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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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XV. CENTCOM Seeks JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan (U) A. May 2004 CENTCOM Request (U) (U) In the wake of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) personnel traveled to CENTCOM headquarters to coordinate a plan to send a training team to assist CENTCOM with interrogations in Afghanistan. [Delete] According to Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office (OSO) the meeting at CENTCOM took place after the mission to Afghanistan had been "tentatively approved." [1747] On May 12, 2004 CENTCOM made a formal request through the Joint Staff for JPRA "interrogation/exploitation" assistance. [Delete] In the May 12, 2004 request, CENTCOM asked that JFCOM provide a Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) team to "conduct an on-site assessment of [Bagram Collection Point] operations in Bagram and Kandahar to assist in the development and implementation of an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options." [1748] The CENTCOM request stated that the JPRA team would "... observe exploitation procedures at the site to assist in identifying improvements or development of alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1749] [Delete] That same day, JPRA personnel briefed JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Wagner, JFCOM Chief of Staff Maj Gen James Soligan, and JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, about the planned support. [1750] (U) Materials prepared for those briefings stated that after September 11, 2001, JPRA was "requested to support [big delete] [Defense Intelligence Agency], [delete] GTMO, Fort Huachuca, and [delete]." [1751] [Delete] [delete] The briefing materials specifically highlighted JPRA's September 2003 trip to Iraq in support of the Special Mission Unit Task Force there and described JPRA's intended support for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. [1752] Among JPRA's "key tasks" for the planned Afghanistan trip was to observe "exploitation procedures" used by CENTCOM personnel and to "identify areas for improvement" and "assist and advise on alternate approaches." [1753] The briefing materials stated that JPRA intended to provide "on the spot recommendations to the [CENTCOM] staff if appropriate" on these alternate approaches. [1754] Delete] [delete] The briefing materials also included a proposed Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the Afghanistan trip. [1755] The proposed CONOP was similar in scope and structure to the CONOP JPRA had circulated in September 2003, near the end of the Iraq trip. Unlike the Iraq CONOP, however, the Afghanistan CONOP included many of the edits that had been suggested by CAPT Daniel Donovan, the JFCOM SJA (e.g., clarifying that Rules of Engagement must be within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to - the Torture Convention, removing reference to "constant sensory deprivation," etc.). The Afghanistan CONOP did not, however, reflect all of the SJA's edits. For example, [big delete] CAPT Donovan had recommended removing these techniques from the Iraq CONOP. [1757] [Delete] The reference to JPRA's prior interrogation support in the briefing materials prompted a discussion among ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, Maj Gen Soligan and CAPT Donovan about the September 2003 trip to Iraq and the CONOP that was created during that trip. [Delete] [delete] Col Moulton, the JPRA Commander, had earlier defended the inclusion of the full range of SERE techniques in the Iraq CONOP by saying that "all the techniques discussed [in the CONOP] are ones that [JPRA] (or other services) employ in our training (with considerable oversight - only the Navy uses the waterboard)." He continued: "In discussions with [the Office of Secretary of Defense General Counsel] last year, they specifically requested what type of techniques we found most effective against our personnel. Our intent is to provide a prioritized list of what works on our folks, and let the lawyers and Combatant Commanders decide to what degree and which target audience they apply these, if any, techniques." [1758] [Delete] [delete] During consideration of the Afghanistan trip, CAPT Donovan forwarded Col Moulton's email to ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, and Maj Gen Soligan and wrote: When [Col Mouhon] says that the Navy uses [waterboarding], he means that they use it against our own people during survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training. In other words, qualified Navy SERE instructors use this to demonstrate to our own people what the ENEMY is likely to do to them in the event they are captured, and (hopefully) to train our people how to resist or cope with such techniques. JPRA and SERE folks will swear that the "water board" does not actually physically harm subjects if it is administered by properly trained SERE instructors, under close supervision, etc. For that reason, some argue that the "water board" does not technically constitute torture under domestic or international law. I can only say that in my opinion, that argument does not pass the "Washington Post test." I fail to see how anyone can reasonably say that employing such techniques against those in our custody is worthy of the United States, no matter how much we may need the information. In my view, for the U.S. to do this "lowers the bar" and ensures, if there is any doubt, that similar techniques will be employed against any U.S. personnel captured by our enemies. For this reason, there is risk involved in having JPRA "advise" interrogators in CENTCOM - JPRA's expertise concerns the effective techniques used by the BAD GUYS against us, and I frankly don't believe that's the kind of advice we should be giving to the U.S. side. I see great potential for theater personnel to do it wrong, and to then say, "well JPRA said this was what we should do." [1759] [Delete] [delete] On May 13, 2004, the day after Col Moulton briefed the JFCOM leadership, he circulated a revised CONOP for the Afghanistan trip. The revised CONOP stated that JPRA would "not recommend or train physical pressures," however, it also stated that a "key task" of the mission was to observe "exploitation procedures at the site to assist in identifying improvements" and develop "alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1760] CAPT Donovan immediately expressed his concern with that "key task" in an email to ADM Giambastiani and LTG Wagner, stating: I [am] concerned about JPRA "identifying alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives" (read: more effective interrogation methods). Since JPRA's expertise is all the unlawful interrogation techniques the enemy uses against captured U.S. forces, I recommend you consider NOT having JPRA get involved in this aspect of CENTCOM's request. [1761] [Delete] CAPT Donovan also expressed his concerns about the intended mission to Col Moulton, writing in a May 13, 2004 email: [I]t is not advisable to have JPRA assist in "improving exploitation" (i.e., suggesting more effective interrogation techniques). JPRA's core expertise is in training DoD personnel to resist/cope with techniques - many of them illegal - that may be employed by our enemies if DoD personnel are captured. It just doesn't make sense to me to have experts in what the "bad guys" do to us advising our U.S. interrogators - there is a real risk, if theater interrogators then "do it wrong," for them to claim "JPRA's experts recommended this." Accordingly, my recommendation is that JPRA not get involved in this aspect of the requested support. [1762] [Delete] The next day, CAPT Donovan sent another email to ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, and Maj Gen Soligan pointing out the "potential risk to the entire JPRA mission if they are in any way implicated in the current mess in Iraq." [1763] JPRA's planned May 2004 mission to Afghanistan was subsequently called off. [1764] B. CENTCOM Makes Another Request for JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan (U) [Delete] On June 20, 2004, about a month after their initial request, CENTCOM made another request to the Joint Staff for JPRA assistance at interrogation facilities in Bagram and Kandahar in Afghanistan. [1765] The request sought a team from JPRA to "conduct on-site assessments" in July and to "assist the commands in ... developing and implementing an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options, required as a result of the assessments." [1766] Specifically, CENTCOM requested that the JPRA team "observe exploitation procedures at the site and identify improvements or develop alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1767] [Delete] When the request arrived at JFCOM, CAPT Donovan again raised concerns with Maj Gen Soligan about the scope of the request. In a June 21, 2004 email, he asked "whether JPRA is really the appropriate choice" for the mission described in the CENTCOM request, i.e., to "observe exploitation procedures at the site and identify improvements or develop alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1768] Maj Gen Soligan subsequently raised the issue with Maj Gen John Sattler, the CENTCOM Director of Operations (13), who Maj Gen Soligan said told him that CENTCOM had made a "conscious decision on what capability they want." [1769] [Delete] CAPT Donovan also raised his concerns directly with lawyers at CENTCOM and the Joint Staff. In an email to the lawyers, he wrote: I'm concerned that the folks from our Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) - who oversee training U.S. military personnel how to resist interrogations by our enemies (e.g., SERE training) - are the wrong guys to be advising U.S. interrogators how to more effectively exploit PUCs. JPRA considers themselves to be the exploitation experts, but in many ways my view is that their expertise is in training U.S. personnel how to best resist ILLEGAL techniques. This kind of advice may be the last thing you all want/need in Afghanistan right now. [1770] [Delete] Over the next month, JFCOM senior leadership discussed the proposed trip with JPRA and the Joint Staff. At JFCOM's request, JPRA developed and provided JFCOM with a training plan for the mission. [1771] On June 30, 2004, Maj Gen Soligan told JPRA in an email to prepare for the trip, but directed them not to deploy until the trip was approved by JFCOM's Commander ADM Edmund Giambastiani. [1772] JFCOM also discussed working with Joint Staff to find a capability outside JPRA to send to CENTCOM to assist with their detainee operations, but expected a "nonconcur" with any "recommendation to use other resources." [1773] [Delete] As discussions about the CENTCOM request continued within JFCOM, Col Kenneth Rollins, a SERE psychologist added his perspective on the advisability of sending JPRA personnel to assist with interrogations. The psychologist said: [W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE school (done to INCREASE RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is taught at interrogator[] school (done to gather information). What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct, and interrogator school, not SERE school is the appropriate focus and model for investigating interrogators. Simply stated, SERE school does not train you on how to interrogate, and things you "learn" there by osmosis about interrogation are probably wrong if copied by interrogators. [1774] [Delete] As Col Rollins's comments were circulated at JFCOM, Lt Col Richard Posey, one of the JFCOM JAGs added that "[i]t would be difficult to come up with a stronger argument against concurring in this request." [1775] Lt Col Posey added: "CENTCOM needs interrogation experts. JPRA is telling us ... that their instructors are ineffective interrogators and probably do it wrong because their focus is on increasing resistance not decreasing it. For the same reasons, this does not pass the Washington Post test. DoD already has enough egg on its face concerning detainee operations." [1776] (U) The trip to Afghanistan was subsequently cancelled. Christopher Wirts, JPRA Operations Support Office (OSO) Chief, told the Committee that although he did not know why JFCOM cancelled the trip, he recalled discussing the negative media attention from Abu Ghraib with LTG Wagner and Maj Gen Soligan. [1777] C. U.S. Joint Forces Command Issues Policy Guidance For JPRA "Offensive" Support (U) [Delete] In July 2004, following JFCOM's cancellation of the proposed trip by JPRA personnel to Afghanistan, ADM Giambastiani issued guidance to JPRA about "offensive" interrogation support. In a July 21, 2004 email to Col Moulton and RADM John Bird, the JFCOM J-3, Maj Gen Soligan wrote: ADM Giambastiani has given specific guidance that JPRA will not conduct any activities on or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation techniques or activities without specific approval from the JF COM Commander, [Deputy Commander, or Chief of Staff] All JPRA actions and recommendations related to interrogations of enemy detainees will be conducted in accordance with JPRA's current mission statement and limited to defensive actions and recommendations. [1778] [Delete] A few days after that email, a draft memo containing the guidance was sent to Col Moulton. In a July 26, 2004 email to Maj Gen Soligan and RADM Bird, Col Moulton questioned why the policy was necessary and offered his view on JPRA's prior support to interrogation operations: Immediately following 9/11 JPRA was approached by various organizations, starting with General Council [sic] (and later [big delete] USA strategic debriefing school in Ft Huachuca, and JTF 170) regarding U.S. training on resistance to interrogation techniques. All requests for information or support were coordinated through JFCOM, and all interested agencies were directed to make formal requests through JFCOM. All external requests for support have been unsolicited. From the very beginning I expressed concern that supporting these requests would go outside the JPRA charter and provided an honest assessment of the potential risk associated with the support. All CONOPS and actions have been fully vetted through JFCOM. If the message is to relay that we won't play in "offensive" ops - that has been received loud and clear. If the purpose is to prevent OSD/GC,. and other DoD Interrogation organizations from making requests I'm not sure this memo is going to help. [1779] (U) A formal JFCOM policy memo relating to JPRA's "offensive" support to interrogation operations was not finalized until September 29, 2004, after the Inspector General of the Department of Defense began looking into the issue. In the September 2004 memo, Maj Gen Soligan wrote: Recent requests from OSD and the Combatant Commands have solicited JPRA support based on knowledge and their application to U.S. strategic debriefing and interrogation techniques. These requests, which can be characterized as "offensive" techniques include, but are not limited to, activities designed not to increase one's resistance capabilities to interrogation techniques but rather intended to instruct personnel, for the purpose of gathering of information, on how to break down another's ability to withstand interrogation ... The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for "offensive" purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA. [1780] (U) The policy did not, however, explicitly prohibit JPRA from conducting such activities in all instances. Instead, it stated that all requests for "offensive" support should "continue to" be directed through JFCOM but instructed that: [A]ny deviation in roles and responsibilities must be carefully scrutinized and vetted through proper legal and policy channels. JPRA personnel will not conduct any activities without specific approval from the USJFCOM Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff. Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for action. JPRA will continue to direct all requests for external support through USJFCOM and refrain from providing any support or information unless specifically directed by USJFCOM as outlined above. [1781] (U) As the Department of Defense Inspector General continued its inquiry into JPRA's prior "offensive" interrogation support, the DoD Inspector General asked JFCOM about the September 2004 policy memo. [1782] In a February 2005 memo to the DoD Inspector General, LTG Wagner stated that the purpose of the September 2004 policy was to provide "clear guidance" and to "prevent use of JPRA outside the command's mission scope." [1783] Knowing that CENTCOM and Joint Staff had expressed interest in JPRA to assist or support "in-theater interrogations," LTG Wagner said that JFCOM sought to clarify that "JPRA is primarily a school house, not an intelligence gathering activity." [1784] He added that "JPRA does not have not have personnel assigned to be interrogators," and that ''the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations - not in how to conduct interrogations." [1785] (U) According to LTG Wagner, JFCOM issued the September 2004 policy statement ''to ensure that JPRA activities remained within the scope of that Agency's mission charter." [1786] He stated that JFCOM considered requests for JPRA "interrogator support" to be "inconsistent" with JPRA's charter. [1787] He stated, however, that the memorandum was not "issued in response to suspected or known inappropriate JPRA activities, as no such activities were known by this headquarters to have been conducted." [1788] Notwithstanding that statement, however, by September 2004, when JFCOM issued the policy, JFCOM had already approved a trip by JPRA personnel to Iraq as well as other "offensive" interrogation support - activities that fell outside JPRA's roles and responsibilities. _______________ Notes: 1747. [Delete] Email from Christopher Wirts to Thomas Markland, John Huffstutter, David Ellis (January 19, 2005). Mr. Wirts's email stated "Initially when the mission was tentatively approved we went to HQ CENTCOM and reviewed/briefed the J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After the CENTCOM visit, we were called to JFCOM and met with ADM [Giambastiani], Gen Soligan, Gen Wagner, JFCOM Legal and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off." 1748. Message from CENTCOM, Request for USJFCOM Support, DTG: 121729Z May 04 (May 12, 2004). 1749. Ibid. 1750. Email from Randy Moulton to Steven Johns and Fred Milburn (May 10, 2004); Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2007) 1751. Email from Randy Moulton to [delete], James Soligan. Robert Wagner, Fred Milburn, et al., attaching Briefing Slides and Executive Summary with Iraq CONOP; Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2007). 1752. As part of the briefing materials, an executive summary of the September 2003 trip identified the JPRA-identified deficiencies as the SMU TF's "lack of clear legal guidance on status of captured personnel," "lack of established [Rules of Engagement or Standard Operating Procedure]," "lack of training and preparation," and "lack of information sharing." [delete] See Executive Summary; see also Briefing Slides at 5-8. 1753. Briefing slides at 6-8. 1754. Ibid. 1755. Several drafts of a Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the planned trip by JPRA personnel to Afghanistan were provided to the Committee. While those drafts are not dated, communications between and/or among JPRA and JFCOM personnel discussing revisions to the drafts suggest when those drafts were produced and how the CONOP evolved. 1756. Ibid. 1757. [Delete] Shortly after the briefing, a JFCOM action officer sent JPRA leadership a list of action items for LTG Wagner and MG Soligan. Among those were JPRA (1) locating the after action report from JPRA's support to [delete] [delete] and (2) preparing a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to provide policy/guidance on possibility of extending JPRA roles/responsibilities to the offensive vice defensive preparations/practices." In response, Col. Moulton told the JFCOM action officer that "[t]here was no [after action report] for the" support" and instead directed him to the "executive summary" of the trip provided in the briefing materials. Col. Moulton also stated that it was JPRA's understanding that "[Admiral Giambastiani] would approve our participation [in the Afghanistan trip] with a [Voice Command] from the Joint Staff regardless of the status of the policy guidance (he has previously approved and we are currently supporting other 'offensive' efforts)." Email from Randy Moulton to Steven Johns, Fred Milburn, Christopher Wirts, and Dan Donovan (May 13, 2004). 1758. Email from Col. Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, CAPT Dan Donovan, RADM John Bird, LTG Robert Wagner et al. (September 30, 2003). 1759. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner and Maj Gen James Soligan (May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original). 1760. [Delete] Draft Concept of Operations in Support of Pending CENTCOM Joint Interrogation Facility Observation and Assessment Requirement. 1761. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner, Maj Gen James Soligan. (May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original). 1762. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Col. Randy Moulton and Col Fred Milburn (May 13, 2004). 1763. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan. copying ADM Edmund Giambastiani and LTG Robert Wagner (May 14, 2004). 1764. [Delete] According to Mr. Wirts, JPRA's OSO Chief, "[W]e went to HQ CENTCOM and reviewed/briefed the J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After the CENTCOM visit, we were called to JFCOM and met with [Admiral Giambastiani, Maj Gen Soligan. LTG Wagner], JFCOM Legal and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off." Email from Christopher Wirts to Lt Col Thomas Markland, copying Lt Col John Huffstutter, Col David Ellis (January 19, 2005). 1765. CENTCOM Request for USJFCOM Operational Support, DTG: 200800Z JUN 04 (June 20, 2004). 1766. Ibid. 1767. Ibid. 1768. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan and LTG Robert Wagner (June 21, 2004). 1769. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to CAPT Dan Donovan (June 21, 2004). 1770. Email from Dan Donovan to Joint Staff and CENTCOM lawyers (June 21, 2004) (emphasis in original). 1771. [Delete] The training plan was intended to provide the JFCOM Commander an idea of how JPRA would satisfy the request to "conduct on-site assessments" at Bagram and Kandahar and "assist the commands in . . . developing and implementing an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options ..." Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, RADM John Bird, LTG Robert Wagner (June 23, 2004). 1772. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to RADM John Bird, Col. Randy Moulton, et al. (June 30, 2004). 1773. Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to CAPT Alan Kaufman, copying LTC John Jones, CAPT Daniel Donovan (June 30, 2004); Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven Johns, CAPT Alan Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004). 1774. Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven Johns, CAPT Alan Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004) (emphasis in original). 1775. Ibid. 1776. Ibid. 1777. Committee staff interview Christopher Wirts (January 4. 2008). 1778. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton. RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein, Col Fred Milburn (July 21, 2004). 1779. Email from Col Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein (July 26, 2004). 1780. Memo from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission Guidance (September 29, 2004). 1781. Ibid. 1782. Memorandum for the Department of Defense Inspector General, signed by LTG Robert Wagner (February 10, 2005). 1783. Ibid. 1784. Ibid. 1785. Ibid. 1786. Ibid. 1787. Ibid. 1788. Ibid.
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