| ANNEX A             
      445 
 Draft Proposal Handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on May 12
 (Washington time)
 
 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED  
      STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
 
 The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint
 responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
 disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
 
 Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
 sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
 deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be
 prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
 unfortunate consequences.
 
 It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may
 establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of
 an *entente cordiale* [*amicable understanding*], arrest, if not dispel,
 the tragic confusion, that now threatens to engulf civilization.
 
 For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
 and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
 instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
 agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in
 act.
 
 It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the
 pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be
 deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our
 respective Governments.
 
 Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
 harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
 or improved; to wit:
 
 1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
 
 3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
 
 4. Commerce between both nations.
 
 5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
 
 6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
 Pacific area.
 
 Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:
 
 I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge
 each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
 
 446             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as
 directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration
 of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
 
 Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,
 concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
 family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting
 responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
 processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
 welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
 not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
 oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.
 
 Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
 concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
 of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
 never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral
 principles and concepts.
 
 II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
 
 The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim
 to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour
 not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also
 speedily to restore peace in Europe.
 
 The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers
 was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not
 at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.
 
 The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military
 assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy
 will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the
 said Pact.
 
 The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward
 the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such
 aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another. The
 United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and
 accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue
 to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the
 protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
 
 III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
 
 The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles
 as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles set forth on the
 basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking
 Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and
 China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to
 establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall
 forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with
 Japan.
 
 IV. Commerce between both nations.
 
 When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by
 both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to
 mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or
 required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take
 necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           
      447
 
 relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and
 Navigation between the United States and Japan.
 
 V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
 Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the
 Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American
 cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural
 resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
 
 VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
 the Pacific area.
 
 a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the
 independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the
 Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The
 Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.
 
 b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable
 consideration on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom
 from discrimination.
 
 Addendum.
 
 The present Understanding shall be kept a confidential memorandum
 between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
 
 The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this
 Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
 
 ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT
 
 II. Par. 2.
 
 Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War.
 
 Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged but we
 desire to make it clearer by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long
 as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation as is
 mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.
 
 If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be
 important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this
 Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.
 
 III.
 
 China Affair.
 
 The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original
 Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as
 the "principles of Konoe." Practically, the one can be used to explain
 the other.
 
 We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document,
 that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chiang
 Kai-shek regime if Chiang Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the
 United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.
 
 If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a
 documents a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.
 
 The three principles of Prince Konoe as referred to in this paragraph
 are:
 
 1. Neighborly friendship;
 
 2. Joint defense against communism;
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         448
 
 3. Economic cooperation by which Japan does not intend to exercise
 economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the
 interests of Third Powers.
 
 The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:
 
 1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
 
 2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation
 cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus
 contributing to world peace;
 
 3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance
 with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
 
 4. No annexation, no indemnities;
 
 5. Independence of Manchoukuo.
 
 III.
 
 Immigration to China.
 
 The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been
 deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken
 impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past
 immigration legislation of the United States, that America is now taking
 a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in
 China.
 
 Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully
 understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.
 
 IV.
 
 Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations.
 
 (a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of
 disagreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to
 determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after an
 understanding has been reached and relations between our two countries
 improved; and after our present China commitments are eliminated. Then
 we will know the actual situation and can act accordingly.
 
 Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.
 
 This proposal, (b) of IV might better be made a subject of a separate
 memorandum. Particular care must be taken as to the timing, manner and
 scope of carrying out such a gesture.
 
 V.
 
 Gold Credit.
 
 The proposal in the second paragraph of V has been omitted for the same
 reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (a) and (c).
 
 VI.
 
 Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.
 
 The words, in the first paragraph, "without resorting to arms" have been
 deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the
 peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear on many
 occasions in various statements made both by the Premier and the Foreign
 Minister.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         449
 
 VIII. [VII]
 
 Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area.
 
 As the paragraph (a) implying military and treaty obligation would
 require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in
 both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this in the
 present Understanding.
 
 Paragraph (b) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has
 been altered for the same reason.
 
 In paragraph (c) [(d)] the words "and to the Southwestern Pacific Area"
 have been omitted because such questions should be settled, as necessity
 arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities in the
 Southwestern areas by the Government of the United States and of Japan
 respectively.
 
 Conference.
 
 The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We consider
 that it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a
 conference between the President and the Premier or between suitable
 representatives of theirs will be considered when both the United States
 and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference after taking into due
 consideration the effect resulting from the present Understanding.
 
 Announcement.
 
 In regard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion of
 the present Understanding a draft will be prepared in Tokio and cabled
 to Washington for the consideration of the United States Government.
 
 (Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 420-425.)
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           
      450
 ANNEX B
 
 Draft Proposal Handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura on June 21
 (Washington time)
 
 Unofficial, Exploratory And Without Commitment
 
 [WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1941.
 
 The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint
 responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
 of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption
 of traditional friendly relations.
 
 Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
 sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
 deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be
 prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
 unfortunate consequences.
 
 It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States
 and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and
 preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation
 of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not
 dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
 
 For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
 and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
 instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
 understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and
 in act.
 
 It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding
 should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory
 concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.
 
 Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
 harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
 or improved; to wit:
 
 1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
 
 3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
 
 4. Commerce between both nations.
 
 5 Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
 
 6 The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
 Pacific area.
 
 7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
 
 Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of
 Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of
 policy:
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      451
 
 I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward
 the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of
 reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.
 
 Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present
 concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
 family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord
 through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting
 responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
 processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
 welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
 not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
 oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.
 
 Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
 concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
 of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
 never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral
 principles and concepts.
 
 II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
 
 The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite
 Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the
 prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.
 
 The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward
 the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely
 and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its
 national security and the defense thereof.
 
 NOTE (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a
 substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of
 the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the United
 States draft of May 31, 1941.
 
 III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
 
 The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the
 United States the general terms within the framework of which the
 Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful
 settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the
 Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding
 neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories
 and with the practical application of those principles, the President of
 the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the
 Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation
 on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of
 hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.
 
 NOTE (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further
 discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic
 activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese
 territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and
 Japan. With regard to suggestions that the, language of Section III be
 changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can
 most advantageously be given
 
 452                  
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been
 satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can, be viewed
 as a whole.)
 
 IV. Commerce between both nations.
 
 When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by
 both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other
 mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and
 required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take
 necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established
 under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States
 and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it
 would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance
 with usual procedures.
 
 V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
 
 On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and
 American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful
 means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in
 international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the
 Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other
 toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United
 States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber,
 tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and
 development of its own economy.
 
 VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
 the Pacific area.
 
 Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this
 understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental
 purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance
 and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has
 territorial designs in the area mentioned.
 
 VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
 
 The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time
 as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with
 the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a
 treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine
 independence shall have been achieved.
 
 [Annex 1 to Annex B]
 
 ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
 
 III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
 
 The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:
 
 1. Neighborly friendship.
 
 2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities
 including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)
 Subject to further discussion.
 
 3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of
 letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of
 non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
 
 4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             
      453
 
 5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation
 cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus
 contributing to world Peace.
 
 6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as
 promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded
 between Japan and China.
 
 7. No annexation.
 
 8. No indemnities.
 
 9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.
 
 [Annex 2 to Annex B]
 
 ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
 
 IV. Commerce between both nations.
 
 It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan
 and the United States each shall permit export to the other of
 commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade,
 except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own
 purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned
 to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as
 restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both
 Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating
 relations with friendly nations.
 
 [Annex 3 to Annex B]
 
 SUGGESTED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE
 JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
 
 The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:
 
 EXCELLENCY: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered
 into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with
 regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war.
 During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of
 this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the
 attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the
 hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy
 were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special
 attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth
 fully the position of this Government upon this subject.
 
 I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude
 toward the European war but in order that there may be no
 misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to
 receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with
 regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in
 defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the
 Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require
 Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental
 objective of the present agreement, to establish and to preserve peace
 in the Pacific area.
 
 Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
 
 454             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:
 
 EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter of June .
 
 I wish to state that my Government is fully aware of the attitude of the
 Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as
 explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth
 in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my Government
 the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been
 explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and
 appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United
 States with regard to the European war.
 
 I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to
 the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to
 adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment
 requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the
 fundamental objective of the present agreement
 
 The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely
 assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no
 action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the
 Pacific area.
 
 Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished
 consideration.
 
 [Annex 4 to Annex B]
 
 SUGGESTED LETTER To BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
 JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION
 
 EXCELLENCY: In the informal conversations which resulted in the
 conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two
 Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and frankly views
 on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to applying to
 Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China the principle of non-
 discrimination in international commercial relations. It is believed
 that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to confirm the
 statements already expressed orally in the form of replies on the
 following points:
 
 1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China
 contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese
 Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights
 which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and
 Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the
 United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon
 the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan
 and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China
 Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their
 subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support
 may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that
 they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present
 circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?
 
 2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel
 by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      455
 
 under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government
 indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately
 upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations
 with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at
 later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of
 the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be
 effected?
 
 3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese
 Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating
 to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese
 Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which
 are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored
 regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after
 the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the
 above ends can in its opinion be carried out?
 
 It would be appreciated if as specific replies as possible could be made
 to the questions above listed.
 
 Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
 
 (Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 486-492.)
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK        
      456
 ANNEX C
 
 TEXT OF BASIC JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE WITH CHINA
 
 1. Neighborly friendship.
 
 2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
 
 3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.
 
 Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing
 communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a
 menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public
 order in China.
 
 Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the
 Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to
 above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.
 
 4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.
 
 The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for
 carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the
 settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which come under
 point 3.
 
 5. Economic cooperation.
 
 (a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having
 the development and utilization of essential materials for national
 defense in China as its principal objective.
 
 (b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic
 activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an
 equitable basis.
 
 6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei
 Government.
 
 7 No annexation.
 
 8 No indemnities.
 
 9. Recognition of Manchoukuo. (Ex. 29, Vol. II, p. 633)
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK      
      457
 ANNEX D
 
 Japanese Proposals Submitted to Secretary Hull on September 27
 
 (Washington time)
 
 The Governments of Japan and of the United States accent joint
 responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
 of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption
 of traditional friendly relations.
 
 Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
 sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
 deterioration of the amicable sentiment between their countries should
 be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
 unfortunate consequences.
 
 It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, by a cooperative
 effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward
 the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by
 the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world
 peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens
 to engulf civilization.
 
 For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
 and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
 instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
 understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and
 in act.
 
 It is the belief of both Governments that such an understanding should
 comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory
 concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.
 
 Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
 harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
 or improved; to wit:
 
 1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
 
 3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
 
 4. Commerce between both nations.
 
 5. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
 
 6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
 Pacific area.
 
 Accordingly, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
 States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration
 of policy:
 
 I. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting
 international relations and the character of nations.
 
 Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward
 the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a
 
 458             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of
 both countries.
 
 Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,
 concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
 family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord
 through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting a
 responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
 processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
 welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
 not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
 oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.
 
 Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
 concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
 of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
 never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral
 principles and concepts.
 
 II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
 
 Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in
 the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor
 jointly for the early restoration of world peace
 
 With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of
 world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by
 considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United
 States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide
 entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite
 Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what
 actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in
 accordance with the said interpretation.
 
 III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
 
 Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of
 the China Affair has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire
 Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to
 expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said Affair.
 
 The Government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the
 sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the
 peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention of
 facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices
 in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into
 negotiations with the Government of Japan for a termination of
 hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain
 from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the
 measures and efforts of the Government of Japan directed toward the
 settlement of the China Affair.
 
 The Government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace
 for the settlement of the China Affair will be in harmony with the
 principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and those agreements
 between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into
 effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic
 cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means
 and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the
 international commercial relations and also with
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         459
 
 the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between
 neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third Powers
 in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an
 equitable basis.
 
 NOTE: There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between
 Japan and China.
 
 IV. Commerce between Japan and the United States.
 
 Both Governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for
 resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.
 
 Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of
 the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue
 immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that
 they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively,
 available and required by either of them.
 
 V. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
 
 Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities
 of Japan and the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be
 carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of
 non-discrimination in the international commercial relations in
 pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both
 Governments agree to cooperate each with the other towards the creation
 of conditions of international trade and international investment under
 which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure
 through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and
 commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and
 development of its own economy.
 
 Both Governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and
 execution of agreements with the Powers concerned in regard to the
 production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such
 specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.
 
 VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
 the Pacific area.
 
 Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of
 vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the Southwestern
 Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which
 may jeopardize such stabilization. The Government of Japan will not make
 any armed advancement, using French Indochina as a base, to any adjacent
 area thereof (excluding China), and upon the establishment of an
 equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are
 now stationed in French Indochina.
 
 The Government of the United States will alleviate its military measures
 in the Southwestern Pacific area.
 
 Both Governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and
 territorial integrity of Thailand and Netherland East Indies, and that
 they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization
 of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved.
 
 The Government of the United States guarantees non-discriminatory
 treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.
 
 [Here follows text of basic terms of peace between Japan and China set
 forth in Annex C above.]
 
 (Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 637-640.)
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK       
      460
 ANNEX E
 
 (TEXT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE OF NOVEMBER
 26, 1941, AS INTERCEPTED AND DECODED IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO
 SECRETARY HULL BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADORS)
 
 (Part 1 of 14)
 
 MEMORANDUM
 
 1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
 amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order
 that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of
 the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world
 peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April
 last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment
 and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of
 the Pacific area.
 
 The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views,
 concerning the claims the American Government has persistently
 maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain
 have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
 
 2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the
 stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable
 all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
 
 Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part
 of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government
 has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted
 its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It
 was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri
 Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
 
 (Part 2 of 14)
 
 However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
 possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the
 establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering
 with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East
 Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing
 French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration
 to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these
 regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
 France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
 American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a
 threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government
 to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing
 economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously
 hostile attitude, these countries
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         461
 
 have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement
 of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very
 existence of the empire.
 
 (Part 3 of 14)
 
 Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan
 proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for
 a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering
 the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the
 Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
 agreement of view had been reached on fundamental  (75 letters 
      garbled)
 The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula
 proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration
 past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
 discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of
 view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
 moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal
 points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to
 reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to
 its original proposal failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit
 of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
 
 (Part 4 of 14)
 
 Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
 averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November
 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution
 of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its
 previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
 
 (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
 dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-
 China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
 
 (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the
 acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and
 commodities of which the two countries are in need.
 
 (3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations
 to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
 
 The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required
 quantity of oil.
 
 (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to
 measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration
 of general peace between Japan and China.
 
 (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
 in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan
 and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific
 area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern
 part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of
 the present agreement.
 
 462             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 (Part 5 of 14)
 
 As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its
 readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to
 act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously
 suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to
 do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when
 the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
 
 The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new
 proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang
 Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the
 offer of the President to act as the so called "Introducer" of peace
 between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it.
 Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese
 government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American
 government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a
 source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
 
 (Part 6 of 14)
 
 4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
 has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did
 its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible
 concessions often in spite of great difficulties.
 
 As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
 negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory
 attitude.
 
 As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce,
 advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed
 its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and
 declared that along with the actual Practice of this principle in the
 world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the
 Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no
 intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers
 pursued on an equitable basis.
 
 Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French
 Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned
 above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern
 French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
 
 (Part 7 of 14)
 
 It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost
 degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully
 appreciated by the American government.
 
 On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to
 theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its
 impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is
 difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the
 Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American
 government especially to the following points:
 
 1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
 principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the
 acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         463
 
 about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through
 recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of
 one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and
 imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose
 of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
 
 (Part 8 of 14)
 
 Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a
 basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the
 Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the
 world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of
 the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
 
 Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact
 between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet
 Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old
 concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of
 East Asia.
 
 The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
 governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded
 with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to
 conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the
 establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It
 is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to
 restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact
 when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
 it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
 
 (Part 9 of 14)
 
 The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may
 be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on
 the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is
 engaged. On the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to
 attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that
 are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is
 totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American
 Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through
 peaceful means.
 
 3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly
 upholds, objects to settling international issues through military
 pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other
 nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means
 of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at
 times more inhuman than military pressure.
 
 (Part 10 of 14)
 
 4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American
 Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great
 Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied
 not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a
 
 464             
      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
 
 fact of history that one countr (45 letters garbled or missing)  been
 compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of
 imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the  es to the prosperity 
      of
 the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the
 perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to
 Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its
 proper place in the world.
 
 (Part 11 of 14)
 
 The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
 Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American
 policy. That the six countries, Japan, the United States, Great Britain,
 The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake
 among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
 French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
 be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the
 governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a
 proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to
 the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be
 considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to
 the n (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of East
 Asia.
 
 (Part 12 of 14)
 
 5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
 China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional
 application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International
 Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to
 destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The
 attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support
 militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime
 at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking
 government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This
 demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
 above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chunking regime,
 demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to
 obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and
 the return of peace to East Asia.
 
 (Part 13 of 14)
 
 5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items
 such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade
 agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and
 stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of
 extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the
 proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the
 China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its
 honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
 government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
 negotiation.
 
 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            
      465
 
 6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
 negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the
 Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with Great Britain
 and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the
 American government. However, since the American government has made the
 proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with
 Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND*
 presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the
 questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that. All these countries
 are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
 
 (Part 14 of 14)
 
 7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
 with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
 toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
 East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and
 interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been
 revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus,
 the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
 relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through
 cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
 
 The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
 Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
 cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
 further negotiations.
 
 (Ex. 1, pp. 239-245)
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