REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS

attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." 

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral  Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel,  particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December  1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio  intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese  naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is  set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral  Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in  Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as  indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active  operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel  conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of  Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel  noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet  Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions  1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned  that those four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were  then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer [10] in his  written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral  Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with  Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you  said, as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You  don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I  replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do  not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as  sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially  with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could  be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that  effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now" or  words to that effect....

"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye  when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion  about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or  a jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said  "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but  if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area  since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be  refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and  it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said "Do you mean to say  they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other  words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact  location.

"Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information  about those carriers?

"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not  say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report,  the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral  Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of  information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat  promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls  have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier  traffic is at a low ebb," and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there  was no information as [11] to Japanese carriers.

In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the  Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the  Commander in Chief, 

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U.S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the  information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval  forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding  the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had  received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief  of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an  attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack  could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral  Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was  sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that  such use of available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval  Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to  make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all  of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears  that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no  attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the  Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means  available did not permit an all- round daily reconnaissance to a  distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more  dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and  that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances  known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention  is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distance reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover  the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral  Richardson.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that  Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the  summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by  Admiral Bloch at that time.

[12] The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the question of air reconnaissance are approved:

"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he  decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral  Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject  must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any  of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had  no such discussion with him.

"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance  daily for more than a few days. 

"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact  available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,  for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 120 degrees  to a distance of about 700 miles.

"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the  most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27  November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors  probably would have been searched.

"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200  miles due north of Oahu."

(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding,  which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should  have served to give at least

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an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also  approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:

"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during  [13] certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."

(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional  opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December  1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful  principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo,  which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It  is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft  torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which  the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding  that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at  that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in  waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the  Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully  launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water  at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval  Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict  with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that:  "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe  when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a  sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient  run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes  launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of  water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.

The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there  was circulated in the Department an intelligence report which described  the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this  report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and  that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching  than the depth at which it made its normal run. 

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the  British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which  torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water. 

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year  prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of  an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary  Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second  only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of [14] the types  of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had  been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February   by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral  Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made  after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a  surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the  Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores  that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A  surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the  Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . ."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words  "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on  the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on  those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also  included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands. 

The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter sent by  Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us  and the message

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I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the  message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued:  "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in  the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until  something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript,  stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that  we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his  bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such  contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we  keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my  advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal [15] with the  question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue  preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and  otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November  27th.

(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far  East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points  out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of  Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He  notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl  Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was  not available to Admiral Kimmel.

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation  that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would  include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information  received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November  27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been  approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of  war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly  possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location  and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with  these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this  connection is approved:

"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to  the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of  forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the  probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The  information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week  of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an  unusual change in Japanese radio call signs, that, on the basis of all  information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of  the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no  information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of  positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a  study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence,  through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of  the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel  to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such  an attack...."

[16] (r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in  substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December  1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and  summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding  was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in  Washington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on the Naval  Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral  Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to  the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the  conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with  the handling of enemy information in the Navy

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Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough  exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information.  It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was  unfortunate.

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concurred. It  further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to  other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with  the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most  helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and  Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the  nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their  assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly  be obtained.

During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the  testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other  testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The  following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:

"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United  States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington,  concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic  negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception,  decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

[17] "6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and  Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged.  The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led  that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch  of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk  and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not  flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.... 

"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted  Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he  be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not  communicate to him important information which would have aided him  materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In  particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means,  information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were  unfortunate.

"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in  his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were  imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important  messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the  "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this  and other important messages."

[18] 12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the  intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese  Consulate General are approved. 

"Conclusion 12: Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information  was

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obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such  cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area. 

"Conclusion 13: Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General  at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of  ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of  the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information  was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain  other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December  1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not  decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack,  apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such  work."

13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds  that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the  part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that  no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the  Pearl Harbor incident, and that the disaster cannot be regarded as an  "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not  it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take  adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same  token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was  known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were  recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these  factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them  to bring about that implementation [19] of the plans that was necessary  if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.

That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in  several important respects.

(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly  evaluated, although there was ample information available on this  subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this  information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense  plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these  selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack  had been successful.

(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate  provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the  fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army  and Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any  appreciable extent prior to the attack.

(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the  Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the  procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of  the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they  require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance  of events.

In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage  of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that  any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost  impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however to all  these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas  in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have  tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to  inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective  sphere, to take appropriate action.

14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of  the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is  pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark  and Admiral Kimmel, as the 

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responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the  initial Japanese blow.

[20] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of  information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:

(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;

(2) The intercepted Japanese message inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;

(3) The implementation of the "winds" message;

(4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available. [sic]

(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by  Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United  States.

I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In  connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of  the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by  Admiral Hewitt is approved: 

"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic  messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio  broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to  the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message  was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating  to the United States."

Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27  November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with  Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization  of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either  the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly  Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to  carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform district and Army  authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures against sabotage."

[21] Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U.S.  Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not  only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the  available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to  evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.

The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26  November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum that it wa  known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese  regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1  December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It  was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the  United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of  a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State  Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further  that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted  from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first  thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy  Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the  thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the  reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to  the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within  narrow limits of time. 

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On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen  parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by  Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an  attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about  some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.

(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second  Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated  that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him  fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of  relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the  "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at  any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential  matter at outlying Pacific Islands.

[22] In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his  personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and  as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the  possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the  information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and  movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have  been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued  and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially  noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message  of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was  relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment  preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War  Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the  arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air  patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth  bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging  in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect  the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of  readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long- range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet  air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His  failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable  nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral  Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine  attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of  Naval Operations for an explanation.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court states that Admiral Kimmel  could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of  action were open to him, viz.:

(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct  long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made  the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have  resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less  routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port;

(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control  organizations fully operational.

Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:

"The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese  carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under  radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable pre-

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cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were: 

"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

[23] "(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft  readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept  possible attack forces.

"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry  into port at irregular intervals.

"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and  aircraft warning installations."

I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which  Admiral Kimmel could and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to  conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest  from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following  conclusion, which is hereby approved.

"Conclusion 14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel  could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning,"  as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning  service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant  air reconnaissance from Oahu."

During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the  aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the  only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled  to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings,  would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force  contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any  other single factor.

In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in  Chief, U.S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was of course always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his  organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective  joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of  the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency  as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.

[24] 15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,  to the Naval Court record concludes that:

"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the  evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be  the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of  superior judgment may not result in future errors."

16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Fleet, states in part:

"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge  Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following  opinions are submitted:

"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that

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the  evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other  proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously  expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless  inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment  necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties. 

"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of  these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment  may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it  impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan,  nor are court [25] martial or other proceedings (prior to the  termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such  proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information  which would be detrimental to current military operations and to  national security measures."

17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:

"1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in  the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former  investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the  pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I  believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be  considered completed.

"2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which  impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a  distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of  placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that  there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible  officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical  period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those  officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected  from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor  was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the  necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of  these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all  possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

"3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any  great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views.  Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese  sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principle  been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The  security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic  concept of responsible officers.

[26] "4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted: 

"(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

"(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable  Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that  it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did.  In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these  officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly  defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated

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