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PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA: SHORT PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS |
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[b]CHAPTER 4: Some Observations on the Antithesis of the Thing-in-itself and the Phenomenon[/b]
§ 61
Thing-in-itself expresses that which exists independently of perception through any of our senses, and so that which really and truly is. For Democritus this was formed matter; at bottom, it was still the same for Locke; for Kant it was an x, for me it is will.
How Democritus took the matter entirely in this sense and thus comes at the head of this group, is shown by the following passage from Sextus Empiricus (Adversus mathematicos, lib. III, § 135) who had his works before him and often quotes from them verbatim:
[x], and so on. (Democritus autem ea quidem tollit, quae apparent sensibus, et ex iis dicit nihil ut vere est apparere, sed solum ex opinione; verum autem esse in iis, quae sunt, atomos et inane). [1] I recommend the reader to go through the whole passage, where it further states: [x] (vere quidem nos, quale sit vel non sit unumquodque, neutiquam intelligimus), [2] also [x] ([x]) [x] (vere scire, quale sit unumquodque, in dubio est). [3] All this simply states that 'we do not know things according to what they may be in themselves, but merely as they appear', and opens up the series that starts from the most decided materialism, but leads to idealism and ends with me. A strikingly clear and definite distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon, even in the proper Kantian sense, is found in a passage of Porphyry which Stobaeus has preserved for us in the forty-third chapter of his first book, third fragment. It runs: [x]. [4] (vol. ii, p. 716.)
§ 62
Just as we know only the surface of the globe, but not the great solid mass of its interior, so we know empirically of things and of the world generally nothing but their phenomenal appearance, i.e. the surface. The precise knowledge of this is physics taken in the widest sense. But that this surface presupposes an interior that is not merely surface but has cubic content is, together with the conclusions as to its nature, the theme of metaphysics. To try to construct in accordance with the laws of the mere phenomenon the essence-in-itself of things, is an undertaking comparable to our trying to construct a stereometric body from mere surfaces and their laws. Every transcendent dogmatic philosophy is an attempt to construct the thing-in-itself in accordance with the laws of the phenomenon. This proves to be like the attempt to cover two absolutely dissimilar figures by each other, which never succeeds because one or other corner sticks out, however we turn the figures.
§ 63
Since every being in nature is simultaneously phenomenon and thing-in-itself, or even natura naturata [5] and natura naturans, [6] it is accordingly capable of a twofold explanation, a physical and a metaphysical. The physical explanation is always from the cause, the metaphysical always from the will; for it is this which manifests itself as a natural force in nature-without-knowledge and higher up as vital force, but which in animal and man receives the name of will. Strictly speaking, the degree and tendency of his intellect and the moral make-up of his character might possibly be deduced in a given man even in a purely physical way. Thus his intellect could be deduced from the constitution of his brain and nervous system together with the blood circulation affecting these; and his character from the structure and combined action of his heart, vascular system, blood, lungs, liver, spleen, kidneys, intestines, genitals, and so on. But for this purpose, of course, we should require a much more precise knowledge of the laws that regulate the rapport du physique au moral [7] than that possessed even by Bichat and Cabanis (Cf. § 102). Intellect and character could then be reduced to a remoter physical cause, to the condition and disposition of his parents, in that these were able to furnish the germ only for a being like themselves, but not for one higher and better. Metaphysically, however, the same human being would have to be explained as the phenomenon of his own perfectly free and original will that has created for itself the intellect appropriate to it. Therefore however necessarily all his deeds proceed from his character in conflict with the given motives and this again appears as the result of his corporization, such deeds are nevertheless to be attributed entirely to him. But now metaphysically the difference between him and his parents is not absolute.
§ 64
To understand is always an act of making a representation or mental picture and therefore remains essentially within the domain of the representation. Now as this furnishes only phenomena, all understanding is limited to the phenomenon. Where the thing-in- itself begins, the phenomenon ends and hence also the representation and with this the understanding. But in its place there comes that which is and exists itself and is conscious of itself as will. If this becoming conscious of ourselves were immediate, we should have a wholly adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself. This, however, is brought about by the fact that the will creates for itself the organic body and, by means of a part thereof, an intellect, but then first through such intellect finds and recognizes itself in self-consciousness as will. Consequently, this knowledge of the thing-in-itself is primarily conditioned by the separation, already contained therein, of a knower and a known and then by the form of time that is inseparable from cerebral self-consciousness; and therefore such knowledge is not wholly exhaustive and adequate. (Compare this with chapter 18 of volume two of my chief work.)
Connected with this is the truth which is discussed under the heading 'Physical Astronomy' in my work On the Will in Nature, and which states that the more clearly we are able to comprehend an event or relation, the more does this lie in the mere phenomenon and does not concern the thing-in-itself.
The difference between thing-in-itself and phenomenon may also be expressed as that between the subjective and objective essence of a thing. Its purely subjective essence is just the thing-in- itself; but this is not an object of knowledge. For it is essential to such an object always to be present in a knowing consciousness as the representation thereof. What manifests itself there is just the objective essence of the thing. Accordingly, this is object of knowledge; but as such it is mere representation and can become this only by means of a representation-apparatus that must have its own peculiar nature and the laws resulting therefrom. Consequently, it is a mere phenomenon that may be related to a thing-in-itself. This holds good also where there is present a self-consciousness and thus a self-knowing I or ego. For this also knows itself only in its intellect, i.e. in its representation-apparatus, and indeed through the outer sense as organic form and through the inner as will. It sees the acts of this will repeated by that form as simultaneously as are those of this form by its shadow; and from this it infers the identity of the two, which it calls I or ego. But on account of this twofold knowledge as also of the great proximity in which the intellect here stands to its source or root, the will, the knowledge of the objective essence and thus of the phenomenon here differs much less from the subjective, from the thing-in-itself, than in the case of knowledge by means of the outer sense, or in the case of the consciousness of other things in contrast to self-consciousness. Thus in so far as self-consciousness knows through the inner sense alone, there still adheres to it only the form of time, no longer that of space; and so the form of time and the falling apart into subject and object are all that separates it from the thing-in-itself.
§ 65
When we perceive and contemplate some natural creature, an animal for instance, in its existence, life, and action, it stands before us as an unfathomable mystery, in spite of all that zoology and zootomy tell us about it. But then should nature out of mere obstinacy remain eternally dumb to our question? Is she not, like everything great, open, communicative, and even naive? Therefore can her answer ever fail for any reason except that the question was wrongly put, one-sided, started from false assumptions, or even contained a contradiction? Indeed, is it conceivable that there can be a connection of grounds and consequents where it must eternally and essentially remain undiscovered? Certainly not. On the contrary, it is unfathomable because we look for grounds and consequents in a sphere to which this form is foreign; and so we follow the chain of grounds and consequents on an entirely wrong track. Thus we try to reach the inner essence of nature, which confronts us in every phenomenon, by following the guiding line of the principle of sufficient reason (or ground); whereas this principle is the mere form with which our intellect apprehends the phenomenal appearance, i.e. the surface, of things, but with which we attempt to go beyond the phenomenon. For within the phenomenon the principle of sufficient reason is useful and adequate. For instance, the existence of a given animal may be explained from its generation. Thus, at bottom, generation is no more mysterious than is the sequence of any other effect, even the simplest, from its cause, since even in the case of such an effect the explanation ultimately comes up against the incomprehensible. In the case of generation, we lack a few more intermediate links of the connection, but this makes no essential difference; for even if we had these links, we should still find ourselves at the incomprehensible. All this is because the phenomenon remains phenomenon and does not become the thing-in-itself.
The inner essence of things is foreign to the principle of sufficient reason; it is the thing-in-itself and this is pure will. It is because it wills, and wills because it is. It is that which is absolutely real in every being.
§ 66
The fundamental character of all things is their fleeting nature and transitoriness. In nature we see everything, from metal to organism, corroded and consumed partly by its own existence, partly through conflict with something else. Now how could nature throughout endless time endure the maintenance of forms and the renewal of individuals, the countless repetition of the life-process, without becoming weary, unless her own innermost kernel were something timeless and thus wholly indestructible, a thing-in-itself quite different from its phenomena, something metaphysical that is distinct from everything physical? This is the will in ourselves and in everything.
The entire centre of the world is in every living being, and therefore its own existence is to it all in all. On this rests also egoism. To imagine that death annihilates it is absolutely absurd as all existence proceeds from it alone. (Cf. World as Will and Representation, vol. ii, chap. 41.)
§ 67
We complain of the obscurity in which we pass our lives without understanding the connection of existence as a whole, but in particular that between ourselves and the whole. Thus not only is our life short, but our knowledge is also entirely limited thereto; for we cannot look back to the time before our birth or forward to the time after our death. Consequently, our consciousness is, so to speak, only a flash that momentarily lights up the night. Accordingly, it really looks as if a demon had mischievously obstructed from us all further knowledge in order to gloat over our embarrassment.
But this complaint is not really justified, for its springs from an illusion, the result of the false fundamental view that the totality of things came from an intellect and consequently existed as mere mental picture or representation before it became actual, and that accordingly as it had sprung from knowledge, it was bound to be wholly accessible thereto and thus capable of being fathomed and exhaustively treated. But in truth the case might rather be that all we complain of not knowing is not known by anyone, indeed is in itself not even knowable at all, in other words, is not capable of being represented in anyone's head. For the representation, in whose domain all knowing is to be found and to which all knowledge therefore refers, is only the external side of existence, something secondary and additional, hence something that was not necessary for the maintenance of things generally and thus of the world as a whole, but merely for the maintenance of individual animal beings. Therefore the existence of things in general and as a whole enters knowledge only per accidens and consequently to a very limited extent. It forms only the background of the picture in animal consciousness where the objects of the will are the essential thing and occupy first place. Now it is true that, by means of this accident, the entire world arises in space and time, that is, the world as representation which has no such existence at all outside knowledge. On the other hand, the innermost essence of this world, that which exists in itself, is quite independent of such an existence. Now since, as I have said, knowledge exists only for the purpose of maintaining each animal individual, its whole nature, all its forms, such as time, space and so on, are adapted merely to the aims of such an individual. Now these aims require only the knowledge of relations between individual phenomena and certainly not that of the inner essence of things and of the world as a whole.
Kant has shown that the problems of metaphysics which more or less perplex everyone, are in no way capable of any direct, or indeed of any satisfactory, solution. Now, in the last resort, this is due to the fact that such problems have their origin in the forms of our intellect, in time, space, and causality; whereas such intellect has merely the business of presenting to the individual will its motives, in other words, of showing it the objects of its willing together with the ways and means of gaining possession thereof. If, however, this intellect is abused and turned to the essence-in-itself of things, to the totality and coherence of the world, then the aforesaid forms attaching to it of the coexistence, succession, and causation of all possible things give birth to such metaphysical problems as the origin and purpose of the world, its beginning and end, the problem of one's own self, of the destruction of this through death or of its continuation in spite of death, the problem of the freedom of the will, and many another. Now if we imagine these forms to be abolished and yet a consciousness of things to exist, then such problems would not be exactly solved, but would rather have entirely disappeared and their expression would no longer have any meaning. For they spring wholly and entirely from those forms that are not concerned at all with the comprehension of the world and of existence, but merely with that of our personal aims.
The whole of this consideration furnishes us with an elucidation and objective justification of Kant's doctrine which is established by him merely from the subjective side, that the forms of the understanding are merely of immanent, not transcendent, application. Thus instead of this, we could say also that the intellect is physical, not metaphysical; in other words, that, just as it has sprung from the will, belonging as it does to the objectification thereof, it also exists merely to serve the will. But this service concerns only things in nature, not anything that lies beyond her. As I have explained and substantiated in the work On the Will in Nature, every animal obviously has its intellect merely for the purpose of being able to discover and obtain its food; and accordingly, this also determines the measure of such intellect. Matters are no different with man, only that the greater difficulty of his maintenance and the infinite variety of his needs have here rendered necessary a much greater measure of intellect. Only when this is exceeded through something abnormal, does there appear a perfectly free surplus which, if considerable, is called genius. Only in this way does such an intellect first become really objective; but it may go so far as to become to a certain extent even metaphysical, or at any rate to endeavour so to be. For precisely in consequence of its objectivity, nature herself, the totality of things, now becomes its object and problem. Thus in it nature first begins really to perceive herself as something which is and yet might not be or might well be otherwise; whereas in the ordinary merely normal intellect nature does not clearly perceive herself; just as the miller does not hear his mill and the perfumer does not notice the odour in his shop. To such an intellect nature appears as a matter of course and it is held captive by her. Only at certain brighter moments does it become aware of nature and is wellnigh terrified by her; but this soon passes off. Accordingly, we soon see what such normal minds can achieve in philosophy even when they congregate in crowds. On the other hand, if the intellect were metaphysical, originally and by disposition, such minds, especially with their united strength, could advance philosophy just as they can any other branch of knowledge.
_______________ [b]Notes:[/b]
1 ['Since Democritus denies that which appears to sense-perception, he maintains that nothing of this phenomenon appears as it is in reality, but only as it seems to us. However, the existence of atoms and of the void is truly real.']
2 ['Truly, therefore, we know not how each thing is constituted or is not constituted.']
3 ['It is difficult to know how everything is constituted.']
4 ['If it is stated of the sensuous and material that it is extended in all directions and is changeable, then this is actually the case .... But of that which truly is and exists in itself, it is true to say that it is eternally grounded in itself and likewise that it always remains the same ... .' (Eclogae, lib. I, c. 35, ed. Gaisford, p. 281.)]
5 ['Created nature'.]
6 ['Creative nature'.]
7 ['Relation of the physical to the moral'.]
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