PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:  HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a  conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel  Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated  he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944,  p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3  December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the  Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the  Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers.  About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between  the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during  which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and  destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this  information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise  telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and  destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers'  statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr.  Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States  and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as  anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain  Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received  similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid.,  Robert L. Shivers)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and  papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6  December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter  information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall  J. Fielder, p. 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese  diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore,  Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated  3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,  Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval  District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular  posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London  to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other  important confidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C,  Safford, p. 183)"

[11] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning  the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid.,  Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent formation which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of

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such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and  signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect.  (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel  Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and  General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944 p. 11). Their reaction was  as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be  quite in order and that it was nothing to be excited about. My  conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively  brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts commission. We were alone and at that time he stated  to me words to the effect "Well Bicknell, I want you to know that  whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." (Affid. Col. George w.  Bicknell, p. 3)"

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell,  or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that  the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the  interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by  me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army  Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had  information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes  and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not  mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General  was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people,  this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes,  which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it,  judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See  Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had  received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and  papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel  Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul  was [12] burning his "codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J.  Fielder, p. 3)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying  his codes. As distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was  destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that  juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering  whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese- American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically  different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and  Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as  sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to  an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction  of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the  Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme  significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies

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& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu.  Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was  secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila.  The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3  December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:   

"A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75  mm).

"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages [sic] early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to  attack Russia at present but will act in South.

"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[13] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, canceled a considerable volume of orders  for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to  Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in  Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the  Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the  British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies  Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him  information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his  receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson.  Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine  Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information  contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George  W. Bicknell)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel  Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short in one  form or another. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this  information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was  shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory,  but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to  7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his  attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from  Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from  Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to  getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

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A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information  he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)

[14] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at  Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr.  Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer  of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the  aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension  in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its  way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which  he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W.  Bicknell)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified  to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the  Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force,  Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various  items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December  1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence,  without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code"  message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic  reconnaissance of the Japanese Mandated islands in November, 1941, he  held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From  time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel,  he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid.,  Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USS ) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts  with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him  over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain  Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at  any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view.  He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)

Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional  information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I  said:

"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander  that there was an outside threat against which he should make  preparations. (P. 30)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject  "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

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[15] Short's SOP Against Attack: In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three  alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of  field positions, Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not  sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in  Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and  uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual  alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further  that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the  earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly  recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile  attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)"

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an  hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against  sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In  response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to  "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to  prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13)  Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War  Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. S).  Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently  Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by  radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought  home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5  November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or  around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received  in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen,  A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to  ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He  searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division,  and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquires of those likely to  have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP  was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the  Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29  January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt  dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:

[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation  of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this  place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall,

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General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation.  I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's  investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions.  The  statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon  the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's  report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present  memorandum.

MYRON C. CRAMER
Major General
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Include: Copy memo from TJAG to S/W, "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board."

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[a] Memorandum for The Secretary Of War
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board) 14 September 1945

[1]                                                   14 SEPTEMBER 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was  classified as Top secret and consisted of one volume. I have examined  the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by  Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel  that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top  Secret Report require modification.

In its Top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the  United States and Japan was in possession of the State War and Navy  Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a  reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions and  were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that  were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington  was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for  resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of  breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the  eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the  Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"  message of November 27 1941. It would have been possible to have sent  safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in  Hawaii or positive directives could have been formulated to put the  Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders and [2] this information cannot  be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is  incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for  specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to  the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete  responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that  its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The  difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from  the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert  them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly  aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the  right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp. 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our  State, War, and

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Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of  the attack. (P 16)"

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board  in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they  should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence.  These revisions include the following: 

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as  to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive  military operations. (R. 86) "

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of  volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record  reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document  as follows:

"[3] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations  of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements  for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin  on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June,  1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General  Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A  more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality  the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message  which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese  envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United  States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter  time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically  going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our  minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United  States. (R. 87) (P2)

"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United  States. (R. 123-124) * * * (P 5)"

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123- 124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl  Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of  the information which he mentioned in his testi-

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mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information  that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United  States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this  information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was  a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to  additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that  what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[4] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November  1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November,  1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese  "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the  execute message. He further testified that his attention was again  called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a  warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking  that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort  immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously  refers to the "Winds code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he  also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert  L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that  Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl  Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message. 

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and  maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he  gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning  intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other  information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly  interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties.  The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of  November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.

The Board found:

"* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff On November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of  the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2  & 3)"

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents"  which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as  follows:

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after  moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air  and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands. (P 87)"

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com-

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mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of  Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence  Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian  Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence  Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the  increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat  Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged  in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese  navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat  Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December,  indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and  concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See  documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's Report.)

The Board found:

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but  would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.)"

This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart examination. General Russell read from this while questioning  Colonel Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General * * * (P. 88.)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the  Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code"  message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance  of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would  notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same  general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State  Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance  to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since  1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite  information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United  States.

[6] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that  Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was  construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P. 3.)"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic  representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and  elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and  that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department dated 3 December 1941,  reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular  posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to  destroy

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most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with  Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence  Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu  had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in  Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was  burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the  morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by  General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this  information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he  was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave  to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu  had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of  Staff, also gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further  testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came  to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the  Chef of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it  was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not  months." (R. 243-244.) (P. 3.)

"[7] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning  agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State,  Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division.  In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was  presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them  abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 3)"

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen. However,  Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his  prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel  Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a  better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously  testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were  contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been  delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of  State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and  the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2. But in testifying before Colonel  Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy  what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and  that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the  material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered  these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to  Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the  deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant  Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel  Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department  did not go out to

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the field with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the  higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given  to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by  Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and  available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese  were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he  asked [8] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders  and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following  this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with  Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a  message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort  concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action  inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his  superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of  Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington  during November and December 1941. This included the information already  mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese  Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25  November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at  Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by  Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any  possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" in toto, and  that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations  would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be  called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and  suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not  necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but  would be followed by military occupation of the Netherlands's Indies by  the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The  proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26  November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to  information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by  Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the  "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of  29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the  information which the War Department sent to General Short. [sic]

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the  Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the  general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and  the United States and warnings of war.

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The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence  reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [9]  which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such  dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4  December 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia  at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese  execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the  Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of  these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel  Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers,  travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other  intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated  by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by  Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are  initialed by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the  probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that  they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and  that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI  was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were  severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his  Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department  did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before  Colonel [10] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of  necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination  to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short  but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be  dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the  information into too many hands. There as been considerable evidence  given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified  before Colonel Clausen,

"* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence  mentioned had been so compromised."

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The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department  information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,

"Dispatches from the war Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in  the Philippines on a war basis which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be  observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the  War Department which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the  Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of  hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts  were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at  Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor  according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of  Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more  frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two  intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December,  were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top  Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the  Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The  two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's  report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's  investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and  transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not  in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and  the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation  until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so,  time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in  readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of  3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attacktarget in  the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [11]  that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial  traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included  an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of  the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the  same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington  concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just  what commercial traffic was decrypted and transmitted by the Navy at  Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to  Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner,  attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports  from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo  and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency  as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged  division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6 the Board referred to testimony of Colonel  Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of

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Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and  Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that  Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for  the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen  conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having  so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel  Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes  on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else  at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual  intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned. 

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese  "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel  Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever  received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain  Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and  other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or  some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the  British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from  London to Manila, and, in turn from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above.  This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub- agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from  the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian  Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's  query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in  the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to  his report.

[12] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based  on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and  General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel  Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15  June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board  as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.  I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith contained in  the affidavit mentioned are correct statements of fact wherein they set  forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General GEROW: "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was  purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the  dissemination or interpretation of Magic. I would naturally expect that  enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention  and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of  Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my  recollection I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification  from any source of implementing message to the Japanese Winds Code.' If  I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would now  recall the fact in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel  Sadtler told me of an unverified report or that he had received some  tentative information which was subject to confirmation, In any event,  there should be written

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evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this  time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

"General SMITH: "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a  difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S.,  War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of  Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority,  and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to  intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at  that time an 'Ultra' officer, and it would have been impossible for him  to give me any information to support his contention that I should step  out of my rather minor province." P 2— ffidavit of Colonel O. K.  Sadtler.)"

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department  Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [13]  of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel  Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend  this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect  that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The  Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5  December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian  Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel  Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it  over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort  and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval  District Intelligence Officer: particularly since the way the radio was  worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General  Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to  ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander  Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds  Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a  crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct  the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and  consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter  information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was  available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese  message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes: 

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p m., December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told  Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers  and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the  bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

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"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his  presence. (R 239-241.) He stated that [14] General Miles did nothing  about it as far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by  General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238.)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m.

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with  General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General  Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part  of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of  Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning."  (Pp. 11, 12.)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final  reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely  translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7  and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately ____     Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of  the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a  locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of  Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General  Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance  to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with  whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War  Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this  information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at  hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally  delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date  by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. (P. 16.)

"These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel  Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave  the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he  delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the  Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant  Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans  Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets  were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith  on [15] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the  message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how  the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7  December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had  asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of  Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he  received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any  until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury  stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely  received. 

"On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General  Smith and General Miles From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears  that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts  before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became  aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening  of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the  Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide,  brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to  General  Miles.

"The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7  December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the  Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part  message at 1:00 p. M., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines.  The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his  office until 11:25 a. m.

"These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified  before

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Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which [sic] would be in the office of the chief of Staff "between  10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified  before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel  Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and  9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he  conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office  at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen  that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the  United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel  Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.  m." 

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6 the imminence of war on the following Saturday and  Sunday, December 6 and 7 was [16] clear-cut and definite. (P. 15)"

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information  which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7  December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department  received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part  reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States,  but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at  some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by  war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6  December of significance, in addition to what had already been  transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December  that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed  to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this  information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in  Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be  delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as  heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and  it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would  occur at that time. The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final  message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part  together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock  on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on  Pearl Harbor. (P. 18)"

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is  not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a  statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General  Short has since testified was information he should have received.  General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the  message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7  December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he  would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him  this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a  question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

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"[17] I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there about the destruction of the code machines. _The _other _matter _wouldn't _have _made _much _of _an _impression _on _me. (Underscoring  supplied.)"

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the  Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular  posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code  machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we  do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of  this communication.

My Conclusion:

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its  reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views  expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

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