Site Map

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE

APPENDIX: The Bissell Philosophy

Minutes of the 1968
"Bissell Meeting" at the
Council on Foreign Relations
as reprinted by the Africa
Research Group

The third meeting of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and Foreign
Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on January 8, 1968, at 5:00
p.m. Present were: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Discussion Leader; Douglas
Dillon, Chairman; William J. Barnds, Secretary; William R. Harris,
Rapporteur; George Agree, Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, Jr., Meyer
Bernstein, Col. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, George S. Franklin,
Jr., Eugene Fubini, Julius C. Holmes, Thomas L. Hughes, Joseph
Kraft, David W. MacEachron, Philip W. Quigg, Harry Howe Ransom,
Theodore C. Sorensen, David B. Truman.
The Chairman, Mr. Dillon, opened the meeting, noting that although
this entire series of discussion was "off-the-record," the subject of discussion
for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject
to the previously announced restrictions.
Mr. Dillon noted that problems involving CIA's relationships with
private institutions would be examined at a later meeting, though
neither Mr. Bissell nor others should feel restricted in discussion of
such problems this evening.
As the session's discussion leader, Mr. Bissell offered a review and
appraisal of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.
Touching briefly upon the question of responsibility, of whether
these agencies are instruments of national policy, Mr. Bissell remarked
that, in such a group, he needn't elaborate on CIA's responsiveness
to national policy; that we could assume that, although CIA participates
in policy making (as do other "action agencies," such as AID, the
military services and Departments, in addition to the Department of
State), CIA was a responsible agency of national policy.
Indeed, in Mr. Bissell's personal experience, CIA's role was more
carefully circumscribed and the established limits observed more attentively
than in ECA, where Mr. Bissell had previously worked.
The essential control of CIA resided in a Cabinet-level committee,
comprising a representative of the White House staff, the Under Sec382
A P PEN D I X
retary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and in recent years the
personal participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. Over the
years this committee has become a more powerful and effective device
for enforcing control. It reviews all new projects, and periodically
scrutinizes ongoing projects.
As an interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who
meet only once per week, this control group is of limited effectiveness.
Were it the only control instrument, Mr. Bissell would view it as inadequate,
but in fact this committee is merely the summit of control,
with a series of intermediate review procedures as lower levels. Projects
are usually discussed in the relevant office of the Assistant Secretary
of State, and, if at all related to Defense Department interests, at a
similar level in DoD, frequently after consideration at lower levels in
these departments. It was rare to take an issue before the Special Group
prior to discussion at lower levels, and if there was objection at lower
levels, most issues were not proposed to the Special Group--excepting
large projects or key issues, which would be appealed at every level,
including the Special Group.
Similar procedures applied in the field. Generally the Ambassador
had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although
in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of
State or the Secretary of State) the chief of station was instructed to
withhold information from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the
restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador
in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.
Of the "blown" operations, frequently among the larger ones, most
are known to have been approved by the President himself. The U-2
project, for example, was an off-shoot of the Land (intelligence) Committee
of the Killian panel on surprise attack; it was proposed as a
Killian panel recommendation to the President, supported by USIB;
its procurement, in utmost secrecy, was authorized by the President,
and, with the exception of the first few flights (the initial authorization
being to operate for a period of ten days, "weather permitting"), each
individual flight was authorized by the President, with participation by
the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
Covert operations should, for some purposes, be divided into two
classifications: (l) Intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the
obtaining of intelligence by covert means; and (2) Covert action,
attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations-sometimes
called "intervention"-by covert means.
Appendix 383
Although these two categories of activity can be separated in theory,
intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap. Efforts
have been made historically to separate the two functions but the
result has usually been regarded as "a total disaster organizationally."
One such attempt was the establishment in the early days of CIA
(1948) of the OPC under Frank G. Wisner as a separate organ for
covert action. Although supported and given cover by the CIA, this
organization was independent and Wisner reported directly to the
Secretaries of State and Defense. "Beedle" Smith decided when he
became Director of Central Intelligence that, if he were responsible
for OPC, he was going to run it and it was merged with the clandestine
intelligence organization in such a way that within the combined
Clandestine Service there was a complete integration of intelligence
collection and covert action functions in each area division.
In addition to our experience with OPC, the Germans and the
British for a time during the war had organizations for covert special
operations separate from, and inevitably in competition with, their
espionage services. In every case the experience has been unfortunate.
Although there are many disagreements within CIA on matters of
doctrine, the view is unanimous that the splitting of intelligence and
covert action services would be disastrous, with resulting competition
for recruitment of agents, multiple recruitment of the same agents,
additional security risks, and dissipation of effort.
Concerning the first category, intelligence collection, we should ask:
(a) What is the scope of "covert intelligence collection"? (b) What
intelligence collection functions can best be performed covertly?
The scope of covert intelligence collection includes: (1) reconnaissance;
(2) communications and electronic intelligence, primarily
undertaken by NSA; and (3) classical espionage, by agents. In gauging
their utility, Mr. Bissell ranked (1) the most important, (2) slightly
below, and (3) considerably below both (1) and (2).
Although it is less effective, classical espionage is "much the least
costly," with the hardware components of recon and NSA activities
raising their costs considerably.
(In the after-dinner discussion, an authority on communicationselectronics
expressed his concurrence in Mr. Bissell's relative rankings.
Notwithstanding technological advances in cryptology, the increased
sophistication in most cryptosystems assured that (1) (reconnaissance)
outranked (2). Another observer noted that the budgets correlated in
similar manner, the former speaker concurring and noting that, how384
A P PEN D I X
ever surprising, the budgets approximated maximum utility according
to cost-effectiveness criteria.)
Postwar U.S. reconnaissance operations began, historically, as
"covert" operations, primarily a series of clandestine overflights of
Communist territory in Eastern Europe, inaugurated in the early 1950s.
These early efforts were followed by the U-2 project, which provided
limited coverage but dramatic results.
Now we have reconnaissance satellites. Overhead reconnaissance is
one of the most open of "secrets" in international affairs; it is no longer
really a "covert activity," and bureaucratic responsibility for it now
resides in the Pentagon.
Classical espionage, in the early postwar years, was conducted with
special intensity in West Germany, and before the Berlin wall, in that
city, which was ideal for the moving of agents in both directions, providing
a sizable flow of political and economic intelligence (especially
from East Germany).
Throughout the period since the early fifties, of course, the Communist
bloc, and more especially the U.S.S.R. itself, has been recognized
as the primary target for espionage activities. Circumstances have
greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within
the bloc so much of the effort has been directed at bloc nationals stationed
in neutral or friendly areas, and at "third country" operations
that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as
sources of information on the Soviet bloc.
More recently there has been a shift in priorities for classical espionage
toward targets in the underdeveloped world. Partly as a result
of this change in priorities and partly because of other developments,
the scale of the classical espionage effort mounted in Europe has considerably
diminished. The U.S.S.R. remains a prime target but Communist
China would today be given the same priority.
As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espionage has
been of declining relative importance as a means of learning about
observable developments, such as new construction, the characteristics
of transportation systems, the strength and deployment of military
forces and the like because reconnaissance has become a far more
effective collection technique and (except in China) travel is freer and
far more extensive than some years ago. It had been hoped that
espionage would contribute to the collection of intelligence on Soviet
and East European technology, since this is a body of information not
readily observable (until embodied in operational systems). Another
Appendix 385
type of intelligence for which espionage would seem to be the only
available technique is that concerning enemy intentions. In practice
however espionage has been disappointing with respect to both these
types of intelligence. They are for obvious reasons closely guarded and
the task is just too difficult to permit results to be obtained with any
dependability or regularity. With respect to the former categorytechnology-
the published literature and direct professional contacts
with the scientific community have been far richer sources.
(A communications-electronics expert interjected the observation
that the same reasoning applied to inadequacies in S&T intelligence
collection; technology is just too difficult for agents, who are insufficiently
trained to comprehend what they observe as the technologies
become increasingly complicated.)
As to friendly neutrals and allies, it is usually easier to learn what
one wishes by overt contacts, human contacts of overt members of the
U.S. mission or private citizens. We don't need espionage to learn
British, or even French intentions.
(The speaker was questioned as to whether the other side's espionage
was of similarly limited utility, or whether-with their Philbys-they
were more successful?)
Mr. Bissell remarked that Soviet Union successes were primarily in
counterintelligence, though going back aways, the Soviet Union had
been more successful in recruiting U.S. scientists.
(The question was raised as to whether Burgess and MacLean
constituted merely C.!. successes.)
Mr. Bissell thought so.
(In another's recollection, Soviet atomic intelligence efforts had been
of substantial assistance in facilitating the Soviet nuclear weapons
program. Although it is not possible to estimate with precision the
effects of this intelligence, it was Lewis Strauss's guess that atomic
intelligence successes allowed the Soviets to detonate their first device
at least one and one-half and perhaps as much as two and one-half
years before such a test would have been possible with purely indigenous
efforts.)
The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc or other
sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence,
although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin Tunnel
and several of the high level defectors). A basic reason is that
espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it
is enormously difficult to recruit high level agents. A low level agent,
386 A P PEN D I X
even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of
communicating with him[,] simply cannot tell you much of what you
want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from
open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policy makers
and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank.
In contrast, the underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities
for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much
less highly oriented; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt
to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties,
localities, organizations, and individuals outside of the central governments.
The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide
Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a
form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance.
Why is this relevant?
Changes in the balance of power are extremely difficult to discern
except through frequent contact with power elements. Again and again
we have been surprised at coups within the military; often, we have
failed to talk to the junior officers or non-corns who are involved in the
coups. The same problem applies to labor leaders, and others. Frequently
we don't know of power relationships, because power balances
are murky and sometimes not well known even to the principal actors.
Only by knowing the principal players well do you have a chance of
careful prediction. There is real scope for action in this area; the technique
is essentially that of "penetration," including "penetrations" of
the sort which horrify classicists of covert operations, with a disregard
for the "standards" and "agent recruitment rules." Many of the "penetrations"
don't take the form of "hiring" but of establishing a close or
friendly relationship (which mayor may not be furthered by the provision
of money from time to time).
In some countries the CIA representative has served as a close counselor
(and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of
state. These are situations, of course, in which the tasks of intelligence
collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable.
(The question was raised as to why ordinary diplomats couldn't
maintain these relationships.)
Mr. Bissell observed that often they could. There were special cases,
however, such as in one Republic where the chief of state had a
"special relationship" with the senior CIA officers without the knowledge
of the U.S. Ambassador because the President of the Republic
Appendix 387
had so requested it. The CIA man sent reports by CIA channels back
to the Secretary of State, but the Ambassador in the field, as agreed by
the Secretary of State, wasn't to be informed. In this case, a problem
arose when the relevant Assistant Secretary of State (who had received
cables from the CIA man) became the new Ambassador, but the
President of the Republic liked the new Ambassador and asked that a
"special relationship" be established with him too.
Aside from this unique case, it seems to have been true generally
that the Ambassador has to be a formal representative of the United
States most of whose relations with the government to which he is accredited
are through or with the knowledge of its foreign office. On the
other hand, the CIA representative can maintain a more intimate and
informal relationship the privacy of which can be better preserved both
within the government of the country in question and within the United
States government. Moreover, if a chief of state leaves the scene or
changes his mind, you can quietly move a station chief, but it could be
embarrassing if it were necessary suddenly to recall the U.S. Ambassador.
(Was the previously described relationship really a "covert operation"?)
The "cover" may be to shield visibility from some junior officials or,
in the case of a "private adviser" to a chief of state, to shield this fact
from politicians of the local government.
(Another observation was that the method of reporting, through
CIA channels, constituted one difference and had some influence. A
chief of state who knew that CIA's reports would be handled in a
smaller circle, with less attendant publicity, might prefer these channels
for some communications.)
Concerning the second category, covert action:
The scope of covert action could include: (I) political advice and
counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and
"technical assistance" to political parties; (4) support of private organizations,
including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5)
covert propaganda; (6) "private" training of individuals anJ exchange
of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary [or] political
action operations designed to overthrow or to support a regime
(like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can
be classified in various ways: by the degree and type of secrecy required
[,] by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile
character.
388 A P PEN D I X
From whom is the activity to be kept secret? After five days, for
example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians but these
operations remained highly secret in the United States, and with good
reason. If these overflights had "leaked" to the American press, the
U.S.S.R. would have had been forced to take action. On a less severe
level the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are
examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations
secret from the general public of both sides. "Unfortunately, there
aren't enough of these situations."
(The remark was interjected that there was another reason for
secrecy; if one had to admit to the activity, one would have to show
the results, and exactly how good or bad they were.)
Covert operations could be classified by their legality or illegality.
Many of them are legal.
They can also be classified as "benign" or "hostile." Most operations
in Western Europe have been "benign," though involving the gravest
improprieties, and in some cases clearly illegal action. (E.g., covert
support of political parties.)
In the case of a large underdeveloped country, for example, money
was put into a party's funds without the knowledge of that party. The
relatively few economic operations that have been undertaken have
been both benign and legal. One of these involved the provision by
CIA of interim ostensibly private financing of an overt project pending
an overt and official loan by AID. Its purpose was to give AID
time for some hard bargaining without causing a complete failure of
the transaction. The stereotype, of course, is that all covert operations
are illegal and hostile, but this is not really the case.
The role of covert intervention can best be understood by contrast
with the overt activities of the United States government. Diplomacy
seeks results by bargaining on a government-to-government basis,
sometimes openly-sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and
cultural programs seek to modify benignly the economies of other
countries and the climate of opinion within them. Covert intervention is
usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with
fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build up the economy
of an underdeveloped country must be subtle, long continued, probably
quite costly, and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups
within the country if it is to have much influence. On the other hand
an effort to weaken the local Communist party or to win an election,
Appendix 389
and to achieve results within at most two or three years, must obviously
be covert, it must pragmatically use the people and the instrumentalities
that are available and the methods that seem likely to work.
It is not surprising that the practitioners within the United States government
of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in
their preferences for methods, friends, and ideologies.
The essence of such intervention in the internal power balance is
the identification of allies who can be rendered more effective, more
powerful, and perhaps wiser through covert assistance. Typically these
local allies know the source of the assistance but neither they nor the
United States could afford to admit to its existence. Agents for fairly
minor and low sensitivity interventions, for instance some covert
propaganda and certain economic activities, can be recruited simply
with money. But for the larger and more sensitive interventions, the
allies must have their own motivation. On the whole the Agency has
been remarkably successful in finding individuals and instrumentalities
with which and through which it could work in this fashion. Implied
in the requirement for a pre-existing motivation is the corollary that
an attempt to induce the local ally to follow a course he does not believe
in will at least reduce his effectiveness and may destroy the whole
operation. It is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor, and cultural
groups that have recently been publicized that the Agency's objective
was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point
them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render
them more effective.
Turning to relations with other agencies, Mr. Bissell was impressed
by the degree of improvement in relations with the State Department.
Seen from the Washington end, there has been an increase in consultation
at the country-desk level, more often at the Bureau level or
the Assistant Secretary of State level as the operation shapes up. The
main problem some five to six years ago was not one of responsibility
or authority but of cover arrangements.
Mr. Bissell provided a brief critique of covert operations, along the
following lines:
That aspect of the Agency's operations most in need of change is the
Agency's use and abuse of "cover." In this regard, the "background
paper" for this session raised many cover-oriented questions.
On disclosure of private institutional support of late, it is very clear
that we should have had greater compartmenting of operations.
390 A P PEN D I X
If the Agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private
institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have
"blown" cannot be resurrected.
We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to
the use of "cut-outs." CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs
to be better protected.
If various groups hadn't been aware of the source of their funding,
the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than
occurred.
The CIA interface with various private groups, including business
and student groups, must be remedied.
The problem of Agency operations overseas is frequently a problem for
the State Department. It tends to be true that local allies find themselves
dealing always with an American and an official American-since the
cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee. There are
powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to
have some CIA personnel housed in the Embassy compound, if only
for local "command post" and communications requirements.
Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and timeconsuming,
to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This
would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the
personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into
the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture.
The United States should make increasing use of non-nationals, who,
with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to
develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the
American staff. As we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and
Africa, the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed.
The primary change recommended would be to build up a
system of unofficial cover; to see how far we can go with non-U.S.
nationals, especially in the field. The CIA might be able to make increasing
use of non-nationals as "career agents" that is with a status
midway between that of the classical agent used in a single compartmented
operation perhaps for a limited period of time and that of a
staff member involved through his career in many operations and well
informed of the Agency's capabilities. Such career agents should be
encouraged with an effort at indoctrination and training and with a
prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty and they
could of course never be employed in ways that would conflict with
Appendix 391
their primary loyalties toward their own countries. This still leaves
open, however, a wide range of potential uses. The desirability of more
effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to
Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the conduct of United States
nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly
circumscribed.
These suggestions about unofficial cover and career agents illustrate
and emphasize the need for continuing efforts to develop covert action
capabilities even where there is no immediate need to employ them.
The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies-both
individuals and organizations-making contact with them, and establishing
the fact of a community of interest.
There is some room for improvement, Mr. Bissell thought, in the
planning of covert action country by country. Covert intervention is
probably most effective in situations where a comprehensive effort is
undertaken with a number of separate operations designed to support
and complement one another and to have a cumulatively significant
effect. The Agency probably finds itself involved in too many small
covert action operations having no particular relationship with one
another and having little cumulative impact.
There is no doubt that some covertly funded programs could be
undertaken overtly, Mr. Bissell thought. Often activities have been
initiated through CIA channels because they could be started more
quickly and informally but do not inherently need to be secret. An
example might be certain exchange of persons programs designed to
identify potential political leaders and give them some exposure to the
United States. It should be noted, however, that many such innocent
programs are more effective if carried out by private auspices than if
supported officially by the United States government. They do not need
to be covert but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations
do not initiate them,.there may be no way to get them done except by
covert support to "front" organizations.
Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some
can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.)
are pretty well "blown" and not inexpensive. USIA doesn't like them,
and although they did have a real justification some ten to fifteen years
ago as the voice of refugees and emigres, groups which also have
declined in value, and in the view of some professionals are likely to
continue declining in value.
392 A P PEN D I X
In his last two years in the Agency, Mr. Bissell felt that the Clandestine
Services could have been smaller.
Indeed, steps were taken to reduce their size. It is impossible to
separate the issue of size from personnel and cover problems. It was
Mr. Bissell's impression that the Clandestine Services were becoming
increasingly a career service, too much like the Foreign Service (personnel
looking to a succession of overt posts in a safe career). One
result was the circumscription of local contacts. There was a subtle
change taking place, which threatened to degrade some of CIA's former
capabilities. Formally, the CIA had a staff with a wide variety of backgrounds,
experiences, and capabilities. Its members were recruited
from every sort of public and private occupation. If this diversity and
variety is lost through the process of recruiting staff members from
college, training them in a fairly standard pattern, and carrying them
through orderly planned careers in the Agency, one of the organization's
most valuable attributes will disappear.
Finally, Mr. Bissell remarked on large operations. It is self-evident
that if an operation is too large, it can't remain a deeply kept secret.
At best, one can then hope for a successful formal disclaimer. The
worst of many faults of the Bay of Pigs operation was excessive
reliance on the operation's disclaim ability.
It has been a wise decision that operations of that scale not be undertaken
by the Agency, except in theaters such as Vietnam, where the
stakes and standards are different.
Covert action operations are generally aimed at short-term goals
and the justification for the control machinery is that bias of operators
to the short run can be compensated for in the review process. Mr. Bissell
can conceive of no other way to force greater attention to longrange
costs and values. One alternative is that caution will lead to ineffectuality.
"Operational types" will be risk-takers; the counterweight
is, and should be, applied by the other agencies in government.
In the discussion following Mr. Bissell's talk, the issue of CIA cover
was cited as among the more interesting from the perspective of a
former State Department appointee. The size of covert operations
known to other governments was a continuing embarrassment, and the
overseas staff maintained for these purposes and known to host governments
was a similar source of embarrassment. From time to time,
efforts were made to reduce overseas staff; although agreement in
Appendix 393
principle was readily forthcoming, the particulars of staff reduction
were difficult to obtain.
A former member of the Special Group (who served eighteen
months on that committee) agreed with Mr. Bissell's earlier remarks
on control mechanisms, insofar as they applied to review of new
projects. These received most careful scrutiny. Insofar as the Special
Group considered ongoing projects during this eighteen-month period,
it was recalled that there was not any systematic, thorough procedure
for such review, the committee finding itself busy with all the new
proposals. If it were true that most operations were most useful for
short-term goals, then perhaps there should be greater attention to
review of ongoing projects, and termination of more projects earlier
than in past practice.
A continuing problem which worries one former official was that
concerning the "charter" of CIA, the public expression of which, in
the National Security Act of 1947, was necessarily vague. CIA's full
"charter" has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain[,]
secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for
the charter and to question the Agency's authority to undertake various
activities. The problem of a secret "charter" remains as a curse, but
the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution.
Another former official remarked on the inadequacy of clandestine
intelligence as a means of obtaining enemy intentions. Sherman Kent
(former Chairman, Board of National Estimates) distinguishes "the
knowable" from "the unknowable," and we should recognize that
much remains impossible to know, including, frequently, enemy intentions.
Respecting the reduction of overseas personnel and programs of
declining utility, it was noted that the curtailment of over-age and unproductive
personnel was a thorny issue. Recognizing the likelihood of
appeal to the President and the absence of widespread participation in
a manpower review, a former budget official arranged the participation
of the Bureau of the Budget, CIA, FlAB, and relevant Under Secretaries
in considerations of budgetary modifications. What emerged was
an inertia, partly the inertia of the cold war. Parenthetically, a couple
of much-criticized public media projects (cited by name) had proven
of value, as the fall of Novotny in Czechoslovakia suggested, but a
number of ineffective programs were retained. The problem was to free
the budget, to do something new, in the place of old programs, not to
394 A P PEN 0 I X
reduce the budget, but unfortunately, the chiefs in CIA wanted to
control their working capital. If it were only possible to tell these officials
not to worry, that we were setting aside $xxx million for CIA,
and merely seeking to encourage better use of the same dollar amounts,
then it would have been possible to move around some money. The big
"iffy" question was a particular (named) foundation, which received
a sizable allocation. Finally, everything was cleared up, and the next
big review was scheduled, but never really effected as a consequence of
the Cuban missile crisis. The review was geared up in 1963 once again.
Another observer, drawing upon work with the "combined cryptologic
budget" and private industry, concluded that it was usually
impossible to cut a budget; usually it was only possible to substitute
a new project for an old one.
The Chairman suggested a number of questions: What are the effects
of covert operations being blown? What can be done to improve the
image of the Agency? What can be done to improve relations between
the Agency and the press?
It was thought that a journalist's perspective might aid in discussing
these questions, but a number of prior issues were thought to require
attention:
( 1) The matter of size required attention. In any government
agency size can become a problem; increasingly there is a realization
that the government is too big and "an ever-swelling tumor." At some
point there will have to be a fairly sharp cutback in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
(2) One was not overly impressed by the use of CIA in the developing
world; in any case, we could have increased confidence in the
range of choice in most developing areas. Conversely, it might not be as
easy as Mr. Bissell suggested to know the power structure in more
developed areas, in Western Europe and Japan.
(A query was interjected: Why should we have increasing confidence
in the range of choice in developing areas?
Perhaps there are less variations than we earlier thought. "Things
are evening out and we can live more comfortably.")
(3) Where do you bury the body? One is not completely convinced
by citation of the experience with Frank Wisner's OPC. We could
get around the responsibility issue raised by "Beedle" Smith; we could
get around conflicting chains of command.
(4) Related to (3). Maybe there is a cost to be paid for having
covert operations under CIA. Perhaps we could have intelligence colAppendix
395
lection under State and covert operations under the Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs.
In response to items (3) and (4) some earlier remarks were clarified:
one would not claim that the operational side of CIA need be
where it is. Rather, one would inveigh against the splitting of covert
intelligence collection and covert operations. One could, however,
split the operational side from the analytic side. This is a plausible
case, a solution for which could be worked out (though, on balance,
the speaker was against it). But to split the operational side-as the
German case, the British case for a time, and our own for a time suggested-
would be disastrous.
Remarking on labor activities, one participant stated that before
May 1967 it was common knowledge that there had been some CIA
support for labor programs, but first Ramparts and then Tom Braden
spelled out this support in public. Those in international labor affairs
were dismayed, and certain newspapermen compounded their difficulties
by confusing AID with CIA, and claiming that the AFL-CIO's
Free Labor Development program was tainted.
Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected.
First, there hasn't been any real trouble with international labor programs.
Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U,S. labor
programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly,
these foreign labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now
they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help.
Worse yet, Vic Reuther, who had been alleging that others were
receiving CIA money, and whose brother's receipt of $50,000 from
CIA in old bills was subsequently disclosed by Tom Braden, still goes
on with his charges that the AFL-CIO has taken CIA money. Here
again, no one seems to listen, "The net result has been as close to zero
as possible. We've come to accept CIA, like sin," So, for example,
British Guiana's labor unions were supported through CIA conduits,
but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations
to the contrary, there has been almost no damage.
A former State Department official offered some remarks on intelligence
operations as seen from the field. He concurred in Mr. Bissell's
remarks on "cover." The initial agreement between the Agency and
State was intended to be "temporary," but "nothing endures like the
ephemera!."
How are Agency officials under "official cover" specially equipped
to handle covert operations? If the Agency station chief has a "special
396 A P PEN D I X
relationship" with the chief of state, one would submit that it was because
the Ambassador wasn't worth a damn. Moreover, such a "special
relationship" created the risk that the chief of state, seeing two channels
to Washington, could play one off against another. Some foreign
statesmen are convinced that an "invisible government" really exists,
and this impression shouldn't be allowed.
Also, prejudice in favor of covertly obtained intelligence is a troublesome
thing.
One way to overcome the misconceptions is to make CIA a truly
secret service, and not merely an agency duplicating the Foreign Service.
With money shortages CIA has often filled a vacuum, but this
does not make it right.
Another questioned the discussion leader's proposal for greater
utilization of non-U.S. nationals. How could you get non-nationals to
do the job and to develop loyalty to the United States?
One was not sure that it was doable, but it was worth trying. It
would be more prone to work if you used a national of Country B to
work in Country C, if what you are asking is neither (1) against the
interest of Country B, nor (2) nefarious. You do need some cover, and
the natural vehicle is an organization with non-American nationals.
Another observer was struck by the lack of interest in the "blowing"
of covertly sponsored radio activities. Why has there been so little
interest in these activities, in contrast to the immense concern over the
CIA-NSA relationship? One might conclude that the public is not
likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at
least not nearly so much as by penetration of U.S. institutions. "The
public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take
a look at their neighbors." Does this suggested expansion in use of
private institutions include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions
operating overseas?
In response, attention was drawn to the clear jurisdictional boundaries
between CIA and the FBI, CIA being proscribed from "internal
security functions." CIA was averse to surveillance of U.S. citizens
overseas (even when specifically requested), and averse to operating
in the United States, excepting against foreigners here as transients.
One might want CIA to expand its use of U.S. private corporations,
but for objectives outside the United States. It was recalled that the
Agency funding of the National Student Association was, in every
case, for activities outside the United States or for activities with
overseas objectives.
Appendix 397
Why, we might ask, should the U.S. government use nongovernmental
institutions more, and why should it deal with them in the
United States? If dealings are overseas, then it is necessary to maintain
an overseas bureaucracy to deal with the locals. It is also necessary
to engage in communications in a possibly hostile environment. If one
deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep
most of the bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the
corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas
communications (including classified communications). In this opinion,
the policy distinction should involve the use to which the private
institution is put, not whether or not to use private institutions.
In another view it was desirable for this discussion group to examine
different types of institutions. For example, should CIA use educational
institutions? Should CIA have influenced the selection of NSA officers?
One was not aware that CIA had influenced the election of NSA
officers; if it had, it shouldn't have done so, in one's opinion.
Mightn't it be possible to deal with individuals rather than organizations?
Yes, in many cases this would be preferable. It depended upon skill
in the use of our operating capabilities.
As an example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence,
a former official noted the clandestine acquisition of Khrushchev's
"secret speech" in February 1956. The speech was too long for even
Khrushchev to memorize, and over one hundred people had heard it.
We targeted it, and by secret means acquired a copy. The State Department
released the text and The New York Times printed it in full. The
repercussions were felt around the world, and particularly within the
Communist bloc. The Soviets felt unable to deny the authenticity of
the text we released, and the effect upon many of the satellite states
was profound. It was the beginning of the split in the Communist movement.
If you get a precise target, and go after it, you can change
history.
Another observer was troubled by the earlier-expressed point about
increased use of private institutions. Most demoralizing in the academic
community was the sense of uncertainty about institutions with which
individuals were associated. There is a profound problem in penetrating
institutions within the country when there is a generalized loss of faith,
a fear that nothing is what it seems.
It was noted that the next session, on February 15, 1968, would
concentrate upon relations with private institutions.
398 A P PEN 0 I X
To one observer, part of this solution would be found in the political
process, involving extragovernmental contacts in the sphere of political
action.
In response to a query, the relative utilities of types of intelligence
data were reviewed. Most valuable was reconnaissance, then communications-
electronic intelligence, then classical espionage.
We have forgotten, it was noted, the number one over-all source,
namely, overt data.
The meeting was adjourned at 9: 15 p.m., and participants were
reminded of the next meeting on February 15.
WILLIAM R. HARRIS
RAPPORTEUR

Go to Next Page