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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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XIV. Interrogation Policies Following Abu Ghraib (U) [Delete] While CENTCOM legal concerns had led to CJTF-7s removal of most of the aggressive interrogation techniques from its interrogation policy in October 2003, interrogation policies issued by Task Forces under CENTCOM Command, including the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) CJTF-180 (the conventional forces in Afghanistan), and the Special Mission Units in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004. A. February 2004 CJSOTF Interrogation SOP(U) [Delete] The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) operated under the tactical command of CJTF-7. CJSOTF-AP contained units from the 5th Special Forces Group, [big delete]. [Big delete] [Big delete] That policy had been superseded by an October 12, 2003 policy that was issued after CENTCOM raised legal concerns with techniques in the earlier policy. [1714] [Delete] On February 27, 2004, [delete] Commander, [delete] issued an interrogation policy for [delete] using the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy as its basis and authorizing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques, including the presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, loud music, and light control, and environmental manipulation. [1715] The policy stated that certain techniques, such as presence of military working dogs, stress positions, and loud music and light control, required approval by the CJTF-7 Commander if they were to be used against enemy prisoners of war. The use of those techniques against all other detainees, however, was permitted with the written approval of a [delete] Deputy Commander or Commander. [Big delete] [Big delete]." [1717] A report completed by Brigadier General Richard Formica stated that [big delete] "some detainees were wet down and laced in air conditioned room or outside in cold weather." [1718] [Big delete] . [1719] [Delete] The March 23, 2004 policy stated that "you should consider the fact that some interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise inconsistent with international law before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a [CAUTION]." [1720] Environmental manipulation, the use of power tools, stress positions, and the presence of working dogs were all marked with the word "CAUTION." [1721] [Big delete] BG Formica also found that some detainees held by a tactical unit were "kept naked for the initial interrogation" and fed only bread or crackers and water "if they did not cooperate with ... interrogators." [1723] He said that a detainee held by another tactical unit under CJSOTF-AP command "may have been fed just bread and water for 17 days." [1724] B. Interrogation Plan in Iraq Derived from SERE (U) [Delete] [delete] The Department of Defense provided the Committee an undated document drafted by a Chief Warrant Officer from the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division was deployed to Iraq and stationed outside Kirkuk from January 2004 through February 2005. The document, called "Camp Honesty Interrogation Plan" stated that it was "based off of U.S. SERE Training Doctrine." [1725] It described subjecting detainees to "sensory over-stimulation" where they would be placed, handcuffed behind their backs in so-called "black room[s]." [1726] The plan stated that two soldiers with night vision goggles would be present in the room and would ''touch [the] detainee on [the] head, hands and feet with string simulating sensors." [1727] In addition, sound would be used to "activate and confuse auditory sensors" resulting in "heart-rate increase and increased stress levels." [1728] C. March 2004 Interrogation SOP for Conventional Forces in Afghanistan (U) [Delete] The interrogation policy in place for CJTF-180, the conventional forces in Afghanistan, also continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004. A March 27, 2004 CJTF-180 Standard Operating Procedure, signed by LTC Charles Pede, the Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Scott Berrier, the Director of Intelligence, and LTC Clayton Cobb, the MP Commander for CJTF-180 included a list of "standard [tactics, techniques, and procedures for use" at Bagram. [1729] That list included the use of "safety positions," "sleep adjustment," "sensory overload," invading a detainee's personal space to "increase psychological discomfort," "dietary manipulation," adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell to "create moderate discomfort," and using blacked out goggles as an interrogation technique. [1730] D. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Polices (U) [Big delete] Prior to March 2004, however, each operated under a distinct interrogation SOP. On March 26, 2004 the SMU TF implemented a single interrogation policy that covered SMU TF operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. [1731] [Delete] The March 26, 2004 SMU SOP authorized 14 "interrogation techniques" not explicitly listed in FM 34-52, including use of muzzled dogs, "safety positions (during interrogations)," sleep adjustment/management, mild physical contact, isolation, sensory overload, sensory deprivation, and dietary manipulation. [1732] [Delete] According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, the March 26, 2004 SMU TF SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. [1733] In fact, many of the techniques in that SOP had been abandoned by conventional forces in Afghanistan months earlier, after CENTCOM identified legal concerns with the techniques. [1734] Although the authority in the March SOP to use "muzzled dogs" was rescinded on April 22, 2004, the remainder of the techniques remained authorized until May 6, 2004, when GEN John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, suspended use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques. [1735] The Church Special Focus Team report said the techniques were suspended as a result of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. [1736] GEN Abizaid stated that neither he nor his staff "reviewed or approved" the March 2004 SMU TF SOP "prior to its issuance." [1737] [Delete] Several interrogation techniques authorized for use by the SMU Task Force prior to GEN Abizaid's suspension, including stress positions, sleep adjustment/management, sensory overload, and sensory deprivation were similar to techniques used in the resistance phase of SERE training. In fact, undated SMU TF SOPs from this period suggest a connection between SMU TF interrogation techniques and SERE. The SOPs state, under interrogation "Standards," that "[i]nterrogations will be done [in accordance with] all applicable rules and regulations to include... Survival/Evasion/Resistance/and Escape regulations." [1738] [Delete] [delete] ) On May 23, 2004 [big delete] the SMU TF Commander, sent a message to [delete] stating that the May 6, 2004 [big delete] wrote that detainees held by his TF were "hardened" and "trained to resist interrogation" and added: FOR THIS LIMITED GROUP OF DETAINEES, [BIG DELETE] SLEEP MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANIPULATION (LIGHT AND NOISE), EXTENDED INTERROGATIONS, VARYING COMFORT POSITIONS AND THE USE OF HOODS TO INDUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF ISOLATION AND DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERROGATORS ARE PARTICULARLY USEFUL. [1740] [Delete] told [delete] that he planned to request "authority to employ" additional techniques. [1741] [Delete] [delete] On May 27, 2004, [delete] formally requested that CENTCOM grant authority to the SMU TF to use five interrogation techniques: sleep management, control positions, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery. [1742] The request stated that control positions - defined as "requiring the detainee to stand, sit, kneel, squat, maintain sitting position with back against the wall, bend over chair, lean with head against wall, lie prone across chairs, stand with arms above head or raised to shoulders, or other normal physical training positions" - could also "be used in order to implement sleep management" and that "in the most exceptional circumstances, and on approval from [the SMU TF Commander]," interrogators could ''use handcuffs to enforce the detainee's position." [1743] An interrogator could require a detainee to remain in a control position for "no more than 45 minutes in one hour and for no more than six hours in a 24 hour period." [1744] (U) Notwithstanding the May 6, 2004 suspension of all non-FM 34-52 techniques, on June 4, 2004, GEN Abizaid approved the use of sleep management, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery for the SMU TF. [1745] He delegated the approval authority for the use of those techniques to the "first general officer in the chain of command," and specified that none of the techniques could be used beyond a 72 hour period "without a review by [the SMU TF Commander] or the first general officer in the chain of command." [1746] _______________ Notes: 1711. AR-15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations (November 8, 2004) at 13, 15, 71 (hereinafter "Formica Report'). 1712. Statement of COL Hector Pagan (August 2, 2004). 1713. Statement of LTC Michael Black (November 3, 2004). 1714. See Section XU E, supra. 1715. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (February 27, 2004) at 2-3. 1716. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (March 23, 2004) at 3. 1717. Ibid. 1718. Formica Report at 71. 1719. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (March 23, 2004) at 4. 1720. Ibid at 6. 1721. Ibid at 4. 1721. Formica Report at 8. 1723. Ibid. at 74. 1724. Ibid at 8. 1725. THT 160 ([Delete]), Camp Honesty Interrogation Plan (undated). 1726. Ibid. 1727. Ibid. 1728. Ibid. 1729. CJTF-180 SJA Memorandum for Record, CTJ'F-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures (March 27, 2004). 1730. Ibid. 1731. Church Special Focus Team Report at 15. 1732. [Delete] The 14 techniques were the use of military working dogs, safety positions (during interrogations), use of blackened goggles/ear muffs during interrogation, sleep adjustment/sleep management, use of female interrogators, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, change of environment/ environmental manipulation, diet manipulation, use of falsified documents or reports and deception, use of individual fears, use of isolation, fear of long-term incarceration, and mild physical contact. Battlefield Interrogation Team and Temporary Screening Facility Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), Change 2 Dated May 18, 2004. 1733. Church Special Focus Team Report at 15. 1734. Ibid. 1735. Ibid at 16; Memorandum from SMU TF Commanding General to USCENTCOM, Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques (May 27, 2004); CENTCOM/SOCOM Briefing to Committee Staff (December 21, 2007). 1736. Church Special Focus Team Report at 16. 1737. Memorandum from General John Abizaid, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 16, 2004). 1738. [Delete] See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force 121 (ITF-121), Baghdad Air Base, Iraq CITF-121 Battlefield Interrogation facility/Team Standard Operating Procedures. 1739. Message from Commander [delete] to Commander [delete] DTG 231006Z MAY 04 (May 23, 2004) at 1. 1740. Ibid (emphasis in original). 1741. Ibid. at 1. 1742. [Big delete] Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques (May 27, 2004). 1743. Ibid. 1744. Ibid. 1745. [Delete] Church Special Focus Team Report at 16. Although the request defined "separation" to include the use of goggles, earmuffs, and hooding, the CENTCOM Commander approved "separation," but not the "use of hooding." Memorandum from General John Abizaid to Commander [big delete] Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques, Dated 27 May 2004 (June 4 ,2004). 1746. Ibid.
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