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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE |
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XIII. Interrogation Techniques and Detainee Mistreatment at Abu Ghraib (U) (U) Between September and December 2003, military personnel at Abu Ghraib engaged in what Major General Antonio Taguba would later call "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" of detainees. [1597] Several instances of abuse were captured in photographs taken by the soldiers themselves and, in April 2004, some of those photographs appeared in the media. (U) Two Army investigations, one conducted by MG Taguba and the other conducted by Major General George Fay would later find that abuses at Abu Ghraib were perpetrated directly by both military police (MP) and military intelligence (MI) personnel. [1598] In addition to the direct participation of MI personnel in incidents of detainee abuse, MG Fay's investigation also identified situations where MI personnel solicited MPs to engage in detainee abuse, using such methods as "isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, [and] the use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse." [1599] (U) MG Fay cited the inadequacy of interrogation doctrine as a "contributing factor" to Abu Ghraib and stated that interrogation techniques developed and approved for use at GTMO and in Afghanistan became "confused" at Abu Ghraib and "were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards." [1600] As discussed above, some of the techniques MG Fay found to be abusive were also authorized for use by military interrogators conducting interrogations at the SMU TF facility in Iraq. (U) Interviews conducted by investigators for both MG Fay and MG Taguba contain evidence that the use of aggressive interrogation techniques like use of military working dogs, stress positions, and removal of clothing, was not limited to the specific incidents described in those reports. In fact, those interviews appear to indicate that the use of some of these techniques was widespread at Abu Ghraib. A. Use of Military Working Dogs (U) (U) The use of military working dogs to exploit detainee fears was authorized on December 2, 2002 by the Secretary of Defense for use at Guantanamo Bay. [1601] Weeks later, the technique appeared in a January 24, 2003 memorandum from CJTF-180's Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and was subsequently considered available for use in Afghanistan. [1602] The use of dogs was also among those techniques authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. [1603] [Delete] Following MG Miller's assistance visit to Iraq in August and September 2003, CJTF-7 had submitted a request for three military police dog teams "to provide an increased security posture" to support detention and interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. [1604] (U) The dog teams arrived at Abu Ghraib on November 20, 2003. [1605] According to MG Fay's report, "abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived" with the first incident occurring on November 24, 2003. [1606] Major General Fay's report documented seven other times over the next six weeks when dogs were used, including three occasions in which they were used in interrogations, one occasion the report referred to as "an apparent [Military Intelligence] directed use of dogs in detainee abuse," and one incident described as dogs being used likely as a ''softening up" technique for future interrogations." [1607] [Delete] COL Pappas, the Commander of the 205th MI BDE, said that on December 12, 2003 he "specifically approved the dogs to be used." [1608] A December 14, 2003 memo for LTG Sanchez, the CJTF-7 Commander, signed by COL Pappas indicated that COL Pappas approved the "presence of military working dogs" for three detainees captured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. [1609] COL Pappas stated that he "couldn't say for sure" whether he actually sent the memo to LTG Sanchez, but that he "signed it with the intent of it going to him." [1610] LTG Sanchez said that no request for the use of dogs in interrogations "was ever received or approved by me." [1611] (U) One intelligence analyst stated that it was "common knowledge" that one soldier used "dogs while he was on his special projects" working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam Hussein." [1612] And an MP said that dogs could be used in interrogations "with the proper authorization," and that "dogs were used to scare the detainee into confessing or producing intelligence." [1613] (U) An Army dog handler said that "MI would ask me to use my dog as a psychological and physical deterrent. It would consist of a dog walking up to a prisoner and the dog barking at a prisoner." [1614] The same dog handler said that "Someone from MI gave me a list of cells, for me to go see, and pretty much have my dog bark at them... Having the dogs bark at detainees was psychologically breaking them down for interrogation purposes." [1615] (U) On February 19, 2004, after MG Taguba had begun his investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the Commander of the 504th MI Brigade issued a memorandum stating that "military working dogs will not be present during the interrogation or debriefing of any detainees at the Abu Ghraib facility." [1616] B. Stress Positions and Physical Training (U) (U) Stress positions were authorized for use in interrogations at GTMO by the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002. [1617] The technique was used in interrogations in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003. [1618] Stress positions were also authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. [1619] (U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that stress positions and forced exercise regimens (also called compulsory physical training) were used in interrogations and the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy explicitly authorized the use of stress positions. [1620] CPT Wood's October 9, 2003 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) for interrogators listed stress positions as an approved technique. [1621] While the October 12, 2003 CJTF-7 policy removed stress positions from the list of authorized interrogation techniques, a subsequent IROE for interrogators continued to list the technique, with the caveat that its use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1622] (U) MG Fay's report stated that "What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise) carried over into sexual and physical assaults..." [1623] The report described one incident where a detainee was ''forced to stand while handcuffed in such a way to dislocate his shoulder" and described a photograph of an interrogation being conducted while another detainee was squatting on a chair which MG Fay called "an unauthorized stress position." [1624] (U) One MP said he "saw MI use stress positions" at Abu Ghraib. [1625] Similarly, the warden of the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib stated that military intelligence made detainees engage in physical training and he saw "detainees holding buckets, arms out, and other drills." [1626] An MP Platoon leader stated that he also "observed [military intelligence personnel] making detainees do physical training." [1627] (U) When asked whether he had ever been directed by MI or another government agency (OGA) to "soften up" a prisoner, one MP said "Yes, I would have them do physical training to tire them out." [1628] Another MP stated that military intelligence personnel insinuated that MP soldiers should abuse detainees telling them to "'Loosen this guy up for us.' 'Make sure he has a bad night.' 'Make sure he gets the treatment.'" [1629] (U) One interrogator confirmed the practice of having MPs "soften up" detainees, stating that the "MPs did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by having them do physical exercises and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with an MP, a detainee and his cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random hours of the night and yelling." [1630] Other MI soldiers confirmed the use of stress positions by interrogators at Abu Ghraib. One interrogation analyst stated that he witnessed the use of a stress position where a detainee was "handcuffed to the floor." [1631] The same soldier referred to that use of the stress position as "in following with the interrogation plan." [1632] An interrogator likewise stated that she "did use a stress position" in interrogations. [1633] Another interrogator who was deployed from GTMO to Abu Ghraib following the MG Miller assistance visit said that "stress positions were authorized" when he first got to Abu Ghraib in October 2003 and that he witnessed use of the technique. [1634] (U) Removal of clothing was authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1635] The technique was also recommended as an effective technique in a January 24, 2003 memo written by the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA and was subsequently considered approved policy in Afghanistan. [1636] [Delete] The Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq also used "removal of clothing" as an interrogation technique in the fall of 2003, just as the Abu Ghraib abuses were taking place. While not included in the SMU TF interrogation SOP, the SMU TF Commander [big delete] stated that when he took command in October 2003 he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique [delete] [big delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. [1638] (U) Though it never appeared in CJTF-7's interrogation policy, MG Fay stated in his report that removal of clothing was "imported" to Abu Ghraib and could be "traced through Afghanistan and GTMO." [1639] MG Fay's report stated that removal of clothing was "used to humiliate detainees" and said the practice "contributed to an environment that would appear to condone depravity and degradation rather than the humane treatment of detainees." [1640] His report identified several specific incidents of detainees being stripped or partially stripped at the direction of interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib. (U) Statements by military police and military intelligence personnel who served at Abu Ghraib indicated that removal of clothing was widely used for interrogations. COL Jerry Philabaum, the Commander of the 320th MP BN at the facility, recalled seeing "between 12-15 detainees naked in their own individual cells." [1641] He said that when he raised the issue with the JIDC Commander, LTC Steven Jordan, he was told it "was normal practice for detainees to be naked in their cells, but that usually they didn't have that many naked and that it was a technique [military intelligence] used." [1642] CPT Donald Reese, the Commander of the 37200 MP Company, stated that LTC Jordan also told him that stripping detainees was "an interrogation method that we use." [1643] CPT Reese said the fact that detainees were naked as an interrogation method was "known by everybody" and stated that it was "common practice to walk the tier and see detainees without clothing and bedding." [1644] (U) Similarly, an intelligence analyst at Abu Ghraib stated that it was "common that the detainees on [military intelligence] hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as an incentive to cooperate with US." [1645] One interrogator stated that "it was practice, especially for [military intelligence] holds to take their clothes in a possible attempt to renew the 'capture shock' of detainees who had been in custody for an extended period of time or were transferred from other facilities." [1646] Another interrogator said that "it was common to see detainees in cells without clothes or naked" and said that it was "one of our approaches." [1647] The interrogator said that "any officer who would walk the area at night should have seen the detainees naked." [1648] (U) One military police (MP) soldier stated that MI "would tell us to take away [the detainees'] mattresses, sheets, and clothes" and that ''the detainees would sleep in their cells naked." [1649] Another MP stated that MI used "clothing removal as an interrogation technique in Tier 1A." [1650] Major Michael Sheridan, who was Executive Officer of the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib, said that he stopped permitting MPs to escort detainees to interrogations after an incident where a male detainee "was being interrogated naked and then my MPs had to escort him back to his cell in 45 degree temps with nothing but a bag over his head, and one of the MPs was female." [1651] (U) One Abu Ghraib interrogator stated that another interrogator who was deployed from GTMO to Abu Ghraib, told him that he "was permitted as the interrogator to strip a detainee completely naked in the interrogation booth." [1652] Another GTMO interrogator deployed to Abu Ghraib said that he oversaw the interrogation of a detainee who had been stripped. [1653] The interrogator said that the technique was approved by a superior officer. [1654] A third interrogator who had previously served at GTMO recalled asking an MP at Abu Ghraib ''to strip [a detainee] naked for us for the interrogation." [1655] D. Sleep Adjustment/Sleep Management (U) (U) On December 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 20 hour interrogations at GTMO. [1656] [Delete] A January 24, 2003 memo from the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA stated that "sleep adjustment," which the memo described as "generally 4 hours of sleep per every 24 hours," was used as an interrogation technique in Afghanistan. [1657] The SMU TF interrogation policy for Iraq listed "sleep management" as an authorized technique and described the technique as "four hours of sleep during [a] 24 hour period" - the same way that CJTF-180 had described "sleep adjustment" in Afghanistan. [1658] (U) The September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy authorized both sleep management and sleep adjustment for interrogations, defining the former as "adjusting the sleep times of a detainee" and the latter as "4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period." [1659] CPT Wood's October 9, 2003 IROE also listed both "sleep adjustment" and "sleep management" as approved techniques. [1660] CJTF-7's October 12, 2003 policy did not include either sleep adjustment or sleep management as authorized interrogation techniques. [1661] However, an October 16, 2003 IROE written by CPT Wood continued to list both techniques, saying that their use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1662] (U) MG Fay's report stated that the "'sleep adjustment' technique was used by [military intelligence] as soon as the Tier 1A block opened" at Abu Ghraib. [1663] Interviews of MI and MP soldiers, however, indicated a lack of clarity among MI and MP as to what "sleep adjustment," "sleep management," and "sleep deprivation" actually meant. In any case, MPs were integral to carrying out each of those techniques for MI personnel. (U) One contract interrogator stated that "During a typical SMMP [sleep and meal management program], the MPs are responsible for administering the written program provided by the interrogator... In addition, the MPs are advised that during the awake time period of an approved SMMS program, the MPs are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee awake in the allotted period of time as long as it adheres to approved rules of engagement and proper treatment of detainee." [1664] An MI non-commissioned officer stated that he provided sleep adjustment schedules included in interrogation plans written by interrogators he was supervising to the MP Sergeant of the Guard. [1665] Similarly, an intelligence analyst said that the process for using sleep management was "for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request with the interrogation plan... Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the schedule." [1666] (U) COL Jerry Philabaum, the Commander of the 320th MP BN, said that "When [military intelligence] wanted a detainee on sleep deprivation, they would tell the MP guard that prisoner 'X' was on sleep deprivation. They would give instructions that the detainee was to sleep four hours within a 24 hour period... I don't believe MPs were given specific instructions on how to keep the detainees awake. It was left to the MPS." [1667] Another MP Officer stated that: When MI needed our assistance with detainees, they did their request through memorandums. The memorandums would dictate what MI wanted. The memorandums were signed by COL Pappas and given to the NCOIC [Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge] of the wing. The memorandums would give instructions on diet patterns, sleep patterns, music playing, and various other techniques that MI requested the MPs to carry out. [1668] An MP non-commissioned officer stated that "there was no SOP for sleep management." [1669] MG Fay stated that techniques used by MPs to keep detainees awake included stripping them and giving them cold showers." [1670] (U) CPT Wood said that "sleep management was approved by the [Commanding General] about a dozen times" during her time at Abu Ghraib. [1671] She stated that she "personally remember[ed] seeing LTG Sanchez's signature on some approvals for sleep management." [1672] COL Pappas said that he believed the October 12, 2003 CJTF-7 policy gave him the authority to authorize sleep management. [1673] [Delete] A December 14, 2003 memo for LTG Sanchez signed by COL Pappas approved "sleep management" for three detainees captured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. [1674] COL Pappas stated that he "couldn't say for sure" whether he actually sent the memo to LTG Sanchez but that he "signed it with the intent of it going to him." [1675] LTG Sanchez said that, other than requests to approve segregation in excess of 30 days, he did "not recall signing any other memos" approving other interrogation techniques. [1676] E. Sensory Deprivation and Isolation (U) (U) "Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli" was authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1677] [Delete] A January 24, 2003 memo from the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA stated that "deprivation of light and sound in the living areas" had been utilized and recommended that ''use of light and noise deprivation" (not limited to living areas) be approved for implementation. [1678] The technique was subsequently considered available for use in Afghanistan. [1679] (U) Sensory deprivation was never listed in CJTF-7 policy as an approved technique. It was listed, however, as an approved technique in an October 9, 2003 interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) document for interrogators at Abu Ghraib. [1680] A subsequent IROE also listed the technique but said its use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1681] (U) Major General Fay's report identified several specific instances where detainees at Abu Ghraib were placed in a small room in Tier 1A of Abu Ghraib that was referred to as "the hole" and where they were subject to total isolation and light deprivation. [1682] The report said that conditions for isolating detainees "sometimes included being kept naked in very hot or very cold, small rooms, and/or completely darkened rooms, clearly in violation of the Geneva Conventions." [1683] (U) MG Fay stated that the "environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of detainee abuse there. [1684] But MG Fay was not the first to note the environment at Abu Ghraib as problematic. An assessment of Abu Ghraib by a retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington in late 2003 had referred to Abu Ghraib as a "pressure cooker" and cited an urgent need to improve conditions at the facility. [1685] F. "Lost Opportunity" to Fix Problems at Abu Ghraib 1. Retired Army Intelligence Officer Leads Assessment Team (U) (U/ [delete] In November 2003, Terry Ford, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) and BG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Director for Intelligence, commissioned retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington to assess U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq. [1686] COL Herrington had also assessed intelligence operations at Guantanamo Bay in March 2002. [1687] Shortly before leaving for Iraq, COL Herrington received a call from [delete] [delete] the former Chief of the Iraq Survey Group's Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). [Delete] told COL Herrington of his concern that detainees had been ''tortured and beaten by "agency guys" and SMU TF personnel in Iraq. [1688] COL Herrington decided to look into [delete] claims during his assessment visit. 2. Assessment Team Visits Abu Ghraib and CJTF-7 Headquarters (U) (U) After arriving in Iraq, COL Herrington and his team visited the interrogation facility at Abu Ghraib. While the team did not see evidence that detainees were being "illegally or improperly treated" at the facility, they did note several serious deficiencies. [1689] (U) In his written report of the visit, COL Herrington cited an urgent need to improve conditions at Abu Ghraib. [1690] He cited overpopulation of the facility as a problem that could lead to further rioting and danger to U.S. personnel. He commented that the leadership at Abu Ghraib felt the facility was a "pressure cooker" and that it was "only a matter of time before prisoners staged an uprising" and that "bad things" such as "death, injury, or hostage situations" were likely to occur. [1691] COL Herrington also assessed that shortages of interrogators and equipment had resulted in a failure to interrogate detainees of intelligence value. [1692] He concluded that Abu Ghraib was simply ''unsuitable for the exploitation of high value detainees." [1693] (U) COL Herrington also expressed concern with the practice of not assigning Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) to certain detainees. He wrote in his assessment report that the creation of "ghost" detainees who were not in the accounting system carried certain risks "not the least of which is that it may be technically illegal." [1694] (U) On December 9, 2003, COL Herrington met with MG Barbara Fast, CJTF-7's Director for Intelligence (CJ-2). [1695] He later described her as "astonished" by his observations of Abu Ghraib. [1696] He said that "in a couple of cases she said, 'I was unaware of that. I didn't know that' or 'I thought we fixed that.'" [1697] COL Herrington added that, "It was very evident to me that she was not being well informed" by her staff. [1698] 3. Team Hears Reports of Detainee Mistreatment (U) (U) While visiting the Iraq Survey Group facility, COL Herrington learned from ISG medical personnel that prisoners arriving at the ISG who had been captured by the SMU TF showed signs of "having been beaten" by their captors. [1699] The report was consistent with what the retired Army Colonel had been told by [delete] the former ISG JIDC Chief, prior to his visit. When, during his visit, COL Herrington asked the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the JIDC whether these problems had been reported to higher authority, the OIC advised him that "everyone knows about it." [1700] (U) COL Herrington wrote in his report that an OGA representative told him that OGA personnel had been instructed not to have any involvement with interrogation operations at the SMU TF as the "practices there were in contravention to his Agency's guidance on what was and what was not permissible in interrogating detainees." [1701] He added that he had been told by his CJTF-7 escort that it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to visit the SMU TF facilities. His written report stated that: Based on 1) What my source [delete] told me before I deployed about what he observed concerning mistreatment; 2) The statement of the ISG-JIDC OIC on the same subject; and 3) the OGA representative's statement, it seems clear that [the SMU TF] needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees. [1702] 4. COL Herrington Reports Findings (U) (U) When COL Herrington returned to the U.S. and briefed LTG Keith Alexander, the Army G2, and his deputy Terry Ford, he reiterated the concerns about what he had seen in Iraq and stated, "when it becomes known, everybody who touched it will be in trouble." [1703] COL Herrington later told the DoD IG that the two were "very supportive and expressed confidence in his assessment, but no official follow-ups were discussed or scheduled at that time." [1704] (U) COL Herrington told the DoD IG that he expected that CJTF-7 and the Army G2 would investigate the issues he raised. [1705] However, he said they never contacted him and he was notified by CJTF-7 in April of 2004 that there had been "insufficient evidence to substantiate" what he had heard from the former ISG JIDC Chief about detainee mistreatment in Iraq.[1706] The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at CJTF-7 stated in an April 7, 2004 letter to COL Herrington that the investigating officer had not been able to "recreate those conversations upon which [COL Herrington's] report was based" and that it had been difficult to "pin down timelines and events in time." [1707] (U) The allegations raised by COL Herrington were the subject of an investigation conducted by CJTF-7 in early 2004. In what VADM Church described as an "extremely brief, three-page report," the CJTF-7 investigating officer found no proof to substantiate the allegations against the SMU TF. [1708] VADM Church criticized the CJTF-7 report as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology." [1709] VADM Church called the failure to more thoroughly investigate the allegations a "lost opportunity to address potential detainee abuse in Iraq early on." [1710] _______________ Notes: 1597. MG Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (hereinafter "Taguba Report'') at 16. 1598. Taguba Report at 16-17; Fay Report at 7. 1599. Fay Report at 7. 1600. Ibid at 8. 1601. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1602. Fay Report at 83; Church Report at 7. 1603. DoD IG Report at 16. 1604. See Deployment Order 231, referencing U.S. CENTCOM October 9, 2003 request for forces. 1605. Fay Report at 83. 1606. Ibid. 1607. Ibid at 85-87. 1608. Sworn statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 7. 1609. Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003). 1610. Sworn statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 9. 1611. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 21. 1612. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004). 1613. Statement of 504th MI BN soldier (June 4, 2004). 1614. Statement of Army dog handler (undated). 1615. Interview of Army dog handler (February 13, 2004). 1616. Memo from COL Foster P. Payne II for Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, Suspension of Use of Military Working Dogs (February 19, 2004). 1617. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1618. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report of Investigation-FINAL -0134-02-CID36923533 (October 8, 2004). 1619. DoD IG Report at 16. 1620. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 30. 1621. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003). 1622. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003); CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003). 1623. Fay Report at 10. 1624. Ibid at 68, 82. 1625. Statement of MP soldier (June 6, 2004). 1626. Interview of MP Company Commander (February 21, 2004). 1627. Interview of MP Platoon leader (June 6, 2004). 1628. Statement of MP soldier (January 17, 2004). 1629. Statement of MP soldier (January 14, 2004). 1630. Statement of MP soldier (January 21, 2004). 1631. Statement of 302nd MI BN soldier (May 11, 2004). 1632. Ibid. 1633. Statement of MI soldier (June 4, 2004). 1634. Statement of interrogator (June 4, 2004). 1635. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1636. Fay Report at 88; Church Report at 7. 1637. [Big delete] Questionnaire (June 29 2004) at 3. 1638. Ibid. 1639. Fay Report at 87. 1640. Ibid at 70. 1641. Statement of Commander 320th MP BN (May 26, 2004). 1642. Ibid. 1643. Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (May 3, 2004); Interview of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 10, 2004) at 48. 1644. Interview of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 10, 2004) at 48-49; Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 21, 2004); Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (January 18, 2004) at 1-2. 1645. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004). 1646. Statement of MI soldier (June 15, 2004). 1647. Unsigned interrogator statement (May 13. 2004). The statement was contained in a memorandum for the record which the interrogator declined to sign based on advice from counsel. 1648. Ibid. 1649. Taguba Report at 19; Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Davis (April 7. 2004) at 11. 1650. Statement of MP soldier (June 6, 2004). 1651. Interview of Major Michael Sheridan (February 14. 2004) at 8. 1652. Statement of MI soldier (May 25. 2004). 1653. Statement of MI soldier (June 4, 2004). 1654. Ibid. 1655. Statement of MI soldier (July 20. 2004). 1656. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1657. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation
Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1658. [Delete] Memorandum for all [delete] Personnel, SUBJECT: Policy No. 1 - Battlefield Interrogation Team and facility (BIT/F) Policy (July 15, 2003). 1659. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003). 1660. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003). 1661. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003). 1662. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003). 1663. Fay Report at 70. 1664. Interview of contract interrogator (June 22, 2004). 1665. Statement of non-commissioned officer (June 4, 2004). 1666. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004). 1667. Statement of COL Jerry Philabaum (May 26, 2004). 1668. Interview of MP officer (February 10, 2004). 1669. Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Davis (April 7, 2004) at 14. 1670. Fay Report at 70. 1671. Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 6. 1672. Ibid. 1673. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007). 1674. Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003). 1675. Statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 9. 1676. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 6. 1677. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002). 1678. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF-180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 4, 9. 1679. Church Report at 7. 1680. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003). 1681. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003). 1682. Fay Report at 94. 1683. Ibid at 28. 1684. Ibid at 9. 1685. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 2. 1686. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Detainee Abuse Evaluation Memorandum for the Record, October 20, 2004 meeting with Col (Ret) Stuart A. Herrington (undated) at 1 (hereinafter DoD IG, Herrington Interview). 1687. See Section I F, supra. 1688. DoD IG, Herrington Interview at 1. 1689. Herrington to Fast. Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 3. 1690. Ibid. 1691. Ibid. 1692. Ibid at 8. 1693. Ibid at 2-3. 1694. Ibid at 4. 1695. Army IG, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17; DoD IG, Herrington Interview. 1696. Army IG, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17. 1697. Ibid. 1698. Ibid at 16. 1699. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 7. 1700. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 7. 1701. Ibid. 1702. Ibid. 1703. DoD IG, Herrington Interview at 3. 1704. Ibid. at 4. 1705. Ibid. 1706. Ibid. 1707. Letter from Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to COL Stuart Herrington (April 7, 2004). 1708. Church Report at 61. 1709. Ibid. 1710. Ibid.
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