PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:  HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning  papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell  1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel  Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding  General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern  Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-  based on their  intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of  Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then  Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne,  Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan.  (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be  relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian  Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record  does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages  in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General,  Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr.,  O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to  Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.

[11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a   telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in  Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors,  searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code  words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr.  Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr.,  Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and  exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941  he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy,  paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted  to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.)  Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98;  Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:

"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be  using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which  pursuit would be slow to start * * *."

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief,  and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air  raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of  the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his  predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan,  Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),

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testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air  defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and  he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany  1727.)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever  wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had  assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance *  * *." (Tr., Short 4442.)

[12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne  in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of  any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative  action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that  when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds  of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short  281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he  must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which  was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November.  (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short  437.)"

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without  ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he  attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.)

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous  action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the  information I had." (Tr., Short 453.)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be  prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be  confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was  mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in  diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the  imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by  Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and  espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan  would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set  forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal  instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared  for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27  November was as follows:

"[13] * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your  defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)"

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Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be  on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)"

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and  without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision  and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message  which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly  indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be  concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his  report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had  only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to  report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."

He testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have  explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps  particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at  the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine  ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action  taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action  taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much  I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short  437.)"

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:

"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were  doing.

"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance  reconnaissance? 

"[14] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite  agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)"

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message  expressly stated:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task  assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar  warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)"

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this  message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War  Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after  stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that  after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan  will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The  implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance  refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which

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provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr. Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377- 380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy  responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put  into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in  part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War  Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not  recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in  accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian  Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)"

[15] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison  with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further  that

"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure  under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)"

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that  defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan.  There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in  toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as  mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)"

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the  brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War  Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In  any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot  entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7  December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the  report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from  27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted,  which called for his reexamination of his decision. 

Reconnaissance: Means Available:

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the  message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into  operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469- 70) and  primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this  was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance  was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other  measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour  operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did  not have sufficient aircraft

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for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this  schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short  470) 

[16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284,  385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not  perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the  Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being  conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted  reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task  forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also  to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch  157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris  2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and *could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been  submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know  the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have  anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a  search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get  more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied)  Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral  Kimmel stated:

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about  800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full  coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles  visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)"

How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as  the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of  patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately  between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on  the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian  Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel  1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)"

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be  needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494) 

According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance,

"flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * *  This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)"

Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short  testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from  outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a  180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the  task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short  4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have  been

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needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel  1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger  1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for  reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of  the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A- 20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not  the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,

"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)"

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of  a Navy Flying Fortress.

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these  planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from  those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear,  however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were  available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some  extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of  planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be  taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

"[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating  from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7  1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and  maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in  various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such  operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the  operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small  areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700  miles.

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack.

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and  November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with  respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the  Navy."

Information Not Received by Short; In General;

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not  transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The  Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information  cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is  incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for  specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do  not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information  definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance  information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to  many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside

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from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would  have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr.,  Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board,  there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not  transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with  having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also  that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War  Department was not informed.

[19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a  basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These  references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses  consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain  intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and  inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by  the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all  proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received  from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military  concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander  of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning  indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of  information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p.  3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the  War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The  basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War  Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and  elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their  codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2,  Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information  before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise  destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in  the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986;  Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he  believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr.,  Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G- 2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told  Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war.  (Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff,  testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242- 243)  Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of  codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch  1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him  in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted  radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called  "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and  what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of  these various messages:

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24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into  various subdivisions for that purpose. 

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting  Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and  gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

[20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S.  might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three- Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the  Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the  above.

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.

5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and  urging renewed effort.

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and  American power in China.

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a  week."

16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press  negotiations with the U. S.

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of  eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be  secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U.  S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is  absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

26 November translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering the  "proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is  negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already  be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that  rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between  Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military  occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele-

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grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no  progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon  Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a  humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations";  therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after  which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not  to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you  also report even when there are no movements."

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting  proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and  Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others,  makes it impossible to find any basis in the American  proposal for  negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied  nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as  an enemy."

[22] 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured broken" and to give  Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and  the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to  move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by  Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out  and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than  anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in  the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out  negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly  suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States  note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested but  in Washington only.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for  that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders  those lower down.

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1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and  American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein  Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and  expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of  26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy  settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to  new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and  destroy all secret documents.

[23] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great  Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

6 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still  continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine. 

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for. U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to  prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other  Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised  against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final  memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine  and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a  British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would  break out on the 7th."

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the  United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941  in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6  December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret  Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review  of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position,  complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A  radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day,  marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present  this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret  Ex. "B")

[24] The Winds Message:

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre-

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sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the  middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as  follows:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:     HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations:    KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:     NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D.  250; Safford C. 125-126)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 25432) The  Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately  commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message.  On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications. Phoned  Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The  message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not  know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr.,  Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S.,  G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral  Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do  you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel  Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and  had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify  it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General  Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253)  Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested  that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified.  General Gerow replied "I think they have had plenty of notification,"  and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant  General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message  and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not  wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds"  message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great  Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel  Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a  breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D.252) According to  [25] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this  latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36- 38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel  Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating  "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of  Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On  this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who  stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or  Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code  (indicating with whom relations

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would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" Code was  intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl  Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he  discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating  "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain (Tr., Sadtler  D. 251-2a2) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or  second "Winds" message was the Navy.

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4  December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in  teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer,  wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace  with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been  expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It  was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132)  According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department.  (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified  that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army  Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the  Navy. (Tr. Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message  can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments  according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various  high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State  Department and White House. (Tr. Safford C. 133, 136 138, 172) The proof  that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine  distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) the same is true as to its  getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in  the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr. Safford C. 139-140,  152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in  evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do  not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that  Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S.I.S. 25850,  the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00  p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect,  "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a  midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)

[28] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret  papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked  him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out  to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum  finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval  commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,  Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy  their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged  for four additional messages o be sent out to various naval attaches in  the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the  same effect was also

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sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187)  An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,  covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the  Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War  Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the  testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of  the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C.  Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the  Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168)   Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

" "On the 4th of December 1941 Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets  summarizing significant events up to that date quoting the Winds Message  and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."

"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

" "Admiral Wilkinson approved this message" 

"which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely

"  "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it and saw it about three p. m.  Washington time on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do  you thing [sic] of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied 'I think it is an  insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson  stated 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,'   and so forth. (Tr. Russell A. 33-34)"

[27] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved  sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of  codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles  and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton  advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders.  General Gerow felt what sufficient warning had already been given.  General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision.  Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went  over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander  McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out.  McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the  first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the  Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284)  Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which  was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:

"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are  mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D.  283)"

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In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo,  dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence  broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHI'
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)"

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr.,  [28] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top  Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This  conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that  Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even  Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051)

There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever  version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19  November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence  broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex.  "B", S. I. S. 25392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The  officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State  the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans  Division (Tr., Bratton D. 297)"

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or  if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these  officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them.  Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted  relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific  recollection of specific occasions cannot be regarded is fairly bringing  home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific  intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific  denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of  having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209- 211)

Discussion of Foregoing Information:

It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war.  Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the  outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts  are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for  example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October from Tokyo to  Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing  Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15  November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu requesting that  the "ships in harbor" [29] report be made

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twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing  Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course  of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November,  translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in  harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to  point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this  inference is in the light of after- events; at that time these radios, to  an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to  keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or  possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from  Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the  agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating  the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November,  translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29  November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to  happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was  not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an  early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As  General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing  happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to  War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain,  not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the  radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3  December, 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction  of codes, code machines and secret papers. There is also the reference  to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel  Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war  was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had  General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view  that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message  clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely the radio of 2  December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there,  whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the  war ships there were provided with antimine nets. But this message was  not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December  1941. (Top Secret Ex. "13", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States.  Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer  told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850  instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.  m., he sent along a [30] note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford C. 167) Action upon this information  if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony  it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis

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by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's  deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of  the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the  time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an  estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light  of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance  which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in  mind that substantially all the definite information received is to Jap  naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast  Asia.

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and  placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of  conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information  he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were  destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's  Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done  if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to  any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which  he should make preparations. To the same effect was he testimony of  General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow  4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr.,  Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D.  253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14;  Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A.  34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18- 21)

Comments on Short's Defenses:

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged  with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there  were threats both from within and from without and that the most  dangerous form of attack which he could expect as a surprise air attack, he cannot now [31] be heard to say at he was led into becoming sabotage- minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing  sabotage. It is obvious at General Marshall's radio of 27 November was  not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly  imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's  assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a  surprise r attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that  Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount  to communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a  new and entirely different estimate of the situation which included a  surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete  and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that  the information given Short continually stressed the pos

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sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with out. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a  threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have  interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on  Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the  inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to  establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no  chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any  event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the  whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would  have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed  his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the  statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the  policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as  restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense.  But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would  not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It  should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard  against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming  the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities  of an experienced Commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of  readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified  except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was  incomplete and confusing. 

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in  Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is  supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the  effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the  Navy. 

[32] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense  under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's  various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of  serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the  erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to  the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the  air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to  be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly  improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones,  not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the  circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement  in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as  without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep  72)

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A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain  witnesses were asked as to their *opinion* of Phillips as Chief of  Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr.,  Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified.  (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of  General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with  subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise the average, run- of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief  of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he  did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of  Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel  Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger  Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to  support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The  Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception  of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to  competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of  the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this  findings is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable  interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were  ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of  a Jap landing, of an air attack, [33] what Phillips considered to be his  duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a  "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general  discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr.,  Phillips 1134-1144)

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November, 1941, (Tr.,  Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as Chief of Staff,  for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences.  (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was  inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that  Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way proximate or  concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said  is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully  qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully  investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their  possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3. or  G4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no  substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses  from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst  that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the  importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese consuls  were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this  viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about  these matters.

The Board also stated that

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"While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that  there was a lack requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident  to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident  loyalty to General Short. (Rep. 74)"

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there  was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that  "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a  serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7."  (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony  as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not  justified.

[34] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which  indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war of  which information he ad an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28 1941 when evidently he failed to  realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th which  indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued  the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his  command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th the critical information indicating an  almost immediate break with Japan though there was ample time to have  accomplished this.

"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7 1941, despite the impending  threat of war. (Rep. 298-299)"

Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information  concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short  to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197)

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the  growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) over-looks the  fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the  Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the  information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7  December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the  United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7  December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may  have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of  a peaceful settlement.

[35] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in  carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead  to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

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Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised the  Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he  stated they Were doing their best and that negotiations were to  continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top  Secret Ex. "B")

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:

"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is  anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am  convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.  Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of  our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.  (Top Secret Ex "B")"

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still  continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:

"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were  times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to  prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the  military people did what might be the result of war. * * * Now the  question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and,  as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and  finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213- 4214 )"

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

"[36] I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible  minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it;  and, not being defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war  was inevitable, up to he last minute. So that I cannot mention any  particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was  definitely inevitable. (Tr., Grew 4199)"

With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and  reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the  Prime Minister.

"I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is well, I won't say  confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation  with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister, at half past twelve, half past  midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl  Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that  conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor  was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me  personally that he didn't know. * * *  (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)"

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:  

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it  besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet  some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far  East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we  might, for our part, have relaxed

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some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened.  But it didn't happen. (Tr., Grew 4218)"

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War  Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It  was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti- Comitern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that  possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) "November 29 arrived and  passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other  than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly  well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly  towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 5)

[37] In the light of all the information possessed by the War Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note  breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese  representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p. m. (Washington  time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion  that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and  adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent,  and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

General Marshall's Views on Warning:

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that  "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic  relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr., Marshall A.  45-46) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities  which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to  the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may  have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short,  nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise.  (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what  has happened. * * * the situation might well have been helped by  translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of  his decision at the time, however, he stated:

In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the  later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy  Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great  responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we  were  pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing  everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could  look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the  wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way  we were the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out,  particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii  without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an  unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

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Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a  certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have gained the  necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for  them to act.

"[38] All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that  commercial shipping in taxing the Pacific Fleets resources in providing  convoys. Everything was involved there at the time and I cannot see how- I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear as  expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault suddenly  seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation or it is and I myself have never discussed it. (Tr. Marshall A. 46-47)"

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect  Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A 27) He also was under the belief in late  November and early December of 1941 that Short ad adequate  reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this  regard, he testified:

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the  means to carry out the air functions of that command particularly as  they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and  Admiral Kimmel (Tr. Marshall A. 27)"

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A 26)

The Chief of staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared  that we had." (Tr., Marshall A 25) He stated:

"* * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent and the Philippines about 10 percent and  Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible. (Tr., Marshall A. 23)"

The Chief of staff continued:

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * * (Tr., Marshall A 26)"

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global  perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal  Department:

"[39] * * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable  way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)"

General Marshall's 7 December Message:

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early  morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with pan, the Chief  of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated  such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6)  He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and  wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted ble of the  interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in  accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant  reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to  General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,  was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the  Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It  must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General  Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of  Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this phrase indicated  he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long  distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War  Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the  reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption  that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive  measures in coordination with the

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