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Book 5
1
With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what kind of
actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and
(3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our
investigation shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character
which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly
and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which
makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too, then,
lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the
sciences and the faculties as of states of character. A faculty or a
science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects,
but a state of character which is one of two contraries does not produce
the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do what is
the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man
walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man would.
Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and often
states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for (A) if
good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and (B) good
condition is known from the things that are in good condition, and they
from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary both
that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome
should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the
most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be
ambiguous; e.g. if 'just' is so, that 'unjust' will be so too.
Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but because their
different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity escapes
notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the meanings are
far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward form is great) as
the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone of an animal and
for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point,
then, the various meanings of 'an unjust man'. Both the lawless man and
the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently
both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is
the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.
Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with goods-not
all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do,
which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person are
not always good. Now men pray for and pursue these things; but they
should not, but should pray that the things that are good absolutely may
also be good for them, and should choose the things that are good for
them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the
less-in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil
is itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is directed at
the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. And he is unfair; for
this contains and is common to both.
Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man
just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts
laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say,
is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the
common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold
power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts
just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for
the political society. And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave
man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our
arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor to
gratify one's lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to
strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the
other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and
forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the
hastily conceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete
virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And
therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and
'neither evening nor morning star' is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in
justice is every virtue comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its
fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It
is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only
in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise
virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to their
neighbour. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that
'rule will show the man'; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to
other men and a member of a society. For this same reason justice, alone
of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related
to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a
ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is he who exercises his
wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best
man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who
exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in
this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the
contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the difference
is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have
said; they are the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a
relation to one's neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state
without qualification, virtue.
2
But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is a
part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain.
Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are
concerned.
That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the man
who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly
indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away his shield
through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help
a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly he
often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all together, but certainly
wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice. There is,
then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide
sense, and a use of the word 'unjust' which answers to a part of what is
unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary to the law'. Again if one man
commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while
another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is
penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather
than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent;
evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his
act. Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some
particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the
desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to
anger; but if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of
wickedness but injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart from
injustice in the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which
shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls
within the same genus; for the significance of both consists in a
relation to one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour or
money or safety-or that which includes all these, if we had a single
name for it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while
the other is concerned with all the objects with which the good man is
concerned.
It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that
there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp
its genus and differentia.
The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and the
just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the
afore-mentioned sense of injustice. But since unfair and the unlawful
are not the same, but are different as a part is from its whole (for all
that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair), the
unjust and injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same as but
different from the former kind, as part from whole; for injustice in
this sense is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly
justice in the one sense of justice in the other. Therefore we must
speak also about particular justice and particular and similarly about
the just and the unjust. The justice, then, which answers to the whole
of virtue, and the corresponding injustice, one being the exercise of
virtue as a whole, and the other that of vice as a whole, towards one's
neighbour, we may leave on one side. And how the meanings of 'just' and
'unjust' which answer to these are to be distinguished is evident; for
practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those
which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole;
for the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids us to practise any
vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are
those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed with
a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the
education of the individual as such, which makes him without
qualification a good man, we must determine later whether this is the
function of the political art or of another; for perhaps it is not the
same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at random.
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense,
(A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or
money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a
share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to
have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) one is
that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man.
Of this there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary
and (2) others involuntary- voluntary such transactions as sale,
purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing,
letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these
transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are
clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement
of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent,
such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence,
mutilation, abuse, insult.
3
(A) We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are unfair
or unequal; now it is clear that there is also an intermediate between
the two unequals involved in either case. And this is the equal; for in
any kind of action in which there's a more and a less there is also what
is equal. If, then, the unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men
suppose it to be, even apart from argument. And since the equal is
intermediate, the just will be an intermediate. Now equality implies at
least two things. The just, then, must be both intermediate and equal
and relative (i.e. for certain persons). And since the equal
intermediate it must be between certain things (which are respectively
greater and less); equal, it involves two things; qua just, it is for
certain people. The just, therefore, involves at least four terms; for
the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which
it is manifested, the objects distributed, are two. And the same
equality will exist between the persons and between the things
concerned; for as the latter the things concerned-are related, so are
the former; if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but
this is the origin of quarrels and complaints-when either equals have
and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this
is plain from the fact that awards should be 'according to merit'; for
all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to
merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of
merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters
of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of
aristocracy with excellence.
The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being not
a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract units,
but of number in general). For proportion is equality of ratios, and
involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four
terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term
as two and mentions it twice; e.g. 'as the line A is to the line B, so
is the line B to the line C'; the line B, then, has been mentioned
twice, so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional terms
will be four); and the just, too, involves at least four terms, and the
ratio between one pair is the same as that between the other pair; for
there is a similar distinction between the persons and between the
things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, and therefore,
alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D. Therefore also the whole is in
the same ratio to the whole; and this coupling the distribution effects,
and, if the terms are so combined, effects justly. The conjunction,
then, of the term A with C and of B with D is what is just in
distribution, and this species of the just is intermediate, and the
unjust is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is
intermediate, and the just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this
kind of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that
it follows that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the
corresponding part.) This proportion is not continuous; for we cannot
get a single term standing for a person and a thing.
This, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the unjust is what
violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too
small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has
too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is
good. In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is
reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser
evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of
choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.
This, then, is one species of the just.
4
(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion
with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the just
has a different specific character from the former. For the justice
which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the
kind of proportion mentioned above (for in the case also in which the
distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership it will be
according to the same ratio which the funds put into the business by the
partners bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to this kind of
justice is that which violates the proportion. But the justice in
transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the
injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of
proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion. For it
makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad
man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed
adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury,
and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is
being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received
it. Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge
tries to equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and
the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been
slain, the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but
the judge tries to equalize by means of the penalty, taking away from
the gain of the assailant. For the term 'gain' is applied generally to
such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g.
to the person who inflicts a wound and 'loss' to the sufferer; at all
events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and
the other gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate between the greater
and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively greater and
less in contrary ways; more of the good and less of the evil are gain,
and the contrary is loss; intermediate between them is, as we saw,
equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective justice will be the
intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when people dispute,
they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to go to
justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort of animate justice;
and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in some states they call
judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is
intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an
intermediate, since the judge is so. Now the judge restores equality; it
is as though there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he took
away that by which the greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to
the smaller segment. And when the whole has been equally divided, then
they say they have 'their own'-i.e. when they have got what is equal.
The equal is intermediate between the greater and the lesser line
according to arithmetical proportion. It is for this reason also that it
is called just (sikaion), because it is a division into two equal parts
(sicha), just as if one were to call it sichaion; and the judge (sikastes)
is one who bisects (sichastes). For when something is subtracted from
one of two equals and added to the other, the other is in excess by
these two; since if what was taken from the one had not been added to
the other, the latter would have been in excess by one only. It
therefore exceeds the intermediate by one, and the intermediate exceeds
by one that from which something was taken. By this, then, we shall
recognize both what we must subtract from that which has more, and what
we must add to that which has less; we must add to the latter that by
which the intermediate exceeds it, and subtract from the greatest that
by which it exceeds the intermediate. Let the lines AA', BB', CC' be
equal to one another; from the line AA' let the segment AE have been
subtracted, and to the line CC' let the segment Cd have been added, so
that the whole line DCC' exceeds the line EA' by the segment CD and the
segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line Bb' by the segment CD. (See
diagram.)
These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange; for
to have more than one's own is called gaining, and to have less than
one's original share is called losing, e.g. in buying and selling and in
all other matters in which the law has left people free to make their
own terms; but when they get neither more nor less but just what belongs
to themselves, they say that they have their own and that they neither
lose nor gain.
Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of
loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal
amount before and after the transaction.
5
Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the
Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without qualification as
reciprocity. Now 'reciprocity' fits neither distributive nor
rectificatory justice-yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus
to mean this:
Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done -for in
many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in accord; e.g.
(1) if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in
return, and if some one has wounded an official, he ought not to be
wounded only but punished in addition. Further (2) there is a great
difference between a voluntary and an involuntary act. But in
associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men
together-reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the
basis of precisely equal return. For it is by proportionate requital
that the city holds together. Men seek to return either evil for
evil-and if they cannot do so, think their position mere slavery-or good
for good-and if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by
exchange that they hold together. This is why they give a prominent
place to the temple of the Graces-to promote the requital of services;
for this is characteristic of grace-we should serve in return one who
has shown grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in
showing it.
Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a
builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get
from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give him in
return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of
goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention
will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold;
for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than
that of the other; they must therefore be equated. (And this is true of
the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if what the
patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of the same
amount and kind.) For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange,
but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who are different and
unequal; but these must be equated. This is why all things that are
exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for this end that money has
been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it
measures all things, and therefore the excess and the defect-how many
shoes are equal to a house or to a given amount of food. The number of
shoes exchanged for a house (or for a given amount of food) must
therefore correspond to the ratio of builder to shoemaker. For if this
be not so, there will be no exchange and no intercourse. And this
proportion will not be effected unless the goods are somehow equal. All
goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before.
Now this unit is in truth demand, which holds all things together (for
if men did not need one another's goods at all, or did not need them
equally, there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange);
but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand;
and this is why it has the name 'money' (nomisma)-because it exists not
by nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power to change it and
make it useless. There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have
been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the
shoemaker's work is to that of the farmer's work for which it exchanges.
But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when they have
already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both excesses), but
when they still have their own goods. Thus they are equals and
associates just because this equality can be effected in their case. Let
A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product equated to C. If it
had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus effected, there would
have been no association of the parties. That demand holds things
together as a single unit is shown by the fact that when men do not need
one another, i.e. when neither needs the other or one does not need the
other, they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one has
oneself, e.g. when people permit the exportation of corn in exchange for
wine. This equation therefore must be established. And for the future
exchange-that if we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we
do need it-money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for
us to get what we want by bringing the money. Now the same thing happens
to money itself as to goods-it is not always worth the same; yet it
tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a price set on
them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so, association of
man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate
and equates them; for neither would there have been association if there
were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality
if there were not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that
things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference
to demand they may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit,
and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for
it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are
measured by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of
B, if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a
tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz.
five. That exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for
it makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a
house, or the money value of five beds.
We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been marked
off from each other, it is plain that just action is intermediate
between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is to
have too much and the other to have too little. Justice is a kind of
mean, but not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it
relates to an intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the
extremes. And justice is that in virtue of which the just man is said to
be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute
either between himself and another or between two others not so as to
give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbour (and
conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in
accordance with proportion; and similarly in distributing between two
other persons. Injustice on the other hand is similarly related to the
unjust, which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion, of the
useful or hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess and defect, viz.
because it is productive of excess and defect-in one's own case excess
of what is in its own nature useful and defect of what is hurtful, while
in the case of others it is as a whole like what it is in one's own
case, but proportion may be violated in either direction. In the unjust
act to have too little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much is to
act unjustly.
Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and injustice,
and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.
6
Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must
ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect
to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief, an adulterer, or a brigand.
Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types.
For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she was, but the
origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts
unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief, yet he
stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly in all
other cases.
Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just;
but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is
just without qualification but also political justice. This is found
among men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who
are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that
between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political
justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For justice
exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and
law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is
the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men between
whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though there is not
injustice between all between whom there is unjust action), and this is
assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too
little of things evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man
to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own
interests and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the
guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And
since he is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for
he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless
such a share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that
he labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated previously,
say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a reward must be given
him, and this is honour and privilege; but those for whom such things
are not enough become tyrants.
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the
justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no
injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own, but
a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets
up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to
hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice towards
oneself). Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is not
manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to law,
and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are
people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice
can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children and
chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this is
different from political justice.
7
Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking
this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it
has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom
shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed,
and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that
sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of
decrees. Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that
which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as
fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things
recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way,
but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true
at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature,
yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by
nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being
otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional,
assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the
same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet
it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things
which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures;
for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in
wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are
just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same,
since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which
is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is
related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are
done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.
There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust,
and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust
by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done,
is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but is
unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the general term is
rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is applied to the correction
of the act of injustice).
Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which
it is concerned.
8
Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts
unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when
involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an
incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust.
Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is
determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is
voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of
injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts
of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By the voluntary
I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a man's own power
which he does with knowledge, i.e. not in ignorance either of the person
acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that will be attained
(e.g. whom he is striking, with what, and to what end), each such act
being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's
hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily; for the act
was not in his own power). The person struck may be the striker's
father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the persons
present, but not know that it is his father; a similar distinction may
be made in the case of the end, and with regard to the whole action.
Therefore that which is done in ignorance, or though not done in
ignorance is not in the agent's power, or is done under compulsion, is
involuntary (for many natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform
and experience, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g.
growing old or dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the
injustice or justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a
deposit unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either
to do what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way.
Similarly the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return
the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only
incidentally. Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others not by
choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, not by choice
those which we do without previous deliberation. Thus there are three
kinds of injury in transactions between man and man; those done in
ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the act, the
instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than the agent
supposed; the agent thought either that he was not hitting any one or
that he was not hitting with this missile or not hitting this person or
to this end, but a result followed other than that which he thought
likely (e.g. he threw not with intent to wound but only to prick), or
the person hit or the missile was other than he supposed. Now when (1)
the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a
misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but
does not imply vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the
fault originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin
lies outside him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after
deliberation, it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to anger or to
other passions necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful
and mistaken acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice,
but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the
injury is not due to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an
unjust man and a vicious man.
Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done of
malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but he who
enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in dispute is
not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice; for it is
apparent injustice that occasions rage. For they do not dispute about
the occurrence of the act-as in commercial transactions where one of the
two parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing to forgetfulness;
but, agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which side justice lies
(whereas a man who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing
that he has done so), so that the one thinks he is being treated
unjustly and the other disagrees.
But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these are
the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust man,
provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly, a man
is just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if he merely
acts voluntarily.
Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mistakes
which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance are
excusable, while those which men do not from ignorance but (though they
do them in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural nor
such as man is liable to, are not excusable.
9
Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing of
injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in
Euripides' paradoxical words:
I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?
Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all
suffering of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust action is
voluntary? And is all suffering of injustice of the latter kind or else
all of the former, or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary?
So, too, with the case of being justly treated; all just action is
voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar
opposition in either case-that both being unjustly and being justly
treated should be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it
would be thought paradoxical even in the case of being justly treated,
if it were always voluntary; for some are unwillingly treated justly.
(2) One might raise this question also, whether every one who has
suffered what is unjust is being unjustly treated, or on the other hand
it is with suffering as with acting. In action and in passivity alike it
is possible to partake of justice incidentally, and similarly (it is
plain) of injustice; for to do what is unjust is not the same as to act
unjustly, nor to suffer what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and
similarly in the case of acting justly and being justly treated; for it
is impossible to be unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly,
or justly treated unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is
simply to harm some one voluntarily, and 'voluntarily' means 'knowing
the person acted on, the instrument, and the manner of one's acting',
and the incontinent man voluntarily harms himself, not only will he
voluntarily be unjustly treated but it will be possible to treat oneself
unjustly. (This also is one of the questions in doubt, whether a man can
treat himself unjustly.) Again, a man may voluntarily, owing to
incontinence, be harmed by another who acts voluntarily, so that it
would be possible to be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our
definition incorrect; must we to 'harming another, with knowledge both
of the person acted on, of the instrument, and of the manner' add
'contrary to the wish of the person acted on'? Then a man may be
voluntarily harmed and voluntarily suffer what is unjust, but no one is
voluntarily treated unjustly; for no one wishes to be unjustly treated,
not even the incontinent man. He acts contrary to his wish; for no one
wishes for what he does not think to be good, but the incontinent man
does do things that he does not think he ought to do. Again, one who
gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomede
Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine, is
not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be unjustly
treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him unjustly. It is
plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not voluntary.
Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain for discussion;
(3) whether it is the man who has assigned to another more than his
share that acts unjustly, or he who has the excessive share, and (4)
whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly. The questions are
connected; for if the former alternative is possible and the distributor
acts unjustly and not the man who has the excessive share, then if a man
assigns more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily, he
treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to do, since
the virtuous man tends to take less than his share. Or does this
statement too need qualification? For (a) he perhaps gets more than his
share of some other good, e.g. of honour or of intrinsic nobility. (b)
The question is solved by applying the distinction we applied to unjust
action; for he suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that he is
not unjustly treated as far as this goes, but at most only suffers harm.
It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but not always the
man who has the excessive share; for it is not he to whom what is unjust
appertains that acts unjustly, but he to whom it appertains to do the
unjust act voluntarily, i.e. the person in whom lies the origin of the
action, and this lies in the distributor, not in the receiver. Again,
since the word 'do' is ambiguous, and there is a sense in which lifeless
things, or a hand, or a servant who obeys an order, may be said to slay,
he who gets an excessive share does not act unjustly, though he 'does'
what is unjust.
Again, if the distributor gave his judgement in ignorance, he does not
act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his judgement is not
unjust in this sense, but in a sense it is unjust (for legal justice and
primordial justice are different); but if with knowledge he judged
unjustly, he is himself aiming at an excessive share either of gratitude
or of revenge. As much, then, as if he were to share in the plunder, the
man who has judged unjustly for these reasons has got too much; the fact
that what he gets is different from what he distributes makes no
difference, for even if he awards land with a view to sharing in the
plunder he gets not land but money.
Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that
being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with one's neighbour's wife,
to wound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our power, but to
do these things as a result of a certain state of character is neither
easy nor in our power. Similarly to know what is just and what is unjust
requires, men think, no great wisdom, because it is not hard to
understand the matters dealt with by the laws (though these are not the
things that are just, except incidentally); but how actions must be done
and distributions effected in order to be just, to know this is a
greater achievement than knowing what is good for the health; though
even there, while it is easy to know that honey, wine, hellebore,
cautery, and the use of the knife are so, to know how, to whom, and when
these should be applied with a view to producing health, is no less an
achievement than that of being a physician. Again, for this very reason
men think that acting unjustly is characteristic of the just man no less
than of the unjust, because he would be not less but even more capable
of doing each of these unjust acts; for he could lie with a woman or
wound a neighbour; and the brave man could throw away his shield and
turn to flight in this direction or in that. But to play the coward or
to act unjustly consists not in doing these things, except incidentally,
but in doing them as the result of a certain state of character, just as
to practise medicine and healing consists not in applying or not
applying the knife, in using or not using medicines, but in doing so in
a certain way.
Just acts occur between people who participate in things good in
themselves and can have too much or too little of them; for some beings
(e.g. presumably the gods) cannot have too much of them, and to others,
those who are incurably bad, not even the smallest share in them is
beneficial but all such goods are harmful, while to others they are
beneficial up to a point; therefore justice is essentially something
human.
10
Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their
respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they
appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different; and
while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man (so
that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the other
virtues, instead of 'good' meaning by epieikestebon that a thing is
better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the
equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy;
for either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different;
or, if both are good, they are the same.
These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the
problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and not
opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better than one
kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different class
of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is just
and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. What
creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally
just but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is
universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal
statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is
necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the
law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility
of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is in the law
nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter
of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks
universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and
has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the
legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have
put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and
better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but
better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the
statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law
where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the
reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things
it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when
the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden
rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the
shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to
the facts.
It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and is
better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who the
equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and is no
stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less than his
share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and this state
of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different
state of character.
11
Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what
has been said. For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in
accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g. the law
does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not expressly permit
it forbids. Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another
(otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a
voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his
action and the instrument he is using; and he who through anger
voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life,
and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly. But
towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he
suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is
also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights
attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is
treating the state unjustly.
Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which the man who
'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible
to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense; the
unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way
just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round, so
that his 'unjust act' does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i)
that would imply the possibility of the same thing's having been
subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time; but this
is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more than one
person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done by choice, and
takes the initiative (for the man who because he has suffered does the
same in return is not thought to act unjustly); but if a man harms
himself he suffers and does the same things at the same time. Further,
(iii) if a man could treat himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily
treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts unjustly without committing
particular acts of injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his
own wife or housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,
In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly?' is solved
also by the distinction we applied to the question 'can a man be
voluntarily treated unjustly?'
(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting
unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more than
the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy does
in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily
training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice
and is blameworthy-involves vice which is either of the complete and
unqualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative,
because not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of
character), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and
injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less
bad, but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater
evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a more
serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become incidentally
the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to your being taken
prisoner or put to death the enemy.)
Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a
justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain parts
of him; yet not every kind of justice but that of master and servant or
that of husband and wife. For these are the ratios in which the part of
the soul that has a rational principle stands to the irrational part;
and it is with a view to these parts that people also think a man can be
unjust to himself, viz. because these parts are liable to suffer
something contrary to their respective desires; there is therefore
thought to be a mutual justice between them as between ruler and ruled.
Let this be taken as our account of justice and the other, i.e. the
other moral, virtues.
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