REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS

not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about, 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which  indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.  Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at State Department.

(3) At about 10:30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was  received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese  Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to  in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P.M. on  that day. Information was of significance because 1:00 P. M. in  Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office  of the Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point  out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that  the information just received pointed to the possibility—even  probability—of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states  this information came to his attention about 11:00 A. M. and that he  immediately telephone [sic] to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn  General [13] Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an  attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at  first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief  consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed  dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General  Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting  what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 P. M. Washington time on 7  December; and that while the War Department did not know the  significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert  accordingly and to inform naval authorities of  this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch  left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M. Honolulu time. This  was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had  decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway.  The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been  received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court  remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or  which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness suited to the  circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval  base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go with  this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would been  of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of  readiness existing on board ship.

[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and  consular in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their  codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning  newspaper in Honolulu," and he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning  of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the  destruction of Secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant  destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy Secret and confidential  documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."

(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 25 November  reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese  short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This inform was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had

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it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the  expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December.  Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were  transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and Admiral  Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them.  *It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts [1] were  never sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4)  above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and  consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy  certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII)  that 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be  unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence  of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court  points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the  Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important  developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."

(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with  information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the  latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important  phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16] seem essential thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not  available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes  that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that  Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; [2] however, it appears to that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

[17] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view  that presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary. And that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet did not require any departure from his  operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to  believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.

(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that  deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an  adverse bear upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on  and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army  and Navy were short of and material at the time and that available means were spread thin through the various areas of probable hostility. The  shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did  not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not informed by the Navy  Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of  the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to  some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the indications  of that information which was given to him.

[1] Later investigations indicate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.

[2] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the opinions or facts established.

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[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the  defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th  Naval District and that the defense of the base was a joint operation  only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this a narrow view of  the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of  the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect  Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties  satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval  defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the  availability of aircraft belonging and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, the plans were ineffective because  they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance  knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of  time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that  available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the  danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it  would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of  the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese  did attack.

[19] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur  in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures  taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only  had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7  December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps  that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day naval planes should have been in the  air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question  at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening of  precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral  Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range  reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the  attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of  time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if  all available information had placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and  that if he had evaluated it properly he would have found it necessary to  do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately  preceding the 7th of December.

[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XV II, the Court expresses the  view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and  Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December.  However, it was not illogical to suppose an attack on Pearl Harbor would  be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this  possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received  in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

[21] (j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the court presses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he received regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the  morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact  that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this

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Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and  his principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating  an attack in the Hawaiian area.  While I concur in the views of the  Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed  upon the information, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer  (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did  take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the  fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight  in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident, that though Admiral Stark  did have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this  information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least  some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that  had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a  matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no  exception to this expression of opinion.  However, it is a fair  conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of information  available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge  the situation better than he did.

[22]  4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no  offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of  any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no  further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not  adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this  does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate. 

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree  likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the  Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond  human power to prevent or mitigate. It true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people are unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and  Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. Attention should have been centered on those two  places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been  informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral  Kimmel felt the need for early accurate information [23] as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the best and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his  initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running  picture the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the  information able in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26  November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain  information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in  Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the  broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral  Stark's office. This together with the handling of other matters of  information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(3) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the  information which he received indicating that a message was to be given  to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark  received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were  appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. [24] It appears that  had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last

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minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in  Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States  and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark  to keep him fully informed nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had  the "war warning" of 27 November; the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6  December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter in outlying Pacific Islands.  These messages must be considered in connection with other facts of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be must given consideration.  After weighing those considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action  were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors.   Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the  Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the  Japanese task more difficult.

[25] (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in  a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would  have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours  before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes  would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships'  batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control  organizations would have been full [sic] operational.

6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral stark and Admiral Kimmel were  faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for  exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence  adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to position in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF  INQUIRY

[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of  the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, a Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I  find the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of  judgment part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of  all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an  investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for  further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet in the  Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Memo for File:

This is the Sec'ys 4th End that was not used because it contained magic; instead the Secy signed the one of Aug 13, that the President made public Aug 29, from which the magic was deleted in the public interest.

JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR
Special Assistant to the Secretary

[1] TOP SECRET

Fourth Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese  armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., ordered by the  Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.

1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission  headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate  action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect  for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other  respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate  measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his  lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned  to such other under the provisions of the  plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of  appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in  their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding  general, Hawaiian Department."

2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed  the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the  Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such  persons as the facts might justify.

[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S.N.,  (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U.S.N., (Retired), with Commander Harold  Biesemeier, U.S.N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944.  The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter  as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances  connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor,  Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it  might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state  its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame  incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious  blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain  portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET,"  and the balance "SECRET."

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6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl  Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval  Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did  not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of  any person or persons in the Naval Service.

7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl  Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had  not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.  Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by  an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the  institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every  material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the  prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination  of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I  appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., as investigating officer, and  John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such  other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts  in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further  investigation directed by my precept of [3] 2 May 1945 was completed on 12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge  Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and  Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.

9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further  investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient  evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval law; that the evidence indicated that the  officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty  of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General  further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion  that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities  with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war  effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months  immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the  efficiency of the Naval service." Notwithstanding the difficulties  pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion,  however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral  Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist.  The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that  Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything  contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be  done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December  1941.

10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August  1945, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by  court martial of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the  Navy; that with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet was still of the  opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to  a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the  superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with  their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relegation  of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might  not result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and  Admiral Kimmel, and stated that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement,  that in any event he considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark  or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure  of information which would be detrimental to current military operations  and to [4] national security measures. He

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concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy  Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that this action should not be taken until after the completion of  hostilities with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the  Judge Advocate General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this  record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.

11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in  Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements  to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements  to the report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following  remarks:

(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that  the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and  the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the  effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he  anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the  Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the  opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel  did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance  schedules. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, states further in this  connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods  of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible  for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in  port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I  concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this  finding.

(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that,  "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ."  make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as  a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of  avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, comments that this gives an  unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional  requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a  definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate  causal relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the  instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to  overt acts did not preclude either long [5] distance reconnaissance or a  sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941,  Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his  responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance  of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.

(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of  assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.

It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:

"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific  Fleet patrol planes.

"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral  Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were  operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."

(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V.—The court here finds that relations  between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being  taken by the other.

In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:

"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack,  including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a  state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between  the local com-

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manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of  mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of  attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information  concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there  was no organized system to ensure such exchange."

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were  informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some  information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It  appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December  1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions.  They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear  that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to  be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in  effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect  Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified  that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.

That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears  from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He  testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they  were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen  these dispatches. 

In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the  Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not working effectively—it failed. In this connection the following  conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major  decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of command."

However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is  important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively  demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or [7] more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning  forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have  been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and  their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the  higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.

I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for  having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine  contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior  to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the following conclusion by him, which is approved:

"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack  on Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in  plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army  unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption  which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced."

(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that  unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the  effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.

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The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief,  U.S. Fleet.

(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an  initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of  strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.  Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a  disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and  War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence  advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

[8] The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the  fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel  was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense  plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet  aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local  defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact  that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was  sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal,  that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could, that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited  to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the  available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that  Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, with respect to this  finding.

(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed  his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is  approved.

(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective  Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.  The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called  for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense. 

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition  of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, further states that he does not  agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of  readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concur.

(l) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to

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