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THEIR KINGDOM COME -- INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OPUS DEI |
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21. United Trading
RUIZ-MATEOS WAS NOT ALONE IN MAINTAINING THAT OPUS DEI controlled a transnational network of banks and financial institutions. In addition to Banco Popular Espanol and Credit Andorra, he believed that the network included Nordfinanz Bank in Zurich. But one supposes other components existed in Argentina, Peru, Hong Kong or Singapore, wherever the Work did business. Opus Dei did not insist on physical control of the banks in its network, and always the links remained well hidden, almost impossible to detect. One theory we shall now explore is that Opus Dei wanted to control, imagined it controlled, or actually did control Milan's Banco Ambrosiano. As always in these situations, Opus Dei would have worked through a restricted circle of people, some unaware that they were being used, while others, if they suspected, remained unsure as to who was manipulating whom and for what purposes. One of the key figures in the Ambrosiano affair was Paul Casimir Marcinkus, a priest from Chicago who was known in Rome as a fixer. Marcinkus was ambitious, wanting to become the first American Curial cardinal and grand elector of future popes. He thought he could achieve this by assuming control of the papal purse strings. Early on in his career he had caught the eye of Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York who advised Paul VI to take the young American prelate under his wing. Affable, golf-playing and occasionally cigar-smoking, Marcinkus worked at the time as a translator in the Secretariat of State. From the outset, financial matters dominated Paul VI's pontificate. The Italian government announced it was going to tax Vatican holdings, which caused the papal money managers to seek ways of diversifying the Holy See's investments. This led to the sale by the IOR of its choicest bank holding, Banca Cattolica del Veneto, which had deposits of $700 million. An option to buy the bank was given to Milan lawyer Michele Sindona, regarded at the time as one of Italy's leading financial wizards. In early 1969 details of Sindona's dealings with the Vatican were leaked to the press and overnight he became a national figure. One of Sindona's closest friends in Rome was Mark Antinucci, an Italo-American businessman who owned the Rome Daily American, a newspaper that had CIA connections. Antinucci and Marcinkus played golf together at Rome's Holy Waters Golf Club. As early as 1967, Antinucci talked to Sindona about Marcinkus. In 1963, when Paul VI began monitoring his 'career, Marcinkus was supervising the construction of Rome's most luxurious priests' residence, the Villa Stritch. Paul VI asked him to help his personal secretary, Father Pasquale Macchi, organize the Eucharist Congress planned for Bombay at the end of the year. Marcinkus and Macchi hit it off well. For the next few years they virtually ran the papal household, and anyone hoping for a confidential chat with the Holy Father had to pass through them. Marcinkus masterminded the Pope's eight remaining foreign journeys, and saved Paul's life by overpowering a knife-wielding assailant as he lunged through the crowd at Manila's international airport. After Spellman's death in December 1967, US contributions to the Vatican decreased significantly. Father Macchi suggested that Marcinkus might be the man to reverse the situation. The idea appealed to the pontiff who decided to shift Marcinkus into a vacant position at the IOR, under the octogenarian Cardinal Di Jorio. Marcinkus was an excellent organizer but had no experience as a banker. He requested time off to visit a couple of big money-centre banks, study their systems and see from the inside how they operated. The request granted, he went to Chase Manhattan in New York, in his own words, 'for a day or two ... to see how stocks and stuff operated', and then to Continental Illinois in Chicago, where he was given 'a kind of three-day course, taking me through everything'. [1] He spent another day with the Continental Finance Corporation in Chicago to learn about trust operations, followed by a final day-long tour of a small local bank. In those seven days, Marcinkus became an international banker, equipped to play a leading role in managing the Vatican's finances. On Christmas Eve 1968, Paul VI made him titular Bishop of Orta, and two weeks later confirmed the new bishop's appointment as the IOR's secretary. Marcinkus's starting salary was $6,400 per annum. Sindona transferred the Banca Cattolica option to Roberto Calvi, a central manager at Milan's Banco Ambrosiano. Calvi became Sindona's understudy in the hidden-hand operations that now evolved between Milan and the Vatican. The two had met some months previously. Sindona, who rarely had a good word to say about anybody, sensed that Calvi wanted to place some of Ambrosiano's offshore funds in joint ventures with him. Sindona implied that Calvi was interested not only in operating offshore, but off-the-books. Not long after getting to know Sindona, Calvi was promoted to general manager. Founded in 1896, Banco Ambrosiano's statutes stipulated that its operations should be devoted to furthering the Christian virtues of faith and charity. It is difficult to believe that either of these virtues led to the founding in 1956 of a Liechtenstein company called Lovelok. This concern, which became the bank's largest shareholder, was of unknown ownership. It may have been controlled by Carlo Canesi, Ambrosiano's then managing director and Calvi's boss, but this is only speculation. More probably it belonged to a hidden partner whose identity mayor may not have been known to Canesi. If taken to the furthest absurdity, the shroud of secrecy surrounding Lovelok meant that it could have been controlled by the Pope himself, or Opus Dei. One year later, Lovelok formed Banca del Gottardo in Lugano, placing 40 per cent of Gottardo's capital with the Ambrosiano. Then in May 1963, Lovelok founded a Luxembourg subsidiary called Compendium S.A. to buy more Banco Ambrosiano shares, mainly from cash-squeezed Church institutions, with monies borrowed from the Ambrosiano itself. Calvi was a character out of a Dostoyevsky novel. Of medium height, balding, with large, brooding eyes, he had served as a cavalry officer on the Russian front, keeping a live chicken under his greatcoat during the winter campaigns to warm his hands. In 1943, his tour of battlefront duty ended, he returned home and found work as a clerk with Banca Commerciale Italiana, a state-owned bank where his father was a manager. Because of his war experience, Calvi spoke fluent German. His English and French were less proficient. He joined the foreign department of Banco Ambrosiano in 1947, the same year that Marcinkus was ordained and Escriva de Balaguer moved permanently to Rome. For Clara Canetti, Roberto Calvi was the man with a 'Clark Gable moustache'. They met on the beach at Rimini during the summer of 1950 and Roberto courted her while Clara's 12-yearˇold brother acted as chaperon. She found him not at all shy. In fact she noted that he was even a bit presumptuous. From a well-to-do Bologna family, Clara was an extraordinarily beautiful young woman, an asset for any rising banker. They married a year later and after a honeymoon in the shadows of Monte Rosa they moved into a small apartment in the centre of Milan. They had two children -- Carlo and Anna -- and the family's closeness was the envy of many in their circle of friends. They bought a country estate overlooking the village of Drezzo, near Como; Clara considered it her personal corner of paradise. They were often seen walking through the narrow streets of Drezzo hand in hand, as if on a perpetual honeymoon. Calvi's first act when promoted Banco Ambrosiano's general manager was to bring Compendium out of its secret existence. He renamed it Banco Ambrosiano Holding S.A., and made it the spearhead of the group's offshore operations. This gave Ambrosiano's hidden partner, Lovelok, increased power in the group's affairs. To what extent this was part of a plan agreed to or even devised by Lovelok's true owners can only remain conjecture. Of course even the name of Banco Ambrosiano Holding was ambiguous as at the outset it was only 40 per cent owned by the supposed parent, Banco Ambrosiano. Another 20 per cent was held by Banca del Gottardo, and the remaining 40 per cent was controlled by still another mystery nominee, Radowal AG of Liechtenstein, through an account at the IOR. Banco Ambrosiano Holding formed a subsidiary bank in the Bahamas, which began its existence under the name of Cisalpine Overseas Bank, but was eventually changed to Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Limited. To simplify matters, from the outset we will call it Ambrosiano Overseas. Canesi confirmed Calvi's appointment as Ambrosiano Overseas's chairman. In April.1971, the IOR became a minority shareholder of the Nassau bank, acquiring 32 per cent of its voting rights. By then Marcinkus had succeeded Di Jorio as the IOR president. So ironclad was the IOR's confidence in this untested offshore bank that within a year it had no less than $73.5 million on deposit with it. Furthermore, 'Mr. Paul C. Marcinkus' accepted to become an Ambrosiano Overseas director. According to Sindona, Marcinkus enjoyed playing the role of international banker. He also enjoyed golfing on Nassau's Paradise Island championship course. Shortly after Marcinkus attended his first Nassau board meeting, Banco Ambrosiano exercised the option to acquire control of Banca Cattolica del Veneto. This came about in August 1971 but was not made public until the following March. How Calvi acquired the Banca Cattolica del Veneto option is in itself an interesting tale. He had bailed Sindona out of a heap of trouble by taking off his hands a lame-duck company called Pachetti for $40 million. Sindona had used Pachetti, a one-time leather goods manufacturer, for stock promotion purposes and, hyped out of its corporate socks, it was not worth the quarter of what Calvi paid for it. To sweeten the deal, however, Sindona had thrown in the option to buy 50 per cent of Banca Cattolica del Veneto for $46.5 million. In addition, Sindona was alleged to have paid a $6.5 million commission to Calvi and Marcinkus for taking over Pachetti. Through these operations, Banco Ambrosiano temporarily solved both Sindona's and the IOR's liquidity problems. Very strong! But the question could now be asked whether the Ambrosiano bought Banca Cattolica del Veneto with the IOR's own money? The answer would appear to be yes, unless -- another possibility -- it was fiduciary money belonging to an anonymous client, for example Lovelok or Radowal. Before consummating the Banca Cattolica transaction, Calvi asked Marcinkus to arrange a private audience with the Pope. Although the Vatican denies that the meeting took place, in a recorded conversation between the banker and a Sardinian businessman by the name of Flavio Carboni that later fell into the hands of the Milan magistrates, Calvi explained that he had insisted on seeing the Pope in order to be certain that the Holy Father was aware of what Marcinkus was up to. Not only was the Pope informed, Calvi said, but he thanked the banker for Ambrosiano's support. Unlike Sindona and Marcinkus, Calvi had been a bank employee all his professional life and Carlo Canesi had chosen him as his personal assistant for his discretion, innovation and high integrity. Calvi spoke rarely of professional matters outside of the bank. But he was not given to being oblique with the truth either. When he told his wife that he had dealings with Opus Dei, she certainly believed him. He neglected, however, to tell her when these dealings began and with whom he dealt. But one thing is certain. In 1971 Calvi started travelling regularly to Rome, and his business dealings there intensified in the winter of 1974-75. Among the names he did mention were Dr Francesco Cosentino, secretary-general of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (whom she said advised her husband on political matters), Flaminio Piccoli, chairman of the Christian Democrat party, and Loris Corbi, chairman of Condotte d'Acqua. Both Piccoli and Corbi were known to be dose to Opus Dei, or, as in the case of Corbi, dose to high-level Opus Dei people. Through Cosentino, Calvi also got to know Andreotti, Ortolani and Gelli. Clara referred to the former as the Great Intriguer, and she called the latter two il Gatto e la Volpe, after the Cat and the Fox who stole the gold pieces from Pinocchio. [2] In 1974, Caivi made the first charted use of Dr Arthur Wiederkehr's Zurich law firm, acquiring United Trading Corporation S.A., a Panamanian shell company. Everything indicates that Calvi was not acting on behalf of the Ambrosiano group but for a confidential client of the IOR, or for the IOR itself, as the IOR took possession of United Trading's entire share capital. But what gives us the greatest insight into the identity of Ambrosiano's hidden partner is that United Trading took over the assets of Radowal and Lovelok, as both were wound up. What the IOR wanted to achieve with United Trading, into which Calvi folded about $80 million of existing debt, is an interesting question. A logical explanation would be that the transferred debt had been incurred in a first instance by the IOR's confidential client and guaranteed -- as far as Calvi was concerned -- by the IOR itself. Otherwise why would the Vatican bank accept such a miserable deal? United Trading remains one of the great mysteries of the Vatican's financial operations up through the 1980s. The fact that it came out of the offices of Arthur Wiederkehr, who was chairman of Nordfinanz Bank, a Zurich bank suspected of being a turntable for Opus Dei monies, provides us with another clear hint of who stood behind it. United Trading had a subsidiary, Nordeurop AG, registered in Liechtenstein. Over the next few years Nordeurop (note similarity of name with Nordfinanz) came to owe nearly $400 million to Banco Ambrosiano's unit in Lima, Peru. Nordeurop would play an important role in the dealings that followed between Ambrosiano, the IOR and the undisclosed mystery client or, as Marcinkus later expressed it, the 'missing counterparty'. In trying to cast new light on United Trading's significance, we must look at what was happening in the world financial system, and remember that 1974 was at least the fifth consecutive year in which the Vatican ran a deficit. The year had started well enough. But few bankers or economists foresaw the consequences of the December 1973 decision by the Islamic oil producing states to quadruple the world price of oil. This produced a vast demand for dollars and from a 5 per cent annual growth rate, the world economy shifted in 1974 to a nil or minus growth rate and 12 per cent inflation. [3] The dollar squeeze led to the downfall of the Sindona banking empire, producing a loss to the Vatican estimated as high as $240 million, an earthquake of major proportions. Indeed, the quadrupling of world oil prices was later described as the most destructive economic event since the Second World War, with the Islamic oil producers siphoning out of the world economy an extra $80,000 million a year equivalent to 10 per cent of all world exports. The rise of Islam in the West can be said to have commenced from this date. Being prudent, Calvi had Banca del Gottardo in Lugano draw up a management contract for United Trading. It was boiler plate, except it stated that United Trading had been formed on instructions from the IOR. Monsignor Donato de Bonis and another IOR employee, Dr. Pellegrino de Strobel, signed the management contract. But Marcinkus later claimed that the contract was undated when they eventually signed it and then backdated by Calvi once he became executive chairman in November 1975. This assertion was strongly denied by Fernando Garzoni, Banca del Gottardo's chairman, and his general manager. Both assured the Milan magistrates that they had already signed and dated the contract when Calvi took it to Rome, and that 'the IOR knew it was operative as of that date'. This automatically cast doubt on the authenticity of a letter on Banco Ambrosiano stationery that was initialled (not signed) by Calvi. In this letter, with the hand-written date of 26 July 1977, Calvi acknowledged that the IOR was holding the United Trading shares on behalf of Banco Ambrosiano. The letter undertook to indemnify the IOR as the fiduciary owner and absolved it of responsibility for United Trading's affairs. At that point the IOR had advanced around $200 million to United Trading. In the best of cases the letter demonstrated the IOR's awareness that United Trading was a deceptive device. At worst, it was a forgery drafted long after the events to which it related. No copy of the document was uncovered in the files of Banco Ambrosiano, from where it is alleged to have originated. It contains elementary grammatical errors, suggesting it was written by someone whose mother tongue was not Italian. But when the Italian judiciary wished to examine the letter, it was unable to do so as the only extant version of the document was in the hands of the IOR. As the IOR is not domiciled in Italy, but in the Vatican City, the document could not be subpoenaed for scientific examination. In sworn testimony given in Milan in January 198'9, Banca del Gottardo's general manager told magistrates, 'Marcinkus confirmed to me that Calvi had been mandated by the IOR to act on its behalf.' [4] What could be more condemning? He had no reason to commit perjury. Marcinkus, on the other hand, refused to give evidence, preferring to hide behind the Vatican's Leonine Walls. In addition to owning a large block of Banco Ambrosiano shares, United Trading also controlled a rainbow of Latin shell companies that owed Ambrosiano a lot of money. But Calvi would have been unlikely to allow such a heavy concentration of unsecured debt to build up unless he was following the orders of Ambrosiano's largest shareholder and hidden partner. Because of United Trading's growing debt, during the second half of 1977 the first cracks began to appear in Ambrosiano's corporate edifice. At the time Sindona, then a fugitive from Italian justice, was languishing in his million-dollar suite at the Pierre Hotel in New York, wondering how he was going to pay his legal bills. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had sunk $1,700 million into his bankrupt Franklin National Bank. Sindona then had the idea of asking Calvi to contribute $500,000 to his defence fund. Calvi prevaricated with the result that when Banco Ambrosiano employees arrived for work on 13 November 1977 they found Milan's financial district plastered with posters accusing their chairman of 'fraud, issuing false accounts, dissimulating assets, illegal export of currency and tax swindling'. The posters also alleged that Calvi had received tens of millions of dollars in undeclared kickbacks from his dubious dealings with Sindona. Calvi sent out a clean-up squad to remove the posters, but the Italian news magazine l'Espresso got hold of one and published the story. Luigi Cavallo, known as il Provocatore, was the artist behind this attack on Calvi's integrity. He ran a news service called 'Agenzia A'. After the Espresso story appeared, he wrote to Calvi threatening further disclosures if he did not reconsider 'the possibility of honouring the undertakings so freely made by you some years ago'. Calvi decided to meet Sindona's attorney in Rome, and eventually agreed to pay the $500,000 into a numbered account in Switzerland. The money was transferred from a United Trading account in Nassau. [5] As a result of Luigi Cavallo's hi-jinx, the Bank of Italy ordered an investigative audit of Banco Ambrosiano. In April 1978, a Bank of Italy inspector, Giulio Padalino, arrived at the Ambrosiano headquarters in Milan with a team of fifty auditors. Calvi seemed unperturbed. After weeks of digging and sifting, Padalino found that the Ambrosiano's domestic operations were, on the whole, successful and well run. The bank's foreign operations, on the other hand, were of such complexity that he suspected they covered a way of transferring Italian currency out of Italy. Padalino confronted Calvi. The banker denied any wrongdoing. However the audit indicated that breaches of the exchange control laws had occurred. Irked by Calvi's lack of co-operation, Padalino promised further enquiries. Confident that the threat would come to nothing, Calvi left Milan on an extended business trip to South America. While the Bank of Italy investigations continued, activity at the Villa Tevere centred on preparing a new file for Paul VI concerning Opus Dei's transformation to a Personal Prelature. In June 1978, Pope Paul 'encouraged' Don Alvaro del Portillo to present a formal petition to obtain the 'desired juridical status'. This coincided with a further worsening in the Vatican's finances. Cardinal Villot, now actively on Opus Dei's side, had for two years been pressing Pope Paul to do something about the deteriorating situation. [6] But before Don Alvaro could draft the petition, on 6 August 1978 Paul VI died. As the cardinals gathered in Rome for the Conclave, Opus Dei's allies made sure that the Vatican's financial problems remained at the forefront of their thoughts. Prior to the Conclave, the new rules decreed by Paul VI before his death required the cardinals to hold daily meetings, called General Congregations, under the chairmanship of the camerlingo (chamberlain) who presides over the Church prior to the election of a new pope. The camerlingo has the task of preparing the De Eligendo Pontifice -- an oration that praises the qualities of the dead pope and sets out the qualities which the cardinals believe are required of the next pope. At Paul's death the camerlingo was Cardinal Villot. The Vatican's deficit was now running between $30 million and $40 million annually, and in the first General Congregation Cardinal Palazzini asked whether the status of the IOR should be changed to bring it under greater Curial control. Cardinal Villot hastily conducted an investigation. In theory, the IOR was answerable to a commission of five cardinals, chaired by Villot himself. Villot concluded in his report to the cardinals a few days later that the IOR's independent status should be maintained but that a system of stronger internal controls was needed. In the midst of the General Congregations, Cardinal Wojtyla paid a visit to the Villa Tevere. [7] He entered the Church of Our Lady of Peace, his robes brushing past the seventy-three freshly cut red roses, and knelt to pray beside the tomb of the Founder. This was an unusual gesture for one of the key electors only a week before the Conclave opened. The election of the Patriarch of Venice, Albino Luciani, was one of the greatest protest votes in the history of papal elections. It marked a rejection of a Conservative-dominated Curia and the Church of Big Business. The new Pope was the son of a bricklayer, quiet, humble and with no diplomatic training nor Curial experience. When the result of the vote was announced, he told his electors, 'May God forgive you for what you have done to me!' After taking the name of John Paul I, Luciani announced that he wished to be Pastor rather than Pontiff, and that papal pomp was not for him. He told the people of Rome that he intended to commit his Pontificate to applying the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. That by itself, Roberto Calvi later remarked, was a dangerous thing to have said. There was a community within the Church, fundamentalist to the core, that was intent on revising -- i.e., correcting -- the conclusions of Vatican II. On Sunday, 27 August, after appearing on the balcony of Saint Peter's to bless the noontime crowds, Luciani lunched with Cardinal Villot. Luciani asked Villot to continue as Secretaty of State 'until I have found my way'. [8] Indeed his liberal views on artificial birth control had distressed the traditionalists, and he needed Villot's counsel while forming his 'new-look' administration. The Conservatives reacted to the new Pope's views by assuring the faithful that he was in fact absolutely dedicated to promoting the continuity of the Church's magisterium. They did this even though they were aware that, when still a bishop, Luciani had wanted the Vatican to relax the rules concerning artificial birth control. Of course, they secretly cursed Luciani's position and immediately after his election a team of trusted priests from the Secretariat of State began cleansing the archives of documents pertaining to the new pope that did not agree with their image of the magisterium. In Venice, according to a former diocesan official, they removed from the Patriarchy's archives all mention of Luciani's views on birth control. Specifically, they were said to have taken with them the notes for a talk Luciani had given to the Veneto region's parish priests during a 1965 spiritual retreat, in which he stated: 'I assure all of you that bishops would be more than happy to find a doctrine that declared the use of contraceptives legitimate under certain conditions ... If there is only one possibility in a thousand, then we must find it and see if, by chance, with the help of the Holy Spirit, we might come across something that has escaped us to date.' [9] Some months before Humanae Vitae's publication Luciani again addressed the problem of contraception at a diocesan conference on marriage. This time he said, 'It is our hope that the Pope will utter a word of deliverance.' Weeks later, his superior, Cardinal Giovanni Urbani of Venice, asked him to prepare a reserved text on artificial birth control for Paul VI. Luciani consulted doctors, parents and theologians, and produced a cogent theological argument for a revision of the Church's stand on birth control. Cardinal Urbani sent the document to Pope Paul before the final drafting of Humanae Vitae. It reinforced the majority conclusion of the panel of experts appointed by the Pope and was said to have swayed him in favour of a more liberal policy on sexual matters. Only Cardinal Wojtyla's energetic intervention, almost bullying his way into the papal chambers and virtually rewriting some of the Humanae Vitae pages himself, saved the day for the Conservatives. All trace of the Luciani text has since vanished, and today the Holy See denies that such a document ever existed. In the draft of the papal acceptance speech, prepared for him by the Secretariat of State, Luciani excised all suggested references to Humanae Vitae. Earlier that year, Opus Dei had organized an International Congress in Milan to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the encyclical's publication. Luciani had refused to address the Congress. Instead, Wojtyla took his place. Then within the first weeks of his papacy, Luciani told Villot that he planned to see US Congressman James Scheuer, vice-chairman of the UN Population Fund, the world agency that promoted family planning. Scheuer wanted Vatican support for a UN Population Fund plan to stabilize world population at 7.2 billion by the year 2050. An audience for Scheuer was tentatively scheduled for 24 October 1978. [10] This alarmed the Curial Conservatives. By then Opus Dei was regarded as the strongest Conservative force in the Church. It was -- and remains -- ferociously antagonistic to all forms of family planning other than the natural rhythm method. Shocked by Luciani's intentions, Opus Dei aligned around it all like-minded members of the cardinalate, particularly Hoffner of Cologne, Krol of Philadelphia, Sin of Manila, Siri of Genoa, Wojtyla of Cracow and the Curial Conservatives Baggio, Oddi, Palazzini, Poletti, Samore and, of course, Villot. The outspoken Oddi began openly suggesting that the Holy Spirit had made a mistake in allowing Luciani's election. Roberto Calvi was in Montevideo when the news of Luciani's election reached him. If anything, he was relieved. Contrary to what was commonly believed, Calvi did not want a cover up of Ambrosiano's dealings with the IOR. At this point he had real grievances and he believed an investigation would result in Banco Ambrosiano receiving the assurances he was seeking. In fact, he regarded John Paul I as one of the few persons likely to instigate a much needed housecleaning at the Vatican bank. Calvi told his wife and daughter that he no longer trusted Marcinkus. Clara Calvi later testified: 'I knew that he was working on resolving the IOR's problems with the help of Opus Dei. One day he told me that he intended to go to Madrid. "Why?" I asked. He laughed and explained that Opus Dei was very powerful in Spain.' [11] Apart from the Vatican's deplorable finances, Papa Luciani's two greatest concerns at the outset of his pontificate were to revise Humanae Vitae and to convince Giovanni Benelli to become his Secretary of State. Such a move spelled immeasurable danger for Opus Dei. It was said that Alvaro del Portillo feared Benelli more than any other person in the Church. _______________ Notes: 1. John Cornwell, A Thief in the Night -- The Death of Pope John Paul I, Penguin edition, London 1990, p. 73. 2. Clara Calvi diaries, p. 33. 3. Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System 1945-1981, Harper & Row, 1982, p. 316. 4. Raw, The Moneychangers, Harvill, London 1992, p. 130. Transcripts of the Bolgiani and Garzoni depositions are contained in the Calvi family archives. 5. Raw, Op. cit., pp. 205-207. 6. Malachi Martin, The Final Conclave, Pocket Books, New York 1978, p. 71. 7. Alain Woodrow, 'Qu'y a-t-il derriere le changement de statut de l'Opus Dei?' Le Monde, Paris, 14 November 1979. 8. Yallop, In God's Name, Corgi Books, London 1984, pp. 240-241. 9. Andrea Tornielli. 'The Hope of a Pastor', 30 Giorni, No. I, Rome 1995. 10. Yallop, Op. cit., p. 246. 11. Clara Calvi's testimony before Milan magistrates Bruno Siclari and Pierluigi dell'Ossa, 25 October 1982, pp. 85-86.
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