REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

"(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members  of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a  court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or  during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many  of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired  lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter,  the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having  been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more  than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely  new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a  former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to  challenge. The summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in  temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers  in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the  opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of  hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to  the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six  months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously  impair the efficiency of the naval service."

18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate  General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief,  U.S. Fleet, thereto; the record, findings, and conclusions of Admiral  Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis  of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:

(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.

(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941,  failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.

(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to  active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.

(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure  of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in  these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken  without injuring current military operations or the national security.

19. Accordingly, I direct:

(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of  superior judgment.

(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior  judgment. 

(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these  investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without  injuring current military operations or the national security.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

Page 371

NOTE

This endorsement released by President Truman 29 August 1945-thereby changing classification.

[1]

13 AUGUST 1945.

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF  INQUIRY

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,  ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further  investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the  Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.

1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The  commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December  7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect  for Joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty  on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other  respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate  measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The  attitude of each that he was not required to inform himself of, and his  lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out  the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the  plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of  appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in  their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding  general, Hawaiian Department."

2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944 Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of  witnesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the  Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to  proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the  Pearl Harbor catastrophe and to commence such proceedings against such  persons as the facts might justify.

[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral  Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN  as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed  to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for  the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the  attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on  7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include  in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be  established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to  whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the  part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its  opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred,  to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain  portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the  findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET" in  the interest of national security, and the balance "SECRET."

The material which was classified "TOP SECRET" was so classified by the Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the  recommendation of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval  Operations because of the extreme care which has been necessary to  safeguard information in the hands of the Navy Department and especially  the sources of that information. These sources were many, including the  Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the Office of Strategic  Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now informs me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of  this infor-

Page 372

mation be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part,  publication of which in the opinion of the Commander in Chef, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would necessarily disclose the sources of secret information. To the same end in the discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret information.

6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of  the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval  Operations, and by me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not  warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any  person or persons in the Naval Service.

7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the  evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the  part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not  gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I  directed that further investigation would be conducted by an  investigating officer and that pending [3] the completion of the  necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the  institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the  prior investigations upon the completion of this review of prior  investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl  Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,  USN, as investigating officer, to examine such witnesses and obtain such  other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop and  clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl  Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.

9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements  to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the  following remarks:

(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and  the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he  anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the  Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the  opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel  did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance  schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet states further in this  connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods  of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible  for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in  port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I  concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.

(b) Court Of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . . "  make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as  a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of  avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional  requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a  definite handicap. Though, in contrast with our Constitutional  principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was but a repetition of  the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating hostilities  and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any  proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and  the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction  as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or  a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it [4] appears that prior to 7 December  1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his  responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance  of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.

(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of  assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently,  Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with  local defense.

Page 373

Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's investigation, it appears that:

(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific  Fleet patrol planes.

(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were  operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by  him at that time which were not revised prior to the attack. The  schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant  reconnaissance from Oahu.

(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V. The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly cordial and  cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being  taken by the other.

In this connection upon all the evidence it appears:

(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet with the available means various types of attack  including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war  plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet  that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a  state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between  the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was  the ease prior to the attack.

(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the  local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of  attack which presupposed the possession and exchange of information  concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

[5] (3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of  information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there  was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and  Navy at Hawaii which included the transmission to the Army of some  information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained  both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates  however that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It  appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions.  They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear  that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to  be placed in effect or the question or advisability of placing in effect  air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed in effect Army Alert  No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did  not know which degree of alert the Army had in effect and that he made  no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection. 

That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November  1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to  United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He  testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be  furnished to General Short and that he did not know whether or not they  were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen  these dispatches.

In view of these facts I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation of joint  command was of working effectively—it failed. 

War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is there must be unity of  command. However it is important to point out that the experience of  this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency  between the existence of two or more separate military or naval  organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of  unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the  major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more  distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations  but all

Page 374

acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical  proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters  or command post.

[6] I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine  contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior  to the air attack. The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language.  Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer.

(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the  effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor. 

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to  the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority,  and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of  strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.  Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it  overlooks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into  account in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and  War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence  advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that  the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes  a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel  was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships  of the Fleet in port had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With  this I concur. It is to be noted moreover, that under the defense plan  the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

[7] (h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon  Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local  defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was  sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal;  that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could;  that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited  to the danger that threatened that it is doubtful whether with the  available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers  before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance that Admiral  Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to  his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage  resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in  Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.

(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed  his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.

(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called  for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of  readiness would have added little to the defense.

Page 375

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that  condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the  Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

[8] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of  readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view  that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening  up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the  comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.

(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to  attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to  predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as  indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time  could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel,  particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December  1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.  This information consisted principally of daily radio intelligence  summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval  communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It  appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls  on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional  progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale;  that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet  Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and  that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the  absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written  estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of  four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were  among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading  toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the  Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home  waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In  his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer,  Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. N., described his conversation with  Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:

"Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied,  'No, sir, I do not. I think they are [9] in home waters, but I do not  know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of  their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a  twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that  effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . .

"Q. Your testimony Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke.  What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence  of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must  estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we  haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they  finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when  he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say that they could  be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he  was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"A This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in  the way to

Page 376

point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that:  "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,  since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the  change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been  recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb" and that  the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to  the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.

[10] In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the  Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the  view that the information as to the location and movements of the  Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the  week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which  he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the  Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating  that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an  attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long range reconnaissance was  sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that  such use of the available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to  make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors  to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all  of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears  that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no  attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation  became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the  Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means  available did not permit an all- ound daily reconnaissance to a distance  necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be  launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous  than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such  particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to  Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the following points may be noted:

(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by  Admiral Bloch at that time.

(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

[11]  (3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning " as to the advisability or practicability of long range  reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject  must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The  Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any  of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance  daily for more than a few days.

(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,  for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees  to a distance of about 700 miles.

(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the  Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors  probably would have been searched.

(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

Page 377

(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the  radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic  state, nevertheless even in its then condition it could have and should  have served to give at least all hour's warning of the attack.

(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December  1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions [12] of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor,  was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful  principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo,  which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft  torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which  the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding  that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at  that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in  waters as shallows as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view  the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in  1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully  launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water  at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court  also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval  Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict  with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that:  "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe  when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient  run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes  launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of  water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.

The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described  the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this  report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and  that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which  torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of  an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary  Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second  only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of  attack upon Pearl Harbor which [13] he considered likely. His letter had  been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February  by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(P) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made  after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the  approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16  October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the  information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17  October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which stated that a  surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the  Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "*A  surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the  Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on  the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on  those two places would be on foreign territory but that the words also  included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The Court refers in its finding to a part personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark

Page 378

stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I  tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also  continued: "perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long  pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a  postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel  assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in  order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any  such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that,  while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully  planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be  difficult to detect. However. We are on guard to the best of our  ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of  the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the  critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.

[14] (q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the  Far East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of  Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He  notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a  commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl  Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably  strengthened by information available at Washington, not all of which  vas available to Admiral Kimmel. 

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would  include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information  received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been  approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of  war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly  possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location  and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with  these estimates.

The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to  the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of  Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which  was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941,  indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in  Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to  December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of  four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to  any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as  to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which  was possible to them, under radio silence. Through the unguarded areas  of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air  attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable  precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.

(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1911 to  transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information [15] in his possession constitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give  Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in  Washington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral  Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to  the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the  conclusions of the Court based thereon were concerned principally with  the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the  facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence who  was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded  that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.

Page 379

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who  was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who according to  other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with  the handling of such information, would be most helpful. Captain  McCollum was also available as a witness to the Court. I ascertaine  that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were  actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so  engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties  which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined  that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their  testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.

During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other  testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this  evidence the following conclusions appear:

(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington,  concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic  negotiations and its intention to wage war. 

[16] (2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained  by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to  intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War  Department had information which led that Department to believe that  Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General  Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic  reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain  information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval  vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army  planes were not made ready.

(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to  all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not  communicate to him important information which would have aided him  materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In  particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of  November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means  certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the  Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December  7th, were unfortunate.

(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and  that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were  imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important  messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war  warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important  subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus  Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton,  who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this  and other important messages.

[17]  10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General  at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were  secured at Honolulu but no information was obtained prior to December  7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal  restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite  handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the  part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that  no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second  Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power 

Go to Next Page