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HISTORY, SOPHIA AND THE RUSSIAN NATION |
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Part One: Theoretical Framework I. Theology of History and Philosophy of History: Two Heuristic Models The understanding of history in Western thought has been the object of steady interest and numerous studies over the past decades. These can be ranged under the category 'theory of history', understood in the broad sense of 'a reflection upon, and the interpretation of, historical consciousness and its various manifestations.' [1] Within theory of history, a distinction is commonly made between 'critical philosophy of history' and 'speculative philosophy of history.' The former is defined as 'philosophy of history in the sense of an analysis of the concepts and assumptions of historical knowledge and inquiry', and has largely dominated English speaking scholarship since the 1960s. The latter type is defined as 'an inquiry not into the arguments and procedures of historians, but into the nature of the historical process itself. [2] The present study deals with the second category. Scholarly research on speculative philosophy of history can be divided into three main groups. First, theoreticians of history and historians of ideas have shown a revived interest in the topic of history in many thinkers, including philosophers. [3] Secondly, theologians, especially in the German-speaking world, have analysed conceptions of history with a focus on the problematic relationship of history with eschatology, and with revealed truth as conceived by the Christian tradition, as well as on the relationship between theology and other fields of humanities. [4] Thirdly, mainly English speaking scholars have conducted epistemological analyses that greatly contribute to critical philosophy of history. [5] From this angle, the common ground shared by speculative and critical philosophy of history is explored. This common ground involves the procedures and categories relevant for knowledge about history, as well as self-reflection by the philosopher or the historian about his own time and about the historical condition. [6] From this body of literature, it appears that the terms 'philosophy of history' and 'theology of history' are widely used, but rarely defined. I understand them as registers, by which I mean different sets of ideas that are thematically closely connected and form a specific perspective, yet without being presented as homogenous wholes in the text. Rather, the term 'register', which is borrowed from musicology, suggests that these elements are distinguishable in various places and in a diffuse way throughout the text. [7] Many theories exist, but there is no consensus about the period in which philosophy of history and theology of history were formulated. According to some, philosophy of history ranged from the first centuries AD to our time (from Augustine to Fukuyama), while others restrict it to the period from the 18th to the 20th century (from Vico to Toynbee), or even more limitedly, to the period from the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century (from Herder to Hegel). [8] The same question applies to theology of history. Did this register disappear after Bossuet, or is it still an object of elaboration up to the 20th century? [9] The answer to these questions depends on the different criteria employed to define both registers. Equally decisive are the relationships that one can trace between them. Is philosophy of history merely a secularised version of the Christian theology of history, as Karl Lowith has contended? [10] Or are the relationships between theology of history and philosophy of history more complex than a break within a continuum? [11] The attempt made below at a definition of the two registers will lead to a positioning with respect to Lowith. b) Preliminary characterisation 'Theology of history' [TH] and 'philosophy of history' [PH] are used in this study as heuristic categories for two major reasons, First, TH and PH do not exist as discrete entities in either the Western or the Russian intellectual traditions. Speculative views on history in Western and Russian thought are infinitely more complex than these registers, Secondly, one can find them combined within one and the same author or even text. These orientations can therefore not be represented by authors, but only by aspects of thought of a particular author. More generally, due to the range of vision that speculative conceptions of history demand, they often contain and combine several types of argumentation and patterns, [12] This also applies to the combination of TH and PH. [13] Moreover, an author may use theological elements in his view on history -- yet that is not enough to make the latter a TH. In order to illustrate the basic principles at work in these registers, I have chosen two guiding models. TH is modelled mainly on the scheme offered by Augustine, whereas PH is based on the central contribution made by Hegel. It is commonly assumed that these authors have made crucial contributions to precisely what I wish to call theology of history and philosophy of history respectively. Both authors had the ability to systematically formulate key points that were current in their own time, and hereby to exert a decisive influence on the history of thought. So, without reducing Augustine's or Hegel's positions to these broad lines, one finds in their work a basis for a definition of the two registers. Two preliminary characterisations of TH and PH with respect to their general structure and scope are illuminating. Firstly, like all speculative narratives of history, both suppose a two-level scheme. This scheme consists of an inferior level, namely the historical world in which humans live, and an upper level, which provides the ultimate reference, framework and norm with respect to which history and human deeds are measured. The relationships between these two levels differ in the theological and the philosophical register of history. Secondly, TH and PH are 'chronosophies', in the way Krzysztof Pomian defined this term. [14] Chronosophies aim at an exhaustive knowledge of history. In this respect, their object is history understood as the past, present, and future. [15] It is also in this sense that I use the term 'history' in this study. In order to achieve their goal, chronosophies organise 'the relationships between past, present and future', and especially 'between the distant past and the distant future' through 'questioning the future' in its 'broad outline.' [16] It also involves ascribing to history a scheme, either linear or cyclic, and characterising a globally ascending or descending direction. [17] Apart from the conception of time emphasised by Pomian, there are other organising principles that permit an understanding of history: the reference framework, the underlying periodisation, the criteria and the method, and finally the actors. These operations can be considered as constitutive of the organising level, and are analysed below separately for each register. The construction of history sketched by Augustine of Hippo is a relevant model for understanding the framework of thought of TH, if only for the historical reason that this model factually dominated the whole Catholic conception of history down to the late Middle Ages. [18] His major work The City of God can be considered the elaboration par excellence, though in a rudimentary way, of a Christian theology of history. [19] In this respect, I assume the relevance of Augustine for Orthodox thought as well. Even though, for the Orthodox tradition, Augustine was only a 'beatified church teacher', not a 'holy church father', and even though the Orthodox Church has been reluctant to acknowledge him fully, which is mainly related to developments well after his death, Augustine is considered a founding father of Christianity as a whole. [20] He developed his thought around 400 AD, nearly 700 years before the definitive schism between the Western and the Eastern Church (1054), and thus his work goes beyond the later divergence between them. Besides, the difference between the Catholic and an Orthodox theology of history is often most difficult to discern since research on this topic is completely underdeveloped. [21] Nevertheless, whenever I deal with issues regarding which there are fundamental differences between the Catholic and the Orthodox tradition, I aim to point these out with the greatest accuracy possible. A theology of history can be defined as a universal, all-encompassing history of a speculative character, dominated by the question 'Why did God create history?' I focus on the question as formulated in the Christian tradition, in which the god in question is the Christian god, and is written with a capital [God]. Emphasis is placed on God, on his transcendence, on his being the main and ultimate actor of history, and on his relationships with the collective of Christians as the channel through which his plan, Providence, is realised. [22] However, it is the absolute transcendence of God and the subsequent ontological distance between him and the world which, most of all, form the characteristic feature of TH and distinguish it from PH. History as a whole is structured as a linear and finite course in the interval between two divine acts, that of Creation and that of Redemption and the Last Judgment. The result of divine decree signifying the end of history, the Last Judgment following Redemption, leads to paradise for some, to hell for the others. The theological model of history elaborated by Augustine is determined by the ontological distinction between, on the one hand, the immanent level of the temporary, mutable, and incomplete human world, and, on the other, the transcendent level of God, who rests in eternity, immutability and plenitude. [23] This dichotomy is articulated in Augustine's metaphor of the two Realms or Cities [civitates], the Earthly City and the Heavenly City. Only the Earthly City is subject to change, which is seen as a negative characteristic, as instability, fragility and imperfection. This is opposed to the perfection of the Heavenly City or City of God. [24] The secular world as such and profane history do not have an immediate meaning, whereas the religious world of the Christian church occupies the foreground. More fundamentally, the emphasis does not lie on history as such but on the transcendent and thus extra-historical foundations of history, namely on its cause and goal in eternity. [25] c) Periodisation and conception of time The distinction between the divine realm and the human realm does not mean that there is no connection between God and his creation. On the contrary -- and this is the etymological meaning of 're-ligion', i.e. 'putting together again' -- , the relationship between God and the world is central to TH. At the present time, the divine and the human levels do not coincide. They did, albeit in quite different ways, in the beginning before the Fall, then in the person of Jesus Christ, and they will merge anew when history ends, that is, at the coming of the Kingdom of God. Between these two points in time, man has the choice of working at his salvation or of rejecting it. Augustine made a distinction between six main periods, using the image of the six days of creation. He drew an analogy between history and the life of an individual from infancy to old age. This allowed the conception of the sixth period as that of an old man, out of which a new man would be born. The sixth period began with Jesus Christ and would last until his Second Coming at the end of time, after which the seventh period would come, freeing man from the condition of the flesh and giving him access to eternity. [26] Significantly, emphasis lies on the goal which transcends history, namely the promised return of the Messiah. In the Christian tradition as a whole, salvation is not found in the domain in which the believer lives, but in one that is qualitatively different. In fact, the eschatological expectations are expectations of a happening coming from an entity other than man, namely from God, and God alone. History will be resolved through an intervention from outside history. This crucial point distinguishes TH from the teaching of Joachim of Fiore, according to whom the City of God can be realised in the third and last stage of history, on earth, by man. [27] In contrast, Augustine poses the central statement that the City of God cannot be realised within history, but that it is only an image, an ideal. [28] Of course, this ideal must be aimed for, and it is the task of the individual and of the community to organise these efforts towards the quantitative goal of gathering all believers, and towards the qualitative goal of a growing fulfilment of the Second Coming of Christ. In this sense, TH contains a concept of progress, but the difference with the modern understanding of it is that in TH progress is a trans-historical principle. [29] Indeed, the ultimate end is decided and accomplished by the transcendent divine instance. The distinction between two realms is supported by the attribution of different characteristics to time. God is not affected by time -- nor can he be, as he himself would then be affected by his own creation -- and rests in eternity. By opposition, human history is subject to change. [30] The aforementioned periodisation has implications for the perception of past, present, and future. [31] The perception of the past is dominated by the figure of Christ, whose life and death is commemorated in the liturgy. In this sense TH is Christocentric. The present is a decisive moment of choice in favour of God in the act of faith professed by Christians during the liturgy and prayer. The Orthodox liturgy in particular emphasises the 'practical and experiential' aspect of the spiritual experience during the liturgy. [32] A 'mystical representation of Christ' occurs during prayer and in the contemplation of the icon, which offers a 'visual theology.' [33] In those moments, the Second Coming of Christ is anticipated liturgically as well as in the spiritual experience of man, which is situated in the 'now' perceived in its immediacy. [34] It is the dimension of the future that is of central concern however, since salvation is at stake. This view of the future is eschatological in the sense that it refers to a set of views that has been revealed by God about the last events of history [from the Greek eskhaton]. A properly apocalyptic eschatology is more specific and refers to the belief that these last events are to some extent imminent. [35] Apocalyptic eschatology, of which Augustine is a prominent example, contains a mainly catastrophic, deterministic, and dualistic view of history. [36] It is catastrophic in the sense that it refers to radical events that are violent, cruel and punishing. It is deterministic because the future is already established. Finally, it is dualistic because the absolute god and absolute evil are depicted in the sense that there is no grey or neutral zone, no ambiguity. [37] Apocalyptic eschatology is perhaps more current in Orthodox Russia than in Catholic Western Europe. [38] This perception of the imminent coming of the end of history and the subsequent search for signs in this time is not necessarily more pessimistic than others, however, to the extent that each new experience, seen as a new catastrophe, brings the world closer to Jesus' Second Coming. [39]
History as a whole is viewed as a battle between two forces, good and evil. These function as the dichotomous criteria of interpretation of history in TH. Their definition draws from the corpus of values promoted in the New Testament, which identifies good with love, solidarity, justice, humility and peace, and evil with hate, selfishness, injustice, vanity and cupidity, violence and war. From this perspective, TH presents history with a Janus' head, one face smiling and turned towards the good and life, the other towards evil, destruction, and death. [40] Correspondingly, in this register history consists not only of the history of salvation, but also of the history of God's judgement of human deeds. These are interpreted along a line leading from original sin to reward or punishment. The objective of TH is to know history as God wanted it. This involves a rational knowledge, attained primarily by religious history and church history, of the whole temporal trajectory of human beings. Elements of this trajectory are revealed in the Old and the New Testaments, which form the primary sources for the speculation of the theologian of history. He also investigates the history of the church, which in the Catholic and Orthodox tradition is the primary channel between God and human beings. Religious history and church history are the fields in which theological beliefs sustain the identification of historical facts, and, facts are expected to be the proof of theories. [41] However, it is impossible for man to fully unravel God's plan of history. Since the moment when Adam was punished for this desire to taste the apple of knowledge, man can no longer know or understand everything. The limitation of knowledge is thus inherent to the human condition. This weakness can be partly compensated by allowing faith to relay reason. The problem for TH is then to determine and justify when the one has to be relayed by the other, as well as to distinguish between the object of revelation and that which can be discovered rationally. [42] Still, the ultimate meaning of history is given by an act of faith in the existence of God and in Providence. This leads to an examination of how agency is distributed among the actors that intervene in the plan that God has conceived for humanity. TH poses God as the main actor of history, who determines it and contains the true meaning of history. [43] The key component is 'the belief that God is able to accomplish what God wills to accomplish in earthly affairs, either indirectly through the contingencies of nature and human purposes or, when necessary, by exercising a direct causality.' [44] God's means of direct intervention can be summed up as follows: 'God exerts causality in world affairs by means of specific and decisive interventions, including not only global historical events but also specific theophanies, miracles, acts of inspiration and punishment and rewards of individuals.' [45] The reigning conviction is that man cannot substantially modify the world -- that this can only be achieved by God by his intervention through Providence. This justifies the distinction made at this point between actor and agent of history. Roughly speaking, man and his world are only agents of history, whilst the decisive influence upon it remains in the power of God alone, the only actor of history. This power is embodied in or represented by the church and by select individuals. The church is the Body of Christ, the Christian community as a whole, which is defined by religious criteria. Since one of the commandments given by Jesus Christ was to enlarge this entity and convert pagan peoples, the contours of this community are not fixed, but should be increasingly expanded. [46] More specifically, the church refers to the clerical institution. [47] There are two central aspects. Firstly, the church has a privileged relationship towards revelation. Christianity did indeed apply 'the notion of revelation to cover not only doctrines and rituals, its laws and its ethics, but also the institutional expression of these ideas in the Church.' [48] Between the divine and the human realms, the church is the main channel through which revelation is given, interpreted, and its content realised. Secondly, the church borrows its authority from the principle of the 'divine origin of authority.' Priests are 'the vicars of God on earth' and their authority as 'guardians and dispensers of spiritual values' is superior to that of temporal sovereigns. [49] Generally speaking, the church is the agent of God par excellence, and by functioning as the intermediary between God and the world, it defines, organises, and controls the activities of the Christian community down to Redemption. In this respect, major events in church history gain central significance, especially the councils, in which the church theoretically specified the message of Jesus Christ in the form of dogma. [50] Individual agents in history are elected by God himself. TH favours people acting within the church, such as bishops or popes, and those acknowledged as having shown a high degree of Christian perfection during their own life, such as saints. The Russian Orthodox Church is more enthusiastic than the Catholic Church in welcoming contemporary figures. The Orthodox tradition holds that some 'spiritual fathers' [starcy] and 'fools in Christ' [jurodivye] are invested with this power to the extent that they carry a prophetic element by virtue of their vision of destiny, not only of the individual, but also of the nation as a whole. A famous example is the case of Saint Seraphim of Sarov. [51] Next to members of the spiritual community, the king, as political head of the country, also possesses a privileged status, confirmed by the church, as monarch of divine right. Constantine the Great (270/80- 337) was the first king to proclaim the Roman empire a Christian monarchy of divine right. This tradition was adopted in Western Europe from the coronation of Charles the Great by the Roman Church, which sealed the legitimacy of the Christian Roman Empire. In Russia, this tradition prevailed until the abolition of tsarist monarchy in 1917. [52] Summarising, the theological register of history emphasises the ontological distinction between God in his absolute transcendence and the historical human being. As a result, man can only partly understand God's ways in history with his reason; otherwise he has to rely on faith. As God decided the beginning, he will decide the end of history, while the church and religious leaders are the main agents through which the meta- historical content of the Christian message is realised. The latter also contains a strict dualism between good and evil, which allows a consistent valuation of historical deeds. There is common agreement on the statement that philosophy of history appeared in various forms during the second half of the eighteenth century. [53] These served as basis for the development of what Hegel conceptualised as philosophy of history. Although Hegel did try to preserve the characteristic feature of TH, namely God's transcendence and agency, his contribution was decisive in providing history with an immanent meaning. In Russia his views on history were enthusiastically welcomed, and he enjoyed there a much more enduring influence than in Western Europe, which makes him a highly relevant author to address with respect to philosophy of history in Russia. Globally speaking, this register was bound to dominate the entire 19th century and is still present in speculative views on history. [54] A philosophy of history can be defined as a universal, all-encompassing history of speculative character, as part of an all-encompassing philosophical system, dominated by the question 'What is the ratio of world history?' History is considered an immanent and rational process achieved by immanent forces, namely humanity, nations and individuals. In contrast with TH, where the primacy is ascribed to God, in PH it is ascribed to this world. In two main respects, the framework underlying philosophy of history can be sketched in opposition to TH. 1) The fundamental premise of PH is not a radical separation between the level of God and that of the world as in TH, but an independent value of the immanent world. 2) The main focus lies on the immanent level. This does not mean that the transcendent level has completely disappeared from the picture, but that it is to a varying extent assimilated in the immanent level. Consequently, history forms a unity covering the whole destiny of man and the world, that is, in the substantial continuity of a process made by man alone and occurring in the world alone. c) Periodisation and conception of time i) Periodisation This framework has significant implications for the periodisation offered in PH. Hegel identifies the true beginning of history with the appearance of a developed form of organisation of people, that is, the emergence of the state. People incarnating universal principles succeeded each other, forming four main realms, the Eastern, Greek, Roman, and German realms. [55] Characteristically, this line runs from East to West and reaches a pinnacle in Western Europe. Fundamentally based on faith in the ability of man to shape history, the idea predominates that the goal of this process is attainable through human deed. Henceforth, why should this ability be limited in scope and in time? The boundaries of history are not clearly defined, even though the last period of history, within which the ideal is bound to be realised, is imminent. ii) Conception of time Time is perceived as a rectilinear, cumulative, irreversible, mostly ascending pattern. [56] Attention is focused on the recent period -- a couple of centuries or decades -- and the present time is systematically thematised as a culminant moment in the whole historical process. The relationship between the remote past and the present consists of one fundamental break or a series of breaks, on the basis of which the present is invested with the quality of introducing novelty. This novelty is understood as an improvement with respect to the former period. [57] This break also allows the future to be seen as a dimension of opening, as the dimension in which the positive changes now already present will be realised. The absence of treatment of the future in Hegel is a notable, but not accidental, exception in the history of philosophy of history. But, generally speaking, projection of the future takes place in conjunction with a retrospective of the past and with a characterisation of the present. It is the difficulty of PH to try and combine the conception of continuity of history as a whole, with that of a break that allows the present to be considered as novelty. [58] i) Criteria PH's chief criterion is progress as an immanent and purely historical force and in its many forms. [59] It was Hegel's merit that he articulated several meanings of progress, namely: progress as determining the historical course, as characterising history itself, as determining knowledge, and as a category of action. [60] In other terms, progress in PH is opposed to the conception of progress found in TH in three main respects. Firstly, in PH progress concerns the course of history, which is immanent, whereas in TH progress characterises a working towards a meta-historical goal, i.e. being part of God's eternity, or in other words, striving to supersede history. Secondly, in PH progress is unlimited in scope, whereas in TH progress does not determine the outcome of history. [61] Thirdly, it does not apply exclusively to the religious domain, but also, and often even exclusively, to the social and political domain, namely in those cases where religion itself is superseded (Marx, Comte). Progress and perfectibility apply to the secular world as a whole. ii) Method The meaning of history is found immanently, within history. This statement dictates the method allowing the construction of the register of PH, namely rational investigation, more precisely speculative reflection and empirical observation. Through speculation, the philosopher obtains a definition of what forms the essence of the historical progress. In its turn, this definition allows him to make a selection from all the empirical facts that he wants to take into account. In comparison with TH, these are extended. [62] Further, a rational investigation of history leans upon specific arguments of causality, expressed in historical laws, the most common of which is the law of development. This approach to history can be partly explained by the attempt made from the 18th century onwards to apply procedures of natural science to history. These 'laws of history' are the result of a combination of speculation and empirical observation. PH has the ambition to bring the meaning of history into the level of immanence, that is, to restrict it to the human level, and, within this level, to extend the meaning of history to human activities within society as a whole. This implies a change of method in PH with respect to TH, notably attention to empirical observation. However, the transcendent level of history often does not disappear in PH, but is only assimilated into the immanent level. The problem of the relationship to transcendence remains central in PH. In order to realise its explicit ambition of yielding a knowledge that is more reliable than TH, PH indeed has to justify its statements regarding transcendence, if its existence is to be admitted, and the future, by means of speculative reason alone, without relying on faith. [63] Historical laws are the main tools for that purpose. But, in their turn, in order to function as such, they have to be universal. This is why rational discourse on history needs the concept of universality, which warrants the homogeneity of progress in time and space. Like the criteria and method, the choice of actors that play a determining role in the narrative produced by PH is the result of developments in the conception of human society in the 18th century. The meaning of history is no longer immanent only to some privileged individuals, but also to the collective individual. As for the only legitimate actor in TH, God, he can again be found in PH but is brought closer to the immanent world. Hegel defines God as the Spirit that incarnates itself in humanity in the following way: while keeping a substantial identity, it changes by going through successive stages corresponding to periods of human history toward a full manifestation of all his potency. [64] More importantly perhaps than the definition of God, the characteristic mark of PH is its focus, that is, not on this absolute principle made immanent, but on other actors, namely humanity, nations, and individuals. Humanity as a collective, total and autonomous entity is the primary actor in history. [65] In PH humanity is understood as the 'model of free and rational [vernunftig] self- understanding, and a free and rational community of men.' [66] On the whole, the confessional and religious differences are sublated, as are differences regarding the political regime, which are identified as merely historically contingent constructions. Generally based on natural law, the conviction is that all human beings are equal. History is sensed as world history, which gradually educates people to be world citizens. This conceptual unity of humanity is not reached at the cost of all specific developments. It is the great achievement of PH, especially of Hegel, to have thought of history as a process involving humanity as a whole while at the same time paying attention to the specific development of each national state or people considered historical. [67] In order to try and combine diversity within the unity of humanity, a new conception of the nation was used. The emphasis on the role of nations can be considered as a characteristic feature of PH. The nation, which can be globally understood as a 'large aggregate of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory', is thought of as a reality capable of uniting the citizens of a political entity in already existing states as well as in movements fighting for national independence. [68] In PH the theological premise of the elected character of one people has underwent two major transformations. Firstly, it is not God, but the philosopher who selects and elects so-called 'historical nations' or 'world-historical peoples.' [69] Secondly, the philosopher no longer attributes the elected status to one and the same people throughout history as in the Old Testament, but distributes it to many peoples successively. [70] In Hegel's terminology, the world-historical people [welthistorisches Volk] maintains its specific character and receives the status of the bearer of the world Spirit [Weltgeist]. [71] Each historical nation has a mission to fulfil, as opposed to non-historical nations, which do not contribute to universal progress. The category of progress therefore functions as a factor of division of humanity between developed, enlightened peoples, and less developed peoples. [72] Even the plurality of the elected nations is not a plurality of equals. As history is progressive, the nation that is elected now accomplishes a mission of a higher kind than the preceding one. [73] On the whole, he succeeded in combining a smaller cyclical pattern for the rise and fall of historical nations, within the global rectilinear, ascending pattern of progress. [74] The global movement of history can thus be outlined as an ascending spiral. Within the nation, individuals can play a historical role. The most famous examples of the role of individuals in history are the Hegelian 'great persons', political leaders who are bearers of the Volksgeist and elevate their nation to a higher level of development and whose influence is wider than their own nation. Yet their acting upon history is a cunning of reason [List der Vernunft], since they do not know the meaning of their acts in history. This raises the fundamental problem for PH of the justification of individual freedom within a scheme of history, the meaning and the direction of which is already pre-established in a teleological conception. By introducing the concept of the heterogeneous nature of goals, Hegel tried to answer this problem by emphasising the fact that human activity sometimes leads to unplanned, unwanted results which are thus completely independent from subjective goals or motives. [75] Yet, despite his attempts to preserve the transcendent and supra-individual level of history through the concepts of cunning of reason and heterogeneity of goals respectively, Hegel contributed to an understanding of history in which the human beings are the determining actors. In sum, in the philosophical register history stands central as an immanent, continuous and ascending process realised by human beings. Rationality characterises not only this process but also the method of gaining complete knowledge of history. [76] The main criterion of valuation is progress, which humanity, nations and great people are able to realise and implement in the world. There are fundamental differences between TH and PH, but they are sometimes hard to distinguish. The three reasons indicated below for this difficulty at the same time point to the intimate connections between the two. Firstly, our perception of history is very much modelled by views
developed in the 19th century, and especially by the interpretation
made at that time of the Christian conception of history. The latter is
often referred to by the term 'history of salvation' [Heilsgeschichte] Secondly, there is a frequent overlap in the terminology and object of TH and of PH. In fact, one may encounter the same key terms in TH and PH. Especially the conceptions of the goal of history, of progress as its motor, and of humanity as its main actor, need to be sharply distinguished. As I have shown, in TH and PH these terms are invested with different meanings. An example of a common object is religious institutions. Still, it is possible to differentiate between the approach to this problem in TH and in Christian PH. PH deals primarily with political and social history, and within this framework might also deal with the church. Indeed, the two levels of history and the absolute may be present in this scheme, but the link between man and God does not form the core of the reflection. In contrast, TH deals primarily with religious history and religious institutions. But the focus is on the relationship God-man, with specific questions concerning the realisation of God's will on earth. Thirdly, TH tends to be assimilated to PH and TH because they are often combined within one author's conception of history. [79] As a matter of fact, a whole range of positions exist that can be situated between TH and PH for their attempts to find a path that combines the chief principle of TH, that is, God's transcendence, with the discovery of the immanent meaning of history which is central to PH. This raises the question whether since Hegel there is any chronosophy that does not combine philosophical and theological motives of history. [80] However, as I have tried to show, the questioning and tools differ in each register. By the primacy given to God in his transcendence, TH fundamentally differs from PH, which ascribes it to this world in its immanence. Finally, I would like to advance a response to Lowith's secularisation thesis. I agree with him that we cannot speak about complete heterogeneity between TH and PH. In many respects, PH tried to offer an all-embracing conception of history and introduce new values such as faith in progress and humanity that would replace the values promoted by TH. In this reaction, PH is heir to the ambitions of TH, and this explains the overlap of interest and terminology, which it remoulded in the new value system of the Enlightenment. However, influences other than biblical eschatology were determinant for TH, such as Greek historiography and philosophy. Similarly, PH was not shaped only by TH, but assimilated ongoing developments from the most varied fields, namely the 17th century scientific conceptions of time, political developments such as the French revolution, mental changes such as the acceptance of 'the wild man' living overseas as part of humanity, to name only a few factors. As I have tried to show, the gap between TH and PH determines the whole approach of history underlying both registers. Aspects such as the framework of reference, the relationship between past, present and future, the criteria, and the actors of history have to be taken into account for a proper distinction of TH and PH. I have highlighted the crucial differences between the two registers through the analysis of these aspects. This makes it possible to avoid the circularity of Lowith's argument, based as it is on a 19th century conception of eschatology for understanding TH, and therefore on a projection of PH categories on TH. The distinction of TH and PH serves as a fruitful key for interpreting Solov'ev's texts on history in the following section. _______________ Notes: 1. Agnes Heller, A Philosophy of History in Fragments (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), p. vi. 2. William Dray, Perspectives on History (London, Boston & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 99 [italics mine]. 3. There are numerous examples. I will mention only two works with a different approach: Reinhart Koselleck's comprehensive article 'Geschichte' in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleek (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 593-717 [abbreviated Koselleck 1975 b], whose examination includes views of philosophers, historians. theologians, writers, etc., from Antiquity up to the 20th century. Another highly valuable work is Bertrand Binoche's analysis of the genesis of philosophy of history in the second half of the eighteenth century in Les trois sources des philosophies de l'histoire (1763-1798) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1994). 4. A recent critical discussion of these works can be found in Schwaiger 2001. See also the bibliography in Walter Jaeschke, Die Suche nach den eschatologischen Wurzeln der Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine historische Kritik der Sakularisierungsthese (Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag. 1976). pp. 332-349. 5. The works of William Dray and William Walsh arc characteristic for this approach. For instance, William Dray has analysed the presuppositions underlying conceptions of history in Hegel. Toynbee, Niebuhr in Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), and in Spengler in Perspectives on History (London et al.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); William Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (1st publ. 1951: New Jersey: Humanities Press. 1967). Quite different is the contribution of Hayden White, who has explored the rhetorical resources of the historical representation in historians (Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, Burckhardt) and in philosophers (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Croce), in Metahistory -- The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973). 6. A recent example of a combination of these two fields of analysis is Paul Ricoeur, La memoire, l'histoire, l'oubli (Paris: Seuil, 2000). The second part is devoted to the epistemology of historical science, whereas the third part deals with a hermeneutical approach to the historical condition. 7. This term does justice to the scattered and partial character of Solov'ev's conception of history, which I gather and classify in my thesis. My definition is inspired by the entry 'Register' in Jeremy Hawthorn, A Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory (London et al.: Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 247-248. 8. While Patrick Gardiner argues in favour of the former position in Theories of History (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959), William Walsh defends the latter position (Walsh 1967, p. 13). 9. These are the positions of Krzysztof Pomian and Wolfhart Pannenberg respectively, in: L 'ordre du temps (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), p. 122; (coll.), entry 'Geschichte/ Geschichtsschreibung/ Geschichtsphilosophie', Theologische Realenzyklopadie, Gerhard Krause and Gerhard Muller (eds.), vols. 1-36 (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977-), vol. 12, pp. 569-698: p. 670. 10. Karl Lowith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949), p. 1. His thesis was expressed within the framework of discussions that were actively led since Dilthey, Troeltsch and Weber had based their understanding of the genesis of Modern times on the term 'secularisation'. There was also a dominant consensus amongst theologians of the most varied currents about the origin of modern philosophy of history in biblical eschatology (Jacschke 1976, p. 14). The term 'secularisation' has become widely used but with a vague meaning. For an account of the discussions on secularisation, see Jaeschke 1976, and the entry 'Sakularisierung' in Theologische Realenzyklopadie 29, pp. 603-634. 11. Lowith's 'secularisation thesis' has been the target of criticism, notably from Hans Blumenberg. who denounced it as historical substantialism. See Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 1966), pp. 9-74. esp. 22-27. 12. This applies to general schemes of history, which often combine linear, cyclic, and chaotic patterns (Dray 1964, p. (2). 13. Hegel's thought is an excellent example for showing that the frontier between PH and TH cannot always be clearly defined. Even though he has been elevated to the rank of philosopher of history par excellence, he is also considered a religious philosopher. See his elaborations on theological problems in his Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, his Philosophie der Religion and Enzyklopadie. For literature on the subject, see for instance, the comprehensive work of Albert Chapelle, Hegel et la religion, 3 vols. (Paris: Editions universitaires. 1964-1971), Michael Theunissen, Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), and Peter Cornehl, Die Zukunft der Versohnung: Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklarung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1971). 14. Pomian 1984, pp. v-ix. 15. On the peculiar case of Hegel, who did not provide any speculation on the future, see subsection 3ii) of this chapter. 16. Pomian 1984. pp. v-vi. 17. Ibid., p. vii. 18. For a thousand years, Augustine's teachings, understood in the general sense of his conceptions of man and God and or the relationships between man and God, were never contested. In a general sense Augustinism became part of the Christian teaching ("Augustin/Augustinismus', Theologische Realenzyklpadie 4. pp. 646-723: p. 699). 19. See also Schwaiger 2001, pp. 70-79. 20. Entry 'Augustine of Hippo', in: Michael Prokurat, Alexander Golitzin, Michael D. Peterson, Historical Dictionary of the Orthodox Church (Lanham, Maryland, & London: Scarecrow Press Inc., 1996), pp. 48-49. 21. The fundamental field of eschatology especially is neglected in Orthodox thought, as Georges Florovsky has complained (Georges Florovsky, 'The Last Things and the Last Events', in Collected Works 3, pp. 243-265). Despite its promising title, a recent publication lacks profound reflection and scholarly accuracy: I.I. Ersova, Pravoslavnaja istoriosofija (Moskva: Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 1993). 22. Most recently, Schwaiger has proposed his own model of the key components of what he calls 'the biblical-Christian thought on history' [das biblich-christliche Geschichtsdenken], namely a creationist start, the link between action and Ergehen or the interaction between the human being and God, Providence shaping the process and periods of history, an eschatological-apocalyptic movement towards the end, and christocentrism (Schwaiger 2001, p. 362). These factors mainly concern the categories of periodisation and the actors. I have tried to understand the inner structure of theology of history by bringing into account other dimensions such as the framework, the conception of time, the criteria and the method. 23. As a matter of fact, within the lower level, nature represents the inferior stage of pure immanence, and human beings the higher one with an immanent component, his body, and a transcendent component, his soul. 24. This opposition between two realms, the one transcendent and eternal, and the other characterised by change as a negative quality, is not solely Christian. It can be found in Jewish thought, and was already central in Parmenidian and Platonist philosophies. 25. Schwaiger 2001, p. 78. 26. Pomian 1984, p. 108. 27. Joachim of Fiore's teaching on the Trinity, including his theory of the kingdom of the Father, or the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (third stage or history), was condemned at the fourth Councilor Lateran (1215). About the influence of Joachim of Fiore on Western thought, see the comprehensive work by Henri de Lubac, La posteriorite spirituelle de Joachim de Flore, 2 vols. (Paris & Namur: Lethielleux, 1981). De Lubac's treatment or Vladimir Solov'ev is examined below [ch. II 'Theology or History in Solov'ev']. 28. Augustine, The City of God (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, et al.: Penguin, 1972), XV, 2, p. 597. 29. Reinhart Koselleck demonstrates this point masterfully in his article 'Fortschritt". Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 2 [abbreviated Koselleck 1975a], pp. 351-423. 30. In Augustine, the Earthly City is characterised by a mere succession of birth and death, i.e. a cyclic pattern. Indeed Augustine did not think the Earthly city to be capable of progress. See the convincing argumentation provided by Ernst A. Schmidt, Zeit und Geschichte bei Augustin (Heidelberg: Winter, 1985). 31. Here I do not elaborate on the specific contribution of Augustine to the problem of time, but follow the broader line of the theological tradition on history. 32. Olivier Clement, L 'Eglise orthodoxe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), p. 34. 33. Tomas Spidlik, L'idee russe (Troyes: Editions Fates. 1994), pp. 294 and 300. 34. Clement 1985, p. 91. 35. Although there are apocalyptic elements in the Old Testament, it is mainly John's book of the Apocalypse [literally 'Revelation'] that presents the Christian interpretation of the term. John exposes the reign of the Antichrist in detail, which God will eventually crush, and the subsequent 1000 years' reign of Christ, which ends with the last Judgement and heavenly Jerusalem. 36. See Books XX-XXIII of Augustine's City of God. 37. The distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic eschatology is drawn from Thomas Robbins and Susan J. Palmer's Introduction of Ibid. (eds.), Millenium, Messiahs, and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 4-6. 38. This also is Bulgakov's view (Pere Serge Boulgakov, L 'Orthodxie, Constantin Andronikoff (transl.) (1st publ. in Russian 1935; Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1980), pp. 199-200). 39. Spidlik 1994, p. 216, Bulgakov 1980, p. 200. 40. The image of Janus' two faces applied to history is borrowed from Henri-Irenee Marrou, L 'ambivalence du temps de l'histoire chez saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), p. 37. 41. George La Piana, 'Theology of History', in: J.R. Stigger (ed.), The Interpretation of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 151-187: p. 152. 42. Although the relationship between reason and faith is a central issue in Christian thought as a whole, Thomas of Aquinas is in this respect the most typical Christian philosopher and theologian. In his address to pagans, he tried to demonstrate through rational thought what Christians know by faith. In the Middle Ages, the distinction was made between 'natural theology' and 'revealed theology'. Natural theology deals with 'truths about God that can be determined by unaided human reasoning', such as 'truths that God exists, that he is eternal', whereas 'revealed theology' deals with 'matters such as God's triune nature and the manner or his redemptive activity' (entry 'Revelation', Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983), p. 504). The issues raised by both natural and revealed theology are combined in theology of history. 43. 'The question of the truth of history can find its answer only through God. If history is essentially history of divine action, then the truth of his acts, the identity of it with him, can only be founded on him' (Wolfhart Pannenberg, Grundfragen systematischer Theologie, Gesammelte Aufsatze, vol. 2 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), p. 117). 44. Peter Hodgson, God in History: Shapes of Freedom (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), pp. 11-12. 45. Ibid., p. 11. 46. There is only a slight difference between the understanding of the church as the Christian community and as a potentially wholly Christian humanity. This leads to question whether the term 'humanity' in the modern sense of the word, that is, as a conscious and active entity, was used in TH. It turns out that humanity, understood in this meaning, and as such as a subject of history, was thematised rather late, namely in the eighteenth century by Vico. Late Antiquity did use the term 'humanitas' in this sense, but very rarely. In that case, the analogy was made with the individual (notably by Augustine, as we have seen) to stress the process of growth and decrepitude. Much stronger was the distinction made between believers and non-believers, which undermined any idea of humanity as a whole. Moreover, the term 'humanitas' commonly referred to the fleshly and sinful human condition, in opposition to God's perfection. For an analysis of the history of the concept 'humanity', see the comprehensive article of Hans Erich Bodeker, 'Menschheit', Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 3, pp. 1063-1128. 47. For this analysis I made selective use of La Piana 1943, who has made an attempt to typologise the premises present in, mainly, Catholic theology of history. 48. La Piana 1943, p. 156. 49. Ibid., p. 161. 50. The Catholic Church recognises all councils up to Vatican II, whereas the Orthodox Church takes into account only the seven first ecumenical councils, that is, up to the second council of Nicae in 787. 51. See for instance Irina Gorainoff, Seraphim de Sarov: Sa vie (Begrolles en Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1973). The prophets acting within society in 16th century Moscow and called jurodivye were respected for the same qualities (See: Eadem., Les fols en Christ (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1983). 52. On the status of divine right of the tsar and the perception of it by Russian society, see the collection of essays A.A. Gorskij. A.I. Kuprijanov. L.N. Puskarev (eds.). Mirovosprijatie i samosoznanie russkogo obscestva, book 2: Car' i carstvo v russkom obscestvennom soznanii (Moskva: RAN, 1999). 53. The work of Bertrand Binoche retraces the genesis of PH between 1764 and 1798, that is, between the publication of Iselin's work Uber die Geschichte der Menschheit and the publication of Kant's Streit der Fakultaten. During this period, three types of registers of history are constructed which 'make of the equivocal elaboration of the concept of history [their] essential object', namely the 'historical picture' (Hobbes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Turgot, d' Alembert, Volney, and Condorcet), 'natural history' (Ferguson, Millar, Kames), and 'theodicy' (Gottingen school, Iselin and Herder) (Binoche 1994. pp. 6-7). 54. Pomian 1984. p. 131. 55. This periodisation is exposed in his Philosophy of Right and serves as basis for his account of his Lectures on Philosophy of History. 56. Pomian 1984, p. 58. This is the dominant model, and also that of Hegel. Of course one can find regression patterns in 19th century philosophy of history, such as in Leont'ev in Russia, and Spengler in Western Europe: but, generally speaking, they are not dominant, and even less are cyclical patterns (Ibid., p. 58. p. 71). This dominant ascending line may include cyclical developments, such as the dialectical schemes of Hegel and Marx. 57. Such is the definition of Modern times, as shows the German equivalent Neuzeit (see Reinhart Koselleek. "'Neuzeit": Zur Semantik moderner Bewegingsbegriffe', in Ibid, (ed.), Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1977), pp. 264-299. 58. A similar hiatus is discovered within the conception or humanity, as is shown below. 59. Of course there have been earlier conceptions of progress, but they were restricted to knowledge or another section of human activity (Koselleck 1975a, pp. 368, 397). 60. These several meanings had to date been used next to each other (Ibid., pp. 403-407). 61. On the problem of the indefiniteness of the goal itself, see Ibid., p. 373. 62. For the first time with Voltaire, aspects that can be observed empirically, such as changes of population and of economy, laws, customs, were taken into account. Other products of a society such as sciences, knowledge and ideas were also considered as bearers of a meaning of history and thus taken as objects of a philosophy of history. 63. However, there
is always a moment when the argumentation relies, explicitly or 64. In order to emphasise the particular use that Hegel makes of the term 'spirit', I write it with a capital [Spirit]. 65. It was only in the 18th century that 'humanity' acquired the cultural and historical dimension of a collective concept (Bodeker 1982, p. 1087). 66. Ibid., p. 1097. 67. See Pomian 1984, p. 29. 68. This general definition, taken from The New Oxford Dictionary of English (2001), also applies to 19th-century upheavals like the 'Spring of nations' in 1848. Other developments are connected to this change of conceptions in the 19th century, such as the invention of the concept of 'historical heritage' to identify historical monuments of a nation, the practice of writing one national history, the selection of national myths, the establishment of a national flag and of a national hymn. 69. Hegel generally used the terms 'Volk' und 'Nation' as synonyms (Bernd Schonemann, in: Fritz Gschnitzler, Reinhart Koselleck, Bernd Schonemann and Karl Ferdinand Werner, 'Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse', in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 10. pp. 141-431: pp. 362-363). Arguably, this explains his two-fold use of the notion world-historical people, namely in the broad or ethnic sense (as a civilisation including several nations), and in the narrow or political sense (as a national state). Hegel was primarily interested in the category of people or nation in the broad sense. It was only from 1840 onwards that the political idea of nation as a national state became predominant (Ibid., p. 348). This 'generation gap' appears quite clearly in the comparison between Hegel's and Solov'ev's views on historical nations [see chap. III, section 2a]. 70. This does not exclude the fact that, at the time of their formation, many nations considered themselves as chosen by God (Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 186 and 195f.). 71. On this point, Hegel attempted to preserve the theological motive of history guided by Providence, and held that the nations are merely an unconscious instrument of the Weltgeist, not autonomous subjects [List der Vernunft]. Nevertheless, with his conception of world-historical people, Hegel greatly contributed to the development of a conception of nation as a fully-fledged actor in history. 72. About this hiatus, see Koselleck 1975a. p. 397. 73. As potential candidates after the Germanic civilisation, Hegel alluded to 'America' as the 'land of the future' and to Russia as a latent possibility (G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, vol. 12 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 114 and 422 respectively. 74. Hegel's dialectic scheme combines these two patterns in an original way. The difference with the commonly used rectilinear pattern is that Hegel emphasised negativity and destruction at each level. 75. See Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklarung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), pp. 461-468. 76. About Hegel's identification or consciousness of freedom as the decisive criterion of progress, see chap. III. section 2a). 77. Heilsgeschichte is now a term widely used in German theology, and refers to any Christian conception of history (Jaeschke 1976, p. 18). Strictly historically speaking Heilsgeschichte was a current in 19th century German theology that emphasised history neither in terms of a transmission of a timeless metaphysical truth, which is typical for TH, nor in terms of a projection of a universal history constructed with speculation, which is the main claim of PH. Salvation is understood as a 'process of specifically religious communication' and the analysis focuses on the historical specificity of biblical tradition, while at the same time rejecting PH's speculative framework (W. Lohff, 'Heil, Heilsgeschichte, Heilstatsache', in: Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 3 (Basel & Stuttgart: Schwabe & co. Verlag, 1974), p. 1031). 78. Jaeschke 1976, p. 326 [italics mine]. 79. For this reason I have not adopted the terminology proposed by Pomian, who distinguishes between 'Christian chronosophy' on the one hand, and 'chronosophy of progress' on the other. Pomian's terminology may suggest that the chronosophy of progress cannot be Christian and vice-versa. The examples of Hegel and of Solov'ev show that this combination is made, particularly in 19th century thought, in which the proclamation of the triumph of progress took place simultaneously with a renewed valuation of Christianity. 80. Even openly declared atheistic chronosophies such as Marxism-Leninism and even more so, Stalinism, contain quasi-theological motives, the promise of Paradise (in this case on earth), the veneration of the leader, and the regenerating power of one institution (in this ease the party) upon society as a whole.
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