PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:  HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command,  the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command.  (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required for  coding was " a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly  as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the  message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief  of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within  which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The  Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so  he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr.,  Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of  the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr.  Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they  informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the  hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr.  Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff as to  what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy  back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply  confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr.,  Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall  A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to  Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio  was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further  delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the  nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the  message was received in Honolulu it was given to a boy for delivery on a  bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the  message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

[40] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr.,  Marshall A. 13.) The Chief of Staff testified:

"* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience,  my own experiences even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * *  * we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the  telephone (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)."

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's  desire that the message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief  of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for  the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message  center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me  that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in  about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty  minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a.  m.  (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80)  (This would be 6:20 a. m. Honolulu time)

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Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about  30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination (Tr. French  196)."

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a  warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the  morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is  pertinent:

"General RUSSELL. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental  commanders a message which would have told them of these recent  developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of  November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of  December [41] 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the  destruction of the code machines?

"General MARSHALL. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge  of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It  depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff  was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible  the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the  possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to  answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a  great; catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way. (Tr., Marshall  C. 211-212)"

Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short  fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of  which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as  already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27  November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it  continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was  required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief  of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further  information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in  the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary  but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance.  The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall  should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for  his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a  bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that  Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's  Conclusions clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately  pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity  that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without.  The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to  Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is  evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period  of months, hereinbefore referred to. While the War Department was  possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough  to require that he be on the qui vive. That Hawaii had already been  sufficiently alerted was [42]

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the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34),  of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles  (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253)

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages.  (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772.) The Navy messages of 24 and 27  November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short  358, 363.) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed  with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval  Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr. Layton 3058-3059.)

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear  instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from  within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected. 

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional  instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of  Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short  had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his  command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non sequitur. But, in  addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall  ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection  of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen  it." (Tr., Marshal 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is  significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though  initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not  initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the  corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39.) The  reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against  sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the  interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in  accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant  reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to  General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,  was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the  Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It  must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General  Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of  Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they  were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this phrase indicated  he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long  distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War  Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the  reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption  that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive  measures in coordination with the

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Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289.) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely  advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations  against an outside threat.

[43] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications  calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no  time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a  communication to the Chief of staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would  be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to  say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had  replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he was relieved of his  responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon  the Chief of Staff.

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff  testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 3S, 36; Kimmel 1772),  the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to  a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those  from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in- Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department  with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising  the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the  Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and  the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and  training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the  over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of  global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the  United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War  Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent  victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose  records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the  prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus  devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian  Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy.  To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention  would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a  General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation  for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced  from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of  Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is  ineffective. There is a distinction, however, between the personal  performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by  members of his staff.

[44] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon  receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

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As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December  the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan  "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes  entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this  information until late in the morning of 7 December and that he did his  best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances  beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command  between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether  this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already  indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his  subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate  preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated  over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander  in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General  Marshall had been [sic] General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941  which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr.,  Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts  Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

Board's Conclusions as to General Gerow:

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the  substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the  Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he  approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained  confusing statements.

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he  failed to take corrective action.

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of  the two services in the manner contemplated. (Rep. 299)"

[45] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy  beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities  as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of  Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of  the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations  and the situation with Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese  future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no  circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the  messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish  reconnaissance.

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But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had  received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the  Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to  Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but  that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In  retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not  sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative,  checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger.  General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of  imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information  been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial  effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make  the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance, the  message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on  vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various  subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to  Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further  message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there  were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested  to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure  to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type  of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we  have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans  Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the  advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to  Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear  and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers  to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In  my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. It  fails to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented [46] itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the  President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and  delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking  place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had  practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese  might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the  United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of  delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day 27  November 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations  of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United  States, urging him to postpone any action that night precipitate war as  long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this  situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the  Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and  similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other  department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as  possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of  the possibility of an attack at any moment and

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that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would  precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate  problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and  not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the  language. There was no other course except to present this problem just  as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate  situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it  requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly  qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the  Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war  warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4261- 4262)

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer  ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible  for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered  the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300),  nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the  sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow  4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on  the demand in the radiogram of 2, November signed "Marshall", for a  report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other  important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to  follow through, (Tr., Gerow 4290)"

[47] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge  of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific  matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291).

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have  made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans  Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although  its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater  who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant  to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these  agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the  two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow  4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed and had the  right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained  in the 27 November message, the two commanders would put into effect the  Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289), or at least such  portions therefore as would assure adequate reconnaissance

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2  is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified.

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(Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so  far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on  Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree  with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the  27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive.  As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and  adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite  instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that  General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the  existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to  believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves  put these plans into effect.

Miscellaneous Statements of Board:

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure  to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating any  agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider  such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.

[48] Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might  advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in  all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in  order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these  leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the  Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by  an individual officer familiar with the matter

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous. 

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information  that he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November  message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant  disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the  error of his division in not checking short's reply, for which he  frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he  has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command  indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of  readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting alert against  sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to each an agreement  with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy  Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the  effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the  Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in 

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the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a)  above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was  not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of  judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a  neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered his various  alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper  alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take  into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack  was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other  factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove  the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes  simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert.  The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to  establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

[49] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and  Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of  being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now  of record, this question is answered by what has been said above.  Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance  reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as  he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a  Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the  Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as  it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be  made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer  picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was  apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally  no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are  still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted  messages were sent and that information of great military value  continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code  systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these  facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of  high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses  who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the  world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is  out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would  adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of  duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable  defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken  with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should  have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the

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action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case  of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that  others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p.  21) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President  Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross  error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p.  125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is  tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is  considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than  dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond reprimand.

[50] As on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am  inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by L  trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a  current public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement  be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings And  pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment or  which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a  sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further  investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could  later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

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[a] Memorandum for the Secretary of War

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945

[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 194:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl  Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in  the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my  opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November  1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20  October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions  reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army  Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in  no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's  investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my  prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination  of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive,  the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to  Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the  Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:  HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
 (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
 (3) Japan-British relations:  NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around  20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [2]  Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute  "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of  Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24)  that an activating "Winds"

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message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of  the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division,  to the same effect (my Memo. P. 24).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating  breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the  United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel  Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which  was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941,  stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.  (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)"

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid.,  Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick,  Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect.  (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such  message was sent. (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)"

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in he Navy was  Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which  meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral  Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November  1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and  belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War  Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen.  Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section  of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds"  message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were  several [3] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the  execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought  that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941,  it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles,  p. 2)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 941, stated  that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See  Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to  ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the  intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be  transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his  affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after  talking to General Miles and

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Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a  repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According  to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General  Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the  above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl  Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this  testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1).  Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such  conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him.  General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was  "purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the  dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic' " messages (Affid., General  Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel  Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was  not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters  of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been  impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him.  (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message  (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the  "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was  received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2,  or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas  commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter,  denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel  Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had  received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the  exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm"  reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never  returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel  Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to  General Gerow or General Bedell Smith Colonel Bratton never brought  Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff.  (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code."  As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that  two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton  pointed out that not two but six copies of any such

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message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941,  representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false  alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2  ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the  Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus T.  Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior  to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds"  message, [5] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on  the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best  of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col.  Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from  Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow,  p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel  Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic")  messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury,  Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several  occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds  Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel  Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered  it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message  prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top  Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19- 23). He never got the "Winds Code" or any activating or implementing  message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his  headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff,  Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect.  (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby,  assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never  seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated  fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE  to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute  message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

Lieutenant-Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical  assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal  Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present  Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In  the latter capacity, he made a search for an activating "Winds" message,  which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett)

[6] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the

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"Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25, November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any  activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War  Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be  recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col.  Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received  by the Navy."   (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, P. 38.)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4  December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction  of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General  Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further  warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow, felt that  sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he  was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still  feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it  with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as  Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the  Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds"  message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a  radiogram be sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander  Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram signed  "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G- 2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the  above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his  subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and  Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no  recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen.  Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2).

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder  testified:

"[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the  passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and  myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No  information was given to me by anyone m the Navy, which indicated in any  way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or  contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely  strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to  predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen.  Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)"

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the  Pa

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cific Fleet Intelligence section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to  know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I  know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from  intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example captain  Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have  divulged the source but in fact, would have given some different  derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian  Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to  defend the Pearl Harbor Naval base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti- aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops, and the 7th Air Force as the  weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive  action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for  Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7 1941 the Intelligence  Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley was in liaison with and received some  information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence,  but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did  not come to me and I didn't now of the liaison until after the war  started. (Affid. Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8 p. 2.)"

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included he  "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23)  (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very  close [8] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl  Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting  Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned  that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds  Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications  Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not  received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was  again called to the Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on  General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles  to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General  Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel  Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the  pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was  monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to  Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the  Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that  "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had"  (including the "Winds" message), the source of which as Navy personnel  whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were  also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto- analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and  translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this  information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely  as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently,  however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this

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message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was  aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese  relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers  of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information  on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal.  (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

Mr. Shivers testified:

"(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until  after 7 December. ( Affid., Robert L. Shivers )"

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.

[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically  denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I fell [sic] sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from  Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and  not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no  idea that Lt. Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted  Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to  me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)"

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial  of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short  personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the  Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort  message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be  considered.

Other Information Possessed by General Short:

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram  prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to  a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert,  he said:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't  have made much of an impression on me*. But when you destroy your codes  or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have  had this advantage also I could have asked him the significance to him.  But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine could have  been very significant to me*. I would have been very much more alarmed  about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the  destruction of the code machine very seriously. (Italics supplied)"

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly  others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p 10, 19, 30), I referred  to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had  information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu  was [10] "destroying its codes and burning its secret papers," which  information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell

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