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HISTORY, SOPHIA AND THE RUSSIAN NATION |
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V. The Famine of 1891-1892
In 1891-1892, a famine struck Russia that cost the lives of 400,000 people. The struggle against this disaster mobilised the energy of the entire country, and provoked an intense reaction among Russian public opinion. Not only did Solov'ev propose his explanation, but also took concrete initiatives to remedy the famine. Within the corpus of So- 10v'ev's work as a whole, his commitment stands out clearly. First, never before or after did he show himself so anxious to commit himself to current affairs in a concrete way. Second, partly because of this commitment, and partly because of other publications, he was more than ever considered a subversive figure, a troublemaker, by the organs of censorship. Third, and in connection with the former point, the solutions that he brought to the fore contained a political message that went beyond the immediate relief of the hunger-stricken. Recent scholarship on the famine of 1891-1892 includes a number of valuable studies on the reaction to it by the Russian government and public opinion. [2] Solov'ev's articles on the famine have often caught the eye of scholars specialised in the philosopher as the most obvious testimony of his social concern, yet without being examined further. [3] Only Gregory Gaut has indicated the significance of Solov'ev's interventions and provided a very clear survey of Solov'ev's main points. Interpreting them as showing a truly liberal stance, he has, however. neither addressed what Solov'ev meant by his call to the educated layer of society to organise itself. nor the political implications of this call for the understanding of his own position. [4] This attempt at recontextualising Solov'ev's views regarding the famine historically aims at underscoring three points. Firstly. ascribing the famine to the absence of a bond between educated society and the peasantry. he tried to remedy this situation by combining his usual moralising tone with a highly exceptional factual approach through borrowing data from agronomy and economy, and practical initiatives. Secondly, against the background of the ongoing debates. his publications stand out, not so much because of the topic they broached or their liberal stance, as the sharpness and broadness of his considerations. His affinity and at the same time profound divergence with Lev Tolstoj can be highlighted most clearly in this case. Third. the peculiar sense that he had of his own historical mission as prophet and leader with respect to educated society especially, showed not only through his writings, but also through particular clandestine activities, which reveal that he still nursed the hope of a free theocracy. As a result, his factual approach rather than speculative schemes and real interest in the issue, combined with practical commitment, is the only case in Solov'ev's life and work about which we can speak of social activism. In this sense, this case brings his conception of history closest to his social commitment. In order to understand Solov'ev's views within the context of their formulation, and to assess their acuity and actual relevance, the following points are addressed in this chapter. First, in (1b) I briefly examine the causes of the famine, and the practical response to it on the part of the government and Russian society on the basis of historical works. This section is completed in (1c) by a survey of the debates that went on in the Russian press during these two years, including a differentiation of opinions into major tendencies on the basis of sources and secondary literature. After in (2a) presenting his publications and other undertakings related to the famine, in (2b) I address Solov'ev's perception of the causes of the famine, as well as of the government and society's reaction. In (2c) I seek to unravel the specificity of his discourse on the occasion of the famine, respectively the extent to which his discourse stood out within the ongoing debates of the time, his views are confronted with these debates. Finally, in (2d), the distinction of the three registers of history is used to explain the role of history in his discourse. b) The famine of 1891-1892 and the measures taken to remedy it For decades Russia had been suffering from a permanent harvest problem that varied in degree, and hunger was part of reality in the countryside. In 1891, however, the country was struck by a disaster of as yet unknown proportions: some 15 provinces in European Russia, mainly in the Volga and black soil provinces, faced a 30% to 50% crop failure as a result of insufficient harvest in both the winter and the summer. [5] These regions were considered Russia's granary, and in 1891 comprised an area one-third larger than Germany, and almost double the size of France. [6] As a direct consequence of the crop failure, millions of peasants and their families had to endure a famine that lasted well into the summer of 1892, and which cost some 400,000 lives. [7] It is possible to distinguish three main causes of the famine. While a succession of unfavourable weather conditions (a long cold winter and summer drought) was the most immediate cause, the chief factor was the long-term impoverishment of the peasantry as a result of the Emancipation Act of 1861 that put an end to serfdom. Since emancipation. the peasants had been forced to till gradually shrinking allotments from which they had to squeeze out their living. They also had to repay the government tor the land they received, often at a cost far above the actual value, which hindered them from investing in new tools, livestock, and fertilisers. In addition, the Emancipation Act had declared the commune [obscina], and not the individual cultivator. the real owner of the land, which hampered technical improvements and made the peasant dependent on the commune. A third cause of the famine and peasant misery were the economic policies of the late 1880s, which placed even greater pressure on the village. [8] The Minister of Finance, Ivan Vysnegradskij, aiming to strengthen the national economy, ordered an increase in the sale of Russian grain abroad at the costs of the peasants' own consumption, and imposed a new tax. [9] In order to break out of this crisis, the peasants, financially burdened. tried to expand their fields at the expense of fallow. pasture. and forest land, which rapidly exhausted the soil; the felling of forests in particular had dramatic consequences, since it robbed the land of natural wind breaks, and created conditions favourable for drought. [10] The government learned about the poor agricultural conditions as early as spring 1891,and during the summer offered help only by granting loans to the zemstva. [11] Facing a growing crisis, the Committee of Ministers convened in October 1891, but failed to present an elaborate programme. From that point onwards, the relief management was carried out in a fragmented way, in the provinces, which operated for their own interests. Within each province, relief was left to three main institutions, the district zemstva, the land captains, and the charity committees, which sometimes handled both public and private relief. [12] The initiative of the central government became confined to those areas where special agencies or individuals were empowered to act, i.e. railway transport, public works, and private charity. [13] At the same time, the tsar and his advisors decided to set up special agencies to take over and administrate parts of the relief program. The most important of these agencies was the Special Committee on Famine Relief [Osobyj Komitet dlja pomosci golodajuscim], created in December 1891 to stimulate and coordinate charity work in the hunger-stricken provinces. [14] It achieved practical relief for thousands of peasant households, by such efforts as financing grain purchase, managing the distribution of grain arriving from abroad, organising village soup kitchens, and the distribution of horses to the peasants. [15] The official end of the famine was declared on July 1st 1892. The state had succeeded in averting the real threat of mass starvation and had prevented total economic collapse in the stricken regions. [16] Yet shortcomings at many levels, institutional, political, and infrastructural, had hampered the government in responding to the crisis quickly and efficiently. The core problem was insufficient coordination between the ministries due to the absence of a cabinet capable of formulating a policy and monitoring its execution. [17] Other defects in the state machinery were also obvious. These included gathering information the command chain from the centre to the countryside, the defiant attitude of both governors and zemstva, the lack of confidence in cooperation with local authorities, the absence of coordination of private efforts, and an inadequate transport network. Tragically. there had been sufficient supplies of grain within the borders of the Empire to feed the people, but these food reserves were located at considerable distance from the starving black soil areas. [18] The government also did not remedy the absence of an institution at the most local level of the volost' and the village, which could have ensured proper distribution of food to the peasants' families. In addition to government aid, other official, semi-official and private aid was also organised. The church organised help mainly on the level of the diocese, and from institutions such as St. Petersburg Kazan' Cathedral. The Holy Synod and the Red Cross also initiated charity projects that were realised by local bodies. But the response of the Russian public was incredibly weak. [19] In addition, the government initially even tried to hinder and prevent the establishment of private aid. [20] Private philanthropic interest emerged among circles of educated Muscovites and the well-to-do in September 1891. But it was only in December, parallel to the creation of the Special Committee that was to coordinate charity works, that instructions were given not to hamper private famine relief. Besides donations, which came from all social strata, and to which wealthy Old Believers made a substantial contribution [see case study II], numerous private organisations, such as merchants and landowner organisations, set up help for the peasants at the local level, mainly in the form of soup kitchens. [21] But despite these efforts. charity relief was not effective at the start of the winter: it was slow, lacked coordination, and remained small in comparison to the extensive relief work carried out under the government's aegis. c) Debates in the Russian press on the famine [22] The famine received extensive coverage in newspapers, journals, and books as early as May 1891, and dominated the news to the point that it literally drove discussions on international politics from the pages of the daily newspapers. [23] How severe was the famine? [24] What were its causes? Which measures should the government take to remedy it? These were the most urgent issues during the winter of 1891-1892. Three main camps can be distinguished in the polemics published in the Russian press, namely the conservative, liberal, and radical camps. Between the two latter camps, there was also the position of Lev Tolstoj, which can be called Christian anarchist and which caused the greatest stir both in the Russian press and abroad. In this survey I discuss these four positions with respect to the main issues mentioned above. All four perspectives were consistent with their general positions, and saw in the famine a confirmation of the views they already held of the regime. The conservatives (Moskovskie Vedomosti, Nikolaj Aksakov, Sergej Sarapov, Dmitrij Samarin) did not unanimously recognise the severity of the famine and considered it an administrative issue. [25] In doing so, they ascribed the famine to the bad state of the grain reserves, which were placed under the administration of the zemstva. During the famine, an entire campaign was held to discredit this institution. [26] They also pointed to a more far-reaching cause, by holding the Emancipation Act of Alexander II responsible for the degradation of the peasants' condition. [27] On the whole, the high and middle bureaucracy approved of the government's response to the disaster, and suggested it could be reinforced by a special governmental organ, or even by passing all grain stocks into the hands of the government. [28] In an anti-bureaucratic stance, other conservatives voiced criticism of the Ministry of Internal affairs, and pointed to the competence of the landed gentry and its representative, the land captains, to educate the peasantry. [29] The liberals (L. Sionimskij in Vestnik Evropy, Russkoe Obozrenie) devoted a considerable number of articles to arguing against the conservatives' underestimation of the scope of the famine. [30] In their eyes, the famine was caused by the gradual decline of crop husbandry and the exhaustion of soil, and was symptomatic of the technical backwardness of the agricultural system. The liberals denounced the dependence of the peasant on the commune since the agrarian reforms of Alexander II, the present inability of the commune to reform agriculture, and more globally, the gradual impoverishment of the peasants over the preceding decades. [31] Vestnik Evropy was highly critical of the government's slow, quantitatively insufficient and inefficient reaction. and related it to the inflexibility of centralised power as well as to the district and province administration. [32] The solution lay in the development of free civil life through the extension of self-government, for instance by the creation of small administrative units that represented all classes [vsesoslovnye volosti] as well as in the activity of the zemstvo. [33] The liberal camp was thus ready to cooperate with the government, and only hoped that this cooperation would be realised by an admission by the government of a wider space for public initiative. [34] An intellectual figure who, properly speaking, was not a liberal, but shared with them some principles, enjoyed their respect and published in their journals, was Lev Tolstoj. [35] He not only organised more than 200 soup kitchens in the year of the famine, the most famous example of private relief, but also made a well-known contribution to the debates concerning the famine. [36] On the basis of his experience on the countryside, he described the peasants' psychology and their real needs, which were fundamentally misunderstood. [37] The degradation of the condition of the peasant lay in a fundamentally unjust relationship between the higher, urban, educated layer of society, and the peasantry. The latter had been living with too many taxes, too little land, and had been kept in too much isolation and wild conditions to be able to feed the whole country. He stated that the educated layer of society should not maintain the people under the threat of hunger and famine, but should show love and brotherhood, and serve the people in practical terms, or else they would rise. Addressing the government with the burning question of whether there was enough bread to feed Russia, Tolstoj also advocated the collection of data on the real needs of the population. [38] The fiercest critique, however, came from the radicals who denounced the tsarist system, and interpreted the famine as a symptom of the failure of autocratic rule. [39] For the populists (V. Voroncov, N. Daniel'son, S. Juzakov, N.A. Karysev in Russkoe Bogatstvo), the development of a capitalist economy and the government's fiscal policies had impoverished the peasantry, of which the famine was direct proof. They concluded that the capitalist system could not possibly work in Russia. [40] From this perspective, logically, the government's response to the famine was judged fully inadequate and believed to point to the system's failure. With respect to the future of the Russian peasantry, they stressed the importance of the commune as the foundation of the future order under the guidance of the zemstvo. [41] This was precisely the point where, within the radical camp, socialists and populists parted ways during the 1880s: the socialists (P. Struve) considered the commune, and the peasantry as a whole, a remnant of an obsolete historical order. [42] The famine of 1891-1892 marked a turning point in Russian life, shaking educated people awake and prompting them to commit themselves not only to the future of peasantry, but also to that of the country as a whole. [43] Even though the government had succeeded in averting the disaster, its way of handling it could neither avoid the ruin of the nation's agriculture, nor conceal the many shortcomings of the administration. After the famine, criticism with respect to the state increased and positions hardened from both sides, culminating in the revolution of 1905. a) Solov'ev's contribution to famine relief: publications and actions The scope of the famine in the Russian countryside, as well as the omnipresence of the debates regarding the issue did not leave Solov'ev indifferent. The philosopher wrote on both issues and engaged in concrete action to relieve the famine. In 1891 and 1892, he published five articles related to the famine: 'Narodnaja beda i ohscestvennaja pomose" [The National Misfortune and Public Aid], 'Nas grekh i nasa objazannost" [Our Sin and Our Obligation], 'Kto prozrel?' [Who Was Enlightened?], 'Vrag s Vostoka' [Enemy from the East], and 'Mnimye i destvitel'nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija' [Imaginary and Real Measures for Raising National Welfare]. 'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose" was published in October 1891 in Vestnik Evropy. [44] In this article, written as a 'general programme', Solov'ev strove to make educated society aware of the necessity of organising common action to remedy the famine. [45] This article already contains all fundamental elements of Solov'ev's position with respect to the issue. First, he wanted to establish the fact that there was a famine. and to this end, gave concrete data on living conditions in the stricken provinces (i). Secondly, he raised the issue of the critical state of agriculture and pointed to the danger of exhaustion of the land (ii). Thirdly, he widened the debate by associating the famine with culture, the goal of which he identified as the common good (iii). Educated society had failed to place culture in service of the peasants and thus contribute to their welfare. The cause of this failure lay in the absence of any organisation of the forces of educated society (iv). At the same time, 'Nas grekh i nasa objazannost" was published in the journal Severnyj Vestnik. [46] In this very short article, he addressed the members of educated society in a more critical tone, sharpening point iii mentioned above. He exhorted them to acknowledge their sin and to show repentance through concrete action, namely by helping the peasants combat the famine. Russian educated society was guilty of the disastrous situation: in thirty years it had done nothing to improve agriculture. It was impossible for the peasantry to improve its condition by itself: and it needed aid from educated society as an organised whole. As a result of the unfavourable position in which Solov'ev found himself with respect to censorship, though not directly for his publications on the famine, he was then silent for the next six months. [47] Many months later, he published 'Kto prozrel?' in Vestnik Evropy, a response to an anonymous critic in Russkaja Mysl'. [48]' This publication, which is only indirectly related to the issue of the famine, served two aims. Firstly, Solov'ev wanted to defend himself against the attack of acting as a prophet and of invoking solutions to the famine that had been known for a long time: secondly, he made his critical position towards populism clear by discussing the attitude of educated society, especially of the populist wing, with respect to the peasantry (related to point iii). One month passed and, in July 1892, Solov'ev provided his readers with scientific material that showed the dramatic character of the situation in agriculture. Indeed, a significant part of his 'Vrag s Vostoka', published in the journal Severnyj Vestnik, consists of quotations from two acknowledged scientific sources, namely works by agricultural economist A.S. Ermolov and geologist Vasilij Dokucaev on the topic. [49] Solov'ev identified increasing drought as the primary danger threatening the Russian countryside (backing point ii). He quoted largely from the two scholars' works to make clear the fact that misery and drought were not accidental phenomena, but the consequence of a natural process that had been accelerated by the destructive relationship of the population to nature and ill-conceived undertakings, such as the drainage of swamps. To fight it, a 'fundamental and systematic transformation of agriculture' was needed, a complex task which required all the forces of state and educated society (point iii linked with point iv). [50] Concerning the support offered by educated society, he only briefly discussed the attempts made by private individuals and organisations to help the peasants, but stressed at the same time the limits of such interventions as compared to public action (point iii). In this respect, Solov'ev seemed to consider the efforts made in science, notably by Ermolov and Dokucaev, to be more promising, and more likely to represent the basis of organised action. Drought remained a central topic in his last publication on the famine, 'Mnimye i dejstvitel 'nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija', written in September, but published only in November 1892 in Vestnik Evropy. [51] Here, Solov'ev actualised point ii once more. He summarized news reports confirming that the drought was even more significant than a year before, lasted longer than the famine itself, and was so dramatic that there was even a danger or desertification. He stated that a solution to this issue could not come from a rational agricultural system, which would be the equivalent of prescribing expensive medicine to a poor person, instead or working at improving the material welfare or the population. Help emanating from the government was also subject to Solov'ev's criticism: the philosopher pointed to the vicious circle in which it was engaged by having to levy means from the peasants through taxes in order to help them. Having shown the inconsistency of purely economic solutions, such as a new division of land or a new repartition of the population by means or deportation, Solov'ev pointed to the only solution in his eyes, namely that educated society educate the peasants in order to remedy their misery (point iii). From his correspondence, we learn that he intended to 'continue the elucidation of the question how one can and must really help the people.' [52] He planned a contribution to the October issue of Severnyj Vestnik, of which there is, however, no trace. Another project was realised though, namely the publication or an essay in a collection for the benefit of the hunger-stricken. Solov' ev wrote' Licnaja nravstvennost' i obscee delo' [Personal Morality and the Common Cause], a first draft of a chapter of Opravdanie dobra. [53] Not incidentally, he pointed to the criminal behaviour of landowners with respect to the peasantry in the Russian countryside. [54] His conclusion that the power of morality was objectivated only in the state, and only there became a common task for all, was undoubtedly relevant in the famine year. As an epilogue to Solov'ev's views on the famine, peasant misery and the related problem of desertification, it is important to consider a later publication of his, 'Iz Moskovskoj gubernii' [From the Moscow province], published in Vestnik Evropy in 1897. [55] This text expresses the author's distressed impressions during a stay in the Moscow province. Five years after the famine, he noted that despite the warnings of Ermolov and Dokucaev, drought had not disappeared -- it was a 'Turkestan summer.' [56] The population in the countryside had even declined, and still lived in misery. 'Is Russia really condemned to a moral drought as well as to a physical one?", Solov'ev asked anxiously. [57] For the first time Solov'ev broached the problem of morality of the peasantry, which he previously had overseen or considered to be the result of its lack of culture. Here he gave up his moralising tone, teaching the educated public how to form the peasant, and instead expressed despair about the condition of the peasantry and of the Russian soil. Thus there are five articles written between 1891-1892 in which Solov'ev quite consistently identified the famine as being the result of a wrong relationship of, mainly, educated society to the peasants. The phenomenon of the famine (i) and the desertification of land (ii) were the result of the inability of primarily educated society to make culture available to the peasants (iii). The only solution to the disaster was that educated society set up public, organised action (iv). Solov'ev did not, however, limit himself to publications, but was also actively engaged in a number of organisational tasks. Not everything is known about this side of Solov'ev's biography, but that which is available completes the picture of his reaction to the famine in an interesting manner. From his correspondence, we learn that in September 1891 he tried with others to organise public lectures for the victims' benefit. [58] He also tried to set up an aid committee on the model of the Panslav committee created during the Crimean war. The unheard of scope of the support achieved at that time had impressed all contemporaries. Solov'ev's correspondence attests to the fact that he sought to create large- scale commitment and mobilisation against the famine. [59] It is most likely that he was hindered by the authorities. Which at that time regarded any private initiative as an intrusion into their task or providing relief, and as a possible means or countering their action. Indeed, in the end, the lectures were never organised. [60] Relating to this episode. Solov'ev on the one hand pointed to the obstacles above in writing that 'no public help will be allowed.' [61] On the other hand, he complained about the impossibility of organising society in the direction of a 'future social/public [obscestvennyj] organism.' The task of mobilising his fellow citizens, and or reaching an agreement on a common goal, was 'obviously far more difficult than the call to the Varangians or the baptism of Russia', he concluded bitterly. [62] He also tried to organise future society in other, less official ways. Contrary to what Gaut affirms, various documents confirm that Solov'ev still nursed the hope of a social movement and or mobilising the theocratic leadership he had dreamt or for years. [63] However, he proposed an adapted, modernised form of the theocratic scheme. This time, it was not the pope and the tsar who would back the prophet (in the function of which he confirmed to see himself), but a religious leader and a general. [64] Solov'ev talked about his plans with Evgenij Trubeckoj, and in more detail with book editor Longin Panteleev, who was engaged in famine relief. [65] These plans consisted of finding a general, whom soldiers would follow, and a member of the higher clergy [arkhierej] whom the people would follow, in order to guarantee the success of a revolution. [66] He wrote to Radlov that he had found such an arkhierej. [67] For the function of general he selected Mikhail Dragomirov, general governor of the provinces of Kiev, Podol'sk and Volhynia, and even planned to travel to Kiev to submit his ideas to him. [68] Panteleev warned Solov'ev that Dragomirov would either call the gendarmes or laugh at him. Fortunately, the philosopher did not go to Kiev, and, by 1892, his revolutionary hopes had vanished, arguably as a consequence of his disillusion about Russian educated society. At the time of the famine, therefore, Solov'ev still maintained his idea of a theocracy, about which he wrote only in his correspondence, and not in the press because of the revolutionary tenor of the project. These are the only known facts about Solov'ev's attempts to organise famine relief, which remained at the level of organising lectures and possibly a committee, and, more importantly, of provoking a social movement of greater scope. There is little information about his further activities during that winter. What is known is that he certainly contributed financially to relief to the best or his ability by asking the editor of Severnyj Vestnik to put aside his honorarium for the hungry. [69] b) Solov'ev's perception of the famine and of the famine relief by government and society In the present section, I analyse Solov'ev's perception of the famine and relief against the background of the general knowledge available in scholarship as presented in section 1b. I examine Solov'ev's analysis of the causes of the disaster, and then focus on his interpretation of the reaction of government and the public. The first question that arises is what the source of his information was. In sharp contrast to other issues on which he intervened, Solov'ev, in his treatment of the issue of the famine of 1891-1892, wanted to present himself as a well-informed, and fact-oriented expert. Far more than in other cases, he referred explicitly to his sources, which came from four areas. First of all, he drew data on the living conditions of the peasants during the famine as well as statistics mostly from the periodical press, namely the newspapers Moskovskie Vedomosti and Grazdanin, and the journals Russkie Vedomosti and Vestnik Finansov. He also used official figures issued by the government. [70] Additionally, the abovementioned scientific works by Dokucaev and Ermolov were central to his argument: the authoritative status or Ermolov was confirmed a couple or years later with his nomination as Minister of Agriculture. [71] Although evidence of contact with people directly involved in famine relief has not been found, apart from his stormy relationship with Tolstoj, it is certain that Solov'ev also heard about it through informal communication and conversations. [72] Finally, his own observations of drought in regions neighbouring the famine-stricken area confirmed his diagnosis of the deplorable state of the Russian land. [73] The famine occurred as an immediate result of drought, as Ermolov stated in Solov'ev's time, and Robbins confirms in ours. From his first article onwards, Solov'ev warned that drought had not only provoked that particular famine, but was in the long run a threat to the Russian land, which could soon turn into desert. In 'Vrag s Vostoka', published after the immediate effects of the famine had been contained in the summer of 1892, he offered lengthy quotes from Ermolov and Dokucaev's scientific works to explain the drought factor. These sources, which are still authoritative today, allowed Solov'ev to be well informed about the issue. [74] He assumed their observations of the black soil region and concluded that the increasing dehydration of the land was due to two main human interventions. The first was deforestation, as a result or which there were no obstacles to Eastern winds. Indeed forests, which not only form barriers to the wind, but also retain water, are the best regulator of atmospheric waters. [75] Second, he mentioned the drainage of swamps and the destruction of other natural water reservoirs. Additionally, the exploitation of the land as it was practiced, including unmanaged ploughing, could only lead to further soil exhaustion. With these comments, Solov'ev showed a thorough knowledge of the agrarian situation from what we would today call an ecological standpoint, as well as of its role in provoking, or at least not precluding the famine. The long-term cause of the famine, the dramatic state of the peasantry, was central to Solov'ev's texts, which emphasised the specifically cultural aspect of this misery. He denounced the peasantry's lack of technical knowledge, which made it exhaust the soil. More fundamentally, the philosopher pointed to the insufficient culture and conditions of the commune. Although he continuously stressed this point in his four articles of 1891- 1892, he did not make it more concrete than a general call far the transformation of agriculture. and in general for the elevation of the cultural level of the peasant. Solov'ev also dealt with the economic side of the peasant's misery, and in particular discussed the statement that the misery of the peasant originated in the insufficient parcel of land he had received to till at the time of the reforms. While he agreed with this, he added that the fundamental problem did not consist in the small parcel of land as such. because elsewhere, notably in the Netherlands, the productivity of the land was four times greater than in Russia. [76] In this way, by using numerous figures, he rejected the solution of a redistribution of land among peasants as invalid. [77] He also voiced a critical remark concerning the economic policies of the 1880s, which Robbins has identified as the third factor that impoverished the peasants. He alluded to the tax system, which he called a vicious circle in this situation: the government had to help the hunger-stricken population but in order to do so, it first had to levy money through taxes from this very population. [78] He therefore provided a many-sided analysis of the causes of the famine and at least in part drew the same conclusions as 20th century scholarship. For another part, he remained silent on the specifically institutional. political, and social causes of the famine. Equally discrete was his criticism of the measures taken by the government to organise famine relief. In the two first articles, he pointed in neutral terms to the merit of the government in having warned the public in time, and of having devoted significant resources to relief. He took it as normal that the government ascribe full priority to famine relief, and placed, in particular, military costs second. He wondered, however, whether these measures fulfilled all the needs of those stricken. In some places, the peasants had not received seeds in time to plant them. In other places, loans had been distributed inequitably. And most often, the peasants used the loans, received in money or in natura, for their immediate needs, i.e. to feed themselves. [79] Here Solov'ev suggested between the lines that the government's relief efforts were not efficient. Indeed, as we know, the government was very slow in initiating a relief programme, and above all failed to present a coordinated plan. Solov'ev remained silent about other specific measures, such as the Special Committee, the public works programme, the activity of the various institutions (zemstva, land captains, governors), and the transport programme. Although he suffered from it himself, he did not mention publicly the initial hindrance by the government with respect to charity work. Instead, he noted that the government had done everything it could, in contrast with the inability of the Russian educated society, to help the peasants. According to the philosopher, the issue was more fundamental and could not be solved by ad-hoc material support by the government. In the long run, all forces of the government as well as of educated society should be directed to the transformation of agriculture. His statements remained on this general level. Several reasons may explain the mildness of his criticism of the government in his articles. The first relates to censorship, as at that time Solov'ev was very strictly controlled with respect to every text he published. [80] The second reason concerns the moment when he published on the famine, namely the autumn of 1891 and the summer of 1892. In the autumn of 1891, the special agencies and measures had not yet been set up; famine relief was only in its first phase, and consisted almost exclusively of loans. This explains why Solov'ev could not write about them then, but not why he failed to mention them in his articles in the summer of 1892. The government was providing aid, as was the church: only the Russian public did not. Solov'ev briefly saluted the efforts made by the committees led by the St. Petersburg Kazan' Cathedral, consisting of high-ranked members of the clergy, and other committees led by the dioceses. [81] But, more important than the reaction by the government or the church, Solov'ev's target was the reaction, or rather the lack of reaction to the famine among the Russian public. His criticism on this point was justi1ied. and was shared both b) man) of his contemporaries and by later scholarship. More specifically, the main addressee of his publications was educated society, by which he meant something more than the total sum of private enterprises and relief organisations. He did not fail to mention the extraordinary efforts in philanthropy made by people such as Lev Tolstoj and botanist Sergej Racinskij, who set up village schools. However, he considered these attempts both quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient, given the fact that the official committees provided 99% of the resources for famine relief. [82] He deplored the absence of coordinated, organised action by educated society in order to help those stricken, and in the long run, to raise 'the intellectual and cultural level of the popular masses.' [83] There is little evidence from which to discern what he meant by organised action, and only a few elements scattered in his articles point to an answer. Arguably, what Solov'ev was suggesting was an organisation endowed with a power and scope such as the state and the church. [84] He was indeed right in saying that there was no such organisation in Russia in his time, and, from this perspective, his claim had a political character. However, in order to make a political claim effective, and not merely the echo of a utopian plan, a reflection would have to follow about the organisation and institutionalisation of the forces in question. This discussion was not engaged in by Solov'ev. More fundamentally, his distinction between private charity and public action implies a distinction between private and public, the discussion of which is completely absent in his interventions. [85] Besides, the reader is surprised to not even encounter a single comment on the very institution that most closely corresponded to Solov'ev's definition of an organisation that takes care of the peasants, namely the zemstvo. The absence of such reflections is all the more striking since the zemstvo received a specific and highly privileged place as the third pillar of Solov'ev's social system elaborated in Opravdanie dobra. [86] An explanation for this 'omission' is that Solov'ev was advocating organisation at the national level, which the zemstvo did not have. [87] Another hypothesis is that the treatment of the issue of the zemstvo, which the regime actively discredited at that time while having to work with it, was considered anti-governmental agitation, especially if it came from an author who already did not enjoy the favour of the censorship organs. More fundamentally, I want to make a case for the following: his understanding of 'zemstvo' went along a speculative rather than institutional line, and referred to the unity between educated society and people [see 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History']. In this connection, plausibly, the philosopher was primarily addressing the urban educated class, and not the so-called zemstvo liberals, in his exhortation to unite with the peasant. [88] The response of the former to Solov'ev's call, however, was not great. After the publication of his two first articles, intended as calls to educated society, he did receive some positive response, if we are to believe his correspondence: 'my note has been remarked, and has thus reached its immediate goal.' [89] However, due to obstacles from the authorities, and probably also to the vagueness of his plans, no massive mobilisation took place under his aegis. The absence of a discussion on the institutional limn that educated society should take docs not mean however, that Solov'ev did not hold opinions about the topic. In private conversations, if we can believe Trubeckoj, it was precisely in this period that he spoke about the necessity of having representative and constitutional institutions. [90] The only example provided repeatedly by Solov'ev to illustrate what he meant by true educated society were the Panslav committees set up in 1875-8 to help the Bulgarians, and which he unsuccessfully tried to recreate. [91] His foremost aim was the fundamental transformation of agriculture ['Vrag s Vostoka']. He saw a germ of this in the contribution of the scientific community to the agrarian question, meaning scholars such as Ermolov, who indeed worked at enlightening the educated public and the agrarian community with new facts. However, one month later, in the following article, Solov'ev took a step back by claiming that this was not the best time for such a transformation, and that the most urgent task was that the peasantry understand their 'inner truth', before they could be saved by agronomy and economy. [92] Solov'ev proved himself to be well-informed about the main causes of the famine. Especially his emphasis on what we would today call the ecological aspects of the famine testifies to an astonishing knowledge of and interest in a long-term relationship with the soil. By contrast, the manner in which he expressed his concern for the fate of the peasants, and the solutions he offered to ameliorate their condition, reveal a far more abstract viewpoint on social relations and economic mechanisms. An interpretation of the reaction of the government to the disaster is virtually absent, whereas the main group that he held responsible for the calamity was the urban educated class. This nearly exclusive focus on the latter may be grounded by tactical motives: in order to be published, that is, to be able to transmit the main message of mobilisation to his addressees, it was essential to avoid censorship, and hence any direct criticism of the state. Characteristically, Solov'ev's call for education and support of the peasantry by educated society is based on a reduced perception of the society of his time, which does not take into account existing public institutions such as the zemstvo. Yet it does entail a political message, which if we take into account his attempts to organise a mobilisation of peasants and soldiers, did not exclude concrete, even revolutionary plans. c) Solov'ev's views on the famine against the background of the debates in the Russian press While his discourse was nurtured by the press of his time, the question arises as to what extent he related it to existing debates and positions. The analysis of his interventions leads to the following conclusions. He debated foremost with the populists and with Tolstoj, in passing also with the conservatives, while remaining silent on the socialist and the liberal positions. Below I explain why this was the case. i) The liberals Generally speaking, it can be said that his interventions testily to his adherence to the liberal camp. The first question that then arises is to what extent he showed himself a liberal in his interventions, and to what extent he could be considered -- by liberals, and by others -- as a mouthpiece of the liberal point of view with respect to the famine. The censorship clearly identified him as a liberal troublemaker who agitated against the state, especially after his lecture 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview', given on October 19th 1891. This lecture, which had nothing to do with the issue of the famine, had triggered the fiercest possible reaction of Moskovskie Vedomosti, who anathemised Solov'ev for his attack on Russian Orthodoxy. At the same time, and in connection with this episode, Solov'ev's paper fell into the turmoil of the struggle against the non-governmental famine relief. [93] The issue of the journal in which the lecture was published, Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, also contained an article by its chief editor Nikolaj Grot, 'Etika i golod' [Ethics and the Famine], as well as Tolstoj's 'O golode·. This issue was considered a liberal defence of non-governmental famine relief, and, consequently, an open affront to government aid, and was confiscated. [94] Facing this harsh reaction. Solov'ev decided not to publish on the famine for the time being. [95] As a matter of fact, censorship as well as the conservatives around Moskovskie Vedomosti considered Solov'ev a prominent representative of liberal agitation. perhaps not directly because of his writings on the famine, but because of his general views of the non- Christian behaviour or Russian educated society. [96] Significantly, the literature that deals with the public response to the famine also presents Solov'ev as a central figure within the liberal camp. [97] A close examination of his statements. however. must lead to a qualification of this characterisation. With the liberals, he decisively shared the opinion that a primitive economy had exhausted the soil. and that technical improvement was necessary to remedy this critical situation. In this context, he criticised the communal system for hampering progress in this field. He also shared their criticism of the flaws of Alexander II's reforms, which had led to the peasants' subjection to the commune. Equally typical for the liberal standpoint is his concern for the cultural backwardness of the peasantry. [98] Moreover, from his calls to mobilise and organise educated society, we can reasonably conclude that he joined the liberal criticism of an underdeveloped civil life. Fundamentally, he advocated a commitment of educated society not against the state, but conjointly with it and complementarily to it. Even if he did not broach this issue from an institutional perspective, he made an explicit political claim that was congenial to that of the liberals. [99] In the same way, their demand to change the system of tax imposition can be found in his discussion of the measures to be taken in order to alleviate the burden of charges upon the peasantry. [100] He remained at a distance of other fundamentally liberal points however, such as the explicit exhortation that the government initiate reforms towards a constitution, or, more directly relevant for the decision-making in the countryside, to extend the access to representative government to all classes. As we have seen, even though in private conversations he expressed the same wish, Solov'ev abstained from such calls in public. His criticism of the communal system also did not go as far as to advocate, as the liberals did, the replacement of the commune by private ownership of land by peasants. [101] He declared that even if the peasantry took hold of all cultivable land, this would not improve the situation, because population increase and a continuous exhausting of the soil would erase any positive result. [102] The philosopher did not engage in the explicit defence of the zemstvo against the attacks of the conservatives either. These two examples convincingly show that he did not publicly adopt all liberal claims. Arguably, he was not primarily preoccupied with political, institutional and juridical issues. Contrary to his fellow publicists, he did not engage into a factual treatment of the famine the political, institutional, and administrative standpoints. ii) The conservatives Solov'ev only voiced minor criticism in passing to the tenants of the conservative view. Against the conservatives' suggestion to displace peasants to other, less populated regions, he attempted to demonstrate that this would solve neither the problem of a primitive agriculture, nor that of desertification, but, on the contrary, would extend the damage. [103] On the whole, he showed the inconsistency of the position that viewed serfdom as a 'golden age', and qualified the supporters of a return to the pre-reform era of serfdom as defenders of a new economic slavery. iii) The populists The defence of the commune also was a major point of the populist position, to which Solov'ev addressed his fiercest critique. Since the beginning of his career as a publicist, he had denounced their use of violence and their belief in revolution for achieving their goals. [104] Even after some populists clearly distanced themselves from terrorist groupings such as Narodnaja Volja, he still had major objections against their principles, such as their rejection of capitalism, and their unconditional support of the commune, which became particularly relevant in the discussions during the famine year. He rejected the populists' idealistic view of the commune, which, in his eyes, came down to a defence of an economically bankrupt institution. [105] A fundamental issue was the relation between educated class and narod. As a matter of fact, Solov'ev shared their commitment. In this regard, it was therefore critical that he made explicit his ambition that the educated class should 'take care of the people', and thereby distinguished his understanding of the issue and his solution from theirs. He denounced their denial of culture and countered the statement by the leader of populism Voroncov that populism had reoriented itself with the remark that their concern about 'the true interests of the people' was nothing but an elementary task of educated society. In doing so, he ironically welcomed them back into the fold of educated society, which had long ago acknowledged these principles. iv. Lev Tolstoj Solov'ev did not spare Tolstoj his criticism either, though he adopted a far more discrete and milder tone than with respect to the populists and the conservatives. His statement that charity was an insufficient means of responding to the needs targeted Tolstoj's soup kitchens, as he specified in a footnote. He even affirmed that the government would not lose much if this help stopped, because it was minimal compared to governmental relief. However, Solov'ev defended Tolstoj by arguing against certain conservatives that the government would be wrong to forbid this type of aid. [106] Solov'ev and Tolstoj diverged on other fundamental points. While Solov'ev argued that educated society had been neglecting the peasants, Tolstoj went further by claiming that educated society had made them its slave. [107] There was a difference of approach here between Solov'ev the scholar, and Tolstoj l'homme de terrain. Solov'ev argued rather in scholarly or global terms, whereas Tolstoj took a more practical stance, could present the viewpoint of the administration and the zemstvo, go into the psychology of the peasant, and suit the action to the word by, in a very concrete manner, helping hundreds of peasants. Perhaps, Tolstoj's experience is the ground for a third major difference with Solov'ev, namely an unconditional appreciation of the narod. 'O golode' clearly claimed 'Free them!', which stood in sharp contrast with Solov'ev's paternalistic call to educate the peasantry. Also his belief in the state as the institution capable of realising morality on a large scale clashed with Tolstoj's anti-statism. [108] As a matter of fact, at that time Solov'ev was furious with Tolstoj's defence of the peasantry's 'simple way of life', at a time when peasants were dying as a result of this force way of living. [109] His hostility went so far that he refused to go to see Tolstoj in December 1891. [110] However, their approach of the issue of the famine bears striking resemblances. Perhaps their hostility was precisely due to more profound convergences. Like Solov'ev, Tolstoj was not a liberal pur-sang, but enjoyed their sympathy and respect, and published in Russkie Vedomosti. Also they both published an article in an issue Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, which was confiscated for its too subversive message, as we have seen, First, both shared the conviction that the crisis was deeper than the famine itself and the crop failure. Secondly, according to them, the case lay in the wrong relationship of educated society with the peasantry. Third, both used a moral discourse and appealed to love. Fourthly, both provided a large number of facts and concrete data; Solov'ev from scientific works, and Tolstoj from his own experience in the countryside and from his observation of the functioning of the local administration. Fifthly, both departed from an explicitly Christian position, however differently understood. The parallel between the two figures remains striking, and beyond the divergences in their commitment against the death penalty and to the Jewish question, suggests that both were competing in the same field, though in different ways. As regards the famine, Tolstoj was in practice far more successful in mobilising people to join his initiatives of relief, and in inciting the government to gather data on the grain reserves. Solov'ev was therefore most critical of the populists and of Tolstoj, while he actually concurred with them on the position of advisor of educated society, and through them, of the people. His political affinities brought him close to the liberals, with whose primarily political approach to the issue he, however, diverged. His fight took place in another area, namely the mobilisation of the urban educated class, first to help the peasants, and, in the long run, to exert power similar to that of the state and church. That his position implicitly rested upon his conception of history is the subject of the following subsection. d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history In stark contrast with other issues on which Solov'ev intervened, his treatment of the famine was not made primarily from a historical perspective. Historical elements arc integrated in his argumentation, but after the second intervention they decreasingly represent the spine of the discourse. The use of history in his discourse declines from a sketch of the historical mission of Russia in the two first articles to the complete replacement of the historical dimension by scientific and economic discussions about the present at the start of the 1890s. A hypothetical explanation for this deviation from his usual practice is that on this issue he wanted to act as a practical and engaged thinker -- hence his emphasis on agronomy -- and a commentator of current affairs, rather than as an abstractly philosophising figure. He himself denounced the tendency to intellectualise the issue, and called for action. Accordingly, references to history were made mainly for the sake of illustration. However, history remains central in his discourse, namely in the view of the present as the result of a long process and as a historic moment, as the battlefield of good and evil forces in which there is an opportunity, and even an emergency, to choose the right path. Solov'ev's self-perception as the figure who might play a role in this choice for the good was particularly emphasised in his interventions. With the help of the three registers of history that I distinguish, we can analyse Solov'ev's discourse on the famine. First, theology of history [TH] is nearly absent. We encounter only one reference to the Bible -- albeit in an ironic mode -- and one call to repent for the detachment from Christianity. [111] Solov'ev hereby connected his interventions on the famine with earlier articles, and referred explicitly to his publications of the early 1880s, namely to the lectures after the tsaricide, and to 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros'. With the exception of these two statements, however, he made no mention or theological aspects or history. This nearly total absence of a register that is predominant elsewhere cannot be incidental. Apart from the general explanation given above, according to which Solov'ev strove to be as practical as possible, another main reason for leaving theology or history aside is that Solov'ev's main addressee was the urban educated class, which he encouraged to commitment. In order to reach a maximum number or readers, he published simultaneously in two journals, and in one or them formulated a call that was probably intentionally devoid of religious motives. Solov'ev wanted to reach the educated class as a whole. The same attitude can be round in the notorious lecture that he gave at the same time, namely 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview', during which he explicitly pointed to the fact that non-Christians had happened to act according to Christian principles more than those who proclaimed themselves true Christians. His deliberate omission of theological elements of history in his interventions on the famine can be interpreted as a tactical move to rally a broader community than only Christians, without any 'qualitative loss.' Indeed, non-Christians could unintentionally contribute to a goal that Solov'ev saw as essentially Christian, i.e. selling up an ideal society in which the educated class would help the people develop. The philosophical register of history is used to support the theme of educated society in relation to culture. In fact, elements of philosophy of history are conveyed to specifically trace the genealogy of educated society. In the articles written in October 1891, Solov'ev broadly sketched the history of educated society, composed of three milestones, i.e. its birth with Peter the Great, the decisive stage of the liberation of the peasants under Alexander II, and the present time. Peter the Great introduced culture, understood as an all-sided effort towards the common good and progress. [112] Since that historical moment, culture had represented a constitutive element of educated society. While it had mainly focused on science and on the institutional establishment of the latter, culture, however, was also meant to be placed in the service of the people. This happened in the epoch of the reforms of Alexander II, during which the educated class together with the government played an active role to ensure the liberation of the serfs, and to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry. This step was meant to pave the way for a next stage of development. Since that time, however, educated society as such had not again manifested itself (with the exception of the aid programme developed by the Panslav committees): its members had turned to terrorism (Narodnaja Volja) or were more eager to defend national intolerance (conservative nationalists). With these terms, he tried to awake that part of the elite with whom he shared convictions. The present famine represented a challenge to pick up the thread of 'social progress' initiated during the reforms. Solov'ev pointed to the discrepancy between a common faith in Russia's historical mission and the present crisis of social progress in Russia, evidence of which was the peasantry's backwardness, cruelly shown by the famine. By casting educated society in this register, Solov'ev wanted to emphasise the ability of it to change the course of affairs by practical acts. The predominant register in these texts, however, is that of sophiology of history. His interest in agronomy can be explained from the sophiological perspective of a spiritualization of nature by man. Hence, his moral relationship to the soil. [113] When the famine was raging, he addressed the public with threatening words characteristic of the prophetic tone: "the earthly nature refuses to feed humanity [...] it is time to accept and realise our solidarity with mother earth, to save her from necrosis [omertvlenie] in order to save ourselves from death.' [114] His articles on the famine were a direct and literal expression of his call to save the earth. Besides, in this context, the figure of the prophet in particular appears between the lines in all texts, with emphasis on his power to predict and to preach. Solov'ev addressed Russian educated society with an accusing tone. He called for repentance and reminded Russian educated society of his earlier warnings that oblivion of the true Christian principles of love and solidarity would lead to problems. In doing so, he made his position with respect to educated society explicit: taking the right to address them in a preaching tone, he at the same time excluded himself from those people who forgot the primary task of educated society. Significantly, he never addressed tsar, state, clergy or church, but concentrated exclusively on educated society, as if he carried a special responsibility regarding the latter. In this way, the implicit reference to Solov'ev's theocratic scheme becomes obvious [see table in synthesis part B]. In this scheme, the prophet is endowed with the leadership of educated society, which is, next to the state and church, one of the three pillars of theocratic rule. During the famine, Solov'ev deplored the absence of an organised educated society that was to be the pendant of the coexisting organised state and church. Even if he did not explicitly apply the term 'prophet' to himself, his arrogant tone irritated a populist critic. To him, Solov'ev had to respond against the charge of proclaiming himself the only prophet [see "Kto prozrel?'). Significantly, Solov'ev did not discuss the appellation of prophet as such, but only the qualifying 'only one.' [115] The years 1891-1892 seemed to offer an opportunity to create this educated society. Solov'ev's correspondence, as well as the memoirs of his contemporaries. provide further evidence of his self-attribution of the role of leader of educated society and of his attempts to concretise its organisation. He indeed took it upon himself to organise this movement, wanting to act as the representative of educated society in cooperation with the state (general) and the church (arkhierej) [see section 2a]. Which institutional form this organisation should take was a question that could only be addressed later, once the minds were rallied under a single banner. The prophet could content himself with indicating priorities. Indeed, he saw himself as a figure authorised to decipher the meaning of the events from God's perspective: was the famine not a sign that 'the heavenly leadership has lost patience and wants to take us in hand'? [116] The famine that Russia endured in 1891-1892 clearly illustrated the peasantry's miserable living conditions. Although the government and, to a limited extent, the Russian public succeeded in averting the famine, the structural shortcomings of the system were more apparent than ever, and were vividly discussed within the debates on the famine. Solov'ev's publications. numerous references to the current press, and his undertakings were a clear demonstration of his commitment. I have tried to show that he was more concretely involved than in other cases, and that he fully deserves the characterisation of social activist. For many thinkers at that time, the famine was the opportunity to hope for a change in the country's political system, and like the liberals, populists, and Tolstoj, Solov'ev felt that this change had to take place primarily in the attitude of the educated class with respect to the peasantry. In this sense, his call was not original. Yet the combination of various perspectives to define this attitude as a material, cultural, scientific, technical, and intellectual support allowed him to understand the issue in a broader sense than many of his contemporaries. with the possible exception of Tolstoj. Partially in order to make his message understood, partly out of genuine concern, he broached a number of issues that were discussed at that time, such as drought, the possibility of land redistribution, and the meaning of culture when applied in practice to the cause of the peasants. His sharp and precise comments on agronomy and economy stand in contrast to the general character of his main motive, namely the mobilisation of educated society. However, his correspondence reveals that Solov'ev actually had in mind a very specific type of mobilisation, which Trubeckoj did not hesitate to stamp as 'revolutionary.' His exhortation to develop a public sphere on equal level with the state, was highly critical of the current state of affairs. A government that considered even private charity a challenge to its power could not but see Solov'ev's project as a threat. Was his call anti- overnmental? Solov'ev was fundamentally a statist, but for a brief period of time nursed the dream of the establishment of an ideal society by means of an uprising. Later, he turned to action not against the government, but without it: even in July 1892, the date of the official end of the famine, he continued to seek means to convince educated society to help the peasants. Incontestably, however, the lack of a response from the educated class to his appeal, and to the famine relief in general, must have undermined his trust in the possibility of building an ideal society on Russian soil. That this period was a moment of historic choice becomes obvious if we observe the emphasis, placed between the lines in his sophiology of history, on his own mission with respect to the educated class, and, through it, the peasants. _______________ Notes: 1. 'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose', S. 1989 2, p. 377. 2. Richard G. Jr. Robbins, Famine in Russia 1891-1892. The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York & London: Columbia Univ. Press. 1975); James Y. Simms The Impact of the Russian Famine of 1891-1892: A New Perspective (PhD thesis Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976); Nikolaj Sokolov, Golod 1891-1892 godov i obscestvennaja politiceskaja bor'ba (PhD thesis Moskva: Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 1987), in which Solov'ev is mentioned: Marina D. Kniga, Istorija goloda 1891- 1892 gg v Rossii (PhD thesis Voronez, 1997). 3. Evgenij Trubeckoj 1995 connected the famine with Solov'ev's first disillusion concerning the Russian state (Trubeckoj 1995 2, p. 10). 4. Gaut 1992, pp. 74-80. 5. Simms 1976, pp. 2-4, p. 10. 6. Ibid., p. 12: Robbins 1975, p. 3. 7. Ibid., p. 171. 8. Robbins 1975, pp. 3-10. 9. Although this policy only started to hear its fruit at the beginning of the 1890s and therefore cannot be held responsible for the famine and the misery of the peasantry, it cannot be denied that by 1891 many Russian peasants sorely felt the financial pressure. 10. Robbins 1975, p. 10. 11. Ibid., pp. 38-40. 12. Ibid. p. 149. The land captains [zemskie nacal'niki] had been introduced in 1889, as one of the most reactionary counter-reform measures. Contrary to what their title suggests, they had nothing to do with the zemstvo. They were recruited among the landed gentry, and appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to reinforce control over the peasants; they combined both administrative and juridical power (Riasanovsky 1993, p. 393). 13. See the chronology of events related to the famine in Sokolov 1987, pp. 219-227, esp. pp, 223-226. 14. Its composition reflected its symbolic importance: it was headed by the tsarevic, and included Durnovo, Pobedonoscev and the secretary of the section of law of the state chancellery and Head of the Red Cross, general Kaufman (Robbins 1975. pp. 95-98). 15. The Special Committee accumulated money mainly by organizing charitable lotteries. While the sums it dispensed were small when compared with the huge grants made available directly by central government, the significance of its work was considerable and was welcomed enthusiastically. The founding of the Committee also helped smooth the way for the growth of charitable activity independently of any governmental agency. Under its auspices, a number of persons considered political suspects, such as Vladimir Korolenko, were permitted to take an active part in relief work (Robbins 1975, p. 210). The Special Committee also contributed to setting up a public works programme to offer work to peasants in need of wages. This operation, however, proved a total failure. 16. Ibid., p. 168. 17. Ministers were responsible to the tsar only on individual basis, and the Committee of Ministers did not form a policy-making body. ‘This lack of unity meant that the Committee of Ministers was, to use the words of M.M. Speranskij, not an institution but a form of report’ (Ibid., pp. 66-67). 18. Ibid., p. 76. 19. This judgment was uttered both at the time and in 20th century scholarship (Simms 1976, p. 50). The mistrust with respect to the government and even the Red Cross, suspected of being corrupt, may explain the reluctance of private persons to donate large sums or money for the relief (Robbins 1975, p. (4). 20. It saw in private enterprises attempts to initiate sedition and protest against the state in the countryside, and to 'tear off from the government's hands the state affair of the struggle against the famine' (Sokolov 1987, p. 149). 21. Beside soup kitchens, childcare centres, school kitchens, feeding and replacing horses and cattle initiatives were set up. About donations, see Simms 1976, pp. 47-49. 22. The reconstruction of the debates in this section is based mainly on Simms 1976 and Sokolov 1987, and complemented with a study of sources when needed. The authors of the journal articles and rubrics are anonymous, unless specified. 23. Simms 1976, p. 14. 24. The question of the severity of the famine even took the form of a lively debate about the question whether there really was a famine in Russia at all; there was no doubt that crops had failed, but the issue was whether this crop failure had evolved into a famine. Until the winter, the government itself was reluctant to use the term famine [golod], but preferred the less emotionally-laden terms crop failure [neurozaj], bad harvest [nedorad], and misfortune [bedstvie] (Robbins 1975, p. 64). 25. N.P. Aksakov (1848-1909), S. F. Sarapov (1855-1911), 1). Samarin (1831-1901). With respect to the conservatives, the only available literature is Sokolov, who offers a rich insight into the ramifications of this camp. Unfortunately, he hardly ever mentions authors, and only refers to the journal or newspaper in which their articles were published. 26. Ibid., p. 146. 27. Ibid., p. 147. 28. Sokolov 1987, pp. 148-149. The Ministry of Agriculture, which was created a couple of years later, was the fruit of this proposition. In a circular, it was also proposed that all superfluous staff working in the commune should be removed (veterinarians, zemstvo teachers, province agronomes, and tax inspectors) (Ibid., p. 152). 29. Sokolov 1987, pp. 145-6, 154. 30. L. Slonimskij (1850-1918). See Simms 1976, pp. 79-85 on the vivid reports of the publicist Vladimir Korolenko published in Vestnik Evropy, on a detailed image of the terrible living conditions of the peasants. 31. See for instance the chronicle 'Vnutrenee Obozrenie' in Vestnik Evropy, 1892, 5, p. 372: Slonimskij (Simms, p. 109) 32. On the late reaction of the government and the hampering activity of land captains and governors, see for instance Vestnik Evropy, 1892. [6]. pp. 375ff. On the creation of new institutions, see Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12, p. 876, 869, Simms 1976, pp. 200-201. 33. See for instance Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 11, pp. 356-357. The bad communication between the zemstvo and the central administration was a commonly acknowledged problem (see the chronicle ‘Sovremennaja letopis’’ in Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, [6], p. 853). 34. See Slonimskij in Vestnik Evropy (quoted in Sokolov, 1987, p. 171); Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12. P. 874; Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, 2, p. 855. 35. Liberal journals not only published Tolstoj, but also defended him against the conservatives (Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12, pp. 870-873; Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, 2, p. 859). 36. ‘Strasnyj vopros’, first published in Russkoe Vedomosti [Russian News] on November 6, 1891. Edition used: L.N. Tolstoj, Polnoe sobranie socienij, vol. 29 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyj Izd. Khudozestvennoj literatury, 1954), pp. 117-125. See also ‘O golode’, first forbidden by censorship when it was issued in October 1891 together notably with an article by Solov’ev, then modified and published in English in the Daily Telegraph on 14 January 1892, then in Russian, with modifications, in Moskovskie Vedomosti, 22 January, 1892. Edition used: Tolstoj 1954, pp. 86-116. 37. The issue was far more complicated and could not be solved by simply distributing food. For instance, there were often no external signs of this need. Besides, for people who had learnt that earning by working was positive, and remaining without work negative, free distribution raised a great deal of confusion and abuse. The administration had therefore fallen into the following vicious circle: the more free distribution there would be, the weaker the population would become, and the greater the need would be. Its needs consisted not only of food, but also, tools, stoves, clothes, shoes, healing, pilgrimage, and also taxes: these needs were not taken into account in the lists trying to assess the scope of the peasants' misery. 38. This question is the object of his article ‘Strasnyj vopros’. Tolstoj’s call had an immediate effect on the government decision-making: an instruction was given to count all the available grain within two weeks (Tolstoj 1954, commentary p. 396). 39. About the various reaction of the radical movement to the famine, see James Y. Simms. Jr., 'The Famine and the Radicals'. in: Edward H. Judge, James Y, Simms, Jr. (eds.), Modernization and Revolution: Dilemmas of Progress in Late Imperial Russia. Essays in Honor of Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Columbia University Pres, 1992, pp. 13-42). 40. See Vasilij Voroncov (1847-1918). N. Daniel’son (pen-name Nikolai-on, 1844-1918). S. Jusakov (1849-1910). N. A. Karysev (years unknown) in Russkoe bogatstvo [Russian Wealth] (Simms 1976, pp. 166-167, 171). 41. Gaut 1992, p. 76. 42. Petr Struve (1870-1944). Sokolov 1987, p. 162: Simms 1976, p. 166. From 1893 onwards, within the socialist movement, a split became more obvious between the revolutionary wing (G. Plekhanov, P. Lavrov), which called for the tsarist regime to be overthrown, as ell as legal Marxism (P. Struve), which focused on the necessity of fostering capitalism in Russia as a necessary phase (Simms 1976, pp. 143-147, 176: Simms 1992, pp. 15, 23, 28-34). 43. Riasonovsky 1993, p. 405; Simms 1976, p. 140. 44. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose’’. Edition used: S. 1989, 2, pp. 370-384. 45. ‘It contains a programme, or, better said, a leading thought of some undertakings that I have conceived and partially realised’ (correspondence with M.M. Stasjulevic, 11.9.1891, in: Pis’ma 1, p. 103). 46. ‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 384-386. About the relationship between Solov’ev and Severnyj Vestnik, see the article of its chief editor in the years when Solov’ev collaborated with it. I jubov’ Gurevic, ‘Istorija “Severnogo Vestnika”’, in: S.A. Vengerov (ed.). Russkaja literature XX veka 1890-1910 (Moskva: Izd. T-va ‘Mir’, 1914), pp. 235-264, esp. pp. 243-244. See also Solov’ev’s correspondence with Gurevic (Pis’ma 3, pp. 129-137). 47. For more details on the circumstances of this silence, see subsection 2c). 48. Full title: ‘Kto prozrel (Pis’mo v redakeiju [zurnala “Russkaja Mysl’”])’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 428-431. 49. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’ Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 432-44. 50. Ibid., p. 432. 51. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 450-458. No information has been found which could explain the delay of this publication. 52. Pis’ma 3, p. 137 (dated 20 August 1892). 53. In: D. Anuein (ed.). Pomose’ golodajuscim (Moskva: Izd. ‘Russkikh Vedomostej’, 1892), pp. 5560564. Information provided in S. 1989 2, p. 699), in which the article is republished (pp. 459-465). See Opravdanie dobra, p. 329ff. 54. See the discussion of these passages, see Part One, ch. III ‘Philosophy of History in Solov’ev’. 55. Full title: ‘Iz Moskovskoj gubernii (Pis’mo v. redakciju [Zurnala “Vestnik Evropy”])’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 623-625. 56. Ibid., p. 624. 57. Ibid., p. 625. 58. For instance, he invited Konstantin Arsen’ev to come and give a lecture (Pis’ma 2, p. 68). 59. ‘I am bustling around [khlopoca] to organize something against the famine […]. On September 8th, on my idea [po moej mysli] something was founded after the manner of the former [byvsego] Slavic committee, but it still is waiting for its permission and, probably, will not get it’ (Pis’ma 4, pp. 124). 60. Pis’ma 2, p. 80. 61. Pis’ma 3, p. 131. 62. Pis’ma 4, p. 54. 63. Gaut 1992, p. 79. According to Gaut, Solov’ev had abandoned this ideal by the end of the 1880s. Contrary to the acknowledged division of his work in three periods, a pre- theocratic, a theocratic, and a post-theocratic one (see for instance Trubeckoj 1995), the presence of the theocratic model in publications of 1891-1892 rather suggests continuity. 64. Another plan was to build a universal tsarian priesthood [vseobscee carskoe svjascenstvo], in which all could take part in priesthood and stardom; the participation of educated society would then be realised in the form of popular representation (Trubeckoj 1995 2. p. 13). In this scheme, the tripartition is maintained: the only difference is the explicit expectation that all take part in priesthood and stardom, whereas the third, initially 'prophetic' pillar is replaced by representation by some members of educated society or the people. Trubeckoj 1995 associated this scheme with Solov'ev's interest in representative power. In which way these three pillars have to share the power remains unclear. 65. Trubeckoj 1995 2. p. 13. 66. Quoted in Ibid., p. 12. 67. Pis’ma 1, p. 247. 68. Ibid., p. 103. 69. Pis’ma 3, p. 130. 70. For some of these data, he referred to his sources. For instance, he drew from the recently published ‘table of execution of the global state budget for the budget period of 1891’ (‘Mnimye I dejstvitel’nye mery …’, p. 452, n. 1) and from information gathered by the Ministry of State Domains (Ibid., p. 456). At other places, he did not mention his source on the cultivable land in European Russia (ex.: Ibid., pp. 454-456). 71. Robbins 1975, p. 179. 72. For instance, he briefly mentioned in a note the anecdote of the activities of the landowner and Slavophile Dmitrij Samarin, who sold his land to the peasants for nearly nothing and had to repurchase it (‘Narodnaja beda I obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 375). 73. He referred twice to his own impressions (probably when staying with family Kovalenskij, with whom he was related, in Dedovo (‘Vrag s Vostoka’, p. 439; ‘Iz Moskovskoj gubernii’, pp. 623-624). 74. Ermolov was an expert on economic problems in the countryside, and his book Neurozaj i narodnoe bedstvie, published in 1892, was the first major examination of the causes and impact of the famine, and still today ‘the best available analysis of the harvest of 1891’ (Robbins 1975, p. 191). Dokucaev published a collection of articles Nasi stepi prezde i teper’ in 1892, which Solov’ev quoted extensively. On his activities as a scholar in the years of the famine, see Kniga 1997, pp. 135-144. 75. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’, p. 443. 76. ‘Narodnaja bedaiI obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 374. 77. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 454-456. 78. Ibid., p. 45 79. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 371. 80. Even in summer 1892, his great problem was still to avoid censorship: ‘I intend to avoid a direct polemics and, probably, I will be able to do that, but which attitude should I take with respect to censorship [kak byt’s cenzuroj]? Even in the last article [‘Vrag s Vostoka’, MC], thanks to the exclusion of some necessary words, something came out which was mysterious and officious. Out of friendship for you, I am ready once more to submit myself to these unavoidable operations’ (letter to Ljubov’ Gurevic: Pis’ma 3, p. 137). 81. ‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”, p. 384. 82. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, pp. 379-380: 'Vrag s Vostoka", p. 436. He also specified that these 99% included the organization of lotteries by the state, which in no case could count as public aid (Ibid., n. 1). 83. 'Vrag s Vostoka', p. 435. 84. 'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 381. 85. There are hardly any elements of a discussion apart from short comments in Opravdanie dobra. 86. See Opravdanie dobra, part III, chap. 10, section 18. However, Solov’ev did not expand on the zemstvo. Worth adding is the absence of consensus in Russia at that time on the function of the zemstvo, whether political (as a forum for liberals) or administrative (as a link in the chain of bureaucratic command) (see Thomas Fallows. ‘The Zemstvo and the Bureaucracy, 1890-1904’, in Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), The Zemstvo in Russia, An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 177-241; p. 178). One would probably expect support of the former position from Solov’ev. 87. The zemstvo was represented at both the district and the province level, and was not allowed to set up a national organization (Robbins 1975, p. 27). 88. The distinction between intelligentsia liberals and zemstvo liberals is provided by Solovov 1987, p. 158. 89. Pis’ma 3, p. 130. 90. Trubeckoj 1995 2, p. 13. 91. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, pp. 382-382. 92. ‘Mnimye I dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, p. 458. 93. S. 1989 2, p. 689. 94. Solov' ev mentioned this setback in his correspondence (Pis’ma 3, p. 131). Vestnik Evropy mentioned the episode on the three alleged agitators (1891, 12, p. 372, note). 95. See his letter: ‘Therefore, in the interests of the affair (including the interest of “Severnyj Vestnik”) it is necessary for the time being, to hush up [promolcat’]’ (Pis’ma 3, p. 131). 96. An interesting, remark by the conservative Kireev reveals that situating Solov’ev, Tolstoj and Grot was more problematic that it seemed, and that not all conservatives agreed with the official anathema on these thinkers. In the days of the scandal around Voprosy filosofii I psikhologii, he wrote in a letter: 'Of course, the party of Rus[skie] Vedomosti, Vest[nik] Evropy etc. work towards a constitution […], but is it fair to count them among the enemies of the government (see yesterday' s N. of Mosk[ovskie] Vedom [osti]), enemies of the established order? It is fair only in theory: fortunately, people of such manners seldom are consequent' (quoted in Sokolov 1987, p. 164). 97. See Simms 1976, p. 109: Sokolov 1987, pp. 163-4. This also applies to works on Solov’ev: see especially Gaut 1992, pp. 74-80. 98. Gaut 1992, p. 79. 99. In other terms, he conveyed a political message without talking politics. 100. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 452-453. 101. In the beginning 1890s, this liberal principle influenced Witte, who became convinced of the necessity to reform land property by peasants. His attitude would change again towards the end of his life (Victor Lcontovitsch, Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland, Kulturwissenschaftliche Reibe, vol. 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957), p. 168. 102. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, p. 456. Also in ‘La question sociale en Europe'. written in August 1892 (published only in 1897), and Opravdanie dobra, his positive valuation of property, and property of soil as highest form, did not prompt him to claim the necessity that the peasant benefit of it and be set free from the commune. 103. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel"nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 456- 7. Massive displacement of peasant populations had been made legally possible by a law passed just before the famine, in 1889. This law was welcomed by public opinion. For a criticism of the applicability of this law and its effectiveness against peasant misery, see the comprehensive essay of a landowner in the province of Perm’, Dmitrij Druckoj-Sokol’ninskij, 'Nase sel'skoe khozjajstvo i ego buduscnost”, Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 10, pp. 698-734, esp. p. 700ff. 104. During the famine, in October 1891, he pinned down the populist attitude by reminding the reader of their tendency to occupy themselves with the wrong issues, such as ‘organising absurd crimes’, hereby alluding to the tsaricide of 1881 (‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”, p. 385) [see case study 1]. 105. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 374-375. 106. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’, pp. 436-7, n. 2. 107. ‘O golode’, pp. 105-106. 108. This point has also been rightly pointed out by Gaut (Gaut 1992, pp. 75-76. 109. See Solov’ev’s criticism in ‘Idoly I dealy’ (S. 1989 1, p. 621) and his correspondence (Pis’ma 1, p. 71). 110. One may wonder if this invitation or meeting was related to Tolstoj setting up the komitet gramotnosti in favour of the hungry, in which case Solov’ev’s refusal shows a deeper animosity than purely intellectual debates in publications. 111. The reference
to an episode in the Old Testament is based on a Talmudic interpretation
(commentary, p. 694). This testifies to his profound interest for the
religious heritage and fate of the Jews during the same period. An
ironic analogy made between the conservatives and Joseph in an episode
of the Old Testament during a famine: Joseph encouraged his people to
sell everything, including their freedom. Solov’ev ironically concluded
that the situation in Russia in his time was worse than in Egypt 2000
years earlier, because peasants were now not free to sell their land but
forced to be dispossessed of their land by the communal system (‘Narodnaja
beda I obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 383). 113. See ‘Ekonomiceskij vopros s nravstvennoj tocki zrenija’, Opravdanie dobra, pp. 406- 440. 114. ‘O pricinakh upadka srednevekovogo mirosozercanija’, p. 355. 115. His argument was that he could not be the only one if he belonged to a group, namely of those who had remained faithful to the Christian principles of educated society (‘Kto prozrel?’, pp. 428-9). He even added to its legitimacy when, in the same article, he referred to earlier publications, tracing, as it were, the genealogy of his mission as a prophet. 116. Pis’ma 4, p. 54.
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