees is a violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8. Therefore, the selection of Abu Ghraib as a detention facility was inappropriate because of its inherent indefensibility and poor condition. The selection of Abu Ghraib as a detention center was dictated by the Coalition Provisional Authority officials despite concerns that the Iraqi people would look negatively on Americans interning detainees in a facility associated with torture. Abu Ghraib was in poor physical condition with buildings and sections of the perimeter wall having been destroyed, resulting in completely inadequate living conditions. Force protection must be a major consideration in selecting any facility as a detention facility. Abu Ghraib was located in the middle of the Sunni Triangle, an area known to be very hostile to coalition forces. Further, being surrounded by civilian housing and open fields and encircled by a network of roads and highways, its defense presented formidable force protection challenges. Even though the force protection posture at Abu Ghraib was compromised from the start due to its location and poor condition, coalition personnel still had a duty and responsibility to undertake appropriate defensive measures. However, the poor security posture at Abu Ghraib resulted in the deaths and wounding of both coalition forces and detainees. (U) Recommendations:
(5) (U) Finding: Leaders failed to take steps to effectively manage pressure placed upon JIDC personnel. (U) Explanation: During our interviews, leaders within the MI community commented upon the intense pressure they felt from higher headquarters, to include CENTCOM, the Pentagon, and DIA for timelier, actionable intelligence (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOOD, PAPPAS, and PRICE). These leaders have stated that this pressure adversely affected their decision making. Requests for information were being sent to Abu Ghraib from a number of headquarters without any prioritization. Based on the statements from the interrogators and analysts, the pressure was allowed to be passed down to the lowest levels. (U) Recommendation: Leaders must balance mission requirements with unit capabilities, soldier morale and effectiveness. Protecting Soldiers from unnecessary pressure to enhance mission effectiveness is a leader’s job. Rigorous and challenging training can help prepare units and soldiers for the stress they face in combat. (DoD/DA/CENTCOM/CJTF-7) (6) (U) Finding: Some capturing units failed to follow procedures, training, and directives in the capture, screening, and exploitation of detainees. (U) Explanation: The role of the capturing unit was to conduct preliminary screening of captured detainees to determine if they posed a security risk or possessed information of intelligence value. Detainees who did not pose a security risk and possessed no intelligence value should have been released. Those that posed a security risk and possessed no intelligence value should have been transferred to Abu Ghraib as a security hold. Those that possessed intelligence information should have been interrogated within 72 hours at the tactical level to gather perishable information of value to the capturing unit. After 72 hours, these personnel should have been transferred to Abu Ghraib for further intelligence exploitation as an MI hold. Since most detainees were not properly screened, large numbers of detainees were transferred to Abu Ghraib, who in some cases should not have been sent there at all, and in almost all cases, were not properly identified or documented in accordance with doctrine and directives. This failure led to the arrival of a significant number of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Without proper detainee capture documentation, JIDC interrogators were diverted from interrogation and intelligence production to screening operations in order to assess the value of the incoming detainees (no value, security hold, or MI Hold). The overall result was that less intelligence was produced at the JIDC than could have been if capturing forces had followed proper procedures. (U) Recommendation: Screening, interrogation and release procedures at the tactical level need to be properly executed. Those detainees who pose no threat and are of no intelligence value should be released by capturing units within 72 hours. Those detainees thought to be a threat but of no further intelligence value should be sent to a long term confinement facility. Those detainees thought to possess further intelligence value should be sent to a Corps/Theater Interrogation Center. (DA/CENTCOM/CJTF-7) (7) (U) Finding: DoD’s development of multiple policies on interrogation operations for use in different theaters or operations confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib. (U) Explanation: National policy and DoD directives were not completely consistent with Army doctrine concerning detainee treatment or interrogation tactics, resulting in CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policies and practices that lacked basis in Army interrogation doctrine. As a result, interrogators at Abu Ghraib employed non-doctrinal approaches that conflicted with other DoD and Army regulatory, doctrinal and procedural guidance. (U) Recommendation: Adopt one DoD policy for interrogation, within the framework of existing doctrine, adhering to the standards found in doctrine, and enforce that standard policy across DoD. Interrogation policy must be simple and direct, with reference to existing doctrine, and possess effective safeguards against abuse. It must be totally understandable by the interrogator using it. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7) (8) (U) Finding: There are an inadequate number of MI units to satisfy current and future HUMINT missions. The Army does not possess enough interrogators and linguists to support interrogation operations. (U) Explanation: The demand for interrogators and linguists to support tactical screening operations at the point-of-capture of detainees, tactical HUMINT teams, and personnel to support interrogation operations at organizations like the JIDC cannot be supported with the current force structure. As a result, each of these operations in Iraq was undermanned and suffered accordingly. (U) Recommendation: The Army must increase the number of HUMINT units to overcome downsizing of HUMINT forces over the last 10 years and to address current and future HUMINT requirements. (9) (U) Finding: The JIDC was not provided with adequate personnel resources to effectively operate as an interrogation center. (U) Explanation: The JIDC was established in an ad hoc manner without proper planning, personnel, and logistical support for the missions it was intended to perform. Interrogation and analyst personnel were quickly kluged together from a half dozen units in an effort to meet personnel requirements. Even at its peak strength, interrogation and analyst manpower at the JIDC was too shorthanded to deal with the large number of detainees at hand. Logistical support was also inadequate. (U) Recommendation: The Army and DoD should plan on operating JIDC organizations in future operational environments, establish appropriate manning and equipment authorizations for the same. (DoD/DA) (10) (U) Finding: There was/is a severe shortage of CAT II and CAT III Arab linguists available in Iraq. (U) Explanation: This shortage negatively affected every level of detainee operations from point-of-capture through detention facility. Tactical units were unable to properly screen detainees at their levels not only because of the lack of interrogators but even more so because of the lack of interpreters. The linguist problem also existed at Abu Ghraib. There were only 20 linguists assigned to Abu Ghraib at the height of operations. Linguists were a critical node and limited the maximum number of interrogations that could be conducted at any time to the number of linguists available. (U) Recommendation: Army and DoD need to address the issue of inadequate linguist resources to conduct detention operations. (DA/DoD) (11) (U) Finding: The cross leveling of a large number of Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers during the Mobilization process contributed to training challenges and lack of unit cohesion of the RC units at Abu Ghraib. (U) Recommendation: If cross leveling of personnel is necessary in order to bring RC units up to required strength levels, then post mobilization training time should be extended. Post mobilization training should include unit level training in addition to Soldier training to ensure cross leveled Soldiers are made part of the team. (DA) (12) (U) Finding: Interrogator training in the Laws of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions is ineffective. (U) Explanation: The US Army Intelligence Center and follow on unit training provided interrogators with what appears to be adequate curriculum, practical exercises and man-hours in Law of Land Warfare and Geneva Conventions training. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib, however, remained uncertain about what interrogation procedures were authorized and what proper reporting procedures were required. This indicates that Initial Entry Training for interrogators was not sufficient or was not reinforced properly by additional unit training or leadership. (U) Recommendation: More training emphasis needs to be placed on Soldier and leader responsibilities concerning the identification and reporting of detainee abuse incidents or concerns up through the chain of command, or to other offices such as CID, IG or SJA. This training should not just address the rules, but address case studies from recent and past detainee and interrogation operations to address likely issues interrogators and their supervisors will encounter. Soldiers and leaders need to be taught to integrate Army values and ethical decision- making to deal with interrogation issues that are not clearly prohibited or allowed. Furthermore, it should be stressed that methods employed by US Army interrogators will represent US values. (13) (U) Finding: MI, MP, and Medical Corps personnel observed and failed to report instances of Abuse at Abu Ghraib. Likewise, several reports indicated that capturing units did not always treat detainees IAW the Geneva Convention. (U) Recommendation: DoD should improve training provided to all personnel in Geneva Conventions, detainee operations, and the responsibilities of reporting detainee abuse. (DoD) (14) (U) Finding: Combined MI/MP training in the conduct of detainee/interrogation operations is inadequate. (U) Explanation: MI and MP personnel at Abu Ghraib had little knowledge of each other's missions, roles and responsibilities in the conduct of detainee/interrogation operations. As a result, some "lanes in the road" were worked out "on the fly." Other relationships were never fully defined and contributed to the confused operational environment. (U) Recommendation: TRADOC should initiate an effort to develop a cross branch training program in detainee and interrogation operations training. FORSCOM should reinstitute combined MI/MP unit training such as the Gold Sword/Silver Sword Exercises that were conducted annually. (DA) (15) (U) Finding: MI leaders do not receive adequate training in the conduct and management of interrogation operations. (U) Explanation: MI Leaders at the JIDC were unfamiliar with and untrained in interrogation operations (with the exception of CPT Wood) as well as the mission and purposes of a JIDC. Absent any knowledge from training and experience in interrogation operations, JIDC leaders had to rely upon instinct to operate the JIDC. MTTs and Tiger Teams were deployed to the JIDC as a solution to help train interrogators and leaders in the management of HUMINT and detainee/interrogator operations. (U) Recommendation: MI Officer, NCO and Warrant Officer training needs to include interrogation operations to include management procedures, automation support, collection management and JIDC operations. Officer and senior NCO training should also emphasize the potential for abuse involved in detention and interrogation operations. (DA) (16) (U) Finding: Army doctrine exists for both MI interrogation and MP detainee operations, but it was not comprehensive enough to cover the situation that existed at Abu Ghraib. (U) Explanation: The lines of authority and accountability between MI and MP were unclear and undefined. For example, when MI would order sleep adjustment, MPs would use their judgment on how to apply that technique. The result was MP taking detainees from their cells stripping them and giving them cold showers or throwing cold water on them to keep them awake. (U) Recommendation: DA should conduct a review to determine future Army doctrine for interrogation operations and detention operations. (DA) (17) (U) Finding: Because of a lack of doctrine concerning detainee and interrogation operations, critical records on detainees were not created or maintained properly thereby hampering effective operations. (U) Explanation: This lack of record keeping included the complete life cycle of detainee records to include detainee capture information and documentation, prison records, medical records, interrogation plans and records, and release board records. Lack of record keeping significantly hampered the ability of this investigation to discover critical information concerning detainee abuse. (U) Recommendation: As TRADOC reviews and enhances detainee and interrogation operations doctrine, it should ensure that record keeping and information sharing requirements are addressed. (DA) (18) (U) Finding: Four (4) contract interrogators allegedly abused detainees at Abu Ghraib. (U) Explanation: The contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguist and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib. The system also failed to provide useful contract management functions in support of the facility. Soldiers and leaders at the prison were unprepared for the arrival, employment, and oversight of contract interrogators. (U) Recommendations: The Army should review the use contract interrogators. In the event contract interrogators must be used, the Army must ensure that they are properly qualified from a training and performance perspective, and properly vetted. The Army should establish standards for contract requirements and personnel. Additionally, the Army must provide sufficient contract management resources to monitor contracts and contractor performance at the point of performance. (19) (U) Observation: MG Miller’s visit did not introduce "harsh techniques" into the Abu Ghraib interrogation operation. (U) Explanation: While there was an increase in intelligence reports after the visit, it appears more likely it was due to the assignment of trained interrogators and an increased number of MI Hold detainees to interrogate. This increase in production does not equate to an increase in quality of the collected intelligence. MG G. Miller's visit did not introduce "harsh techniques" into the Abu Ghraib interrogation operation. (20) (U) Finding: The JTF-GTMO training team had positive impact on the operational management of the JIDC; however, the JTF-GTMO training team inadvertently validated restricted interrogation techniques. (U) Explanation: The JTF-GTMO team stressed the conduct of operations with a strategic objective, while the Abu Ghraib team remained focused on tactical operations. Instead of providing guidance and assistance, the team's impact was limited to one-on-one interaction during interrogations. Clearly a significant problem was the JTF-GTMO's lack of understanding of the approved interrogation techniques, either for GTMO or CJTF-7 or Abu Ghraib. When the training team composed of the experts from a national level operation failed to recognize, object to, or report detainee abuse, such as the use of nudity as an interrogation tactic, they failed as a training team and further validated the use of unacceptable interrogation techniques. (U) Recommendation: TRADOC should initiate an Army-wide effort to ensure all personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations are properly trained with respect to approved doctrine. There should be a MTT to assist ongoing detention operations. This MTT must be of the highest quality and understand the mission they have been sent to support. They must have clearly defined and unmistakable objectives. Team members with varied experience must be careful to avoid providing any training or guidance that contradicts local or national policy. (DA/DoD) (21) (U) Finding: The Fort Huachuca MTT failed to adapt the ISCT training (which was focused upon improving the JTF- GTMO operational environment) to the mission needs of CJTF- 7 and JIDC; however, actions of one team member resulted in the inadvertent validation of restricted interrogation techniques. (U) Explanation: Although the Fort Huachuca Team (ISCT) team was successful in arranging a few classes and providing some formal training, to include classes on the Geneva Conventions, both the JIDC leadership and the ISCT team failed to include/require the contract personnel to attend the training. Furthermore, the training that was given was ineffective and certainly did nothing to prevent the abuses occurring at Abu Ghraib, e.g., the "Hole," nakedness, withholding of bedding, and the use of dogs to threaten detainees. The ISCT MTT members were assigned to the various Tiger Teams/sections to conduct interrogations. The ISCT team's lack of understanding of approved doctrine was a significant failure. This lack of understanding was evident in SFC Walters' "unofficial" conversation with one of the Abu Ghraib interrogators (CIVILIAN21). SFC Walters related several stories about the use of dogs as an inducement, suggesting the interrogator talk to the MPs about the possibilities. SFC Walters noted that detainees are most susceptible during the first few hours after capture. "The prisoners are captured by Soldiers, taken from their familiar surroundings, blindfolded and put into a truck and brought to this place (Abu Ghraib); and then they are pushed down a hall with guards barking orders and thrown into a cell, naked; and that not knowing what was going to happen or what the guards might do caused them extreme fear." It was also suggested that an interrogator could take some pictures of what seemed to be guards being rough with prisoners so he could use them to scare the prisoners. This conversation certainly contributed to the abusive environment at Abu Ghraib. The team validated the use of unacceptable interrogation techniques. The ISCT team's Geneva Conventions training was not effective in helping to halt abusive techniques, as it failed to train Soldiers on their responsibilities for identifying and reporting those techniques. (U) Recommendation: TRADOC should initiate an Army-wide effort to ensure all personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations are properly trained with respect to approved doctrine. There should be a MTT to assist ongoing detention operations. This MTT must be of the highest quality and understand the mission they have been sent to support. They must have clearly defined and unmistakable objectives. Team members with varied experience must be careful to avoid providing any training or guidance that contradicts local or national policy. (DA/DoD) (22) (U) Finding: Other Government Agency (OGA) interrogation practices led to a loss of accountability at Abu Ghraib. (U) Explanation: While the FBI, JTF-121, Criminal Investigative Task Force, Iraq Survey Group, and the CIA were all present at Abu Ghraib, the acronym “Other Government Agency” referred almost exclusively to the CIA. Lack of military control over OGA interrogator actions or lack of systemic accountability for detainees plagued detainee operations in Abu Ghraib almost from the start. Army allowed CIA to house “Ghost Detainees” who were unidentified and unaccounted for in Abu Ghraib. This procedure created confusion and uncertainty concerning their classification and subsequent DoD reporting requirements under the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, the treatment and interrogation of OGA detainees occurred under different practices and procedures which were absent any DoD visibility, control, or oversight. This separate grouping of OGA detainees added to the confusion over proper treatment of detainees and created a perception that OGA techniques and practices were suitable and authorized for DoD operations. No memorandum of understanding on detainee accountability or interrogation practices between the CIA and CJTF-7 was created. (U) Recommendation: DoD must enforce adherence by OGA with established DoD practices and procedures while conducting detainee interrogation operations at DoD facilities. (23) (U) Finding: There was neither a defined procedure nor specific responsibility within CJTF-7 for dealing with ICRC visits. ICRC recommendations were ignored by MI, MP and CJTF-7 personnel. (U) Explanation: Within this investigation’s timeframe, 16 September 2003 through 31 January 2004, the ICRC visited Abu Ghraib three times, notifying CJTF-7 twice of their visit results, describing serious violations of international Humanitarian Law and of the Geneva Conventions. In spite of the ICRC’s role as independent observers, there seemed to be a consensus among personnel at Abu Ghraib that the allegations were not true. Neither the leadership, nor CJTF- 7 made any attempt to verify the allegations. (U) Recommendation: DoD should review current policy concerning ICRC visits and establish procedures whereby findings and recommendations made by the ICRC are investigated. Investigation should not be done by the units responsible for the facility in question. Specific procedures and responsibilities should be developed for ICRC visits, reports, and responses. There also needs to be specific inquiries made into ICRC allegations of abuse or maltreatment by an independent entity to ensure that an unbiased review has occurred. (DoD/CJTF-7) (24) (U) Finding: Two soldiers that the 519 MI BN had reason to suspect were involved in the questionable death of a detainee in Afghanistan were allowed to deploy and continue conducting interrogations in Iraq. While in Iraq, those same soldiers were alleged to have abused detainees. (U) Recommendation: Once soldiers in a unit have been identified as possible participants in abuse related to the performance of their duties, they should be suspended from such duties or flagged. (25) (U) Observation: While some MI Soldiers acted outside the scope of applicable laws and regulations, most Soldiers performed their duties in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations. (U) Explanation: MI Soldiers operating the JIDC at Abu Ghraib screened thousands of Iraqi detainees, conducted over 2500 interrogations, and produced several thousand valuable intelligence products supporting the war fighter and the global war on terrorism. This great effort was executed in difficult and dangerous conditions with inadequate physical and personnel resources. c. (U) Individual Responsibility for Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) Finding: COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205 MI BDE. A preponderance of evidence supports that COL Pappas did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to COL Pappas' chain of command for appropriate action. (2) (U) Finding: LTC Stephen L. Jordan, Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. A preponderance of evidence supports that LTC Jordan did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to LTC Jordan's chain of command for appropriate action. (3) (U) Finding: MAJ David M. Price, Operations Officer, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 141st MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence indicates that MAJ Price did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to MAJ Price's chain of command for appropriate action. (4) (U) Finding: MAJ Michael D. Thompson, Deputy Operations Officer, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that MAJ Thompson failed to do the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to MAJ Thompson's chain of command for appropriate action. (5) (U) Finding: CPT Carolyn A. Wood, Officer in Charge, Interrogation Control Element (ICE), Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 519 MI BDE. A preponderance of evidence supports that CPT Wood failed to do the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to CPT Wood's chain of command for appropriate action. (6) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-28, Guantanamo Base Team Chief, 260th MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER28 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-28's chain of command for appropriate action. (7) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-23, Operations Section, ICE, JIDC, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER23 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER23' chain of command for appropriate action. (8) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-14, Night Shift OIC, ICE, JIDC, 519 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER-14 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-14's chain of command for appropriate action. (9) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-15, Interrogator, 66 MI GP. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER15 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-15's chain of command for appropriate action. (10) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-22, 302d MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER22 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-22's chain of command for appropriate action. (11) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-10, Analyst, 325 MI BN (currently attached to HHC, 504 MI BDE). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER10 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-10's chain of command for appropriate action. (12) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-17, Interrogator, 2d MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER17 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-17's chain of command for appropriate action. (13) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-19, Interrogator, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER-19 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-19's chain of command for appropriate action. (14) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-24, Analyst, 325 MI BN (currently attached to HHC, 504 MI BDE). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER24 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-24's chain of command for appropriate action. (15) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-25, Interrogator, 321st MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER25 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-25's chain of command for appropriate action. (16) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-29, Interrogator, 66 MI GP. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER29 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-29's chain of command for appropriate action. (17) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-08, Dog Handler, Abu Ghraib, 42 MP Detachment, 16 MP BDE (ABN). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER08 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-08's chain of command for appropriate action. (18) (U) Findings: SOLDIER34, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER34 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER34’s chain of command for appropriate action. (19) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-27, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER27 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER27’s chain of command for appropriate action. (20) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-27, Dog Handler, Abu Ghraib, 523 MP Detachment. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER27 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-27's chain of command for appropriate action. (21) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-20, Medic, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER20 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-20's chain of command for appropriate action. (22) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-01, Medic, Abu Ghraib. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER01 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-01's chain of command for appropriate action. (23) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-05, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-05 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-05 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the Contracting Officer (KO) for appropriate contractual action. (24) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-10, Translator, Titan employee. After a thorough investigation, we found no direct involvement in detainee abuse by CIVILIAN-10. Our investigation revealed CIVILIAN-10 had a valid security clearance until it was suspended. (U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to Titan via the KO. CIVILIAN- 10 is cleared of any wrong doing and should retain his security clearance. (25) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-11, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN11 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-11 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action. (26) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-16, Translator, Titan employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-16 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-16 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action. (27) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-17, Interpreter, Titan employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-17 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-17 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action. (28) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-21, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-21 did, or failed to do, the following:
(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-21 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action. (29) (U) Finding: There were several personnel who used clothing removal, improper isolation, or dogs as techniques for interrogations in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Several interrogators documented these techniques in their interrogation plans and stated they received approval from the JIDC, Interrogation Control Element. The investigative team found several entries in interrogation reports which clearly specified clothing removal; however, all personnel having the authority to approve interrogation plans claim they never approved or were aware of clothing removal being used in interrogations. Also found were interrogation reports specifying use of isolation, "the Hole." While the Commander, CJTF-7 approved "segregation" on 25 occasions, this use of isolation sometimes trended toward abuse based on sensory deprivation and inhumane conditions. Dogs were never approved, however on several occasions personnel thought they were. Personnel who committed abuse based on confusion regarding approvals or policies are in need of additional training. (U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Soldiers' chain of command for appropriate action. CIVILIAN-14 (formally with 368 Military
Intelligence Battalion) (30) (U) Finding: In addition to SOLDIER-20 and SOLDIER01, medical personnel may have been aware of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and failed to report it. The scope of this investigation was MI personnel involvement. SOLDIER-20 and SOLDIER- 01 were cited because sufficient evidence existed within the scope of this investigation to establish that they were aware of detainee abuse and failed to report it. Medical records were requested, but not obtained, by this investigation. The location of the records at the time this request was made was unknown. (U) Recommendation: An inquiry should be conducted into 1) whether appropriate medical records were maintained, and if so, were they properly stored and collected and 2) whether medical personnel were aware of detainee abuse and failed to properly document and report the abuse. (31) (U) Finding: A preponderance of the evidence supports that SOLDIER-31, SOLDIER-32, and SOLDIER-33 participated in the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee by forcibly kissing her and removing her shirt (Reference CID Case–0216-03- ID259-6121). The individuals received non-judicial punishment for conducting an unauthorized interrogation, but were not punished for the alleged sexual assault. (U) Recommendation: CID should review case # 0216-03-CID259-61211 to determine if further investigation is appropriate. The case should then be forwarded to the Soldiers’ chain of command for appropriate action. (32) (U) Finding: An unidentified person, believed to be a contractor interpreter, was depicted in six photographs taken on 25 October 2003 showing the abuse of three detainees. The detainees were nude and handcuffed together on the floor. This investigation could not confirm the identity of this person; however, potential leads have been passed to and are currently being pursued by CID. (U) Recommendation: CID should continue to aggressively pursue all available leads to identify this person and determine the degree of his involvement in detainee abuse. Deleted in accordance with the Privacy Act and 10 USC §130b
Contract Services provided by Object Sciences Corp. and SYTEX 2 MI BN 2d Military Intelligence
Battalion
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