The Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times

THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR -- AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Chapter 6: The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam: August, 1964 - February, 1965

Highlights of the Period: August, 1964-February, 1965

Between the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August, 1964, and the start
of concentrated U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, the details
of such an air war were being planned, discussed and debated within
the Johnson Administration, according to the Pentagon chronicle.
Here, chronologically, are highlights of those months:
AUGUST 1964
Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor cabled agreement with the Administration
"assumption" that "something must be added in the coming
months" to forestall "a collapse of national morale" in Saigon. He
suggested "carefully orchestrated bombing attacks" on the North.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, called an air war "essential to
prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia."
SEPTEMBER 1964
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, outlined a "provocation" plan "to provide
good grounds for us to escalate if we wished ... "
The Pentagon analyst finds a "general consensus" on the necessity
for early 1965 air strikes at a White House strategy meeting, but
adds it was felt that "tactical considerations" required a delay. He
cited the President's "presenting himself as the candidate of reason
and restraint," the need for "maximum public and congressional support,"
the fear of "premature negotiations" and the weakness of the
Saigon regime.
The President ordered low-risk interim measures, according to a
memo by William P. Bundy, "to assist morale ... and show the Communists
we still mean business ... "
OCTOBER 1964
Air strikes at Laos infiltration routes began, following a delay
pending the outcome of the Laotian cease-fire talks. The U.S. feared
a new Geneva conference might result. The analyst says this was
"not compatible with current perceptions of U.S. interest."
NOVEMBER 1964
The Vietcong attacked Bienhoa airfield. The Joint Chiefs urged
"prompt and strong response," including air strikes on the North.
Ambassador Taylor urged bombing "selected" targets.
The President declined, and directed the interagency working
group under Bundy to consider Vietnam options.
The group's three recommended options all included bombing the
North. The analyst says the group's deliberations showed "remark-
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ably little latitude for reopening the basic questions about U.S.
involvement."
Option A-Called for reprisal air strikes and intensification of the
covert pressure.
Option B-Bomb the North "at a fairly rapid pace and without
interruption" until all the U.S. demands were met; the U.S. was to
define the negotiating position, the chronicle says, "in a way which
makes Communist acceptance unlikely" if the U.S. were pressed to
negotiate "before a Communist agreement to comply."
Option C-A graduated air war and possibly the deployment of
ground troops.
At a meeting of the select committee of the National Security
Council, George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, indicated
"doubt" about the effectiveness of bombing the North and argued
against the domino theory, according to a Bundy memo.
DECEMBER 1964
The President approved the recommended plan-Option A for 30
days, then Option C. He stressed that he felt that "pulling the South
Vietnamese together" was basic to any other action.
Operation Barrel Roll-U.S. air strikes at infiltration routes in the
Laotian panhandle-got under way. The National Security Council
agreed that "no public statements" would be made unless a plane
were lost, and then "to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance
flights."
JANUARY 1965
Two U.S. jets were lost over Laos, and there were press reports on
"Barrel RoiL"
South Vietnamese forces were trounced at Binhia. The study says
that the "final collapse" of the Saigon regime and a Vietcong takeover
seemed "distinct possibilities."
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. McNaughton
favored "initiating air strikes"; they agreed that the U.S. aim was
"not to 'help friend' but to contain China," the chronicle says.
FEBRUARY 1965
The Vietcong attacked the U.S. military advisers' compound at
Pleiku. The study says this "triggered a swift, though long-contemplated
Presidential decision to give an 'appropriate and fitting
response.' "
Forty-nine U.S. jets made the first reprisal strike, bombing
Donghoi.
Operation Rolling Thunder-the sustained air war-was ordered
to begin.
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Chapter 6
The Consensus to Bomb North
Vietnam: August, 1964-
February, 1965
-BY NEIL SHEEHAN
The Johnson Administration reached a "general consensus"
at a White House strategy meeting on Sept. 7, 1964, that air
attacks against North Vietnam would probably have to be
launched, a Pentagon study of the Vietnam war states. It was
expected that "these operations would begin early in the new
year."
"It is important to differentiate the consensus of the principals
at this September meeting," the study says, "from the
views which they had urged on the President in the preceding
spring. In the spring the use of force had been clearly contingent
on a major reversal-principally in Laos-and had
been advanced with the apparent assumption that military
actions hopefully would not be required. Now, however, their
views were advanced with a sense that such actions were
inevitable. "
The administration consensus on bombing came at the
height of the Presidential election contest between President
Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater, whose advocacy of
full-scale air attacks on North Vietnam had become a major
issue. That such a consensus had been reached as early as
September is a major disclosure of the Pentagon study.
The consensus was reflected, the analysis says, in the final
paragraph of a formal national security action memorandum
issued by the President three days later, on Sept. 10. This
paragraph spoke of "larger decisions" that might be "required
at any time."
The last round of detailed planning of various political and
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military strategies for a bombing campaign began "in earnest,"
the study says, on Nov. 3, 1964, the day that Mr. Johnson was
elected President in his own right.
Less than 100 days later, on Feb. 8, 1965, he ordered
new reprisal strikes against the North. Then, on Feb. 13, the
President gave the order for the sustained bombing of North
Vietnam, code-named Rolling Thunder.
This period of evolving decision to attack North Vietnam,
openly and directly, is shown in the Pentagon papers to be
the second major phase of President Johnson's defense of
South Vietnam. The same period forms the second phase of
the presentation of those papers by The New York Times.
In its glimpses into Lyndon B. Johnson's personal thoughts
and motivations between the fateful September meeting and
his decision to embark on an air war, the Pentagon study
shows a President moving and being moved toward war, but
reluctant and hesitant to act until the end.
But, the analyst explains, "from the September meeting
forward, there was little basic disagreement among the principals
[the term the study uses for the senior policy makers]
on the need for military operations against the North. What
prevented action for the time being was a set of tactical considerations.
"
The first tactical consideration, the analyst says, was that
"the President was in the midst of an election campaign in
which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason
and restraint as opposed to the quixotic Barry Goldwater,"
who was publicly advocating full-scale bombing of North
Vietnam. The historian also mentions other "temporary reasons
of tactics":
• The "shakiness" of the Saigon Government.
• A wish to hold the line militarily and diplomatically in
Laos.
• The "need to design whatever actions were taken so as to
achieve maximum public and Congressional support . . ."
• The "implicit belief that overt actions at this time might
bring pressure for premature negotiations-that is negotiations
before the D.R.V. [Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam]
was hurting."
Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton, the
head of the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs,
summed up these tactical considerations in the final paragraph
of a Sept. 3 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, in preparation for the crucial White House
strategy session four days later:
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"Special considerations during the next two months. The
relevant audiences of U.S. actions are the Communists (who
must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose
morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as
'underwriters'), and the U.S. public (which must support our
risk-taking with U.S. lives and prestige). During the next two
months, because of the lack of 'rebuttal time' before election
to justify particular actions which may be distorted to the
U.S. public, we must act with special care-signaling to the
D.R.V. that initiatives are being taken, to the G.Y.N. [Government
of (South) Vietnam] that we are behaving energetically
despite the restraints of our political season, and to the U.S.
public that we are behaving with good purpose and restraint."
The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton's.
"Not to Enlarge the War"
The President was already communicating this sense of
restraint to the voters. On the night of Aug. 29, in an address
to a crowd at an outdoor barbecue a few miles from his ranch
in Texas, when two tons of beef were served in a belated
celebration of his 56th birthday, he made a statement that
he was to repeat in numerous election speeches.
"I have had advice to load our planes with bombs," the
President said, "and to drop them on certain areas that I
think would enlarge the war and escalate the war, and result
in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a
war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to
help protect their own land."
The policy of the United States toward Vietnam, the
President explained later in his speech, was "to furnish advice,
give counsel, express good judgment, give them trained counselors.
and help them with equipment to help themselves."
"We are doing that," he said. "We have lost less than 200
men in the last several years, but to each one of those 200
men-and we lost about that many in Texas on accidents on
the Fourth of July-to each of those 200 men who have given
their life to preserve freedom, it is a war and a big war and
we recognize it.
"But we think it is better to lose 200 than to lose 200,000.
For that reason we have tried very carefully to restrain ourselves
and not to enlarge the war."
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Eleven days earlier, on Aug. 18, Ambassador Maxwell D.
Taylor had cabled from Saigon that he agreed with an "assumption"
now held in the Administration in Washington that
the Vietcong guerrillas-the ve, as they were usually termed
-could not be defeated and the Saigon Government preserved
by a counterguerrilla war confined to South Vietnam itself.
"Something must be added in the coming months," the
Ambassador said in his message. What General Taylor proposed
to add was "a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on
NVN [North Vietnam], directed primarily at infiltration and
other military targets" with "Jan. 1, 1965, as a target D-Day."
The bombing should be undertaken under either of two
courses of action, the Ambassador said. The first course would
entail using the promise of the air attacks as an inducement
to persuade the regime of Gen. Nguyen Khanh to achieve
some political stability and get on seriously with the pacification
program. Under the second course, the United· States
would bomb the North, regardless of whatever progress
General Khanh made, to prevent "a collapse of national
morale" in Saigon.
For the Ambassador cautioned that "it is far from clear at
the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until
Jan. 1, 1965." The Ambassador said that before bombing the
North the United States would also have to send Army Hawk
antiaircraft missile units to the Saigon and Danang areas to
protect the airfields there against retaliatory Communist air
attacks-assumed possible from China or North Vietnam and
to land a force of American Marines at Danang to protect
the air base there against possible ground assaults.
His cable was designated a joint United States mission message,
meaning that Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, chief of the United
States Military Assistance Command, had concurred with the
Ambassador's views.
On Aug. 26, three days before the President's speech at
the barbecue in Stonewall, Tex., the Joint Chiefs of Staff
submitted a memorandum to Secretary McNamara agreeing
with Ambassador Taylor. They said that bombing under his
second criterion, to stave off a breakdown in Saigon, was
"more in accord with the current situation" in their view
and added that an air war against the North was now "essential
to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in
Southeast Asia."
The Joint Chiefs' memorandum was the first appearance,
the account says, of a "provocation strategy" that was to be
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discussed at the Sept. 7 White House session-in the words
of the narrative, "deliberate attempts to provoke the D.R.V.
into taking actions which could then be answered by a
systematic U.S. air campaign."
The memorandum itself is not this explicit, although it does
seem to suggest attempting to repeat the Tonkin Gulf clashes
as a pretext for escalation.
In a Sept. 3 memorandum to Secretary McNamara, however,
Mr. McNaughton was specific. He outlined several
means of provocation that could culminate in a sustained air
war. In the meantime, they could be employed to conduct
reprisal air strikes that would help hold the situation in South
Vietnam together and, the analyst notes, permit postponing
"probably until November or December any decision as to
serious escalation."
This serious escalation Mr. McNaughton defined as "a
crescendo of GVN-U.S. military actions against the D.R.V.,"
such as mining harbors and gradually escalating air raids.
He described his provocation program to Mr. McNamara
as "an orchestration of three classes of actions, all designed
to meet these five desiderata-( 1) From the U.S., GVN and
hopefully allied points of view they should be legitimate things
to do under the circumstances, (2) they should cause apprehension,
ideally increasing apprehension, in the D.R.V., (3)
they should be likely at some point to provoke a military
D.R.V. response, (4) the provoked response should be likely
to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished, and
(5) the timing and crescendo should be under our control,
with the scenario capable of being turned off at any time."
[See Document #79.]
The classes of actions were:
• South Vietnamese air strikes at enemy infiltration routes
through southeastern Laos that would "begin in Laos near the
South Vietnamese border and slowly 'march' up the trails and
eventually across the North Vietnamese border."
• A resumption of the covert coastal raids on North Vietnam
under Operation Plan 34A, which President Johnson had
temporarily suspended since the Tonkin Gulf incident. The
South Vietnamese Government would announce them publicly,
declaring them "fully justified as necessary to assist in
interdiction of infiltration by sea."
• A resumption of patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin by United
States destroyers, code-named De Soto patrols, although these
would still be physically "disassociated" from the 34A attacks.
Mr. McNaughton noted that "the U.S. public is sympathetic
322
to reasonable insistence on the right of the U.S. Navy to ply
international waters."
But a majority of the officials at the Sept. 7 White House
strategy meeting disagreed. They decided for the present
against adopting a provocation strategy for reprisal air attacks,
precisely because the Khanh regime was so weak and vulnerable
and the morale-lifting benefits of such strikes might be
offset by possible Communist retaliation, the analyst says. The
meeting was attended by the President; Secretary of State
Dean Rusk; Secretary McNamara; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Ambassador Taylor, who
had flown in from Saigon, and John A. McCone, the Director
of Central Intelligence.
"We believe such deliberately provocative elements should
not be added in the immediate future while the GVN is still
struggling to its feet," Assistant Secretary of State William P.
Bundy wrote in a memorandum recording the consensus
recommendations formally made to the President after the
meeting.
"By early October, however, we may recommend such actions
depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction
in the meantime, especially to U.S. naval patrols." A resumption
of the destroyer patrols was one outcome of the Sept. 7
meeting.
The analyst says that a similar reason was given for the
decision against beginning a sustained bombing campaign
against the North, with or without a provocation strategy, in
the near future. "The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be
too weak for us to take any major deliberate risks of escalation
that would involve a major role for, or threat to, South
Vietnam," the Bundy memorandum states.
Ambassador Taylor had acknowledged in his cable of Aug.
18 that bombing the North to prevent a collapse in the South
if the Khanh regime continued to decline "increases the likelihood
of U.S. involvement in ground action since Khanh will
have almost no available ground forces which can be released
from pacification employment to mobile resistance of D.R.V.
attacks."
The Pentagon account concludes from the Sept. 7 strategy
discussions that by now the Saigon regime was being regarded
less and less as a government capable of defeating the Vietcong
insurgency than "in terms of its suitability as a base for
wider action."
Despite the pessimistic analyses of Ambassador Taylor and
the Joint Chiefs for future escalation, some of those at the
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White House meeting hoped the Khanh regime could be somewhat
stabilized. Citing handwritten notes of the meeting in the
Pentagon files, the analyst quotes Mr. McNamara as saying
that he understood "we are not acting more strongly because
there is a clear hope of strengthening the GVN."
"But he went on," the account continues, "to urge that the
way be kept open for stronger actions even if the GVN did
not improve or in the event the war were widened by the
Communists. "
The handwritten notes of the meeting quote the President
as asking, "Can we really strengthen the GVN?"
And in his memorandum of the consensus, William Bundy
wrote: "Khanh will probably stay in control and may make
some headway in the next 2-3 months in strengthening the
Government (GVN). The best we can expect is that he and
the GVN will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification
program ticking over (but not progressing markedly), and
give the appearance of a valid government."
On Sept. to, therefore, the President ordered a number
of interim measures in National Security Action Memorandum
314, issued over the signature of his special assistant, Mc-
George Bundy. These were intended, in the words of William
Bundy's memorandum of consensus, "to assist morale in SVN
and show the Communists we still mean business, while at the
same time seeking to keep the risks low and under our control
at each stage."
The most important orders Mr. Johnson gave dealt with
covert measures. The final paragraph in the President's memorandum
also reflected the consensus, the analyst finds, of the
Sept. 7 meeting and other strategy discussions of the time-
"the extent to which the new year was anticipated as the
occasion for beginning overt military operations against North
Vietnam."
This final paragraph read: "These decisions are governed
by a prevailing judgment that the first order of business at
present is to take actions which will help to strengthen the
fabric of the Government of South Vietnam; to the extent
that the situation permits, such action should precede larger
decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by
a change in the situation, they will be taken." [See Document
#81.]
The interim measures Mr. Johnson ordered included these:
• Resumption of the De Soto patrols by American destroyers
in the Tonkin Gulf. They would "operate initially
well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly disassociated
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from 34A maritime operations," but the destroyers "would
have air cover from carriers."
• Reactivation of the 34A coastal raids, this time after
completion of the first De Soto patrol. The directive added
that "we should have the GVN ready to admit they are taking
place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the
facts of VC infiltration by sea." The account explains, "It
was believed that this step would be useful in establishing a
climate of opinion more receptive to expanded (air) operations
against North Vietnam when they became necessary."
The word in parentheses is the study's.
• An arrangement with the Laotian Government of Premier
Souvanna Phouma to permit "limited GVN air and ground
operations into the corridor areas of [southeastern] Laos,
together with Lao air strikes and possible use of U.S. armed
aerial reconnaissance." Armed aerial reconnaissance is a military
operation in which the pilot has authority to attack unprogramed
targets, such as gun installations or trucks, at his
own discretion.
• The United States "should be prepared" to launch "tit for
tat" reprisal air strikes like those during the Tonkin Gulf
incident "as appropriate against the D.R.V. in the event of
any attack on U.S. units or any special D.R.V.-VC action
against SVN."
The President also ordered "economic and political actions"
in South Vietnam, such as pay raises for Vietnamese civil
servants out of American funds, to try to strengthen the
Saigon regime.
The United States destroyers Morton and Edwards resumed
the De Soto patrols in the Tonkin Gulf on Sept. 12, two days
after Mr. Johnson's directive. They were attacked in a third
Tonkin incident on the night of Sept. 18, and the President
glossed over it.
However, he went ahead with his decision to resume the
34A coastal raids, still covertly, the account says. The order
to reactivate them was issued by Mr. Johnson on Oct. 4, with
the specification that they were to be conducted under tightened
American controls.
Each operation on the monthly schedules now had to be
"approved in advance" by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus
R. Vance for Secretary McNamara, Llewellyn A. Thompson,
acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
for Secretary Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy at the White House
for the President.
During October, a subsequent report to William Bundy on
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covert activities said, the 34A coastal raids consisted of two
shallow probes of North Vietnamese defenses, an attempt to
capture a junk, and successfully shellings of the radar station
at Vinhson and the observation post at Muidao.
Two of the sabotage teams that had previously been parachuted
into the North also "carried out successful actions
during October," the report said. "One demolished a bridge,
the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol. Both teams
suffered casualties, the latter sufficient to cast doubt on the
wisdom of the action."
The U-2 spy plane flights over North Vietnam and the
parachuting of supplies and reinforcements to sabotage and
psychological warfare teams in the North continued throughout
this period and had not been affected by the President's
suspension of the coastal raids after the original Tonkin Gulf
incident.
The covert step-up in the air operations in Laos ordered
by the President did not take place until mid-October. The
Pentagon account says that one reason for the delay was the
Administration's need to "await the uncertain outcome" of
negotiations then taking place in Paris between the rightwing,
neutralist and pro-Communist factions in Laos. The
objective of the talks was to arrange a cease-fire that might
lead to a new 14-nation Geneva conference to end the
Laotian civil war.
"However, a Laotian cease-fire was not compatible with
current perceptions of U.S. interest," the analyst writes.
The Administration feared that during an ensuing Geneva
conference on Laos, international pressures, particularly from
the Communist countries, might force the discussions onto
the subject of Vietnam. Negotiations in the present circumstances
were considered certain to unravel the shaky anti-
Communist regime in Saigon.
The Administration also believed that even the convening
of a conference on Laos might create an impression in Saigon
that Washington was going to seek a negotiated withdrawal
from South Vietnam and set off a political collapse there and
the emergence of a neutralist coalition regime that would
ask the United States to leave.
The account notes that in his Aug. 11 high-level policy
memorandum on Southeast Asia, William Bundy had "characterized
U.S. strategy" toward the Paris talks with the
statement that "we should wish to slow down any progress
toward a conference and to hold Souvanna to the firmest
possible position." Mr. Bundy had referred to a suggestion
326
by Ambassador Leonard Unger that Prince Souvanna Phouma
insist on three-faction administration of the Plaine des Jarres
as "a useful delaying gambit."
"Significantly," the analyst says, "this proposal was advanced
at Paris by Souvanna Phouma on 1 September -- illustrating
the fact that Souvanna was carefully advised by
U.S. diplomats both prior to and during the Paris meetings.
Other features of Souvanna's negotiating posture which apparently
were encouraged as likely to have the effect of
drawing out the discussions were insistence on Communist
acceptance of (1) Souvanna's political status as Premier and
(2) unhampered operations by the I.C.C. [International Control
Commission]."
"Insistence on Souvanna's position is another point on which
he should insist, and there would also be play in the hand
on the question of free I.C.C. operations," Mr. Bundy wrote
in his Aug. 11 memorandum.
"It will be recalled that the latter point was the issue on
which progress toward a cease-fire became stalled," the analyst
remarks. The negotiations broke down in Paris late in September.
American mission representatives from Bangkok and Vientiane
met in Saigon on Sept. 11 under Ambassador Taylor's
auspices, however, and decided that the South Vietnamese Air
Force should not participate in the stepped-up air action in
Laos authorized by the President in his directive of Sept. 10.
A list of 22 targets in the Laotian panhandle had been
drawn up during the summer for the possibility of such
raids, including one on a control point at the Mugia Pass,
just across the North Vietnamese border.
South Vietnamese air strikes would offend Premier Souvanna
Phouma by complicating his political position, the
meeting determined, so the air attacks would be confined to
clandestine raids by the T-28's in Laos and the United States
Navy and Air Force jets-code-named Yankee Team-operating
over Laos. Accord was also reached that South Vietnamese
troops, possibly accompanied by American advisers, would
also make ground forays into Laos up to a depth of 20
kilometers, or 12 miles.
"The mission representatives agreed that, once the [air and
ground] operations began, they should not be acknowledged
publicly," the analyst writes. "In effect, then, they would
supplement the other covert pressures being exerted against
North Vietnam. Moreover, while the Lao Government would
of course know about the operations of their T-28's, Souvanna
327
was not to be informed of the GVN/U.S. [ground] operations.
The unacknowledged nature of these operations would thus
be easier to maintain."
On Oct. 6, a joint State and Defense Department message
authorized Ambassador Unger in Laos to obtain Premier
Souvanna Phouma's approval for the T-28 strikes "as soon
as possible."
But as the analyst points out, the message showed that
the President had decided to postpone the accompanying
strikes by Yankee Team jets, the "U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance"
mentioned in Mr. Johnson's National Security
Action Memorandum 314.
Five of the targets in the Laotian panhandle, well-defended
bridges, had been specifically marked for the American jets,
and fire by the Yankee Team planes would also be required
against antiaircraft batteries defending the Mugia Pass. The
message from Washington excluded these targets from the
list of 22.
"You are further authorized to inform Lao that Yankee
Team suppressive-fire strikes against certain difficult targets
in panhandle, interspersing with further T-28 strikes, are part
of the over-all concept and are to be anticipated later, but
that such U.S. strikes are not repeat not authorized at this
time," the cable said. [Document #83.]
Ambassadors Unger and Taylor both warned that the
Laotian Government, without some participation by the
American jets, would not persevere in attacking targets on the
Communist infiltration routes. Accordingly, the day before
the T-28 strikes began on Oct. 14 with Premier Souvanna
Phouma's approval, Washington authorized the Yankee Team
jets to fly combat air patrol over the T-28's to raise morale
and protect them from any interference by North Vietnamese
MIG's.
Ambassador Taylor said in his cable that the combat air
patrol missions could be achieved by "a relatively minor extension"
of the current rules of engagement for American
aircraft in Indochina.
The President also postponed for the present the planned
ground forays into Laos by the South Vietnamese. Ambassador
Taylor pointed out in a cable on Oct. 9 that these would
not be possible "in foreseeable future" in any case because
the South Vietnamese Army was so tied down fighting the
guerrillas in its own country.
Several eight-man South Vietnamese reconnaissance teams
were parachuted into Laos in an operation called Leaping
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Lena, but the Nov. 7 report to William Bundy on covert
operations would note that "all of these teams were located
by the enemy and only four survivors returned. . . ."
On Nov. 1, two days before the election, the Vietcong
struck with a devastating mortar barrage on American planes
and facilities at Bienhoa airfield near Saigon. The attack put
the President under great internal pressure, the analyst says,
to strike back openly, as he had said in his directive of Sept.
10 that he was prepared to do "in the event of any attack on
U.S. units or any special D.R.V./VC action against SVN."
In the enemy's barrage, four Americans were killed, five
B-57 bombers were destroyed and eight damaged. These were
some of the B-57's that had earlier been sent from Japan to
the Philippines at Mr. McNamara's suggestion as part of the
preparations for possible bombing of the North. They had
since been moved into South Vietnam, however, to try to
shore up the Khanh Government's military position by bringing
more air power to bear upon the Vietcong.
"As of the end of October (in anticipation of resumed
De Soto patrols), elements of our Pacific forces were reported
as 'poised and ready' to execute reprisals for any D.R.V.
attacks on our naval vessels. Thus, there was a rather large
expectancy among Administration officials that the United
States would do something in retaliation," the analyst writes.
The words in parentheses are his.
The Joint Chiefs told Mr. McNamara that the Bienhoa
attack had been "a deliberate act of escalation and a change
of the ground rules under which the VC had operated up to
now." Asserting that "a prompt and strong response is clearly
justified," they proposed, on the same day as the incident,
"that the following specific actions be taken" (the words in
parentheses are those of the Joint Chiefs; words in brackets
have been inserted by The Times for clarification) :
"a. Within 24-36 hours Pacific Command (PACOM)
forces take initial U.S. military actions as follows:
"(1) Conduct air strikes in Laos against targets No. 3
(Tchepone barracks, northwest), No. 4 (Tchepone military
area), No. 19 (Banthay military area), NO.8 (Nape highway
bridge), and the Banken bridge on Route 7.
"(2) Conduct low-level air reconnaisance of infiltration
routes and of targets in North Vietnam south of Latitude 19
degrees.
"b. Prior to air attacks on the D.R.Y. land the Marine
special landing forces at Danang and airlift Army or Marine
units from Okinawa to the Saigon-Tansonnhut-Bienhoa area,
329
to provide increased security for US personnel and installations.
"c. Use aircraft engaged in airlift (subparagraph b, above)
to assist in evacuation of U.S. dependents from Saigon, to
commence concurrently with the daylight air strikes against
the D.R.V. (subparagraph d, below).
"d. Assemble and prepare necessary forces so that:
"(1) Within 60 to 72 hours, 30 B-52's from Guam conduct
a night strike on D.R.V. target NO.6 (Phucyen airfield).
[Phucyen, 13 miles from Hanoi, is the principal North Vietnamese
air base].
"(2) Commencing at first light on the day following subparagraph
(1) above, PACOM air and naval forces conduct
air strikes against D.R.V. targets No. 6 (Phucyen airfield)
(daylight follow-up on the above night strike), NO.3 (Hanoi
Gialam airfield), No. 8 (Haiphong Catbi airfield), No. 48
(Haiphong POL), and No. 49 (Hanoi POL). [POL is a
military abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.]
"( 3) Concurrently with subparagraph (2), above the
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) will strike DRV target No.
36 (Vitthulu barracks).
"( 4) Combat air patrols (CAP), flak suppressive fire, strike
photographic reconnaissance, and search and rescue operations
(S.A.R.) are conducted as appropriate.
"(5) The above actions are followed by:
"( a) Armed reconnaissance on infiltration routes in Laos.
"(b) Air strikes against infiltration routes and targets in
the D.R.V.
"( c) Progressive PACOM and SAC [Strategic Air Com and]
strikes against the targets listed in 94 Target Study.
"( e) Thai bases be used as necessary in connection with
the foregoing, with authority to be obtained through appropriate
channels. . . .
"Recognizing that security of this plan is of critical importance,
they [the Joint Chiefs] consider that external agencies,
such as the VNAF, should be apprised only of those parts of
the plan necessary to insure proper and effective coordination.
The same limited revelation of plans should govern discussions
with the Thais in securing authority for unlimited use
of Thai bases."
From Saigon, Ambassador Taylor cabled for a more restrained
response consisting of "retaliation bombing attacks
on selected D.R.V. targets" using both American and South
Vietnamese planes and for a "policy statement that we will act
similarly in like cases in the future."
330
But the President felt otherwise for the moment. "Apparently,
the decision was made to do nothing," the analyst
says, adding that the documentary evidence does not provide
an adequate explanation.
At a White House meeting the same day, the account continued,
the President expressed concern that United States
retaliatory strikes might bring counterretaliation by North
Vietnam or China against American Mu":eS irod" civifiayi' dependents
in the South.
In briefing the press, Administration officials, unidentified in
the study, drew a contrast "between this incident and the
Tonkin Gulf attacks where our destroyers were 'on United
States business.'"
"A second [White House] meeting to discuss possible U.S.
actions was 'tentatively scheduled' for 2 November, but the
available materials contain no evidence that it was held," the
account continues. "President Johnson was scheduled to
appear in Houston that afternoon, for his final pre-election
address, and it may be that the second White House meeting
was called off."
"One thing is certain," the writer concludes. "There were
no retaliatory strikes authorized following the attack on the
U.S. bomber base."
But the President had not altogether declined to act on
Nov. 1. He had appointed an interagency working group
under William Bundy to draw up various political and military
options for direct action against North Vietnam. This was
the one "concrete result" of the Nov. 1 mortar raid on
Bienhoa, the account reports.
The Bundy working group, as it would be unofficially
called in the Government, held its first meeting at 9: 30 A.M.
on Nov. 3, the day that Mr. Johnson was elected to the
Presidency in his own right by a huge landslide.
"Bienhoa may be repeated at any time," Mr. Bundy wrote
in a memorandum to the group on Nov. 5. "This would tend
to force our hand, but would also give us a good springboard
for any decision for stronger action. The President is clearly
thinking in terms of maximum use of a Gulf of Tonkin
rationale, either for an action that would show toughness and
hold the line till we can decide the big issue, or as a basis for
starting a clear course of action under the broad options."
[See Document #84.]
Ostensibly, the Bundy group had a mandate to re-examine
the entire American policy toward Vietnam and to recommend
to the National Security Council a broad range of
331
options. Its membership represented the entire foreign-policymaking
machine of the Government-Mr. Bundy; Marshall
Green; Michael V. Forrestal, head of the interagency Vietnam
coordinating committee, and Robert Johnson of the State
Department; Mr. McNaughton from the civilian hierarchy of
the Pentagon; Vice Adm. -Lloyd M. Mustin from the Joint
Chiefs' staff and Harold Ford of the Central Intelligence
Atz..!'·71I::Y.
But, the account says, 'there appears to have been, in fact,
remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic question
about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam struggle."
The basic national objective of "an independent, non-
Communist South Vietnam," established by the President's
National Security Action Memorandum 288 of the previous
March, "did not seem open to question."
The Options Harden
The September discussions had established a consensus
that bombing of the North "would be required at some proximate
future date for a variety of reasons" and individual
and institutional pressures all tended to harden the options
toward this end as they were finally presented to the National
Security Council and then the President,
The analyst gives a number of examples of this stiffening
process from the successive draft papers developed by the
group during its three weeks of deliberations.
"The extreme withdrawal option was rejected almost without
surfacing for consideration" because of its conflict with
the policy memorandums. "Fall-back" positions outlined in an
original working-group draft suffered a similar fate.
The first fallback position, the study says, "would have
meant holding the line-placing an immediate, low ceiling on
the number of U.S. personnel in SVN, and taking vigorous
efforts to build on a stronger base elsewhere, possibly Thailand."
"The second alternative would have been to undertake some
spectacular, highly visible supporting action like a limited duration
selective bombing campaign as a last effort to save
the South; to have accompanied it with a propaganda campaign
about the unwinnability of the war given the GVN's
332
ineptness and, then, to have sought negotiations through
compromise and neutralization when the bombing failed."
But because of "forceful objections" by Admiral Mustin,
the Joint Chiefs representative, both of these possibilities were
downgraded in the final paper presented to the National
Security Council on Nov. 21. In effect they were "rejected
before they were fully explored," the study says.
Thus all three options, labeled A, Band C, entailed some
form of bombing, with "the distinctions between them" tending
to blur as they evolved during the group's three weeks
of deliberations, the analyst says. Mr. McNaughton and
William Bundy collaborated closely on their formulation.
A similar convergence occurred on the question of negotiations.
Here the minimum United States position was defined as
forcing Hanoi to halt the insurgency in the South and to agree
to the establishment of a secure, non-Communist state there,
a position the analyst defines as "acceptance or else." Moreover,
talks of any kind with Hanoi were to be avoided until
the effects of bombing had put the United States into a position
to obtain this minimum goal in negotiations.
"The only option that provided for bargaining in the usual
sense of the word was Option C," the study says. Here the
United States would be willing to bargain away international
supervisory machinery to verify Hanoi's agreement.
"The policy climate in Washington simply was not receptive
to any suggestion that U.S. goals might have to be compromised,"
the study comments.
These are the options in their final form as the study summarizes
them:
OPTION A-Conduct U.S. reprisal air strikes on North
Vietnam "not only against any recurrence of VC 'spectaculars'
such as Bienhoa," intensify the coastal raids of Operation
Plan 34A, resume the destroyer patrols in the gulf, step up
the air strikes by T-28's against infiltration targets in Laos and
seek reforms in South Vietnam.
OPTION B-What Mr. McNaughton called "a fast/full
squeeze." Bomb the North "at a fairly rapid pace and without
interruption," including early air raids on Phucyen Airfield
near Hanoi and key bridges along the road and rail links
with China until full American demands are met. "Should
pressures for negotiations become too formidable to resist and
discussion begin before a Communist agreement to comply,"
the analyst writes, "it was stressed that the United States
should define its negotiating position 'in a way which makes
333
Communist acceptance unlikely.' In this manner it would be
'very likely that the conference would break up rather rapidly,'
thus enabling our military pressures to be resumed."
OPTION C-Mr. McNaughton's "slow squeeze"; the option
he and William Bundy favored. Gradually increasing air
strikes "against infiltration targets, first in Laos and then in the
D.R.V., and then against other targets in North Vietnam"
intended to "give the impression of a steady deliberate approach
... designed to give the United States the option
at any time to proceed or not, to escalate or not and to
quicken the pace or not." This option also included the possibility
of a "significant ground deployment to the northern
part of South Vietnam" as an additional bargaining counter.
On Nov. 24, a select committee of the National Security
Council met to discuss the option papers formally presented
to the council three days earlier. This group comprised Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler,
McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George W.
Ball. William Bundy attended to keep a record and to represent
the working group.
In the account of this meeting, Mr. Ball makes his first
appearance in the Pentagon history as the Administration
dissenter on Vietnam. William Bundy's memorandum of
record says Mr. Ball "indicated doubt" that bombing the
North in any fashion would improve the situation in South
Vietnam and "argued against" a judgment that a Vietcong
victory in South Vietnam would have a falling-domino effect
on the rest of Asia.
While the working-group sessions had been in progress, the
study discloses, Mr. Ball had been writing a quite different
policy paper "suggesting a U.S. diplomatic strategy in the
event of an imminent GVN collapse."
"In it, he advocated working through the U.K. [United
Kingdom, or Britain] who would in turn seek cooperation
from the U.S.S.R., in arranging an international conference
(of smaller proportions than those at Geneva) which would
work out a compromise political settlement for South Vietnam,"
the analyst says. The words in parentheses are the
analyst's.
Of those present at the November 24 meeting, the memorandum
of record indicates, only Mr. Ball favored Option
A. The study gives the impression this was conceived as a
throwaway option by the Working Group. The group's
analysis labeled it "an indefinite course of action" whose "sole
advantages" were these:
334
"(a) Defeat would be clearly due to GVN failure, and
we ourselves would be less implicated than if we tried Option
B or Option C, and failed.
"(b) The most likely result would be a Vietnamese negotiated
deal, under which an eventually unified Communist
Vietnam would reassert its traditional hostility to Communist
China and limit its own ambitions to Loas and Cambodia."
At the Nov. 24 meeting, however, Mr. Rusk said that while
he favored bombing North Vietnam, he did not accept an
analysis by Mr. McNaughton and William Bundy that if the
bombing failed to save South Vietnam "we would obtain
international credit merely for trying."
"In his view," the analyst writes, "the harder we tried and
then failed, the worse our situation would be."
McGeorge Bundy demurred to some extent, the account
goes on, but Mr. Ball "expressed strong agreement with the
last Rusk point."
General Wheeler, reflecting the viewpoint of the Joint
Chiefs, argued that the hard, fast bombing campaign of Option
B actually entailed "less risk of a major conflict before achieving
success," in words of the study, than the gradually rising
air strikes of Option C.
The study adds that Mr. Bundy and Mr. McNaughton may
have deliberately loaded the language of Option B to try to
frighten the President out of adopting it lest it create severe
international pressure for quick negotiations.
General Wheeler's argument presaged a running controversy
between the Joint Chiefs and the civilian leadership
after the bombing campaign began in the coming year.
The meeting on Nov. 24 ended without a clear majority
decision on which option should be recommended to the
President. The principals resumed when Ambassador Taylor
reached Washington to join the strategy talks on Nov. 27,
1964.
In a written briefing paper, he told the conferees:
"If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in
South Vietnam . . . it is high time we change and find a
better way." He proposed gradually increasing air strikes
against the North for a threefold purpose:
"First, establish an adequate government in SVN; second,
improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign;
finally persuade or force the D.R.V. to stop its aid to the
Vietcong and to use its directive powers to make the Vietcong
desist from their efforts to overthrow the Government of
South Vietnam."
335
To improve anti-Communist prospects in the South, the
Ambassador proposed using the lever of American air strikes
against the North to obtain promises from the Saigon leaders
that they would achieve political stability, strengthen the army
and the police, suppress dissident Buddhist and student factions,
replace incompetent officials and get on with the war
effort.
The analyst says that the Ambassador had thus revised his
earlier view that Washington should bomb the North merely
to prevent "a collapse of national morale" in Saigon. He still
favored some form of bombing in an emergency, but now he
wanted something solid from the Saigon leaders in exchange
for a coherent program of rising air war.
In the course of discussions on Nov. 27, however, the
Ambassador acknowledged that while bombing "would definitely
have a favorable effect" in South Vietnam, ". . . he
was not sure this would be enough really to improve the
situation," the analyst reports, again quoting from William
Bundy's memorandum of record.
"Others, including McNamara, agreed with Taylor's evaluation,
but the Secretary [Mr. McNamara] added that 'the
strengthening effect of Option C could at least buy time,
possibly measured in years.' "
Ambassador Taylor proposed that the Administration therefore
adopt a two-phase program culminating in the bombing
of infiltration facilities south of the 19th Parallel in North
Vietnam, in effect Option A plus the first stages of Option
C. Phase I would consist of 30 days of the Option A type of
actions, such as intensification of the coastal raids on the
North, air strikes by American jets at infiltration routes and
one or two reprisal raids against the North. Meanwhile, Ambassador
Taylor would obtain the promises of improvement
from the Saigon leadership.
At the end of the 30 days, with the promises in hand, the
United States would then move into Phase II, the air war.
The air raids were to last two to six months, during which
Hanoi was apparently expected to yield.
The others agreed, and the proposal was redefined further
at a meeting on Nov. 28. William Bundy was assigned the
task of drawing up a formal policy paper outlining the proposal.
The Cabinet-level officials agreed to recommend it to
the President at a White House meeting scheduled for Dec. 1,
right after Mr. Johnson's Thanksgiving holiday at his ranch.
On Nov. 28, the same day that his closest advisers made
336
their decision to advise him to bomb North Vietnam, Mr.
Johnson was asked at a news conference at the ranch:
"Mr. President, is expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos
or North Vietnam a live possibility at this moment?"
"I don't want to give you any particular guide posts as to
your conduct in the matter," Mr. Johnson told the newsmen
about their articles. "But when you crawl out on a limb, you
always have to find another one to crawl back on.
"I have just been sitting here in this serene atmosphere of
the Pedernales for the last few days reading about the wars
that you [speculating newsmen] have involved us in and the
additional undertakings that I have made decisions on or that
General Taylor has recommended or that Mr. McNamara
plans or Secretary Rusk envisages. I would say, generally
speaking, that some people are speculating and taking positions
that I think are somewhat premature."
"At the moment," he concluded, "General Taylor will
report to us on developments. We will carefully consider
these reports. . . . I will meet with him in the early part
of the week. I anticipate there will be no dramatic announcement
to come out of these meetings except in the form of
your speculation."
William Bundy's draft policy paper, written the next day,
said the bombing campaign "would consist principally of
progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo
adjusted to the situation as it develops (possibly running from
two to six months)." The words in parentheses are Mr.
Bundy's.
The draft paper added: "Targets in the D.R.V. would start
with infiltration targets south of the 19th Parallel and work
up to targets north of that point. This could eventually lead
to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related
targets, aerial mining of D.R.V. ports, and a U.S. naval
blockade of the D.R.V. . . .
"Concurrently," it continued, "the U.S. would be alert to
any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to
explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an
acceptable manner." [See Document #88.]
Apparently at Mr. McNamara's suggestion, the analyst says,
a final sentence in this paragraph was deleted; it read, "The
U.S. would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose
any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate." Also
removed, possibly during a final meeting of the top officials
on Nov. 30 to review the policy paper and "apparently on the
advice of McGeorge Bundy," was a proposal that the President make a major speech indicating the new direction that
Washington's policy was taking.
Likewise deleted was a provision to brief "available Congressional
leaders . . . (no special leadership meeting will
be convened for this purpose)" on new evidence being compiled
on North Vietnamese infiltration into the South, as a
public justification of the bombing.
A separate recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for a
series of major raids-like those in their retaliation proposal
for the Vietcong mortar strike at Bienhoa air base on Nov. 1-
was deleted for unspecified reasons, the analyst says, "in effect,
presenting a united front to the President."
The paper that was sent to the President made no mention
of American ground troops to provide security for airfields
in the South when the bombing began, as General Wheeler
had reminded the conferees on Nov. 24 would be necessary.
The writer notes the "gap" between the drastic concessions
expected from Hanoi and the relatively modest bombing campaign
that was expected to break Hanoi's will. He puts
forward "two by no means contradictory explanations of this
gap." This is the first:
"There is some reason to believe that the principals thought
that carefully calculated doses of force could bring about
predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi. Underlying
this optimistic view was a significant underestimate of the
level of the D.R.V. commitment to victory in the South and
an overestimate of the effectiveness of U.S. pressures in weak·
ening that resolve."
A related factor, the account says, "which, no doubt, commended
the proposal to the Administration was the relatively
low cost-in political terms-of such action." The context
here indicates that the Administration thought the public
would find an air war less repugnant than a ground war.
The President seems to have shared the view of his chief
advisers, the analyst writes, that "the threat implicit in minimum
but increasing amounts of force ('slow squeeze') would
. . . ultimately bring Hanoi to the table on terms favorable
to the U.S."
"McGeorge Bundy, as the President's assistant for national
security affairs, was in a position to convey President Johnson's
mood to the group," the account goes on. It adds that
notes taken at a White House meeting on Dec. 1 when the
senior officials met with Mr. Johnson to present the bombing
plan "tend to confirm that the President's mood was more
338
closely akin to the measures recommended" than to other,
harsher bombing plans.
"A second explanation of the gap between ends and means
is a more simple one," the account comments. "In a phrase,
we had run out of alternatives other than pressures."
A memorandum by Assistant Secretary McNaughton on
Nov. 6, 1964, made the point succinctly: "Action against
North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute for strengthening
the Government in South Vietnam. That is, a less active VC
(on orders from D.R.V.) can be matched by a less efficient
GVN. We therefore should consider squeezing North Vietnam."
The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton's. [See
Document #85.]
Doubts at Two Poles
The two dissenters from the view that "calculated doses
of force" would bring Hanoi around were, at opposite poles,
the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence agencies.
"The J.C.S. differed from this view on the grounds that if
we were really interested in affecting Hanoi's will, we would
have to hit hard at its capabilities," the account says. The
Joint Chiefs wanted the United States to demonstrate a willingness
to apply unlimited force.
Their bombing plan, deleted from the position paper before
it was presented to the President, asserted that the destruction
of all of North Vietnam's major airfields and its petroleum
supplies "in the first three days" was intended to "clearly ...
establish the fact that the U.S. intends to use military force
to the full limits of what military force can contribute to
achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia ... The follow on
military program-involving armed reconnaissance of
infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes on infiltration targets
in the D.R.V. and then progressive strikes throughout North
Vietnam-could be suspended short of full destruction of the
D.R.V. if our objectives were achieved earlier."
The analyst remarks that the Joint Chiefs' plan was
"shunted aside because both its risks and costs were too high,"
but the author does not attempt to evaluate the possible effect
of the plan on Hanoi's will.
Like Mr. Ball, the account says, the intelligence community
339
"tended toward a pessimistic view" of the effect of bombing on
the Hanoi leaders.
The intelligence panel within the Bundy working group,
composed of representatives from the three leading intelligence
agencies-the C.I.A., the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence
Agency-"did not concede very strong chances for
breaking the will of Hanoi," the author writes.
"The course of actions the Communists have pursued in
South Vietnam over past few years implies a fundamental
estimate on their part that the difficulties facing the U.S. are
so great that U.S. will and ability to maintain resistance in
that area can be gradually eroded-without running high
risks that this would wreak heavy destruction on the D.R.V.
or Communist China," the panel's report said.
If the United States now began bombing, the panel said, the
Hanoi leadership would have to ask itself "a basic question"
about how far the United States was willing to step up the
war "regardless of the danger of war with Communist China
and regardless of the international pressures that could be
brought to bear. ... " The decision of the Hanoi leadership
was thus uncertain for a number of reasons, the panel cautioned,
and "in any event, comprehension of the other's intentions
would almost certainly be difficult on both sides, and
especially as the scale of hostilities mounted."
The panel then cast doubt on the so-called Rostow thesis of
how much Hanoi feared destruction of its industry. This thesis,
named for its proponent, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the
State Department's Policy Planning Council, underlay much
of the Administration's hope for the success of a bombing
campaign.
The panel said: "We have many indications that the Hanoi
leadership is acutely and nervously aware of the extent to
which North Vietnam's transportation system and industrial
plant is vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, North Vietnam's
economy is overwhelmingly agricultural and, to a large
extent, decentralized in a myriad of more or less economically
self-sufficient villages. Interdiction of imports and extensive
destruction of transportation facilities and industrial plants
would cripple D.R.V. industry. These actions would also
seriously restrict D.R.V. military capabilities, and would
degrade, though to a lesser extent, Hanoi's capabilities to
support guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and Laos. We do
not believe that such actions would have a crucial effect on the
daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam
340
population. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets
would so greatly exacerbate current economic difficulties as to
create unmanageable control problems. It is reasonable to infer
that the D.R.Y. leaders have a psychological investment in the
work of reconstruction they have accomplished over the last
decade. Nevertheless, they would probably be willing to suffer
some damage to the country in the course of a test of wills
with the U.S. over the course of events in South Vietnam."
As in the case of earlier intelligence findings that contradicted
policy intentions, the study indicates no effort on the
part of the President or his most trusted advisers to reshape
their policy along the lines of this analysis.
One part of the intelligence panel's report that the Administration
did accept was a prediction that China would not react
in any major way to a bombing campaign unless American
or South Vietnamese troops invaded North Vietnam or northern
Laos. The study indicates that this analysis eased Administration
fears on this point.
Chinese reaction to systematic bombing of North Vietnam
was expected to be limited to providing Hanoi with antiaircraft
artillery, jet fighters and naval patrol craft. The panel
predicted that the Soviet role was "likely to remain a minor
one," even where military equipment was concerned. However,
the Russians subsequently sent large-scale shipments of
formidable antiaircraft equipment to North Vietnam.
"Cautious and Equivocal"
Now that a decision to bomb North Vietnam was drawing
near, the study says, Mr. Johnson became "cautious and
equivocal" in approaching it. Two analysts of this period, in
fact, differ in their characterization of his decision at the twoand-
a-half-hour White House meeting on Dec. 1, 1964, a
month after the election, when the bombing plan was presented
to him.
One analyst says that at this meeting the President "made
a tentative decision" to bomb, ordering the preparatory Phase I
put into effect and approving Phase II, the air war itself, "in
principle. "
The second analyst says that while the President approved
the entire bombing plan "in general outline at least . . . it is
341
also clear that he gave his approval to implement only the
first phase of the concept."
The President tied the actual waging of air war to reforms
by the Saigon Government, this analyst says, and left an
impression by the end of the meeting that he was "considerably
less than certain that future U.S. actions against North
Vietnam [the air war] would be taken, or that they would be
desirable. "
The study notes that "the precise nature of the President's
decisions" at the meeting is not known because a national
security action memorandum was not issued afterward.
"However," the study continues, "from handwritten notes
of the meeting, from instructions issued to action agencies and
from later reports of diplomatic and military actions taken,
it is possible to reconstruct the approximate nature of the
discussion and the decisions reached." The footnotes do not
indicate who made the handwritten notes found in the Pentagon
files, although the indication is that it was Mr. Mc-
Naughton or Mr. McNamara.
After a briefing by Ambassador Taylor on the situation in
South Vietnam, the discussion turned to a draft statement,
prepared by William Bundy, that the Ambassador was to
deliver to the Saigon leaders. The statement explained the two-phase
bombing plan and tied Phase II to a serious attempt by
the Saigon leadership to achieve some political stability and
get on with the war effort against the Vietcong.
In Saigon, General Khanh had nominally surrendered
authority to a civilian cabinet headed by Premier Tran Van
Huong. The general was intriguing against the Huong Cabinet,
however, as the ostensible commander in chief of the armed
forces and head of a Military Revolutionary Committee of
South Vietnamese generals. Within this council, a group
headed by Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the chief of the
air force, was intriguing both with and against General
Khanh.
Against this background, the study says of the White House
meeting:
"The President made it clear that he considered that pulling
the South Vietnamese together was basic to anything else the
United States might do. He asked the Ambassador specifically
which groups he [Ambassador Taylor] might talk to and what
more we might do to help bring unity among South Vietnam's
leaders. He asked whether we could not say to them 'we just
can't go on' unless they pulled together. To this, Taylor replied
that we must temper our insistence somewhat. "
342
The meeting then moved into a discussion of which allied
countries were to be briefed on the proposed air war. The
President said he wanted "new, dramatic effective" forms of
assistance from several, specifically mentioning Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the Philippines. These briefings by
special envoys were included in the draft position paper laying
out the bombing plan as the important diplomatic element in
Phase I.
"In each case," the study says, "the representative was to
explain our concept and proposed actions and request additional
contributions by way of forces in the event the second
phase of U.S. actions were entered."
The plan made no provision for similar consultations with
Congressional leaders and there is no evidence in the study
that Mr. Johnson conducted any.
In approving the statement General Taylor was to make to
the Saigon leaders, the President also gave his assent to read
the military signal that was formally to sound the beginning
of the 30 days of Phase I-Operation Barrel Roll, air strikes
by United States Air Force and Navy jets of Yankee Team
against infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian panhandle.
which was to be the final step-up in the Laos air
operations.
At the end of the meeting, the account continues, Ambassador
Taylor "slipped out the White House rear entrance" to
avoid the press and "only a brief, formal statement" was
issued. The analyst, remarks that the White House press statement
released immediately afterward "contained only two
comments regarding any determinations that had been
reached."
One said, "The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to
consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as
to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in
all its aspects."
The other, the concluding paragraph, said the President
had "reaffirmed the basic U.S. policy of providing all possible
and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and
Government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported
insurgency and aggression being conducted against
them. "
The final sentence in this paragraph, the analyst notes, was
one "specifically linking this policy" with Congress's Tonkin
Gulf resolution. The sentence read: "It was noted that this
policy accords with the terms of the Congressional joint
343
resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, which remains in full force and
effect."
Then, on Dec. 3, emerging from a second meeting with
Mr. Johnson, "presumably having received the final version
of his instructions," the account goes on, Ambassador Taylor
told reporters assembled at the White House "that he was
going to hold 'across-the-board' discussions with GVN."
"Asserting that U.S. policy for South Vietnam remained the
same, he stated that his aim would be to improve the deteriorating
situation in South Vietnam. Although he hinted
of changes 'in tactics and method,' he quite naturally did
not disclose the kind of operations in which the United States
was about to engage or any future actions to which immediate
activity could lead."
The Administration now moved quickly. William Bundy
left for Australia and New Zealand the next day, Dec. 4, to
brief their governments on both phases of the bombing plan,
the writer says.
Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain was "thoroughly
briefed on the forthcoming U.S. actions" during a state visit
to Washington Dec. 7 to 9, the narrative continues, while
other envoys briefed the Canadians and the Asian allies. The
writer notes that while Britain, Australia and New Zealand
were given "the full picture," the Canadians were "told slightly
less" and the Philippines, South Korea and the Chinese Nationalist
Government on Taiwan were "briefed on Phase I
only." What the Thais and the Laotians were told is not made
explicit.
The New Zealand Government "expressed grave doubts"
that the bombing would break Hanoi's will, the writer says,
and predicted that it might increase infiltration to South
Vietnam.
In meetings in Saigon on Dec. 7 and 9 with General Khanh
and Premier Huong, Ambassador Taylor exacted the desired
promises in exchange for the bombing. At the second meeting,
the Ambassador presented them with a draft press release
describing the desired improvements, including strengthening
of the army and the police, which the Saigon Government
released in its own name, at the United States' request, on
Dec. 11.
William H. Sullivan, newly appointed as Ambassador to
Laos, obtained Premier Souvanna Phouma's agreement on
Dec. 10 to the American air strikes at infiltration routes along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply network through the Laotian
panhandle, and Operation Barrel Roll got under way on
344
Dec. 14 with attacks by American jets on "targets of opportunity"-
that is, unprogrammed targets sighted by the pilots.
At a meeting of the National Security Council on Dec. 12,
when the final details for Barrell Roll were reviewed and approved,
the study reports, it was "agreed that there would be
no public operations statements about armed reconnaissance
in Laos unless a plane were lost."
"In such an event, the principals stated, the Government
should continue to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance
flights as requested by the Laotian Government."
McGeorge Bundy was quoted in the memorandum of record
as stating that the agreed plan "fulfilled precisely the President's
wishes."
On Dec. 18 Secretary McNamara set the level of Barrell
Roll attacks for the 30 days of Phase I-the analyst indicates
that he did so at the President's wishes-at two missions of
four aircraft apiece each week.
The Administration also stepped up the raids by T-28
fighter planes in Laos with a joint message on Dec. 8 from
Secretaries McNamara and Rusk to Ambassador Sullivan. The
cable instructed him to have the Laotians intensify bombing
"in the corridor areas and close to the D.R.V. border."
The analyst reports that in the three months between the
beginning of October and the end of December there were
77 sorties by the T-28's in the panhandle area-a sortie is a
strike by a single plane-and that by early December the
air raids had "already precipitated several complaints from
the D.R.V." to the International Control Commission "alleging
U.S.-sponsored air attacks on North Vietnamese territory."
Events in Saigon had meanwhile gone awry. Political turmoil
broke out there again with Buddhist and student demonstrations
against Premier Huong's Cabinet.
On Dec. 20, in defiance of Ambassador Taylor's wishes,
General Khanh, in a temporary alliance with the so-called
Young Turks-the young generals led by Marshal~ Ky announced
the dissolution of the High National Council, a
body that was supposed to be functioning as a temporary
legislature to draw up a constitution for a permanent civilian
government. They also made a large number of political
arrests by night, seizing several members of the High National
Council.
That day, Ambassador Taylor summoned the Young Turks
to the embassy and, in the writer's words, read them "the riot
act." They included Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, now President
of South Vietnam.
345
According to the embassy's cable to Washington, the conversation
began like this:
Ambassador Taylor: Do all of you understand English?
(Vietnamese officers indicated they did ... )
I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's
dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently
I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something
is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't
understand. I made it clear that all the military plans
which I know you would like to carry out are dependent
on government stability. Now you have made a
real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do
things like this.
Marshal Ky and other Vietnamese generals denied that they
had staged a coup and said they were trying to achieve unity
by getting rid of divisive elements, the account goes on.
The Ambassador tried to persuade them to support the
civilian regime of Premier Huong and apparently to restore
the High National Council. The Vietnamese officers would
not agree.
The embassy cable describes the end of the conversation:
"In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: 'You
people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to
see how we can straighten out this mess.' " [See Document
#89.]
By the end of the month, Ambassador Taylor, Deputy
Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland had apparently
despaired of trading a bombing campaign against the
North for a stable Saigon Government that would prosecute
the war in the South. On Dec. 31, the account continues, they
sent a joint message to Washington saying, in effect, that the
United States should go ahead with the air campaign against
the North "under any conceivable alliance condition short of
complete abandonment of South Vietnam."
The account indicates, however, that the President was
reluctant to proceed into Phase II without at least the appearance
of a firmer base in Saigon since the turmoil there was
making it more difficult for him to justify escalation to the
American public.
The writer remarks that at the meeting of the senior
National Security Council Members on Dec. 24, Secretary
Rusk "raised an issue that was high among Administration
concerns-namely that the American public was worried
346
about the chaos in the GVN, and particularly with respect
to its viability as an object of increased U.S. commitment."
On Christmas Eve, the Vietcong planted a bomb in the
Brinks, an officers billet in Saigon, killing two Americans in
the blast and wounding 58 others; the President declined to
authorize reprisal air strikes against the North, despite vigorous
recommendations from Ambassador Taylor, Admiral
Sharp in Honolulu and the Joint Chiefs, who were now pressing
hard for escalation.
"Highest levels today reached negative decision on proposal
... for reprisal action," Mr. Rusk cabled the Ambassador
on Dec. 29.
Five days earlier, Mr. Rusk had also instructed Ambassador
Taylor to halt, until the turmoil in Saigon subsided, the
planned, piecemeal release to the press of evidence of a major
increase in infiltration from the North during 1964, the writer
says. The Ambassador had first reported the increase to
Washington in October, along with a report of the appearance
of individual North Vietnamese Army regulars, and the
Administration began leaking the information in November
through background briefings.
Making a Case in Public
By this time, the Administration felt that it had sufficient
information on infiltration to make a public case for bombing
the North. The intelligence community had obtained evidence
that a minimum of 19,000 and a maximum of 34,000 infiltrators,
mostly former southerners who had fought against
the French in the Vietminh, had entered the South since 1959.
Chester L. Cooper, a former intelligence officer, had put
together a major report on Hanoi's support and direction of
the guerrillas, but the Administration had decided earlier in
December against public disclosure of the document itself
because this might create "undesirable speculation," and had
instead instructed the Ambassador to continue the piecemeal
approach. Now, the analyst says, Mr. Rusk wanted this halted
as well for fear that more publicity might create pressure for
action prematurely.
The political upheaval in Saigon, the writer continues, was
fueling a Vietnam debate in Congress, which, while it did
347
not exhibit much antiwar sentiment, did show considerable
confusion and dismay, the writer says.
Secretary Rusk, on television on Jan. 3, 1965, felt it necessary
to defend the Administration "in the context of a yearend
foreign policy report," the account adds.
Mr. Rusk did not hint at the Administration's plans for
possible bombing of the North. "Ruling out either a U.S.
withdrawal or a major expansion of the war," the writer says,
"Rusk gave assurances that with internal unity, and our aid
and persistence the South Vietnamese could themselves defeat
the insurgency."
On Jan. 14, however, as a result of the loss of two American
jets over Laos in Operation Barrel Roll, "accounts of U.S.
air operations against Laotian infiltration routes gained wide
circulation for the first time," the writer says. A dispatch from
Laos by United Press International, he adds, "in effect blew
the lid on the entire Yankee Team operation in Laos since
May of 1964."
"Despite official State or Defense refusal to comment on the
nature of the Laotian air missions, these disclosures added new
fuel to the public policy debate," the writer continues. The
disclosures were complicating matters for the President by
giving ammunition to the very small minority of antiwar
senators who were taking seriously the press speculation that
the United States might be getting ready to bomb the North.
In a Senate speech on Jan. 19, the account goes on,
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon charged that the Yankee
Team air strikes had ignored the 1962 Geneva accords on
Laos and "violated the nation's belief in 'substituting the rule
of law for the jungle law of military might.' Broadening his
attack, he warned, that 'there is no hope of avoiding a massive
war in Asia' if U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia were
to continue without change,"
Within the Administration in Washington, key policy
makers were coming to the same conclusion that Ambassador
Taylor and his colleagues had reached in Saigon-that it was
desirable to bomb the North regardless of what state of government
existed in the South.
The political turmoil in Saigon, the narrative says, appears
"to have been interpreted in Washington as an impending
sellout" to the National Liberation Front. Fear increased that
a neutralist coalition government would emerge and invite the
United States to leave.
Washington's sense of crumbling in the military situation
was heightened when Saigon's army suffered a "highly visible"
348
setback in a ferocious battle at Binhgia, southeast of the
capital, between Dec. 26 and Jan. 2. Vietcong guerrillas nearly
destroyed two South Vietnamese Marine battalions.
"All evidence pointed to a situation in which a final collapse
of the GVN appeared probable and a victorious consolidation
of VC power a distinct possibility," the narrative says.
The Hour Approaches
William Bundy communicated the feeling in a memorandum
he wrote to Secretary Rusk on Jan. 6 for a meeting Mr. Rusk
was to have with the President that afternoon. Mr. Bundy explained
that the memorandum encompassed, besides his own
thoughts, those of Mr. Forrestal, head of the interagency
committee, and Ambassador Unger, who had recently been
transferred back to Washington from Vientiane.
"I think we must accept that Saigon morale in all quarters
is now very shaky indeed," he said in part, "and that this
relates directly to a widespread feeling that the U.S. is not
ready for stronger action and indeed is possibly looking for a
way out. We may regard this feeling as irrational and contradicted
by our repeated statements, but Bill Sullivan was very
vivid in describing the existence of such feelings in October,
and we must honestly concede that our actions and statements
since the election have not done anything to offset it. The
blunt fact is that we have appeared to the Vietnamese (and
to wide circles in Asia and even in Europe) to be insisting on
a more perfect government than can reasonably be expected,
before we consider any additional action-and that we might
even pull out our support unless such a government emerges.
"In key parts of the rest of Asia, notably Thailand, our
present posture also appears weak. As such key parts of
Asia see us, we looked strong in May and early June, weaker
in later June and July, and then appeared to be taking a
quite firm line in August with the Gulf of Tonkin. Since then
we must have seemed to be gradually weakening-and, again,
insisting on perfectionism in the Saigon Government before
we moved.
"The sum total of the above seems to us to point-together
with almost certainly stepped-up Vietcong actions in the
current favorable weather-to a prognosis that the situation
in Vietnam is now likely to come apart more rapidly than
349
we had anticipated in November. We would still stick to the
estimate that the most likely form of coming apart would be
a government of key groups starting to negotiate covertly with
the Liberation Front or Hanoi, perhaps not asking in the first
instance that we get out, but with that necessarily following at
a fairly early stage. In one sense this would be a 'Vietnam
solution,' with some hope that it would produce a Communist
Vietnam that would assert its own degree of independence
from Peiping and that would produce a pause in Communist
pressure in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it would still
be virtually certain than [sic] Laos would then become untenable
and that Cambodia would accommodate in some way.
Most seriously, there is grave question whether the Thai in
these circumstances would retain any confidence at all in our
continued support. In short, the outcome would be regarded
in Asia, and particularly among our friends, as just as humiliating
a defeat as any other form. As events have developed,
the American public would probably not be too
sharply critical, but the real question would be whether Thailand
and other nations were weakened and taken over thereafter.
"The alternative of stronger action obviously has grave
difficulties. It commits the U.S. more deeply, at a time when
the picture of South Vietnamese will is extremely weak. To the
extent that it included actions against North Vietnam, it would
be vigorously attacked by many nations and disapproved
initially even by such nations as Japan and India, on present
indications. Most basically, its stiffening effect on the Saigon
political situation would not be at all sure to bring about
a more effective government, nor would limited actions against
the southern D.R.V. in fact sharply reduce infiltration or,
in present circumstances, be at all likely to induce Hanoi to
call it off.
"Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would
have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese
situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger
position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand.
Accepting the present situation-or any negotiation on the
basis of it-would be far weaker from this latter key standpoint.
If we moved into stronger actions, we should have in
mind that negotiations would be likely to emerge from some
quarter in any event, and that under existing circumstances,
even with the additional element of pressure, we could not
expect to get an outcome that would really secure an independent
South Vietnam. Yet even on an outcome that produced a progressive deterioration in South Vietnam and an
eventual Communist take-over, we would still have appeared
to Asians to have done a lot more about it.
"In specific terms, the kinds of action we might take in
the near future would be:
"a. An early occasion for reprisal action against the n.R.V.
"b. Possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance of the
n.R.V. at once.
"Concurrently with a or b, an early orderly withdrawal of
our dependents [from Saigon, but only if] stronger action
[is contemplated]. If we are to clear our decks in this way -- and
we are more and more inclined to think we should-it
simply must be, for this reason alone, in the context of some
stronger action. . . .
"Introduction of limited U.S. ground forces into the northern
area of South Vietnam still has great appeal to many
of us, concurrently with the first air attacks into the n.R.V.
It would have a real stiffening effect in Saigon, and a strong
signal effect to Hanoi. On the disadvantage side, such forces
would be possible attrition targets for the Vietcong."
Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Bundy's counterpart at the Pentagon,
had given Mr. McNamara a similar memorandum three
days earlier.
"The impact of these views can be seen in the policy guidance
emanating from Washington in mid and late January,
1965," the Pentagon's narrative says.
In a cablegram to Saigon on Jan. 11, the writer goes on,
Secretary Rusk instructed Ambassador Taylor "to avoid actions
that would further commit the United States to any
particular form of political solution" to the turmoil there.
If another military regime emerged from the squabbling "we
might well have to swallow our pride and work with it," Mr.
Rusk said.
Another memorandum to Mr. McNamara from Mr. McNaughton, on Jan. 27, along with Mr. McNamara's penciled
comments on it, "adds perspective to this viewpoint," the historian
says. Mr. McNaughton stated "and Mr. McNamara
agreed" that the United States objective in South Vietnam was
"not to 'help friend' but to contain China," and "both favored
initiating strikes against North Vietnam."
Paraphrasing the memorandum and Mr. McNamara's
comments, the writer says, "At first they believed these [air
attacks] should take the form of reprisals; beyond that, the
Administration would have to 'feel its way' into stronger,
graduated pressures. McNaughton doubted that such strikes
351
would actually help the situation in South Vietnam, but
thought they should be carried out anyway. McNamara believed
they probably would help the situation, in addition to
their broader impacts on the U.S. position in Southeast Asia."
"Clear indication that the Administration was contemplating
some kind of increased military activity" had gone
out to Saigon two days earlier in another cablegram from
Mr. Rusk, the account goes on. "Ambassador Taylor was
asked to comment on the 'departmental view' that U.S. dependents
should be withdrawn to 'clear the decks' in Saigon
and enable better concentration of U.S. efforts on behalf of
South Vietnam."
Ever since the original bombing scenario of May 23, 1964,
the evacuation of American women and children had been
the signal for "D-Day."
"The Rusk cable made specific reference to a current
interest in reprisal actions," the analyst says.
The initial blow came in about two weeks. The Vietcong
attacked the United States military advisers' compound at
Pleiku in the Central Highlands and an Army helicopter base
at Camp Holloway, four miles away. Nine Americans were
killed and 76 wounded.
"The first flash from Saigon about the assault came on the
ticker at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon
at 2:38 P.M. Saturday, Feb. 6, Washington time," the
narrative says. "It triggered a swift, though long-contemplated
Presidential decision to give an 'appropriate and fitting' response.
Within less than 14 hours, by 4 P.M. Sunday, Vietnam
time, 49 U.S. Navy jets-A-4 Skyhawks and F-8 Crusaders
from the Seventh Fleet carriers U.S.S. Coral Sea and U.S.S.
Hancock-had penetrated a heavy layer of monsoon clouds
to deliver their bombs and rockets upon North Vietnamese
barracks and staging areas at Donghoi, a guerrilla training
garrison 40 miles north of the 17th Parallel.
"Though conceived and executed as a limited one-shot tit-for-
tat reprisal, the drastic U.S. action, long on the military
planners' drawing boards under the operational code name
Flaming Dart precipitated a rapidly moving sequence of events
that transformed the character of the Vietnam war and the
U.S. role in it."
Then the guerrillas attacked an American barracks at
Quinhon, on the central coast, and on Feb. 11, the President
launched a second and heavier reprisal raid, Flaming Dart II.
Two days later, on Feb. 13, he decided to begin Operation
Rolling Thunder, the sustained air war against North Vietnam.
352
"As is readily apparent," the analyst concludes, "there was
no dearth of reasons for striking North. Indeed, one almost
has the impression that there were more reasons than were
required. But in the end, the decision to go ahead with the
strikes seems to have resulted as much from the lack of
alternative proposals as from any compelling logic in their
favor."
353
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's
history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to
February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam
was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents
are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical
errors corrected.
# 74
Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy on
Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire
Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United
States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also
sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions
in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New
Delhi, Moscow, Pnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the
Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.
1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to
stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the
1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be
establishment of military equilibrium in the country. Moreover, we
have some concern that recent RLG successes and reported low
PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side,
which we do not now wish to have to deal with.
2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position has been that military
equilibrium would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas
seized in POI since May 15 and that such withdrawal is also basic
precondition to convening 14-nation conference. Question now
arises whether territorial gains of Operation Triangle, provided
they can be consolidated, have in practice brought about a situation
of equilibrium and whether, therefore, it is no longer necessary
to insist on Pathet Lao withdrawal from POI as precondition
to 14-nation conference. This is in fact thought which has previously
occurred to Souvanna (Vientiane's 191) and is also
touched on in Secretary's letter to Butler (Oeptel 88 to Vientiane).
If Souvanna and we continued to insist on POI withdrawal other
side would inevitably insist on our yielding Triangle gains, and
354
our judgement is that such arrangement substantially worse than
present fairly coherent geographical division. If withdrawal precondition
were to be dropped, it could probably best be done at
tripartite meeting where it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining
counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that
he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining
condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions
cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna-we are
thinking primarily of T-28 operations-Pathet Lao would no
doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC
policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming
period.
3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals
[one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue
for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt
be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks.
Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized
pressures while at same time providing some deterrent
to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would
insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could
in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the
conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in
1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided
but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor
discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable
at this juncture.
4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of
course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal
precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain
himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first
question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about
the second. Request Vientiane's judgement on these points. Views
of other addresses are so requested, including estimated reactions
host governments. It is essential that these estimates take account
of recent developments: military successes non-Communist forces
in Laos and latest demonstration U.S. determination resist Communist
aggression in Southeast Asia.
# 75
Saigon Embassy's Response on Drawbacks
in Laos Talks
Cablegram from Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in
Saigon to Secretary Rusk, Aug. 9, 1964, with copies to the
embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok and the Pacific command.
355
From our vantage point we can see positive disadvantages to
our position in SEA in pursuing course of action outlined
REFTEL.
1. In first place rush to conference table would serve to confirm
to Chicoms that U.S. retaliation for destroyed attacks was
transient phenomenon and that firm Chicom response in form of
commitment to defend NVN has given U.S. "paper tiger" second
thoughts. Moreover, much of beneficial effects elsewhere resulting
from our strong reaction to events in Gulf of Tonkin would be
swiftly dissipated.
2. In Vietnam sudden backdown from previous strongly held
U.S. position on PDJ withdrawal prior to conf on Laos would
have potentially disastrous effect. Morale and will to fight, particularly
willingness to push ahead with arduous pacification task
and to enforce stern measure on Khanh's new emergency decree,
would be undermined by what would look like evidence that U.S.
seeking to take advantage of any slight improvement in non-
Communist position as excuse for extricating itself from Indochina
via conf route. This would give strength to probable
pro-Gaullist contention that GVN should think about following
Laotian example by seeking negotiated solution before advantage
of temporarily strengthened anti-Communist position recedes.
3. General letdown in Vietnam which would result from softening
of our stand in Laos just after we had made great show of
firmness vis-a-vis Communists would undoubtedly erode Khanh's
personal position with prospects of increased political instability
and coup plotting.
4. It should be remembered that our retaliatory action in
Gulf of Tonkin is in effect an isolated U.S.-DRV incident.
Although this has relation, as Amb. Stevenson has pointed out,
to larger problem of DRV aggression by subversion in Vietnam
and Laos, we have not rpt not yet come to grips in a forceful way
with DRV over the issue of this larger and much more complex
problem. Instead, we are engaged, both in Vietnam and Laos, in
proxy actions against proxy agents of DRV. If, as both Khanh
and Souvanna hope, we are to parlay the consequences of our
recent clash with the DRV into actions which specifically direct
themselves against DRV violations of the 1954 and 1962 agreements,
we must avoid becoming involved in political engagements
which will tie our hands and inhibit our action. For example, any
effort to undertake credible joint planning operations with GVN
re interdictory air strikes upon infiltration network in southern
DRV and especially in panhandle would be completely undercut
if we were engaged in conf discussing the Laos territory in
question.
5. Similarly, it would seem to us that Souvanna's willingness
to hold fast on pre-conditions or substantive negotiations bears
direct relationship to his assessment of U.S. willingness to meet
the problem where it originates-in North Vietnam itself. This
356
fact shines clearly through his recent brief letter to Pres Johnson.
Moreover, it would be folly to assume that Khanh, who is now
in fairly euphoric state as result of our Gulf of Tonkin action,
would do anything other than slump into deepest funk if we
sought to persuade him to send GVN del to coni. [two words
illegible] is that he would resign rather than send [two words
illegible].
Intensified pressures for Geneva-type conf cited in REFTEL
would appear to us to be coming almost entirely from those who
are opposed to U.S. policy objectives in SEA (except possibly
UK which seems prepared jump on bandwagon). Under circumstances,
we see very little hope that results of such conference
would be advantageous to U.S. Moreover, prospects of limiting it
to consideration of only Laotian problem appear at this time
juncture to be dimmer than ever. Even though prior agreement
reached to limit conf, we do not see how in actual practice we
could limit discussion solely to Laos if others insist on raising
other issues. To best our knowledge, we never "withdrew" from
room when DRV attempted raise extraneous issues during 1961-
1962 conf. Instead, we insisted to chair on point of order and had
DRV ruled out of order. Prospect of informal corridor discussions
with PL, DRV and Chicoms is just what GVN would fear most
and may well increase pressures on GVN to undertake negotiated
solution so as to avoid their fear of being faced with "fait
accompli" by U.S.
7. Rather than searching for "safety valve" to dissipate current
"generalized pressures" SEA, it seems to us we should be looking
for means which will channel those pressures against DRV; seems
to us "safety valve," if needed (for example by Soviets), exists in
current UNSC discussion. We should continue to focus attention
in all forms on Communist aggressive actions as root cause of
tension in SEA and reinforce our current stance. In the final
analysis, this stance would be more valid deterrent to escalation
by PLjVM than attempt seek accommodation within context Laos
problem alone.
While not rpt not specifically within our province, we would
point out that PLjVM appear to have capability of retaking territory
regained by RLG in Operation Triangle at any time of their
choosing and that therefore "territorial swap" invisaged in
DEPTEL may be highly illusory. Moreover, any territorial deal
which seems to confirm permanent PLjVM control over corridor
as an arrangement acceptable to U.S. would be anathema to GVN
and indicate our willingness accept infiltration network as tolerable
condition on GVN frontiers. Such situation would in their
and U.S. mission opinions vitiate against any hope of successful
pacification of GVN territory.
357
# 76
u.s. Mission's Recommendations on
Further Military Steps
Cablegram from the United States Mission in Saigon to
the State Department, Aug. 18, 1964.
This is U.S. Mission message.
In preparing our reply, we have found it simpler to produce a
new paper which undertakes to state the problem in South Viet
Nam as we see it in two possible forms and then to provide
course of action responding to each statement of the problem.
Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of Deptel
439 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country
pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain national
morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something
must be added in the coming months.
Statement of the problem-A. The course which US policy in
South Viet Nam should take during the coming months can be
expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important
objective is to gain time for the Khanh government to develop
a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of
viability. Since any of the courses of action considered in this
cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the U.S., we should
be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better
feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it,
we should not get involved militarily with North Viet Nam and
possibly with Red China if our base in South Viet Nam is insecure
and Khanh's army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency.
Hence, it is our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow
Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from
the VC threat which presently reigns (as received) it and assure
that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a
reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction
which may develop in the execution of our program and thus
avoid the possible requirement for a major U.S. ground force
commitment.
A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale
in South Viet Nam particularly within the Khanh Government.
This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we
can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure
on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part.
Thirdly while gaining time for Khanh, we must be able to hold
the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet Cong
strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout
this period, we should be developing a posture of maximum
readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North
Viet Nam, using January 1, 1965 as a target D-Day. We must
358
always recognize, however, that events may force U.S. to advance
D-Day to a considerably earlier date.
[Start of sentence illegible] we then need to design a course of
action which will achieve the four objectives enumerated above.
Such a course of action would consist of three parts: the first, a
series of actions directed at the Khanh Government; the second,
actions directed at the Hanoi Government; the third, following
a pause of some duration, initiation of an orchestrated air attack
against North Viet Nam.
In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our
willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to
exert intense pressure on North Viet Nam, providing certain conditions
are met in advance. In the first place before we would
agree to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his government
and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard.
Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop
Tac Plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from
the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification program, including
Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allow earmarking at least
three division equivalents for the defense in I Corps if the DRV
step up military operations in that area.
Finally we should reach some fundamental understandings with
Khanh and his government concerning war aims. We must make
clear that we will engage in actions against North Viet Nam only
for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of
South Viet Nam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements;
that we will not (rpt not) join in a crusade to unify the
north and south; that we will not (rpt not) even seek to overthrow
the Hanoi regime provided the latter will cease its efforts
to take over the south by subversive warfare.
With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set
in motion the following:
(1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations)
and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome
of discussions with Khanh.
(2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN.
(3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration
targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the
Khanh Government are ready. Such plans will have to be related
to the situation in Laos. It appears to U.S. that Souvanna Phouma
should be informed at an appropriate time of the full scope of our
plans and one would hope to obtain his acquiescence in the anti-infiltration
actions in Laos. In any case we should always seek to
preserve our freedom of action in the Laotian corridor.
By means of these c.ctions, Hanoi will get the word that the
operational rules with respect to the DRV are changing. We
should perhaps consider message to DRV that shooting down of
U-2 would result in reprisals. We should now lay public base for
justifying such flights and have plans for prompt execution in
359
contingency to shoot down. One might be inclined to consider
including at this state tit-for-tat bombing operations in our plans
to compensate for VC depredations in SVN. However, the initiation
of air attacks from SVN against NVN is likely to release a
new order of military reaction from both sides, the outcome of
which is impossible to predict. Thus, we do not visualize initiating
this form of reprisal as a desirable tactic in the current plan but
would reserve the capability as an emergency response if needed.
Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level
of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking
such visible measures as [word illegible] Hawk units to Danang
and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang for defense of the
airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time
(assumed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's
performance.
Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that
Hanoi has failed to respond favorably, it will be time to embark
on the final phase of course of action A, a carefully orchestrated
bombing attack on NVN directed primarily at infiltration and
other military targets. At some point prior thereto it may be
desirable to open direct communications with Hanoi if this
not been done before. With all preparations made, political and
military, the bombing program would begin, using U.S. reconnaissance
planes, VNAF /Farmgate aircraft against those targets
which could be attacked safely in spite of the presence of the
MIG's and additional U.S. combat aircraft if necessary for the
effective execution of the bombing programs.
Pros and cons of course of action-A. If successful course of
action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as
essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Viet Nam. I will
press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification
and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country
ventures it gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated
at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal
morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and
Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming
overcommitted.
On the other hand, course of action A relies heavily upon the
durability of the Khanh government. It assumes that there is
little danger of its collapse without notice or of its possible replacement
by a weaker or more unreliable successor. Also, because
of the drawn-out nature of the program it is exposed to the danger
of international political pressure to enter into negotiations before
NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it.
Statement of the Problem-B. It may well be that the problem
of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the
foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment
that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965,
although the application of course of action A should have the
effect of strengthening the government [rest of sentence illegible].
360
[Start of sentence illegible] we would have to restate the problem
in the following terms. Our objective avoid the possible consequences
of a collapse of national morale. To accomplish these
purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV
without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to
resist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must
cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency.
Course of Action-B. To meet this statement of the problem,
we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to obtain results
f<.ster than under course of action A. Such an accelerated program
would include the following actions:
Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time
expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi
at once, providing that he will undertake to perform as in course
of action A. However, U.S. action would not await evidence of
performance.
Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject
with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. The scenario
of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under
Course A but the execution would await only the readiness of
plans to expedite relying almost exclusively on U.S. military
means.
Pros and cons of Course of Action B. This course of action
asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily
because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids
tht: consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government
and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions
against Hanoi. Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the
program by an international demand for negotiation by presenting
a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the
likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action since Khanh will
have almost no available ground forces which can be released
from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks.
Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the
greater promised achievement of U.S. policy objectives in SVN
during the coming months. However, we should always bear in
mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to
shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In
either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which
may be initiated by NVN or by Chicoms.
Miscellaneous: as indicated above, we believe that 34A
operations should resume at once at maximum tempo, still on a
covert basis; similarly, Desoto patrols should begin advance,
operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of
VNAF pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first
of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on
evacuation of U.S. dependents.
Recommendation: It is recommended that USG adopt Course
of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of
Action B.
361
# 77
Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos on
Search and Rescue Flights
Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the
United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug .. 26, 1964.
A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in
Chief, Pacific.
We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations
that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and
SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans,
Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary
authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations
when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success
of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance
Washington authorization wherever situation permits.
At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and
control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future.
Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations
more or less automatically impose demands for use of U.S.
personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability
clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each
loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of
escalation from one action to another in ways that may not be
desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize
T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological
effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's
position. Request your view whether balance of above factors
would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping
of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28
operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be
covered by septel.)
On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly
missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with
[word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao
pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of
firm control.
Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future
scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our
impressions present control structure correct and whether steps
could be taken to tighten this.
362
# 78
Joint Chiefs' Recommendations on
Military Courses of Action
Excerpts from memorandum, "Recommended Courses of
Action-Southeast Asia," from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Aug. 26, 1964.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered Ambassador
Taylor's statements of objectives and courses of action. In recognition
of recent events in SVN, however, they consider that his
proposed course of action B is more in accord with the current
situation and consider that such an accelerated program of actions
with respect to the DRV is essential to prevent a complete collapse
of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. Additionally, they do not
agree that we should be slow to get deeply involved until we have
a better feel for the quality of our ally. The United States is
already deeply involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that
only significantly stronger military pressures on the DRV are
likely to provide the relief and psychological boost necessary for
attainment of the requisite governmental stability and viability.
4. Recent U.S. military actions in Laos and against the DRV
have demonstrated our resolve more clearly than any other U.S.
actions in some time. These actions showed force and restraint.
Failure to resume and maintain a program of pressure through
military actions could be misinterpreted to mean we have had
second thoughts about Pierce Arrow and the events leading
thereto, and could signal a lack of resolve. Accordingly, while
maintaining a posture of readiness in the Western Pacific, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the U.S. program should have
as concurrent objectives: ( 1) improvements in South Vietnam,
including emphasis on the Pacification Program and the Hop Tac
plan to clear Saigon and its surroundings; (2) interdiction of the
relatively unmolested VC lines of communication (LOC) through
Laos by operations in the Panhandle and of the LOC through
Cambodia by strict control of the waterways leading therefrom;
(3) denial of Viet Cong (VC) sanctuaries in the Cambodia-South
Vietnam border area through the conduct of "hot pursuit" operations
into Cambodia, as required; (4) increased pressure on North
Vietnam through military actions. As part of the program for increased
pressures, the OPLAN 34A operations and the Desoto
patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed, the former on
an intensified but still covert basis.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that more direct
and forceful actions than these will, in all probability, be required.
In anticipation of a pattern of further successful VC and Pathet
Lao (PL) actions in RVN and Laos, and in order to increase
pressure on the DRV, the U.S. program should also provide for
363
prompt and calculated responses to such VC/PL actions in the
form of air strikes and other operations against appropriate military
targets in the DRV.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that defining what might
constitute appropriate counteroperations in advance is a most
difficult task. We should therefore maintain our prompt readiness
to execute a range of selected responses, tailored to the developing
circumstances and reflecting the principles in the Gulf of Tonkin
actions, that such counter operations will result in clear military
disadvantage to the DRV. These responses, therefore, must be
greater than the provocation in degree, and not necessarily limited
to response in kind against similar targets. Air strikes in response
might be purely VNAF; VNAF with U.S. escort to provide protection
from possible employment of MIG's; VNAF with U.S.
escort support in the offensive as well as the defensive role; or
entirely U.S. The precise combination should be determined by
the effect we wish to produce and the assets available. Targets
for attack by air or other forces may be selected from appropriate
plans including the Target Study for North Vietnam consisting of
94 targets, recently forwarded to you by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff ....
# 79
Plan of Action Attributed to McNaughton
at Pentagon
Excerpts from memorandum, Sept. 3, 1964, "Plan of
Action for South Vietnam," which the Pentagon study indicates
was drawn up by Assistant Secretary of Defense John
T. McNaughton.
1. Analysis of the present situation. The situation in South
Vietnam is deteriorating. Even before the government sank into
confusion last week, the course of the war in South Vietnam had
been downward, with Viet Cong incidents increasing in number
and intensity and military actions becoming larger and more
successful, and with less and less territory meaningfully under
the control of the government. Successful ambushes had demonstrated
an unwillingness of the population even in what were
thought to be pacified areas to run the risk of informing on the
Viet Congo War weariness was apparent. The crisis of the end of
August-especially since the competing forces have left the government
largely "faceless" and have damaged the government's
ability to manage the pacification program-promises to lead to
further and more rapid deterioration. . . . The objective of the
United States is to reverse the present downward trend. Failing
364
that, the alternative objective is to emerge from the situation with
as good an image as possible in U.S., allied and enemy eyes.
2. Inside South Vietnam. We must in any event keep hard
at work inside South Vietnam. This means, inter alia, immediate
action:
(a) to press the presently visible leaders to get a real government
in operation;
(b) to prevent extensive personnel changes down the line;
(c) to see that lines of authority for carrying out the pacification
program are clear.
New initiatives might include action:
(d) to establish a U.S. naval base, perhaps at Danang;
(e) to embark on a major effort to pacify one province adjacent
to Saigon.
A separate analysis is being made of a proposal:
(f) to enlarge significantly the U.S. military role in the pacification
program inside South Vietnam--e.g., large numbers of
U.S. special forces, divisions of regular combat troops, U.S. air,
etc., to "interlard" with or to take over functions of geographical
areas from the South Vietnamese armed forces ....
3. Outside the borders of South Vietnam. There is a chance
that the downward trend can be reversed-or a new situation
created offering new opportunities, or at least a convincing demonstration
made of the great costs and risks incurred by a country
which commits aggression against an ally of ours-if the followine
course of action is followed. The course of action is made up
of actions outside the borders of South Vietnam designed to put
increasing pressure on North Vietnam but designed also both to
create as little risk as possible of the kind of military action which
would be difficult to justify to the American public and to preserve
where possible the option to have no U.S. military action
at all. ...
Actions. The actions, in addition to present continuing "extraterritorial"
actions (U.S. U-2 recce of DRV, U.S. jet recce of
Laos, T-28 activity in Laos), would be by way of an orchestration
of three classes of actions, all designed to meet these five
desiderata-( 1) from the U.S. GVN and hopefully allied points
of view, they should be legitimate things to do under the circumstances,
(2) they should cause apprehension, ideally increasing
apprehension, in the DRV, (3) they should be likely at some
point to provoke a military DRV response, (4) the provoked
response should be likely to provide good grounds for us to escalate
if we wished, and (5) the timing and crescendo should be
under our control, with the scenario capable of being turned off
at any time ....
4. Actions of opportunity. While the above course of action is
being pursued, we should watch for other DRV actions which
would justify [words illegible]. Among such DRV actions might
be the following:
365
a. Downing of U.S. recce or U.S. rescue aircraft in Laos (likely
by AA, unlikely by MIG).
b. MIG action in Laos or South Vietnam (unlikely).
c. Mining of Saigon Harbor (unlikely).
d. VC attacks on South Vietnamese POL storage, RR bridge,
etc. (dramatic incident required).
e. VC attacks (e.g., by mortars) on, or take-over of, air fields
on which U.S. aircraft are deployed (likely).
f. Some barbaric act of terrorism which inflames U.S. and world
opinion (unlikely) ....
6. Chances to resolve the situation. Throughout the scenario,
we should be alert to chances to resolve the situation:
a. To back the DRV down, so South Vietnam can be pacified.
b. To evolve a tolerable settlement:
I. Explicit settlement (e.g., via a bargaining-from-strength conference,
etc.).
II. Tacit settlement (e.g., via piecemeal live-and-let-live Vietnamese
"settlements," a de facto "writing off" of indefensible portions
of SVN, etc.).
c. If worst comes and South Vietnam disintegrates or their
behavior becomes abominable, to "disown" South Vietnam, hopefully
leaving the image of "a patient who died despite the extraordinary
efforts of a good doctor."
7. Special considerations during next two months. The relevant
"audiences" of U.S. actions are the Communists (who must feel
strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be
buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters"), and
the U.S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U.S.
lives and prestige). During the next two months, because of the
lack of "rebuttal time" before election to justify particular actions
which may be distorted to the U.S. public, we must act with
special care-signalling to the DRV that initiatives are being
taken, to the GVN that we are behaving energetically despite the
restraints of our political season, and to the U.S. public that we
are behaving with good purpose and restraint.
# 80
Top Aides' Proposal to Johnson on
Military Steps in Late '64
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy, for President Johnson,
Sept. 8, 1964. The memorandum was headed "Courses of
Action for South Vietnam."
This memorandum records the consensus reached in discussions
between Ambassador Taylor and Secretary Rusk, Secretary
366
McNamara and General Wheeler, for review and decision by the
President.
THE SITUATION
1. Khanh will probably stay in control and may make some
headway in the next two-three months in strengthening the Government
(GVN). The best we can expect is that he and the GVN
will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification program
ticking over (but not ptogressing markedly) and give the appearance
of a valid Government.
2. Khanh and the GVN leaders are temporarily too exhausted
to be thinking much about moves against the North. However,
they do need to be reassured that the U.S. continues to mean
business, and as Khanh goes along in his Government efforts, he
will probably want more U.S. effort visible, and some GVN role
in external actions.
3. The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be too weak for
us to take any major deliberate risks of escalation that would
involve a major role for, or threat to, South Vietnam. However,
escalation arising from and directed against U.S. action would
tend to lift GVN morale at least temporarily.
4. The Communist side will probably avoid provocative action
against the U.S., and it is uncertain how much they will step up
VC activity. They do need to be shown that we and the GVN are
not simply sitting back after the Gulf of Tonkin.
COURSES OF ACTION
We recommend in any event:
1. U.S. naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed
immediately (about September 12). They should operate initially
beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated from 34A
maritime operations. The patrols would comprise 2-3 destroyers
and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers would
have their own ASW capability.
2. 34A operations by the GVN should be resumed immediately
thereafter (next week). The maritime operations are by far the
most important. North Vietnam is likely to publicize them, and at
this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are
taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of
the facts on VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations
should also be resumed but are secondary in importance.
We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present.
3. Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor
areas of Laos should be undertaken in the near future, together
with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get Souvanna's permission.
These operations will have only limited effect, however.
4. We should be prepared to respond on a tit-for-tat basis
against the DRV in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any
367
special DRV /VC action against SVN. The response for an attack
on U.S. units should be along the lines of the Gulf of Tonkin
attacks, against specific and related targets. The response to special
action against SVN should likewise be aimed at specific and comparable
targets.
The main further question is the extent to which we should add
elements to the above actions that would tend deliberately to provoke
a DRV reaction, and consequent retaliation by us. Example
of actions to be considered would be running U.S. naval patrols
increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or associating
them with 34A operations. We believe such deliberately
provocative elements should not be added in the immediate future
while the GVN is still struggling to its feet. By early October,
however, we may recommend such actions depending on GVN
progress and Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to
U.S. naval patrols.
The aim of the above actions, external to South Vietnam, would
be to assist morale in SVN and show the Communists we still
mean business, while at the same time seeking to keep the risks
low and under our control at each stage.
Further actions within South Vietnam are not covered in this
memorandum. We believe that there are a number of immediate impact
actions we can take, such as pay raises for the police and
civil administrators and spot projects in the cities and selected
rural areas. These actions would be within current policy and will
be refined for decision during Ambassador Taylor's visit. We are
also considering minor changes in the U.S. air role within South
Vietnam, but these would not involve decisions until November.
# 81
Memo on Johnson's Approval of Renewed
Naval Operations
National security action memorandum from McGeorge
Bundy, adviser to the President on national security, to
Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State
Rusk, Sept. 10, 1964.
The President has now reviewed the situation in South Vietnam
with Ambassador Taylor and with other advisers and has approved
the following actions:
1. U.S. naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin will be resumed
promptly after Ambassador Taylor's return. They will operate
initially well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated
from 34A maritime operations. The patrols will comprise tw~ to
three destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the
destroyers will have their own ASW capability.
368
2. 34A operations by the GVN will be resumed after completion
of a first DeSoto patrol. The maritime operations are by far
the most important. North Vietnam has already publicized them,
and is likely to publicize them even more, and at this point we
should have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place
and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts of
ve infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should
also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not
consider air strikes under 34A for the present.
3. We should promptly discuss with tht: Government of Laos
plans for limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor
areas of Laos, together with Lao air strikes and possible
use of U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance. On the basis of these
discussions a decision on action will be taken, but it should be
recognized that these operations will in any case have only
limited effect.
4. We should be prepared to respond as appropriate against the
DRV in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any special
DRV Ive action against SVN.
5. The results of these decisions will be kept under constant
review, and recommendations for changes or modifications or
additions will be promptly considered.
6. The President reemphasizes the importance of economic and
political actions having immediate impact in South Vietnam, such
as pay raises for civilian personnel and spot projects in the cities
and selected rural areas. The President emphasizes again that no
activity of this kind should be delayed in any way by any feeling
that our resources for these purposes are restricted. We can find
the money which is needed for all worthwhile projects in this
field. He expects that Ambassador Taylor and the country team
will take most prompt and energetic action in this field.
7. These decisions are governed by a prevailing judgment that
the first order of business at present is to take actions which will
help to strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam;
to the extent that the situation permits, such action should
precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at
any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken.
# 82
Report of Meeting of U.S. EnvoY8 to
Review Operation8 in Lao8
Excerpts from cablegram, signed by Ambassador Taylor,
from United States Embassy in Saigon to State Department,
Defense Department and Commander in Chief,
Pacific, Sept. 19, 1964.
369
Following is a summary, coordinated with Vientiane and Bangkok,
of the conclusions of the meeting of the three posts held at
Saigon September 11 to review air and limited ground operations
of the Lao corridor:
1. Air operations in conidor. This involves attack of 22
targets for which folders available at Vientiane and Saigon. If
objective is primarily military, i.e., to inflict maximum damage to
targets, to prevent VN /PL dispersal and protective measures, and
impede rapid. VN /PL riposte, it was agreed that a series of sharp,
heavy attacks must be made in a relatively short timespan, which
would involve substantial U.S. and/or VNAF /Farmgate attacks.
If objective primarily psychological, military disadvantages of
attacks over longer time frame would be acceptable and chief
reliance could be placed on RLAF T-28s with some Yankee team
strikes against harder targets, e.g., five bridges. Estimated sortie
requirements for this second option 188 T 28 sorties and 80
USAF sorties. Time required [number illegible] days. Vientiane
representatives believe Souvanna would [words illegible] would
probably wish [words illegible] such attacks spread out over considerable
period of time. Also felt Souvanna would prefer VNAF
not conduct air strikes in corridor. It was general consensus that
best division of targeting for immediate future would be RLAF /
YANKEE team mix.
Vientiane 'is very reluctant to see VNAF participation such
strikes and would hope that by keeping GVN informed of actions
being taken by RLAF and U.S. in corridor, psychological needs
of GVN could reasonably be met. Saigon will seek to do this, but
if there are compelling reasons for covert VNAF participation
Vientiane would be given prior info on necessity, timing, and
place of such strikes.
Alternatively, it was agreed that, if possible, joint Lao, Thai,
RVN, and U.S. participation in a common effort against a common
enemy would be desirable but, recognizing that, even if
possible, arrangements for such an effort would take some time
to achieve. If such negotiations are conducted, however, RLAF /
Yankee team strikes should not be precluded. Vientiane has since
stated it does not consider that it would be desirable to seek to
formalize such four country participation in corridor operations
as to do so would raise question of degree of Souvanna Phouma's
knowledge and involvement which Vientiane feels would jeopardize
success of operations.
2. Ground operations.
A. Although it was agreed that northern Route 9 area offered
most profitable targets, conference proceeded on assumption that
Vientiane would find operations astride Route 9 politically unacceptable
at this time. However, Vientiane's 448 to dept, dispatched
after return of conferees, now indicates that "shallow
penetration raids (20 kilometers) ... in Rte 9 area ... by
370
company-sized units" would be acceptable and would not require
clearance by the RLG ....
E. It was the view of Saigon group that authority for U.S.
advisors to accompany units is a prerequisite to successful operations.
Without this U.S. participation probability of success is
judged so low that the advisability of conducting cross border
operations would be questionable. Vientiane representatives were
strongly opposed to presence U.S. advisors because of difficulty
with current SAR operations in Laos and political importance of
U.S. maintaining credible stance of adhering to provisions Geneva
accords.
F. Embassy Vientiane had earlier indicated that they would
insist on advanced clearance of cross border operations. All representatives
agreed that this requirement would be met by Vientiane
having opportunity to comment on all plans submitted to Washington
for approval. Once approval to execute is received, Vientiane
would be kept informed of day-to-day operations as information
addressee on operational traffic between Saigon/Washington/
CINCP AC. ...
# 83
Cable Authorizing Air Strikes on Laos
Infiltration Routes
Cablegram from the State Department and the Defense
Department to the United States Embassy in Vientiane,
Oct. 6, 1964. Copies of the cablegram were sent to the
United States Embassies in Saigon and Bangkok and to the
commander in chief of Pacific forces. The embassy in
Saigon was asked to relay the message to the United States
commander in Vietnam.
You are authorized to urge the RLG to begin air attacks against
Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle
by RLAF T-28 aircraft as soon as possible. Such strikes should
be spread out over a period of several weeks, and targets should
be limited to those deemed suitable for attack by T-28s and listed
Para. 8 Vientiane's 581, excluding Mu Gia pass and any target
which Lao will not hit without U.S. air cover or fire support since
decision this matter not yet made.
You are further authorized to inform Lao that YANKEE
TEAM suppressive fire strikes against certain difficult targets in
Panhandle, interspersing with further T-28 strikes, are part of the
over-all concept and are to be anticipated later but that such U.S.
strikes are not repeat not authorized at this time.
Report soonest proposed schedule of strikes and, upon implementation,
all actual commitments of RLG T-28s, including
371
targets attacked, results achieved, and enemy opposition. Also
give us any views in addition to those in Vientiane's 581 as to any
targets which are deemed too difficult for RLG air strikes and on
which U.S. suppressive strikes desired.
FYI: Highest levels have not authorized YANKEE TEAM
strikes at this time against Route 7 targets. Since we wish to avoid
the impression that we are taking first step in escalation, we inclined
defer decision on Route 7 strikes until we have strong
evidence Hanoi's preparation for new attack in PDJ, some of
which might come from RLAF operations over the Route. END
FYI.
You may inform RLG, however, that U.S. witI fly additional
RECCE over Route 7 to keep current on use being made of the
Route by the PL and to identify Route 7 targets and air defenses.
The subject of possible decision to conduct strikes on Route 7
being given study in Washington.
FYI: Cross border ground operations not repeat not authorized
at this time.
# 84
William Bundy Draft on Handling World
and Public Opinion
Draft section of a paper, "Conditions for "Action and
Key Actions Surrounding Any Decision," by Assistant Secretary
of State Bundy, Nov. 5, 1964.
1. Bien Hoa may be repeated at any time. This would tend to
force our hand, but would also give us a good springboard for
any decision for stronger action. The President is clearly thinking
in terms of maximum use of a Gulf of Tonkin rationale, either
for an action that would show toughness and hold the line till
we can decide the big issue, or as a basis for starting a clear
course of action under the broad options.
2. Congress must be consulted before any major action, perhaps
only by notification if we do a reprisal against another Bien
Hoa, but preferably by careful talks with such key leaders as
Mansfield, Dirksen, the Speaker, Albert, Halleck, Fulbright,
Hickenlooper, Morgan, Mrs. Bolton, Russell, Salton stall, Rivers,
(Vinson?), Arends, Ford, etc. He probably should wait till his
mind is moving clearly in one direction before such a consultation,
which would point to some time next week. Query if it
should be combined with other topics (budget?) to lessen the
heat.
3. We probably do not need additional Congressional authority,
even if we decide on very strong action. A session of this rump
Congress might well be the scene of a messy Republican effort.
372
4. We are on the verge of intelligence agreement that infiltration
has in fact mounted, and Saigon is urging that we surface
this by the end of the week or early next week. Query how loud
we want to make this sound. Actually Grose in the Times had
the new estimate on Monday; so the splash and sense of hot new
news may be less. We should decide this today if possible ....
In general, we all feel the problem of proving North Vietnamese
participation is less than in the past, but we should have the
Jorden Report updated for use as necessary.
5. A Presidential statement with the rationale for action is high
on any check list. An intervening fairly strong Presidential noise
to prepare a climate for an action statement is probably indicated
and would be important in any event to counter any SVN fears
. of a softening in our policy. We should decide the latter today
too if possible.
6. Secretary Rusk is talking today to Dobrynin. For more direct
communication Seaborn can be revved up to go up the 15th if we
think it wise. He is not going anyway, and we could probably
hold him back so that the absence of any message was not itself
a signal.
7. Our international soundings appear to divide as follows:
a. We should probably consult with the U.K., Australia, New
Zealand, and possibly Thailand before we reach a decision. We
would hope for firm moral support from the U.K. and for participation
in at least token form from the others.
b. SEATO as a body should be consulted concurrently with
stronger action. We should consult the Philippines a day or so
before such action but not necessarily before we have made up
our minds.
c. The NATO Council should be notified on the Cuban model,
i.e., concurrently, by a distinguished representative.
d. For negative reasons, France probably deserves VIP treatment
also.
e. In the UN, we must be ready with an immediate affirmative
presentation of our rationale to proceed concurrently either with
a single reprisal action or with the initiation of a broader course
of action.
f. World-wide, we should select reasonably friendly chiefs of
state for special treatment seeking their sympathy and support,
and should arm all our representatives with the rationale and
defense of our action whether individual reprisal or broader.
8. USIA must be brought into the planning process not later
than early next week, so that it is getting the right kind of materials
ready for all our information media, on a contingency basis.
The same [word illegible] true of CIA's outlets.
373
# 85
McNaughton's November Draft on
Vietnam Aims and Choices
Second draft of a paper, "Action for South Vietnam," by
Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, Nov. 6, 1964.
1. U.S. aims:
(a) To protect U.S. reputation as a counter-subversion
guarantor.
(b) To avoid domino effect especially in Southeast Asia.
(c) To keep South Vietnamese territory from Red hands.
(d) To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from
methods.
2. Present situation:
The situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating. Unless new
actions are taken, the new government will probably be unstable
and ineffectual, and the VC will probably continue to extend their
hold over the population and territory. It can be expected that,
soon (6 months? two years?), (a) government officials at all
levels will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over,
(b) defections of significant military forces will take place, (c)
whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to
the GVN, (d) neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the
government, (e) a popular front regime will emerge which will
invite the U.S. out, and (f) fundamental concessions to the VC
and accommodations to the DRV will put South Vietnam behind
the Curtain.
3. Urgency:
"Bien Hoa" having passed, no urgent decision is required regarding
military action against the DRV, but (a) such a decision,
related to the general deteriorating situation in South Vietnam,
should be made soon, and (b) in the event of another VC or
DRV "spectacular," a decision (for at least a reprisal) would be
urgently needed.
4. Inside South Vietnam:
Progress inside SVN is important, but it is unlikely despite our
best ideas and efforts (and progress, if made, will take at least
several months). Nevertheless, whatever other actions might be
taken, great efforts should be made within South Vietnam: (a) to
strengthen the government, its bureaucracy, and its civil-military
coordination and planning, (b) to dampen ethnic, religious, urban
and civil-military strife by a broad and positive GVN program
designed (with U.S. Team help) to enlist the support of important
groups, and (c) to press the pacification program in the
countryside.
5. Action against DRV:
Action against North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute
374
for strengthening the government in South Vietnam. That is, a less
active VC (on orders from DRV) can be matched by a less
efficient GVN. We therefore should consider squeezing North
Vietnam.
6. Options open to us:
We have three options open to us (all envision reprisals in the
DRV for DRV /VC "spectaculars" against GVN as well as U.S.
assets in South Vietnam).
OPTION A. Continue present policies. Maximum assistance
within SVN and limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN
covertly against North Vietnam. The aim of any reprisal actions
would be to deter and punish large VC actions in the South, but
not to a degree that would create strong international negotiating
pressures. Basic to this option is the continued rejection of
negotiating in the hope that the situation will improve.
OPTION B. Fast full squeeze. Present policies plus a systematic
program of military pressures against the north, meshing at some
point with negotiation, but with pressure actions to be continued
at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption until we achieve
our central present objectives.
OPTION C. Progressive squeeze-and-talk. Present policies plus
an orchestration of communications with Hanoi and a crescendo
of additional military moves against infiltration targets, first in
Laos and then in the DRV, and then against other targets in
North Vietnam. The scenario would be designed to give the U.S.
the option at any point to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and
to quicken the pace or not. The decision in these regards would
be made from time to time in view of all relevant factors.
7. Analysis of OPTION A
(To be provided)
8. Analysis of OPTION B
(To be provided)
9. Analysis of OPTION C
(a) Military actions. Present policy, in addition to providing
for reprisals in DRV for DRV actions against the U.S., envisions
(l) 34A Airops and Marops, (2) deSoto patrols, for intelligence
purposes, (3) South Vietnamese shallow ground actions in Laos
when practicable, and (4) T28 strikes against infiltration-associated
targets in Laos. Additional actions should be:
PHASE ONE (in addition to reprisals in DRV for VC "spectaculars"
in South Vietnam): (5) U.S. strikes against infiltration associated
targets in Laos.
PHASE TWO (in addition to reprisals in DRV against broader
range of VC actions): (6) Low-level reconnaissance in southern
DRV, (7) U.S./VNAF strikes against infiltration-associated targets
in southern DRV.
PHASE THREE: Either continue only the above actions or
add one or more of the following, making timely deployment of
U.S. forces: (8) Aerial mining of DRV ports, (9) Naval quarantine of DRV, and (10) U.S./VNAF, in "crescendo," strike additional
targets on "94 target list."
South Vietnamese forces should play a role in any action taken
against the DRV.
(b) Political actions. Establish immediately a channel for bilateral
U.S.-DRV communication. This could be in Warsaw or
via Seaborn in Hanoi. Hanoi should be told that we do not seek
to destroy North Vietnam or to acquire a colony or base, but
that North Vietnam must:
( 1) Stop training and sending personnel to wage war in SVN
and Laos.
(2) Stop sending arms and supplies to SVN and Laos.
(3) Stop directing and controlling military actions in SVN and
Laos.
(4) Order the VC and PL to stop their insurgencies and military
actions.
(5) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.
(6) Stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam.
[(7) See that VC and PL stop attacks and incidents in SVN
and Laos?]
[( 8) See that VC and PL cease resistance to government
forces?]
[(9) See that VC and PL turn in weapons and relinquish
bases?]
[(10) See that VC and PL surrender for amnesty of expatriation
?]
U.S. demands should be accompanied by offers (1) to arrange
a rice-barter deal between two halves of Vietnam and (2) to
withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam for so long as the
terms are complied with.
We should not seek wider negotiations-in the UN, in Geneva,
etc.-but we should evaluate and pass on each negotiating opportunity
as it is pressed on us.
(c) Information actions. The start of military actions against
the DRV will have to be accompanied by a convincing world-wide
public information program. (The information problem will be
easier if the first U.S. action against the DRV is related in time
and kind to a DRV or VC outrage or "spectacular," preferably
against SVN as well as U.S. assets.)
(d) VS/DRV /Chicom-USSR reactions. (To be elaborated
later.) The DRV and China will probably not invade South Vietnam,
Laos or Burma, nor is it likely that they will conduct air
strikes on these countries. The USSR will almost certainly confine
herself to political actions. If the DRV or China strike or invade
South Vietnam, U.S. forces will be sufficient to handle the
problem.
(e) GVN Reactions. Military action against the DRV could be
counterproductive in South Vietnam because (1) the VC could
step up its activities, (2) the South Vietnamese could panic, (3)
they could resent our striking their "brothers," and (4) they could
376
tire of waiting for results. Should South Vietnam disintegrate
completely beneath us, we should try to hold it together long
enough to permit us to try to evacuate our forces and to convince
the world to accept the uniqueness (and congenital impossibility)
of the South Vietnamese case.
(f) Allied and neutral reactions. (To be elaborated later.) (l)
Even if OPTION C failed, it would, by demonstrating U.S. willingness
to go to the mat, tend to bolster allied confidence in the
U.S. as an ally. (2) U.S. military action against the DRV will
probably prompt military actions elsewhere in the world--e.g.,
Indonesia against Malaysia or Timor, or Turkey against Cyprus.
# 86
View of Chiefs' Representative on
Options Band C
Memorandum from Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin of the
staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Assistant Secretary
Bundy as chairman of the Working Group on Southeast
Asia, Nov. 14, 1964. The memorandum was headed "Additional
Material for Project on Courses of Action in Southeast
Asia."
References: a. Your memorandum of 13 November 1964 to the
NSC Working Group
b. JCSM 902-64, dated 27 October 1964
c. JCSM 933-64, dated 4 November 1964
d. JCSM 955-64, dated 14 November 1964
1. Reference a requests JCS views spelling out Option "B" as a
preferred alternative, with something like Option "C" as a fallback
alternative. Because of the way in which formal JCS views
in the premises have been developed and expressed, this requires
some degree of interpretation.
2. Reference b is the most recent recommendation by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for courses of action with respect to South Vietnam,
framed in context of initiation "in cold blood." Various JCS
papers, the most recent dated 22 October 1964, identify the corresponding
recommendations with respect to Laos. Reference b
specifically identifies certain of its listed actions to begin now,
with the balance of them "implemented as required, to achieve
U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia."
3. Reference c formalized the most recent JCS recommendation
for reprisal (hot blood) actions and reference d provided an
analysis of DRV /CHICOM reactions to these strikes, and the
probable results thereof. The proposed actions are essentially the
same as in reference c except for the principal difference that the
377
"hot blood" actions are initiated at a substantial higher level of
military activity.
4. Only in that the courses of action in either of these sets of
documents can be completed in minimum time consistent with
proper conduct of military operations do they match Option "B"
as defined for purposes of the NSC Working Group study. The
distinction is that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the capability
for pursuing Option "B" as defined, they have not explicitly
recommended that the operations be conducted on a basis necessarily
that inflexible. All implementing plans do in fact explicitly
recognize a controlled phase which would permit suspension
whenever desired by national authority.
5. I believe my draft contribution to PART VI provides a
reasonable application of the JCS recommendations to Option "B"
as defined for the study, but this does not mean that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have recommended Option "B" as defined in the
study.
6. There is in an advanced state of completion a JCS fall-back
recommendation for a course of action which, subject to possible
further modifications by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide
essentially the same military actions listed in my draft input to
PART VII. These include the same military actions listed in the
above, but without the stress upon starting forthwith, and with
more specific emphasis on some extension of the over-all time for
execution of the complete list. Thus it imposes what amount to
some arbitrary delays, which would provide additional intervals
for diplomatic exchanges.
7. Because of the time delays which it reflects, it is specifically
the JCS fall-back position.
8. For information, the analysis in reference d develops and
supports the conclusion that the United States and its Allies can
deal adequately with any course of action the DRV and/or CHICOMS
decide to pursue. You may note that this conclusion is
developed in the context of the most intense of all courses of
action prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This reflects a position
less pessimistic than some which have appeared in project
drafts.
9. A final overall comment by the Joint Staff member of the
Working Group:
We recognize quite clearly that any effective military action
taken by the United States will generate a hue and cry in various
quarters. The influence that this kind of "pressure" may have
upon the United States acting in support of its national interests
will be no more than what we choose to permit it to be. There
are repeated expressions in various project draft materials indicating
that this influence will necessarily be great. We do not
agree. There are too many current examples of countries acting
in what they presumably believe to be their own [word illegible]
self-interest, in utter disregard for "world opinion," for us to
accept the position that the United States must at all times con-
378
duct all its affairs on the basis of a world popularity contest. In
short, we believe that certain strong U.S. actions are required in
Southeast Asia, that we must take them regardless of opinion in
various other quarters, and that results of our failing to take them
would be substantially more serious to the United States than
would be any results of world opinions if we did take them. And
as far as that goes, we do not believe that if we took the necessary
actions the adverse pressures from other countries would prove to
be very serious after all-at least from countries that matter to us.
# 87
Taylor's Briefing of Key Officials on
Situation in November '64
Excerpts from prepared briefing by Ambassador Taylor,
"The Current Situation in South Vietnam-November,
1964," delivered to the "principals"-the senior officials to
whom the Southeast Asia working group reported-at a
Washington meeting on Nov. 27, 1964.
After a year of changing and ineffective government, the
counter-insurgency program country-wide is bogged down and will
require heroic treatment to assure revival. Even in the Saigon
area, in spite of the planning and the special treatment accorded
the Hop Tac plan, this area also is lagging. The northern provinces
of South Viet-Nam which a year ago were considered almost
free of Viet-Cong are now in deep trouble. In the Quang Ngai-
Binh Dinh area, the gains of the Viet-Cong have been so serious
that once more we are threatened with a partition of the country
by a Viet-Cong salient driven to the sea. The pressure on this area
has been accompanied by continuous sabotage of the railroad and
of Highway 1 which in combination threaten an economic strangulation
of northern provinces.
This deterioration of the pacification program has taken place
in spite of the very heavy losses inflicted almost daily on the
Viet-Cong and the increase in strength and professional competence
of the Armed Forces of South Viet-Nam. Not only have the
Viet-Cong apparently made good their losses, but of late, have
demonstrated three new or newly expanded tactics: the use of
stand-off mortar fire against important targets, as in the attack on
the Bien Hoa airfield; economic strangulation on limited areas;
finally, the stepped-up infiltration of DRV military personnel
moving from the north. These new or improved tactics employed
against the background of general deterioration offer a serious
threat to the pacification program in general and to the safety of
important bases and installations in particular.
Perhaps more serious than the downward trend in the pacification situation, because it is the prime cause, is the continued weakness
of the central government. Although the Huong government
has been installed after executing faithfully and successfully the
program laid out by the Khanh government for its own replacement,
the chances for the long life and effective performance of
the new line-up appear small. Indeed, in view of the factionalism
existing in Saigon and elsewhere throughout the country it is
impossible to foresee a stable and effective government under any
name in anything like the near future. Nonetheless, we do draw
some encouragement from the character and seriousness of purpose
of Prime Minister Huong and his cabinet and the apparent
intention of General Khanh to keep the Army out of politics, at
least for the time being.
As our programs plod along or mark time, we sense the mounting
feeling of war weariness and hopelessness which pervade
South Viet-Nam, particularly in the urban areas. Although the
provinces for the most part appear steadfast, undoubtedly there
is chronic discouragement there as well as in the cities. Although
the military leaders have not talked recently with much conviction
about the need for "marching North," assuredly many of
them are convinced that some new and drastic action must be
taken to reverse the present trends and to offer hope of ending
the insurgency in some finite time.
The causes for the present unsatisfactory situation are not hard
to find. It stems from two primary causes, both already mentioned
above, the continued ineffectiveness of the central government,
and the other, the increasing strength and effectiveness of the
Viet-Cong and their ability to replace losses.
While, in view of the historical record of South Viet-Nam, it is
not surprising to have these governmental difficulties, this chronic
weakness is a critical liability to future plans. Without an effective
central government with which to mesh the U.S. effort the latter
is a spinning wheel unable to transmit impulsion to the machinery
of the GVN. While the most critical governmental weaknesses
are in Saigon, they are duplicated to a degree in the provinces.
It is most difficult to find adequate provincial chiefs and supporting
administrative personnel to carry forward the complex programs
which are required in the field for successful pacification.
It is true that when one regards the limited background of the
provincial chiefs and their associates, one should perhaps be
surprised by the results which they have accomplished, but unfortunately,
these results are generally not adequate for the complex
task at hand or for the time schedule which we would like
to establish.
As the past history of this country shows, there seems to be a
national attribute which makes for factionalism and limits the
development of a truly national spirit. Whether this tendency is
innate or a development growing out of the conditions of political
suppression under which successive generations have lived is hard
to determine. But it is an inescapable fact that there is no national
380
tendency toward team play or mutual loyalty to be found among
many of the leaders and political groups within South Viet-Nam.
Given time, many of these [words illegible] undoubtedly change
for the better, but we are unfortunately pressed for time and
unhappily perceive no short term solution for the establishment of
stable and sound government.
The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units
and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this
guerrilla war. We are aware of the recruiting methods by which
local boys are induced or compelled to join the Viet-Cong ranks
and have some general appreciation of the amount of infiltration
personnel from the outside. Yet taking both of these sources into
account, we still find no plausible explanation of the continued
strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even
approximately correct. Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the
recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing
ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found
evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded
in captured Viet-Cong documents.
Undoubtedly one cause for the growing strength of the Viet·
Cong is the increased direction and support of their campaign by
the government of North Viet-Nam. This direction and support
take the form of endless radioed orders and instructions, and the
continuous dispatch to South Viet-Nam of trained cadre and military
equipment over infiltration routes by land and by water.
While in the aggregate, this contribution to the guerrilla campaign
over the years must represent a serious drain on the resources of
the DRV, that government shows no sign of relaxing its support
of the Viet-Congo In fact, the evidence points to an increased
contribution over the last year, a plausible development, since one
would expect the DRV to press hard to exploit the obvious internal
weaknesses in the south.
If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South
Viet-Nam, it is high time we change and find a better way. To
change the situation, it is quite clear that we need to do three
things: first, establish an adequate government in SVN; second,
improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; and
finally, persuade or force the DRV to stop its aid to the Viet-Cong
and to use its directive powers to make the Viet-Cong desist from
their efforts to overthrow the government of South Viet-Nam ....
In bringing military pressure to bear on North Viet-Nam, there
are a number of variations which are possible. At the bottom of
the ladder of escalation, we have the initiation of intensified
covert operations, anti-infiltration attacks in Laos, and reprisal
bombings mentioned above as a means for stiffening South Vietnamese
morale. From this level of operations, we could begin to
escalate progressively by attacking appropriate targets in North
Viet-Nam. If we justified our action primarily upon the need to
reduce infiltration, it would be natural to direct these attacks on
infiltration-related targets such as staging areas, training facilities,
381
communications centers and the like. The tempo and weight of
the attacks could be varied according to the effects sought. In its
final forms, this kind of attack could extend to the destruction of
all important fixed targets in North Viet-Nam and to the interdiction
of movement on all lines of communication .
. . . We reach the point where a decision must be taken as to
what course or courses of action we should undertake to change
the tide which is running against us. It seems perfectly clear that
we must work to the maximum to make something out of the
present Huong government or any successor thereto. While doing
so, we must be thinking constantly of what we would do if our
efforts are unsuccessful and the government collapses. Concurrently,
we should stay on the present in-country program, intensifying
it as possible in proportion to the current capabilities of the
government. To bolster the local morale and restrain the Viet-
Cong during this period, we should step up the 34-A operations,
engage in bombing attacks and armed recce in the Laotian corridor
and undertake reprisal bombing as required. It will be important
that United States forces take part in the Laotian operations
in order to demonstrate to South Viet-Nam our willingness to
share in the risks of attacking the North.
If this course of action is inadequate, and the government falls
then we must start over again or try a new approach. At this
moment, it is premature to say exactly what these new measures
should be. In any case, we should be prepared for emergency
military action against the North if only to shore up a collapsing
situation.
If, on the other hand as we hope, the government maintains
and proves itself, then we should be prepared to embark on a
methodical program of mounting air attacks in order to accomplish
our pressure objectives vis-a-vis the DRV and at the same
time do our best to improve in-country pacification program. We
will leave negotiation initiatives to Hanoi. Throughout this period,
our guard must be up in the Western Pacific, ready for any reaction
by the DRV or of Red China. Annex I suggests the train
of events which we might set in motion ....
# 88
Final Draft Position Paper Produced
by Working Group
"Draft Position Paper on Southeast Asia" circulated to
the principal top-level officials concerned, Nov. 29, 1964.
The draft was accompanied by a memorandum from William
Bundy saying: "I attach a draft action paper for review
at the meeting at 1:30 on Monday in Secretary Rusk's conference
room. Secretary Rusk has generally approved the
382
format of these papers, and they have been given a preliminary
review for substance by Ambassador Taylor and
Messrs. McNaughton and Forrestal. However, I am necessarily
responsible for the way they are now drafted." The
Pentagon study says this paper was originally a draft
national security action memorandum but that it was
changed to a draft position paper at the instructions of the
principals. Words and phrases that were deleted from the
final version are shown in italics. Handwritten interpolations
or revisions are shown in double parentheses.
I. CONCEPT
A. V.S. objectives in South Vietnam (SVN) are unchanged.
They are to:
1. Get Hanoi and North Vietnam (DRV) support and direction
removed from South Vietnam, and, to the extent possible, obtain
DRV cooperation in ending Viet Cong (VC) operations in SVN.
2. Re-establish an independent and secure South Vietnam with
appropriate international safeguards, including the freedom to
accept V.S. and other external assistance as required.
3. Maintain the security of other non-Communist nations in
Southeast Asia including specifically the maintenance and observance
of Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.
B. We will continue to press the South Vietnamese Government
(GVN) in every possible way to make the government itself more
effective and to push forward with the pacification program.
C. We will join at once with the South Vietnamese and Lao
Governments in a determined action program aimed at DRV
activities in both countries and designed to help GVN morale and
to increase the costs and strain on Hanoi, foreshadowing still
greater pressures to come. Vnder this program the first phase
actions « ( see TAB D) » within the next thirty days will be
intensified forms of action already under way, plus (1) V .S. armed
reconnaissance strikes in Laos, and already under way, plus (1)
V.S. armed reconnaissance strikes in Laos, and (2) GVN and
possible V.S. air strikes against the DRV, as reprisals against any
major or spectacular Viet Cong action in the south, whether
against V.S. personnel and installations or not.
D. Beyond the thirty-day period, first phase actions may be
continued without change, or additional military measures may
be taken including the withdrawal of dependents and the possible
initiation of strikes a short distance across the border against the
infiltration routes from the DRV. In the later case this would
become a transitional phase. «Be prepared to stop flow of dependents
to SVN at [illegible word] time we start air strikes in
force.) )
E. Thereafter, if the GVN improves its effectiveness to an
acceptable degree and Hanoi does not yield on acceptable terms,
or if the GVN can only be kept going by stronger action the U.S.
383
is prepared-at a time to be determined-to enter into a second
phase program, in support of the GVN and RLG, of graduated
military pressures directed systematically against the DRV. Such
a program would consist principally of progressively more serious
air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation as it
develops (possibly running from two to six months). Targets in
the DRV would start with infiltration targets south of the 19th
parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could
eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major
military-related targets, aerial mining of DRV ports, and a U.S.
naval blockade of the DRV. The whole sequence of military
actions would be designed to give the impression of a steady,
deliberate approach, and to give the U.S. the option at any time
(subject to enemy reaction) to proceed or not, to escalate or not,
and to quicken the pace or not. Concurrently, the U.S. would be
alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to
explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an
acceptable manner. The U.S. would seek to control any negotiations
and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts
to negotiate.
HEADING ILLEGmLE
A. A White House statement will be issued following the
meeting with Ambassador Taylor, with the text as in Tab B,
attached.
B. Ambassador Taylor will consult with the GVN promptly on
his return, making a general presentation «in accordance with the
draft instructions» as stated in Tab B, attached. He will further
press for the adoption of specific measures as listed in the Annex
to Tab B.
C. At the earliest feasible date, we will publicize the evidence
of increased DRV infiltration. This action will be coordinated by
Mr. Chester Cooper in order to insure that the evidence is sound
and that senior government officials who have testified on this
subject in the past are in a position to defend and explain the
differences between the present estimates and those given in the
past. The publicizing will take four forms:
1. An on-the-record presentation to the press in Washington,
concurrently with an on-the-record or background presentation to
the press in Saigon.
2. Available Congressional leaders will be given special briefings.
(No special leadership meeting will be convened for this
purpose.)
3. The Ambassadors of key allied nations will be given special
briefiings.
4. A written report will be prepared and published within the
next ten days giving greater depth and background to the evidence.
D. Laos and Thailand
The US Ambassadors in these countries will inform the government leaders ((in general terms» of the concept we propose
to follow and of specific actions requiring their concurrence or
participation. In the case of Laos, we will obtain RLG approval
of an intensified program of ((U.S. armed» reconnaissance
strikes both in the Panhandle area of Laos and along the key
infiltration routes in central Laos. These actions will not be publicized
except to the degree approved by the RLG. It is important,
however, for purposes of morale in SV, that their existence be
generally known.
Thailand will be asked to support our program fully, to intensify
its own efforts in the north and northeast, and to give further
support to operations in Laos, such as additional pilots and
possibly artillery teams.
E. Key Allies
We will consult immediately with the UK, ((DC» Australia,
New Zealand, ((Bundy» and the Philippines. ((Humphrey?»
1. UK. The President will explain the concept and proposed
actions fully to Prime Minister Wilson, seeking full British support,
but without asking for any additional British contribution
in view of the British role in Malaysia.
2. Australia and New Zealand will be pressed through their
Ambassadors, not only for support but for additional contributions.
3. The Philippines will be particularly pressed for contributions
along the lines of the program for approximately 1800 men
already submitted to President MacapagaI.
F. We will press generally for more third country aid, stressing
the gravity of the situation and our deepening concern. A summary
of existing third country aid and of the types of aid that
might now be obtained is in Tab C, attached.
G. Communist Countries
1. We will convey to Hanoi our unchanged determination
((and» our objectives, and that we have a growing concern at
the DRV role, to see if there is any sign of change in Hanoi's
position.
2. We will make no special approaches to Communist China
in this period.
3. We will convey our determination and grave concern to
the Soviets, not in the expectation of any change in their position
but in effect to warn them to stay out, and with some hope
they will pass on the message to Hanoi and Peiping.
H. Other Countries
1. We will convey our grave concern to key interested governments
such as Canada, India, and France, but avoid spelling out
the concept fully.
2. In the event of a reprisal action, will explain and defend our
action in the UN as at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
We do not plan to raise the issue otherwise in the UN. (The Lao
Government may stress the DRV infiltration in Laos in its speech,
and we should support this and spread the information.)
385
I. Intensified Military Actions
1. The GVN maritime operations (MAROPS) will be intensified,
((including U.S. air protection of GVN vessels from attacks
by MIGs or DRV surface vessels)) and we will urge the GVN to
surface and defend these as wholly justified in response to the
wholly illegal DRV actions.
2. Lao air operations will be intensified, especially in the corridor
areas and close to the DRV border. U.S. air cover and flak
suppression will «may» be supplied where «if) needed.
3. U.S. high-level reconnaissance over the DRV will be stepped
up.
4. U.S. armed «air» reconnaissance «and air» strikes will
be carried out in Laos, first against the corridor area and within
a short time against Route 7 and other infiltration routes, in a
major operation to cut key bridges. (These actions will be publicized
only to the degree agreed with Souvanna.) «At this time
we prepare to stop flow of dependents to V.N.»
J. Reprisal Actions.
For any VC provocation similar to the following, a reprisal will
be undertaken, preferably with 24 hours, against one or more
selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces will be used to the
maximum extent, supplemented as necessary by U.S. forces. The
exact reprisal will be decided at the time, in accordance with a
quick-reaction procedure which will be worked out.
The following may be appropriate occasions for reprisals, but
we should be alert for any appropriate occasion.
1. Attacks on airfields.
2. Attack on Saigon.
3. Attacks on provincial or district capitals.
4. Major attacks on U.S. citizens.
5. Attacks on major POL facilities.
«expand) )
6. Attacks on bridges and railroad lines after the presently
damaged facilities have been restored and warning given.
7. Other "spectaculars" such as earlier attack on a U.S. transport
carrier at a pier in Saigon.
In these or similar cases, the reprisal action would be linked
as directly as possibly to DRV infiltration, so that we have a
common threat of justification.
A flexible list of reprisal targets has been prepared running from
infiltration targets in the southern part of the DRV up to airfields,
ports, and naval bases also located south of the 19th parallel.
K. US/GVN joint planning will be initiated both for reprisal
actions and for possible later air strikes across the border into
the DRV.
L. Major statement or speech. Depending on U.S. public reaction,
a major statement or speech may be undertaken by the
President during this period. This will necessarily be required if a
reprisal action is taken, but some other significant action, such as
the stopping of the flow of U.S. dependents, might be the occasion.
386
Such a statement or speech would re-state our objectives and our
determination, why we are in South Vietnam, and how gravely
we view the situation. It should in any event follow the full publicizing
of infiltration evidence.
M. Dependents. The flow of dependents to South Vietnam will
be stopped [at an early date, probably immediately after Ambassador
Taylor has consulted with the GVN] [at the start of the
second phase], and this will be publicly announced.
N. Deferred ActioDS. «See TAB D»
The following actions will not be taken within the thirty-day
period, but will be considered for adoption in the transitional or
second phases of the program:
1. Major air deployment to the area.
2. Furnishing U.S. air cover for GVN MAROPS. «2» 3. (( Be required to resume» Resuming destroyer patrols
in the Gulf of Tonkin. If attacked, these would be an alternative
basis for reprisals, and should be considered primarily in this
light.
((5» 4. ((Be prepared to evacuate» Evacuation of U.S. dependents.
((3» 5. U.S. low-level reconnaissance into the DRV.
((4» 6. GVN/((LAO/)U.S. air strikes across the border
( (s) ), initially against the infiltration routes and installations and
then against other targets south of the 19th parallel.
NOTE
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend immediate initiation of
sharply intensified military pressures against the DRV, starting
with a sharp and early attack in force on the DRV, subsequent
to brief operations in Laos and U.S. low-level reconnaissance
north of the boundary to divert DRV attention prior to the attack
in force. This program would be designed to destroy in the first
three days Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, other airfields, and
major POL facilities, clearly to establish the fact that the U.S.
intends to use military force to the full limits of what military
force can contribute to achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia,
and to afford the GVN respite by curtailing DRV assistance to
and direction of the Viet Congo The follow-on-military program -- involving
armed reconnaissance of infiltration routes in Laos, air
strikes on infiltration targets in the DRV, and then progressive
strikes throughout North Vietnam--could be suspended short of
full destruction of the DRV if our objectives were earlier achieved.
The military program would be conducted rather swiftly, but the
tempo could be adjusted as needed to contribute to achieving our
objectives.
387
# 89
Account of Taylor's Meeting with Saigon
Generals on Unrest
Excerpts from Saigon airgram to the State Department,
Dec. 24, 1964, as provided in the body of the Pentagon
study. Ambassador Taylor and his deputy, U. Alexis Johnson,
met with the so-called Young Turk leaders, among
them Generals Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Van Thieu and
Nguyen Chanh Thi and an Admiral identified as Cang .
. . . AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand
English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the
understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you
all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were
tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is
because something is wrong with my French because you evidently
didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military
plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on
governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot
carry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for
this group? Do you have a spokesman?
GENERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I
do speak English. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this
action last night.
We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities,
we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty
years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability
until you have unity .... But still there are rumors of coups and
doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the
HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both
military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in
the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence.
Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he had received
from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Prime Minister
to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military
would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally
sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed
Forces Council unanimously recommended be retired in order to
improve unity in the Armed Forces.
GENERAL T~IEU: The HNC cannot be bosses because of
the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.
GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want
unity. It does not want to fight the Communists.
It has been rumored that our action of last night was an intrigue
of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we
seek to retire these generals? Because they had their chance and
did badly ....
388
Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We
reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to
arrest the bad members of the HNC, bad politicians, bad student
leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation,
which is a Communist organization. We must put the troublemaking
organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister
and the Chief of State to stay in office.
After we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference,
we would like to return to our fighting units. We have
no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed
Forces to support the struggle and a stable government. Chief of
State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also
agreed.
We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried
to have a civilian government clean house. If we have achieved it,
fine. We are now ready to go back to our units.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you
gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences
of what you have done. But first, would any of the other
officers wish to speak?
ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that we are being treated as
though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only
for the good of the country.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel
about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a
military coup that has destroyed the government-making process
that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall
largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.
You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military
are now back in power. You are up to your neck in politics.
Your statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves
again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee.
The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree
recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but
this recognition is something that you could withdraw. This will
be interpreted as a return of the military to power ....
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces?
General Khanh?
GENERAL KY: Yes, sir ...
GENERAL THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should be
noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special
situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force
General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders ...
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers be willing to
come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have
been impressed by the high quality of many Vietnamese officers.
I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in
uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was
being formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be
some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted.
389
It would therefore be natural for some of them now to be called
upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do
so? ...
GENERAL KY: Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the
military going back into the government right away. People will
say it is a military coup.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND AMBASSADOR JOHNSON:
(together) People will say it anyway ...
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter.
The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. Nobody
believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability
to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I
were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction
of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a
legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation
of a government with National Assembly ...
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime
Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC ...
GENERAL THIEU: What kind of concession does Huong
want from us?
Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.
GENERAL KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General
Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk.
GENERAL THIEU: After all, we did not arrest all the members
of the HNC. Of nine members we detained only five. These
people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled
residence . . .
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is
to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the
government will have to issue a communique.
GENERAL THIEU: We will still have a press conference this
afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did.
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the U.S.
side. I don't know whether we will continue to support you after
this. Why don't you tell your friends before you act? I regret the
need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake ...
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary
to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been
put off a day or two? ...
In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people
have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can
straighten out this mess.

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