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THE DIALOGUE IN HELL BETWEEN MACHIAVELLI AND MONTESQUIEU -- COMMENTARY

Part II:  The New Machiavellian Founding

Chapter Three:  THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION I

The undermining of the liberal regime proceeds in an orderly fashion in Part Two of the Dialogue. Since Machiavelli is largely free at this point to develop  the discussion as he wants, particular attention will be devoted to the way in which the discussion evolves. Joly is indeed a fine student of the works of Machiavelli and well-versed in their spirit. We have noted Konrad Heiden's appreciation for Joly's mastery of the Machiavellian teaching but we would also suggest a certain artful imitation of his way of writing. The Dialogue's subtitle is  "Machiavellian Politics in the Nineteenth Century" and some of the intricacies  found in the Florentine's presentation of his political teaching can be found in Joly's work, as well.

Part Two contains ten Dialogues. The first Dialogue (the Eighth) begins with a discussion of the coup that brings the despot to power. What follows is how  that power is made secure. The next two Dialogues (the Ninth and Tenth) deal  with the "reform" Machiavelli will bring to the legislative and executive  branches. This is followed by more Dialogues (the Eleventh and Twelfth) on the very important subject of the press. The first explains how the despot will defend himself against the press's attacks and gain control over the sources of information. The second describes how he will put it to use within his regime.  This is followed, after an interruption, by a discussion of the judiciary, to which  Machiavelli again devotes the major part of two Dialogues (the Fourteenth and  Fifteenth). What is discussed in this section leads naturally to such a topic and  allows Machiavelli to complete his reform of the three branches of government. 

After the institutions of government have been discussed, Machiavelli turns his attack to society and important social groupings that present obstacles to despotism. The Fifteenth Dialogue addresses itself to political parties and the  undermining of the political process. The freedom of association, guaranteed in  a liberal system, encourages the formation of parties that organize and promote various social causes and interests. The next Dialogue (the Sixteenth) deals with other social groups, less conspicuously political but nevertheless important for  their political effects. These include the militia, universities, the bar of law, and  the clergy .

This last Dialogue deals largely with the police. It proceeds on a new plane at the end, but only, in the words of Montesquieu, to fill "a serious gap" left in  the discussion of the judiciary. [1] It is through the police that ultimate social control will be effected. We anticipate the great importance of this topic in the  broader scheme of Machiavelli's attack on society. The present chapter will  comment upon the Eighth through the Eleventh Dialogue. The next chapter will  begin with the Twelfth Dialogue, the end of which culminates at the dramatic heart of Joly's work. It will then proceed to a commentary on the rest of Part  Two in the next chapter.

An example of the Machiavellian care with which Joly has constructed his work is revealed by the following consideration. The center of Part Two divides  at the beginning of the Thirteenth Dialogue. Precisely at this point Montesquieu  intervenes to break the order of the discussion, which has been proceeding by  discussions involving pairs of Dialogues. The center of Part Two, which describes the political teaching of the Dialogue, is a short discourse separated from  the topic of the two preceding Dialogues-the press, and that of the Dialogue  following-the judiciary. It is a discussion of conspiracies. One is tempted to say that Joly understands the real core of the Machiavellian teaching to be its  teaching on conspiracies. 

Even more remarkable is the fact that the entire Dialogue in Hell also has its center at this very same place. There are twenty- ive Dialogues in the whole work that divides at the beginning of the Thirteenth Dialogue, that is to say, at  this same discussion of conspiracies-a theme of vast importance to Machiavelli's The Prince as well as The Discourses. Through the complex organization  of the text, itself .'meaningful" in a careful writer, we are given some preliminary evidence that we are perhaps in the presence of an uncommon student of  the real Machiavelli. Joly shows an awareness not only of the darker Machiavellian themes but of an intricate way of writing that he broadly imitates, out of  certain prudential considerations, and even in details of his text. It is an awareness of this way of writing that allows him to perceive different levels to Machiavelli's character and teaching, the true appreciation of which he endeavors  to convey in the portrait of the philosopher given in the Dialogue.

Part Two of The Dialogue in Hell could be roughly characterized as describing a situation that begins in violence and ends in domestic peace, later declared  the great good of Machiavellian politics. It shows how Machiavelli deals with  the institutional obstacles to the consolidation of power he finds upon assuming the seat of rule. It then enters upon an important interlude, a discussion of the press, from which it ascends to the peak of the work. At that peak, there is a discussion of the propaganda offensive that can be launched through manipulation of the press. This is the most brilliant section of the work, as Jean- Francois Revel has sensed. [2] It prepares, finally, a teaching on conspiracies, a theme of the piece that has great resonance which will be touched upon throughout the commentary.

The teaching on conspiracies is actually out of order. Machiavelli intimates that, if not for Montesquieu's interruption at the end of the Thirteenth Dialogue,  he would consider the topic to be more appropriate to his latter discussion of the  police. In fact, the conspiracy discussion is resumed in the "appropriate place" in  the last Dialogue of this part. Thus, Machiavelli's treatment of conspiracies envelops the second half of Part Two and has been prematurely taken up, literally to be put at the center of the work. A fuller discussion of Machiavelli's and Joly's way of writing will await a later chapter and the analysis of the Dialogue's drama.

The second part of the Dialogue in Hell opens with the Eighth Dialogue where Machiavelli establishes certain ground rules for their "wager."3 They will  take as their hypothesis "a state constituted as a republic" and "endowed with all  the institutions that guarantee liberty." Machiavelli assumes what he understands  to be the most difficult case to prove his theories. It is a regime where resistance  to despotism is most extreme and where, to all appearances, ideas, customs, and  laws are least amenable to his project. Such a .'hypothetical" case could indeed  be France, specifically described in just such a manner by Montesquieu in a previous Dialogue. In any event, Machiavelli generously offers to take as his test  case the Montesquieuan regime par excellence. Tactically, the granting of such a  large concession at the outset makes it difficult for Montesquieu to quibble over  small points later on.

Given such ground rules, we come to see why Joly thought the illustrious Montesquieu and the infamous Machiavelli appropriate interlocutors and adversaries for this dialogue in hell. Montesquieu presents the modern political teaching that is most profoundly "anti-Machiavelli," insofar as the Machiavellian  teaching is understood as the teaching of political tyranny. Montesquieu's early  confidence in the face of Machiavelli's attack, and certainly some of the concessions he later grants him, stem from the fact that he thinks he has anticipated the  threats of Machiavellianism. The anti-Machiavellian design for Montesquieu's regime is understood by its architect to be based on the accumulated wisdom of  the ages. We are thus meant to see in its subversion the consummate test of tyranny and its most artful demonstration.

A "Hypothetlcal" Coup d' Etat

Montesquieu seemingly grants very little to Machiavelli in agreeing with him that such a state is not immune to a successful coup d'etat. As Machiavelli  points out, the opportunity for such a takeover is latent in "factions" that prey  upon regimes throughout history and threaten society with divisiveness and breakdown. In fact, the factional threat is perhaps even more pronounced in a large, diverse, and plural nation where different groups proliferate and are free to organize in promotion of their interests. As Montesquieu himself admits, the elements of  "civil war" are latent in party conflict and it is often the case that  pretenders to rule kindle such conflagrations.

However, Montesquieu goes on, a successful coup would be singularly difficult in a modem, enlightened society, Given "modern mores" and deference to  aw, usurpers face "great dangers" and their success would be exceedingly rare. Moreover, they don't have the significance that Machiavelli attaches to them. A  pretender might install his faction in rule. Yet, "power is in other hands. That's  all."

Without overthrowing the political system altogether, the successful usurper and himself constrained by institutions beyond his control. "Public right and the constitutional basis of power stay intact" and that is the "crucial thing" for Montesquieu. He grants to Machiavelli that dangerous factions can arise and be manipulated by the unscrupulous in securing power. However, he requires a further argument from Machiavelli that despotism can succeed usurpation without in  urn provoking a popular counterrevolution.

Machiavelli describes the social conditions that favor the success of "an armed enterprise," which, for the sake of argument, Montesquieu grants as a distant if real possibility. Again, such a state of affairs, offered as a hypothetical case, in fact describes the actual conditions of France as it existed in the atmosphere of 1848. 

[Social discord) manifests itself in a cacophony of ideas and opinions, from contradictory pressure groups and interests, as happens in  all states where liberty is momentarily unleashed. Political elements  of all kinds make their class interests felt. Present are remnants of  previously victorious but now vanquished parties, unbridled ambitions, bumming greed, implacable hatreds. There are men of every opinion and doctrine-those who would restore former regimes,  demagogues, anarchists, and utopians, all acting out of devotion to  his cause and equally at work in trying to overthrow the existing order.

In sum, it is a political society more fractious than Montesquieu might well imagine and has nothing in common with the more regularized conflict of interest groups that characterize healthy liberal regimes. Its revolutionary symptoms can be read in the general anarchy of ideas, reflecting a yet more fundamental internal conflict between the privileged classes and the people. This is the deepest and perhaps most salient source of social discord. The diverse parties that  create this impression of general anarchy can agree only in their opposition to  the established order which is perceived by the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy  as failing to protect their privileges and by the people as frustrating their desires.

In Part One of the Dialogue, Machiavelli contended that the need for order had primacy over the desire for liberty, "a secondary idea." The new prince will  play to this need, now felt universally, in the breakdown of society. He will triumph in the vanguard of that faction which, because of its privileges, has most  to lose in the drift toward anarchy, But he will direct his energies toward harnessing the popular forces that threaten to overwhelm a society, so divided, by  their strength and numbers. His course is determined by two considerations.  "First, the country feels a great need for tranquility and will refuse nothing to  whatever power can provide it. Second, given these partisan divisions, there is  no real locus of power or rather only one-the people."

The appeal to the people will cover all necessary acts and their cause will supply "the blind power" behind his authority. The people in fact care nothing  for the "legal fictions" that are the basis of Montesquieu's constitutional guarantees. The institutions still standing after the coup present no real obstacle to his  power. They are purely formal, parchment barriers to the dictatorial force he has  ssumed.

For the moment, there is no power except his own. "I am legislator, executive, judge, and as head of the army, I'm firmly in the saddle, so to speak." He is  himself a victorious pretender. In less than subtle reference to Louis Napoleon  and his illustrious uncle, he will assume the name of a great man in history , "capable of capturing the imagination of the masses." 

Enjoying a momentary respite from the discord. of factions, the new prince will proceed according to advice found in The Prince, a book that contains all  one has to know "for those who know how to read." His situation is not unlike  that of a conqueror "forced to remake everything," even to changing the prevailing customs of the people. [4] However, modern times require him to eschew naked violence as far as possible and to move by indirection and cunning, He will  not dismantle institutions but will "secretly tamper with each of their mechanisms." A new spirit will infect old Jaws. Without their outright abrogation, their  hold gradually slips away. Following these generalities, he then proceeds to particular acts.

He will undertake "one big thing" and then "one little thing" on the day after his successful coup. The "big thing" Machiavelli's prince will do is to crush the  factions that have opposed him. The insecurity of his position requires immediate eradication of serious opposition as well as a demonstration of strength to  intimidate others that might want to test the usurper. He will unleash a terror that  will cause "the most intrepid souls to shrink back." This is no time for temporizing or "false humanity." This terror is demanded to preserve the order of society  itself.

Apparently, the modern prince does not wholly repudiate bloodshed. What is important is that it be employed well so that its use may be effectively circum  scribed. Above all, Machiavelli implies, the prince must avoid a reputation for  cruelty .Though circumstances would exonerate him, he nevertheless is visibly  pained by the measures that necessity force upon him.

The prince takes great precautions to avoid the odium of the people, which belonged to Agathocles, by having others dispense his harsh justice. He pursues  a clever policy that will at once make sure of his control over the armed forces at  the same time that he covertly works through them as the agents of his repression. When an army punishes, it "never dishonors its victims." A public execution, skillfully managed by the armed forces, can impress the community with a  sense of urgency without outraging its sense of justice. [5] Moreover, the odium of  such acts will be attached to the prince's overzealous agents in the military, who  are presumed to act without the knowledge or countenancing of the prince. Isolated in its actions, the army will in turn bind itself ever closer to the prince.

As Montesquieu points out, the prince's actions are not unlike those of Borgia in Cesena. The clever prince might profitably imitate him in sacrificing the  willing accomplice and agent of his commands in a public execution, when his  services are no longer needed. A violently grotesque demonstration of princely  displeasure softens his subjects' character through fear while it satisfies their  thirst for vengeance. It also endears them to the prince, their real tormentor, who  is received as their liberator. The skillful use of terror is aptly illustrated in such  an anecdote. Quickly and definitively applied, it will "prevent new bloodletting  down the line." Moreover, the "image" of De Orco vividly introduces the theme  of mass conditioning, a subject that gets immediately developed and is constantly amplified in Machiavelli's discourse. [6]

The "second thing" Machiavelli will do is mint a great amount of currency stamped with his visage. Given the urgent political problems he faces, he is accused of indulging in puerile vainglory. Machiavelli emphatically denies the  charge, however. "From the day that my image appears on coins, I am king," he retorts. In fact, such currency multiplies the presence of the living ruler who  insinuates himself in the daily matters of exchange among people in a modern  commercial society .He assumes an honor normally reserved for dead national  heroes, replacing the mottoes and abstract symbols of the republic with the new ruler's portrait.

Montesquieu initially misses the full significance of Machiavelli's action. Vulnerable in modern times are those staunch souls, "proud spirits," whose dignity rests on a noble indifference to material things and their blandishments.  Even the enemies that opposed the prince's coup "will be forced to carry his  portrait in their purses" and, "little by little," they will be forced, like everyone  else, to associate him "with the material tokens of their joy."

In issuing such currency, Machiavelli intends an act of hubris to dazzle the proud, the ranks from which arise future rivals to his power. Not only will everyone, including the spirited, be obliged to carry the tyrant's image in their pockets, their eyes will also see the stamp of his "image" in a monumental architecture, of which more will be said later. In reducing the pretensions of the  proud, Machiavelli gives a preliminary indication of how they will be undermined. He will ply society with material satisfactions to erode any independence of spirit. Finally, the proud, too, begin to smile on his countenance as the tyrant  is deemed their active benefactor.

The real threat of the materialist mentality to the future of free institutions is not its effect on the people at large but those proud and spirited souls that would  be the watchdogs of the people's liberties. The continued vitality of liberal society seems to rest on cultivating these characters and finding a noble outlet for  their passions, turning a prideful, self-regarding posture toward concern for the  common good. In the "two things" that Machiavelli will do after the coup, we have the key to  Machiavellian politics. The able use of fear and love, of intimidation and benefaction, is directed toward controlling and pleasing the many and  undermining that spirited group of people that pose the strongest threat to his  regime.

If successful in reducing that spirited group, the prince will effectively homogenize society. It will assume the uniform character and taste of the masses of people, that, by virtue of an extended franchise, will rise to a politically, dominant position, In effect, the class that sets the tone for society is seduced or  isolated and can provide no counterpoise to popular passions. This prepares the  way for the prince who can then, by various techniques, further shape society to conform to the mass desires that favor his despotic rule.

Still, "the two things" Machiavelli will do after his coup do not speak to what really concerns Montesquieu. The prince will continue to operate within  the context of "a fundamental charter whose principles, regulations, and provisions are completely contrary" to The Prince's "maxims of government." A third thing he has neglected to mention will be to "enact another constitution.  That's all." There really is no difficulty in such a step, Machiavelli asserts. "For the time being, there is no other will, no other power than mine, and the popular  element of the regime serves as the basis of my action."

Montesquieu imagines quite correctly that this new constitution "will not be a monument to liberty." However, he does not see how the momentary opportunity that crisis offers the prince as sufficient "to rob a nation of all its rights" and  "all the principles under which it has been accustomed to live." Machiavelli not  only names these principles, presumably so embarrassing to the prince, but will go so far as to include them in the preamble of his constitution. Being more attached to "appearances than reality," the people will be mollified and rest content with a mere declaration of his backing for '.the great principles of modern right." He must be especially careful, however, not to enumerate them specifically within that document as in a bill of rights. This would restrict his "freedom  to act" by holding him precisely accountable to certain standards of behavior.  He prefers only to seem to accord all rights, while not specifically according  any.

Montesquieu thinks such a ploy presumes too little of the people. They are attached to liberty as to a sacred patrimony and see in its defense the only surety  for their lives and possessions. To the contrary, Machiavelli sees even in modern people nothing that would change his opinion expressed in The Prince: "The governed will always be content with the prince, so long as he touches neither  :heir possessions or honor. And from that time on he has only to combat the  pretensions of small numbers of malcontents, whom he can easily finish off." [7]

He presumes a freer rein for the prince when it comes to questions of constitutional principles such as "separation of powers." These are matters beyond the people's comprehension and concern. He will, however, be more scrupulous with respect to "civil rights," to which "the people are most attached." More-  over, those who can comprehend such principles are hostile to the ends they  serve. The literati join the classes of the privileged in making known "a kind of  hidden love for vigorous and powerful geniuses." The people do not "thirst for  liberty." Nor are the educated few enamored of popular institutions that discount  their influence. They rest contemptuous of a regime oriented by "interests" that concern them little.

Plebiscitory Democracy

Montesquieu assumes that Machiavelli's constitution will be foisted upon the people "without the consent of the nation." In fact, Machiavelli has no intention to so offend "traditional opinion." He must iterate his conformity with such  ideas and will even go one better than Montesquieu in their direction. The nation will not only be involved with the new prince in the preparation of a fundamental charter but directly so. Accordingly, the people will be immediately called upon to ratify the coup "by popular vote." There is no question about the outcome. All are pleased by his reign's promise of general peace as well as by the  benefits it promises to bring to each group individually.

Moreover, the prince sees himself as bringing about what all the peoples of  Europe ardently aspire to, Universal manhood suffrage is decreed before such  ratification takes place. The "poll tax and class-based qualifications" will be abolished. As Montesquieu quickly points out, such a step is far from progressive. It intends to reduce the influence of the enlightened few so that the prince may, by dint of raw "numbers," justify his usurpation and begin to harness the  "blind power" of the people to his will. Absolutism will be set up in a single  stroke as popular win becomes the very base of his government.

In Part One, Montesquieu held that constitutional rule was the most historically advanced regime precisely because its institutions gave soundest expression to the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty. In the rule Machiavelli begins to describe, that principle finds even more direct expression in a plebiscite called to ratify the constitution submitted by the prince. As Machiavelli  insisted in his discussion of political origins, we indeed find "brute force" as the  fundamental reality. But it is masked by certain "forms" congruent with the  times and the democratic thrust of history. [8]

Machiavelli claims to be not unlike a Washington in establishing universal manhood suffrage for his nation. But as Montesquieu points out, Americans were not called upon to ratify their constitution directly. Rather, it was "discussed, deliberated, and voted upon by the representatives of the nation" in numerous assemblies. Machiavelli sarcastically ridicules Montesquieu's reproof as  belonging to "eighteenth century" ideas, wholly out of step with "modern  times."

Mimicking criticisms formerly made by Montesquieu, Machiavelli implies that it is not he who suffers from certain antiquated notions. "For goodness sake.  Let's not confuse times, places, and peoples. My constitution is presented en bloc. It is accepted en bloc." The specific articles of its text will not be formally debated and discussed. In associating himself with Washington, the new prince  has no intention of founding a republic in the manner of the United States.  Rather, he invokes Washington's name as one who stood in the vanguard of the people, properly reflecting the spirit of time and place.

Ratified at large, in a plebiscite and not in conventions, the new constitution will retain a singleness of design and purpose that is requisite to a strong and  enduring rule. " A constitution must issue, fully elaborated, from the head of a  single man or it is only a work doomed to disappear," wracked by the dissensions of the various parties that presided at its composition. A look to history, to  the examples of Sesostris, Solon, Lycurgus, Charlemagne, Frederick II, Peter I  confirms his contention. In moving from the example of Washington to such  figures, Machiavelli reveals his real ambitions for his prince to be imperial and  not in the mold of Montesquieuan or Washingtonian liberalism.

Montesquieu objects to Machiavelli's comparison with these great historic founders. The situation he is facing is not at all comparable to the situation they  faced. They were bringing new modes and orders to benighted peoples while the premise of their discussion has been an enlightened regime and a civilized people where public right is well established, and well-ordered institutions are functioning.

Machiavelli does not propose destroying Montesquieu's institutions to consolidate power in a single person, as his interlocutor presumes. Through his  study of Rome and Titus-Livy, he is not unfamiliar with mixed regimes and even the "seesaw politics" described as uniquely belonging to the parliamentary  states of Europe. What he has found is that certain powers belong to any government, if not a specific institution. Thus, it is necessary that there be an executive, legislative, judicial, and regulatory power somewhere. In a modern state,  these might find themselves dispersed among a cabinet, Senate, Assembly,  Council of State, and Court of Cassation.

Machiavelli does not want to shock political sensibilities, particularly where lip service is still paid to "the principles of 89," by overthrowing such institutions. Moreover, since the functions they serve are essential anyway, he will let them stand. Again, mimicking Montesquieu and his penchant for mechanistic  metaphors, Machiavelli indicates the spirit of his reform. "Please listen to me  carefully. In statics, moving the fulcrum causes a change in the direction of  forces. In mechanics, changing the location of a spring causes a change in the  machine's movement. And yet, it appears to be the same apparatus, the same  mechanism." Machiavelli will proceed accordingly and will not change the  overall machinery of the constitutional regime. Only the inner workings and  internal springs will be rearranged.

In coupling his talk of imperial ambition with the republican institutions described by Titus-Livy, Machiavelli has subtly introduced the experience of  Rome as background to the discussion of the present founding. Montesquieu  correctly sees the spirit of reform introduced by the new prince as imitating that of Augustus when he destroyed the Republic. The "names" of institutions stay  the same while their purposes are redirected. The leitmotif of the. Roman experience, introduced by Joly on the title page of the Dialogue itself, surfaces most  obviously at this point, as Machiavelli acknowledges Augustus as an appropriate "model" for his founding.

Machiavelli harkens to "the experience of the ages" to demonstrate the eternal relevance of living genius for "greatness" in rule. He intends to contrast such an understanding with the impersonal and systemic politics of Montesquieuan parliamentary government. His scheme represents nothing more than "schools  for quarreling" and "centers of sterile conflict." "Public debate and the press" condemn such governments to "impotence."

While Montesquieu wants to hedge in vaulting ambition in the name of rational politics, Machiavelli wants to give it latitude for its vast designs. He appeals to a restoration of vital powers as wielded by one of the few "men of genius" that history ordains to lead. The despot claims to proceed from an elevated  point of view and means his reforms to be seen in the light of the exasperating  stalemates and respective turbulence that can infect parliamentary government.

Legislative and Administrative Reform

Having heard Machiavelli elaborate upon the general spirit of his reforms, Montesquieu demands his interlocutor stop talking in "generalities" in order to  come to some precise conclusions. Machiavelli then announces his "first reform." He will abrogate ministerial responsibility. The sovereign will accept direct responsibility for all that occurs in his administration. Machiavelli reasons that the people attribute such responsibility anyway. To accept total responsibility is therefore in accord with public sentiment and is more in keeping with the  magnanimity he would like to convey in his person. It would thus further his  direct rapport with the people.

Machiavelli then turns to the most popular branch of government. Parliamentary initiative in introducing legislation runs counter to the personal responsibility of the prince. It is, of course, ultimately threatening to despotic rule in permitting the lawmaker to "take the place of the government." Accordingly, Machiavelli denies to all but the sovereign the right to propose laws, a step that  Montesquieu sees in turn as effectively setting him up ''as the sole legislator."

Still, it would seem, the prince finds himself in tight straits. Universal suffrage, Machiavelli admits, is the sole basis of his rule. Yet, if the prince is solely responsible for the actions of his government, it is inconceivable that he would  survive even the first crisis. Contingencies that require unpopular steps threaten  the foundations of his rule. Ultimately, a new majority of representatives with  the Assembly may bring down the prince without recourse to violence.

Machiavelli reminds Montesquieu that the constitution has reserved certain dictatorial powers for the prince in emergency situations. As head of the armed  forces, he has the entire public force in his hands to meet insurrections. He may  'also petition the people directly through the plebiscite were he to encounter too much intransigence even within his "reformed" Assembly. As a matter of fact, Montesquieu's reservations come too soon. Machiavelli has barely begun to list  his scheme of reform for the Assembly and the rest of his government's institutions, all of which intend to wed popular will with autocracy.

Beyond denying lawmakers legislative initiative, Machiavelli also denies them the right to change laws once submitted to them. Their deliberations are  confined to voting a measure either up or down, without compromise. Such then is the beginning of his intention to "reinvigorate" politics.

The employment of any extraordinary constitutional power would be truly exceptional, since control over the rules of the Assembly would seemingly suffice to effect the sovereign's will. The size of the body will be reduced, allowing leadership to exert effective discipline. The leadership is appointed by the sovereign and not elected by the membership. Machiavelli would then reduce the  length of the legislative session, which denigrates that body and increases reliance on executive prerogatives and decrees. Any popular agitation that might find voice in the Assembly can be quickly silenced as the sovereign assumes the  power of convoking and proroguing the legislature.

Above all, he "would abolish the unpaid status of legislative service." The implication is that, henceforth, bribery, more or less covert, will be one of the more efficacious means of promoting public policy. A truly independent legislature, drawn from the leisured and more enlightened segments of society, will at once be more democratic and more malleable. In sum, there are multiple ways  of neutralizing the power of the Assembly.

For Montesquieu, the subversion of the Assembly would seemingly suffice to establish the prince's supremacy. But "in reality, sovereignty could not be established on such frail foundations." At the end of the Ninth Dialogue and before he turns to the "reform" of the Senate, Machiavelli indicates more generally how power comes to be exerted within a nominally popular regime.

He will leave Montesquieu's form of government intact but will shift the base of power from the Legislature proper to the Judiciary, which, by a change in the appointment process, is tied to executive will. Ultimate sovereignty for the prince may derive from the plebiscite, but real authority within the frame of  government moves in a contrary direction, away from nominally popular institutions, until it concentrates and reaches its proper locus at the throne, where all  meaningful action is determined.

At the end of the Ninth Dialogue, Montesquieu accuses Machiavelli of acting like a king while at least according to the ground rules of their discussion, they are in a republic. According to Machiavelli, however, the "exact time" he  proclaims himself king is 'just a matter of expediency." In fact, the discussion of the Senate that opens the next Dialogue reveals the prince, in action, making  the transition from a republican past to an imperial future.

The Tenth .Dialogue continues the discussion of Rome with reference to Montesquieu ' s "memorable work" The Causes of the Greatness of the Romans  and Their Decline.9 Specifically, Machiavelli asks the author of such "exhaustive studies" to discourse for a moment on the role of Senate under Augustus.  Montesquieu declares that "until the last days of the Republic," the Roman Senate was "an autonomous institution vested with great privileges" and powers. Its  independence, revered through long tradition, was key to "the greatness it  stamped on the Republic." It is not clear by what means the Emperors succeeded  "finally in stripping it of its power." In any case, it became nothing more than "a tool in the hands of the Emperors."

Machiavelli declares that his Senate will playa political role "analogous to the Roman Senate in the times that followed the fall of the Republic," It is always necessary for the prince to cover his actions with respected authority." At  the side of the prince must be found bodies of individuals that remain impressive  by virtue of brilliant titles, respectability, and the personal illustriousness of  those who compose them." The imposing stature of the Senate will fill this need  and is "the keystone" in Machiavelli's constitution.

Continuing his scholarly commentary, Montesquieu indicates that the Senate during the Empire made law by senatus- consultum. Machiavelli abjures such a  power in his regime as foreign to modem times. Besides, the new prince has  himself such decree-making powers. The real power of his Senate is reserved for the most solemn occasions, as guardian of the fundamental law.

According to Machiavelli, modern theories have tried to anticipate every- thing in their constitutional schemes of government. Machiavelli "is not prone to  such an error," which would so circumscribe his powers. To perpetuate his rule,  his constitution must have ample means to adapt to change. "Then, in serious  crises there might be some other alternative to the disastrous expedient of revolution." The Senate will propose amendments by senatus-consultum to the fundamental law. In the manner of "a truly Roman Senate," as Montesquieu says, it  will be able to judge statutes and ultimately define the meaning of individual  constitutional articles. [10]

Machiavelli denies that his constitution will be vaguely drawn and subject to disputes that dilute reverence for it If everything can not be anticipated, everything "essential" must be. He will not constrict himself and be subject to contingencies by strictly limiting the means to amendment and thereby the survival of  his power. On the other hand, he will see to all that is essential to the preservation of that power in any circumstance.

Pressed by Montesquieu, Machiavelli admits that the Senate will have no real power of its own. Theoretically, it may so amend the constitution ''as to make it disappear altogether" if the prince judges it expedient Montesquieu  charges that the people will not stand for such a deception, But, exactly as in the  adoption of the constitution itself, the people in plebiscite will be called upon to ratify any constitutional change en bloc. Dissidence will be controlled because, ultimately, the people as a whole will be made a party to any changes. The despotic design that is advanced in such constitutional changes will be cloaked in concerns for making the popular will effective.

Machiavelli will be "briefer" about the Council of State, a powerful tool of centralization, ready at hand. This is the proper rule-making body. Moreover, at  its discretion, it may remove from the courts any matter of an administrative  character it prefers to decide, thereby effectively making itself "both party and  judge in its own case." As the body that drafts the laws, it is merely an adjunct of the prince. And he will exert the tightest "political control." Like the Senate,  its eminence will lend prestige to what are the plots and maneuverings of the  price.

With the discussion of the Council of State, Machiavelli has presented his constitution "in finished form," except for the discussion of judicial matters,  which Machiavelli would rather postpone until later. Montesquieu proceeds to  "add up" the prince's powers, equating them with the numerous lawmaking  functions he has taken upon himself. These effectively extend regal power into  properly legislative and judicial grounds and find for their legitimacy popular sanction in the plebiscite. 

It is agreed that the powers are indeed formidable. For Montesquieu, we will recall, the primary political question relates to how the laws are made. For all intents and purposes, it is the prince alone who makes laws, directly, and when convenient, indirectly. Montesquieu sees the "most difficult" part of Machiavelli's task in establishing despotism as already accomplished. He grants too  much at this point, at least according to Machiavelli, whose political art enters a more delicate phase. Machiavelli turns to a mass of subsidiary rights, which  follow implicitly from constitutional rule, but which are wholly "incompatible with the new order" of things. These include the freedom of the press, the right  of association, the independence of judges, the right of suffrage, periodic elections, the institution of the civil guard-topics that receive due treatment eventually.

At the outset, Machiavelli will admit only the rights that are convenient for him. None follow necessarily or in "principle." In fact, the "day after" his constitution takes effect, "a series of decrees" will abrogate all the rights and liberties that might prove dangerous. In acting in such a way, Machiavelli is applying a maxim of The Prince to contemporary times.

The successful innovator will undertake reform not in a piecemeal fashion but all at once. The essentially conservative nature of the people will endure a  sudden and definitive change more readily than a series of changes that constantly strain patience. In effect, the constitution they are asked to adopt -- en bloc -- fulfills the prince's prescription. [11] Furthermore, any harsh measure will be  decreed forthwith, since, from that point on the prince will become progressively more tolerant. The liberties he is forced to repress are solemnly promised  restoration after "the storm" abates. Soon he will take it upon himself "to pass  for the most liberal man" in the kingdom.

"In the meantime," Montesquieu assumes, he will "directly suppress all liberties." Machiavelli objects to the word "directly." The successful innovator  must be as much "fox" as "lion." This reference to The Princel2 indicates to  Montesquieu that Machiavelli is about to enter a "new phase" in his teaching.

Controlling the Press

The next two Dialogues are devoted to a discussion of journalism and the press, a topic chosen by Montesquieu after the outline of the constitution is finished, Machiavelli avers the shrewdness of Montesquieu in turning the discussion to what he calls "the most delicate part of my task." In fact, Machiavelli  clearly warms to a topic that displays his Machiavellian arts in the most impressive manner by detailing a project that is "both momentous and subtle."

The discussion approaches the heart of Machiavelli 's teaching. It concludes literally at the end of the Twelfth Dialogue where Machiavelli delivers the longest uninterrupted statements in the work to this point. Dramatically, the silence  of Montesquieu in so deferring to Machiavelli contrasts sharply with his captious criticisms and repeated interruptions at the beginning of this discussion. It  is testimony to Machiavelli's dialectical skill that he so changes Montesquieu's  grudging recognition to an unabashed admiration for his artfulness and the  power of his mind.

His discussion outlines the uses to which his press will be put and presents a scheme unprecedented in its vision. "No government has conceived of anything  as bold" as what he is about to describe. The most dazzling part of Machiavelli's  teaching, it represents one of the earliest analyses of modem political propaganda and the enormous potential it holds for shaping the masses to tyranny.  The use to which it will be put is much more than Montesquieu can possibly  imagine. Montesquieu comes to realize Machiavelli's ultimate intention is to  transform "the instrument of thought" into "instruments of power" wielded by the prince.

A reminder of The Prince might prove fruitful to introduce the section on propaganda. The Prince advises the political innovator to use his own arms and  not those of another, as one is more secure and less dependent in the use of what  is one's own. [13] According to Montesquieu in Joly's Dialogue, the modem arm  par excellence against tyranny is the press. In effect, Machiavelli illustrates in  this section how he would appropriate the weapon of his adversaries as his own.  In the Eleventh Dialogue, Machiavelli shows how he will in fact, through various schemes, defend himself against the press's attack. This is "the defensive part," so to speak, of the regulations he would impose on the press. Next, he will  make Montesquieu understand how he will employ this institution to his own  advantage.

In the Eleventh Dialogue, Machiavelli first indicates how he will deal with newspapers, then how he will deal with other publications, We shall see that he  intends to assume control over all sources of thought within his regime. Two  sections are devoted to newspapers. One concerns the regulations governing domestic news and the other concerning the steps that will be taken to control  even the foreign press. He thus intends to control and use information arising  from beyond his borders or, when not convenient, at least to neutralize its effects.

Machiavelli admits that he is entering a task that requires finesse. If he decided to suppress newspapers outright, he would imprudently shock public sensibilities that are always dangerous to oppose openly. He will proceed by indirect means in an attempt to "muzzle" the press, not suppress it. Still, he indicates  that such a task is simplified by the way it conducts itself in parliamentary governments.

In a scathing critique, Machiavelli alludes to the peculiar knack of the press "of making itself hated." Among other things, it is "mercenary," not unlike any  other enterprise for profit. Its character is formed accordingly as it appeals to  prejudice and a disparaging leveling that finds popular favor, Being in the ser-  vice of "violent, selfish, and narrow passions," it is a "public voice" but for narrowly interested groups. For such reasons, it often fails to attain the larger view that justifies its freedom. It often stands rightly accused, as the Anglo-Saxon  press of today, of being "unjust," "operating without magnanimity and patriot  ism." Joly would agree that there is much truth in a view that famously saw the  journalistic corps as "effete," "impudent," and "snobbish." [14]

Montesquieu is aware of all these "grievances against the press." In fact, it is easy enough to amass a great many more. Yet, its crucial role in liberal regimes  can not be denied. The fate of free governments, by its very nature, is tied to  public opinion that the press forms. It forces the depositories of public authority  to govern constitutionally. It obliges them to be honest, restrained, and respectful of constitutional practices in relations among themselves and with regard to  others. Finally, "it gives to anyone who is oppressed the means to voice grievances and be heard." To adequately perform its function, it needs freedom from  state control and restrictions. It stands, so to speak, virtually unchecked among  the system of checks and balances it surveys. It has no direct government power  and it is granted these prerogatives in deference to the role it plays in the grander  design of free government, "Much can be pardoned in an institution that, despite  so many abuses, serves so many crucial ends."

According to Machiavelli, however, the "masses" are utterly incapable of understanding that grander design and what it implies for them. He is freer than  Montesquieu realizes to meet its manifest "abuses" through certain measures, each of which cumulatively acts to reconstruct the press's role in the context of  the new regime and to actively shape thought to its requirements. The importance of its role is perhaps even more magnified in the Machiavellian scheme.  By direct and indirect means, the new prince attempts to move public opinion  beyond the clash of narrow interests which the press serves to what in the  Twelfth Dialogue is revealed as a new collective consciousness united behind a  new historic leader.

Machiavelli begins by announcing that all future newspapers will be thoroughly reviewed by the government prior to being authorized to operate. This is  not an adequate safeguard to protect the prince, Montesquieu points out, as even  licensed newspapers can become antagonistic later on. "The spirit of newspapers" emanates from its board of editors. It guides the thought of reporters and shapes the newspaper's stance on a variety of complex matters. In response to  Montesquieu, Machiavelli will authorize any changes in editorial personnel,  subsequent to a newspaper's licensing. [15] As with government institutions, he  intends to undermine the press by tampering with "its internal mechanisms." As  Montesquieu again points out, such measures do not prevent old newspapers with hostile editorial boards from speaking out. We shall see how such ripostes  disappear as the scope of Machiavelli's design overwhelms him.

To undermine present newspapers and discourage any antagonistic new publications, Machiavelli will continue his indirect assault, All newspapers will be  subject to a stamp tax and a surety of future solvency. As profit-making operations, newspapers are vulnerable to economic disincentives that, if rigorous  enough, will drive even established newspapers out of business. In any event, if such newspapers do in fact become too expensive, they will likely be the luxury  of the well-to-do, that is, the classes least prone to incendiary politics.

We thus have the first instance of policy goals indirectly effected through the taxing power, a technique that promises wider application, given the nature of  modern finance described in the subsequent part of the Dialogue. By such  measures, the prince can reduce the number of hostile newspapers while, we shall shortly see, he takes other steps to proliferate friendly enterprises. Nevertheless, Montesquieu objects, all measures to this point do not affect the publications of political parties and other associations. These are not profit-making ventures. However, Machiavelli has something "to shut them up" and introduces  measures that are blatantly more repressive.

He criticizes the jury system as it exists in several states of Europe, particularly as a proceeding to handle the "misdemeanors" of the press. It is a "deplorable measure" that often ends up enflaming opinion it seeks to quell by providing a forum for dissident views. Machiavelli has respect for the cleverness of  journalists whose subtle way of writing vouches for a nimble intelligence beyond the reach of the common juror. "A writer can disguise his attacks in such  varied and subtle ways that it is not even possible to bring clear charges before  the courts." Machiavelli therefore suggests that such offenses be handled by an administrative proceeding, conducted without the same regard to formal procedures that attain in regular judicial proceedings.

Again, the prince's goal will be achieved by indirect means, through threats and intimidation wherever possible. In the text, the new prince speaks in his own voice, underscoring his personal solicitude for such matters. He will not suppress any writer without cause and tries to make such "restraint" appear commendable. He explains that more aggressive steps would be counterproductive anyway. He likens the corps of journalists to the head of Hydra-"if you cut off  ten of them, fifty more grow."

Knowing the penchant for writing in the now literate times of Europe, he actually encourages newsmen in their writing endeavors. "I don't want to surnrnon you everyday before the courts" or be constantly relying on the law to curb in-  fractions. "Even more, I don't want an army of censors looking into the day before what you are going to publish the next day." Nevertheless, the activities of  recalcitrant troublemakers will be closely monitored. After a few warnings, certain things will simply not be tolerated, They may write, by all means, but "no  subtleties" and nothing that will obstruct the prince or diminish his power. He  alone will judge such things.

As Montesquieu points out, the journalist is not the target in all this. The ultimate object of the prince is not so much to be rid of certain noisome newspapermen, "nasty and spiteful journalists" who "constantly put themselves above  the law." It is rather to strike at the association and the cause a newspaper  serves. Two convictions in one year will automatically bring about the suppression of the newspaper.

Machiavelli lists other restrictions that might find application. He will forbid verbatim reporting of chamber debates and judicial proceedings. The publication  of "false" news, whether in good or bad faith, might be penalized by the reporter's incarceration. Nor will the reporter be allowed to pass on news from  abroad in an effort to escape personal responsibility. The prince ultimately determines the "veracity" of matters that pertain to him. This is as it should be and  will give pause to newsmen who often lack material proof for "news" that is  really only their personal convictions.

Montesquieu grants that the prince may secure himself against the domestic press by such measures. He then draws Machiavelli's attention to the foreign  press, ostensibly beyond the prince's control but which still might hold him accountable before world opinion. Machiavelli proposes the most rigorous punishment of those who distribute news items from unauthorized foreign sources.  "First, the introduction or circulation in the kingdom of any unauthorized newspapers or writings will be punished with imprisonment, and the punishment will  be sufficiently severe to stifle the desire." Furthermore, "those of my subjects  convicted of having written against the government while abroad will be investigated and punished when they return." [16]

Assuming he governs a large kingdom, the small states on the border will be sufficiently intimidated to curb their own press in what regards him and to extradite agitators. According to The Spirit of the Laws, "the areas surrounding a  despot must be laid waste." The modern despot also will not stop short in taking  all steps necessary to prevent the penetration of civilization. The prince might  try to seduce opinion-makers in foreign countries responsible for disseminating  information entering his realm. Machiavelli quotes Benjamin Constant in describing the actions of his prince. He will make "his kingdom into an island where what happens in Europe will not be known, and the capital will be made into another island where what happens in the provinces will not be known." [17]

Having apparently satisfied Montesquieu with regard to his control of the press, Machiavelli next turns to how he will control other publications. In fact, control would be even easier as their production involves different enterprises.  The publishing industry can be crippled by attacking the printer, the editor, or  the bookseller, all of whom will be regulated by the government. Taxes will be particularly steep on small tracts that deal with political themes. "I shall impose  a heavier stamp tax on books that do not have a certain number of pages." In  what is a comment on modern tastes, Machiavelli declares that steep taxes on  long and expensive texts are not necessary. There is no will to write them and  certainly no inclination on the part of the masses, otherwise diverted, to read  them.

"Today, there are hardly any but a few devils that have the conscience to write books." Economic considerations will discourage "literary pretensions"  while "criminal law" will discourage printing. "If there are writers daring  enough to write books against the government, they must not be able to find  anyone to publish them." 

Indirect censorship will be employed to exert pressure, not so much on the author, as on the publisher, Timid types will simply refuse to deal with certain  material. Moreover, through the surveillance of printers and publishers, the government can procure subject matters prior to its distribution and sale, Unlike  newspapers, prior restraint is not disavowed as the ultimate method of control.

Where Montesquieu assumes that Machiavelli is already well fortified against the press, Machiavelli declares that he has completed only one half of his project. What remains, the subject of the Twelfth Dialogue, is how Machiavelli  will use the press against itself, followed by a discussion of how Machiavelli  will employ it for propaganda purposes. In effect, Machiavelli intends his  government to absorb the function of journalism in order to project the  information and thought it wishes.

Notes

1. The gap that needs filling in concerns individual liberties, police powers, and the judiciary.

2. See Revel's Preface to the Dialogue ala Enfers, xvi iff.

3. Toward the beginning of the Eighth Dialogue, Montesquieu remarks that their discussion here would find the perfect setting in "the gardens of Rucellai." This was the  setting for Machiavelli's dialogue on the Art of War. Fabrizio Colonna (Machiavelli?) engages in conversation with the amiable and capable Cosimo Rucellai. He comments on  some rare plants that the garden contains. The plants were favored by their Roman ancestors and Cosimo's grandfather, a Renaissance enthusiast of ancient things, planted them.  Fabrizio comments that it's too bad that the enthusiasm for the past attaches to such trivial things. The discussion then turns to the way their Roman ancesters conducted war.  This passing reference to Rucellai is another example of the effort Joly makes to embellish his Dialogue with details relevant to the lives of his interlocutors. Montesquieu is also intimating that they are discussing dark themes that should not be spoken of openly. 

4. See The Prince, V and VI for reference to the proper conduct of one who has recently acquired rule. That text is meant to give a "general idea" of how the prince will  proceed. What follows are the details of how he will conform to The Prince's prescriptions in a modern setting. "For those who know how to read," all is contained in The  Prince, Machiavelli claims, giving a dig to Montesquieu. Remember that Montesquieu  considers himself as among those who truly understand Machiavelli. Here Machiavelli is  indeed not saying anything "new. "

5. Reference to Agathocles occurs in The Prince VIII. It is interesting that in addition to a reputation for cruelty, Agathocles affronted the prevailing religious sentiments of his  time. The actions of Machiavelli's prince in the Dialogue should be kept in mind in this  regard.

6. See Prince VII for references to the Remirro de Orco episode.

7. The different character of the nobility and the populace is the focus of discussion in The Prince IX. Joly quotes from there. Joly's Machiavelli is very attentive to that "noble" class of "spirited men" and what it implies for politics. He returns often to this theme  in the course of his discourse.

8. Nazi apologists, who saw the Second Empire as a precursor to the Third Reich, especially admired the way Napoleon periodically used the plebiscite to justify his dictatorship.

9. Machiavelli's discussion of Rome draws inspiration from Montesquieu's "memorable work." David Lowenthal, in his Introduction to Montesquieu's Consideration of the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965) I, begins his discussion of Montesquieu's book by asserting how formidable the influences of the Discourses was upon it, When Joly's Machiavelli praises the  author of the Considerations, it is genuine. The two "adversaries" might again be trading  sincere compliments. Joly's Machiavelli has already remarked on the similarity of certain  of Montesquieu's ideas to his own. Throughout the Dialogue, Joly often refers to common ground shared by the two disputants.

10. The irony is that while Montesquieu speaks of a "truly Roman Senate," a parody of the Napoleonic constitution is being discussed.

11. See The Prince VIII.

12. The infamous phrase appears in The Prince XVIII.

13. See The Prince VI which is entitled "Of New Dominions Which Have Been Acquired By One's Own Arms and Ability."

14. Spiro Agnew's famous characterization of journalists was in fact coined by a then obscure journalist, Remember, too, that Joly made his living as a journalist and a government aide.

15. Vladmir Putin is probably the most notorious practitioner today of Machiavellian arts here described.

16. It is remarkable that Joly foresaw all the dangers he was running in publishing his work. The first publisher he approached, a Frenchman, was indeed a "timid soul" and  refused to print Joly's work, having divined its true target-Napoleon III. Joly then  sought publication in Brussels. Joly here indicates some of the reasons why he wrote the  tract he did. Among other things, it conforms to prevailing literary tastes. What is said  about the character of contemporary authors, the reading public, and the secret police is  no doubt meant to shed light on Joly's endeavors in the Dialogue. The design and intention of Joly's work gets fuller elaboration in chapter 9.

17. Cf. The Spirit of the Laws V 14. Montesquieu there writes that a despotic state is "happiest when it can look upon itself as the only one in the world, when it is environed  with deserts, and separated from those people whom they call barbarians. Since it can not depend on the militia, it is proper that it should destroy a part of itself." 

Chapter Four:  THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION II

Machiavelli may belittle journalist but he doesn't "the press." Indeed, it is be- cause of the press that governments fall in parliamentary regimes. Because  "journalism wields such great power," his government will turn journalist itself.  It will become 'journalism incarnate" in actively shaping thought to what will  be presented as an historic rule. "No government has conceived of anything as  bold as what I am about to describe," he declares.

In the Eleventh Dialogue, Machiavelli listed the steps he would take to contain the press in an effort to reduce and control any hostility emanating from  such quarters. The tools he employs are many and impressive but useful for  what has a limited purpose in the overall scheme of things. In the Twelfth Dialogue, Machiavelli shows how he will expand the role of the press in his regime in proliferating newspapers and other means of communication. This will provide the proper outlet for the vanity that stands behind the penchant for writing  in modern times.

He intends to enlist the most talented writers of his generation to his cause and plays upon their secret predilections for power. The prince himself, we shall  see, has no mean pretensions in the field of letters and moves freely among men  of ideas. He bestows honors and other recognition on otherwise disaffected  intellectuals to reconcile them to the new political order. They are capable of  projecting the prince's rule in proper terms, while their art embellishes his reign with monuments to its spirit. In such literate times, they are essential allies of the  prince and key to the success of its political project.

His more important allies will speak from their favored positions and will give voice to the loftiness of princely sentiments. Their defense of the prince's  policies will be projected against the background of the narrow self-interested  views advanced by the myriad journals found in parliamentary regimes. Ultimately, he intends to convert the press, the freedom of which was to stimulate wide-ranging debate on public policy, to an instrument in service to the prince's  regime.

Putting the Press to Use

The new role for the press bespeaks a fine appreciation for the character of modern writing. The prince predicates his own effectiveness in this area precisely upon his understanding of its nature in modern times. He uses the press to  create certain impressions that help insinuate certain ideas. He eschews cruder propaganda techniques and prefers to shape rather than force opinions. His scheme is deemed appropriate for the most civilized regime in modern Europe,  where, according to Montesquieu, ideas still have the greatest influence.

Machiavelli begins rather simplistically. He will count the number of opposition newspapers in his kingdom and double their number with pro-government  journals whose ties to the prince will be covered. Machiavelli's plan gets refilled. He will categorize the newly created journals into several groups. The  first group will present the most orthodox views and will appeal to the most fanatic of government partisans. The next group will rally that "mass of lukewarm  and indifferent men" whose abiding interest lies in support of public order, regardless of government. These newspapers will reflect the official slant on things but in less demagogic terms.

A more important role is reserved for the remaining categories of newspapers. Their personnel will be used to infiltrate parties and other associations to  form respectable alternatives to existing journals. To become credible in this  capacity , they must downplay official orthodoxy. Once in place, they will proceed to subtly shade opinions. Such journals will be secretly tied to the prince as if by a leading string. Those who work in key positions in the journals ostensibly  agitate for their group's concerns, while they are actually employed by the government and serve its purposes.

Finally, every variety of opinion will be absorbed into the government's press and be secretly manipulated. "Like the god Vishnu, my press will have a hundred arms, and these arms will stretch out their hands throughout the country delicately giving form to all manner of opinion." Such a scheme begins to do justice to the presumed sophistication of the populace in succeeding to neutralize inconvenient views while amplifying its own.

The whole enterprise will be secretly controlled and coordinated from one center. What appears under the title of "division of printing and the press" has more in common with a bureau of intelligence. Montesquieu is confounded by the orders that are issued from such an agency. For example, the prince will be attacked. Newspapers devoted to him will "cry out and stir up trouble" for the  prince. But never will the principles of his regime or the foundations of his rule be subject to criticism. Noise will be heard but only on peripheral matters. It  signifies nothing more than polemical differences.

The benefits to the prince are many. In suffering the attacks he himself has orchestrated, the prince will earn a reputation for great restraint and tolerance.  The press will be supposed to have the widest latitude of freedom yet there will  never be heard the least doubts about the essentials of the prince's rule. Because  of their reputation for being captious, the reporter's silence on such matters will  be heard as loud praise.

The description of the scheme to this point, called "truly Machiavellian" by Montesquieu, expounds upon even more noteworthy benefits. Through his corps of journalists, the prince will establish an almost organic rapport with the people." A secret and mysterious sympathy" unites the prince with the will of the  people. The throne will be enveloped in a reverent awe. With the help of government newspapers, he can "plumb public opinion and assess whatever reaction" he provokes. He is free to try out schemes, float trial balloons, incite enthusiasm or hold it back, and attack enemies "without ever compromising" his  power.

As a slightly more chastened Montesquieu points out, the sole vulnerability in all this would seem to be the independent newspapers that were in existence  prior to the coup and are not affiliated with the government. Machiavelli is confident that his secrets will not reach the public. "Surely you are aware that journalism is a kind of freemasonry. Those who live by it are all more or less attached to one another by bonds of professional discretion." Indeed, "like ancient  auguries, they do not easily divulge the secrets of their oracles." But even those  privy to such secrets will be intimidated by the more severe measures leveled  against potential troublemakers.

The prince does not fear the few sharp reporters in his capital. Any influence they have will be circumscribed and exist only in that city. Gullible provincial  types are most susceptible to the prince's propaganda and are among his most  fervent supporters. He intends to make use of this situation through the mechanisms of the press that he has just elaborated. 

The prince will prepare the ground for his political moves by sending word to his press bureau. A stimulus will be given that spreads throughout the provinces. The capital will be the last affected by a movement that begins in the outer reaches of the kingdom. The capital, in effect, is no longer the activist center of the kingdom and is now reduced to a reactive role. It will run behind  trends without even being aware of it.

According to Montesquieu, "absolute power brings in its train a number of abuses for which the sovereign himself may not be responsible," but for which  he will be blamed. Even Machiavelli admits that the prince's government "will not be perfect." Moreover, he has assumed sole responsibility for all that happens and will thus, at the very least, lose prestige in the treatment he suffers  from certain journalists. Recognizing this vulnerability, Machiavelli does not  wish to be put into a position that requires a ceaseless recourse to covert repression. His censure is open. He simply obliges newspapers to print retractions. He  will "always have the last word, without resorting to violence."

Machiavelli asserts that his prince will engage in journalism to a much greater extent than imagined. In preparing a political initiative, Machiavelli will  have the issue mooted. Directives will be sent out to his political newspapers to  promote a course of action. Finally, an official directive will declare policy in a  Delphic-like pronouncement. Reacting to what is said, the newspapers will again  be in turmoil, each interpreting the prince's statement "according to its particular  slant" on things. The prince will then clarify the confusion to which his newspapers have contributed. [1]

This will have a profound impression on the people. All movement in the kingdom will be seen to initiate with the prince. Grand drama will surround his  official statements. He is not one to break his silence for trivial reasons. The  prince's statement will be solemn and stern, reflecting his august rank and elevation of mind. This will contrast sharply with the noise of the press, as each  newspaper reads the prince's statement in light of its own narrow concerns.  Where the throne radiates mystery, dignity, and decisiveness, the press in general appears as the source of squabbling and confusion. A host of publicists, the favored of the prince, will step forward as his effective mouthpiece.

Machiavelli intentionally creates the background of confusion that demands the commanding presence of the prince. Without changing its essential character, the press will be put to use in creating the impression of a prince who is indispensable and inhumanly prescient. The prince will present policies that circumstances force him to change as a development of a single thought and a  single goal. Words, if not deeds, can be made consistent. All this has a great  effect on the masses that must not only admire their leader but treat him as a  superior kind of being.

Machiavelli spares no enthusiasm in describing the activities of his official press. Every day the papers will be filled with references to his ministers' reports, projects, and schemes. While docile themselves, the masses, particularly in southern climes,2 demand an active and energetic government. "Novelties,  surprises, and theatrics" will constantly divert their attention. But beyond mere  diversion, the prince and his policies will be presented in a certain ideological  light that, we shall see in detail later, reflects key elements of the doctrines of  Saint-Simon. The people, we are told, do not like anything that smacks of atheism in their governments. He will build upon religious sentiments, not contradict  them, and will present his acts as under the protection of Divine Providence.

He may be likened to the medieval prince who, under the dispensation of "divine right," acts as "God's anointed representative on earth." In Part One,  Montesquieu had described princes as presuming the persons and property of all  their subjects as their own and the domain of their private pleasures. This nineteenth century prince attains to similar power but has as his putative goal the  welfare of the people. His utterances will "breathe the spirit of the most enthusiastic, universal liberalism." In matters of commerce, arts, industry, and administration, he will look to all sorts of projects, plans, innovations, and improvements and have his course of action broadcast by the press as aiming at  disinterested beneficence.

According to Montesquieu, certain Christian forces shape the development of modern society .This modern prince can be seen as advancing such influences in a secular context through social policies that answer to Christian charity in the  relief of man's estate. This is presented as effectively completing the social progress, begun by Christianity, in advancing the lot of the many, a goal that becomes the direct object of social policy. It is not so much in the name of "divine right" as traditionally understood that the new prince acts, but in the name of  "history" and the historic process, which is interpreted as tending to the prince's  rule as a culminating and providential goal. The people will be encouraged to see human and political problems as having technological solutions and hopes  and energies will be directed accordingly. Technological advances give the  masses palpable evidence of progress. The new reading of universal history will  reinforce a view, also shared by Montesquieu, which sees this progress as ex-  tending to political and moral realms.

In effect, the prince expands on the Enlightenment view of historic progress that Montesquieu emphasized in defending  liberalism in Part One but has it  culminate in an explicitly authoritarian regime. His regime intends no violence to the principle of popular sovereignty, however. Indeed, in the frequent appeal  to plebiscites that installs the prince in power, sanctions his constitution, and  ratifies policy decisions, that principle arguably enjoys more direct and relevant  application than in the liberal regime, where popular consent is understood to be  only tacitly accorded. Shortly, the prince will reveal the techniques available to  him to ensure that the exercise of the franchise will not pose any problems for  the prince's rule. In purely secular terms-according to the principle of popular  sovereignty-the prince gains legitimacy for his reign.

He is not, however, content to ground his rule on the mere voice of the people. To accommodate his dynastic ambitions, popular support must be deepened.  His rule, like that in the Middle Ages, seeks some higher justification to enlist the profounder allegiance of the masses. Here the religious elements of the prince's rule are adumbrated in the reintroduction of the principle of divine  right, which, in an updated version, once again becomes applicable to legitimate authoritarian rule. They stand more explicitly revealed at the end of the Dialogue when the prince emerges as a kind of "living god' and the character of his regime receives final definition.

Appeal is made to both secular and religious authority and points to realms that Montesquieu was at great pains in Part One to keep in vital tension. Here  they begin to blur and merge in the reign of the new prince as secular rule receives sanctification in quasi-religious terms. In ending that tension, Machiavelli  wants to end the deepest source of party strife, earlier identified by Montesquieu  as pitting the religious party of reaction against the secular modernists. A religious base is ultimately sought for politics to satisfy the profound need for order  in a modern society At the same time, autocratic rule is directed toward techno-  logical progress, as espoused by the modernists. Such a regime presents itself as  holding forth the greatest hope for ameliorating the lot of the masses, the constant object of the prince's public solicitude and a solid popular base for his regime. It could be characterized as being animated by the Christian teaching of  charity, but in a "new" application of this core doctrine to society. An unprecedented consensus of thought is sought on this basis. It has legions of writers and  artists at the prince's command to give it expression.

Unlike former times, which attained a consensus on fundamental issues in antiquity and the Middle Ages, thought need not be controlled. He will satisfy  the rage for writing and allow philosophic and religious questions to be debated.  But, as stated earlier, free inquiry will stop at key elements of his rule. There  may be differences of opinion, but as with the scholasticism of the high Middle Ages, it bespeaks a more fundamental harmony of views. 

At the end of the Twelfth Dialogue, it is Machiavelli who is anxious that his conversation with Montesquieu continues. His discussion of the press, hastened  because of circumstances that threaten their dialogue, has succeeded in giving a  "first impression" of the new regime. Montesquieu responds with irony to the  evident enthusiasm of Machiavelli. The image Machiavelli conjures of his prince is likened to "poetry" not unworthy of a "Byron." The talents of the author of the Mandragola are well displayed. Yet, it is a nervous irony as Montesquieu is "not quite certain that these things are not possible."

Formerly overconfident and complacent, Montesquieu is now uneasy as he gets his first clear premonition of the ultimate designs of the prince. Out of his  discomfort, he encourages Machiavelli to finish. Machiavelli wants to press the attack but not lose Montesquieu altogether through his growing exasperation. He  therefore yields the initiative to Montesquieu who may choose the topic he  wishes. He turns to the subject of conspiracies.

Conspiracies

The discussion of propaganda and conspiracies stand at the heart of Joly's work. Their juxtaposition is not accidental. In the Dialogue's most brilliant section, Machiavelli shows how the prince will publicly present his regime. This is  followed by a discussion of the most sinister aspects of his rule-machinations,  intrigues, and the subterranean supports that assure the prince's security. The  rest of the discussion in Part Two is literally enveloped in the subject of conspiracies as the topic is resumed in his concluding discussion of the police.

Conspiracies have a big role to play in Machiavelli's scheme that transcends what Montesquieu initially imagines. Montesquieu is perhaps too easily satisfied  by Machiavelli's methods of controlling conspiracies. This requires a return to  the discussion that allows Machiavelli to expand on how he will make crucial use of them. Machiavelli beguiles Montesquieu, whose patience is tested, by  fascinating him with the intricate web of tyranny he spins. Watching his interlocutor operate, he is often as much intrigued as repelled. It is a disposition of  mind that persists only so long as he remains convinced that he is merely involved in a theoretical dispute, the "fantasies" of a poet, as it were. 

The prince's rule begins with a conspiratorial coup and, in a way, all the prescriptions in Part Two are meant to guarantee  against a second such occurrence.  Conspiracy is the preoccupation of the prince and in a crucial sense it is the essence of his politics. [3]

Because the prince's constitution and other "reforms" have effectively blocked political paths of change, the most serious obstacle to his security  comes from conspiratorial sources. Montesquieu seems to understand this by  broaching the matter at this particular time when, after Machiavelli's brilliant  discourse on propaganda, he would like to exploit his most obvious vulnerability.

The design of Machiavelli's politics, aside from cultivating the masses, was to take the necessary steps against the fewer but more spirited of his subjects.  The people at large are tamed through various benefactions, but force must subdue the latter, at least initially. It is from this group that the danger of conspiracies arises. The more thorough the prince's political control, the more they are  forced to extralegal channels and ultimately to resistance in seeking effective  political expression.

The prince may "liberalize" his rule, but only when assured that these more spirited individuals have been subdued and no longer pose a serious threat to  him. Otherwise, political control requires a concomitant repression and an  enormous police apparatus geared to searching out and eradicating conspiracies.  But this has its own inherent dangers. Repression that is too thorough will of  itself spark broader resistance to his rule. The most important features of the  prince's politics are found as much in the prince's public pronouncements and  projects as they are in the use of repression, which becomes his most delicate  political problem. [4]

Montesquieu had earlier argued in Part One that the "public morality" of the prince cannot escape the strictures that govern "private morality." A rule that  begins in violence and which uses violence to stay in power will end violently.  Machiavelli gives testimony to the truth of Montesquieu's contention in presenting a public image of the prince in the Twelfth Dialogue that effectively masks  the violent steps that follow. It is to be remembered that the new prince "stands  for peace." Furthermore, the prince is most anxious to be a popular tyrant and to  put himself on a course where repression can be progressively eased. This is one  of the chief ends of propaganda, the effectiveness of which will diminish the  necessity for harshness.

The topics of propaganda and conspiracies are thus intimately connected in a thematic way as integral components of the prince's policy. As propaganda has  its effects, the class of people that would resist his rule win be reduced. Con-  spirators will be deterred from their projects if convinced that their efforts will find no broader appeal among the growing partisans of the regime. Moreover,  the ideological appeal of the prince is directed toward satisfying many that  might be among the number of potential revolutionaries. "Almost all their ideas  have an incredible affinity with the doctrines of absolute power."

Machiavelli will cleverly use conspiracies so that he can move against conspirators themselves through his police. Harshness can then be focused and concentrated and need not disturb those other elements of society, longing for  peace, that are content with his rule, if not its enthusiastic supporters or chief  beneficiaries. Machiavelli had stated he would have his prince be 'Journalism  incarnate." Apparently, he is also the regime's arch conspirator. Our discussion of conspiracies will include Machiavelli's discussion in the Eighteenth Dialogue  and will give a broad outline of the state's repressive machinery and its use.

Machiavelli states that he will use the moment after his coup to move against secret societies since it is through them that conspirators are recruited. Accordingly, "the act of organizing a secret society or of being affiliated with one will  be severely punished." Also, Machiavelli states, "I would start with hundreds of  deportations-all those who greeted my coming to power with gun in hand."  Any alleged member of a secret society will be tried administratively. There will be little pity for sedition mongers. Peace must be implacably restored.

Montesquieu sees the future as filled with executions. Given the peculiar sensitivity of such a despot to conspiratorial elements, he sees Machiavelli as  launching an all-out attack to annihilate any and all seedbeds of dissension. Machiavelli will not proceed down the harsh path predicted by Montesquieu. If rigorous enough at the beginning, future dissidence will be kept to a minimum.  He follows Duke Valentinois, who, apart from some "ruthless moments," was "a  rather good natured fellow," especially kind to the "disadvantaged," Machiavelli  adds facetiously.

Contrary to what Montesquieu thinks, some secret societies must not only be tolerated in his regime, but actively cultivated. Those within these societies are "from every nation, every class, and every social rank." Without their knowing  it, the prince will have his allies infiltrate secret societies. This will allow the  prince to be "privy to the most obscure intrigues." His ultimate goal would be to  subvert their leaders and control them from the throne.

Machiavelli hints at the size of his secret police, an institution so vast "that in the heart of his kingdom one half the populace will be watching the other  half." To please Montesquieu, he might change the name of his police to something more euphemistic, such as "ministry of state." He will establish security  bureaus in each of his departments. These will survey the offices of government  and will be centralized under the prince's direction. This is only the beginning of  the "multitude of tasks" that he will assign to what he calls "the most important  of my ministries." An enormous secret police will be integrated with the machinery of government. Its activities will extend to the remotest reaches of society and beyond, into international realms.

Machiavelli's police share certain key traits with police in later totalitarian states, not the least of which is its expanded ranks and functions. Integrated into  various facets of government, one of its many duties will be to ensure political  loyalty. When we recall that the prince's corps of journalists are really involved  in intelligence gathering, we begin to see a new social role for police activities  that intends to guarantee the orthodoxy of all opinion and behavior in matters  essential to the prince. Machiavelli implies that his police will be everywhere.  Through it, he will be like the god Vishnu, not only able to "touch everything"  but literally to "see everything." However, unlike the police of later totalitarian regimes, its more repressive functions are not meant to spread terror through the  populace at large. Rather, it guards its secrecy while choking the seeds of potential resistance.

The prince's object is not to intimidate everyone but only the dangerous. As Machiavelli points out, acceding to "Gallic conviviality" and its garrulous char-  acter, "his reign will not be as savage" as Montesquieu thinks. Gatherings of a  certain number of people will be permitted. Even literature may be discussed.  But, under its cover, people must not promote partisan political goals. In the  end, the nature ofMachiavelli's secret police is a reflection of the regime's revolutionary objective to arrive at a new historic order, while eschewing a reliance  on the force typical of later totalitarian regimes.

The international functions of the police will be diverse. There will be those whose backgrounds allow them easy access to court life in other countries.  These are bon vivants who will survey foreign princes and even certain pretenders to his own crown. Next, there will be a cadre whose revolutionary credentials are impeccable. They will penetrate the ranks of more obscure revolutionary circles, both at home and abroad. The prince will also subsidize bookstores,  foreign journals, and publishing houses, where political opinions can be more  easily monitored. Finally, he will have a prince of his own house seated on the  steps of thrones in foreign capitals who "plays the role of the malcontent." He  gulls his entourage while informing the prince of the most interesting intrigues  hatched abroad. [5]

Domestically, his secret police will infiltrate all levels of society. It is only slightly hyperbolic when Machiavelli states that "there will be no private room  or gathering place, no drawing room or intimate setting where an eavesdropper  is not found to absorb what is said at any hour." Among other things, Machiavelli's police will survey the mails and will possess the most advanced instruments of espionage. Such things are alluring for the characters that would be  attracted to serve in his police, drawn to such activities by "a kind of love of the art, " not unlike the fabricators of The Protocols, we might add. 

Machiavelli reveals other benefits that accrue from his way of handling conspiracies. He confounds Montesquieu by saying that some conspiracies are an  absolute necessity. At opportune times, contrived conspiracies can be put into  play to rally the people and justify a request for extraordinary powers. Hearings can be called to investigate his sham conspiracy and if they are skillfully handled, the prince "will pass for being too easygoing." Where in fact repression is  most thorough, it is most hidden, and the reputation of the prince masks a different reality.

The centrality of conspiracies in Joly's organization of the Dialogue reflects what is perhaps the most fundamental preoccupation of the prince. Moreover, in  a very real way, much of the prince's activities are at their core conspiratorial-  the application of "force and cunning" in league with the secret police. In Part  One, where Machiavelli purported to state the essence of his teaching, he implied that the successful prince does not distinguish between domestic and foreign policy. In effect, the spirit of foreign policy, at least in its reliance on "force and cunning," predominates even in domestic policy. 

Judicial Reform

Machiavelli concludes his teaching on the techniques of tyrannical rule in Part Two with judicial reforms. Again, the bent of his proposals is directed  against conspiracies. He intends to undermine the judicial process and protections afforded the individual that extend to political enemies of the state. Accordingly, the prosecution of cases will be expedited. Arguments will be heard  before a single magistrate instead of a panel. The privacy of such proceedings will work to the defendant's disadvantage.

Machiavelli also shows himself a crafty master of judicial proceedings in using them to condition the masses. He will do away with the distinction between  misdemeanors of common law and political misdemeanors. He will also do  away with specific criminal courts that separate different classes of offenders. "In my kingdom," Machiavelli states, "no distinction will be made between the  insolent journalist and the ordinary thief. They will share the same cell and appear in the same court. The conspirator will share the docket with the forger and  the murderer and appear before the same jury." Such an innovation will have an  effect on public opinion. The people will see "the conspirator treated no differently than the common criminal" and "will begin to blur the two categories of  crime" in their mind.

Machiavelli's discussion of conspiracies in the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Dialogues lead in both instances to a discussion of the judiciary because the  laws that are necessary to control political enemies eventually will be brought  before the courts for their hearing and interpretations. In the Montesquieuan scheme, the judiciary is the ultimate check on the tyrant and the last refuge of the subject. We have already seen how its character begins to change in the new  regime founded by Machiavelli. 

In general, the judicial branch retains its eminent position. The harsh laws of the prince will be determined with a solicitude for certain "forms." In this regard, Machiavelli is very far from the barbarous processes of government attributed to him at the beginning of his conversation. Indeed, "violence plays no  role." Unlike traditional despotism, this regime is premised on respect for due  process of law. The prince finds support where every enlightened ruler of today finds it-in the law, not outside it. In fact, Machiavelli feels "no need to decree a great number of harsh laws," as many laws necessary to the prince will already  be in force. Without exception, all governments must have laws sufficient to  protect the public order. Machiavelli's government is no different. In difficult  situations, the prince may not have to pass new laws but only resurrect old ones  that have fallen into desuetude.

Machiavelli begins "judiciously" enough with deference to judicial forms. The prince would rather appeal to magistrates on the precedents of existing laws than to have to convince judges of the need to apply harsh and novel acts. circumstances require the prince to be adaptable to meet extreme situations. The  new prince will attain this flexibility moving through the laws, not beyond them.  "You see that it is only a question of giving the courts a little fine-tuning. This is  always easy in centralized countries where the judiciary stays in direct contact"  with the administrative machinery.

Machiavelli turn to a "very ingenious and simple scheme" to achieve his ends. In the Montesquieuan system, judges are appointed by the king to life tenure, not elected to the bench. The intent of such a procedure is to remove judicial selection from the pressure of politics and to allow merit to determine the  choice of personnel, according to the prince's considered judgment. The judge is  not the representative of the people but of the law and he is to act as its living  embodiment. Life tenure ensures his independence and conduces to a temperament rich in the prudence that comes with age among men who live by the "continued exercise of the mind."

Machiavelli intends to exploit the prince's appointment power to eradicate the independence of the bench and tie it to despotic rule. He does not advocate  anything as crude as court-packing. [6] There will be no wholesale turnover of  court personnel nor any revision of judicial operations. In harmony with his  other "reforms," he wants to maintain dignity and respect for the bench because, once subverted, it will be a useful tool in his hands. He proposes a single change, justifiable on the grounds of the high esteem in which he holds the judicial branch. He will merely require judges to retire at a certain age to preserve the judiciary from the unseemliness of senility. Public opinion will be on his  side.

The repercussions from this small change are great. It plays to the careerist ambitions of sitting and prospective judges. It shatters the esprit de corps and  common interest that binds them as a branch of government and introduces divisiveness among men supposedly characterized by the disinterested concern for  the law. Machiavelli explains that forced retirement will open many positions  that can be filled by the prince. His appointments will set the tone for the judiciary as a whole and shape the behavior of prospective judges as they strive to  emulate the favored. Every year, Machiavelli continues, at least twenty and as  many as fifty new appointments can be made on the basis of a single vacancy  through the successive advancements of those in lower positions. Career interests, especially among the young and ambitious, will keep these justices from  ranging too far from the prince's wishes. "In their deliberations, the police  power will receive an interpretation so favorable to my power that I will be relieved of a multitude of restrictive measures that otherwise would be necessary." 

The rest of this discussion, continued in the Fourteenth Dialogue, may be said to focus on the merits and drawbacks of an active bench. As Machiavelli  points out, it is perhaps impossible to keep judicial activities contained. Even the  most clearly written law is liable to surprising interpretations. Moreover, the  legislature often passes laws with a certain elasticity to accommodate ensuing  situations. The potentiality for activism is latent in certain legislation. Once the  judiciary as a whole has been rendered subservient through appointment "winnowing," an active judiciary can prove useful to the prince in cloaking despotic  will with the respectability of "forms."

Machiavelli gives two such examples involving the court of appeals, apparently taken from actual cases in contemporary France. In an electoral matter the  court declares the principle of a "tacit abrogation" of law to escape the potentially embarrassing prosecution of an elected representative. In a matter of concern to the press, "peddling" of publications, restricted under certain police regulations, is extended to even the author of a "pamphlet" who distributes several copies, even as gifts! Thus, "instead of a simple exercise of the police power, you have a law regulating freedom of the press and restricting the right  to publish one's thoughts."

Montesquieu claims that when courts are not bound by their own judgments, numerous lawsuits will result from individuals who try to affect policy through  judicial petitions. This need not be the case, however, as several determinate  decisions on specific matters could definitively discourage what are costly endeavors for any citizen. Declaratory judgments could even preempt inconvenient  lawsuits. Montesquieu rightly suspects the general thrust of Machiavelli's policy to place the people under a form of paternalism, a mode of governance far from  the lupine practices he first imagined. [8]

Political Reform

Machiavelli freely admits his intention to declare his prince not only king, but hereditary monarch for life with succession going to the first-born male. He  continues his pose as a man of the Middle Ages in harkening back to the principle of Salic and Frank monarchic rule. However, he has already declared that his  regime will be founded on popular sovereignty. This causes Montesquieu to see  Machiavelli as espousing two incompatible premises. The dynastic ambitions of  the founder can not be built on such unstable foundations. The people need not  have recourse to revolution to rid themselves of the prince as they are given the  means to deliver themselves in their right to vote.

In Dialogue Fifteen, Machiavelli elaborates on the techniques that are available to ensure the "proper" exercise of the franchise and gives a view of his rule  strikingly different from medieval notions. Though he wears a crown, his  avowed goal is to embody popular will. He is in fact one with the people. "What I will, they will. What I do, they do." He declares himself the "trustee" of all  power it has delegated. He is their "true representative."

With this understood, Machiavelli will begin by extending appointment powers where they do not already exist. For example, the prince will appoint the  administration of the localities. The franchise will then be exercised only to determine national representatives. Presumably; this is where the sovereign will of  the people is voiced anyway and where interesting and important concerns are  decided. Therefore, resistance to his restrictions of the franchise to the national  legislature would not be forthcoming. Such policy might even pass as enlightened administrative policy.

In avoiding local elections, Machiavelli will keep his citizenry from participating in a too-frequent exercise of their sovereignty. This will prevent the cultivation of certain habits that develop from a vigilant regard for the operations of  government. People in the provinces will be taught to look to the centralized  administration to solve their collective problems. The prince will focus his energies on the national chamber. In effect, he can secure his reign by making sure  of this body by steps that amount to de facto appointment there.

Machiavelli will have candidates swear "a solemn oath" to the person of the prince and not, as in 1789, to the nation. Here begins a more overt effort to accommodate them to personal rule. Fidelity and personal loyalty will once again be elevated in the public's esteem. Such an oath will contrast sharply with republican mottoes of former eras.

According to Machiavelli, "the smallest details of electoral laws are of the utmost importance." He taunts Montesquieu by directly citing the authority of The Spirit of the Laws in this regard. "The laws establishing suffrage are fundamental, likewise how suffrage is apportioned and how ballots are cast." [9]

Machiavelli states that he will submit his list of candidates with those of other parties. Here the wisdom of extending his appointment powers comes into  play. Within the government itself, Machiavelli will have the built-in support he  needs eager to work for the cause of the prince and his party, if for no other reason than personal interest. In the nature of things, the prince's party will be the  strongest. Indeed, the prince himself will be seen as the people's most ardent  and true representative. Through his control of the press, the prince will have the ears of his subjects as well as a feeling for what they desire.

The relative strength of the prince's party can also be assured by sabotaging opposition parties. Still other ways have been found to paralyze their efforts.  Political assemblies will be forbidden and the ban will extend to conventions,  thus preventing opposition parties from drawing up platforms and drumming up  enthusiasm for shared political goals. Public proclamations for opposition candidates will be tolerated but will be dwarfed by the same proclamation of support for the prince's candidates.

Machiavelli next proceeds to an elaboration of how suffrage will be regulated to his advantage. He will have voting by commWIe. The vote will then be split among local personages and be attracted to the better-financed and better-known official candidate. His eye is not directed toward men of ability ."Public  order has less need of men of talent than men devoted to the government." In  effect, "great ability belongs to the person who sits on the throne and those gathered around it." Moreover, elections will be in single-member districts with a plurality vote being sufficient to elect or return the prince's favorite. There will  be recourse to "gerrymandering" and districts will be conveniently divided to  dissipate the crucial numbers of opposition votes.

Finally, electoral colleges can be influenced. Machiavelli eschews a more blatant form of vote tampering, given other means at his disposal. To Montesquieu's surprise, ballot stuffing, a measure "during the time of Leo X" is not  proposed. The controversy it could ignite is dangerous and unseemly and can be  avoided, we may presume. [10] Recalcitrant districts can be made amenable  through patronage. Contracts and other benefactions may be promised districts if there vote is right. In the discussion of the budget, we shall see the expanded opportunity for such leverage.

Machiavelli admits that, despite such efforts, opposition may emerge. Scandals alone may create vacancies that will be filled by opponents. However, he  never claimed that his regime or his representatives would be perfect. From his  position of strength, he can admit to faults and thereby appear magnanimous.  Moreover, within parliament he will have orators on his side that will anticipate  and counter attacks. Legislative business will be controlled by the presiding officials that the prince has appointed and conducted according to his rules.

Social Reforms

Montesquieu next draws attention to certain social groups that are important buffers against tyranny. Unlike parties, the expressed goal of these groups is not  directly political but their influence has important consequences for politics. The  principles that they serve harmonize well with the liberal design of things. Montesquieu claimed that modern political mores are least receptive to the regime of  tyranny. These groups encourage those elements of character that are nourished  in a greater community of shared interests and high-minded purposes, independent of the state.

As a political system, Montesquieuan liberalism tried to institute checks and balances internal to the functioning of government so as to frustrate tyranny.  These groups provide some of the stronger social checks to a tyrannical project.  They are the social supports to the political system that grow up and flourish in  the freedom that the system allows. By virtue of freedom, they are allowed to  exist, and they in turn endow the regime of freedom with certain strengths.

Montesquieu lists some of these major social groupings: the church, the university, the bar of law, the national militia, and business corporations. The  prince's relation to private enterprise is not treated here but can be extrapolated  from his discussion of the budget and state finances. The variety and vitality of these groups poses a problem for the prince in his move to centralize control.  Montesquieu characterizes Machiavellian politics as trying to annihilate political  parties and destroy "other collective forces."

Unlike the disciplined regular army, the citizens' militia is often a fractious group. Machiavelli will dissolve it as currently organized only to reconstruct it on new foundations. He will choose its leaders and determine where it can legally exist. To outlaw such a "useless institution" (or to confiscate its gWIS, we presume) would be exceedingly unpopular. The people derive a sense of security from its existence, however false, as well as certain "puerile" satisfactions from participating in certain of its exercises.

Machiavelli's approach to higher education shows greater seriousness. Nevertheless, he declares that "the way things are now handled is just about fine" the way it is. He immediately explains himself. "These great bodies of learning  are no longer organized as they once were." The state has already encroached  upon a large measure of their autonomy and reoriented the direction of learning  to the point where they are no longer anything more than the appendage of the  state and an extension of its power and influence. His attack on the institutions  of higher learning is as much an attack on liberal education itself.

Machiavelli merely furthers recent trends affecting state education. It is only a question of a decree or ministerial order to further the changes he wants. He will assume the prerogative of hiring and promoting the heads and members of  the teaching corps. He also assumes control over the curricula. For example, the  study of constitutional politics in the teaching of law will be proscribed. He  wants to prevent certain false ideas from reaching the youth, who might become  as "wrapped up in writing constitutions as they would tragic poetry." Such studies later on will only produce utopians instead of sound statesmen. The changes  signal a more or less blatant attempt at indoctrination. "I want the history of my  reign to be taught in my schools while I am still alive. In such a way, a new  prince finds his way into the hearts of a generation."

Machiavelli will multiply the state schools. He thereby gains a reputation for love of learning while infiltrating the colleges and universities with professors he has appointed. Private education will not be proscribed but will suffer in competition with the state schools. The prince advocates open enrollment and  free courses in all the major cities. This will not only dilute educational excellence as traditionally conceived, it will also provide a convenient forum for his  indoctrination, as he tries "to co-opt even the last vestiges of independent thinking."

According to Machiavelli, the law profession must also be suborned. "You know better than I, Montesquieu, that this profession fosters cold and stubborn  temperaments when it comes to matters of principle and minds whose tendency  is to hold the acts of government to strict legality." A rigid emphasis on the  formal requirements of law would frustrate the grand designs of the prince, who  might be called to account for his illegal ways in a court of justice. However, the  people hold the bar of law in high esteem and see its independence as a guarantee of material possessions, life, and honor. Machiavelli's proposal is to have the  prince designate the bar while not touching its independence in any other way.  Current practices could be discredited as favoring the well-connected over the  meritorious. Machiavelli would wean lawyers away from the temptation to en-  gage in certain causes that embarrass the prince by tying their livelihood to his  will.

According to Montesquieu, however, the greatest bulwark of liberty is found in the clergy and the propagation of faith. "I know of nothing that threatens your  power more," he declares. "The Christian teaching is a teaching of liberty." The  spread of Christian influence through the "humble and gentle" Gospels was enough "to destroy the Roman Empire, Caesarism, and its power." Its morality  elevates the individual and strengthens the soul, over which human power has  no sway. In sum, "nations that avow Christianity will always escape despotism."  Assuming the prince rules over such a country, he will be checked by the clergy,  whose influence is intimately felt everywhere, emanating from the sanctuary to  deeply influence the family and the schools. [11]

Machiavelli denies that the priesthood is as Montesquieu indicates. Pointing to history , in both ancient and modern times, he has found it "to be a natural  support for absolute power." The ultimate basis of the prince's authority is no  different from its own. The idiom of his public speech, laced with appeals to divine sanction, will find approval from the priestly caste. Machiavelli further  denies that the church has influence as wide and deep as Montesquieu claims.  The progress of Enlightenment thought has had its effect as it shapes liberal and  advanced opinion toward anti-clericalism. Machiavelli would provoke a schism  in the Church by appealing to such elements. A break with Rome would be warmly greeted in such quarters and perhaps not broadly resisted by the masses.  But, finally, Machiavelli has a keener appreciation for the conservatism of the  people-already manifest in his appeal to "divine right"-that he would want to build upon as more solid than liberal opinion and secularism.

Machiavelli intends to radicalize the anti-clerical elements in his regime to impress the clergy and the papacy with the anti-religious fervor with which he  must contend. The Pope, already under siege in Italy, would be grateful to the prince for any effort on his part to maintain the status quo in his regime. In coming to the Pontiff's aid with his armies, the prince finally succeeds in attaching  him to his person both by gratitude and self-interest. In rising to his defense, he  becomes the protector of faith and installs his legions in Rome. These armies  might prove useful to intimidate the Pope if his gratitude becomes exhausted.  Such a foreign policy will open up options that can be followed according to  changing circumstances. He will have the aJternative at any time to accede to  those liberal elements in his regime, if need be. 

In the meantime, the defense of the Pope will be popular with the masses. Again, in pointed reference to Napoleon I, the people might even see the prince  anointed in Paris. In such an event, the lingering strength of Christianity and its  hold on the public's consciousness would attach itself to such a prince. Machiavelli thereby shows how the Vicar of Rome can be made the servant of the new Caesar, reconciling the tension between secular power and religious authority in  the prince's favor. "The secular religion of revolutionary ideology ends up playing the same role that orthodox religion did ... Caesaro-Papism is reborn and the  interpreter of History becomes the pope-emperor." [12]

We shall see that this theme gets most explicit treatment in the last part of the Dialogue and concludes the work as a whole. With Montesquieu, we come slowly to the realization that Machiavelli is describing not merely a change in rule but the most radical and complete of foundings, extending beyond political and into spiritual realms. At the end of the Dialogue itself, the portrait of the prince is complete. He seeks God-like status in an Empire that wants universal influence.

Notes

1. Here is the forerunner of our masters of "leaks" and "spin." The "spinning" of economic statistics in manipulating the budget is comically fresh. Napoleon's ministers  are specifically cited in Part Three.

2. Machiavelli makes this remark to the thinker who famously focused on considerations of climate to determine what is politically appropriate, or possible.

3. This accords with Marx's analysis of Louis and will be discussed more fully in the last chapter. Raymond Aron has stated that "the maintenance of a kind of conspiracy  within the party that controls the state" is one of the essential elements of totalitarianism.  It is one on a list of other elements which, "all of them taken together" (Aron's emphasis) reveals the "essence" of the phenomenon. See Aron's essay "The Essence of Totalitarianism According to Hannah Arendt" in Daniel J. Mahoney, ed. In Defense of Political  Reason (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993) 104. It is interesting that all the  elements Aron mentions, except terror, are features of Napoleon's rule. The absence of  terror indicates what perhaps made Napoleon's regime more sedulous than twentieth century varieties as well as crucially different.

4. Autocratic regimes of today, threatened by oftentimes violent secret societies, use the whole panoply of repressive techniques so ably described by Joly. His discussion is a worthy introduction to the essential character of certain of these places.

5. This was the role played by Prince Napoleon, cousin of the Emperor, who had widespread connections in opposition circles. His faction, called the Palais Royal Group, was active in working class causes.

6. Unlike FDR's very rare political misstep.

7. The incident he chooses to illustrate his point is significant. Remember, the secret police of the Second Empire saw Joly as indeed the writer of just such a "pamphlet."  Parenthetically, it can be noted that Napoleon understood very well the threat from a  samizdat press.

8. With the discussion of the judiciary, Machiavelli has completed his teaching regarding the formal institutions of government. In the broad sweep of his treatment of the  judiciary and the fine details of criminal proceedings, we should bear in mind that Joly  himself was a practicing lawyer and observed the justice of the Second Empire from  within courtrooms and behind bars.

9. The discussion of suffrage in democracies is found in The Spirit of the Laws II 2.

10. An American who has lived through "The Dade County Shad Controversy" and other voting irregularities can appreciate Machiavelli's prudent restraint in this regard.

11. Machiavelli underscores the point by references to The Spirit of the Laws XXIV 3. He there memorably writes: "How admirable the religion which, while it seems to have  in view the felicity of the other life, continues the happiness of this!"

12. The words are Raymond Aron's again and describe Stalinist totalitarianism. They are perfect in their description of Louis Napoleon, as he appears in the Dialogue. They  indicate how archetypical the Joly analysis is for the despotic ern he saw forthcoming.  See Raymond Aron, "The Essence" in in Defense of Political Reason, l 10.

Chapter Five:  THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

Part Three consists of four Dialogues, the Eighteenth through the Twenty-First and divides about equally between Machiavelli and Montesquieu. Montesquieu  first lays out the teaching of modern finance and budgetary science, which he  believes is inimical to despotism. It is followed by Machiavelli's attack and final  victory over Montesquieu, who meekly defers to his interlocutor in Part Four and allows him to put the finishing touches on the portrait of tyranny he has drawn. 

The drama of the dialogue in Part Three gives us convincing evidence of Machiavelli's absolute control over the movement of the discussion. In success-  fully handling what Montesquieu perceives as "the most difficult problem of all"  for a sovereign who wants to exert absolute power, we suspect Machiavelli's  complete control throughout the entire conversation.

The movement of Part Three is not unlike that of the conversation to this point. The debate begins with Montesquieu's emphatic assertions and ends with Machiavelli's victory. Montesquieu begins this section with a display of confidence he has not shown since the beginning of their encounter.

Though The Spirit of the Laws is not simply a "financial treatise," it displays a masterful grasp of the science of modern economics that Montesquieu in fact  helped formulate in his most famous work. [1] On the basis of such competence,  Montesquieu presumes a superiority over Machiavelli and has held this subject  matter in reserve as a final obstacle to Machiavelli's goal. It is understood as his "last stand," as it were, from a position he deems unassailable.

Though Machiavelli has accomplished a great deal thus far, "he has only just begun," compared with what remains for him to do. Machiavelli coyly encourages Montesquieu by assuming the defensive and playing to what his adversary  deems the real basis of his superiority. A tone of deferential modesty is struck.  "I confess that you take me somewhat aback. I was born in a century extremely  backward when it comes to matters of economics and I understand very little  about such things."

Machiavelli takes the position of student to teacher and allows Montesquieu to expound his doctrines confidently. After his previous rout, Montesquieu  would only be too eager to press any advantage he has. Though Machiavelli claims to be extremely backward in economic matters, he shortly will reveal his  knowledge as up to date. It includes the "latest theories" and might be said to supercede the liberal understanding in such matters. We eventually come to realize that Machiavelli has maneuvered Montesquieu into a position that will render his defeat all the more resounding and definitive.

Liberal Economics Explained

Montesquieu proceeds as if it were he that was baiting Machiavelli. Accord- ing to his view of despotic government, the tyrant necessarily rules over a primitive economy and a less than enterprising population. Destitution is the common  lot and any wealth that does exist makes it's way to the despot's hands. Under  such conditions, there is neither the means nor the will for society to generate its  own wealth. As The Spirit of the Laws indicates, it follows as "a principle" of  that government that the despot can impose "only small taxes" on his subjects. [2]  To finance their rule, the sovereigns of such societies are forced to plunder others, relying on arms for what industry can not produce. Having some inkling of Machiavelli's aggressive designs in foreign policy, Montesquieu feigns naivete when he wonders aloud if his despotism will follow suit. In this case, the subjects of Machiavelli's regime might at least avoid an oppressive taxation. "Will  you at least give your subjects the same satisfaction?"

For his part, Machiavelli asserts that there is "nothing more questionable than the proposition" put forth in that particular part of The Spirit of the Laws. [3]  Montesquieu's theory might be true "in Turkey or in Persia" but he does not  intend to rule a satrapy. To say the least, the praise of oriental despotism at the  end of the Fifth Dialogue stands qualified. He intends to rule a luxurious European kingdom whose labor economy generates a superfluity of goods and whose  government provides a broad range of services.

How could Montesquieu expect him to limit himself to moderate taxes when he has both the opportunity and need to tax on a larger scale? In modern societies, "labor produces a superabundance of wealth that presents itself in various  forms-all amenable to taxes." Moreover, luxury is a tool of modern governments. The state undertakes extensive public services. These create posts for functionaries who enjoy great salaries at public expense. An active and munificent rule will prove costly. The main question is how its revenue needs can be  met.

Looking to past experience, Montesquieu sees this absolute ruler as forced to warfare to meet the financial needs that cannot be met internally without crushing his subjects. "He would have to be a conqueror, for war would be the principal source of those revenues that would keep him in splendor and support his  armies." However, this presents its own problems, not the least of which is the  necessity to remain victorious in such foreign undertakings if the despot himself  is not to find his wealth confiscated by others. In a sort of vicious circle, the  despot turns to war for his finances. But to guarantee his success in war, he needs greater and greater wherewithal.

Moreover, unlike the past, the conduct of war in contemporary times is complicated for an even more substantial reason. Given the destructive power of  modern weaponry, large-scale warfare, to which the despot is driven, has become outmoded. [4] The expense of war, for lack of better motives, makes its conduct prohibitive. "War is no longer profitable." There can be no rational incentive for Machiavelli's despot to pursue a course that ends by ruining "the conqueror as well as the conquered." Inevitably, then, revenue must be raised internally, through taxes. It is precisely here that Machiavelli's despot would seem to  receive his strongest check.

In despotic states, Montesquieu points out, there exists a "legal fiction" that  allows the despot to tax at will. "The sovereign is presumed to possess all the  goods of his subject by right." Therefore, when he expropriates something, he is only taking back what belongs to him in the first place. He thus finds little resistance on the part of the people. Legally, at least, there is no recourse.

Modern society is informed by a different understanding of things. Government is instituted to protect subjects who cede to it only those powers necessary  for guaranteeing their security and possessions. When modern governments appropriate, they are perceived to be taking private property.This is why such action must be sanctioned by the people, or their representatives, who assUl'e the spending of monies for necessary and agreed-upon common purposes. Far from  being based on a "legal fiction," both appropriations and spending follow a "due  process of law" premised on "informed" consent and popular control.

To remain absolute, the prince must be free to dispose of the resources procured for him by taxes. His actions are "above discussion and control." This  matter is crucial to Machiavelli's rule. If the new prince cannot control finances  absolutely, he cannot remain absolute politically. The whole reign "threatens to collapse on this score."

Machiavelli's easy acceptance of popular control over his budget seems to Montesquieu testimony of his interlocutor's naivete in such matters. In letting  the power of the purse stay in the hands of the nation's representatives, Machiavelli has surrendered the most fundamental of powers to the people. "This principle is the clearest token of the people's sovereignty." Giving the people the right to vote taxes means giving them the right "to refuse, limit, or reduce to  nothing the power of the prince to act." As Machiavelli stated earlier, the prince  will likely find it easier to trifle with the people's liberties than with matters  where their material interests are so clearly involved. In sum, their interests are  bound to an economic regime antithetical to despotism. [5]

Moreover, "those who vote taxes are taxpayers themselves." Their concern in such matters is inextricable with that of the nation. This conduces to vigilance  on the part of representatives who regard such affairs with eyes wide open. The new prince will find the nation's representatives as "adamant and unaccommodating in appropriating money" as he found them "docile with regard to liberties."

Machiavelli makes two points that reveal the weakness of Montesquieu 's argument. Dealing with his last point first, Machiavelli points out that, taxpayers  or not, the representatives of the nation are salaried. They may be disciplined by  the leadership and lose positions of importance, along with their emoluments.  They are not disinterested guardians of the nation's purse. Their votes may be assured by making spending decisions they favor. Montesquieu does not deny the validity of Machiavelli's counterarguments. Ultimately, fiscal matters are a  question of votes like any other piece of legislation and the prince will have an  assured majority within the legislature.

More important, Montesquieu exaggerates his case when he assumes parsimony on the part of an "enlightened" group of citizens as well as an unyielding   jealousy over their prerogatives in fiscal matters. He might very well be right if  the new prince based his power on the aristocracy or the bourgeoisie. However,  the foundations of his rule rests upon "the proletariat, the bulk of which possess  nothing." Machiavelli repeats an argument of Part One when he states that,  unlike the propertied classes, fiscal niceties do not inform the character, interests, and habits of the working class. Since the "costs of supporting the state are hardly borne by them," he will take further steps so that "they are completely exempt from any burden." In the expanded franchise, he will have the votes to extract necessary revenues by encouraging the predatory instincts of the poor. [6]

Montesquieu very soberly rebukes such a policy. The poor must be made to see their interests as resting with a system that advances their liberation from  poverty, not in plundering the sources of wealth. It is a grave error to believe  that the proletariat can profit from such attacks. The best promise for the poor  lies in encouraging productivity and expanding the base of capital. "By impoverishing the haves through fiscal measures, you will only be creating an unstable  social situation. In time, even the have-nots will be totally impoverished." A  secure social and political order is a prerequisite for the release of society's productive forces and is ill-served by a mortal class warfare that Machiavelli's policies invite. 

Montesquieu apparently is blind to the great concentration of wealth that Machiavelli sees today. "In contemporary society," he states, "there is no rigid  line of demarcation between the rich and the poor," at least in any permanent  sense. "Through labor, the artisan of yesterday can be the bourgeois of tomorow." Though he assumes he speaks from the most advanced historical point of view, Montesquieu is perhaps describing the liberal regime in only its nascent stages. He is oblivious to the rapid social changes wrought by industrialization  in the interval of years hidden from his view. In any event, Machiavelli indicates  that he is fully capable of countering his interlocutor's "pretty theories" with  those of his own. In fact, his are presented as more harmonious with the conditions of "contemporary society" and its historic demands. As we shall see, such  theories do not contemplate class warfare to bring about the necessary social  revolution.

Such a policy would run counter to the conservative instincts of the new prince and the desire for order that is repeatedly demonstrated in the political  steps he took in Part Two. All revolutionary change is meticulously veiled and  takes place behind the facade of liberal institutions. The prince is a self-declared harbinger of peace and intends to found a dynasty. Such a political project, with no mean pretensions to personal glory, cannot endure on the basis of a politics that appeals to class warfare. By and large, Machiavelli accepts the premises of  Montesquieu's arguments.

Machiavelli will show that the productive potential of the modern economy might be augmented tremendously by an expanded and more dynamic role for  government that simultaneously serves imperial ambitions and embraces certain welfare policies. In the latter half of Part Three, Machiavelli indicates how he will assume greater control over the resources of society .By exploiting them, he will gain his glory and win over the forgotten masses to his side. This awaits a discussion in Part Four of the Dialogue of the grand public works projects he  envisions for his reign.

Financial Management

Montesquieu cuts Machiavelli short from elaborating his theories at this moment. He prefers to counter Machiavelli's "two points." Even if Machiavelli  were to work from a majority in the legislature, his designs on absolute power  would be encumbered by the science of finance that informs "the financial  mechanisms" of modern enlightened societies. Like the development of public  law, the science of finance has gone through progressive refinements designed  to counter the exercise of arbitrary power in state fiscal matters. "In free industrialized countries, everyone is acquainted with financial management either out of necessity or out of personal or professional interests. Your government could  not deceive anyone," Montesquieu affirms.

Machiavelli feigns ignorance in order to elicit an elaboration of this science, which Montesquieu gives in summary form. His financial system rests on two  foundations: an intricate scheme of accountability that minutely categorizes appropriations and expenditures, and the coherent presentation of its documentation as a matter of public record, to be voted on as any other  piece of legislation.  The prince's initiatives are "controlled" by the most popular branch of government, following close public scrutiny of these money matters. The prince will  not be able to tamper with public funds without alerting his subjects to his  predatory actions.

"The whole work of financial management, so vast and complicated, can be reduced to two very simple operations: appropriations and expenditures. " One of the most important innovations in state finances has been the State Budget, which brings these operations to light on a year-to-year basis. Within that document is an estimate of revenues from various taxes and their allocation toward  various state goals.

In short, each minister, responsible for his own department, prepares his own budget, which he submits to the Minister of Finance. The latter's duty is to prepare a budget for the whole government based on other ministers' requests. The  legislature amends and votes on the budget plan, like any other bill. The budget  is a yearly submittal and in it the economic health of the nation can be gauged  while government expenditures can be tracked on a department by department  basis. Any requested increase will have to be justified as the budget goes  through multiple readings and revisions in the legislature. Before it is voted, the  plan is submitted to the public and dissected and discussed by all interested parties.

Although it is voted on like any other piece of legislation, the budget is no ordinary measure. It is as much a political as it is a financial statement. Its bulk of figures, when properly analyzed, reveals the basic commitment of the government and the broad outline of domestic and foreign policy. "This impressive  document is published, printed, and reproduced in a thousand newspapers and  reveals to all eyes the domestic and foreign policy of the state and its civil, judicial, and military administration."

Montesquieu continues his discussion of the budget in the Nineteenth Dialogue. All other financial reforms are an emanation and refinement of this budgetary system, which is standard in all modern, well-regulated societies. Proper budgeting requires the balancing of expenditures and revenues. In this matter,  there has been recourse to "a very prudent expedient." The legislature votes the  revenue and appropriations parts of the budget in turns. Having first passed the  revenue part, expenses can be tailored and allocated accordingly. Desired expenditures will not then be determinative of the revenues to be raised. Rather,  given revenues will be the frame for essential expenditures. This will keep individual legislators from getting carried away by any spending excesses. The two  elements of the budget will then be harmonized by a comprehensive vote of the  legislature.

Machiavelli would like Montesquieu to address the matter of emergency spending beyond the scope of the State Budget. "But can it be that expenditures are restricted to only what has been voted by the legislature? Is it in the power of  a legislative body so to cripple the executive, to forbid a sovereign to appropriate for unforeseen expenses through emergency measures?  In fact, exactness is  not always possible or expected. Changing political circumstances-a foreign  attack, for example-may require unanticipated expenditures for which there is no budgetary provision. The system simply has to admit a certain amount of  elasticity.

Machiavelli ties to exploit this loophole to elude the limitations set by the budget process elaborated by Montesquieu. Montesquieu closes off any such opening. The limitations to any emergency spending are necessarily very strict if legislative prerogative is not to be sacrificed. Regardless of changing circumstances, there remains only a finite amount of resources. "Political events cannot  force financial realities to change from one moment to another ."

Emergency appropriations must be ratified by the legislature in any case. If it is not in session, they must be ratified when it reconvenes. If it is, they must be authorized by going through the ordinary legislative process. Sufficient revenues  must exist to cover any spending, otherwise a supplementary appropriation must be attached to such a bill. Moreover, Montesquieu explains, all unused appropriations must revert to the general fund. They cannot be set aside for the prince  as discretionary spending in future years. If diverting funds is the design of the  prince, it is made even more difficult by a system of line-item budgeting and  subsidiary accounts for each department and government agency.

That is, expenditures within these budgets are further broken down into easily categorized expenditures common to all agencies. Each subsidiary account,  personnel expenses, for example, receives its own appropriation. This sets a  limit on that particular spending. Any unused portions of an allocation must revert to the general fund. There is to be no transfer among accounts. Otherwise, "by an ingenious subterfuge," the prince could evade the legislatively designated  destination of spending and we would return to arbitrary finance. A treasurer  and a board of auditors oversee the whole arrangement to guarantee the regular  movement of monies and the accuracy of bookkeeping.

A Revolution in Fiscal Practices

Machiavelli facetiously confesses to be "dumbfounded" by all this and to have been taken at his most vulnerable point. As a practical matter, he applauds  the application of strict accounting techniques to state fiscal affairs and the orderly approach to the movement of monies. He will adopt these reforms but not  the "plethora of precautions" he calls "puerile." For his part, he speaks from a  more exalted view of things. He is a "statesman" not an accountant. In fact, he will adopt "all these marvels" of accounting, all these financial reforms and have  them redound to the splendor of his reign.

He is perhaps not so "dumbfounded" by Montesquieu and as vulnerable as he lets on. In a surprising statement, he claims that the question of finance is, of  all political concerns, the one that lends itself most easily to the maxims of The  Prince. The spirit of reform that Machiavelli will bring to such matters is consistent with his statements in Part One, where he attempted to lay bare the essentials of his political teaching, for which he claims "eternal relevancy."

In effect, Machiavelli asserts here, as before, that Montesquieu's science describes a system as it ought to be, not how in fact states conduct real affairs. It is foolish to be guided by what never attains in the real world. "I answer that it is  necessary to will the possible and that what holds universally cannot but be done. " He will look to the real practices of states that only theoretically operate  under the financial system outlined by Montesquieu.

He accuses Montesquieu of elevating the standards of private morality as the standard for political action. The principles that have supposedly brought the  budget process to its "perfection" are those which inform "household management." He might have pointed out that "economics" as "household management" was the original meaning of the Greek word but we are here dealing with  modern societies that operate on different, more complex principles. Indeed, any  move toward "perfection" for Machiavelli is premised on getting away from such antiquated and ill-conceived notions.

Since Machiavelli has mentioned The Prince, Montesquieu. confronts him with his own teaching on fiscal matters found there. "What I find surprising is that your financial theories are in patent contradiction with what you said in The Prince, where you strictly recommend parsimony for the prince, even avarice." Montesquieu, like Machiavelli a short while ago, here points to inconsistencies between the person before him and the texts he has written. Given the resplendent reign Machiavelli envisions, he would seem to be acting contrary to his  own maxims. [7]

Machiavelli retorts with an even more fundamental principle of The Prince. Above all, the prince must remain flexible and change with circumstances. This  is an updated Machiavellian teaching apropos of the nineteenth century, as the  subtitle of Joly's work indicates. He will act in accord with the requirements of the times and the unique opportunities they afford to despotism. Contrary to  Montesquieu, we may not assume the niggardliness of modem peoples. These are not times of scarcity but, we shall see, of new hopes in the possibility of plenty, brought by a technological society, reformed to exploit it to the utmost.

Precisely because he, and not Montesquieu, really knows the character of modern peoples, he need not rescind popular sovereignty in the matter of state  finances. Taxes will be duly voted and collected; the people's representatives will also approve expenditures. "The people who acclaim me do not merely tolerate the splendor of the throne. They positively crave it" and look to the prince  for a vicarious sense of power. "They really hate only one thing-wealth in their peers."

Machiavelli begins his reform of the Montesquieuan system of financial management by loosening its restraints. He is like the "giant in the fairytale," he  says, bound by pygmies when he sleeps. He awakes and shatters his fetters  without even knowing he was tied.

First and foremost, he will take advantage of the power that the coup affords him. Just as the coup was used to introduce the necessary changes in the constitution, it will also justify the streamlining of financial management. In fact, a new budget, following his accession to power, will be declared extraordinarily "by decree." Legal ways will return in subsequent years, but with some changes,  of course.

For Machiavelli, the board of auditors poses no real threat. It is a "book-keeper's office" that can not prevent funds from being voted and expended. As a source of information, it is perhaps of some use but its reports do not really go  too far beyond the data in the budget. As a purely administrative body, it is under the prince's control. Having no power of remonstrance, it need not worry the  prince. The other safeguards to which Montesquieu alluded win not be met with such forbearance. In true Machiavellian spirit, however, nothing will be changed directly. As he encounters certain regulations upon assuming more le-  gal ways, he merely proposes to regulate a little in return.

He will do away with the division of the budgetary process into a revenue vote followed by an expenditure vote. Finances are better handled when expenditures are voted piecemeal, with expenditure decisions adjusted as you go along. His is a "diligent" government and he does not want to waste precious  time by unnecessary formalities. The intent of such a measure is to let the expenditure side of the budget determine the overall balance. Extraordinary budgets no longer need to have retroactive legislative ratification. The gist of this  reform is the same. It removes fiscal discipline from executive spending.

The "spirit" of such reforms extends to line-item budgeting. Where subsidiary accounts pinpointed allocated expense, Machiavelli prefers gross blocs of appropriations for each agency. This grants greater discretion in the use of  funds. [8] He will retain the prohibition against the transfer of funds, but only between ministries, not within or among agencies.

At the end of the Nineteenth Dialogue, Machiavelli gives the impression that he has finished with the discussion of such matters. What he has already indicated is sufficient to show Montesquieu that he is not restrained by mere parchment barriers. As a man of the Middle Ages, Machiavelli is supposedly unversed in modern financial matters. His statements seem to reflect a certain prejudice  against the detailed consideration of a topic for which he, speaking as a statesman from a former era, has a certain disdain.

For Montesquieu, however, the "reforms" Machiavelli lists are not sufficient. He may exercise greater discretion in the deployment of funds, but he is still  limited by the overall budgetary "frame," the boundaries of which may be bro-  ken through but not without "peril." For Machiavelli, however, it is an "elastic" frame that can be "stretched as far as wanted." He will in any event remain  "within it, never outside," he declares. In the Twentieth Dialogue, Montesquieu  gives Machiavelli the opportunity to explain what he means.

Machiavelli now assumes the teacher's role from Montesquieu and begins to elaborate the devices at his disposal. Individually, the changes are too "subtle"  to attract the attention of citizens, let alone signal any alarms. There is no reason that they should disquiet them any more than any other political measure. As  Machiavelli prefaced this discourse, they are the common practices of all existing societies and it is from such practices, not abstract theories, that he seeks  guidance.

However, such statements belie the revolutionary design he has in store for his economic policies. In fact, he posits a new role for government within the  economic sphere that finally "dumbfounds" Montesquieu and silences him. It is  an understanding of political economy that challenges the presumptions of early liberalism that define Montesquieu's view. What begins with a recitation of  some common executive practices in budgetary matters ends with rather uncommon conclusions for economic theory tout court. [9]

Machiavelli doubts that the State Budget imposes any rigid limitation on the prince. For Machiavelli, it is "nothing but a provisional measure," a projection  of principal financial trends. There are in fact other extraordinary budgets which correct, revise, or add to the main State Budget: emergency budgets, supplementary budgets, deficiency budgets. The financial situation at any given moment is never definitive. Machiavelli endeavors to show that there is considerable elasticity in the system to accommodate the prince.

Machiavelli proceeds as if the requirement that expenditures balance with revenues were just a matter of. bookkeeping. Devices to ensure the proper "balance" are myriad. Certain projected revenues, for example, may be used to off-set present expenditures. Present expenditures may also be deferred to future  budgets. The extraordinary budgets can be deftly handled to disguise certain  costs. They will be treated essentially as appendices to the main budget and not  be subsumed under its revenue limitations. In fact, each year, you will have "many budgets." In this way, "at the end often years, the budget can be doubled  or tripled" beyond allocations in the main State Budget.

To this point, Machiavelli has avoided the real thrust of Montesquieu's contentions. In saying that the budget itself will constrain the prince, Montesquieu means that certain fiscal realities must be faced. By and large, the artifices that Machiavelli employs are merely ways to sequester monies within already appropriated sums. They may garner substantial revenues for the prince but not on the  order he wishes. More important, they do not produce any wherewithal for the  prince beyond that appropriated in the budgets.

Will he, "like Julius Caesar," find fabulous sums in the coffers of the state? Perhaps he intends to discover the equivalent of the "Potosi mines," Montesquieu facetiously comments. To attain desired revenues Machiavelli has two real choices: raising taxes or borrowing. If it is true that peoples in modern states are  niggardly and jealous, they simply will not stand for confiscatory taxes. It follows that Machiavelli will be forced to borrow.

The Role of Public Debt in their Respective Schemes

Montesquieu briefly seizes the initiative once again to elaborate on the system of debt financing in modern states. [10] In forcing Machiavelli's admission of  his dependence on borrowing, Montesquieu believes he has maneuvered him  into a position of weakness. "This is what I wanted you to say." In fact, the rest  of the discussion of Part Three concerns borrowing and how Machiavelli will escape the last restraint by which Montesquieu secures the tyrant. Once again, we see Machiavelli give a step-by-step description of how he will undermine Montesquieu's scheme.

Montesquieu acknowledges the necessity of borrowing but only for all "but a few governments." Those which do resort to "such expedients do so with great caution."  It is both "immoral" and "dangerous" to "weigh down future generations with exorbitant burdens beyond the limits of any foreseeable resources."  Modern states that want to escape an exclusive reliance on a burdensome and  possibly self-defeating taxation turn to borrowing. These borrowing needs are handled by sinking fund arrangements, a scheme that "is truly admirable in its  simplicity and mode of execution." According to such" scheme, sums can be  gathered for a price (interest) and paid off piecemeal by putting aside each year  a certain portion of the borrowed sum. The borrowed sum (principal) along with  the interest will be redeemed in full after the time allotted the borrower. The  public debt is thus liquidated by successive fractions paid yearly. 

If constantly required to amortize, borrowing will not be taken lightly. The government's integrity is on the line and its solvency is a precondition for further borrowing. The people will authorize debts only when the obligation can be  easily met. Surprisingly, Machiavelli shows himself as no neophyte when it  comes to such matters. He points to the practice of England, which has been  known to suspend debt payments on more than one occasion. For his part, he will keep the amortization scheme, which has "certain advantages."

It is Machiavelli who in fact has manipulated Montesquieu to the matter of borrowing, upon which rests the final burden of restraining the prince. At this  point, the previously deferential Machiavelli heaps scorn on Montesquieu and  his theories. For Machiavelli, deficit financing is a matter to be handled, not so  much by financial officers, as by the press. The prince's skillful propagandists  will reassure the people who ultimately authorize the debt. All of Montesquieu's  previous discourse on this science is parodied and used as a smokescreen for  Machiavelli ' s financial intrigues.

Montesquieu had previously stated that the science of modern finance fundamentally relies on the control and public accountability that the budget process affords. As it turns out, the new prince escapes the "control" of that process  principally through borrowing, an action that takes place "off budget." Moreover, the press itself can be effectively employed to justify the ways of the  prince as proceeding from more enlightened economic theories. The press, which was to shed all possible light on the activities of the prince, is really a tool that can be used to produce powerful effects on "the minds of bourgeois block-heads."

The limits to fiscally appropriate borrowing are disputed and are presented by Machiavelli as an outmoded understanding of things. "I want my Minister of  Finance to be perfectly clear in his use of statistics. Moreover, his literary style  must be impeccably lucid." The people will see that the government operates on  principles different from those that guide private affairs. No one will dispute that  economics is amenable to the advances seen in other sciences.

Prosperity and productivity, the keynotes of his rhetoric, will in fact be fueled, at least initially, by the expenditures of borrowed monies. The government's solvency, which is the precondition of borrowing, must not be put into  question by any yearly deficit. If less than predicted, it will be reported as a real triumph. If more, mitigating circumstances will be found, which, when they  pass, will permit a return to tighter management. As Machiavelli illustrates in  considerable detail, there is no dearth of ways that budgetary statistics can be  presented and manipulated if the common faith of the times in material and  theoretical progress is not disturbed. The confidence of the prince in the power of his propaganda is nowhere more in evidence than here.

In the last dialogue of this part, the Twenty-First, Machiavelli doggedly at- tempts to dispel Montesquieu's prejudice against borrowing, which is touted for  many different reasons. Through it, "whole families are made dependent on the  government." [11] Moreover, "contemporary economics recognizes that far from impoverishing the state, public debt enriches it." It is interesting that for the second time in this part, an offer by Machiavelli to elaborate "new theories" is rejected. 

Montesquieu is presumptuous enough to think that he knows such theories. He has been consistent in this respect throughout and has not changed from the very beginning when Machiavelli's opening statement is greeted as "nothing  new." Though not explicitly spelled out, we may infer a new economic and industrial policy from the schemes Machiavelli elaborates. Montesquieu's presumptuousness notwithstanding, they point economic policy in a wholly new  direction that challenges the fundamental presuppositions of liberalism by dramatically changing the organization of the productive forces of society. [12]

Rather than listening to a theoretical discourse, Montesquieu would first rather like to know the source of the prince's borrowed capital as well as the  reasons for raising it. To provide a rationale for raising monies, the prince may always call a foreign war. It is interesting, however, that Machiavelli does not  intend to use these monies exclusively for war-making purposes. A domestic  end is also in view, as he explains. "Only one-half to two-thirds of such a sum need be spent. The rest finds its way into the treasury for domestic expenditures."

The rough sums that he envisions from war requisitions are three-quarters of what is allotted in the State Budget. This is clearly an enormous sum of money,  equal to "the total wealth of certain states." It would certainly be beyond the capacity of any banks to finance such a sum. As it turns out, it is not Machiavelli's intention at all to seek funding from such sources. The whole idea is ridiculed as bespeaking a "dark age" mentality.

In modern times, the small cartel of money merchants is broken. Sufficient monies can be had cheaply if banking institutions are initially bypassed. The  prince will issue government securities in denominations that can be afforded by  the common artisan. Money will be taken from under mattresses and invested in  government bonds.

Substantial sums can be generated immediately this way. Interests rates offered by banks fall in competitive bidding with the government. Machiavelli  presents a scheme that intends to undermine the strength of the traditional bank.  It is far better to satisfy borrowing needs by addressing all of the country's subjects-"the rich, the poor, artisans, manufacturers, anyone who has a penny at  his disposal." In this way, such "excellent investments" break the monopolist hold of banks over finance and succeed in attaching "whole families" to the government.

Machiavelli will also resort to a very clever ploy. After issuing his securities, he will announce that demand has so far outstripped supply that he will be forced to return several millions to would-be investors who "rush from all sides"  to buy shares rising at a substantial premium. Things get to "a fever pitch." [13]  The prince's tactic will underscore the desirability of such investments and inspire an all-important confidence in a government that acts with such exemplary forebearance and honesty. "Judge for yourself how great an effect this will have  on the public mind."

Machiavelli will have even more money than Montesquieu can imagine. The small cartel of private banks are replaced by "great banking institutions," now  common to all modern societies. They are capable of lending to the state, at  prime rates," sums equivalent to a quarter of the yearly State Budget. For all  intents and purposes, government has subsumed the banking function. Later, it  becomes clear that these government institutions of credit exist to lend money to large industrial enterprises and to coordinate the financial needs of the country's  industrial structure.

Beyond banks, other government authorities, with their own revenue sources, are capable of lending additional sums to the government. Moreover,  pension funds, health insurance plans, and savings schemes may tap even vaster sums that will be "deposited in the public treasury" where they will mix with  general revenues. The subjects of the prince are modern men, preoccupied above all with security concerns that a materialistic government serves. We are here given some indication of the myriad "public services," controlled by the state, that prompted Machiavelli in the beginning to reject a parsimonious government. What were formerly matters of personal responsibility now are concerns of the state and a cover for the prince's revenue needs.

How Debts are "Dealt With"

Machiavelli has proved that there are indeed numerous schemes for securing necessary funds. The problem arises when such debts fall due. Montesquieu  turns the discussion to how Machiavelli will pay back what he has borrowed. If  he is not to act like the "common stock jobber," his debts must somehow be paid off. Machiavelli will presently show his interlocutor how his debts "will be dealt with." The choice of words is apt, he declares, because debts can not always be  paid but somehow always must be met. There are several ways.

He might resort to taxes. But, it will be recalled, he originally turned to borrowing in the first place to avoid resorting to this inherently unpopular step.  Nevertheless, modern society is amenable to a diversity of tax measures, the burdens of which can be artfully disguised. If the tax route is .not taken, it is  more perhaps due to a lack of imagination and initiative than to any really formidable impediment. There are still other ways, once tax possibilities are exhausted.

The outstanding public debt can be consolidated under a uniform rate of interest and then, if need be, converted to a lower rate. Agreement to the new interest rate is accepted or the principal is immediately returned. The mentality of  the common investor inhibits him from taking this option. Montesquieu really  does not know these stockholders. Ever creatures of habit, they prefer an investment at a lower rate than to return their monies to their mattresses, especially when they have become accustomed to new-found paper wealth. In this  way, substantial sums of interest can be annulled in a single stroke.

In effect, Machiavelli has succeeded in drawing the common artisan and workingman into his investment schemes. The small scale of their disposable  income, as well as their inherent conservatism, makes them reliable supports for the grander designs of the prince. They are predictable investors, not the speculators whose placement of funds can leverage markets. Machiavelli has inculcated a new way of thinking in such types, previously untouched by economic concerns. Their new interests have been made complicit with those of the prince,  and serve ends of a wholly different scale and order.

As to principal costs, recourse can be had to a different expedient. Debts can be "rolled over," that is to say, refinanced. As debts fall due, investors can be  reissued another certificate of indebtedness and the due date postponed to a  more auspicious time. This can be applied to all "floating debts." Montesquieu  objects that the prince will jeopardize the solvency of his government and its  credit standing. Its bonds will be spurned first in foreign markets and then at  home.

Finally, just as Machiavelli would control the press by the press and conspiracies by conspiracies, he would control financial markets by financial markets themselves. Great credit institutions that serve the designs and needs of government would be able to bolster the price of the prince's securities if they  were to sag too much by buying up great quantities. Opposite pressures can be relieved by having these institutions sell securities. By means of such action, the prince can virtually create or destroy the fortunes of investors. Montesquieu  ends this discussion with a taunt. The prince's favorites, his ministers and mistresses, privy to the state's financial secrets, will be able to reap large fortunes.  Machiavelli agrees that indeed the favored will be rewarded, whereas a "thunderbolt" awaits those who stand in his way. [14]

The Principles of the Economic Revolution Fleshed Out

Ostensibly, Part Three is an exercise in how Machiavelli manipulates the budget. Montesquieu has kept the conversation limited to such a topic and away  from the views of "modern economists today" whose theories he already presumes to know. Nevertheless, in accord with those views, though unstated, Machiavelli holds out the promise of. a vast expansion of productive capacity by a  strategic infusion of public monies into the economy. Beyond the Machiavellian  devices at his disposal in manipulating the budget, he can perhaps "deal with his debts" through unprecedented economic growth, centrally planned and directed.  Implicit in his discussion are the germs of an economic theory that transcends  the frame of understanding of Montesquieuan liberalism as it belies Montesquieu's claim to speak authoritatively about such matters.

Machiavelli calls for a new and dynamic role for government in economic society .Unlike oriental despotism, heavy sacrifices are placed on the nation to support extensive "public services" and a "brilliant" and "great" court at the apex of a large centralized administrative structure. Tremendous revenues are  needed, not as Montesquieu presumes, to satisfy tyrannical appetites and to furnish the prince and his cohorts with luxuries. Through the active intervention of  the government, in conjunction with the advance of technology and applied science, productivity might be greatly improved. This could generate enough public monies to retire public debts easily but also for programs that help minimize the threat of revolution emanating from the masses and assure the popularity he  seeks for despotism.

The specifics of his economic program await a discussion of the grand public works programs in the next part of the Dialogue. The foundations for that policy lie, however, in the budgetary and banking revolution adumbrated in this part.  The steps of the prince are directed by a new economic theory that can be fully  measured against the background of Montesquieuan liberalism as it is presented in the Dialogue.

The Economic Premises of Montesquiean Economics

Montesquieu's thought is informed by classic notions of liberalism that Machiavelli at one point facetiously likens to a "dark age" mentality. His system  implies a parsimonious government not only because it was understood to be  dependent on the requisitions of a grudging people but because of the limited role government was to perform. "The tendency of economics is to see the political apparatus merely as a necessary but very costly mechanism, whose workings must be simplified. It reduces the role of government to such elementary functions that its greatest drawback perhaps is to destroy government's prestige." [15]

Briefly, the first task facing men is to end the state of nature. Government must be instituted to control the predatory instincts of the species. The next task, equally important to man's well being, is to control government itself. This is  the historic task that Montesquieu set himself in his political teaching. As Montesquieu explained earlier, government is mechanistically arranged to control  itself. Furthermore, any invasion of rights was to be resisted by an enlightened populace, upon which rested ultimate authority .His arrangement presumes vigilance on the part of the people to keep government properly restrained.

The role of government was limited. Its primary function was as arbiter and guarantor of social peace. Within a protected private sphere, the liberty of the  individual would find expression in the self-interested pursuit of material betterment and the accumulation of property. Unfettered from certain religious and  governmental restraints, such motives would be given scope and force. Properly  channeled by institutions and law, such self-interested pursuits would also serve  the interests of society as a whole by protecting the wealth in which all share,  through commerce and trade. It was therefore in government's interest to protect  property and that private sphere as the precondition of society's prospering and as the guarantee of its own perpetuation. In sum, its natural tendency to aggrandizement had to be curbed and incentives established to restrain its activist tendencies.

A restricted role for government would seemingly give the greatest play to man's productive capacities. Competition among individual producers arises  naturally, keeping the costs of production at prices accessible to consumers  while encouraging innovation and enterprise. In such a scheme, the sovereign is discharged from the duty of regulating a society that, under enlightened conditions, is extraordinarily capable of self-regulation. This leaves the greatest  amount of natural liberty to the individual while it conduces to the material security that was the motive behind forming society in the first place. To attempt  to regulate modern society is thus counterproductive. It would expose the sovereign to innumerable delusions because of the insufficiency of human wisdom to  properly supervise the myriad industries and employment of peoples. At the  same time, it would require granting dangerous powers to direct such enterprises  and coerce individuals from whom the strongest and most reliable motive to  work has been removed. It is for these reasons that, according to Montesquieu at  least, the maxims derived from the study of modern economies are "most contrary to the concentration of power."

Joly's Machiavelli, however, sees an end to such a restricted role for government. Like Marx, he presents himself as speaking from a view that sees liberal society as having reached an advanced stage. Society is now vast, diversified, and increasingly interdependent. The role of government, even as arbiter, would naturally grow apace. State finances, the subject of Part Three, becomes  an increasingly important factor as government plays the central role in the economic and social nexus.

Joly's Machiavelli shows how the increased economic leverage of government might be used by the modern tyrant. In controlling the powers to borrow,  spend, and tax, he controls the power to reward and punish, as the concluding  reflections in this part suggest. Such are formidable weapons in the hands of the  modern ruler. With such economic tools, he need not rely on a crude fear to  bend his subjects to his will. "To rule today does not require committing atrocities, or decapitating your enemies, confiscating the goods of your subjects, or engaging in widespread torture." Such measures are passe, especially with other more fastidious weapons at his disposal. But beyond the exercise of such economic leverage, Machiavelli intends even more fundamental changes. He will  bring into being a new social arrangement appropriate to developments that,  presumably, have rendered liberal theories obsolete.

According to Montesquieu, the people are bound to an economic regime that is "inimical to despotism." Therefore, if Machiavelli is not supreme in this  sphere, he will not be in the political one. The logic of Machiavelli's despotism  thus leads him to an attack on society, understood by Montesquieu as effectively  preserved from government encroachment because it would run counter to the  material benefits modern peoples enjoy from the freedom allotted them. But, as Machiavelli points out, such benefits do not extend to the masses and economic  niceties do not form part of their character. These represent vast reservoirs of  peoples in the latter stages of capitalism that Machiavelli describes. Indeed, society is not as fluid or dynamic as Montesquieu implies and its benefits exclude  the most numerous and turbulent classes "riveted" to work by poverty. The new  prince has their interests and desires as his constant preoccupation. In winning them over, he finds the broadest base for his regime.

According to Machiavelli, social stratification has reasserted itself wjthin modern societies. Ultimately, it is inherited wealth, an accident of birth, which  perpetuates privilege. A misplaced respect for the principle of inheritance is a  vestige of aristocratic times and gives rise to a class of idle rich as the modem  counterpart to the idle nobility .In the end, they are as unproductive as the "in-  temperate gentleman's son," as Joly's Montesquieu so aptly puts it. Their existence is inappropriate to the society of the future as the land, workshops, and capital come under the prince's direction in an attempt to control the whole society as if one interconnected enterprise. In such a view, government becomes a  tutelary power of vast proportions, like the society of India, which receives Machiavelli's praise in this respect at the end of the Fifth Dialogue.

According to this view, the revolutions that menace modern societies derive from the inadequate coordination of society and the putative failure of private  markets to efficiently organize production and assure a broader distribution of  goods that include the masses. Machiavelli's financial reforms intend to bring centralized control through the State Budget and the allocation of key capital  investments to increase productivity that will reduce the revolutionary threat. If  successful in attenuating class conflict, he will bring about a new form of despotism, at once marked by mildness but potentially quite enduring. We might be witnessing the beginnings of "a frightful calm," the statement that stands at the  beginning of Joly's work as a kind of motif.

In the "sketch" of the regime given in the Seventh Dialogue, Machiavelli declared he would borrow certain features from the very industrial order that elicits  the admiration of Montesquieu. He will bring into existence immense monopolies. "The fate of all private fortunes would become completely dependent on  these vast reservoirs of public wealth." Landed wealth would be kept "in a condition of relative inferiority" through taxes which intend to destroy inherited  privilege. "Independent fortunes" in industry will be controlled by competition from huge government monopolies. "The point must be reached where the state  is composed of nothing but proletarians, a few millionaires, and soldiers"-the  latter two groups being the least revolutionary elements in the state and the former exclusively cultivated by the policies of the prince. 

The role of the market and individual enterprise as the primary engine of production and distribution comes to an end and is replaced by the sovereign's will and his dictates.

As head of my government, all my edicts, all my ordinances would constantly aim at the same goal-the annihilation of independent  powers, whether of groups or individuals, to develop the unlimited  dominance of the state, making it the most powerful force in protecting, promoting, and remunerating society's activities.

With such a statement, we arrive at the furthest extreme from the limited government of Montesquieu's scheme. The individual exists solely in and through the prince, who personally undertakes decisions that were formerly  made impersonally by the market. The prince directly assumes activities that were the preserve of the individual. He absorbs the social spheres that sheltered  the citizen and afforded him opportunity to pursue his individual happiness. He  thereby annihilates autonomy and responsibility, and the very possibilities of  dignified existence.

As with the theory of despotism that originally. framed the understanding of Montesquieu and opened the discussion of this part, private property is effectively held at the sufferance of the sovereign. Indeed, we are told, there is not a "farthing" whose spending is not in some way connected to the wishes of the  prince. However, all this occurs not in a primitive and backward society but in  one of the most materially advanced societies of the world. Again, unlike what  Montesquieu originally presumes, the despotism of the future will generate its revenues, initially at least, not from the conduct of a self-defeating war, but internally, from available resources. Unlike despotic regimes of old, "economics" is not a derivative of effective war making. Effective war making is a derivative  of "economics." The modern prince will set out on his path of conquest, the subject of the next Part of the Dialogue, subsequent to his economic revolution.

The initial prospects for Machiavelli's revolution seemed promising at the rime Joly wrote. The perpetuation of such a regime was a different matter. Joly leads his contemporaries to ponder its prospects. [16] In the reflective light of history, we partisans of liberal regimes can draw the appropriate lessons from its rise and fall.

The next chapter addresses the manners and mores of the Machiavellian regime, a "moral revolution" as profound and extensive as that in the economic sphere.

Notes

1. See The Spirit of the Laws XX-XXII, which deal explicitly with commerce and money. Sorel writes that Montesquieu anticipates Adam Smith in attempting to "give scientific form to the problem of political economy." See Sorel, Montesquieu, 148.

2. Montesquieu's remarks at this point indicate an understanding of despotism that is limited to oriental varieties. These are classically described in The Spirit of the Laws. His  consternation in the face of Machiavelli's regime, which assumes a modern, industrial society, can be traced to such thinking. The principles of force and fear that define despotism are progressively minimized in the Machiavellian revolution. In this part, we begin to see how the promise of economic prosperity shifts the foundation of despotism by  winning popular support for the despot.

3. Machiavelli is referring to arguments found in The Spirit of the Laws XIII 10.

4. This argument was made repeatedly in the century following Joly, that is, the century that knew the greatest wars. It is still frequently heard today! Who wants to make  war when there is so much money to be made in the "global village"? When there are so many places to go and people to meet?

We have been told that the existence of a McDonalds inside countries borders is a kind of gage of peace. I never understood why. Is it all the "happy meals" they serve?

The proliferation of war in the future is at least as inevitable as the proliferation of McDonalds.

5. Machiavelli remarks upon the vehemence with which Montesquieu asserts his proposition.

6. There is a parallel between economic policy here stated and policy pursued by the prince in regard to the pope. Anti-clerical elements are radicalized to energize the orthodox. Essentially, different groups are politicized and played off against each other. This  creates the necessity for the prince to reassert control, while satisfying one group or an  other in turns.

7. See The Prince XVI.

8. President Reagan was motivated by similar thinking when he advocated his re forms in the realm of "fiscal federalism"- federal grants to local programs. However, the  consolidation of accounts was proposed to encourage greater administrative discretion in  the reduction of expenditures.

9. What is described is uncanny in its anticipation of key elements of what later be came known as Keynesian economics and more radical economic theories.

10. See The Spirit of the Laws XVII 18, "Of the Payment of Public Debts," where sinking fund arrangements are elaborated.

11. Contrary to the financial policies of Machiavelli's despot, who envisions a "bond- holding" society, Margaret Thatcher spoke of turning her country into a "stockholding" ,  society. This, of course, would make "whole families" dependent on the health of corporate Britain and loosen dependence on government (and unions) for the economic well-  being of its citizens. The process is well advanced in America. In the span of a decade we  changed from being a society of institutional "bondholders" to the "stockholder society"  envisioned by Thatcher. The changes to the economy have been dramatic. The Chairman  of the Federal Reserve has admitted to targeting the stock market in his management of  the country's monetary policy. At the end of his tenure as President, the Democrat  Clinton bragged about the Thatcherite change that took place in his administration. It  should be kept in mind that the precipitous decline in the paper wealth of the untold mil-  lions of stockholders in the United States lies at the heart of the now current economic  malaise. Is not this empowerment of "Wall Street" by Washington, direct and indirect,  not without its own inherent dangers and potential abuses? What is now a "malaise" may  later be a problem of a different order.

12. In The Spirit of the Laws, XXII 17, Montesquieu questions those theorists who insist that the state could "multiply riches" by turning to deficit financing. After listing  the numerous disadvantages, he concludes baldly; "I know of no advantage."

13. As we in the United States all know now, investment schemes can take on a momentum of their own. "Irrational exuberance" has a way of setting in.

14. Among others, DeMorney, longtime friend and confident of Louis, became notorious for profiting in office from the financial schemes of the Second Empire.

15. Machiavelli implies that his financial revolution is meant to restore prestige to government.

16. As the quote from Montesquieu on the title page of Joly's work augurs: "soon," perhaps, people would unite against such a power.

Chapter Six:  THE MORAL REVOLUTION

Part Four consists of four dialogues, the Twenty-Second through the Twenty- Fifth. In the previous two parts of the Dialogue, Machiavelli shows in detail  how he will surmount the obstacles to despotism in the political and financial  system outlined by Montesquieu. Having heard Machiavelli, Montesquieu admits to not knowing "either the spirit of the laws or the spirit of finance" and facetiously thanks his interlocutor for having taught him both. They may now  begin other topics in accord with the "wager" they have made. Machiavelli's  prince is now absolute. "With such prodigious power, you will do great things,"  Montesquieu ironically quips in challenging Machiavelli to indicate how despotism will escape the odium in which it is normally held.

The discussion in Part Four reverts to the themes of Part One. There, Montesquieu contended that pure selfishness, implemented by Machiavellian means,  could not be a consistent maxim of both prince and subject. At a minimum, if a  regime is to endure, it must appeal to some notion of a greater good. It is not  enough for Machiavelli to have gained complete power, even granting the momentousness of such an achievement. Machiavelli must justify the means he has  used to gain rule by pointing to the redeeming ends that his despotism serves. In  Part Four, Machiavelli endeavors to spell out the basis of a new "common good"  between the ruler and the ruled that would endow his regime with the legitimacy  necessary for its perpetuation. Machiavelli must prove his dictum that the end  justifies the means. "It is finally the time to show that good can come from evil."

As the discussion progresses, we are given a fine portrait of the despot as he crucially shapes the character of the people to his rule. Joly's sensitive eye as a social analyst is nowhere more in evidence than in the vivid description of the  manners and mores of the Napoleonic regime. On the deepest level, however,  his artfulness intends to bring to life the character of a totally new order, the  expression of a new historic epoch that succeeds the "constitutional era" defined by Montesquieu.

In the opening Dialogue of this part, Montesquieu adjures Machiavelli's prince to adopt the manners, not of an overbearing despot, but of Alfred the Great and "Godly Louis," who never ceased in their humble ministering to the  poor. He also offers the ancient founders of austere republics as the proper models of one who would really seek the public welfare and the common good.  Theirs was a legacy of liberty based on simplicity and decency and is meant to  contrast most sharply with the legacy of Machiavelli's models, history's great  conquerors and luxury-seeking emperors. Montesquieu understands himself as  standing with his interlocutor "like the Atlas and the Taurus," as a republican polar opposite from the imperial Machiavelli. As it turns out, the whole movement of Part Four is led by Machiavelli to bridge the differences with Montesquieu over the principles of rule each admires. Like the "Godly Louis" and Alfred the Great, he declares himself to have the poor as the principal concern of  his rule. Moreover, in the last Dialogue of this part, he shows how he will even  claim for himself the mantle of champion of "liberty." At the conclusion of  Joly's work, we are meant to contemplate the success of Machiavelli in satisfying the principles and passions of moderns. Machiavelli has founded a regime,  not as a reactionary partisan of the Middle Ages, but by appealing to the same fundamental principles defended by Montesquieu but applied to a new historic  order. A fuller elaboration of the Machiavellian revolution points to elements of  Saint-Simonian thought that inspire Napoleon III and, beyond, to essential elements of modern totalitarianism.

The New "Spirit" of the Laws

In the shortest and arguably most beautifully written part of the Dialogue, the stereotypical view of Machiavelli, which Montesquieu shares, is shattered. What  separates the two interlocutors is not merely an admiration of republican virtue  and imperial grandeur but two historic epochs. Far from a limited defense of his own epoch, "bordering on the Middle Ages," Machiavelli comes to light as an apparent apologist for an epoch that transcends the so-called modern world defended by Montesquieu. He successfully brings about a "return" to despotism,  but presented as an advance of the historic process, the demands of which his  regime effectively fulfills.

Machiavelli declares he will bring peace, "the greatest of my benefactions," to a country previously wracked by factions. Montesquieu immediately attacks  Machiavelli's assertion that his rule stands for "liberty, dignity, and strength."  Such a claim can be maintained only by changing "the meaning of words" as  they would apply in the republican regime described by Montesquieu.

Following the policy of Rome, the unity of the country, as indeed its "dignity and strength," is guaranteed through an aggressive foreign policy, a subtopic of  Part Four. Domestic peace is premised on war abroad as all factions unite in  extending the influence of the regime globally. Having helped restore stability at  home through the establishment of authoritarian rule, the prince uses the collective resources of the state in pursuit of the most exalted glory as he emulates the  great conquerors of history in the most diverse regions of the world. The new  prince's deeds, Machiavelli implies, will be commensurate with the unprecedented power he has gained.

In the face of evident hyperbole which compares the new prince to " Alexander, Caesar, and Charlemagne," among others, Montesquieu grants that "no hero  of antiquity or modern times could rank" with him. Even the example of Louis  XIV pales beside him. But such musings are beside the point. Montesquieu fails  to see what "good" accrues from a policy based on war, an "evil" where, inevitably, destruction and servitude follow. "This is not the time to equivocate,"  Machiavelli  interrupts.  "Glory is itself a great good," he says to one who has   asted earthly celebrity and secretly pines over its loss in hell. " All other assets  accrue to the sovereign who has glory." In winning it, the prince will come to arbitrate the affairs of the world personally.

Machiavelli recurs to the past grandeur of great historical figures to frame his vision of the future. He intends to fire the imagination of the masses and unite  them to a leader who, by words and deeds, gives expression to a new historic  consciousness. Machiavelli attempts to end the disruptions that are endemic to liberal society by removing their most serious causes. He projects through  propaganda a world-historic view that would replace the liberal consciousness  by elevating the masses and uniting formerly disparate groups in a common historic enterprise.

Machiavelli seizes upon a casual reference to Louis XIV. Like the former French sovereign, the new prince will have his name associated with the apogee of an historic epoch, which rivaled the splendors of the Periclean and Augustian ages. [l] Political parallels may also be drawn in their common efforts to maximize centralization, co-opt independent groups, and emasculate institutions that might  serve as independent centers of opposition.

As he competes with Louis in war, he also competes with him in constructing monuments. Here is introduced a subject of vast importance to this part of the  Dialogue which simultaneously serves diverse objectives. In a technological and  engineering feat of unprecedented dimensions, he will refurbish and redesign  cities in magnificence while providing housing for his people. Machiavelli here once again touches on the key to his rule and sway over the people. They are to be impressed with the glory of the sovereign and participate through him in certain exalted emotions tied to the unprecedented power he holds. "I would want  to show the people that a monument whose construction used to require centuries could be built by me in a few years." His architecture need not be tasteful by past standards, as long as it is large and "modern," as befitting the tone of a new  industrial age. "The palaces of my predecessors would fall under the wrecker's  ball in order to raise them anew in modern forms."

Admittedly, "the number of great actions" to achieve glory "is not limitless." The two "principal marks" of great reigns, whether that of Ramses II, Louis  XIV, or Peter I, have been "war and buildings." [2] Like these former sovereigns,  he intends his buildings to dwarf the significance of the individual by its scale  and have him seek identity with the strength of the prince. This will serve the  prince 's political principles "aesthetically" by giving expression to an imperial  grandeur in which all collectiveJy participate. At the same time, it appeases their  Jove of equality, which all the ruled share, at least in comparison to a person of  such exalted stature.

The prince also intends his building program to accommodate the people in their needs. Massive public works programs will give employment to the masses of men, formerly excluded from a stake in society and from the pleasures ollJy  the "few rich" could procure. They will be furnished housing. The spirit of enterprise will flourish in his regime but only in those occupations peripheral to  the great economic tasks of the prince. Small-scale businesses will be subsumed  into the massive government programs that aim at improving "the material conditions of workers, laborers, and those bent under the weight of social necessity." In underscoring the concern of the prince for the masses of poor, he finds  moral justification for his rule, while discrediting the laissez-faire arrangements  of the Montesquieuan system as "cold-blooded indifference" to the "wretched-  ness of the people."

In "an oratorical outburst," as Machiavelli puts it, Montesquieu forces a comparison between this sovereign and others, who brought not monuments of  glory, but a legacy of Jaws, simplicity, and liberty. If Machiavelli were sincere  about his solicitude for the people, he would dispose of his court and all its trap-  pings as well as his policy of bread and circuses. In a tirade against pomp, Montesquieu adjures Machiavelli to follow the likes of Agesilaus, Lycurgus, and  Gracchus and not the emperors he emulates. [3]

At the end of the Twenty-Second Dialogue, Montesquieu asserts that the greatest act of benefaction is the abnegation of absolute power. He asks Machiavelli to have his prince step down from power as the touchstone of his good faith  intentions for the people. In any case, "the people that elected you would only  have to express its will by asking you to descend from the throne in the name of  the state's salvation." According to Montesquieu, the new prince can be counted  among those "who last but a day."

Montesquieu's "outburst" interrupts the flow of the discussion. Machiavelli was to specify the "good" his rule would serve. It continues with how in fact he  can guarantee the perpetuation of his rule. The Twenty Third Dialogue elaborates the means that are available. Such considerations continue in the Twenty-Fourth Dialogue. Machiavelli begins to sketch in detailed particulars of the portrait of the new prince who begins to take on the aspect of not merely a glorious  ruler but a new kind of god.

Machiavelli's Realism

In the Twenty Third Dialogue, Machiavelli argues why the necessities of the moment prevent him from adopting the role of a modern Lycurgus in renouncing absolute power. Montesquieu is acquainted with Machiavelli's political,  economic, and financial system. He will now learn "the final way" by which he  will "sink the roots" of his dynasty "into the depths of the earth."

Machiavelli characterizes Montesquieu's "oratorical outburst" as misplaced enthusiasm for things which are no longer possible. In an equally vehement  statement, he attempts to show that the times demand despotism. If he succeeds in showing that his rule is the last buffer against utter destruction, then what  serves his rule is "good," at least insofar as it preserves against a greater evil. He seeks strength and security, not for self-interested motives or out of profligacy,  but for urgent political reasons. In this light, the self-abnegation that Montesquieu demands would be irresponsible.

The character of modern society is presented in vivid and scathing terms. Machiavelli's prince cannot be an "Agesilaus, Lycurgus, or Gracchus" because he is not among "Spartans or Romans." He is "in the midst of voluptuous societies, where a passion for pleasure and war go hand in hand, where people are  transported by power and sensuality and no longer recognize divine authority,  paternal authority, or religious restrictions." It follows that he cannot lead by an  appeal to virtue. "I control this society through its vices because it only presents  me with vices." The events of 1848, not to mention 1789, have made evident the  anarchic and destructive possibilities possible in mass revolution. Consequently, the masses must be appeased to forestall chaos. [4]

For their part, the privileged classes make common cause with the prince and embrace policies that stand between them and a Europe "aflame." In the final  analysis, it is an appeal to security that justifies the Machiavellian coup and  serves as the ultimate objective of the prince's policies. This is a compelling  argument for the liberal Montesquieu whose design of political society is fundamentally motivated by the same desire for security but who is now forced to  entertain the idea that it is best guaranteed by dictatorial rule.

If it is granted that the Machiavellian revolution has thwarted anarchy, then Machiavelli's view of history is seemingly vindicated as to the recurrent possibility and even necessity for despotism. Moreover, he has, in a sense, proved that "good can come from evil"-at least if forestalling a greater evil is "good."  It follows that any steps that strengthen his regime can be viewed as justified.  Machiavelli has maneuvered the discussion to the point where his principles, in  the extreme situation that comes to prevail in modern times, would force at least  conditional assent on Montesquieu's part. Upon such foundations, less justifiably, he would build his grand structure of tyranny. Working within the frame of  liberal politics to meet the problems he identifies is not considered.

Machiavelli turns to measures that will ensure that his rule takes hold. Up to this point, he has emphasized the harsher aspects of his rule and, as conqueror,  stands accused of being an "avenging angel." In mock protest, Machiavelli asks:  "Am I really so harsh when I embrace, not violence, but self-effacement as my  political end?" His rule in fact is not to be confused with the military despotism  of old. With sarcasm, he promises to bring Montesquieu "more than one unexpected consolation" and points to certain softer features of his rule. But first, he  asks indulgence for listing "a few more precautions" necessary for the prince's  safety.

He will expand the praetorian guard, a person force one-third the size of the regular army. As far as the army goes, there will be universal conscription to  ensure an adequate force for his imperial policies. Continued service necessary  to a professional armed forces will be encouraged by monetary incentives. The  goal is state employment of the masses, bound to the prince through patriotic  loyalty and employment. [5]

His rule will find support of other sovereigns interested in a tranquil Europe. He will have his "worker's Jacquerie" to go along with his praetorian guard and  armed services. But, in the end, it is the prince's building program that represents the most efficacious way of finding permanent occupations for the masses.  They are tied to the regime whose policies guarantee their livelihood. And the  propertied classes, meanwhile, realize that this is the only means to defuse revolution. His building policy is the most important of many steps to organize and co-opt the workers while it lays down the foundations for a more integrated  economy.

Attention is rightly redirected to such a policy for the multiple objectives it serves. "Have you noticed that almost all my political reforms simultaneously serve economic goals?" In a truly Machiavellian vein, reconstruction also pursues a strategic goal. The avenues of the capital, for example, will be widened. They will come to be rightfully admired for providing the most beautiful urban  vistas in the world. But they also allow for the easy movement of troops. The  workers who widen such thoroughfares will make the erection of barricades  more difficult. They are depriving themselves of their favored means of mounting effective protests and insurrections. Moreover, important building projects  will take the workers outside of the city, the center of agitation, where the government is most vulnerable to a revolutionary coup. The subsidized housing that  the workers will construct for themselves will be interspersed in the environs of  the city. This will isolate troublemakers and fractionalize the strength of any  revolutionary movement. [6]

There will be an explosion in the growth of the bureaucracy as the role of government expands to handle the grand projects and social programs of the  regime. With the new programs initiated by the prince, the bureaucrat comes to  the fore. With such employment, he hopes to channel the aspirations and energies of the more talented and ambitious.

He will not neglect the "little things" to secure himself. Those who cannot be bought off will be won by honors. Equality of conditions breeds a love of distinction that can easily be satisfied by baubles and braid. Trophies, emblems,  images, and statues will be erected everywhere to remind of the greatness of the  prince who will designate everything under his authority with the epithet  "royal." Titles will multiply and ceremony will return into vogue. As petty honors satisfy little souls at little expense, the ancient nobility is appeased by a  scrupulous regard for traditions and honors which, until recently, had fallen into  desuetude. 

Above all, the general tone of the regime will be set by pleasure-seeking appropriate to a rich and luxurious Empire and far removed from the austerity associated with ancient republics or the peculiar asceticism and disciplined life-  styles of many in the money-making classes of early liberal regimes. Public  spectacles will rout boredom. And austere individuals who do not succumb to all  such blandishments will appear singular: Efforts will be made to seduce the  most pure among them. In no way will the people be made to feel self-conscious  in their pursuits. Rather, the fall of the pure will confirm them in their predilections. The prince will be "harsh only in what relates to politics." All other passions will be tolerated and encouraged by the prince's example.

Montesquieu had presumed that virtue would exist in substantial numbers of citizens, who would be moved to resistance to despotic rule. But Machiavelli has succeeded in impoverishing citizen character and reducing and isolating such  types. [8] At the same time, he has enlisted, through self-interest, the diverse factions and groups in liberal society to the prince's cause.

The Character of Louis Napoleon

In the Twenty-Fourth Dialogue, Machiavelli will give his government its "final countenance."

In political matters, the prince must remain inscrutable. He follows the likes of Alexander VI and the Duke of Valentinois, of whom it was said of the former  that "he never did what he said" and of the latter that "he never said what he  did." Machiavelli thus begins the Twenty-Fourth Dialogue with reference to two  prominent personages from The Prince, whose lives make for most profitable  study for would-be rulers. As it turns out, this Dialogue contains the most frequent references to The Prince. Moreover, except for one interruption, Machiavelli is free to proceed as he wishes. The dialectical character of Joly's work disappears as the interlocutors hasten to finish their conversation. The resulting  prose reminds one of the character of The Prince in the quickened pace in which  it prescribes the "proper" and oftentimes shocking conduct of princes.

In adjuring the prince to be inscrutable in word and deed, Machiavelli gives the first of a series of recommendations that intend to conjure a god-like image  for the sovereign. Mystery surrounds the throne. But when the prince does act,  he acts with vigor. The people see him as a singular kind of law unto himself.  Montesquieu interrupts Machiavelli to object to this dissimulation, which, no  matter how beneficial in keeping his subjects off balance and fearful, might provoke foreigners not held "under foot." The combined strength of his neighbors  would limit his power to act and ultimately overthrow such a faithless and men-  acing personage.

Machiavelli is momentarily forced to leave the portrait of the prince he is sketching and address foreign affairs. His foreign policy consists in offsetting  the strength of his more formidable enemies by seeking allies from countries in  decline. He will then manipulate them through appeals to memories of ancient  glory. This would provide him "with 300,000 more men against armed Europe" for as long as he lived. After this interlude, Machiavelli can return to the task of  revealing "the royal countenance" in its finished form, in virtually uninterrupted  discourse.

Competent advisors will serve the prince and debate in his presence. The correct course of action will recommend itself without the prince having to commit  himself beforehand. His word in fact may betray opposite intentions. Anticipating Orwell and .the descriptions of later totalitarianism, he will signal his designs   o the privileged few by words opposite to his acts. "When I say: 'My reign is  peace,' it means there will be war. When I make an appeal to morality, it means  that I am going to use force." His motives will remain obscure except to the initiated who penetrate the inner sanctums of power. The line of authority will constantly shift to prevent the coalescence of cliques that may grow presumptuous.

His press will talk constantly of the grandeur of the reign and the love of his subjects. It will put "into the mouths of the people the opinions and ideas, and  even the forms of speech by which they communicate them." His pronouncements will be grand occasions, oracular in character. When he addresses himself  to the people, he is not above a more blatant demagoguery and other techniques of mass appeal.

He will follow a great historic figure as his model. He could not "put his leisure to better use than by writing, say, the history of a great man" he emulates.  Precisely like Louis Napoleon, he will be a man of the times, cultivated, a poet-master. This will lend a certain charm to go with historic stature as it appeals to intellectuals whose sympathies are necessary in helping to project the "proper"  image of the prince for his subjects and posterity. [9]

At times, he must appear awesome. We are reminded of The Prince where it is asserted that men avenge slight wrongs but not great ones. [10] They like to feel the strength of the prince. Since they are venal, they would be ready accomplices in ventures that subdue the proud and independent.

The wrath of his 'justice' would affirm their commonality with others, including their superiors. All immediately around him are vulnerable to the prince  and the fate he dispenses. Restraint would be viewed with gratitude, almost as  an active benefaction. The smallest gesture will be studied as a sign of his disposition. Any odious excesses will be attributed to his underlings. He is to punish  with unyielding vigor but reward with alacrity. In the end, the hold of moral  principle will be loosened and replaced by reference to the will and pleasure of  the prince.

Machiavelli next turns to the human side of the prince. Clemency and magnanimity complement his more forceful features and soften his aspect. "Man is  the image of God, and the Divinity avails Himself of severe blows as well as mercy." Since customs have softened in modern times, he will not disregard the  usefulness of clemency in winning the allegiance of the multitudes.

He must appear superstitious. This will endow all his actions with a certain fatefulness to play upon the credulity of the masses. He will also be a lusty prince. This will enlist the interest and attention of the more beautiful half of his subjects. He will be envied of men and desired by women. Chivalry will return in his person. In effect, the whole of his policy is to make men forget their loss  of liberty. "I can assure you that if I carefully follow the rules I have just out-  lined there will be little concern about liberty in my kingdom." Making the people happy and providing them with diversions is what occupies him. "A thousand different objects will constantly occupy people's minds."

"I shall even go so far as to satisfy the obsession for liberty." He returns to foreign policy where he might exploit certain opportunities to gain popular influence on the pretext of fighting for the advancement of popular causes. He  would assure his fellow monarchs, however, that he embraces the cause of liberty only to stifle it.

At end, students of Napoleon III and, certainly, the contemporaries of Joly could not help but be aware that "the portrait of the prince" Machiavelli has  endeavored to sketch in the Twenty-Fourth Dialogue is in perfect likeness to the  French Emperor. We are left little doubt as to who Joly conceived as the practitioner of the "politics of Machiavelli in the Nineteenth Century," in the Dialogue  that is at once most explicitly Machiavellian in character and tone and most detailed in its description of Napoleon III.

Loosening Repression

At the beginning of the Twenty-Fifth Dialogue, Machiavelli indicates that he will rule for "ten years" in strictly absolute fashion. It is time for severe repression, whatever the prince's efforts to mask such a reality. It might be thought  that the people will be unhappy and complain. They will in fact receive their fate  as deserved punishment.

According to Machiavelli, there comes a moment to loosen pressure. The prince will grant liberties. The enemies of the prince fool themselves when they  think that repression will redound against the prince. It had its effect in dissipating the forces of resistance. He can grant certain liberties without them threatening him. Partisan hatred will be disarmed as he grants the  necessary concession  to the liberal spirit of the times. "I could even grant real liberties," he declares.  "You'd have to be completely bereft of political intelligence not to see that by  this time my legislation has borne fruit." In fact, "the character of the nation has  changed." Absolutism has penetrated the customs and reformed the mindset of  the nation. He may now enter the path of toleration without fearing anything.

An anecdote drawn from the experience of Rome demonstrates how liberty affects the souls of people. Dion relates that "the Roman people were indignant  toward Augustus because of certain very harsh laws that he had promulgated.  But as soon as he had the actor Piladus recalled and the seditious were banished  from the city, discontent ceased." Montesquieu himself recounts this anecdote in  The Spirit of the Laws. [11] The Romans felt tyranny more deeply when a dancer  was exiled than when all its laws had been taken away. We have reached a similar point in the evolution of France.

The portrait of the prince is virtually complete. A short while before, Montesquieu had asked Machiavelli to step down from the throne as the touchstone of his good will and concern for the common good. He will relinquish power on one condition, ''as a martyr" to the popular cause and as a testament to his love  of the people. After his death, their love for him will turn to adoration.

The Cult of Personality

Far from an act of self-abnegation, such a martyred death represents the height of hubris that would see the beloved prince elevated to a god-like status  to rival that of the Roman Caesar, also the founder of a universal dynasty. Here  we glimpse the real ambitions of the modern prince in what comes to light as a  Napoleonic emulation of the Caesars and one of the deepest insights into the  character of Louis. [12] The modem Caesar seeks the highest glory in the founding  of a new historic order. It is based on a new religion, generated by his sacrificial  death, that finds this prince, as Caesar before him, the supreme object of worship.

At the dramatic end of Joly's work, this becomes explicit.

I don't say that I shall be respected or loved, but I do say that I will be revered and adored. If I so wished I could have altars erected for  me. ...When I pass by, the soul of the people exalts. People run deliriously in my train. I am an object of idolatry. The father points me  out to his son. The mother invokes my name in her prayers. The girl  look.., at me. sighs, and thinks that if only I might glance at her, perchance, she could lie for a moment in my bed... I tell you, my name  will be invoked as if I was a god. When there are hailstorms, droughts, and fires, I rush up and the people throw themselves at my  feet. They would bear me to heaven in their arms if god gave them wings.

There can be no recourse to liberty, at least as Montesquieu understands the term. "In the mind and soul of my people I personify virtue. Even more, I personify liberty and also revolution, progress, the modern spirit, finally all that is  best at the core of contemporary civilization."

At the beginning of this part, Montesquieu had claimed that Machiavelli would have to change the meaning of words, if he were, as he said, to personify such things. A transvaluation of values, to borrow a phrase from Nietzche, is implied in his appeal to "virtue and liberty"-a change in the fundamental significance of words that rival the changed world view inaugurated by the real  Machiavelli in his use of such terms.

We are along way from the mechanistic politics of Montesquieu outlined in the first part of the Dialogue. Machiavelli has attempted to establish a popular  despotism. In the "cult" of the prince, he has also attempted to reconcile modern  rational politics with the credulous disposition of the masses and former faiths.  Devotions, formerly directed to other worlds, are  redirected to this world and the  person of this prince, who finds legitimacy in both secular and religious terms,  or rather, in an ideology that tries to synthesize the deepest sources of authority  in the West.

Notes

1. See Voltaire, Siecle de Louis XIV (Paris; Flammerion, 1931), I, 507. The opening of Voltaire's history indicates the appropriateness of Louis XIV as an object of emulation  for the new prince. He reigned over one of the four great epochs of the West. The first of  these belonged to Periclean Athens, the second to the Caesars, the third to Renaissance  Italy, and the last to Louis XIV, an era enriched by the three previous and therefore the  culmination of an "esprit" that Napoleonic France wanted to emulate.

2. HitJer's ambitions on this score parallel those of Louis. See Alben Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York; Macmillan, 1970), 8. Speer  had a theory of "ruin value" that attracted Hitler's interest. The buildings of the Third  Reich, in terms of their materials and statics, were to be designed on the order of Roman  models and their condition after the passing of a thousand years. (This was the Thousand  Year Reich and the first Reich, Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire, lasted this long.) As  in the Dialogue, an economic consideration also inspired the erection of the Third  Reich's monuments. The money spent on public buildings, like that spent on armaments,  injected the capital necessary to revive a depressed economy. It created the artificial demand for goods that alleviated the employment problem. Also, in the Dialogue, the buildings policy was meant to speak to and represent certain ideological goals of the regime.

3. In no way does the real Montesquieu adjure modems to follow the likes of the ancient founders. One can not read the description of Lycurgus's "singular" institutions without strong feelings of antipathy. See The Spirit of the Laws IV 6 and 7. Joly's distortion of the thought of the real Montesquieu is clearly evident here.

Ironically, the real Machiavelli, in fact, touts ancient founders as appropriate models for curing the "peculiar" diseases of modem politics.

4. Machiavelli's defense of his despotism in fact parodies the wisdom of ancient founders-recommended by Montesquieu for his emulation-when he constructs constitutions tailored to the character of the people he finds.

5. The secret to Saddam Hussein's political longevity may lie in the pursuit of similar policies.

6. One thinks of Sarcelles, on the outskirts of Paris.

7. This is the Paris of Offenbach, we should always remember. More to the point, Joly indicates that he knows very well how his contemporaries view him, indeed an "austere" and strange individual against the background of the Second Empire. He later indicates that there is no dearth of individuals who can be counted on to subdue the few proud and "independent men" of the times.

8. The "impoverishment" of the character of the people is precisely how the court that tried Joly saw him as depicting the effects of Napoleon's policies.

9. French presidents who followed DeGaulle have shown themselves of one mind with Joly.s Machiavelli on this score. They have felt compelled to demonstrate their affinity for literature (Mitterand) or art (Pompidou). Even the staid  Giscard apparently wrote a romantic novel. The family name -- d'Estaing -- though a bought title, was no electoral handicap. The contrast with America is  striking. The "populist" streak in American democracy inclines to suspicion in  matters that the French see as de rigeur in their leaders. The only recent exception to "populist suspicion" in the U.S. was JFK (and perhaps FDR). Like Louis  Napoleon, Kennedy burnished his reputation before running for president by  writing a history of great men-a Pulitzer- Prize winner, to boot. He and his wife  were genuinely at ease in the world of culture. It is for this that he is known as  being the most "European" of presidents. Family wealth, athletic good looks, prep schools and Harvard, an attractive, intelligent, French-speaking wife, beautiful children-were all critical elements of his charm. It rendered his life, not suspect, but feerique, and for a brief moment Washington (of all places) became  "Camelot." He seduced a whole generation of "the best and brightest." What the  Machiavelli of Joly's Dialogue says is pertinent here. The intellectuals he seduced would perpetuate his memory through their writing. Doesn't the "Kennedy myth" have something to do with this? 

10. See The Prince III.

11. The reference to Dion can be found in The Spirit of the Laws XIX 3.

12. The nephew Augustus stood to his uncle Julius as "civilizer" to "conqueror." Louis probably saw himself in a similar light with regard to his relative. I argue that his "civilizing" mission was undertaken in the element of Saint-Simonianism, the topic of the following two chapters.

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