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HISTORY, SOPHIA AND THE RUSSIAN NATION |
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III. Philosophy of History in Solov'ev
From the very outset of his career, Solov'ev was concerned with the category of progressive development. This category is central in 19th century philosophy of history that developed an examination of world history both in its immanence and in its global nature. Solov'ev found support in this register to emphasise three main points: history, including non-religious institutions, has to be valued positively, and can be directed by men, who gather in a supra-entity, humanity. In PH, in contrast to TH, history is not seen as mere contingency opposed to the true being which is eternity, but is examined in its intrinsic value. Secular forms of collectivity, such as the state and the nation, have to be valued positively. In addition, progress is not initiated and directed by a transcendent plan, but is a law immanent to the subject changing, is initiated from within by men. This view implies that the subject in question is a harmonious entity. Solov'ev identified the chief subject of this process as humanity. In a teleological perspective, he posed that humanity is evolving by virtue of a single metaphysical principle, which he defined as 'all-unity' [vseedinstvo]. All-unity governs the historical process from within and is the goal towards which humanity as a whole is striving, and which it will realise. In this sense, all-unity functions as the metaphysical principle that structures Solov'ev's philosophy of history and can be considered the philosophical equivalent of Bogocelovecestvo. With this concept, Solov'ev strove to pose the values of both individual freedom and collectivity as criteria for historical action. [2] In doing so, he struggled against the tendency to sacrifice the former term, as Pobedonoscev, the neo-Slavophiles and the socialists did, as well as against the neglect or negation of collectivity such as in liberal and subjectivist thought. This also applies to the most comprehensive form of collectivity, humanity, the ontological existence and unity of which Solov'ev defended against nationalist views on history. In this respect, his philosophy of history allowed him to defend universalism on the basis of an immanent conception of history. In my opinion, Solov'ev developed a philosophy of history of his own, which includes Hegelian and Comtian elements, and bears the influence of his father, Sergej Mikhailovic Solov'ev. Solov'ev did not produce a systematic philosophy of history backed by a great number of facts, as did Hegel, Comte, or Spengler. Nevertheless, he offered broad interpretations of world history, which testify to his powerful and historical range of vision. However, in his effort to simultaneously show continuity and change in world history, his approach remained on the whole highly general, which resulted in a schematic discourse on progress. In the scarce places where he elaborated on history, Solov'ev operated highly selectively with respect to historical data. What strikes the reader is the constant effort to connect these data to a progressive line of history, and to its universal significance within this line. He mainly elaborates on philosophy of history in the introduction to Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, entitled 'Obsceistoriceskoe vvedenie (ol zakone istoriceskogo razvitija)' [General-Historical Introduction (about the Law of Historical Development)], and in Opravdanie dobra. A wide range of other publications also contains elements of philosophy of history, which I use in this analysis. In order to understand the working of the philosophical register of history in Solov'ev's work, in the first part of this section (1) I deal with (a) his definition of history in philosophical terms, (b) the general framework, (c) periodisations and underlying conception of time, (d) method and criteria, and (e) the actors that play a major role in history. In the second part (2), I examine the relationship of Solov'ev's philosophy of history with that of (a) Hegel, (b) Sergej Solov'ev, and (c) Comte. 1. The Register of Philosophy of History in Solov'ev Characteristically, it is difficult to find in Solov'ev's work a single definition of history that is entirely formulated in the philosophical register, as it always contains Christian elements or a sophianic colouring. Significantly, rather than defining the term 'history', Solov'ev offers various characteristics of 'historical development' and the 'historical process.' His outspoken preference for such expressions strongly suggests that he saw philosophy of history as the best available means of describing history in terms of continuity, in its immanence and in its concrete forms. In Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija he announced that the main objective of his examination of history was to solve the question of the goal of human existence. [3] He hereby from the outset established a teleological perspective that remained constant in his work. This goal is common to all men, since it is connected to the life of all people. It is also intrinsic to them as the formal and final cause of their development. [4] He identified this goal as 'integral life organisation' or 'all-unity.' [5] In all-unity, a balance is obtained at the level of humanity between individual freedom and unity of the community. [6] A goal also implies development leading up to it, in which one should take part collectively. This is made possible by the fact that this final goal is understandable to every human being and can be defined in broad lines. [7] For it is not enough to be conscious of this goal:
The observation that history is goal-oriented implies active participation in its realisation. We can therefore reconstruct the following syllogism: history is an immanent goal-oriented process; this goal is knowable and achievable; everything knowable and achievable must be done; thus the human collectivity has to contribute to the realisation of this goal. To sum up, in Solov'ev's philosophy of history, history can be defined as the gradual realisation of all-unity through collective action. In his philosophy of history, Solov'ev focused on the world alone, namely on the immanent development of humanity towards all-unity, regardless of the transcendent level of divine agency. The framework of history is structured by one and the same global principle of development, to which all beings, whether individual, national, or universal, are subjected. The priority of the principle of a single continuous development determines the general outline of history in Solov'ev as a primarily linear, rather than cyclical, or dialectical, scheme. [9] In order to build his conception of teleological development as an immanent process on a firm basis, Solov'ev turned to the organicistic model of explanation. The analogy between human society and a biological organism offers three main advantages. Firstly, it permits an understanding of human society, and thus by extension, history, as an immanent entity moving forward on the basis of its own force, not that of God as in theology of history. [10] Secondly, it presupposes that there is a certain unity or continuity of evolution between the natural and the human realm, within the immanent world, i.e. between nature and culture. [11] Solov'ev discussed, mainly with reference to Darwin, the biological and psychological evolution of animals into human beings, even though his interest in evolutionism focused on human beings and human society. [12] The framework of his philosophy of history is shaped by the evolution of the collective forms of human existence towards the ideal society, that is, organic unity or solidarity at all levels: local, national, and universal. In addition to the unity of the temporal framework, which is thoroughly structured by the category of progressive development, Solov'ev posited the unity of the spatial or geographical framework. Two factors come to the fore in Solov'ev's approach. On the one hand, the main actor and ultimate achiever of all-unity is humanity in its entirety, i.e. humanity realising its potency. In this respect, the third advantage of the organicistic metaphor is that it permits an intrinsic link between the parts and the whole, similar to the link between organs and the organism. This notably implies a mutual influence between the individual, the various forms of collectivity, and humanity as a whole. [13] On the other hand, Solov'ev divided humanity into several groups and sketched a movement of history from East to West, from the Middle and Near East to Europe. He largely left out America, Africa, and Oceania, and displayed a strong Eurocentrism, which included Russia and which found support in the idea of cultural imperialism. [14] According to the latter, to which Solov'ev adhered, Europe, including Russia, was the starting point for bringing true values to humanity as a whole and realising (all-)unity of the whole planet. It is precisely this goal, and the immanent development leading to it, which are the objects of Solov'ev's philosophy of history. c) Periodisation and conception of time Properly speaking we find in Solov'ev only one periodisation of world history, namely in the first chapter of Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. Significantly, the succinctness of this survey (only about twenty pages!) reveals that Solov'ev was interested in general lines rather than in particular events. In an attempt to deal with human activities exhaustively, he divided these into the theoretical (theology, philosophy, science), practical (spiritual, political, economic society), and creative (mysticism, fine arts, technical arts) fields. Examining their evolution throughout history, he posed that history is made up of three successive phases, undifferentiated unity, separation, and differentiated unity between and within these fields. [15] These three phases as it were form Solov'ev's universal law of historical development. In the first phase, which took place in Ancient India, Greece, and Rome, the three fields were not differentiated. [16] Later on, after the distinction between theory, practice, and creation had occurred, a fusion still remained within each of the three fields, for example, in knowledge, between theology, philosophy, and science. A second phase began with the appearance of Christianity, which introduced the separation of the sacred from the profane. In this phase Western civilisation dominated, which excessively distinguished between all fields of human activities. For instance, in practical life, church, state, and economy were separated. Besides, each of these successively played the leading role in Western history, ending with the domination of economics, as was claimed by socialism in Solov'ev's time. [17] In a near future, a third phase of synthesis or differentiated unity, would follow, in which 'human development' would realise its 'absolute content.' In this phase, the reconciliation would take place between the forces of the first (mainly Eastern) and second (mainly Western) phase. The task of performing this reconciliation would be that of the Slavic people, especially Russia. Solov'ev characterised this phase in religious terms, and thus at this point left open the register of pure philosophy of history [see synthesis Part Two]. In Opravdanie dobra, he completed the general picture of world history by examining, in the first place, what we could identify as the phase preceding the process sketched above. Solov'ev comprehensively analysed the evolution of human community from the clan through Eastern monarchies up to the state. [18] Solov'ev borrowed much of the argumentation from Sergej Solov'ev for this account [see subsection 2b]. In the second place, he depicted the progressive unification of humanity in secular terms, by pointing to the intensification of internal relationships and the globalisation of culture [see Aei-ii). We may conclude that, rather than in periodisations per se, Solov'ev seemed interested in certain episodes in history, the interval between which he might have considered as periods, but which he did not examine as such. This is most obvious in his treatment of Russian history. Solov'ev pointed to three fundamental episodes: first the call to the Varangians in the 9th century, second the opening towards Europe under Peter I, and third the abolition of serfdom under Alexander II. [19] As a matter of fact, Solov'ev's teleological perspective on history dictates a tendency to examine the events that are constitutive for the establishment of the goal, rather than examining the phases between those events, which would require more detailed investigations. Solov'ev hardly ever devoted special attention to the question of time. In the short entry 'Vremja' [Time] written for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, he approached time in a Kantian manner as a universal form of Anschauung. He argued that no explanation of time could be given on an empirical or rational basis, but rather that philosophical elaborations on time all had a metaphysical character. [20] It appears therefore that Solov'ev, in contrast with transcendental philosophy, did not consider time a philosophical issue independently from metaphysics. [21] He only mentioned the contribution made by Kant in the conceptualisation of time, yet did not either elaborate on it or propose his own vision on the topic. [22] Nor did he broach the topic of historical time as such, which generally includes a definition of its main components, namely past, present, and future, an analysis of the perception of these by man, as well as an interpretation of the mutual relationships between past, present, and future. One can explain this absence of reflection by the fact that he deliberately reflected on history from a speculative, universalistic, and eternalistic standpoint, from which all questions related to time were unproblematic. Characteristically, he neither questioned nor justified the very standpoint he adopted. Consequently, a personal experience of time such as that which initiated and nurtured Augustine's reflections, for instance, was not relevant for Solov'ev. Although time is not addressed in Solov'ev, it plays no less fundamental a role than in any other discourse on history. The principles of teleology and continuity that are so determinant in Solov'ev, dictate a certain view on the phenomenon of change in time. Holding to the idea that that which appears as novelty is only the concrete realisation or actualisation of an element that was already working in some form, he interpreted problems of the present as the result of an entire historical process. Besides, he sensed that history had accelerated since the end of the eighteenth century, and felt that Europe and Russia were rapidly changing. [23] As far as his conception of future is concerned, Solov'ev was, like most philosophers of history of his century, deeply optimistic. [24] He perceived the future as the open dimension in which man would be able to implement the final goal of universal solidarity. This goal should be attained while preserving a link of continuity with the past, that is, a respect for the work achieved by ancestors and their values, in short a respect for tradition. Solov'ev's philosophical conception of time is therefore marked by a dynamic tension between an attachment to the past and the effort required to create a future different from the present. [25] In his PH he emphasised man's capacity to achieve this ideal in the future. Solov'ev considered progress to be a fundamental force shaping history into a single ascending line. This concept rests on the major contribution made by European science, which, towards the end of the 18th century, developed the concept of a unified and determined historical process. [26] In his eyes, progress in practice included regressions and stagnations, yet improvement remains predominant:
As is obvious from this passage, Solov'ev needed the concept of progress because of one functional aspect: the structuring of historical phenomena along one single line leading to the goal of all-unity. [28] He had taken great care to preliminarily define this goal, notably because he was opposed to progress that was deprived of any goal, or indefinite progress, as well as to a progress without an end, an endless progress. [29] Progress is also something necessary, in two respects, Firstly, it occurs as the necessary result of inner motives nurtured by individuals and nations. Secondly, it is made up of stages that were and are necessary. Hereby is the meaning of history itself justified. For instance, wild humanity had to go through despotism to overcome it and become civilised. [30] In this respect, Solov'ev's view was akin to Hegel, Comte, and Marx, who all believed in the necessary succession of given stages. Beside its structuring function, the idea of progress allows the legitimisation of continuity. [31] Solov'ev offered a challenging argumentation on this point. On the one hand, true progress, especially moral progress, implies a conservative attitude, an attachment to tradition: 'moral progress can only consist in a better and wider fulfilling of the obligations which derive from tradition.' [32] Tradition transmits certain principles of order, because, if it was anything other than order, tradition would have disappeared. In other terms, progress is not the negation of order, but rather the progress of order. [33] On the other hand, true progress implies the introduction of positive innovation. In connection to this, Solov'ev defined progress in opposition to stagnation, for which he used the term kitaizm, 'Chin ism" to point to 'the exclusive concern with a traditional order that has been undermined [podkopannogo] from all sides.' [34] The link that the philosopher formulated between continuity and change shows that he was against what we could call 'progress by making tabula rasa.' He was fiercely opposed to the socialist interpretation of progress coming from revolution that was fashionable in the Russian populist press of the I870s. [35] In his eyes, this conception of progress had been dominant in Western European debates since the 18th century, and implied a chiefly negative relationship to the past, because it rejected the past order en bloc. [36] This was therefore equivalent to suppressing the very essence of progress. A radical break with the past generations would have fatal consequences and was for him equivalent to a destruction of 'the unity of that which develops itself or progresses, i.e. most of all the real inner solidarity of the old and the new generations of progressing humanity.' [37] The motive of Solov'ev's deep-seated aversion against revolution thus lies in the potential destruction of the unity with the past, and, as a result, of humanity. His conviction that positive development was already an embryonic component of the present, and should be introduced gradually, sustained his belief in progress by means of reform instead of revolution. In conformity with the common tendency in philosophy of history, Solov'ev distinguished between different types of progress that touched upon the most varied of human activities: moral, social, political, technical, cultural, and spiritual progress. [38] Three general factors of progress had been operating from the Middle Ages onwards: the development of nationalities [razvitie nacional'nosti], the corresponding development of international relationships, and the geographical extension of the unity of culture to the entire globe, or, in present-day terms, the globalisation of culture [see next subsection on humanity and nations.] [39] Interestingly, Solov'ev also brought war to the fore as a motor of progress. Here we encounter one of the very few historical analyses made by Solov'ev entirely in the register of philosophy of history. [40] War, he argued, 'has been the chief historical means of bringing about the external political unification of humanity.' [41] War had first led to the formation of states. It had then initiated other positive developments such as the abolition of war within the states' own boundaries, conditions for a mutual rapprochement between the states, a reduction of active military forces for more effective results, and a decrease in the number of human lives sacrificed. Solov'ev stated that war had also played an active role as a condition of technical and scientific progress in the nineteenth century, and in the propagation of ideas in general. Apart from the question whether war in itself promoted the abovementioned developments, one can note that his considerations in no way address the question of the damage caused by war, such as the destruction of cultural heritage. Generally, he perceived a progress towards fewer conflicts; they were becoming shorter and more rare, from which he concluded that humanity would witness the end of war. [42] His treatment of the phenomenon of war shows that on the very few occasions that that the philosopher made a historical analysis, his perspective was restricted to the point, namely on war as a factor of unification. Solov'ev also pointed out progress as far as Russian history was concerned, albeit in low key. When he commented on the abolition of serfdom, he ironically explained that there had actually been no moral progress between the heroes of Homer and the Russian landowners of the 1840s. [43] It was only in the last thirty years (1865-1895) that an elevation of moral demands had occurred through the abolition of serfdom in Russia, parallel to the abolition of slavery in the United States of America (1865). What had happened, he argued, was that an idea that had been so far restricted to the subjective area of morality had now become a common and objective task. [44] For progress to become objective, an idea had first to reach collective awareness. The main tool for fostering this awareness is the use of speculative reason. ii) Method: speculative reason Speculative reason, and its main device deduction, is the key instrument used by Solov'ev to convince his fellow men of the rationality of the historical world and to exhort them to take active part in the historical process towards all-unity. The result of his accounts, however, is often disappointing. The philosopher applied deduction in a hastened way, and as a result strongly simplified history in order to integrate particular episodes in his own picture. He carried out these simplifications in three ways. Firstly, by defining a phenomenon on the basis of an abstract principle, for instance 'Byzantinism', the manifestation of which he quickly deduced from historical events, he ended up yielding historical misinterpretations and circular arguments. [45] Secondly, by imposing his law of historical development, he was highly selective. [46] Thirdly, as a result of this approach, characterised by the exclusive search for signs and symptoms in history that could confirm his thesis, he tended to reduce collective historical participation to the action of its most prominent figures, mostly political leaders. In the description of an epoch, he often limited himself to portraying individual deeds of heroes, such as Vladimir, Peter I, Catherine II and Alexander II. Such an arrangement of the world can be justified only speculatively, which the philosopher did by untiringly pointing to the goal of all-unity, out of which all empirical things could be deduced. [47] He showed himself reluctant to take historical experience for more than a verification of his own metaphysical theses. Speculative reason can nevertheless find assistance in the empirical examination of sources, which is at work in historical science. One of Solov'ev's very few reflective moments on the relationship between philosophy and history is a review of the historical journal run by his old school companion, historian Nikolaj Kareev. [48] Solov'ev contested the claim made by the historian that philosophy relates to subjective data, and historical science to objective data, and attempted to show philosophy as contributor to 'a theory of the world process.' [49] Against Kareev's defence of a separation between philosophy and historical science, Solov'ev pleaded for cooperation between the two fields, in which he proposed the following division of labour. Philosophers pointed to general principles, to paths of reflection, such as the explanation of the unity that makes up history, while historians provided concrete objects of reflection. [50] He argued that Kareev's distinction between objective and subjective, used to differentiate the work of the historian from that of the philosopher, was irrelevant, for that what is true subjectively, is true objectively. He replaced the dichotomy objectivity/subjectivity by the dichotomy true/false, but did not answer the question about what the criteria of truth are. [51] By this omission, he placed truth, which he considered the norm, by which we should judge history, above method. So even within an epistemological reflection, his philosophical account of history often results in a dogmatic discourse. The division of labour between philosophers and historians did not however stop him from applying the main method of historians, namely the use of sources such as empirical observations made by others, on a number of occasions. The manner in which he treated the famine of 1891-1892 is a brilliant and rare counter-example to his usual deductive method. He made use of geographical and statistic data, and outlined the worsening of the peasant situation over the last decades in factual terms [see case study V 'The famine of 1891- 1892']. Solov'ev also turned to the empirical method for other studies that, with rare exceptions, can be situated on the border between empirical and speculative history. [52] Characteristically, in his sketch of the formation of the character of a people, Solov'ev investigated neither the historical life of peoples in their concrete variety, nor for instance external influences such as climate, but addressed precisely an issue that can hardly be submitted to empirical investigation, namely the origin of the national character. [53] He ascribed the latter to the character of the founder of the clan [rodonacal'nik] and pointed to the religious dimension at work, hereby situating himself on the border between phenomenal history and religion. [54] In sum, Solov'ev operated mostly with speculative reason in his philosophical register on history in order to demonstrate that the pervasiveness of the principle of all-unity was being realised. Because of a lack of historical data, the results of these accounts are mostly unconvincing. Man not only understands the rational meaning of history, but shapes history through the participation of an increasingly large community. For a philosopher of history, the challenge consists in emphasising the agency of larger groups without neglecting the plurality of the individuals:
According to Solov'ev, the forms of this collective being are most of all humanity, the nations, and the state; great (states)men form the prominent category of individual actors. Throughout Solov'ev's work, humanity is the chief subject of history: 'The subject of development here is humanity as a real, though also collective organism.' [56] The role of the organicistic model for the definition of humanity as an immanent and autonomous force has been pointed out above [see subsection I b]. [57] With respect to humanity, the analogy also permits a distinction between, on the one hand, humanity's organs, or composite parts, i.e. nations, and, on the other hand, the systems that form it and which are common to all nations, i.e. knowledge, practical activity and creation. [58] On the basis of this programmatic statement, one would expect Solov'ev to examine all these domains in the context of their development in one or several nations, and observe the complementary character of these contributions from the perspective of humanity. However, as we have seen, the philosopher did not elaborate on any of these domains and only offered sketches. Obviously, he was most eager to integrate all the composing elements into the totalising perspective, rather than in a precise analysis of the multiple forms of manifestation of and interrelationships between these categories. It is a recurring feature in Solov'ev's work to advocate a consideration of national developments from the perspective of humanity. He stated that 'civilised humanity' as a whole was rising, which tended 'increasingly to become the whole of humanity.' [59] What did he mean precisely? International relationships had intensified, a world market had appeared, as well as a 'constant collaboration of all civilised countries in technical and scientific work', and inventions in communication media and transport, which suppressed geographical distance. [60] In his eyes, the same process included the penetration of European culture in increasing numbers of areas, and thus, colonialism, which he regarded highly as a propagator of civilised culture to the whole planet. [61] By the 1890s, when he equated civilised culture with European culture, Solov'ev showed himself a eurocentrist and at the same time a universalist, in his own terms, a Westerniser. [62] As a matter of fact, it was Solov'ev's fundamental contribution to the Russian tradition of philosophy of history to conceive of history from a consistently universalist perspective. [63] In his early years, he focused on Russia's mission, and later, moored Russia's history to that of the West by interpreting it on the basis of the criteria of the Enlightenment: freedom, emancipation, and progress [see case studies IV and V). At stake was the extension of solidarity to humanity as a whole, which should not be realised at the expense of individual rights. In this respect, his motivation to engage in a polemic with the Russian proponent of the theory of separate cultural types, Nikolaj Danilevskij, also becomes clear. Against the view that a cultural type develops separately and does not transmit its values to others, Solov'ev was eager to defend the conception of humanity as an organic whole, structured by strong relationships. This whole, humanity, he saw precisely as the ontological and epistemological condition for the universalisation of the good. [64] This scheme of gradual unification of humanity is challenged by another, similarly powerful scheme in his work, namely that of a humanity divided into two conflicting components, East and West. The antagonism between the Eastern and the Western world is one of Solov'ev's most permanent historical topics, not only in theological, but also in philosophical terms. [65] Solov'ev filled these categories with varying geographical contents. The East meant first the Middle-East (India), then Eastern Christianity (Byzantium), and finally, with a sharper perception of the 'yellow peril', the Far East (China and Japan). [66] As to the notion of Europe, he regarded it first as excluding Russia, then as including it, but only up to a certain point, because his fatherland perfectly embodied the conflict between East and West, between exclusive conservatism and progress. However, this conflict between East and West was not to last forever. The Russian philosopher was convinced that humanity was not ontologically determined by this dichotomy, but could and should be unified because it was in essence a unity. [67] In this sense, he was not a civilisationist, and his polemic with Danilevskij confirms his universalist position. He predicted that the struggle between East and West would continue between the two halves of the world, in a future armed struggle between Europe and Mongol Asia, which would be the last war, a world war. The victory of one of them would ensure 'peace to the rest of the world', and a 'world empire' or world monarchy would be established. [68] In this way, he believed that humanity was destined to ultimately become one. Solov'ev did not offer a systematic view on the role of nations in world history, as did Hegel or Danilevskij, but only a short survey in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, a more extensive overview in Opravdanie dobra, and passages in various works. [69] They testify, if not to his sustained interest in the question, to his range of vision. In these surveys he showed himself to be a typical nineteenth century thinker, in the sense that, at least since Herder, it was common to reflect on history in terms of historical nations. [70] Solov'ev considered nations to be central categories of world history and consistently related their existence to humanity. [71] He picked up on four fundamental Hegelian characterisations of the nation [see subsection 2aii] and more specifically described the character of certain nations on the basis of their historical achievements, mostly in the fields of art, science and culture (Italy, Germany, England, Poland, Russia), religion (Spain, Germany) and civil rights (England, France). [72] Spain served humanity by defending Europe against Islam. [73] The English nation developed geniuses in literature and science, brought to the fore the principles of religious and civil freedom, which influenced the formation of the United States of America, and had scientists who demonstrated the physical unity of the universe. England also succeeded in expanding civilisation to India and Australia. Whereas France introduced the idea of human rights, Germany contributed to world history with the Reformation, poetry, Kant and Hegel's philosophy. Solov'ev focused on national geniuses, dropping names in art and science, and hastily mentioned significant religious events and conquests in order to produce this hurried picture of national characters. If a nation is true to its idea, he held, it does not attach an absolute significance to its material interest, but only to its ideal, universal mission, and that it feels this universal dimension in itself. The essential message that Solov'ev wanted to convey was clear: the significance of a nation is determined by its contribution to humanity. From this perspective, a theory such as that of Danilevskij on cultural types, which denied the supra-unity of humanity, was totally incoherent. He found it also to be invalidated by current developments, such as an intensification of internal exchange in politics, economy and culture. [74] However, Sternkopf's conclusion that he totally subordinated the existence of nations to humanity is exaggerated. [75] Solov'ev's valuation of the existence of nations was undeniably positive. These nations could only achieve what they achieved by virtue of their particularity, and were bound to remain until the end of history. By arguing that nations find their essential meaning in humanity, he was aiming at two targets. Firstly, he sought to formulate a consistent answer to the supporters of nationalism. His point was that a nation lives only in the supra-national and international environment, only in relationship to humanity and to other nations. [76] Unfortunately, this remains one of the least developed aspects of his philosophy of history. Secondly, and more fundamentally, by claiming that 'the reason for the existence of nations does not find itself in them, but in humanity', he was pointing out what he considered the main priority, or in other terms, the ideal entity to be realised in the future, namely all-unity or universal solidarity. [77] His emphasis that this goal should be realised by man makes his philosophy of history a call for action. From a teleological perspective, he kept emphasising humanity, and only briefly described the formation of such and such a nation. From a general point of view, one has to make the distinction between two understandings of the term 'state' [gosudarstvo]. There is the state in the broad sense and the state in the narrow sense. The state in the broad sense is 'a nation or territory considered as an organised political community under a government.' This is similar to 'nation' in Solov'ev's understanding of the term, with emphasis on the aspect of internal organisation. [78] The state in the narrow sense is 'the civil government of a country', as the particular political institution within the nation. [79] Solov'ev neither made this distinction nor developed a theory of the state, but offered reflections on state both in the broad and the narrow sense. [80] Influenced by his father and through him by Hegel, Solov'ev viewed the state as the culminating point of the evolution of human organisation [on these influences, see part 2 of this chapter]. The state acquired not only the conservative task of protecting the basis of social life, but also a progressive one, namely improving the conditions of that life. [81] The social task of the state was made possible if the state concentrated in its own hands those means of production and distribution that are purely material (factories, banks, infrastructure, lines of communication, firms) in order to guarantee minimal material good for everyone. [82] In a liberal stance, however Solov'ev also defended the preservation of private property. This position shows how he strove to preserve both individuality and collectivity in his system. In addition to the above, Solov'ev also relativised the role of the state. In his theocratic scheme, in which the state turns out to be only one of the three highest instances, he posed that the power should be shared by church, state, and zemstvo. [83] He also stated that a perversion of the idea of the state, for instance by those who place it above moral law such as Hobbes, Hegel and Marx, is a specific evil. [84] Another reason he gave for relativising the role of state is that it is a particular organism that does not deal with universal interests and, in this respect, is limited. [85] Solov'ev primarily considered the state from a universal perspective. As to the regime of the state, Solov'ev believed in monarchy as the best possible form for the realisation of all-unity. [86] Accordingly, he suggested that the idea of a universal state or world monarchy, even though it had not been realised politically so far, would be the ideal political form of all-unity. [87] iv) Great (states)men and common individuals The category of great men is certainly the least original in Solov'ev's philosophy of history. He may have picked it up directly from Hegel, or indirectly through Sergej Solov'ev [see subsection 2a and 2b]. Great men are called 'best men, heroes, motors [dvigateli] of history.' [88] These enlightened personalities are an elite that introduces a new level of consciousness, and represents the dynamic element, opposed to the static established order. [89] These heroes are often builders of nations or states. [90] They are also sometimes the cultural representatives of national genius, such as poets and thinkers. [91] The political leaders especially are rough people, who do not accept any limits. However, Solov'ev neither further elaborated the category of great men nor applied it concretely to great figures of (Russian) history. This raises the question of his real interest in history as a whole. Arguably, he made use of certain events and figures in order to illustrate his theses about the embodiment of morality in history, rather than analysing them for their own sake. [92] In other words, although one cannot deny that his thought was embedded in a historical mould, his use of historical elements often bears an instrumental character. Concerning ordinary individuals, he emphasised their role by arguing that the individual had always been 'the active principle of historical progress.' [93] Hereby Solov'ev aimed at the socialist perspective, which emphasised the group, collectivity as the main actor of history, at the expense of the individual. His interest in the category of the individual is well known. [94] At the same time, this did not stop him from fiercely criticising individualism, for instance in Lev Tolstoj's moral subjectivism. [95] He emphasised the possibility, and the obligation, for everyone to act well, as a way of taking part in the general progressive movement of history. [96] In sum, Solov'ev organised a set of views that bear the stamps of nineteenth-century philosophy of history on the basis of the metaphysical principle of all-unity, namely the definition of history as a single goal-oriented process sustained by an optimistic view of progress and described in rationalistic terms. [97] Hereby he sought to enlighten history from the point of view of its immanent processes. He succeeded in establishing humanity as chief subject of history, and consistently, though often schematically, related the historical nations and the state to humanity. The following section deals with the question of the role of three major authors, namely Sergej Solov'ev, Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Auguste Comte, in shaping his philosophy of history. Solov'ev engaged in discussion with many philosophers during the course of his career. As far as his philosophy of history is concerned, two major protagonists appear on the foreground, namely Hegel and Comte. Prior to them, however, he was subject to the influence of his father, Sergej Solov'ev, who apart from being a prominent historian, also developed a philosophy of history from a strongly Hegelian perspective. In this section, I investigate the reception of the Hegelian and the Comtian philosophy of history by Vladimir Solov'ev. I depart from his explicit comments on the two philosophers, and then conduct a specific investigation of the Hegelian and Comtian elements in his view. As a matter of fact, one cannot fully rely on Solov'ev's own statements on these authors for two reasons. Firstly, Solov'ev overlooked several differences between the two authors, especially regarding their concept of development, as a result of a simplification of Hegelian dialectics. Secondly, although he heavily criticised Comte, he also implicitly assumed certain elements from him. My thesis is that Solov'ev took over the dialectical scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis for his survey of world history from Hegel [see Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija], and then neglected its most original component, namely conflict, or in Hegelian terms, negation and negation of negation. He also borrowed from Hegel, possibly through Sergej Solov'ev, the division of history into three main phases, the view of history moving from East to West, the historical role of nations, and the figures of historical heroes. From Comte he borrowed the aspect of linearity of progress, the definition of progress in combination with order, and possibly the division of history in three phases. He also had affinities with Comte's definition of humanity as historical subject. Apart from Hegel and Comte, and prior to them, Solov'ev was inspired by the worldview of his historian father. Sergej Solov'ev was practically the only generalist historian with whom Solov'ev dealt. My thesis is that Solov'ev borrowed the general framework of world history, the law of organic development and the Hegelian categories of historical actors, namely nations, the state, and the individual, directly from his father. Two problems arise concerning the reception of Hegel and Comte. Firstly there is the question of the influence of Hegel on Sergej Solov'ev, and through him, on Vladimir Solov'ev. On the one hand, it often remains unclear whether Solov'ev borrowed aspects from Hegel directly, or indirectly via his father. On the other hand, whenever we encounter Hegelian views in Solov'ev that cannot be traced back to his reading Hegel, but which are present in Sergej Solov'ev's work, we can point to an indirect reception of Hegel via the historian. Therefore, it is crucial for the issue of the reception of Hegel by Solov'ev to include the work of Sergej Solov'ev and to acknowledge the significance of his influence on his son. Secondly, Hegel and Comte shared a number of views, which can be found in Vladimir Solov'ev. This makes it difficult to assess precisely the influence on him by the German or the French philosopher, or simply that of commonly shared views in his time. Therefore, whenever there is no textual evidence, my conclusions remain hypothetical. For the sake of clarity, I do not approach the three authors chronologically, but start with Hegel (1770-1831), then discuss Sergej Solov'ev (1820-1879), and, thirdly, Comte (1798- 1857). In each case, I devote an introductory part to general issues related to Solov'ev's knowledge of works of these authors (i). In a second part, I focus on specific points of their philosophy of history that Solov'ev assumed, rejected, or discussed (ii). This issue demands a comprehensive treatment if only because Hegel was probably the most influential philosopher of history in his century, so that the issue of the reception of his views by a Russian philosopher fifty years later is relevant in its own right. In addition, the question of the reception of Hegel by Solov'ev forms an important issue in Solov'ev scholarship. I claim that, on the whole, commentators have exaggerated the Hegelian legacy in Solov'ev's works and have been blinded by Solov'ev's own use of the same terminology -- the most obvious examples being 'dialectics', 'thesis', 'antithesis', and 'synthesis.' [98] Solov'ev took a position on Hegel's philosophy of history specifically on many occasions. The irony is that in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, the twenty-four year-old Solov'ev proposed to bring Hegel's theory of development one step further and apply it to the field of history, apparently not knowing that Hegel had already accomplished this task himself in his Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte. [99] This analysis also deals with two texts which both contain elements taken from Hegel, namely La Sophia and Opravdanie dobra. [100] Besides, in his early writings in the 1870s, he commented on Hegel, and employed terms (re)introduced by Hegel such as 'dialectics' and 'historical process.' In his later years (1890s), he devoted an article to Hegel for the Russian Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia. [101] This section aims to understand to what extent Solov'ev's philosophy of history is related to Hegel as its source of inspiration and object of critique. This, first, includes the question of which Hegelian elements Solov'ev acknowledged as explicitly having played a decisive role in his own reflections on history. The investigation must secondly examine to what extent these elements retain their Hegelian character when employed by Solov'ev. Thirdly, I discuss Solov'ev's critique of aspects of Hegelian philosophy of history. My hypothesis is that Hegel exerted a decisive, yet complex influence on Solov'ev's philosophy of history. Solov'ev integrated that what he considered useful in Hegel's system, namely certain elements of his conception of development and progress, and the central role of historical nations, the state, and great men. He also openly rejected Hegel's turning the state and reason into absolute concepts. However, he misinterpreted a central Hegelian component, namely dialectics. This investigation helps to discern to what extent Solov'ev's conception of history was a response to Hegel's philosophy of history, or an attempt to improve it, and to what extent we can speak of a Hegelian heritage when Solov'ev makes use of Hegelian terms in his philosophy of history. So far, the issue of Solov'ev's reaction to Hegel's philosophy of history has not been extensively analysed by a specialist of Solov'ev and has only been the object of a few scholarly articles and isolated chapters within general works on Hegelianism in Russia. [102] The only study that deals specifically with our topic is the balanced article by J. L. Navickas. Navickas concludes that Hegel significantly influenced Solov'ev's doctrine of development, and at the same time indicates a radical difference between Hegel and Solov'ev's 'Christian historicism.' [103] Diverse claims have been made concerning Hegel's influence on Solov'ev's philosophical system as a whole. The Russian philosophy specialist, George Kline, has pointed to the profound influence that Hegel had on Solov'ev. [104] The opposed thesis can be read in the work of the expert of Hegelianism in Russia, Guy Planty-Bonjour, who, focusing mainly on Hegel's logic, concludes that Solov'ev remained highly remote from Hegel, in spite of his terminological borrowings. My analysis shows that Planty-Bonjour's conclusion applies especially to Solov'ev's philosophy of history. ii) Solov'ev 's reception of Hegel's philosophy of history It has been said of Hegel's philosophy of Right that it was the last testimony of a philosophical culture that understands itself explicitly as 'practical philosophy', in the sense of a methodical understanding of the 'whole' human (ethical as well as political, scientific and historical) 'praxis.' [105] The least we can say, if we drop the common occidentocentric perspective, is that Hegel was not the last. This statement is applicable to Vladimir Solov'ev as well, who aimed at regarding the 'whole human praxis' through the prism of historical development. The conception of process (dialectics, development, progress)
In his article for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, Solov'ev recognised the crucial contribution made by Hegel. If the concepts of process, development and history are in his eyes 'true and fruitful', he may have assumed them from Hegel. We have at least one testimony of his project, formulated as early as 1875, to integrate the Hegelian concept of world-process into his new system of universal religion. [107] The latter rests upon Hegel's conception of dialectics, which is exposed in his Logic, and which underlies the whole system of the German philosopher. [108] The dialectical conception implies an active process that allows, through negation, the sublation [aufheben] of contradiction, making this contradiction creative. The presentation of dialectics is limited here to some elementary aspects. Dialectics describes the movement of the subject of history, the spirit [Geist], passing through three main stages: first it is posed in itself (an sich, thesis), then it develops out of itself and for itself in its manifestation (fur sich, antithesis), in order to return then into itself (an und fur sich, synthesis) and be with itself as an actualised and manifested being. The dialectic movement goes from abstraction to manifestation in concreteness by means of successive negations.
In his theoretical writings Solov'ev reflected on the Hegelian dialectics from a metaphysical and logical point of view. [109] In 'Gegel', he valued Hegel's dialectics highly positively as a means by which the German philosopher had succeeded in establishing the conception of 'a living mobile trinity of moments' and arriving at 'a perfect identity of system and method.' [110] Concerning more specifically his application of dialectics to the field of history, we note a significant evolution in the course of his life. Starting from what comes across as an intentionally uncritical and full application in La Sophia, he later hardly ever used the term. Nevertheless, Solov'ev was most probably attracted to the Hegelian notion of historical process leading to a full unfolding. In La Sophia, Solov'ev confessed to having learnt from Hegel that substance consists of the union of contraries, and that manifestation does not diminish the substance, but develops it. In this dialogue, Sophia herself suggests understanding history by means of dialectics. Significantly, dialectics are defined here as 'the unity of contraries' and referred to as a 'special philosophical science', characterised by the focus on 'the different phases of the process, or special forms of the ideal [ideel] world and their mutual relationship.' [111] Compared to the Hegelian understanding of dialectics, this short characterisation does not take into account the movement provoked by successive and numerous sublations [Aufhebungen], even if this is at best alluded to in the expression 'different phases.' Furthermore, Solov'ev offered a short overview of the cosmic and historical process in which tripartitions, negations, and syntheses abound. Dialectics seems to be used schematically to present a colourful picture, often difficult to follow, of the cosmic and historical process. [112] La Sophia can therefore be seen as Solov'ev's first attempt to apply Hegel's dialectics to philosophy of history, however intermingled with cosmic and sophiological elements it may have been. [113]
In Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija Solov'ev did not distinguish between Hegelian dialectics and the conception of organic development, and together called them 'law of development.' For Hegel, the dialectical process does include some form of organic development, yet applies to Spirit rather than to nature: development takes place through consciousness. Besides, it is precisely through this mediation that development encounters opposition and hindrance. [114] Perhaps mistaken by Hegel's frequent use of the organicistic metaphor, Solov'ev overlooked the pre-Darwinian distinction between unchanging nature and progressive Spirit made by the German philosopher. He mixed the two schemes in his definition of the law of development, explicitly stating that it had received its logical formulation in Hegel. [115] He did take over the Hegelian law of development, when positing that development comprises three phases, namely a first external, undifferentiated unity, sublated by a second phase of individuation and division, which in its turn is sublated by the third phase of unification as an internal and free link between all elements. [116] But he applied the law to the world as a whole, including nature [see his sophiology or history], and tended to ignore the element of negation. After these initial statements, Solov'ev explicitly stated his intention to apply to history the law of development allegedly first formulated by Hegel, hereby presenting himself as Hegel's successor. He mainly adopted one central Hegelian aspect, namely the complex movement of abstract to concrete. [117] He also made an interesting move by extending the Hegelian model. The result was the following: whereas Hegel had applied dialectical development primarily to 'socio-moral and political human institutions' (cf. the Rechtsphilosophie), Solov'ev extended it to include creativity and knowledge, and placed 'all three on the same ontological and axiological level as essential components of "integral life".' [118] De Facto, Solov'ev described all three fields in their historical development in this text. However, countering Kline we must state that, even though Solov'ev's scheme may appear horizontal when compared with Hegel and indeed expanded dialectics to new fields, it is nevertheless structured in a vertical, hierarchical way, culminating with the highest domain in creativity, namely mysticism. [119] Another, piquant point is Solov'ev's most vehement critique, in his encyclopaedia entry, that Hegel had applied dialectics to the absolute. [120] On the one hand, from a theological perspective of history, he sought to preserve the absolute from being fully included in the historical process, and declared that 'it is impossible to admit that also absolute truth depends essentially on that process.' [121] On the other hand, in his early sophiological investigations, Solov'ev himself flirted with the same device of applying dialectics to Sophia and to the divine. [122] A last difference is that, contrary to Hegel, he placed mysticism higher than philosophy. Even though Hegel's dialectics may be the most effective way of attaining truth logically, Solov'ev held that it does not reach absolute truth, which is grasped by mysticism. It is in this sense perhaps that we can understand the following statement, dating from 1898:
The limitation of rational thought, which Solov'ev sensed as early as 1877, remained a constant statement. Solov'ev was opposed to Hegel making philosophy the adequate self- awareness of the absolute. Solov'ev was attached to another category in Hegel linked to his dialectics, namely that of progress, but he did not as much grasp the tragic colour of Hegel's notion, according to which history marches forward by means of oppositions, conflicts, and contradictions. [124] He rather picked up the content of the notion, which Hegel identified with the consciousness of freedom: 'World history, then, represents the phases in the development of the principle whose content is the consciousness of freedom.' [125] According to the principle that truth, in order to be actually true, must manifest itself concretely, Hegel posed the actualisation of freedom as ultimate goal: 'We have established Spirit's consciousness of freedom, and thereby the actualisation of this Freedom as the final purpose of the world.' [126] Solov'ev made a similar point and stated that history is about the realisation of all-unity through the awareness and concretisation of freedom. He agreed with Hegel that freedom is consciousness of the general goal and is the voluntary serving of that goal and that this was feasible only within the boundaries of powerful political rule. [127] At this point, two fundamental differences between the two thinkers arise. Firstly, while Hegel sustained that history marches forward irrespective of individual happiness, Solov'ev believed that the worth of the individual was increasingly respected in history and that he or she developed in more harmony with collectivity. Secondly, in contrast with Hegel's tendency to reduce God and transcendence into immanence, Solov'ev introduced a theology of history to reinforce the connection of history with transcendence. As far as the course of world history is concerned, strong analogies can be found in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija with the Hegelian system, all the more striking because Solov'ev wrote this text not knowing the Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte. A possible explanation of this is that Solov'ev received Hegel's scheme through his father, who had read Hegel's Vorlesungen. Both philosophers thought in terms of a succession of great civilisations by means of sublations. Here we can recognise the same civilisations as in Hegel's system, with the important difference that Hegel considered them thoroughly, and Solov'ev only superficially. For instance, Hegel included China and Japan in his survey of the Eastern civilisations, whereas Solov'ev limited himself to India in his work. A further parallel is that Christianity plays a central role in both systems, a point that is moreover related to theology of history. [128] The philosophy of history sketched in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija can be called the most Hegelian of all Solov'ev's surveys of history, in the sense that it provides tripartitions at all levels, encased within each other. Furthermore, the dynamics of these tripartitions arise and evolve by means or oppositions, negations, and sublations, which was also characteristic for Hegel's dialectical method. However, two major differences with Hegel's survey appear. First, whilst for Hegel humanity is merely a goal and it is ultimately the Spirit, the idea, which is the main subject of history, Solov 'ev placed the emphasis on the living organism of the human community, which, in its ideal state, is the goal or the historical process. [129] This probably is a substantial difference between the two philosophers, nurtured by Solov'ev's eagerness to convince his readers, against Orthodox laissez-faire, that it was within the power of the human being to change reality. The emphasis that he placed on the living organism as the real subject of history can be understood in this context of his activism, which was absent in Hegel. There is a second, not less fundamental difference: whereas Hegel did not deal with the future at all, the future seemed to be the Russian philosopher's central focus of interest. [130] The absence of the future dimension was one of Solov'ev's fundamental reproaches of Hegel. In his eyes, the German philosopher had not left any space for further developments in the nineteenth century, such as socialism and the national movements, for instance in the Slavic countries. [131] While this is true, one can easily object to his criticism and show that Hegel had a conception of the future as a space that he did not fill in, as first having to have occurred before something rational can be said about it. In addition to the above, Solov'ev applied dialectical schemes only to world history, not to Russian history, even within a single text that is dealing with both, Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. [132] There, Russia represents the third element by which synthesis is possible between hostile forces, without itself being subjected to dialectical development. It remains unclear why Solov'ev did not interpret Russian history from the same dialectical prism as world history, unless it was for the very reason that Russia has an ultimate reconciling role to play; here Solov'ev leaves the philosophical register of history and enters the theological register. Significantly, in later surveys, Solov'ev disregarded the dialectical character of historical development and favoured a linear, organic interpretation of history. It thus seems that his flirt with Hegelian dialectics was a thing of youth and that their ways of thinking were in fact very different. The question of the exact influence of Hegel's conception of historical nations on Solov'ev cannot be definitively solved: it remains unclear whether it is a direct influence, an indirect one through his father, or simply an effect of the general way of thinking of the nineteenth century, Nevertheless, on the basis of Solov'ev's philosophy of history in Opravdanie dobra, parallels can be easily drawn with Hegel's Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, which strongly suggest that by that time Solov'ev had read them and had been inspired by them. Roughly speaking, for Hegel, history is informed by the succession of four worlds [the Eastern, Greek, Roman, and Germanic Welten]. These are made up of nations or peoples [Volker], a term that Hegel used both in the broad sense of what we today would call 'civilisations' and in the narrow sense of 'peoples'. [133] The history of a nation in both senses consists first of a phase in which the nation develops self-consciousness and becomes aware of its mission. This national consciousness is a principle [Volksgeist] that is the manifestation or the Weltgeist at a certain moment of history. In a second phase, the nation performs its historical task. After that, it undergoes a phase of decline and fall, and is relayed by the appearance of a new principle, which is higher, and embedded in another nation. [134] We find the main aspects of Hegel's conception in Solov'ev's meagre and schematic account of world history in Opravdanie dobra, where, quite in line with his time, he focused on nations in the narrow sense. In conformity with his time, he focussed on nations in the narrow sense. As it seems, he applied Hegel's views rather uncritically, and integrated them into his scheme of historical preparation for universal solidarity. The central aspects of his conception of historical nations are the following. Firstly, the idea of nationality appeared at a certain moment of history, narrated in the Old Testament, with the Jews, who were the first to develop a clear national consciousness. Correspondingly, they were the first to produce a philosophy of history. [135] Secondly, on the basis of this idea of nationality, groups physically formed a nation. [136] This condition is necessary in order to realise the good. Thirdly, the essence of this nation is not limited to its interest, on the contrary: it draws its meaning from its contribution to humanity. [137] Fourthly, not only do nations appear at a certain time, but their development is finite. [138] This is at least what Solov'ev implicitly suggested, without saying a word about the decay of nations. For instance, like Hegel, he no longer expected a new contribution from Europe. [139] Each of the West European nations (Italy, Spain, England, France, Germany) had enjoyed growth analogous to that of an individual, that is, childhood, youth, maturity, in which they had achieved inner unity and bloomed. Solov'ev observed that this development repeated itself for each nation, which in this way obeys a 'general ethico-historical law.' [140] Fourthly, this does not apply to all nations in the world. Some nations are active in history by a specific contribution to humanity by virtue of their national idea; others are not, and only the former are taken into account as historical nations. [141] Solov'ev's conception of historical nations therefore echoes Hegel's theory. As far as the role of the state within the nation is concerned, Solov'ev evidenced a more critical distance. In his articles for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, Solov'ev criticised the absolute character of the state in Hegel as a goal in itself. 'The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth', Hegel had said. [142] Solov'ev concluded that 'Hegel even calls it [a] god.' [143] Indeed, for Hegel, the state was the most accomplished form of objective Spirit that history, or Reason has produced. In the form of its idea, and not of this or that particular state, the state is the final purpose of reason: 'the state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualisation of freedom; and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual.' [144] However, Solov'ev's criticism does not hold because it disregards the fact that in Hegel's system the state is the culmination point of the objective Spirit, not that of the absolute Spirit. [145] Solov'ev refuted the exclusivity of the power of the state as stated by Hegel, as well as its status as a goal, using various arguments. We can regard Solov'ev's outspoken statements in Opravdanie dobra against the primacy of the state and the emphasis on a power shared at the top between the state, the church, and society, as a direct answer to Hegel's position. [146] He affirmed that the state was not an absolute form, but only an instrument, 'only the condition and the means of human progress, and it itself is gradually becoming more perfect in different respects.' [147] In the course of history, the state itself had improved according to Solov'ev, by 'gradually elevating its coercive power up to the height of moral authority.' [148] Contrary to what Solov'ev perhaps thought, Hegel would have subscribed to Solov'ev's statement that the state is subject to progress. However, there are two significant similarities in Hegel and Solov'ev's conceptions of the state, which are overshadowed by Solov'ev's fierce criticism. These similarities, arguably, were conveyed to him through his father, the founding father of the state school of history, Sergej Solov'ev. Firstly, for Vladimir Solov'ev the state is a high form of development and a tool for historical progress. It is even the highest means available, at this stage of history, and the best channel for contributing to the realisation of the good. He encouraged the use of the material and spiritual forces of the state 'for the good of nations and the whole of humanity.' [149] Secondly, the state is the embodiment of morality in two ways. By its powers, it can guarantee the application of law, which is for Solov'ev the minimum level of morality. This point is exactly the same in Hegel: 'morals are a matter of the state and are handled by officials of the government and the courts.' [150] Besides, in the state morality becomes something that is thought about in the consciousness of its citizens and belongs to their self-consciousness. In this way, this self-consciousness receives a substantial content in the state. [151] On the whole, however, Solov'ev, who perhaps enjoyed more social and institutional independence than Hegel, went one step further, and did not hesitate to claim that institutions, and especially the state, should be reminded of their ideals. The duty of the individual 'would be to try and actively reform these institutions, insisting on what their function ought to be.' [152] Here we have the core of Solov'ev's motivation to intervene in Russian public life. He never condemned the institutions, the authorities as such, but indicated what they should do by reminding them of their role in history. [153] Hegel lived in a state of law [Rechsstaat], which despite its authoritarianism was the form of state that he believed in, whereas the Russian state in which Solov'ev lived was by far no state of law. This partly explains that the German philosopher committed himself less to reform than Solov'ev. On the whole, the latter permanently defended a normative, even moralistic position with respect to institutions, and notably the state, which was absent in Hegel, at least in his later years. Although there is no textual evidence, one can suppose that by the mid-1880s, when he wrote various texts dealing with Peter I, Solov'ev was acquainted with Hegel's passage on great men in the Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte and borrowed it to depict the historical role of the tsar. The strong similarity of the notion in Hegel and in Solov'ev supports this hypothesis. [154] From the perspective of philosophy of history, he did not add any original elements to Hegel's category of heroes. But his category of prophets, which he developed in the theological and sophiological register of history, is an original addition to the Hegelian category of great men. Another hypothesis is that he assumed everything from his father, who was deeply inspired by Hegel when he wrote on Peter the Great. Due to a direct or indirect influence, the category of great men is similar to Hegel's. These men are related to the divine in the sense that they are chosen and supported by Providence and then supported by it during their entire mission. In the society in which they live, they are the incarnation of a new consciousness. Solov'ev specified how such individuals arise from the masses of their fellow countrymen and which contribution they make to their environment. [155] He held that they were themselves not fully conscious of the goal that they were achieving. [156] On the one hand, this position seems identical to Hegel's characteristic of the role of the cunning of Reason in history, that is, in objective Spirit. On the other hand, it differs by its emphasis on the radical transcendence of God in the theological register of history, in contrast to Hegel's tendency to immanentise Reason in the objective Spirit. [157] To summarise, two issues were raised at the start of this section, namely: To what extent can we speak of a Hegelian heritage in Solov'ev'? And to what extent is Solov'ev's conception of history a response to Hegel's philosophy of history, or an attempt to improve it? As far as Solov'ev's Hegelian heritage in his historical views is concerned, the following results have been found. Firstly, we can speak of a direct influence that Solov'ev received on the overview of world history in dialectical terms in his early writings. He integrated the Hegelian categories of nations, state and great men acting upon history in a more complete way. With time, even though Solov'ev may have 'come to confess to Hegel more honestly and more openly', as Kline puts it, he also seemed to distance himself from Hegelian categories. This happens, for instance, with the Hegelian concept of process, of which Solov'ev made a merely linear process, and hereby lost the dialectical component of negation, which was central in Hegel. A close analysis which distinguishes the profound influence from superficial borrowings has revealed that Solov'ev did not totally apply this terminology in the Hegelian sense, for instance not to Russia, but was rather attracted by the wide scope of the Hegelian scheme. In this respect, Planty-Bonjour's conclusion of Solov'ev's remoteness from Hegel in spite of conceptual borrowings, seems to apply especially, though not exclusively, to Solov'ev's later works. As far as Solov'ev's response to Hegel is concerned, there are two ways of expressing it, i.e. on the one hand a direct critique, and on the other, considerations included in his writings on history, which testify to his ambition to impose his own views by using reference frameworks other than Hegel's. Solov'ev formulated an explicit critique of Hegel's primacy given to the state vis-a-vis church and society, and, globally, the absence of a conception of the future. While the former criticism seems justified, the latter is a misunderstanding of Hegel's views. His response to Hegel is also essentially formulated by bringing to the fore meta-historical principles from different conceptions of history, namely what I have identified as theology of history and sophiology of history. The question arises whether Solov'ev challenged Hegel's philosophy of history. Perhaps he historicised the conception of the state more than Hegel did. The state is, after all, only a historical form of human organisation, which is subject to development and improvement. In contrast, Hegel's fascination with the state led him to make it an absolute end of historical development, in the sense that it could not be improved on or be completed by other institutions. Also, against the primacy of the Hegelian state, Solov'ev stressed the remaining distinction of the three powers, the state, the church and society. An obvious difference of focus distinguishes the Hegelian from the Solov'evian philosophical approach of history. While Hegel identified the present as the most accomplished form of manifestation of the absolute for the time being, for Solov'ev, this phase still had to come in a near future; hence his concern for the future. This implied a difference of focus. Whilst Hegel focused on factual events in the past, Solov'ev, by situating the last and crucial period in an immediate future with respect to himself, allowed himself to play an active part in it in theory and in practice with his self-definition as a prophet -- a role Hegel did not assume. In other terms, Solov'ev rejected the idea of philosophy as Eule Minervas, and operated a shift to theosophy [see chap. II "Theology of History in Solov'ev'] and theurgy [see chap. IV 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History']. In his eyes, history can be made and directed by man, in contract to the fatalist taint of Hegel's view. Sergej Solov'ev was the first author to offer a monumental and thorough history of Russia in his twenty-nine-volume History of Russia from the Oldest Times. [158] He was also, together with two other historians, the founding father of the Russian "state school" in the 1840s, which interpreted Russian history by emphasising the role of the state as the main factor of modernisation. This view played a major role in his philosophy of history, which he developed in historical works as well as in essays. [159] Vladimir Solov'ev familiarised himself with his father's work in his childhood and through it received a tremendous bulk of historical information as well as a historical worldview. One fact testifies to this transmission of knowledge: at the age of nineteen, Solov'ev assisted at the lectures given by his father on Peter the Great, and was given the task of writing them out. He rendered the content so well and so accurately that his father decided to use it for his university lectures. [160] So, even though Vladimir seemed as an adult not to have close contact with his father, and barely mentioned his works, he assimilated his father's work at an early age, which left its impression on his views on history. [161] Solov'ev not only inherited a mass of historical facts and examples to serve his own theses from both the historian and the philosopher of history Sergej Solov'ev, but also, and most importantly, the interpretation of history as a universal progress, the organicistic model of development, the liberal filling of the categories East and West, the analysis of the origin and of the significance of the state in general, and the role of the individual, notably the hero Peter the Great. These issues are examined below in this order. This analysis finds support in a number of thorough studies, including Joachim Sternkopf's comparative analysis between the historical views of Vladimir and Sergej Solov'ev -- the only comprehensive study on this issue -- as well as two recent publications on Sergej Solov'ev's philosophical views on history by Ol'ga Kazak and Ana Siljak. [162] ii) Solov'ev's reception of Sergej Solov'ev's views on history The young Vladimir received the view of history as a universal process from his first influence, his father. Sergej Solov'ev reflected within a universal framework, and sought to discover regularities [zakonomernosti], the most fundamental of which was the law of organic development applicable to the 'human organism as a whole.' [163] Although the expression in quotation marks seems to suggest that the historian applied the organicistic metaphor to humanity as a whole, a closer look at his works reveals that he applied it to the development of different nations only. [164] Vladimir as it were picked up the organicistic model naturally. [165] In contrast to his father, he extended it to humanity as a whole in order to describe the intrinsic bond existent in reality, or at least in principle, between peoples. However, he did not explicitly follow the organicistic parallel up to its logical conclusion that nations ultimately undergo aging, and die. Only as late as 1900 and in a weary tone did Solov'ev explicitly voice his father's view on the 'aged humanity', and the latter's conviction that humanity was a 'sick old man', and that world history had 'finished'. [166] Unchallenged by an optimistic view of human progress, this view interestingly gives full priority to a biological view of humanity drawn to its tragic conclusion: humanity was on the point of dying of old age. However, both thinkers conceived of humanity not only as a unified entity or organism, but also as a being split into two antagonistic civilisations, East and West: in the Hegelian and occidentalist view, the East was conservative, while the forces of progress lay in the West. Whereas Sergej Solov'ev always displayed a univocally pro-European stance, this became Solov'ev's general position only at the end of the 1880s, after he had abandoned Slavophile anti-Europeanism. In his early years, by contrast, Solov'ev addressed a fierce criticism to individualistic and materialistic Europe, and until his death, never ceased to defend a view of the state that could overcome the limitedness of the Western state. Nevertheless, there is probably a line of continuity between Sergej and Vladimir Solov'ev on this point. Sergej emphasised the spiritual nature of both civilizations in a descriptive and historical way. Even if he was concerned with pointing to the differences in a political and cultural respect, we can assume that his investigations of the East-West opposition provided the more liberal-oriented Vladimir with a confirmation of his own hypotheses and with the opportunity to elaborate on this conflict from the teleological perspective, that is, by indicating its resolution. Regarding the inner development from clan to state, it appears that Solov'ev for the most part embraced his father's argumentation, which in turn echoed Hegel's interpretation of the origin of the state in the patriarchal order. In his treatment of the life of peoples and the rise of nations, Solov'ev used the same genealogy and terminology as his father, which strongly suggests that he was inspired by him directly, and not by Hegel on this issue. The first form of community was the clan, followed by the militia [druziny], the first political unions, Eastern monarchies, and finally the state. [167] This formal, external process was accompanied and strengthened by the inner, substantial development of the national character. [168] Both Sergej and Vladimir placed particular emphasis on communal life as a natural dimension of human life. Sergej Solov'ev, and Vladimir in his trail, identified the origin of historical development with clan life. Clan life, in the long run, had hindered the blooming of the individual, and had incited gifted individuals to leave it and form militias. However, clan life, even if it was due to disappear, had contributed to the formation of a historical person in the figure of its leader, who determined the formation of the character of a people, or, in other words, its national principles. On this point, Vladimir Solov'ev explicitly referred to Sergej Solov'ev. [169] Once militias were formed, these began to form alliances, which gave birth to political unions. Separate peoples emerged, which subsequently formed the first states, the Eastern monarchies. [170] Solov'ev took up his father's research and interpreted these monarchies as a necessary stage in the preparation of world solidarity. [171] He also, and quite exceptionally, made efforts to bring together speculative views and historical facts. When dealing with Eastern monarchies and military-theocratic despotism, he used recently discovered inscriptions of Assyrian and Persian kings as sources. [172] The view that the state was the culminating point of the evolution of human organisation was clearly borrowed from Sergej Solov'ev. The historian identified the rise of the state in both the narrow and the broad sense with the appearance of a new order. The state fostered solidarity, introduced the distinction between public and private, and favoured aspects which fed spiritual life, such as religion, science and art. Solov'ev assimilated these views. [173] He valued the state in the broad sense foremost for its totalising character. In his eyes, the state is the collective organisation that embraces all others, and by virtue of which, demands the participation of everybody to its action. [174] The originality of Solov'ev's interpretation of the state in comparison with his father lies in the link between state and morality. [175] In this sense, Solov'ev showed himself more Hegelian than his father. Sergej Solov'ev also devoted attention to the development of the Russian state in the narrow sense. [176] Russia had to move beyond both the clan principle of hierarchy and central power (typical for Asia) and the militia principle of diversity and autonomy (typical for Europe). This was possible only by developing 'the "state [pravitel'stvennyj] principle" of government and the "civic" form of social structure.' [177] The former is related specifically to state in the narrow sense. The historian investigated the development of a Russian Rechtsstaat [pravovoe gosudarstvo]. Solov'ev also devoted analyses to the role of the state in the narrow sense. [178] He defined it as a 'social body with a definite organisation, containing in itself the fullness of positive rights of the one supreme authority.' [179] He examined the function of state as warrant of the law and as 'embodied law.' [180] Law must rest upon a real power in order that its aspects, its public character, its concreteness, and its actual application can be carried out. [181] Solov'ev therefore defended a statist view, which he most probably inherited directly from his father, while going philosophically further than he did, and thereby getting closer to Hegel. Characteristically, while his father limited himself, quite logically for a historian, to the empirical form of the phenomenon of the state, the son elaborated a normative determination of the tasks of society, such as a consolidation of the state order, the repression of individualism, and the ethical significance of concrete phenomena. For instance, concerning the abolition of serfdom in Russia (1861), he identified three stages, first a moral preparation in educated society, second the issuing of a law by the state, and third, a higher consciousness among the majority of the population as a consequence. In this case, the 'sudden progress is solely due to the tact that the organised social force [the state, MC] was inspired by moral demands and transformed them into an objective law of life.' [182] Here Solov'ev wanted to emphasise the crucial role of the state in making morality objective in law, which was visible, clear, and objectively known, and so making it an obligation for all. [183] Both thinkers dealt with the role of individuals in history along two lines. Firstly, they discussed individual freedom in the state. Both Sergej and Vladimir Solov'ev examined the opposition between the private and the public domain, both emphasised the goal that the forms of community serve, rather than the individual implications, and both postulated that the individual shared the same nature with community, in conformity with their use of the organicistic metaphor. [184] However, there was a distinction between individual and community that was made possible only within the state, namely the distinction between public and private. Sergej Solov'ev defended individuality against the state, an attitude that Solov'ev shared. [185] Secondly, outstanding individuals in a community, or heroes, were the object of special investigation by Sergej Solov'ev. His son adopted the analysis of Peter the Great made by his father along a Hegelian line. [186] Against a current mythologizing interpretation of Peter the Great, the historian examined the historical role of this figure in a rather pragmatic manner. Peter's tremendous reformatory action was the result of the whole prior history of Russia. [187] He was the representative of the people, and fulfilled their needs in a given period of time. He was the leader, but not the creator of the new orientation of Russia towards Europe. Solov'ev assumed Sergej Solov'ev's treatment of Peter the Great in its entirety. [188] The activity of car' bogatyr' Peter the Great was so determinant that it formed the 'centre' of Russian history, dividing it in two, one preceding his reign, the other following it. His reign had been anticipated in the call to the Varangians, and was in particular the direct result of the two preceding centuries of Russian history. Concerning the era of Peter, where Sergej Solov'ev meticulously analysed the issue of the numerous reforms, which touched upon education, law, administration, culture, religion, army, clothing and others, Vladimir Solov'ev only provided general statements on the Christian significance of his work, hereby switching to the theological register of history. [189] In a more detailed investigation, he explicitly quoted his father's argumentation regarding the reform of the clergy. [190] From a global perspective, both thinkers interpreted the reign of Peter the Great as the entry of the Russian nation into world history. [191] This entry had been achieved not only by transformations of Russian society and institutions, but also by fostering international relationships, and by imposing Russia as a nation a part entiere on the strategic map of Europe. Sergej Solov'ev particularly emphasised Peter's historic achievements of instituting the significance of the state, generating among Russians a sense of citizenship [grazdanstvennost'], and issuing laws protecting the individual. Vladimir in particular used this last point and interpreted it from the ethical perspective by arguing that the tsar had succeeded in reintegrating the Christian principles into society and politics. [192] In summary, Solov'ev was significantly inspired by Sergej Solov'ev's work and assumed many categories, arguments, and concepts that governed his father's discourse on history, namely the concept of organic development, the liberal interpretation of the opposition East-West, the genealogy of the state, and the figure of Peter the Great. This influence was prior to those of Hegel and Comte, and left a deep impression on Solov'ev. This did not stop him from rearranging them in his thoroughly teleological view, hereby falling into teleological determinism -- a position Sergej Solov'ev rejected, along with a purely speculative approach of history, because it neglected empirical reality. [193] The father of positivism, Auguste Comte, had succeeded in establishing an entirely immanent philosophy of history, which substituted Hegel's primacy of philosophy with that of science, thus discarding the elements of transcendence in Hegel, and promised the triumph of positive science in creating the conditions for a happy society. Solov'ev devoted a great deal of effort to criticizing the philosophical school of positivism, which was pervasive in his time throughout all fields of human and natural sciences in Russia. His primary approach to Comte was resolutely critical, as the title of his dissertation, Crisis of Western Philosophy; Against the Positivists, shows. [194] Arguably, Solov'ev's primary critical approach was motivated by a perception of Comte as a competitor in the same field. He dealt with Comte's views related to history in three main texts. Firstly, in the appendix to his dissertation he directed his criticism at Comte's law of three stages. Then, in the 1890s, he wrote the entry 'Kont' for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, devoted to the life and teaching of the French thinker. Finally, in a public lecture in 1898, he commemorated the century of the birth of Comte and took another perspective in order to 'pay [his] old debt towards the old thinker.' [195] Until very recently, the question of Comte's influence on Solov'ev's views on history has been massively overlooked. One reason is the absence of thorough studies of the reception of Comte in Russia, despite his success in the 1860s-1870s, which was comparable to that of Hegel two decades earlier. [196] Another reason, more specific to the reception of Comte in Solov'ev, is the sort of blind belief, based on Solov'ev's own highly critical statements, that he was entirely opposed to the system of the French thinker. [197] Yaclav Zdenek David was the first scholar who examined the issue thoroughly and concluded to a direct influence of Comte on Solov'ev. [198] After him, the only serious contribution comes from S.B. Rocinskij, who has provided a detailed account of Solov'ev's views on Comte. [199] Solov'ev showed a sustained interest with respect to positivism in general, and Auguste Comte in particular, from the very beginning of his philosophical training. He had a thorough knowledge of Comte's two chief works, Cours de philosophie positive, and Systeme de politique positive. The sharpness of his criticism could not conceal the significance he attached to positivism as well as the affinity he bore with Comte. [200] His relationship to the French philosopher can therefore be characterised as, on the one hand, originating in sharp criticism, which was preserved in the 1890s, though blended and more balanced. On the other hand, Solov'ev had a close affinity with some aspects of Comte's philosophy, which he grew to admit and value. This two-fold attitude also shapes his reaction to Comte's views on history. In this connection, two questions have to be addressed, about the hypothetical Comtianism of his philosophy of history and about the soundness of his criticism of Comte's views. My thesis is, firstly, that only in his early work, Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, can one detect a Comtian scheme of history; secondly, that Solov'ev's criticism of Comte's positivism and of his law of the three stages was not entirely consistent. Below, I investigate the place in Solov'ev's work of the Comtian law of the three stages, his concept of progress, and his concept of humanity as a historical subject. In doing so, I will show the partial influence on Solov'ev with respect to the first point, a direct influence on the second point, and an affinity between the two philosophers on the third. ii) Solov'ev 's reception of Comte's views on history The question of Solov'ev's reception of the Comtian law of three stages cannot be entirely solved, for reasons explained below. However, it is possible to draw a few hypothetical conclusions. Comte's law of the three stages can be described in brief as follows: history is governed by a process that consists of three subsequent stages, namely the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive stage. [201] In the theological stage, which lasted from Ancient times to the Middle Ages, man searched for the ultimate cause of all things in supra-natural beings (in fetishism, veneration of the stars, polytheism and monotheism), in the metaphysical stage he substituted these by abstract concepts (in speculative thought, notably ontology). With the foundation of positivism, a substitution took place of the unreachable search for causes, typical for the theological and the metaphysical stage, by the simple search for laws, i.e. constant relationships between observed phenomena. In doing so, humanity had entered its final and most advanced phase of development, which was bound to overcome the limitations of the two previous ones, and to have universal application. This application would first take place in the field of knowledge, and then, notably on the basis of the new science, sociology, would be extended to society and politics, resulting in the establishment of a fair and stable order for all. [202] Comte illustrated this scheme with examples from the history of thought, mainly religion, philosophy, and science. Solov'ev's first reaction was a total rejection of this theory, which, in his eyes, sought to suppress knowledge of the absolute. [203] In the appendix to his dissertation, he provided two arguments to demonstrate the inconsistency of Comte's theory of the three stages. Firstly, Comte did not understand what theology and philosophy properly speaking were. [204] In my eyes, this argument is partially valid. Solov'ev was right to the extent that Comte often provided only a caricature of theological and metaphysical preoccupations. [205] But these schematic definitions contained some relevant points, with which Solov'ev himself would agree; [206] as the Russian philosopher himself admitted, the previous metaphysical systems had failed in attaining true knowledge by looking for an object external to the subject. [207] Secondly, he affirmed that the succession of theology, metaphysics and positive science was inconsistent because these fields and methods were incompatible. This argument would be sound only if Comte had identified the theological stage with theology, the metaphysical stage with metaphysics, and the positive stage with science. However, a closer look at Comte's text shows that despite his schematism, he did not take this step. Rather, he defined these phases far more generally, as ways of thinking, 'different theoretical stages', which were operative in 'each branch of our knowledge.' [208] So Solov'ev's critique, according to which these two flaws ruined the positivists' ambition of a universal system, does not hold. Two decades later, in the article for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, Solov'ev adopted a different approach. Ironically, Comte, in his own intellectual development, had submitted himself to this law of development, but in the opposite direction. He had grown from a positive, scientific view through the metaphysic principle and arrived at the theological stage. [209] Comte's error had thus been to think that this process happens only in one direction, in contrast to that which he demonstrated in his own life. In fact, Solov'ev argued, this process took place in both directions, not only once, but several times, and until 1500. Moreover, Comte did not -- and could not, one should add -- take into account a new phenomenon, namely the new interest in metaphysical and religious-mystical questions that followed positivism. [210] These arguments against the unilinearity of the law are coherent, although the relationships between the Comtian stages are more flexible than a strict succession from the one to the other. [211] One could also address the same criticism to Solov'ev himself: he also did not take much account of the possibility of a revival of a principle which was opposed to his ideals, for instance political separatism. Nevertheless, Solov'ev saw some truth in the law of the three stages:
Cornte had discovered a universal law applicable to ideas. In my opinion, however, the difference between Comte and Hegel is more substantial than Solov'ev thought. The similarities between Hegel and Comte are the triadic constructions and the continuous ascending line of progress shaping history. But the divergences are perhaps even more important. The fundamentally original aspect of the Hegelian dialectical development, negation, or conflict, was not operative in a structural way in the Comtian organic conception of development. Solov'ev's abusive identification of the Hegelian dialectics with organic development [as I have pointed to in 2a], led him to associate Hegel too closely with Comte. What did Solov'ev do with the law of the three stages? Did he borrow it, rework it, or suggest an alternative scheme? This question cannot be solved with certainty. Some elements certainly suggest borrowing. For example, even though Solov'ev criticised some of the conclusions drawn by Comte, he nevertheless reflected on the basis of similar principles. [213] Solov'ev, like Comte, distinguished three types of knowledge, namely theology, philosophy, and science, which he identified as absolute, formal, and material degrees [stepeni], an equivalent term for the Comtian states or stages [etats]. Also similar to Comte is the distinction of three main areas of human activity: intellectual, social, and aesthetic or creative. Solov'ev, like Comte, related manifestations of the three stages to the three areas of human activity: the absolute, or theology and the ecclesiastical institution, the formal, or metaphysics and the political institutions, and the material, or natural science and economic institutions. However, Solov'ev distanced himself from Comte in his application of the stages to the domain of aesthetics, which he approached from a sophiological perspective. Therefore, only the intellectual and social areas are examined in this account. It seems that Solov'ev consistently applied the Comtian law of the three stages in his survey of world history in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. [214] The first phase in history was dominated by the absolute principle, similarly to Comte's definition of the first stage as theological. In this stage, religion governed all areas of human activity, which were not differentiated. After Jesus Christ, a struggle occurred, mostly in Western history, between the absolute, the formal, and the material, in all domains of human activity. In the Middle Ages, the conflict between the absolute and the formal could again be found in the struggle between theology and philosophy, and between church and state. From the end of the Middle Ages up to the French revolution, Solov'ev saw the victory of the formal over the absolute in the form of the domination of the state over the church, and of metaphysics over theology. The first victory of the material stage could be seen in the ascendance of science and in the rise of the third estate and of industry. However, while Comte positively valued the French revolution, the boom of industrialisation, and the triumph of science as the definitive 'success of the positive spirit', Solov'ev regarded them as only a temporary phase. But they agreed on the necessity of a last phase to overcome the antagonisms between the three principles. However, an important obstacle to the conclusion that Solov'ev simply assumed the entire Comtian scheme is that some points are present in other philosophical systems. The distinction between philosophy, theology and science is not specifically Comtian. More importantly, a law of the three stages can be found in other theories, such as those about the state of nature (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau drew a scheme of i) the state of nature, ii) the fall, and iii) a new order). Also Hegel pointed out three phases of development, namely confusion, distinction, new unity. The question therefore arises whether Solov'ev took these elements from other theories, from Hegel or from Comte (both directly or through Sergej Solov'ev). If we focus on the two philosophers discussed in this chapter, Hegel and Comte, the following hypotheses can be formulated. On the one hand, the fact that, at the time when he wrote Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, he was acquainted with Comte's three stages theory, and not with Hegel's philosophy of history, suggests that he borrowed the scheme from Comte. On the other hand, the logic adapted in the survey of history is rather dialectic, as the central role given to conflicts, oppositions, and negations, however mechanic they seem, suggests. Solov'ev possibly picked up Comte's concept of the three stages, and related these stages to each other by means of Hegelian dialectics. [215] A far more obvious influence can be detected in Solov'ev's borrowing of the Comtian definition of progress in terms of order. [216] Solov'ev's formula that 'true progress is the progress of order', is strikingly similar to those of Comte: [217] 'for the new philosophy order permanently forms the necessary condition of order; and reciprocally, progress becomes the necessary goal of order.' [218] There is no textual evidence that Solov'ev had read this passage by Comte; however, Comte's famous slogan of positivism 'Love as a principle, and order as a basis; progress as a goal', must have been widely known. [219] To the concept of humanity, which was central in Comte's second system, Solov'ev devoted two texts, namely his article for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia and his lecture commemorating the hundredth anniversary of Comte's birth, eloquently entitled 'The Idea of Humanity in Auguste Comte.' Solov'ev pointed out four characteristics of humanity in Comte, which belong to a specifically philosophical perspective on history. [220] The Russian philosopher was eager to establish the reality of humanity against the refutation of its existence by thinkers such as Danilevskij, and, clearly, found support in Comte's texts. [221] Firstly, humanity can be divided into groups, such as family and fatherland, as Comte pointed out, but it is in its essence indivisible, and is more than the totality of its components. [222] Secondly, humanity has more plenitude than smaller groups, such as family and fatherland, and its components have no meaning when taken in isolation. To make this point, Solov'ev referred to Comte's analogy between sociology and geometry, which shows the relationship between the whole and the parts. Here Solov'ev reproduced Comte's following argument: the dot can be identified with a person, the line with family (semejstvo), surface with people, the tri-dimensional figure with a race, and the full physical body with humanity: taken separately, these parts are only abstract. [223] The third aspect of humanity follows from this analogy: the essence of humanity is prior to the essence of its components. This priority of order is demonstrated by the general movement of world history. Or, in Solov'ev terms, who referred to Comte:
Rather than infer an influence of Comte on Solov'ev's concept of humanity, it seems that Solov'ev only assumed the analogy between sociology and geometry as a useful metaphor for his own conception of humanity. A look at the central place occupied by this concept in the whole work of Solov'ev suffices to demonstrate that the Russian philosopher did not have to borrow it from Comte, but arrived at the same definition and significance of humanity. [225] Solov'ev's conception of history bore affinity with that of Comte in four respects. Firstly, they shared a conception of history as being mainly the history of ideas, of intellectual development. Secondly, they believed in the reality of humanity as the ultimate entity, thereby providing human groups with a meaning. Thirdly, both presented a tripartition of history into an initial, transitory, and final stage. Fourthly, and more generally, both were oriented towards the future as the dimension in which ideal society would be fully implemented. In this respect, both viewed their own contribution as crucial. Their focus on the future also explains the hasty, schematic treatment to which they submitted history. More specifically, the question of Solov'ev's borrowing the Comtian law of three stages can be partially solved. It seems that Solov'ev did borrow some schemes, but one should bear in mind that these schemes also contain Hegelian elements. The question of who exerted a more decisive influence cannot be easily answered. Only the definition of progress in necessary combination with order bears an incontestably Comtian stamp. As far as the Comtian concept of humanity is concerned, this is perhaps the point on which Solov'ev admired Comte most. However, he himself arrived at the same definition of this category and only found additional support in Comte's formulations and analogies. In doing so he showed his admiration for the scientific approach of the French thinker. After all, as we read in an early letter [see introduction II], it was part of his youth dream to fully acknowledge the role of science and to integrate its most fundamental results in a synthesis with philosophy and religion. History in its immanent development deserved attention and respect in its own right. This motivated Solov'ev to elaborate a view based on some key points made in 19th century philosophy of history, namely: an acknowledgement of one universal goal-oriented process achieved mainly by humanity, which in a harmonious unity contains smaller entities, the nations. These, in their turn, are guided by world historical heroes, who introduce novelty in an established order. Solov'ev assimilated these points and reorganised them on the basis of his chief metaphysical principle of all-unity. The originality of Solov'ev's philosophical register of history lies mostly in his constant attempt to provide historical events with a universal meaning. This was the first time such an approach has been applied to Russian history as a whole, future included. For this purpose, he drew aspects from Comte, Hegel, and for the larger part from Sergej Solov'ev. As a matter of fact, Solov'ev's reception of Hegel's, Comte's, and Sergej Solov'ev's philosophy of history is an interesting case of his extremely differentiated way of dealing with philosophical schools. In Solov'ev's work, reception took the form of a fully assimilated legacy (his father's world view and categories of historical actors), affinities which he acknowledged (with Comte's conception of humanity), or which he rejected (the schematism of Comte's law of the three stages), a criticism combined with approval (Hegel's conception of the state), a misinterpretation and unacknowledged distancing (Hegelian dialectics), up to a total rejection (the epistemological foundation of Comte's positivism). This wide range of reactions explains the complexity of the issue of the reception of history in Solov'ev's thought. In a global assessment, one must conclude that Solov'ev did not develop a consistent philosophy of history for two main reasons. Firstly, the philosopher was often not specific enough in his treatment of history and too speculative, and as a result of an insufficient 'data base' he failed to provide an articulate interpretation in this register. This relates to his main focus on the teleological principle of all-unity, which led him to simplifications in order to make history result in the pre-defined ideal. Secondly, there are conflicting schemes, such as his dialectical treatment of world history and his linear treatment of Russian history. Solov'ev ultimately privileged a linear and organic concept of development to Hegelian dialectics. But in order to be convincing, this shift of position should have been accompanied by a criticism of the inconsistency of dialectics when applied to history. One can say that Solov'ev criticised philosophies of history as much as they inspired him. The rationalistic and positivist interpretation of history provided by Hegel and Comte respectively, which, in his eyes, implies that there is ultimately nothing outside history, could only meet with resistance from Solov'ev's part. He used the theological register of history to firmly establish against these two thinkers the transcendence of God and the unconditional character of the good. In this respect, he showed himself at ease in his criticism of the Comtian system, which he could easily refute because of the philosophical schematism and to some extent superficiality inherent to the French scholar. Interestingly, he neglected the theological components of Hegel's views on history, and hereby, whether consciously or not, reduced them to a 'pure', that is, immanent, philosophy of history. By overlooking Hegel's developments of the absolute Spirit, he reduced the latter's position to a 'theory of the objective Spirit.' Perhaps this reduction made it easier for him to react to the German philosopher from a theological and sophiological perspective. There were fundamental limitations in philosophy of history, which Solov'ev could not accept. God as main though transcendent actor was neglected or even removed, as well as the absolute value of the good. Besides, in the Comtian system, ideal society seemed realisable by human hands alone. Religion and the church were relegated to one of the many pillars of mental and social life, or removed from the social ideal. Pure immanence vs. the primacy of God's transcendence, human vs. divine agency, evolution vs. creation, reason vs. faith: philosophy of history and theology of history seemed impossible to combine within one system. Like Hegel, Solov'ev sought a way to bridge this gap. Unlike the German philosopher, he found it in sophiology of history. _______________ Notes: 1. Opravdanie dobra, p. 473, transl. p. 396. 2. Van der Zweerde 2001 p. 232. 3. He established the category of such a goal a priori, justifying it only by the fact that our consciousness demands a 'general and ultimate goal" (Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, p. 185). 4. Ibid., pp.186-187. 5. Ibid., p. 215. The term 'all-unity' appeared later in Solov'ev's work [see footnote 6]. 6. See the definition of all-unity: 'I call true or positive all-unity that in which one [edinoe] exists not on account of everyone or to their detriment, but to the benefit of all' ('Pervyj sag k polozitel'noj estetike'. S. 1991. pp. 90-98: p. 95 n. English translation in Wozniuk 2003, 'A First Step toward a Positive Aesthetic', pp. 135-143: p. 140); 'in the second, positive sense, the relationship of the one principle to all is understood as the relationship of the all-encompassing spiritual-organic whole to the living members and elements that find themselves in it' ('Vseedinstvo', SS. 12. p. 231). 7. In theory, it is inaccessible because one cannot have a concept of the ultimate state of things. In this sense, this 'limit' may be only conceptually 'ideal', but in reality history is moving towards it ('Pervyj sag k polozitci'noj estetike', pp. 92-93). 8. Ibid., p. 95. 9. The cyclical elements [see subsections 1eii and 2b] and dialectical [see subsection 2a] are present in Solov'ev's work, but play a secondary role. 10. Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, p. 187. 11. See for instance 'Rukoyodjascie mysli "Istoriceskogo Obozrenija'" (SS. 6, pp. 363-373: p. 370). This statement unmistakably leads to tensions with the TH scheme, which Solov'ev did not solve. According to the theological scheme of history, there is n strict separation between nature and man. Contrary to Kant, who distinguished between the finalised activity of the intellect [Zwecktatigkeit] and the finalised effectiveness of nature [Zweckmassigkeit], Solov'ev made both terms equivalent and elevated them to a general category applicable to the world (Sternkopf 1973, pp. 82. 161). Solov'ev developed the substantial unity between man and nature as a central aspect of his sophiology of history [see chap. IV]. On the one hand, for Solov'ev society has all the features of an organism. On the other, society is an organism sui generis, thus is differentiated from a biological organism, but on this point Solov'ev did not specify in which sense. In another discussion, he agreed with Darwin that the fundamental factor distinguishing man from animal is the fact that man possesses moral feeling (Opravdanie dobra, p. 26). 12. The significance of the natural sciences in his thought, in particular the theory of evolution, should be emphasised. In a letter dated 1873, he wrote: 'one has to appropriate oneself the general results of the scientific development' (Pis 'ma 3. p. 89). Solov'ev is one of the very few Orthodox authors who took into account the theme of evolution (Olivier Clement, 'Vladimir Soloviev, theologien de la modernite?', Contacts 169 (1995), pp. 35-45). 13. From this perspective, the use of the organicistic metaphor allowed Solov'ev to argue that the social forms influence the individual, and so permits him to counter the attitude of people like Lavrov, Mikhailovksij, and Tolstoj who neglected history as the collective shaping of the world, and worked towards the good only on an individual basis. 14. This discrepancy between an aspired universality and an adopted eurocentrism is typical for most nineteenth-century philosophers. 15. See Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, pp. 197-216 for the account that follows. Concerning the question of a Hegelian influence on the terminology, see below, subsection 2b): concerning the question of the law of the three stages from Comte being borrowed, see subsection 2c). 16. More ancient civilisations such as Egypt and China are not mentioned. 17. Solov'ev stated the same phenomenon in the field of science, where positivism became dominant, and in art, with 'utilitarian realism' (Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, pp. 205-208). 18. There also he pointed to three main periods, without, however, providing historical data. This second account is characterised by a strict continuity between the stages, which stands in sharp contrast with the first periodisation made by means of conflicts between the phases and between their composing elements. 19. About the Varangians and Peter, see 'O narodnosti i narodnykh delakh v Rossii', Nacional'nyj vopros I, S. 1989 I , pp. 279-293: p. 285. Another version of this scheme was the following. First of all, there was a political emancipation, with the rejection of Tatar and Lithuanian power, an inner, economical emancipation, i.e. of peasants from serfdom in 1863, and finally a spiritual emancipation, which still had to come ('Kogda byl ostavlen russkij put' i kak k nemu vernut'sja? (Po povodu "Zametki O vnutrennem sostojanii Rossii" K.S. Aksakova)', Nase Nasledie, 1988, 2, pp. 81-84). Solov'ev recurrently presented this scheme of Russian history in his publicistika, especially in relation to actual problems [see case studies]. 20. 'Vremja' (SS. 10. pp. 230-231). 21. Worth mentioning are five aphorisms about time that Solov'ev wrote in a style and tone closer to his poetry than to his philosophical works, and, as pointed out, can be associated to the humoristic aphorisms of his contemporary writer Koz'ma Prutkov. See his 'Mysli o vremeni', published for the first time by I.G. Visneveckij, 'Vladimir Solov'ev kak estestvennyj myslitel'', Aequinox MCMXCIII (Moskva: Kniznyj sad, 1993), pp. 230-235: p. 234. One example: 'It has been noticed a long time ago that there are three times: the past, the present, and the future, but it is not yet known whether there is a fourth one' (Ibid., p. 234). 22. Lemma 'Kant' for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia (SS. 10, pp. 345-380), p. 377. 23. Opravdanie dobra, p. 338. 24. The definition of optimism which he gave in the entry 'Optimizm' for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia applies to him as well: 'view according to which the existing world is the best possible one and all that accomplishes itself in it leads to the good' (5S. 9, p. 250). 25. Arguably, it is his attachment to tradition that explains why many of his views were, even in his days, considered conservative; for instance, he did not question the Russian tsarist regime as an institution. On the other hand, he could just as well be considered a utopian on the basis of his numerous statements on the ideal universal community that had to be built. 26. 'Ponjatie o Boge', p. 25. 27. 'Pervyj sag k polozitel'noj estetike', p. 93, transl. p. 139 [italics Solov'ev's]. 28. Solov'ev did not specify whether this goal could be attained by man alone, or whether the intervention of God was necessary. One can assume that, in order to be consistent with his theological scheme, he admitted that this goal, once realised. would mean the end of history. 29. On this point, one could logically object that it is possible to conceive of an infinite progress towards a precise goal that remains unattainable, as in Kant's regulative idea. 30. Opravdanie dobra, p. 305. 31. Continuity can be viewed as a unity through time and/or through space. Continuity through time was a subject dear to Solov'ev. He emphasised the value of a bond with ancestors, of tradition. Continuity through space was a subject of concern that he translated into the religious field, by ardently advocating the unification of the churches. 32. Opravdanie dobra, p. 498. transl. p. 422. 33. This formula is strikingly similar to that of Auguste Comte [see subsection 2c]. 34. 'Kitaj i Evropa', SS. 6, pp. 93-150: p. 148. In this text, he also used the term kitaizacita to refer, on the basis of the cliche of Chinese conservatism, to the tendency towards stagnation in Russian society. Interestingly, Sergej Solov'ev used the term 'Buddhism' in a similar sense to characterise a fear of progress (Sergej Solov'ev, Socinenija v 18 knigakh (Moskva: Mysl', 1988-1996), vol. 16, pp. 357-66). 35. Influenced by positivism, the term progress, despite its vagueness, had a fantastic impact in the Russian press of the 1870s. 36. See 'Kitaj i Evropa' for a discussion or the term progress. 37. 'Kitaj i Evropa', p. 147. See also Opravdanie dobra, p. 422. 38. In principle Solov'ev saw no difference of degree between these different types of progress. The technical improvement of weapons is considered as much a form of progress as social progress (see 'Rukovodjascie mysli "Istoriceskogo Obozrenija'", p. 372). 39. Opravdanie dobra. p. 478. transl. p. 395. 40. The chapter of Opravdanie dobra 'The meaning of war' was later reedited separately (ex.: Smysl vojny (Odessa: Pecatnoe Delo, 1915), which suggests that it was widely read. 41. Opravdanie dobra, p. 478. With this claim he undoubtedly aimed at pacifists like Lev Tolstoj. 42. Ibid., p. 475. About his prediction of the end of wars, read also 'Pervyj sag k polozitel'noj estetike', p. 94. The argumentation is somewhat twisted: the current growth of militarism and military equipment made the fear for a war greater, thus diminished the danger of a real war. He predicted that if war were to occur, it would be the last one. The numerous wars from 1914 up to the present time sourly contradict this statement. 43. Opravdanie dobra, p. 336. 44. Ibid., pp. 337-338. 45. His interpretation which lies at the basis of his 'Byzantinism' was far from reality, and left aside important phenomena taking place in the period just preceding Byzantium's fall, such as forms of humanism and the Renaissance, as G.I. Scetinina has pointed out, in 'Vladimir Solov'ev: istoriceskie vzgljady', in: coll., Istorija i istoriki (Moskva: Nauka, 1995), pp. 229-255: p. 242. 46. Nikolaj Strakhov criticised the dry, formal, artificial (forced conception of continuity based on no proof) character of Solov'ev's views of history (pointed out by Muller 1947, p. 117). 47. In this respect, there was no room for chance in his teleological scheme. Neither did he pay attention to unintended effects, which he arguably did not consider problematic, since in his eyes the initial intention of the agent mattered less than the end result. 48. 'Rukovodjascie mysli "Istoriceskogo Obozrenija'" was devoted in principle to reviewing the journal, for which apparently, Kareev (1850-1931) himself asked the philosopher (Pis 'ma I, p. 70). However, Solov'ev focused on two of the historian's articles on theory of history and about the relationships of historical science with philosophy. The review thus came down to a discussion of Kareev's epistemological position. 49. 'Rukovodjascie mysli "Istoriceskogo Obozrenija"', p. 367. Solov'ev did not indicate to whom he ascribed the task of actual reflection on these concrete objects. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., p. 370. The philosopher mentioned only one criterion of truth in this text, namely 'the law of uninterrupted development' as 'the main truth of any science' (Ibid., p. 371). 52. One of these exceptions is his argument on the formation of the clan, made on the basis of data provided by the sociologist Lewis Henry Morgan on the Indians of North America called Seneka (Opravdanie dobra, p. 290). 53. Sternkopf 1973, p. 354. 54. Opravdanie dobra, p. 292. He completed this genetic explanation by pointing to the religious dimension of patriotism. In this argument, the link between the character of people and its founder was not only historical, but also had a religious dimension (Sternkopf 1973, p. 355). From then on, Solov'ev could easily ground patriotism in religion. This step I identify as a move from a philosophical to a theological register of history. 55. Opravdanie dobra, p. 485. transl. p. 410. 56. Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, p. 189. 57. Ibid., p. 186 ff. He explicitly acknowledged Hegel's merit in having enlightened the relationship part-whole with this analogy to the living organism, which permitted to understand of how the universal process penetrated particular phenomena ('Gegel", SS. 10. p. 318). For an analysis of this point see subsection 2b). On the question whether Solov'ev really took this directly from Hegel, as he wrote, or from Sergej Solov'ev, as I suppose, see paragraphs 2a and 2b. 58. Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, pp. 190-196. synopsis p. 196 reproduced in my introduction, p. 12. 59. Opravdanie dobra, p. 474. transl. p. 397 [italics Solov'ev's]. 60. Ibid., pp. 474-475. Cf: This process was taking place in his time: "In this new period, humanity is undoubtedly going [ ... ] towards a greater and greater rapprochement and mutual interpenetration of big groups (clans, peoples, etc.)' ('Iz filosofii istorii', p. 341). 61. 'The whole of the African coast has been divided between European powers' (Opravdanie dobra, p. 474, transl. p. 397). 62. His definition of Westernism was characteristic: 'orientation of social thought and literature which acknowledges the spiritual solidarity of Russia and Western Europe as two joined parts of one cultural-historical whole, which has to include humanity as a whole within itself (entry 'Zapadnik, zapadnicestvo' written for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia (SS. 11, pp. 582-584), p. 582). There, Solov'ev offered his very personal interpretation of the movement of Russian Westernism. Significantly, he stripped away the exclusive focus on Europe that was so characteristic for the tenants of Westernism, and heavily emphasised the universal significance of the questions raised by these thinkers. As to the notions of universality and universalism, Solov'ev used, but only sporadically, the term universal 'nost (Kritika otvlecennykh nacal, PSS. 3, pp. 7-360: p. 310), and universalizm (Opravdanie dobra, pp. 308, 326). He by far preferred the term vsemirnyj. His concept of all-unity is closely associated, and in some cases equivalent with universality ('universality, or all-unity' (Kritika otvlecennykh nacal, p. 680). 63. This point has been rightly emphasised by Ignatow 1997, p. 3. 64. About Solov'ev's polemics with Danilevskij, see: 'Rossija i Evropa', Nacional' nyj vopros book I (S. 1989 I. pp. 333-396), and the far more balanced entry 'Danilevskij' (SS. 10, pp. 498-505). 65. Solov'ev took up the scheme of the conflict East-West from the Slavophiles [see above chapter II. 'Theology of History in Solov'ev'] and found confirmation of its adequacy in his father's work [see subsection 2b of this chapter]. 66. See' Kitaj i Evropa', op. cit. For a detailed account of Solov'ev's views on China, see Setnickij 1926. Setnickij's article is one of the very few writings of the early Soviet period on Solov'ev. In his account of Solov'ev's and Fedorov's views on China as the initiators of the Russian view on China, he distinguished two main phases of Solov'ev's relationship to China: a first, conciliatory phase (up to the 1890s), in which the philosopher advocated Europe to convert China, and a second, defensive phase of a threat from China, and the Far East in general, best expressed in his poem 'Panmongolizm' (SS. 12. pp. 95-96). 67. 'Humanity, though divided in a plurality of alienated and hostile clans and peoples, has never lost the consciousness of its inner unity and of its strife to realize its unity in a practicable way' ('Vsemirnaja monarkhija', SS. 12, pp. 563-564: p. 563). See also Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, p.185. 68. Opravdanie dobra, pp. 476-478, transl. pp. 399-401. These events are narrated in a text penetrated with eschatological motives, namely 'Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste'. On world monarchy, see subsection eiii). 69. The only attempt to make a geographical repartition of nations can be found in a draft of La Sophia, (p. 72). 70. Solov'ev, though, never referred to this crucial contribution by Herder to philosophy of history. 71. Solov'ev used the terms narod and nacija indifferently (see Opravdanie dobra, pp. 375, 367). Correspondingly, nacional 'nyj and narodnyj are used as equivalents. Narodnost' means nationality (Ibid., p. 357), national character (Ibid., p. 369), or nation (Ibid., pp. 367, 473). 72. Opravdanie dobra, pp. 357-379. 73. The attempts by the Spaniards to protect and propagate the Christian faith lay close to his own motivations expressed in his theology of history. 74. He did however admit to the existence of national hostility as a 'zoological fact.' (Opravdanie dobra, p. 377, transl. p. 296). 75. Sternkopf defends the idea of a subordination (Sternkopf 1973, p. 345ff.). 76. Opravdanie dobra, p. 503-504. 77. L'idee russe, p. 89. 78. The problem arising from this terminological vagueness between state in the broad and the narrow sense, as well as between state and nation, is that Solov'ev did not take into account some limited cases, for example the Jews in Solov'ev's time. He called them a nation, although they did not have a state in the narrow sense, and were not called a state in the broad sense. Solov'ev failed to acknowledge that there was a problem if one amalgamates the terms nation and state. 79. Definitions from The New Oxford Dictionary of English (2001), p. 1816. 80. A possible explanation for the quasi-absent treatment of the functioning of the state in his philosophical register of history is that he actually had little interest in the functioning of political regimes. He admitted that he was not familiar with discussions about constitution, for instance (Pis 'ma 2, p. 84). 81. Opravdanie dobra, p. 456. 82. 'Sur la question sociale', in: E. 1978. pp. 299-304: p. 302. 83. On this notion in Solov'ev's work. see chap. IV. subsection eiii. 84. Opravdanie dobra, p. 299. 85. Cf.: 'The interests of the whole of humanity do not exist for the state and for the secular government, the duties of which are limited to the fraction of human kind to which it is ascribed' (L'idee russe, pp. 98-99). 86. Although he did not explicitly favour absolute, constitutional or parliamentary monarchy, he does not seem to have opposed popular representation (see for instance his entry on Joseph-Marie de Maistre, 'Mestr', SS. 10, pp. 429-435, in which his disapprobation of the French thinker's political position appears between the lines). 87. Yet a cultural realisation had already taken place in the European civilisation ('Vsemirnaja monarkhija', p. 564). 88. 'Iz filosofii istorii'. p. 346. 89. Opravdanie dobra p. 287. 90. As 'bearers of a higher consciousness, of a better personal and social morality', they were 'benefactors of humanity' or 'heroes' of history (Opravdanie dobra, p. 299, transl. p. 212). These people struggled for a broader social life than the clan, broke up with it, and founded states and cities. Solov'ev considered the personal exploit, which breaks the existing social limits in order to form new and higher forms of social and political life, a fundamental fact (Ibid.). One cannot help wondering whether Solov'ev saw himself a hero of his time, trying to promote his views on a new, theocratic, rule. 91. Solov'ev gave examples or these geniuses mentioned in the previous paragraph. Concerning Adam Smith and Darwin, he ironically advanced that fortunately these people were not aware of the influence of their nationality on their scientific works, or else they would have spent much energy protecting themselves against this influence (' Ljubov' k narodu i russkij narodnyj ideal', Nacional 'nyj vopros I, S. 1989 1, pp. 293-311: p. 298). 92. Examples of political heroes of Western European history can be found in Solov'ev's texts, but are never the object of an analysis. See for instance Joan of Arc, whose 'national' and supra-national' significance' was only briefly discussed in a footnote ('Ljubov' k narodu i russkij narodnyj ideal', pp. 299, 300). 93. Opravdanie dobra, p. 295, transl. p. 213. From the examples Solov'ev gave, it appears that the individual actor of history is a man rather than a woman. In our eyes, the common woman is rather badly treated in Solov'ev, since he ascribes to her only a 'passive' and 'conservative' principle, which he highly valued as 'embodiment of moral heroism' (Ibid., p, 296, transl. p. 214). 94. Worth mentioning are his considerations on the history of personal consciousness. However, they also belong in part to the register of theology of history, since he viewed personal consciousness through the prism of the history of religion, namely through Buddhism, Hinduism, Platonism, Christianity (Opravdanie dobra, pp. 308-328). 95. Sternkopf has pointed to this aspect (Sternkopf 1973, pp. 213-215). 96. Solov'ev went as far as to claim that participation in progress involves one's position regarding all domains, including art, and, logically, the rejection of art for art's sake, which he saw as a form of regression and separatism from the general progress ('Pervyj sag k polozitel'noj estetike', p. 95). 97. A study on the influence of the evolutionistic theories of Darwin, Spencer and Haeckel on Solov'ev would shed light on the role of theories of evolution in Solov'ev's work. This issue, however, goes beyond the scope of my research. 98. 'He not only understood the essence of the Hegelian triad, but also used it himself constantly in his considerations' (Losev 200, p. 172): see also Ignatow 1997, p. 11. 99. The Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte were first known in Russia by the Russian Hegelians of the 1840s. Russian thinkers had been eager to read Hegel and a whole generation of scholars passionately debated his philosophy. For a general introduction of the reception of Hegelianism in Russia, see Guy Planty-Bonjour, Hegel et la pensee philosophique en Russie 1830-1917 (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff. 1974), chap. 1: 'Diffusion de I'hegelianisme', pp. 8-37. Solov'ev's father himself had the opportunity to read them, as he related in his memoirs: S[ergej] Solov'ev, Moi zapiski dlja detej moikh. a esli mozno, i dlja drugikh (1st publ. 1907: Petrograd, n.p., 1914), p. 60. It was all the more surprising that Vladimir Solov'ev most probably did not know of Hegel's central work on philosophy of history in his early years, as his goal to apply Hegel in the field of history (in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija) shows. The only explanation, though unsatisfactory, could be the fact that Hegel was completely out of fashion in Solov'ev's generation. Obviously, Solov'ev filled this lacuna in the 1890s: he referred to this work in his article on Hegel for the encyclopaedia Brokgauz-Efron. 100. La Sophia (op. cit.), Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija (op. cil.), 'Gegel" (SS. 10, pp. 300-321), Opravdanie dobra (op. cit.). 101. Interestingly, Solov'ev, who was responsible for the philosophy section of the encyclopaedia, had first suggested to Cicerin and Lopatin that they write the entry on Hegel, which both refused, 'thus I will have to take it myself' (Pis 'ma 2, p. 322). The text of the entry was reprinted as the post face of a general work about Hegel written by an English scholar and translated into Russian: 'Filosofija Gegelja', in: E. Kerd, Gegel, S.N. Trubeckoj (transl.) (Moskva: tip.-lit. T-va Kusnereva i Ko., 1898). 102. G.L. Kline, 'Hegel and Solovyov', in: J.J. O'Malley, K.W. Algozin and F. G. Weiss (eds.), Hegel and The History of Philosophy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 159-170; J.L. Navickas, 'Hegel and the Doctrine or Historicity of Vladimir Solovyov', in: The Quest for the Absolute, Boston College Studies in Philosophy, vol. 1, F.J. Adelmann (ed.) (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1966 & The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff: 1966), pp. 135- 54; A.N. Golubev, 'Gegel' i VI. Solov'ev: granicy idealisticeskoj dialektiki' in: Doklady X Mezdunarodnogo gegel evskogo kongressa Moskva 26-31 avgusta 1974g., book 2 (Moskva: n.p., 1974), pp. 73-87. On the history of Hegelianism in Russia, see especially Planty-Bonjour 1974, pp. 232-240. 103. Navickas 1966, p. 154. It is this 'Christian historicism' that I have identified and elaborated as 'theology of history', on the one hand, and as 'sophiology of history', on the other. I extend Navickas' investigation by including some works, which he docs not use in his article, such as Solov'ev's article on Hegel for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia. 104. 'In his early works, Solov'ev was [ ... ] systematically Hegelian in metaphilosophy and systematically neo-Hegelian in philosophy, even though he assigned Hegel a rather reduced role in the history of speculative thought. Later he came to confess to Hegel more honestly and more openly' (Kline 1974, p. 169). 105. Ch. Helferich. G.W.F. Hegel, Sammlung Metzler, vol. 182 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1979), pp. 72-3. 106. ‘Gegel", p.318 [italics Solov'ev's]. 107. <Plany i cernoviki>, PSS. 2, p. 177. 108. Hegel, Science of Logic, I. Miller (transl.) (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989). 109. See Krizis zapadnoj filosofii [1874], Teoreticeskaja filosofija [1898-]. For an analysis of Hegelian dialectics in Solov'ev from the perspective of logic, see Planty-Bonjour 1974, pp. 232-240. Surprisingly. Solov'ev's article for the encyclopaedia, the major text on Hegel written by him, although mentioned, is not discussed in Planty-Bonjour's study; nor is Solov'ev's early work Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. On the understanding of dialectics as an expression of all-encompassing love, see chapter IV 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History'. 110. 'Gegel", pp. 310-311. 111. La Sophia, p. 108. 112. The fact that this overview is extremely schematic does not plead for Solov'ev's misuse of Hegel's method, since schematism in dialectics was a typical feature of Hegel himself. Losev has also noted this aspect in Solov'ev (Losev 2000, p. 172). 113. Solov'ev put the definition of dialectics in the mouth of Sophia, hereby implying that his own application of it to history, achieved later (Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, 1877) was suggested to him by Divine wisdom. 114. As a matter or fact, in the Lectures on Philosophy of History, Hegel characterised development [Entwieklung] in two steps. First of all, he used the analogy with living organisms in order to show the aspect of self-making: the entity is a organic whole which undergoes dynamic changes by which all parts are affected and then evolve towards a more advanced form, in virtue of an inner unchangeable principle. Secondly, he showed the fundamental difference between the organic unmediated, unhindered development from one stage to the other, and the development of the Spirit which, because of the mediation of consciousness, encounters opposition (Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 'Einleitung', p. 75. English translation: G.W.F. Hegel, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Indianapolis & New York: The Library of Liberal Arts. 1953), p. 69). 115. Solov'ev defined development as 'a series [rjad] of immanent changes of an organic being, which goes from a certain start and is oriented towards a certain determined goal: such is the development of every organism; infinite development is simply nonsense, contradictio in adjecto') (Filosofski nacala cel'nogo znanija, p. 187). This definition remained unchanged twenty years later in the entry 'Mirovoj process' in the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia (SS 10, pp. 247-250). 116. Filosofski nacala cel'nogo znanija p. 188. 117. On the basis of Filosofski nacala cel'nogo znanija, Kline has argued in favour of Solov'ev's use of Hegelian dialectics, though with two qualifications. According to him, in Solov'ev's work, though 'in an subordinate sense, I suppose, the development of one-sided principles -- principles which are "abstract" in Hegel's sense of the term, i.e., "one-sided, inadequately related, relatively unmediated" -- into integral principles -- principles which are "concrete" in Hegel's sense, i.e., "many-sided, adequately related, complexly mediated" -- may be considered a historical, as well as a structural and dialectical, development' (Kline 1974, pp. 165- 6). Concreteness is expressed by Solov'ev as 'cel'nost" [wholeness, literally, often translated as 'integrality']. Kline's reservation that this should apply 'in a subordinate sense' may be related to the fact that only principles, and not, for instance, phenomena are understood in that way. 118. Kline 1974, p. 165. 'Perhaps, Solov'ev's clearest difference from Hegel -- as well as from Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza -- lies in his refusal to subordinate either doing [social- moral and political institutions. MC] or making [art and mysticism, or creativity, MC] to knowing' (Ibid.). Through this extension of dialectics, Solov'ev obtained an abolition of the domination of knowledge over the other fields. 119. Solov'ev identified a highest form of human activity, which is not knowledge, nor the practical activity of society, but creativity; and within creativity, mysticism holds the highest rank (Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, p. 195). 120. Hegel focused exclusively on the 'immanent side of the absolute idea which moves the world forward', and 'mixed up the world-soul with the absolute', which 'always remains transcendent' ('Gegel", p. 319). In opposition. Solov'ev repeatedly stressed God's transcendence. His change of position with respect to the question whether to use dialectics to define the absolute, the divine, is therefore obvious. 121. 'Gegel", p. 319. 122. Solov'ev's vehemence can be understood as a reaction to his own investigations on the nature of the absolute and its relation to process, formulated in his early works, such as in the Sixth Lecture on Divine Humanity. See Solov'ev's considerations on the essence of God and of Sophia, and his discussion with Schelling [chapter IV 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History']. 123. Teoreticeskajaja filosofija, S. 1988 1. pp. 757-831: p. 829 [italics Solov'ev's]. 124. But this tragic colour seems to disappear in Hegel's idea of the achievement of the objective Spirit in the state. In this tension between the tragic and a goal described in dogmatic terms, probably lies one of the most original aspects of Hegel's philosophy of history. 125. Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 77, transl. p. 70. 126. Ibid., p. 32, transl. p. 24. 127. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. T.M. Knox (transl.) (1st publ. 1952; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), §§ 142-157, pp. 104-110. Cf. Solov'ev: 'The genuine objective morality consists for man in serving consciously and freely this general goal, identifying it with his own personal will, and this identification, which is at the same time man's liberation, will necessarily be achieved when he becomes aware of the truth of this idea. "Get to know the truth, and truth will make you free'" ('Iz filosofii istorii', p. 350). 128. For both, Christianity is the most significant turning point in history (on Hegel see also Helferich 1979, p. 87). For both, it was under the influence of Christianity that the consciousness of human freedom that man as free had appeared. The difference is that Hegel situated it as the turning point between the second phase (Greco-Roman) and the third phase (Christian-German), whereas for Solov'ev it happened within the third phase (Jews). Concerning the last crucial turning point according to Hegel, namely the Reformation, which extended freedom to the mundane world and to all, it is reduced in Solov'ev to a form of protest against Church, simply a form of negative Christianity (La Sophia, p. 150). As far as the predecessors of the Christians are concerned, namely the Jews, Hegel showed that they had played a crucial role, which was equated to the 'absolute turning point' (see Jean Hyppolite, Introduction a la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p. 54 ff). By contrast, the Jews are strikingly absent from the philosophical register of history that Solov'ev gave in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. From his theology of history, we know that Solov'ev ascribed them a central role in world history [see also case study III 'The Jewish Question]. A possible explanation for this contrast is that Solov'ev developed a sustained interest in the Jewish people only some years later, in the mid-1880s. 129. This difference has been pointed out by S.B. Rocinskij, in 'Gegelevskie elementy v metafiziceskoj sisteme Solov'eva, in: Ibid., Vladimir Solov'ev i zapadnaja mysl': kiritika, primirenie, sintez (Moskva: Dzangar, 1999), pp. 44-55: p. 46. 130. As a matter of fact, of the 23 pages of the account of world history in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, nearly one third. i.e. 7 pages, are devoted to the future, sketched as the last phase or synthesis and reconciliation of all hostile elements. 131. ‘Gegel", pp. 319-320. 132. Ironically, by not including Russia in the dialectical process that governs history, Solov'ev agreed with Hegel, for whom Russia and the Slavic countries were in principle not bound to play a historical role. This stands in sharp contrast with Solov'ev's many efforts spent to promote the idea of Russia's future universal mission. 133. For instance, 'nation' in the broad sense appears in the expression 'die germanische Nation' (Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 422), meaning all the Germanic peoples at the end of the Roman empire, and in the narrow sense in 'die Englische Nation', when Hegel commented on the modern phenomenon of the English constitution (Ibid., p. 536). 134. See Philosophy of Right, pp. 217-8. 135. Opravdanie dobra, p. 363. 136. In another passage he explained that the unity of nations is produced by three main factors: a physical bond, language, and history (Opravdanie dobra, pp. 501-504). These factors are problematic. It indeed remains unclear what Solov'ev meant by 'physical bond', either ethnicity or a geographical situation: equally problematic is the question of the language: did Solov'ev promulgate one language in one nation, as he here seemed to suggest? From other sources, we know that this was not the case [see case study IV 'The Polish question']. Finally, the issue of national history rests upon an unproblematised definition or nation. 137. A nationality or national character is 'not something self-existent and self-contained, living in itself and for itself, for this great nation proves to be simply a special form of universal content, living in that content, filled with it and embodying it not for itself only but for all' (Opravdanie dobra p. 288). The distinction in nations has to remain till the end of history: 'National differences must remain till the end of time: nations must subsist as really distinct members of the universal organism' (L idee russe, p. 99). 138. Nevertheless, the distinction in nations has to remain till the end of history: 'National differences must remain till the end of time: nations must subsist as really distinct members of the universal organism' (L 'idee russe, p. 99). 139. Cf. Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 114. 140. Opravdanie dobra, p. 368. However, Solov'ev later rejected the cyclic view of the development and decay of nations, when he said: 'Nations will not perish. The soul of Spain can resurrect' ('Nemezida', p. 70). This quotation shows that his conception of nations was contaminated by theological motives. 141. 'Nravstvennost' i politika: istoriceskie objazannosti Rossii', Nacional'nyj vopros V.S. 1989 1, pp. 264-279; p. 264. 142. Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 57, transl. p. 53. As such the state becomes the mediation [Vermittlung] between the divine and the human at the level of the objective Spirit. 143. 'Gegel", p. 315. 144. Philosophy of Right, addition 152 to § 258, p. 279. Hegel's usage of the term 'state' was ambiguous, as was Solov'ev's. He understood state in the broad sense of an entity incorporating spiritual phenomena, as well as in a restricted sense, as 'political state.' For a discussion of these definitions, see Joseph McCarney, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel on History (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 157-158. 145. Cf. Enzyklopadie, part III (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), § 552. 146. Solov'ev was explicit when it came to criticising Hegel's concept of national mission: see 'Cto trebuetsja ot russkoj partii?', Nacional'nyj vopros I. S. 1989 1. pp. 327-333: p. 330). 147. Opravdanie dobra, p. 452-453. transl. p. 406. 148. 'Iz filosofii istorii', p. 349. 149. Opravdanie dobra, p. 265, transl. p. 178. 150. Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 96, transl. p. 87. In reaction to Kant's conception of Moralitat in exclusively individual terms, Hegel distinguished it from ethical life [Sittlichkeit], which refers to the objective Spirit in its normative aspect, as embodiment in the institutions and in social life. Solov'ev did not make this distinction, and considered that the same nravstvenmost' was operating in both individual and social life (see for instance Opravdanie dobra, p. 415) 151. Ludwig Heyde, De verwerkelijking van de vrijheid: een inleiding in Hegels rechtsfilosofie (Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1987) pp. 209-210. 152.Opravdanie dobra, p. 264, transl. p. 177. 153. See for instance Solov'ev's interventions after the condemnation of the murderers of tsar Alexander II [case study 1]. 154. Compare with Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschicte, pp. 46-49, transl. pp. 39-43. 155. 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo', Nacional'nyj vopros 2. S. 1989 1, pp. 414-433. Compare with Hegel: 'It is different with large relations in history. This is precisely where great collisions arise between the existing acknowledged duties, laws and rights, and those possibilities which are opposed to this fixed system, harm it and destroy its foundation and reality, and which at the same time have a content which can be good, globally speaking advantageous, essential and necessary. These possibilities then become historical: they involve a general principle of a different order from that which provides the basis in the existence of a people or a state. This principle is a moment in the development of the productive idea, a moment of truth striving and urging towards itself. Historical men, world-historical individuals are those in whose aims such a general principle lies' (Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, pp. 44-45, transl. p. 39). 156. This is at least what Solov'ev stated with respect to Peter the Great ('Vizantizm i Rossija', p. 578). 157. For a discussion of the problem of internal and external purposiveness with respect to the cunning or Reason in Hegel, see McCarney 2000, p. 129. 158. Istorija Rossii s drevnejsikh vremen (1st publ. 1851-1879). Edition used: Socinenija v vosemnadcati knigakh (Moskva: Mysl', 1988-1996). 159. Sergej Solov'ev developed his philosophy of history in his historical works as well as in essays such as 'Istoriceskie pis'ma' (1958), 'Progress i religija' [1868], 'Nabljudenija nad istoriceskoj zizn'ju narodov' (1868-1876), in: S. Solov'ev 1988-1996 16, pp. 353-404, 673- 92, and 17, pp. 215-238. Solov'ev did confess his father's influence in the field of Christian faith and ethics, as we have seen in chap. II, n. 55]. Even so significantly, he rendered a significant homage to Sergej Solov'ev by dedicating to him his comprehensive work of ethics Opravdanie dobra. 160. Luk'janov 1990 1, p. 147. History professor Vladimir Ger'e was indulgent with Solov'ev and at his final exams did not demand a special knowledge of history, since 'I knew that even as a gymnasium student he had read all the volumes of his father's history that had been published up till then, and he had a phenomenal memory. (Ibid.: quoted in S. Solovov 2000 1. p. 59). 161. Sternkopf emphasised the distance between father and son (Sternkopf 1973. p. 4). 162. Ol’ga Kazak, Teoretiko-metodologiceskie osnovanija koncepcii russkoj istorii S.M. Solov’eva (PhD thesis Moskva: Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 1987). Ana Siljak, ‘Christianity, Science, and Progress in Sergei M. Solov’ev’s History of Russia’, in: Thomas Sanders (ed.), Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State (Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 215-238. Both include a comprehensive bibliography on the Russian and Soviet reception of Sergej Solov’ev’s philosophical views on history. Sergej Solov’ev as a philosopher of history, and especially his concept of progress, was the object of my article, ‘Russische en westerse geschiedfilosofie: voorwaarden voor een vergelijking’, Wijsgerig Perspectief 1999-2000, 4, pp. 110-115. 163. Quoted in Kazak 1987, p. 55. Cf. also: 'We do not have the right to invent special laws of development of the peoples, except the well-known laws of development of an individual human being and of all that is organic' ('Nahljudenia nad istoriceskoj zizn'ju narodov', p. 107). For an excellent analysis of the understanding of the history of the Russian nation within a universal process, and the complexity of such an approach that sought to explain 'how laws of historical development that were in principle universal and uniform could operate to produce such different results in different societies' and 'why Russia was and why it was not European', see Mark Bassin, 'Turner, Solov'ev, and the "Frontier Hypothesis": The Nationalist Significance of Open Spaces', Journal of Modern History 65 (1993), 3, pp. 473-511, esp. pp. 481-484, 490-503, 508-509, quotation p. 490. 164. See in particular 'Nahljudenija nad istoriceskoj zizn'ju narodov'. 165. See subsection 2a) about Solov'ev combining the organic and the dialectic concept of development. 166. 'Po povodu poslednikh sobytij', SS. 10, pp. 222-228: p. 223. This shows that Sergej Solov'ev in this statement used a variant of the organicistic metaphor, namely the analogy of humanity with a human being. 167. The tentative translation of the term druzina by 'militia' was proposed in Siljak 1999, p. 224. 168. Like his son, Solov'ev's father did not make a sharp distinction between nation and people, and commonly used the Russian term narod to refer to people and/or nation. Both valued nationality [narodnost'] positively. It would he plausible to ascribe this to an influence of Sergej Solov'ev. However, there is documentary evidence that Solov'ev specifically discussed Samarin's view on narodnost' [see case study IV 'The Polish Question']. I therefore agree with Sternkopf that Solov'ev picked up the positive valuation of nationality from certain Slavophiles (Sternkopf 1973, pp. 399-403). 169. Opravdanie dobra, p. 366. 170. Sternkopf 1973. p. 265. Solov'ev's references differed from his father's, however. Whereas the model of China inspired the historian, the philosopher rather referred to the world monarchies or universal monarchies, which were alluded to in the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament. This book tells about a king who dreams about four monarchies, symbolised by a statue made up of four different materials. Solov'ev followed the tradition of interpreting these (see Pomian 1984, p. 106) by identifying them as the Assyrio- Babylonian, the Median-Persian, the Macedonian-Hellenic, and the Roman Empire. See also Solov'ev's entry 'Vsemirnaja monarkhija', op. cit. 171. Sternkopf 1973, pp. 261-2. 172. Ibid., p. 285. 173. 'The [s]tate, as the authentic historical embodiment of human solidarity, is the practical condition of humanity's universal concern, that is, the realisation of Good in the world' ('Znacenie gosudarstva', S. 1989, 2. pp. 549-561: p. 555. English translation in Wozniuk 2000. 'The Significance of the State', pp. 45-64: p. 59). In this article, devoted to the history of the conception of state, Solov'ev criticised all models of the state in Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Western society. 174. Opravdanie dobra, p. 263. 175. In the state, morality has evolved and manifests itself as patriotism and civic virtue, which are one stage higher than morality in family and clan life. It has also evolved in the sense of the appearance of a collective morality, which affects all people [Opravdanie dobra pp. 286-288. transl. p. 204-207]. 176. See 'Vzgljad na istoriju ustanovlenija gosudarstvennogo porjadka v Rossii do Petra Velikogo' (S. Solov'ev 1988-1996 16, pp. 5-420). 177. Siljak 1999, p. 227. 178. See Opravdanie dobra, and articles, primarily 'Znacenic gosudarstva', op. cit. 179. Opravdanie dobra, p. 461. transl. p. 383. 180. Ibid. 181. Ibid., pp. 460-461. 182. Ibid., p. 338. 183. It would be interesting to know which authors, thinkers, people Solov'ev had in mind when he referred to the moral preach: liberal thinkers like his father, Slavophiles committed in the liberation of the serfs? Anyway the state is the main force at stake precisely because it is inspired by views that come from educated society. 184. Sternkopf 1973, p. 298. See for instance Opravdanie dobra, p. 365-366. 185. See for instance Opravdanie dobra, pp. 295-296. 186. Most probably, the historian picked up the category from Hegel via his professor at University, Timofej Granovskij. See Planty-Bonjour 1974, p. 13, 21-32, 250. See also Dmitrij Tschizewskij, Hegel bei den Slaven (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 1961), 'Hegel in Russland'. pp. 145-396: on Granovskij, see pp. 229-236. On the influence of Hegel on the state school, see A.N. Medusevskij, 'Gegel' i gosudarstvennaja skola russkoj istoriografii', in: coll., Rossija i Germanija: Opyt filosofskogo dialoga (Moskva: Medium, 1993), pp. 146-174. 187. Sergej Solov'ev, 'Publicnye ctenija o Petre Velikom', S. Solov'ev 1988-1996 18, pp. 8-11. 188. Sternkopf 1973, p. 440. Unfortunately, Sternkopf does not further specify this borrowing. 189. Compare Sergej Solov'ev, 'Publicnye etenija o Petre Velikom' (pp. 5-152), with Vladimir Solov'ev, 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo', pp. 414-433. 190. See 'Vizantizm i Rossija', esp. pp. 581-586. 191. Compare Sergej Solov'ev, 'Istorija Rossii s drevnejsikh vremen (Fragment)', in: D.K. Burlaka, A.A. Kara-Murza, K.E. Nemuzilov, L.V. Poljakov, R.V. Svetlov (eds.), Petr Velikij: Pro et Contra (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd. Russkogo Khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 2001), pp. 165-178, esp. p. 165: Vladimir Solov'ev, "Neskol'ko slo v zascitu Petra Velikogo', p. 414. 192. This specific interest in religious and ethical questions appears from the title of a short essay, Religiozno-nravstvennoe sostojanie russkogo obscestva pred reformoj Petra Velikogo (n,p., 1877), signed 'VI. Solov'ev.' Despite the thematic similarity, we cannot, however, conclude that it was the philosopher who wrote this essay. There arc striking differences which suggest that a homonym author wrote this essay, such as an extensive use of references, the detailed anthropological treatment of ethics in domestic life, as well as a reference to another work of the same author (p. 10) which so far nobody has ascribed to Vladimir Sergeevic Solov'ev ('Ostatki jazyceskikh verovanij", Strannik 1877, 9). 193. Sternkopf 1973, p. 262. 194. As Scetinina points out, Solov'ev was the most significant critic of positivism in Russian idealist philosophy. However, Mikhajlovskij reproached him for not making a distinction between positivism and materialism (Scetinina 1995. p. 232). 195. Krizis zapadnoj filosofii (protiv positivistov) (PSS. I. pp. 38-138: 'Prilozenie: teorija Ogjusta Konta o trekh fazisakh v umstvennom razvitii celovecestva' (Ibid., pp. 139-152): 'Kont (SS. 10. pp. 380-409); 'Ideja celovecestva u Avgusta Konta' (SS. 9. pp. 172-193: p. 172). 196. The role of Comte in shaping Russian positivism was downplayed by Soviet historians of Russian philosophy. The publication of the collection Ogjust Kont: vazljad iz Rossii (K.Kh. Delokarpov and H.M. Sakhmatov (eds.) (Moskva: Izd. RAGS. 2000) successfully changed this situation. For an outline of the history of Comte's reception in Russia, see B.M. Sakhmatov. 'O, Kont i russkaja mysl", in: Ogjust Kont: vazljad iz Rossii pp. 50-67. That Solov'ev is considered a key figure is apparent from the fact that the author not only points to Solov'ev as the main initiator of the second period in the reception of Comte, but also quotes Solov'ev in expressing his own opinion of Comte (Ibid., p. 63). 197. Nobody saw this influence, except Florovsky (mentioned in David 1960, p. 30). However, Solov'ev scholars did not fail to notice the evolution of Solov'ev's views on Comte towards a more positive valuation. For Losev 'in the whole history of philosophy, Solov'ev was the only idealist who found highly valuable ideas in the founder of European positivism himself' (Losev 2000, p.176). 198. David 1960, pp. 29-81. 199. S.B. Rocinskij. 'VI. Solov'ev i O. Kont: Cerez kritiku -- k konvergencii', (1st publ. in Rocinskij 1999). in: Ogjust Kont: vazljad iz Rossii , pp. 67-89. Rocinskij recontextualises Solov'ev's interventions on Comte in the movement of protest against positivism which arose in the late 1860s, under the guidance of scholars with whom Solov'ev was in contact, such as his professor Pavel Jurkevic, but also Viktor Kudrjavcev-Platonov and Nikolaj Strakhov. 200. David 1960, p. 31. 201. The idea of the three stages was expressed in his works from 1822 onwards, and then permanently reworked, for instance in his Cours de philosophie positive (1830-1842), Discours sur l'esprit positif (1844), and Systeme de politique positive (1851-1854). See Comte, Discours sur l'esprit positif (Paris: Vrin 1995). p. 41, n. l. 202. Discours sur l'esprit positif, pp. 30 n: 203. For a philosophical account of Solov'ev's criticism of Comte's law of the three stages, see Tatjana J. Kochetkova, Vladimir Solov'jov 's Theory of Divine Humanity (Kiev: Blago, 2001). pp. 13-17. 204. For instance, Solov'ev criticised Comte's view of fetishism as the first period of the theological stage. According to him, religion originated rather in the image of the parents. On this point he rather agreed with Spencer, according to whom religion derives from the cult of ancestors (Opravdanie dobra, p. 176). 205. For instance, when Comte characterised theology as the stage where 'all our speculations spontaneously manifest a characteristic predilection for the less solvable questions, the subjects which are the most radically inaccessible to any definitive investigation' (Discours sur l'esprit positif, p. 43). 206. See for instance Comte's characterization of metaphysics as ontology (Discours sur l'esprit positif, p. 57). 207. Krizis zapadnoj filosofii, p. 72. 208. Discours sur l'esprit positif, pp. 41. 42 (n. 1). 209. Hereby Solov'ev referred to the religion of humanity professed by Comte in his later years. 210. ‘Kont', pp. 399-400. Hereby Solov'ev referred to religious philosophy not only in his own country, and to which he brought a central contribution, but also to French fideism and Christian rationalism (for instance Philippe Buchez) that flourished under the persisting influence of de Bonald and Lamennais. 211. See for instance Discours sur l'esprit positif, pp. 62-63. 212. 'Kont', p. 400. 213. David 1960, p. 57ff. 214. The account below is drawn from David, who has convincingly shown this point (David 1960, pp. 62-(11). 215. In any case, his scheme does not display much originality. Further information on the possible influence of Hegel on Comte or conversely, and that of Comte on Sergej Solov'ev, who was after all as a historian much influenced by positivism, would help shed light on this matter. 216. This point was obviously overlooked by David. 217. 'Kitaj i Evropa', p. 147. 218. Discours sur l'esprit positif, p. 150. 219. Ibid., p. 149, n.2. 220. There also is a sophiological aspect of Solov'ev's views on humanity that bring him close to Comte's concept of Grand Etre [see chap. IV 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History']. 221. This is also the opinion of Rocinskij 2000, p. 86. It is piquant to read how, in a letter to the encyclopaedia editor Arsen'ev, Solov'ev defended himself against his 'preference' for Comte's second system, which had a far more religious tenor and in which the concept of humanity was fundamental (see Pis 'ma (12. p. 94). 222. Family and fatherland, 'being consistent preparations to humanity, must not be understood as its real elements or components, for humanity is an indivisible being' ('Ideja celovecestva u Avgusta Konta', p. 185). 223. Ibid., p. 180. 224. Ibid., p. 181. Despite the quotation marks, Solov'ev appears to have modified Comte's text. The German critical edition mentions several omissions, additions and distortions of Comte's text by Solov'ev. 225. In the dictionary Russkaja filosofija, the Russian scholar Piama Gajdenko hastily concluded that Solov'ev had borrowed the concept of humanity from Comte. Rocinskij convincingly argues against this thesis that Solov'ev's views rather came to a 'coincidence, a convergence' (Rocinskij 2000, pp. 85-86, n. 34).
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